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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

Lillian Hatheway sued her employer, the University of Idaho, for age discrimination,
hostile work environment, retaliation, constructive discharge and negligent int1iction of
emotional distress.

Ms. Hatheway, a 61-year-old Administrative Assistant in the English

Depaltment, was forced from her job after an express policy change at the University to recruit
young entry level employees to replace older workers, despite her previous exemplary reviews as
an "outstanding employee." Her work conditions dramatically worsened after complaining to
the University and the Human Rights Commission, which ultimately resulted in her departure
and this lawsuit. Despite Ms. Hatheway's evidence of the new "age" policy at the University,
direct comments and conduct from her supervisors relating to ageist attitudes towards her, and
the temporal connection with a drastic about-face on her employment evaluations and treatment,
the trial court impermissibly weighed the evidence and dismissed all of Ms. Hatheway's claims
on summary judgment. This appeal follows.
B.

Course of the Proceedings in the Hearing Below and its Disposition.

On October 22, 2008, Plaintiff-Appellant Lillian Hatheway filed a Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial against the Board of Regents of the University of Idaho, and the
University of Idaho, alleging four causes of action (which the District COUlt broke out into five
separate claims in its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment):
(1) age discrimination and hostile work environment under state law (the Idaho Human Rights

Act); (2) unlawful retaliation under state law (the Idaho Human Rights Act); (3) constructive
discharge; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Following extensive discovery in this case, on August 18,2011, the University of Idaho
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Ms. Hatheway's claims. In
response, Ms. Hatheway responded to the University's Motion for Summary Judgment,
submitting supporting affidavits from herself and Dr. Richard K. Howe. as well as deposition
testimony of Pamela Yenser. Kurt Olsson, Gordon Thomas, Robert Wrigley, Gary Williams,
Steve Chandler, Mary Blew. Mary Ann Judge. Ronald McFarland, and Jeffrey Jones.
Ms. Hatheway also brought forward discovery answers and responses from the University of
Idaho, as weJl as relevant documents including but not limited to her annual evaluations, e-mails,
and handwritten notes Ms. Hatheway took contemporaneously during her employment.

She

presented evidence as outlined below on her employment history, the abrupt about-face on her
performance the University took after its new "youth" policy was announced, and direct evidence
of negative comments and conduct of her superiors, all of which were temporally connected to
the new policy, and which were unconnected to her previously lauded performance.
Despite Plaintiffs evidence, on November 10, 2011, District Court Judge Brudie issued
his written Opinion and Order granting the University's Motion for Summary Judgment holding:
Age Discrimination Claim
(T]he Court must consider the third element of an age discrimination claim,
which requires a showing by Plaintiff that she was discharged or was
subjected to adverse decisions by her employer and, but for her age, the
discharge or adverse decisions would not have occurred. Defendants contend
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this element has not been met and is dispositive of her claim. The Court
agrees.
(R. Vol. III, p. 679)
Plaintiff Hatheway has failed to demonstrate she was constructively
discharged or received disparate treatment.

(R. Vol. III, p. 681)
(T]he Court is unable to find that a reasonable trier of fact could find she was
driven from the workplace or that her age played any role in her performance
evaluations.

(R. Vol. III, p. 682)
Ms. Hatheway has simply failed to demonstrate that age was a factor driving
Dr. Olsson's actions as required in order to establish a prima facie claim for
age discrimination.
(R. VoL III, p. 683)
Hostile Work Environment Claim
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate that she was subjected 10 age
discrimination and, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that her workplace
was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or
pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment.
The Court, after considering the record as a whole, is unable to find either
subjectively or objectively that a hostile work environment was created as a
result of age discrimination.

(R. Vol. III, p. 684)
Unlawful Retaliation Claim
There is no evidence no evidence that the University retaliated against her
because she engage in protected activities.

(R. Vol. III, p. 685)
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Constructive Discharge Claim
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate she was the subject of age
discrimination. The absence of such a showing is fatal to her claim for
constructive discharged [sic] based on age discrimination.
(R. Vol. III, p. 686)
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate the Defendants breached a duty owed
to her. There being no breach of duty shown. Ms. Hatheway's claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress thereby fails.
(R. Vol. III, p. 686)
In so holding, the District COUlt improperly applied the standards of review for a
discrimination claim on summary judgment, and improperly granted the University's Motion for
Summary Judgment, dismissing all of Ms. Hatheway's claims. Ms. Hatheway is appealing the
District Court's grant of complete summary judgment, and requests that the Idaho Supreme
Court reverse the District COUlt's opinion and order.

C.

Facts.

The relevant facts of this case on appeal, presented in chronological order, establish that
genuine issues of fact exist which preclude summary dismissal of Ms. Hatheway's claims.
1.

From November of 1999 to June 30,2005, Ms. Hatheway was viewed
as an "outstanding" employee.

In November of 1999, Ms. Hatheway accepted a position as an Administrative
Assistant II with the University of Idaho, College of Letters and Science, Dean's Office in
Moscow, Idaho. (R. Vol. II, pp. 302-303) Ms. Hatheway held this position until approximately
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September 2002, when she accepted a lateral transfer within the University to an Administrative
Assistant II position with the Department of English.

Ms. Hatheway was employed in that

capacity with the Department of English until she was essentially forced to retire on
September 12,2008. (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L. 4-8)
During her time at the University of Idaho, other than Dr. Olsson, all other University of
Idaho employees and faculty andlor administrators who provided testimony and/or evidence in
this case stated that they had never had any issues with Ms. Hatheway'S honesty or reason to call
into question the truthfulness or veracity of Ms. Hatheway. They all generally testified that
Ms. Hatheway was an honest and pleasant woman. (R. Vol.

n, pp. 449,453,470,473,431-432,

479-480,486-487,491,492-493,497-498 and 502-503)
In Ms. Hatheway's employment capacity as an Administrative Assistant II for the
University's Department of English, her supervisor was the Chair of the English Department at
the University. It was this individual's duty and job responsibility to assess Ms. Hatheway's job
and work performance and to provide her with her annual evaluation (and any disciplinary
actions). (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L. 9-14)
In her first year with the Depaltment of English at the University, Ms. Hatheway received
an overall very positive, "Exceeds Requirements" annual review from the Chair at that time,
Dr. David Barber.

Ms. Hatheway received no negative marks or comments.

Ultimately,

Dr. Barber ended his evaluation by stating that "Lillian is a team player and a wonderful asset to
the college." (R. Vol. II, p. 294, L. 10-14, pp. 335 and 348-353)
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In her second year with the Depmiment, Dr. Barber rated Ms, Hatheway's overall annual
performance as "Outstanding," the very best score possible, Dr. Barber stated in that review, in
part, that "Lillian is one of the best things to happen to the English Department in a long time"
and "She's a real find for us. Thank you, Dean Zeller!" (R. Vol. II, p, 294, L. 14-18, pp, 336
and 354-360)
For Ms, Hatheway'S third year review while with the Department, Dr, Barber again rated
Ms. Hatheway's overall annual performance as "Outstanding." Dr. Barber stated in the review,

in part that "Lillian has been a wonderful asset to the English depmiment this past year," and
that Ms. Hatheway was a wonderful "team player." (R. Vol. II, p, 294, 1" 19-23, pp. 336 and
360-365) Dr. Barber ended the review by commenting that "[t]he English department has grown
to

depend on Lily and it would be a great loss should she evcr leave." (R. VoL II, p, 294, L.

19-23, pp, 336 and 360-365)
On or about March 2, 2005, Ms. Hatheway received her last annual review from
Dr. Barber. Ms. Hatheway again received an overall "Outstanding" review as she had the two
previous years, In pertinent parts of that review, Dr. Barber commented that Ms. Hatheway
demonstrates a strongly positive attitude that greatly enhances the atmosphere in
the depattmental office ... overall her civility one of her great assets ... Lillian never
wavered in working to produce a positive overall atmosphere.
(R. Vol. II, pp. 294-295, L. 24-2, pp. 336 and 366-371)
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2.

Ms. Hatheway was continued to be viewed as an "outstanding"
employee, in'espective of her concern regarding an issue of unfair pay
differential with a new younger employee.

On or about July 1,2005, the University employed Dr. Kurt Olsson to replace Dr. Barber
as Chair of the Department of English. (R. VoL II, pp. 403 and 407-408) This meant that
Dr. Olsson was now Ms. Hatheway's new supervisor. Dr. Olsson was the Chair of the English
Department and Ms. Hatheway's supervisor for the remainder of Ms. Hatheway's employment
with the University.

During Dr. Olsson's tenure as the Chair of the English Department,

according to his colleagues, Dr. Olsson was "kind of secretive in how he r[an] things" as the
Department Chair. (R. Vol. II, p.p. 431 and 434) As of2009, Dr. Olsson is no longer employed
by the University ofIdaho.

CR. VoL II, pp. 403-404)

Shortly after Dr. Olsson came on-board as the Chair in or around September 2005, with
the assistance and support of Ms. l1atheway, Dr. Olsson hired Ms. Deborah Allen for the
position of Financial Technician to the Department of English.

CR. Vol. II, pp. 300, 310, 403 and

409) Ms. Allen was being paid more than Ms. Hatheway, despite the identical pay grade with
Ms. Hatheway, and Ms. Hatheway's higher "Hay Point"l rating and longer tenure. (R. Vol. II,
pp. 300 and 310 and p. 319) Ms. Hatheway approached Dr. Olsson and other University officials
several times regarding the pay rate differential between herself and Ms. Allen's position,
expressing concern that she was being subjected to age discrimination. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300, 310I The Hay Point factor analysis is a method of job measurement used to establish the relative significance of jobs as
they tit within an organization. At the University of Idaho, it is a way the University establishes pay grades for
classified employees. Ms. Hatheway, whose job required knowledge of and how to interpret University policies and
procedures, states that Hay points means that your job is considered a little more difficult and is a scale for the
University to determine pay. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 310)
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312) Ms. Hatheway's complaint was not about Ms. Allen as a person, it was about the fact that
the Financial Tech position, with less "Hay Points," and who was younger with less tenure at the
University was making more money. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 309)
Regardless of her inquiries or concerns about this issue, Ms. Hatheway's initial
professional relationship with Ms. Allen was not soured as a result of this issue. 2 (R. Vol. II, pp.
300 and 311) And Ms. Hatheway continued to be considered an excellent employee. In fact, in
or around April 2006, Ms. Hatheway was nominated for the University of Idaho Outstanding
Employee Award, for the year, by Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies for
the Department of English, Dr. Walter A. Hesford. (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L.

15~21)

In Professor

Hesford's nomination letter, he wrote of Ms. Hatheway: "Lillian is the administrative heart of the
Department of English. Her skills and warmth are essential to the well-being of our faculty and
students. She goes far beyond the call of duty to serve and bring us together." (R. Vol. III, p.
519, L. 15-21, pp. 597-598) In March of 2006, Ms. Hatheway also received another outstanding
performance evaluation. (R. Vol. II, p. 411, L. 7-10)

3.

On May 1, 2006, former University of Idaho President, Mr. Timothy
P. White gave his State of the University Address urging older
University employees to "get out of the way" and "retire" to help the
University r'ecruit "young entry-level" individuals.

Shortly after receiving her outstanding evaluation and this nomination, on or about May
1, 2006, then University ofIdaho President, Timothy P. White, gave a "State of the University"
address.

While Ms. Hatheway was not present for the speech live, she later went to the

?

- In fact, Ms. Hatheway testified that she did not have a problem with Ms. Allen as a person. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300
and 329)
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University's website and listened to a recording of it. (R. VoL II, pp. 300 and 313-314) In that
speech, President White indicated that some of the staff at the school needed to seriously
consider retirement.

President White stated, in his speech, that all employees had a

responsibility, individually and collectively, to rctire, and that to help the University recruit
young entry-level or mid-career persons, because "it is time to get out of the way." (R. Vol. III,
p. p. 519, L. 21-23, pp. 600 and 611) President White further stated that he was going to ask the
Deans to think about the barriers that are getting in the way of those who may want to go to a
part-time appointment or to fully retire. (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L. 22-23, pp. 600-613) In hearing
this speech, Ms. Hatheway recalls feeling anxious and that she felt that she was going to be on
her way out of the University. (R. Vol. II, p.p. 300 and 313-315)

4.

After President Timothy P. White's State of the University Address,
Ms. Hatheway's work envit'onment started to become negative and
hostile.

After President White's speech, in or around the end of spring of 2006, Dr. Olsson's
attitude and supervision of Ms. Hatheway changed dramatically. (R. Vol. III, p. 519, L. 24-26)
From approximately August 2006, until her separation of employment in September 2008, the
University and its employees started to exhibit a pattern of behavior, conduct and comments
towards and/or generally about age/older workers and retirement to Ms. Hatheway that sent the
message to her that due to her age, "it's time to move that girl out." (R. VoL II, pp. 300 and 318)
Dr. Olsson frequently kept his office door shut, avoided communicating with Ms. Hatheway and
failed to follow-up with Ms. Hatheway on scheduled or required meetings. (R. VoL III, p. 520,
L. 1-18) Ms. Hatheway was ever increasingly isolated in the office, had her work space changed
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without her knowledge while she was out of the office, was kept out of office decisions and
communications that were necessary for Ms. Hatheway to be able to successfully perform her
job, and had several of her primary job duties and responsibilities taken away from her. (R. Vol.

III, p. 520, L. 1-18)
In Ms. Hatheway's Administrative Assistant II position with the Department of English,
six of Ms. Hatheway's "Essential" responsibilities included, but were not limited to:
(l) [m]maintaining an up-to-date record of donors to the English department and consulting with

the chair to send out thank-you letters for gifts; keeping current in Banner Alumni module;
(2) [w]orking with chair and directors to maintain the departmental Web site and (future) online
departmental newsletter; (3) [u]ndertaking the periodic inventory of departmental equipment;
(4) [0 ]rdering supplies for the copier machine, and coordinating with other administrative
assistants regarding ordering of supplies generally; (5) [p ]rocessing all biweekly payroll time
entry and maintaining personnel sick, annual compensatory, and other time reports; and
(6) [i]nterpreting, explaining, and applying department and university policies, regulations and
procedures to faculty and students. CR. VoL III, p. 520, L. 1-18 and R. Vol. II, p. 294, L. 5-9, pp.
335 and 339-347) Although those six "essential" duties and responsibilities remained in her job
description, Dr. Olsson refused to allow her to perform them.
Dr. Olsson started to not communicate even pleasantries of good-morning or good-bye,
and often used his office door connected to the hall instead of his office door connected to the
main office to bypass Ms. Hatheway. (R. Vol. III, p. 520, L. 1-18; p. 517, L. 25-26, pp. 528-544;
and p. 518, L. 18-20 and R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 412-413)
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Dr. Olsson acknowledges that Ms. Hatheway did come to him starting in 2006 with her
concern that she was being kept out of the loop of communication and that he, Dr. Olsson, was
not communicating to her. (R. VoL II, pp. 403 and 414) Dr. Olsson stated that Ms. Hatheway
was "upset" about the issue.

However, Dr. Olsson recognized that it was appropriate for

Ms. Hatheway to come to him with her concerns. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 415)

5.

During an English Department Faculty meeting on October 4, 2006,
Dr. Olsson made comments that he would only consider "young"
employees for a new position.

Five months after President White expressed the new "ageist" policy, on or about
October 4, 2006, there was an English Department Faculty meeting. During this meeting there
was a discussion involving Dr. Olsson in regards to the hiring for a
MFA program.

(R. Vol. III, p. 520, L. 19-22)

lecturer~level

position for the

During this discussion, Dr. Olsson made

disparaging remarks about older workers and expressed his desire to only hire "young and
energetic" employees. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300, 316, 437 and 440)
At this meeting was Ms. Pamela Yenser, an approximately sixty-two (62) year-old parttime instructor in the Depar1ment of English. who at the time was interested in the open position.

(R. Vol. II, pp. 437-439 and 441) After hearing this, Ms. Yenser addressed Dr. Olsson directly
and said "[y]ou're talking about hiring a young and energetic person. What if there's somebody
older and wiser and more experienced with a good resume and good qualifications? Wouldn't
that person be appropriate for this position?"

(R. Vol. II, pp. 437 and 440)

In response,

Dr. Olson answered Ms. Yenser back very quickly and said "[n]o. We're looking for someone
young and energetic." (R. Vol. II, pp. 437 and 440) Dr. Olsson repeatedly made the statements
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about "young and energetic" employees over and over in the meeting. (R. Vol. II, pp. 437 and

440l After this meeting, Ms. Yenser relayed the events of the Faculty meeting and Dr. Olsson's
age discriminatory comments to Ms. Hatheway. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 317) Eventually, the
individual who was hired for the lecturer-level position for the MFA program was Mr. Brandon
Schrand. At the time of his hire, Mr. Schrand was thirty-six (36) years-old. (R. Vol. II, pp. 509516)
6.

Less than six months later, Ms. Hatheway began to receive negative
performance evaluations from Dr. Olsson, which precluded an
automatic pay raise.

In or around March 23, 2007, Ms. Hatheway received her second annual performance
evaluation from her supervisor, Dr. Olsson. (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13, pp. 383-392) This
annual performance evaluation was for the rating period of 1-1-2006 to 12-31-2006. Unlike all
of Ms. Hatheway's previous evaluations, in which she was rated overall as "Outstanding,"
suddenly this year's evaluation was very poor; although Ms. Hatheway had no "Needs
Improvement" ratings on any previous evaluation, Ms. Hatheway received six (6) "Needs
Improvement" ratings on her 2006 evaluation. (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13. pp. 383 and 385-387)
Due to Ms. Hatheway receiving at least one "Needs Improvement" rating on her annual
evaluation, Ms. Hatheway was eligible for being placed on probation, and more detrimentally,
she was ineligible for an automatic state pay raise. (R. Vol. III, p. 518, L. 21-24, pp. 589-592;
p. 519, L. 1-3, pp. 594-595 and R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 328; 403 and 419) University policy
3Eight University employees, including faculty at that hearing, all testified that they had no reason to call into
question or issues with Ms. Yenser'$ truthfulness or veracity and no reason to doubt Ms. Yenser's recollection of
Dr. Olsson's statements during the meeting. (R. Vol. II, pp. 431, 433; 449, 464-465; 470 and 476; 479-481; 486,

488 and 489; 491, 494-495; 497, 499-500; 502 and 504-507)
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3340A-IO(d.) and other University policies and procedures provide that if a classified employee
of the University, receives at least one "Needs Improvement" rating on their annual evaluation,
"the employee [is] placed on 90 day probation," and are automatically ineligible for an automatic
state pay raise.

CR. VoL III, p. 528, L. 21-24, pp. 589-592; p. 519, L. 10-3, pp. 594-595 and R.

Vol. ; R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and 328; 403 and 419
The following day, Ms. Hatheway met with Dr. Olsson about the evaluation.

When

Ms. Hatheway arrived, she was surprised to find Ms. Suzanna Aaron, the University of Idaho
Director of Administrative & Fiscal Operations in the room as well. 4 Not understanding the
ulterior purpose for Dr. Olsson having Ms. Aaron in the room, Ms. Hatheway did not allow her
to stay. After Ms. Aaron left, Ms. Hatheway requested specific instances of situations related to
her performance issues stated in the evaluation, which Dr. Olsson was unable to provide. (R.
Vol. III, pp. 520-521, L. 25-5, pp. 528-545; p. 518, L. 18-21, pp. 575-584) Ms. Hatheway stated,
during this meeting to Dr. Olsson, that she believed that she was being discriminated based on
her age. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 408)
In response to this meeting, on March 16, 2007, Dr. Olsson sent April Preston, Director
of Employment Services at the University, an e-mail summing up his meeting with
Ms. Hatheway and stating in pali
[s]he [Ms. Hatheway] wanted names, of course, but backed off immediately when I told
her I would not provide them. At one point, she touched on age discrimination, but there
she backed off quickly as well. Near the end of our chat, she said we're both nearing
4 On or about February 28, 2007, prior to this meeting and prior to even providing Ms. Hatheway with the
evaluation, Dr. Olsson sent April Preston an e-mail regarding having another individual in the meeting with him
who was not objective and neutral, but rather someone who simply "may be perceived as neutral and objective by
Lillian [Ms. Hatheway]." (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13, pp. 393-395). Emphasis added.
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retirement and implied, I'm guessing, that she wanted to be in English for the duration.
The bottom line, however, is that she said she would not sign the evaluation. I assume
that doesn't tie my hands ... she suggested we meet half-way, but I don't know what that
means. I don't really want to change a thing.
(R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13, pp. 393-395)
When Ms. Hatheway was provided her 2006 annual evaluation, she was also given a
Performance Development Plan ("PDP") by Dr. Olsson. CR. Vol. III, p. 520, L. 23-24, pp. 615617) The PDP stated that fmiher instances of behaviors of Ms. Hatheway, exhibited during
2006, (the year she was nominated for employee of the year) would not be tolerated. (R. Vol.

n,

p. 295, L. 9-13, pp. 383, 391) The PDP also stated that the PDP, together with the annual
evaluation given in March, 2007, constituted a "final" verbal warning and further instances
would provide grounds for disciplinary action, yet Dr. Olsson did not give Ms. Hatheway any
specific examples to determine what behaviors were at issue. (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 9-13, pp.
383,391) Ms. Hatheway refused to sign it because she did not agree with it.

CR. Vol. II, pp. 300

and 320) And although this was alleged to be a "final warning," Ms. Hatheway had never before
received any warnings, write-ups, reprimands, or negative evaluations.
Ms. Hatheway thereafter questioned Dr. Olsson on at least three more separate occasions
for the reasons andlor specific instances of situations related to the alleged performance issues
stated in the poor 2006 evaluation and PDP. Dr. Olsson was unable to provide Ms. Hatheway
with any reasons or instances for the poor performance evaluation ratings and simply stated that
Ms. Hatheway's work was "outstanding." Following Ms. Hatheway'S second discussion with
Dr. Olsson regarding her poor 2006 evaluation, Dr. Olsson stated that Ms. Hatheway needed to
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"keep quiet and suck it up" and that she needed to "learn a lesson." (R. Vol. III, p. 521, L. 6-15)
Additionally, after receiving the bad 2006 evaluation and inquiring into the factual reasons for
her poor ratings, Ms. Hatheway was asked by Dr. Olsson as she was leaving for a vacation, "are
you coming back?," suggesting that Dr. Olsson expected Ms. Hatheway to retire and not return.
(R. Vol. III, p. 521, L. 6-15; p. 518, L. 15-17, pp. 575-584; and pp. 528-545.)

Then, sometime in April 2007, Ms. Hatheway met with Dr. Olsson and University
Ombudsman, Roxanne Schreiber.

(R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 420-421)

During this meeting,

Ms. Hatheway again requested specific instances for performance problems to support the poor
evaluation; nonetheless, again, Dr. Olsson was unable to provide any information.

Instead,

Dr. Olsson stated that Ms. Hatheway's work was "outstanding" and that he, Dr. Olsson, was not
a communicator. During this meeting, Ms. Schreiber stated to Ms. Hatheway that there was a
"slim chance that Dr. Olsson would change the evaluation," and how she should just "move on."
Therefore, the meeting ended at an impasse with no answers provided to Ms. Hatheway. CR.
Vol. III, pp. 562-566; p. 518, L. 18-2 I, pp. 575-584; and pp. 521-522, L. 19-2)

7.

Despite receiving a poor evaluation, Ms. Hatheway again received a
nomination for employee of the year at the University.

Even after receiving her poor evaluation and the PDP from Dr. Olsson, on or around
April 6, 2007, Ms. Hatheway received notice from the University that she was again nominated
for the University of Idaho Outstanding Employee Award for the year. (R. Vol. III, p. 521, L.
16~19,

pp. 619-637; p. 518, L. 18-21, pp. 575-584)
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8.

On April 30, 2007, Ms. Hatheway filed a Univel'sity of Idaho Problem
Solving Request because of her unwarranted and unsupported poor
annual employment review and Performance Development Plan,
which worsened her treatment within the Department.

On or about April 30, 2007, Ms. Hatheway filed a Problem Solving Request Form to the
University, regarding in part, "Age discrimination" and "Retaliation." (R. Vol. II, p. 295, L. 1821, pp. 396-397)

Ms. Hatheway believed that the lack of explanation of the unwarranted

criticism of her performance which led to a disciplinary PDP and lack of pay raise, the continued
push for "youth" as a University policy, demonstrated age discrimination.
A few weeks later, on or about May 14,2007, Ms. Hatheway noticed that Ms. Allen had

been provided with a new door to her office, allowing her the ability to shut-off Ms. Hatheway.

At some point during that day, Ms. Hatheway heard Dr. Olsson and Ms. Allen discussing the
door to her office. Ms. Hatheway then heard Ms. Allen state to Dr. Olsson that "the door is
sending up a red flag" in regards to Ms. Hatheway. (R. VoL III, p. 522, L. 3-7 and pp. 528-545)
Days later, on or about May 18, 2007, Ms. Iiatheway had a meeting with Paul Michaud,
Assistant V.P. of Human Resources, Dr. Olsson, and Dr. Nicholas Gier, the American Federation

of Teachers Union President. During this meeting, again, Dr. Olsson stated that Ms. Hatheway's
work was outstanding and that he was not a communicator. Lastly, Mr. Michaud stated that
Ms. Hatheway's complaints of discrimination and retaliation needed to be brought to the
University of Idaho Human Rights Compliance Office. (R. Vol. III, p. 522, L.
L. 18-21, pp. 575-584)
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8~14

and p. 518,

On June 1, 2007, Dr. Olsson provided Ms. Hatheway a response letter to their problemsolving session of May 18, 2007. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403,422 and 428-429) In his response letter,
he stated that he would not change her compensation level for the fiscal 2008 year, and that they
should move forward with the PDP. Dr. Olsson ended his letter by stating that he would like to
meet with Ms. Hatheway the following week to go over his letter and the PDP; however,
Dr. Olsson admits that no such meeting ever occurred and they never met again about the PDP.
(R. Vol. II, pp. 403, 423 and 428-429)
9.

On May 30, 2007, Ms. Hatheway met with the University of Idaho
Human Rights Compliance Officer, and her work environment
worsened.

As a result of the unsubstantiated and unexplained evaluation and PDP, on or about May
30,2007, Ms. Ifatheway followed University policy and had her first meeting with Ms. Andreen
Neukraz-Butler, the University of Idaho I-Iuman Rights Compliance Officer.

During this

meeting, Ms. Hatheway reported her complaint of age discrimination. (R. Vol. III, p. 522, L. 1517)
Approximately a week later, on June 7, 2007, Ms. Hatheway overheard Dr. Olsson and
Ms. Allen discussing an audit that was happening in the Department. CR. Vol. III, p. 522, L.
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23 and p. 518, L 1-3, pp. 547-560) During their discussion, Ms. Hatheway heard Dr. Olsson
state to Ms. Allen that this was the "second go around" in regards to Ms. Hatheway, and how
they were going to "replace" Ms. Hatheway. (R. Vol. III, p. 522, L. 18-23 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp.
547-560)

Dr. Olsson and Ms. Allen then discussed how the person that would replace

Ms. Hatheway would do a lot of the same work as Ms. Hatheway'S job. CR. Vol. III, p. 522, L.
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18-23 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp. 547-560) Dr. Olsson admits in his deposition that he received a lot
of information from Ms. Allen concerning Ms. Hatheway. (R. Vol.

n,

pp. 403 and 426) He

stated that he and Ms. Allen "had to sort through these issues [in reference to Ms. Hatheway] if
we were going to get forward - get anywhere." CR. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 426)
A short time later, on or about June 27, 2007, as Dr. Olsson was preparing to leave for his
annual summer vacation, Ms. Hatheway asked Dr. Olsson whether he was keeping her under
surveillance.

In response, Dr. Olsson admitted that he was keeping Ms. Hatheway under

"continued surveillance" and watching "evidently [her] every move." (R. Vol. III, pp. 522-523,

L. 24-2 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp. 547-560) Thereafter, while Mr. Olsson was on leave for vacation,
Ms. Allen repeatedly asked Ms. Hatheway when she planned to retire, and suggested that Ms.
Hatheway should leave by stating to Ms. Hatheway that she would not stay in a place she wasn't
wanted. (R. VoL III, p. 523, L. 3-6 and pp. 518 and 547-560)
On or about August 1, 2007, Ms. Hatheway and Dr. Olsson had a meeting to discuss
Ms. Hatheway'S work environment; she specificalJy asked about Dr. Olsson's Faculty Meeting
comments that he wanted an employee to be "young and energetic," as well as the numerous
duties and tasks that were being taken away from her. Dr. Olsson admitted that he made the
comment and then tried to rationalize it by stating that the employee would need to make a lot of
phone calls and thus had to have "young energy." Ms. Hatheway then asked Dr. Olsson, based
on what Ms. Yenser had told her, if he would consider a well-qualified experienced older person
and he answered "no." (R. Vol. III, p. 523, L. 7·17; p. 518, L. 18-21, pp. 575-584 and p. 518, L.
1-3, pp. 547-560 and R. Vol.

n. pp. 300 and 317)
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Also during this meeting, Ms. Hatheway again questioned Dr. Olsson about her isolation
in the office, not being informed or included in necessary communications needed to do her job,
and how there had been numerous duties and tasks that he had taken away from her.
Ms. Hatheway provided Dr. Olsson specific examples of duties and tasks taken away from her
such as working with alumni, maintaining and creating websites, inventory tracking, and the
elimination of decision to cross-train her position with the Financial Tech position.

Ms.

Hatheway expressed to Dr. Olsson that the treatment and hostility towards her in the office was
cruel and that she would never do to a person what he was doing to her. In response, Dr. Olsson
stated that he would have to rework Ms. Hatheway's job description, yet, that was apparently
never completed. (R. Vol. III, p. 523, L. 18-26; p. 518. L. 18-21, pp. 575-584 and p. 518, L. 1-3,
pp. 547-560)

10.

On August 28, 2007, Ms. Hatheway filed a charge of discrimination
and retaliation with the Idaho Human Rights Commission and her
work environment further deteriorated.

As a result of the above conduct, actions and inactions, on or about August 28, 2007,
Ms. Hatheway filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation against Defendant University of
Idaho with the Idaho I-Iuman Rights Commission. (R. Vol. III, p. 523, L 18-26; p. 524, L. 1526, pp. 638-641 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp. 547-560) Following this filing, Dr. Olsson continued to
be hostile towards Ms. Hatheway, avoiding communications with her and keeping his office door
closed. After filing the Human Rights charge, throughout the end of2007 and through the winter
and spring of 2008, Ms. Hatheway continued to be isolated in her job, left out of critical
communications and discussions and continued to have numerous job duties and responsibilities
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taken away from her. Tn addition, other University employees began to approach Ms. Hatheway,
harass her and make comments to her about retirement. For example, on or about April 3, 2008,
Ms. Karen Thompsons, a Department of English instructor, approached Ms. Hatheway, allegedly
on behalf of Ms. Allen, telling her it was probably not comfortable for Ms. Hatheway to be there,
and so "why don't you get another job?", and asking "how long are you going to stay?" CR. Vol.
III, p. 524, L. 4-14 and p. 518, L. 1-3, pp. 547-560)5

11.

On Apl'il 29, 2008, Ms. Hatheway received a second negative annual
performance evaluation which again marked her as an employee who
"needs improvement;" thereby initially disqualifying her once more
for an automatic pay raise.

A few weeks later, on or about April 29, 2008, Ms. Hatheway was provided her 2007
annual performance evaluation for the rating period of 110112007 to 12/3112007. (R. Vol. III, p.
524, L. 15-26, pp. 619-637)

In light of the administrative procedures that were transpiring,

Ms. Hatheway's 2007 evaluation was conducted and provided to her by the Associate Dean of
the College of Letters, Arts, and Social Sciences, Ms. Debbie Storrs; regardless, it still received
input directly from Dr. Olsson.
To Ms. Hatheway's dismay, this 2007 evaluation was again another poor evaluation.
Ms. Hatheway received another, two (2) "Needs Improvement" ratings.

The two "Needs

Improvement" ratings were given in the criteria of "teamwork" and "attendance." Receiving at
least one "Needs Improvement" rating meant that Ms. Hatheway was again ineligible for the
automatic state pay raise and eligible to be placed on probation.

Therefore, Ms. Hatheway

5 Dr. Olsson testified that Ms. Thompson approached him and told him that Ms. Hatheway did not like him, that
Ms. Thompson stated that she herself had a problem, issue, or concern with Ms. Hatheway, and that Ms. Thompson
and Ms. Allen had a fairly close relationship. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403, 416-417 and 424-425)
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received a letter for May, 2008, stating that her pay was going to be frozen at the hourly rate of
$13.03. This was the rate that it had been at since May to,2006. (R. Vol. III, p. 5159, L. 1-3,
pp. 594-594; p. 524, L. 15-26, pp. 638-641 and pp. 528-545)

In regards to the basis for receiving two negative marks, Ms. Hatheway's evaluation
made vague references to "evidence" of unprofessional communication and unclear absences,
without any specific details or instances provided. In fact, the evaluation stated that "[m)ost
directors indicated she met or exceeded expectations in regard to teamwork, noting her polite and
respectful response to requests and Willingness to engage in work that arises." (R. Vol. III, p.
524, L. 15-26, pp. 619-636) The basis for the negative mark on unprofessional communication
was from only one of the six evaluators.

Yet, that evaluator, Dr. Robel1 Wrigley (whose

supervisor at that time was also Dr. Olsson), testified, when questioned about his evaluation, that
Ms. Hatheway "was always someone tremendously cordial, tremendously friendly, extremely
nurturing." (R. Vol. II, p. 449 and 454)
Following a meeting regarding her second straight terrible evaluation, on or about June
12, 2008, Ms. Hatheway was provided an amended annual performance review for the 2007 year
that still had a needs-to-improve rating on the area of "teamwork.,,6 As a result Ms. Hatheway
continued to be ineligible for the automatic state pay raise and eligible to be placed on probation.
However, on or about June 19, 2008, Ms. Hatheway received notification that she would receive
a pay raise. (R. Vol. III, pp. 528-545 and p. 519, L. 1-3, pp. 594-595)

6 The amended review had a change of the attendance criteria evaluation to "Meets Requirements." (R. VoL III, p.
524, L. 15-16, pp. 638·64 J).
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12.

Ms. Hatheway's work conditions caused her bodily, mental and
emotional injury, resulting in medical treatment, premature retire
from the University of Idaho.

The isolation, lack of communication, removal of job tasks, and hostility towards
Ms. Hatheway in the office by Dr. Olsson and Ms. Allen, and baseless poor evaluations leading
to lack of pay raises caused Ms. Hatheway severe emotional stress and anxiety over her working
conditions that resulted in dizziness and a rise in her blood pressure. (R. Vol. II, pp. 300 and
322)
Due to the symptoms Ms. Hatheway was suffering as a result of the incidents with the
University, on or about August 21, 2008, Ms. Hatheway sought medical treatment with her
primary health care provider, Dr. Richard K. Howe, M.D., at Moscow Family Medicine. (R.
Vol. II, pp. 300 and 306-308 and R. Vol. III, p. 643, L. 4-7, pp. 646-655) Dr. Howe objectively
assessed Ms. Hatheway with "anxiety [that was] poorly controlled with recent stresses at work."

CR. Vol. III, p. 643, L 4-7, pp. 646-655)
A few days later, on or about August 25, 2008, Ms. Hatheway woke up feeling very
"dizzy" and was unable to go to work; as a result, she returned to Dr. Howe. Dr. Howe then
assessed Ms. Hatheway with "dizziness for a few days

some improvement - possible anxiety

symptoms" and then placed Ms. Hatheway off of work for a few days.

CR. Vol. III, p. 643, L 4-

7, pp. 646-655)
With being placed on medical leave, discussing her medical issues and work with
Dr. Howe, and realizing that the University's conduct at work was causing her severe physical,
mental and emotional troubles, on or about August 28, 2008, Ms. Hatheway decided to provide
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the University notice that she could no longer work under the conditions and therefore was being
forced to retire. (R. VoL II, pp. 300 and 323-324) Ms. Hatheway testified that simply "the work
conditions became intolerable." (R. Vol. II, pp. 479 and 482) So on that day, Ms. Hatheway
provided Dr. Olsson and the University a letter informing them of her intention to retire from the
University of Idaho on September 12, 2008. The University staff recognized that Ms. Hatheway
was upset with leaving.
13.

CR. Vol. 11, pp. 479 and 482)

Following Ms. Hatheway's forced departure, Dr. Olsson hired a
replacement for Ms. Hatheway who was thirty-two (32) years old, and
gave that individual a higher starting salary than Ms. Hatheway had
at the end of her employment tenure with the University.

After Ms. Hatheway's constructive discharge from the University, Dr. Olsson embarked
on hiring Ms. Hatheway's replacement. (R. Vol. II, pp. 403 and 427) On December 8, 2008,
Dr Olsson hired a woman by the name of Ms. Brittney Carmen.

At the time of her hire,

Ms. Carmen was 32-years-old. (R. VoL II, pp. 509-5] 1) In addition, when Ms. Carmen
was hired, her starting hourly wage was higher, $13.75 per hour, than Ms. Hatheway'S hourly
wage at the end of her employment, $13.41. (R. VoL II, pp. 513-516)
II.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's age

discrimination claims, including disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and constructive
discharge, under the IHRA?
2.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's

retaliation claim under the IHRA?
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3.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim?

III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

An award of attorney fees may be granted to the prevailing party on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41, when the court is left with the abiding belief
that the appeal has been brought, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2002); (see,

~,

Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates,

L.L.c., 140 Idaho 354, 365 (2004) (holding that a district COUlt's grant of summary judgment in
favor of a purchaser was improper, and that therefore attorney fees for the appealing party was
proper pursuant to LA.R. 41 because it was the prevailing patty on appeal and the saJe agreement
further provided as such). A plaintiff may be entitled to an award of fees for an appeal under the
prevailing party standard even though a defendant could ultimately be found to be the prevailing
party after triaL Bowen v. Heth, 120 Idaho 452 (Ct. App. 1991). Thereby, if the Supreme Court
determines that the District Court's grant of summary judgment was improper, and
Ms. Hatheway is implicitly the prevailing party for purposes of the appeal, and Supreme Court
should award Ms. Hatheway her attorney's fees for having to bring this unnecessary appeal.

IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Ms. Hatheway presented evidence that the University and her direct supervisor voiced a
policy to promote youthful hiring and removing aging employees, immediately after which she
began to receive her first ever poor evaluations, was denied pay raises, and significantly lost job
duties. The University also hired a younger contemporary and paid her more despite University
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rules. Ms. Hatheway was also treated poorly, and subjected to continued, age-based, harassing
behavior such as comments about retirement, about her not returning to work, and refusal to
include her in departmental communications and operations. The evidence presented included
undisputed statements and speeches from the University President, an undisputed pay differential
with younger employees, an undisputed change in her performance evaluations, established
comments from her supervisors on the necessity for young employees, and her own testimony of
comments and conduct by her supervisor and others for the University. This evidence created
both direct evidence of discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation and constructive
discharge, as well as establishing a prima facie case to hurdle the ItMcDonnell Douglas" burden
shifting analysis on pretextual explanation for discriminatory conduct. However, the trial court
incorrectly applied the burden of proof in a discrimination claim, improperly weighed the
evidence and made credibility determinations, which led him 10 rule that no issues of fact
existed.

v.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Standard of Review on a discrimination case precludes an aware of
summary judgment.

The Idaho Supreme Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de
novo. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394 (2008). In such a case, the
Idaho Supreme Court employs the same standard as that used by the trial court when ruling on
the motion. Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 747 (1995).
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Summary judgment should be granted only if the court determines that "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."

LR.C.P. 56Ce); Sharp v. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 299 (1990); Bonz v.

Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541 (1991). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of
the nonmoving paI1y, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be
drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sharp, 118 Idaho at 299; Bonz, 119
Idaho at 541.

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is not within the court's

province to assess the credibility of an affiant or deponent when credibility can be tested in court
before a trier of fact. 80hn v. Folev, 125 Idaho 168,171 (Ct.App. 1994); Lowry v. Ireland Bank,
116 Idaho 708, 711 (Ct.App. 1989). The role of the trial court at the summary judgment stage is
limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried; it does not
extend to deciding them. Curlee, 148 Idaho at 396.
Specifically in employment discrimination cases, there is a high standard for granting of
summary judgment. Schnidrig v. Colum. Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406,1410 (9th Clr. 1996).7 At
the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff who alleged employment discrimination's burden is
not high. Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cif. 2003). Very little evidence is
necessary to survive summary judgment in a discrimination case because the ultimate question is
one that can only be resolved through a "searching inquiry" - one that is most appropriately
7 fdaho and other state courts routinely use federal court decisions interpreting federal anti-discrimination laws such
as the ADEA for guidance and interpretation of the Idaho Human Rights Act and other state anti-discrimination
laws. See,~, Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 812, (1979); Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33 (1982);
Pottenger, 329 F.3d 740.
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conducted by the factfinder, upon a full record. Schnidrig, 80 FJd at 1410; Lam v. Univ. of
Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cil'. 1994). Ifa rational trier of fact could, on all the evidence,
find that the employer's action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons, summary
judgment for the defense is inappropriate. Wallis v. lR. SI111plot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.
1994).
Once a prima facie case is established, summary judgment for the defendant will
ordinarily not be appropriate on any ground relating to the merits because the crux of a
[discrimination] dispute is the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.
Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1991). Courts are hesitant to grant summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases, if issues of motive or intent are involved because in such
cases, genuine issues of fact usually exist. Evans v. Tech. Apnlications & Serv.Co., 80 F.3d 954
(4th Cil'. 1996); Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982).
When motive and intent are involved, the summary judgment standard is to be applied rigorously
in employment discrimination cases because intent and credibility are frequently crucial issues.
Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94 FJd 353 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, summary judgment is not
proper if the plaintiff has produced more than a scintilla of evidence that the employer's motive
for the adverse action was illegitimate. Flavel v. Svedala Indus., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D.
Wis. 1994).
Thus, because of inherently factual nature of the employment discrimination inquiry, a
plaintiff need produce very little evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue of
fact. Any indication of discriminatory motive may suffice to raise a question that can only be
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resolved by a fact-finder.

Unfortunately, in granting the University of Idaho's motion for

summary judgment, the District Court did assess the credibility of affiants, decided genuine
issues of material fact, and did not construe disputed facts liberally in favor of the non-moving
patty, Ms. Hatheway.
B.

There are genuine issues of material fact, credibility determinations, and
issues of motive and intent which should have precluded summary judgment
on Ms. Hatheway's IHRA age discrimination claims.

The facts and evidence presented in this case establish a genuine issue of fact that
Ms. Hatheway was subjected

to

intentional age discrimination (as opposed to unintentional,

disparate impact discrimination) by the University ofIdaho.
To establish a prima facie case of her age discrimination claim Ms. Hatheway must show
that: (1) she is at least 40 years of age; (2) she was qualified for her position and performing her
job in a satisfactory manner; (3) she was discharged (including constructive discharge) or her
employer took adverse employment actions against her; and (4) her position was filled by a
younger person of equal or less qualifications. The third element of the prima facie case above
may be found by a

sub~claim

of constructive discharge, which Ms. Hatheway has alleged (in

addition to other adverse employment actions).

Under a constructive discharge claim, the

plaintiff must show that "a reasonable person in [the employee's] position would have felt that
(the employee] was forced to quit because of intolerable and discriminatory working conditions.
Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1411; Waterman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667 (2009).
Ms. Hatheway soundly meets all elements of the prima facie cases set forth above.
Particularly considering that the proof required to establish a prima facie case on an employment
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discrimination claim is "minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance
of the evidence." Chuang v. Onlv. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir.
2000) (detennining that remarks about "two chinks" in reference to Chinese-American professor
seeking tenure at university was sufficient to create issue of fact as to professor's prima-facie
case for race discrimination). The prima facie case may be based either on direct evidence of
discriminatory intent or a presumption arising from the factors such as those set forth in

McDonnell Douglas, which allows indirect evidence to establish a prima facie case where there
may not be direct motive of discrimination. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889 (citing Lowe v. City of
Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985).
As stated in the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision Gross v. FEL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557
U.S. 167 (2009) "plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must
prove [at trial], by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the 'but-for' cause of the
challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer
to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced
some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision." Gross, Inc., 557 U.S. at 180.
However, Gross does not place a heightened evidentiary requirement on ADEA plaintiffs to
prove that age was the sole cause of the adverse employment action. Jones v. Oklahoma City
Pub. Schs., 617 F.3d 1273, 1277-1278 (lOth Cir. 2010).
In this case, it is undisputed that Ms. Hatheway is over forty and was replaced by a
younger employee under forty.

Furthermore, the District Court in this case found, and

Ms. Hatheway takes no issue with the District Court's Opinion and Order in regards to the
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second element of the prima facie case of age discrimination that "whether Ms. Hatheway was
performing her job in a satisfactory manner is factually disputed and as such is not conducive to
a determination on motion for summary judgment." (R. Vol. III, p. 679)
Therefore, the crux of the dispute of the ease on summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's
age discrimination claims and constructive discharge claim are: (l) whether there are genuine
issues of material fact that Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse employment actions and/or was
constructive discharged; and (2) if so, whether there are genuine issues of material fact that butfor Ms. Hatheway'S age and/or her protected activities engaged in, she would not have suffered
the adverse employment actions and/or was constructively discharged. The District Court erred
in its decision granting summary judgment on these two issues because there is direct evidence
which creates genuine issues of material fact that both Ms. Hatheway did suffer adverse
employment actions, was constructive discharged, and that but-for Ms. Hatheway's age, she
would not have suffered those adverse employment actions and constructive discharge.
1.

There is direct evidence that Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse
employment actions and that age and/or engagement in protected
activities was the but-for cause of her adverse employment actions
suffered.

The District Court wrongly found that Ms. Hatheway'S claims of age discrimination
failed as a matter of law because Ms. Hatheway could not meet the prima facie element that she
was (constructively) discharged or her employer took adverse employment actions against her
based on a discrimination motive. However, Ms. Hatheway presented direct evidence that the
University and its agents made ageist comments and established a policy of seeking young
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employees who they paid more to, while mistreating a previously highly regarded but older
employee.
Direct evidence in the context of a discrimination case is defined as evidence of conduct
or statements by persons involved in the decision-making process that may be viewed as directly
reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude ... sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that
that attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision. Enlow v.
Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004). Stated another way,
direct evidence is evidence, which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without
inference or presumption. Goodwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998).
Furthennore,
[w]hen a plaintiff does not rely exclusively on the presumption but seeks
to establish a prima facie case through the submission of actual evidence,
very little such evidencc is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact
regarding an employer's motive; any indication of discriminatory motive
... may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder.
Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009.
Using the above rational in a Motion for Summary Judgment on a discrimination case,
courts have held:
when a plaintiff has established a prima facie inference of disparate
treatment through direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory
intent, he will necessarily have raised a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to the legitimacy or bona fides of the employer's articulated reason
for its employment decision." ... When (the] evidence, direct or
circumstantial, consists of more than the McDonnell Douglas
presumption, a factual question will almost always exist with respect to
any claim of a nondiscriminatory reason. The existence of this question of
material fact will ordinarily preclude the granting of summary judgment.
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Schnidrig, Inc., 80 F.3d at 1410; Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. ColI. Dist, 934 F.2d 1104,
1 I 11 (9th Cir.) (quoting Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009).8 Here, there was an abundance of direct
evidence that shows that Ms. Hatheway did suffer multiple adverse employment actions as a
direct result of discriminatory motive.

(a)

The evidence established that Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse
employment actions leading to constructive discharge.

First, another employee who was younger, had less tenure with the University, and less
"Hay Points" than Ms. Hatheway, and received a higher rate of pay than Ms. Hatheway. At the
time of her hire, Ms. Allen was 47 years old and Ms. Hatheway was 62 years old; which is a 15
year difference of age between the two. 9 After raising that issue with Dr. Olsson and the Dean,
and stating that she believed that it was based on her age, Ms. Hatheway was denied a remedy.
Second, after complaining about that issue after President White's speech about older
workers needing to retire, and Dr. Olsson's ageist comments, the University began a pattern of
behavior conduct and comments that materially affected the compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of Ms. Hatheway's employment. This included, but is not limited to, isolating her,

8 When an employee presents direct evidence to support his or her disparate treatment claim, the COUlt will not
apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis (which is discllssed below in section V.B.2), See Enlow v.,
389 F.3d at 812 (stating that when a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment based on direct evidence in an ADEA
claim, we do not apply the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
93 s,Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U,S. Ill, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985),
the Supreme Comt instructed that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct
evidence of discrimination,").

The fact that Ms. Allen was over 40 years of age, i.e., she herself was in the protected class for age discrimination
is not probative, Case law provides that the fact that an individual loses out to another individual in the same
protected class is irrelevant, so long as the individual is being discriminated against based on their age. O'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp .. 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996).
9
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keeping her out of the loop of communications, changing her work area without her notice,
failing to follow-up and having required meetings with Ms. Hatheway, and taking away several
of her essential job duties and responsibilities. The University admits that they did not follow~up
on some of the required meetings and that they rearranged her work area. They also admit that
Ms. Hatheway had some of her essential job duties and responsibilities removed from her.
"[S]ignificantly diminished material responsibilities" is an indication of a material adverse
employment action.

Waterman,146 Idaho at 672-673, citing Burlington Industries, Inc. v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
Third, after raising her issues with regards to her pay and stating that she believed the
disparity was based on her age (and President White and Dr. Olsson's ageist comments), and
receiving negative conduct and actions within the office, Ms. Hatheway received back to back
poor annual evaluations, the first ever in her entire professional career. The evaluations were
completely subjective and Ms. Hatheway has presented evidence, that when viewed in a light
most favorably to her, shows they were untrue.

This resulted in Ms. Hatheway being

disqualified for an automatic pay raise and being on probation (according to the University's
polices). The evaluation, coupled with the PDP was "a final verbal warning," Accordingly, this
direct, undisputed evidence alone clearly establish an adverse employment action to survive
summary judgment on that element of Ms. Hatheway'S claims.
The facts and evidence discussed above further create a material issue of fact that
Ms. Hatheway was constructively discharged. That is, a reasonable jury could clearly conclude
that Ms. Hatheway'S working conditions became so intolerable that a reasonable person in her
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shoes would have felt compelled to resign. Those facts and evidence include, but not limited to:
(1) being denied a pay raise due to a younger, less tenured, less hay points individual receiving a

larger pay rate; (2) receiving back to back needs-to-improve evaluations based on false and
erroneous allegations which resulted in being eligible for probation and being disqualified for her
automatic pay raises after complaining about perceived age discrimination; (3) having
Ms. Hatheway's supervisor and the University tell her and/or hearing comments such as "keep
quiet and suck it up," "move on," "are you coming back" (suggesting she should retire), that they
were going to "replace" Ms. Hatheway," they had her under "continued surveillance," admitting
that Dr. Olsson wanted a "young and energetic" employee, and being asked "why don't you get
another job ... do you like your job ... how long are you going to stay?," (4) being placed in
isolation. being removed from the loop of necessary communication. not being followed-up with
required meetings, having her work space rearranged without her knowledge, and having
essential job duties and responsibilities taken from Ms. Hatheway; and (5) having
Ms. Hatheway's doctor place her off of work due to the bodily, mental and emotional symptoms,
including physical manifestations such as the dizziness and rise in blood pressure, Ms. Hatheway
was suffering from the stress and anxiety that was being caused by the University.
Based on the above, it is plain that there were genuine issues of material fact created by
the direct evidence on the issue of whether Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse employment actions
and/or was constructive discharged; therefore the District Court's grant of summary judgment on
that basis was erroneous and the Supreme Court should reverse the Opinion and Order.
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(b)

The facts and evidence provided by Ms. Hatheway further establish
that these adverse employment actions lead to constructive discharge
were based on discriminatory animus.

Ms. Hatheway presented directed statements by persons involved in the decision-making
process, President White and Dr. Olsson that directly reflect discriminatory attitude against age.
This is sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that Ms. Hatheway's age and/or her reporting
of age discrimination was the cause of her adverse employment actions.

Yet, despite the

standard that the facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Hatheway, that
credibility determinations are not to be made on summary judgmene O, and that all inferences are
to be made for the non-moving party, the District Court abused its discretion and found that Ms.
Hatheway had not provided direct evidence on the University's and Dr. Olsson's age biased
motive and intent. This was in error.
First, Defendants do not deny all of the ageist comments made in this case; however, they
stated that Plaintiff could not survive summary judgment because said comments were "stray
comments" and Ms. Hatheway could not establish a nexus for them to the adverse actions.
Ultimately the court agreed with the University that the ageist comments were allegedly "stray
comments. "
While "stray remarks" by non-decisiolID1akers or by decision makers unrelated to the
decision process are given less weight, courts do recognize the weight given is somewhat
dependent on whether the comments are temporally remote from the date of decision.

See,

J 0 As stated above, it is not with in the court's province on summary judgment to assess the credibility of an affiant
or deponent as credibility is left for the trier of fact at trial. Sohn, 125 Idaho at 171.
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Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992).

While

comments can be made without suggesting age discrimination, "like any remarks, they must be
viewed in context, along with the specific language used and the number of times the comments
were made." Schug v. The Pyne-Davidson Co., No. 2001 WL 34312877, at *5 CD.Conn. 2001).
As the Ninth Circuit Court stated in a recent age discrimination case that "[ d]etermining whether
the comments were, in fact, innocuous or, in fact, a sign of bias belongs to the jury." Troy v.
Standard Ins. Co., 24 Fed.Appx. 801,803 (9th Cir. 2001).
As the facts provided above offer, especially when viewed in the light most favorably to
Ms. Hatheway, there were several age andlor age discrimination retaliation related comments
made in this case which were not stray comments, but instead is direct evidence of age biased
intent and motive, all temporally related to her declining treatment, evaluations and pay. Some
of those comments included, but are not necessarily limited to: (1) "we also have a
responsibility, individually and collectively, to retire. And when we get to that point in life where
we're not as productive, where it'll help the University and our program that we care so deeply
about, recruit a young entry-level or mid-career person. It is time to get out of the way."; (2)
"keep quiet and suck it up,"; (3) "move on,"; (4) "are you coming back" (suggesting
Ms. Hatheway should retire); (5) that they were going to "replace" Ms. Hatheway:" (6) they had
Ms. Hatheway under "continued surveillance:" (7) Dr. Olsson wanted a "young and energetic"
employee; and "no" he would not consider a qualified older worker (8) and being asked "why
don't you get another j ob ... do you like your job ... how long are you going to stay?"
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All of the above comments clearly give rise to the inference of anti-age bias and/or age
discrimination retaliation, which created a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment.
See, e.g., Greenberg v. Union Camp Co.!1'...;., 48 FJd 22, 28-29 (1 st Cir. 1995), citing Calhoun v.
Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (lst Cir.1986) (stating in pertinent part that repeated
and/or coercive inquiries can clearly give rise to a reasonable inference of an anti-age bias (and
lend support to a finding of constructive discharge), see Calhoun, 798 F.2d at 562-63 (three
inquires over seven months coupled with demotion requiring employee to report to younger
person employee had previously trained, and threat of onerous working conditions if no
resignation).
Additionally, the first of those comments were made by former University president
Timothy P. White during his State of the University Address. The facts and evidence of this case
show that the President's speech was made on or about May 1, 2006, right before the time that
the adverse employment conducts started to occur against Ms. Hatheway.

President White's

comments were also made shortly before Dr. Olsson's similar "young" comments reflecting age
discriminatory animus were made at the Faculty meeting. The comments made by President
White during his State of the University Address concerning age were made in the open to all
University employees, were made as the senior decision-maker of the University and were made
regarding assignments, promotions and university policies. The remarks made by him were not
merely general observations or loose comments, but rather were statements meant to have
purpose and policy at the University, and to cause older University employees to retire.
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This power and influence is evidenced by the treatment of Ms. Hatheway.

The

reasonable inference that can be drawn is that President White's comments and position on age
and retirement were intended, and ultimately did shape and influence the intentions of the
University's decision-makers attitude toward its older workers. That intention and attitude of the
University decision-makers was for older retirement age University employees to retire and
allow the University to hire "young, entry-level or mid-career persons" to replace them. That is
exactly what occurred in this case.

First, Dr. Olsson stated that he would only consider a

"young" person for the MFA position. The individual hired for that position was thirty-six years
old, below the protected classification for age.

Then, after Dr. Olsson successfully forced

Ms. Hatheway into retirement, he was able to hire a "young" replacement for her, Ms. Brittney
Carmen.

At the time of her hire, Ms. Carmen was thirty-two years old, again below the

protected classification of age.
Furthermore, when the fact section above is set out in sequential order, the direct
evidence establishes a temporal relationship between the comments and the adverse employment
action(s) Ms. Hatheway suffered,

Temporal relationships create a sufficient nexus.

The

President's speech occurred right before Ms. Hatheway began to suffer the negative treatment
and conduct. including, but not limited to, the isolation, lack of communication and removal of
some of her essential job duties. Then, Dr. Olsson's comments about a "young and energetic"
employee occurred right before her first poor evaluation. Lastly, the other age related comments
occurred as Ms. Hatheway was being subjected to a hostile work environment after Ms.
Hatheway reported her belief of Age Discrimination and in the form of two poor annual
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evaluations, removal of some of her essential job duties, and being set-up for failure in her
position by Dr. Olsson by isolating and keeping her out of the loop of communications.
Therefore, the District Court's grant of summary judgment was improper and should be reversed.

2.

In addition to the direct evidence, Ms. Hatheway'S age discrimination
claim and constructive discharge claim must not be dismissed on
summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis.

Even assuming that the evidence of genuine issues of fact of age discrimination, hostile
work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge in this case was not sufficiently
"direct," the COUli should not have granted summary judgment in favor of the University under
the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test.

At the summary judgment stage in age

employment discrimination cases, where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, courts,
including the Ninth Circuit (citing Gross) still use the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See, e.g.,
Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 607·08 (9th Cil'. 2012). Courts in the Ninth Circuit recognize
that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for age discrimination claims under both
the ADEA and the IHRA where an employee must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove
disparate treatment. Enlow, 389 F.3d at 812.
The McDonnell Douglas is simply "a tool to assist plaintiffs at the summary judgment
stage so that they may reach trial .. , [I]t is not normally appropriate to introduce the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework

10

the jury." Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855

(9th Cir.2002). The McDonnell Douglas test is if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, '[ t]he
burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer to articulate some
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions.' Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgn1t., Inc.,
615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Chuang, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir.2000)).
"If defendant meets this burden, plaintiffs must then raise a triable issue of material fact as to
whether the defendant's proffered reasons for their terminations are mere pretext for unlawful
discrimination." Id.
A plaintiff can prove pretext (1) indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is 'unworthy of credence' because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not
believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the
employer. Shelley, 666 F.3d at 609. See, also Morrow v. Bard Access Sys., Inc., 2011 WL
2471525 (D. Or. 2011) (wherein a plaintiff who contended that age, not misconduct, was the
reason for his termination, survived summary judgment when the plaintiff largely relied on his
own affidavit, in which he describes statements made by several of defendant's managers that
may be construed as demonstrating age bias; the court held that at a summary judgment
proceeding, the veracity of plaintiffs testimony was not before the court, accepted the plaintiffs
testimony as true for purposes of the pending motion, and found that a reasonable trier of fact
could find that plaintiffs termination was an unlawful employment practice).
Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to this case, Ms. Hatheway
must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58
F.3d 454, 456 (9th Cir. 1995). As set forth above, taking Ms. Hatheway'S evidence as true, and
giving the benefit of all inferences, there is ample evidence in the record to create a genuine issue
of material fact on each element of the prima facie case of age discrimination.
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The burden then shifts to the employer, the University of Idaho, to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. It was the University's position on its
motion for summary judgment, which ultimately the District Court agreed, that its basis for its
adverse employment actions were that Ms. Hatheway was simpJy an unhappy employee who
disliked her co-workers and the poor evaluations were justified. The University argued thereby,
and the District Court wrongly agreed that Ms. Hatheway then could not establish her claims
because of their proffered non-discriminatory reason.
However, Ms. Hatheway provided sufficient evidence to rebut andlor at least create
issues of material fact that the University's reasons for its adverse employment actions were not
believable, inconsistent, and were in fact false (pretextual). Ms. Hatheway presented evidence
that, when viewed in the light most favorable to her, shows that she was actually an exceptional
employee, who was not disgruntled, and that the poor evaluations were not factually justified.
The argument that Defendants' alleged non-discriminatory reason is in fact a pretext to
discrimination is bolstered by the undisputed evidence that Ms. Hatheway was a highly regarded
University employee who had been nominated for numerous University awards, always received
excellent yearly evaluations and had an impeccable work history up to the point of the
discrimination and retaliation occurred.
In her last yearly evaluation given to Ms. Hatheway by Dr. Barber, it rated her as
outstanding. In her last yearly evaluation give to Ms. Hatheway before the discrimination and
retaliation began, Dr. Olsson rated Ms. Hatheway also as outstanding.

Yet, after the ageist

comments by Dr. White and Dr. Olsson were made, and Ms. Hatheway'S complaints thereof,

41

Ms. Hatheway then received in her very next annual evaluation an overall rate of below
expectations, placing her on probation and denying her an automatic state pay raise. The timing
of this is a significant circumstantial fact because the only two real matters that occurred between
these evaluations were the Faculty meeting and Prcsident White's speech. It is implausible and
inherently inconsistent to state on one hand that Ms. Hatheway was a bad employee who neededto-improve, and on the other receive nominations for the outstanding employee of the year.
Accordingly, the circumstantial evidence of Ms. Hatheway's superior work history, the positive
comments made by her peers, and the recognition for her outstanding work during the same time
that she was receiving the adverse employment actions against her, tends

to

show that the

Defendants' reason for the adverse employment action against Ms. Hatheway was really a
pretext to discrimination.
Even Defendants' proffered reason for its adverse employment actions against
Ms. Hatheway, i.e. a personality conflict with Ms. Allen and being an unhappy employee which
allegedly resulted in misconduct by Ms. Hatheway, creates a genuine issue of material fact still
exists on that issue. Stated plainly, there are two competing inferences that can be drawn from
the evidence, the University's and Ms. Hatheway'S.

Ms. Hatheway's reasonable competing

inference from the evidence is that it was Ms. Hatheway'S age andior her reporting of age
discrimination was the basis for the negative reviews and the negative actionsiconduct she
received fr0111 the University which forced her to retire.

Consequently, two competing

reasonable inferences create a question of fact that can only be decided by the trier of fact.
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Moreover, if the facts and evidence establish that Ms. Hatheway was an unhappy
employee, it was due to the fact that she was being subjected to discrimination and retaliation
because in paxt the bases for her poor evaluations were false and/or lacked merit. The University
cannot use Ms. Hatheway's proper reporting or discussions of her treatment as proof of her lack
of "teamwork," and then use it as the basis for her poor treatment. And, that issue is a question
of credibility which requires a subjective analysis, one that the District COUIt was not allowed to
make, yet did regardless. As stated in the standard of review section above, in reviewing such
credibility and subjective documents in a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, Ms. Hatheway, and the Court must
not make credibility determinations. See, e.g., Stansbury v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Serv.,
Inc., 128 Idaho 682, 685-86 (1996) (wherein the Idaho Supreme COUIt in a discrimination case
took all of a non-moving plaintiffs assertions to be true, and held, in light of a factual dispute, to
vacate a district court's entry of summary judgment against the plaintiff).
As a result of the above arguments, and based upon the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the
District COtllt's grant of summary judgment was wrong and should be overturned.
C.

Issues of fact existed on Ms. Hatheway's hostile work environment claim to
preclude summary judgment.

To prevail at trial on her hostile work environment age discrimination claim,
Ms. Hatheway must show: (1) she was subject to verbal or physical conduct of a [age
discriminatory} nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; (3) that the conduct was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive
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working environment; and that (4) the employer ratified, knew, or should have known about the
conduct. Like hostile work environment claims brought under Title VII, employees who allege a
hostile work environment under the ADEA must prove the existence of severe or pervasive and
unwelcome

verbal

or

physical

harassment

because

of the

employee's

age.

See

Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1109 (superseded by statute on other grounds) (recognizing a
claim for a hostile work environment based on age under the ADEA).
The facts and evidence suppOlting the constructive discharge claim from the materials
submitted at the motion for summary judgment also supports that the District Court should not
have granted summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway'S hostile work environment claim. The facts
and evidence brought forth by Ms. Hatheway, when considered true, and viewed in the light
most favorably to her establish that there are genuine issues of material fact a reasonable jury
could use to conclude that: (1) Ms. Hatheway was subjected to verbal or physical conduct
because of her age; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome, as evidenced by her numerous
complaints about it and ultimately being forced to retire; (3) that the conduct was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to aIter the conditions of the Plaintiff's employment and create an abusive
working environment, which is also evidence by the fact that there was an abusive working
environment that caused Ms. Hatheway to suffer bodily, mental and emotional harm, which
necessitated medical treatment, and Jeft her no reasonable cboice but to quit; and that (4) the
employer ratified, knew, or should have known about the conduct at issue but failed to take
action or took insufficient action to prevent it, as evidenced by Ms. Hatheway'S early and often
complaints to Dr. Olsson, the Dean, and to the IHRC of the age discriminatory conduct, which
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continued up through the point of her retirement. Therefore, the University of Idaho's motion
for summary judgment on this claim was also improperly granted.
D.

Issues of fact existed on Ms. Hatheway's retaliation claim to preclude
summary judgment.

To prevail at trial on her retaliation claim, Ms. Hatheway must show that she was
discriminated against because she "opposed any practice made unlawful by this chapter [the
IHRA] or because such individual has made a charge, testified, assisted, or patticipated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter." Patterson v. State,
Dept. of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 318 (2011); I.C. § 67-5911. Case law provides that
the prima facie elements Ms. Hatheway must show for a retaliation claim are a (1) protected
activity, (2) adverse employment action, and (3) causation. Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350
F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2003).
"Protected activities include: (1) opposing an unlawful employment practice; and (2)
participating in a statutorily authorized proceeding." E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002). It is not disputed that Ms. Hatheway engaged in
protected activities by both opposing a (disputed) unlawful employment practice, and also
participated in a statutorily authorized proceeding.
Generally under retaliation claims, an "adverse employment action" is "any adverse
treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party
or others from engaging in a protected activity." &!Lv. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th
Cir. 2000).

This definition includes actions "materially affect[ing] compensation, terms,
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conditions, or privileges" of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); Kortan v. CaL Youth
Auth., 2 17 FJd 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000). The direct evidence in this case establishes that Ms.
Hatheway both opposed an unlawful employment practice, but also participated in a statutorily
authorized proceeding when she filed her Idaho Human Rights Complaint.

Direct evidence

establishes that ShOlily thereafter, Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse employment actions including
poor evaluations, isolation, failure to receive increase in pay, and removal of her employment
duties.
Further, direct and circumstantial evidence shows that the reasons for the adverse
employment actions were false, and the timing and nexus of those actions creates a question of
fact on the issue of causation. Causation is generally held to be a question of fact that can only
be determined by a trier of fact. See

~

Ennis v. Boundary County, 2010 WL 2813361 (D.

Idaho July 15, 2010) (holding on a summary judgment motion on a retaliation claim that the
"element of causation [is] purely a question of fact.) Thereby, thcre is, at the very least, material
questions of fact surrounding the timing and motive/intent of those adverse actions which only
took place after Ms. Hatheway reported her beliefs that she was suffering from age
discrimination; this then must necessarily preclude summary judgment

E.

There are genuine issues of material fact which should have precluded
summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim.

The District Court improperly dismissed Ms. Hatheway'S negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim because it found the University did not engage in age discrimination,
hostile work environment, or retaliation, and as result, found that there was no duty that was
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breached. The District Court's determination on this issue was wrong because Ms. Hatheway
clearly raises genuine issues of material facts on her age discrimination, hostile work
environment, and retaliation claims. Thereby, according to the District Court's own logic and
analysis in granting summary judgment, summary judgment on appeal must be reversed.
Moreover, Ms. Hatheway's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim arises out of
the tortious conduct involved in the age discrimination, the hostile work environment, retaliation
and constructive discharge by the wrongful handling of the allegations of her alleged misconduct
and the failure by the University to act with care towards Ms. Hatheway. In wrongful discharge
cases, claims of infliction of emotional distress are allowed if the facts of the case support such a
claim in addition to the other claims. See, e.g., Olson v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 134 Idaho 778, 78384, (2000); Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 211 (2002).
Ms. Hatheway's claim of NIED is rooted in the false and pretextual documents and
statements contained in her evaluations, along with the University's tortious conduct towards
Ms. Hatheway by the harmful words and conduct/actions taken against her. Defendants have a
common law duty of due care to not cause harm and damages to Ms. Hatheway. The University
breached its duties to Ms. Hatheway by their wrongful tortious conduct, which caused physical
manifestations of Ms. Hatheway's emotional distress.

Therefore, summary judgment on

Ms. Hatheway's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim should not have been granted.
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v.
reasons,

reverse
summary judgment and

Idaho's motion

the case
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Manriquez and Fernando Manriquez,
children under 18 years ofage, PlaintiffAppellant,

In reviewing order of summary judgment, court
liberally construes record in light most favorable
to party opposing motion, drawing all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.

v.
Dale Brent WAHLQUIST and the State of
Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare,
a governmental agency, DefendantsRespondents.
No.

21070.

I Feb. 23, 1995.

Motorist injured in collision with vehicle driven by state
employee brought action against state under Tort Claims
Act. After state moved for summary judgment based on
failure to provide notice within 180 days as required by
Act, motorist moved to compel discovery, and the Fifth
1.,
Judicial District Court, Cassia County, 1.
denied motorist's motion to compel pending resolution of
state's motion and subsequently granted summary
judgment. Motorist appealed, and the Supreme Court,
J., held that: (1) claim was barred due to motorist's
failure to give notice even though state insurance adjuster
had notice that motorist intended to seek medical attention
for injuries; (2) fact that motorist was illiterate in English
did not affect applicability of notice requirement; and (3)
trial court did not abuse discretion in suspending discovery
pending resolution of potentially dispositive motion.

Claim by motorist injured in collision with state
employee against state under Tort Claims Act
was barred where motorist failed to provide
notice to state within 180 days as required by
Act, even though insurance adjuster for state was
aware that motorist was considering seeking
medical treatment within one week after accident
and motorist was illiterate in English and could
not read notice sent to her by state shortly after
accident informing her of steps required to bring
claim under Act.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (7)

On appeal from order of summary judgment,
standard of review is same as standard used by
district court in ruling on motion for summary
judgment.

Notice of potential insurance claim does not
constitute notice to state of claim against state
and its employees for any act or omission of
employee within course or scope of his
employment as required by Tort Claims Act.
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Justice.

Insurance company's awareness of accident or
medical expenses does not relieve claimant of
burden to file timely notice of tort claim with
appropriate governmental entity in order to
recover under Tort Claims Act.

Control of discovery is within discretion of trial
court.

This is an appeal from an order granting summary
judgment and dismissing with prejudice the appellant's tort
action against the State of Idaho and its employee arising
out of an automobile accident. The district judge held that
the appellant failed to serve a notice of tort claim on the
State of Idaho within the 180 day time limit as required by
the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The appellant also appeals from
an order denying a motion to compel production of
documents and granting the respondents' motion for a
protective order. We affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
suspending discovery in action under Tort
Claims Act pending resolution of potentially
dispositive motion for summary judgment based
on claimant's failure to provide notice to state of
claim within 180 days as required by Act where
claimant admittedly took no steps during 180
days after accident to notify state of claim other
than speaking to state insurance adjuster and
information sought through discovery was
immaterial to motion for summary judgment.

Attorneys and Law Firms

On August 19, 1991, the appellant Blanca Estela Avila and
her children, Selma Manriquez and Fernando Manriquez
(collectively Avila) were involved in a traffic accident
when a vehicle driven by respondent Dale Brent Wahlquist
(Wahlquist) rear-ended Avila's vehicle. Wahlquist was an
employee of respondent Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare (H & W), and was driving a state-owned vehicle
while returning from state business at the time of the
accident (Wahlquist and H & W collectively respondents).
Within a week of the accident, Kris Michalk (Michalk), an
insurance adjuster hired by the state's Bureau of Risk
Management, visited Avila's home to take her statement
and photographs of her automobile. According to Avila's
affidavit:
... in the course of the representative's
investigation, the representative asked
me questions regarding the occurrence of
the traffic collision and informed me that
the State would be handling the damages
which had occurred to me .... [D]uring
**333 *747 our conversation, I informed
the representative that I had not been
feeling well as a result of the accident
and that I would be seeking medical
treatment.

**332 *746 Raymundo Pena, Rupert, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. and Hall, Farley, Oberrecht
& Blanton, Boise, for respondents.
argued.
Opinion

Following this meeting, Michalk wrote to Avila, in a letter
dated August 27, 1991, informing her that if she wished to
make a claim against the state of Idaho, she needed to fill
out and file a notice of tort claim with the Idaho Secretary
of State's office. The letter also notified Avila that the
notice had to be filed within 180 days of the accident.
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Michalk enclosed a notice of tort claim form with the
letter. A vila claims she is illiterate in the English language
and did not understand the adjuster's instructions regarding
filing a written claim.
Avila filed a tort claim notice with the Secretary of State's
office on May 28, 1992, approximately nine months after
the accident, and filed a complaint for damages in
September 1992. In answering the complaint, respondents
raised the affirmative defense that A vila failed to file a
timely tort claim notice pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims
Act, and later filed a motion for summary judgment.
Thereafter, A vila filed a discovery request seeking, among
other things, a copy of all investigative reports,
memoranda, documents, and photographs executed by any
employee of H & W regarding the adjustment of Avila's
claim. Respondents objected to this request on the grounds
that these items were protected from discovery pursuant to
the attorney/client privilege, and by the work product
doctrine, as these items belonged in the claim file of the
Bureau of Risk Management. Avila filed a motion to
compel production of the requested documents, and a
notice of deposition by subpoena duces tecum of Michalk,
requiring her to bring with her to the deposition the
specified documents. Respondents filed a motion for
protective order to prevent the deposition of Michalk.
Following a hearing in June 1993, the district court denied
Avila's motion to compel and provisionally granted
respondents' motion for protective order pending
resolution of respondents' motion for summary judgment.
After hearing arguments on the motion for summary
judgment, the district court issued its Opinion and Order on
October 21, 1993, granting the motion. Avila appeals both
the order denying the motion to compel, and the order
granting summary judgment.

II.

ST ANDARD OF REVIEW

pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to ajudgment as a matter oflaw."

III.
180-DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT

The Idaho Tort Claims Act states that "[n]o claim or action
shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its
employee unless the claim has been presented and filed
within the time limits prescribed by this act."
The Act establishes a 180-day time limit to file a claim:
All claims against the state arising under
the provisions of this act and all claims
against an employee of the state for any
act or omission of the employee within
the course or scope of his employment
shall be presented to and filed with the
secretary of state within one hundred
eighty (180) days from the date the claim
arose or reasonably should have been
discovered, whichever is later.
All such claims must "accurately describe the
conduct and circumstances **334 *748 which brought
about the injury or damage, describe the injury or damage,
state the time and place the injury or damage occurred,
state the names of all persons involved, if known, and shall
contain the amount of damages claimed, together with a
statement of the actual residence of the claimant...."

The accident occurred on August 19, 1991. The notice of
tort claim was filed with the state on May 28, 1992, over
nine months later. Accordingly, Avila's claim is barred
unless she gave some other notice within the 180 day time
period. A vila argues that the state knew ofthe existence of
the accident and sent an adjuster to investigate the claim,
and therefore, the state was on notice and was not
prejudiced in its ability to investigate or process the claim.
A vila argues that written or oral notice may be sufficient to
§
as long as the
satisfy the notice provisions of
State is not prejudiced by the manner of imparting notice.
Citing

[31 This Court recently rejected a similar argument in
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and will start the running of the 120-day period.") The
letter dated August 27, 1991 from the insurance adjuster
advising Avila of the necessity of filing a notice of tort
claim, even if Avila was unable to read it, was sufficient to
put Avila on inquiry notice as to the contents of the letter.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of respondents for Avila's failure to file a timely
notice of tort claim.

The holding in Sysco, that notice of a
potential claim to a governmental
entity's insurer constitutes substantial
compliance with the ITCA notice
requirements, was not necessary to the
disposition of Pounds, and the reference
in that opinion to the Sysco rationale was
dicta.
Friel at 31. Likewise, Avila's reliance on Huff is
unavailing. The claimant in Huffwent to the governmental
entity and presented written repair estimates, discussed the
claim with the secretary treasurer of the governmental
entity, and followed up with at least two telephone calls.
The Huff court held that the governmental entity "was
clearly apprised of the fact that a claim was being
prosecuted against it, and the amount thereof."
By contrast, Avila never
notified the state that she was pursuing a tort claim and the
amount thereof, within the 180 day period. Avila's alleged
statements to the adjuster that she had not been feeling well
as a result of the accident and would be seeking medical
treatment were insufficient to "provide notice that she
intended to go a step farther by bringing a tort claim."

14j (5) Further, this Court has rejected the argument that
notice of a potential insurance claim constitutes notice of a
potential tort claim sufficient to satisfy

The same analysis applies under
An insurance company's awareness of an
accident or medical expenses does not relieve a claimant of
the burden to file a timely notice of tort claim with the
appropriate governmental entity.

**335 *749 IV.

MOTION TO COMPEL

Avila also contends that the district court erred in granting
provisionally respondents' motion for a protective order
and denying Avila's motion to compel, pending resolution
of the motion for summary judgment. Avila sought access
to the claim file of the Bureau of Risk Management to
determine what the state knew and the extent it was put on
notice.

16117) Control of discovery is within the discretion of the
trial court.
no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to
suspend discovery pending resolution of the potentially
dispositive summary judgment motion. Avila admittedly
took no affirmative steps during the 180 days after the
accident to notify the state of her tort claim, other than
speaking with Ms. Michalk when she investigated the
accident. The information in the claim file would be
immaterial to the motion to dismiss, because an insurance
company's information about an accident or medical
expenses does not relieve a claimant of the burden to file a
timely notice of tort claim with the appropriate
governmental entity.

V.

CONCLUSION

The district court's orders which granted summary
judgment in favor of respondents, and provisionally
granted respondents' motion for a protective order and
denied Avila's motion to compel are affirmed. In view of
our disposition of this case, we need not reach the other
issues and arguments raised by the parties on appeal. Costs
on appeal to respondents.

890 P.2d 331

C.J.,
and
WOODLAND, J. Pro Tern., concur.

JJ., and
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limitation period begins to run.
subd.4.

119 Idaho 539
Supreme Court ofIdaho ,
Twin Falls Nov. 1990 Term.

Ronald T. BONZ and Ruth I. Bonz,
husband and wife; Elbert L. Haye and
Margaret T. Haye, husband and wife;
Stanley V. Haye, Sr. and Joyce Ann Haye,
husband and wife; Larry Hughes and
Leslie L. Hughes, husband and wife;
Stanley V. Haye, Jr. and Patricia E. Haye,
husband and wife; and Jack A. Gibson, all
individually, Plainti£fs-Appellants,

v.
Jay D. SUDWEEKS, J. Dee May, Jon J.
Shindurling, Mark Stubbs, and L. Jay
Mitchell, individually and as partners of
Sudweeks, May, Shindurling, Stubbs &
Mitchell, a partnership and Sudweeks,
May, Shindurling, Stubbs and Mitchell, a
partnership, Defendants-Respondents.

7

Existence of a cloud on title to real property
which continued because of a failure to properly
record a release of lis pendens was not sufficient
damage for a professional malpractice action to
accrue; rather, damage did not occur, and cause
of action did not accrue, until investor learned of
cloud on the property and thereafter refused to
participate in a venture to develop the property.
subd.4.

No. 18335. I March 29,1991.
Suit was brought alleging professional malpractice. The
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County,
W.H.
1., granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant attorneys on ground that the action was
barred by the statute of limitations, and the plaintiffs
appealed. The Supreme Court,
1., held that
existence of a cloud on title to real property which
continued because of a failure to properly record a release
oflis pendens was not sufficient damage for a professional
malpractice action to accrue; rather, damage did not occur,
and cause of action did not accrue, until investor learned of
cloud on the property and thereafter refused to participate
in a venture to develop the property.
Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes (2)

There must be "some damage" before
professional malpractice action accrues and

Attorneys and Law Firms
**876 *539
pI ainti ffs-appe Ilants.

Jerome,

for

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Boise, for
defendants-respondents.
argued.
Opinion
BOYLE, Justice.

In this appeal we are called upon to determine whether the
existence of a cloud on the title to real property which
continued **877 *540 because of a failure to properly
record a release of lis pendens is sufficient damage for a
professional malpractice action to accrue.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' case on the basis that
the action had accrued at the time the cloud on title was
allowed to remain and the two-year statute oflimitations in
had expired prior to plaintiffs filing their
complaint. For reasons set forth herein, we reverse the
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
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The plaintiffs in this action were owners of real property
located in Jerome County, Idaho, at the intersection of
Interstate 84 and State Highway 93, and were former
clients of the attorneys and law firm named as defendants.
In early 1985, several real property transactions and
exchanges involving land in Lincoln County and Jerome
County, Idaho, occurred which resulted in litigation and,
relative to the instant appeal, the filing and recording of a
lis pendens on real property located in Jerome County.
Defendants in this action were attorneys retained in that
prior case to provide legal services to plaintiffs herein
related to the real property transactions and resulting
litigation. Negotiations between the parties in that prior
action resulted in settlement of the controversy and the
attorneys prepared settlement and dismissal documents,
together with a release of lis pendens intended to be
recorded in Jerome County. Following settlement of the
controversy a paralegal at defendants' law office mailed
the release of lis pendens to Lincoln County where it was
recorded. Unfortunately, the original lis pendens sought to
be released had been recorded in Jerome County and not in
Lincoln County. As a result, the original lis pendens filed
in Jerome County was not released and continued to be a
cloud on the title to plaintiffs' property.

In March, 1987, the cloud on the title of plaintiffs' Jerome
County real property was discovered by a third-party
investor who had intended to invest $300,000.00 in the
development of that property. As a result of the unreleased
lis pendens remaining on the county records, the
third-party investor refused to participate or have any
further involvement in the development of plaintiffs'
Jerome County property. The third-party investor did not
advise plaintiffs that the presence of the lis pendens was
the reason for withdrawing his offer of financial support
for development of the property. As a result, plaintiffs
were unable to obtain financing for the project.
In January, 1988, plaintiffs were not able to meet financial
obligations on a note secured by the Jerome County
property and a foreclosure action was commenced. In
April, 1988, it was discovered by the parties to this action
that the release of lis pendens had been recorded by the
attorneys in the wrong county. On January 6, 1989, this
action for damages alleging professional malpractice was
filed.
The following dates and events are crucial to the issues
presented in this appeal:
March 13, 1986 Release of Lis Pendens recorded in
Lincoln County
March, 1987 Third party investor learns of Lis

Pendens on Jerome County records and withdraws
offer of $300,000.00 financial investment III
plaintiffs' property
April, 1988 Plaintiffs discover Lis Pendens has not
been released from Jerome County records
January 6, 1989 Complaint in this action filed seeking
damages for professional malpractice
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the two-year statute of
limitations in
had expired prior to the
complaint being filed on January 6, 1989, because
plaintiffs had been damaged at the time of recording the
release of lis pendens in the wrong county on March 13,
1986. As a result of the cloud remaining on the title to the
Jerome County property on March 13, 1986, the trial court
held that plaintiffs could not freely transfer the property
and their action had accrued at that time.
**878 *541 For reasons set forth herein, we reverse the
trial court's granting of summary judgment and remand the
action for further proceedings.

I.

ST ANDARD FOR REVIEW-SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
"A motion for summary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

Standards applicable to summary judgment require the
district court and Supreme Court upon review, to liberally
construe facts in the existing record in favor of the
nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences
from the record in favor of the nonmoving party.

"[M]otions for summary judgment should be
granted with caution."
contains
conflicting inferences or reasonable minds might reach
different conclusions, a summary judgment must be
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to accrual of an action for statute of limitation purposes
was also addressed in

II.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE-ACCRUAL OF
ACTION
This is an action based on professional malpractice.
applicable statute of limitations contained in
provides that an action to recover damages for
professional malpractice must be commenced within two
years.
provides in pertinent part:
4. An action to recover damages for
professional malpractice, ... shall be
deemed to have accrued as of the time
of the occurrence, act or omission
complained of, and the limitation
period shall not be extended by reason
of any continuing consequences or
damages resulting therefrom or any
continuing professional or commercial
relationship between the injured party
and the alleged wrongdoer, ...

!11 Although not stated in the statute, this Court has
interpreted the law to require "some damage" before the
action accrues and the limitation period begins to run.
I
As
noted by a unanimous Court in Griggs v. Nash:
Having resolved that
is the applicable
statute of limitations in this case, we must then
determine when the action accrued. The statute provides
that actions for professional malpractice accrue "as of
the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained
of." Ifwe were to apply the statute strictly, the claims .. .
would clearly be barred. The alleged acts or omissions .. .
occurred in May 1984. Since the third-party complaint
was not filed until September of 1987, the statute would
bar the claims. However, in
this Court extended the date
for the accrual of actions **879 *542 for professional
malpractice where the negligence is continuing, until
the date that damage occurred
(Emphasis added.)
The requirement of "some damage" as a necessary element

This Court has dealt with the question of professional
malpractice in a number of recent cases. These cases
point out that while
points out that "the
cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the
time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of
... ," nevertheless until some damage occurs no cause of
action accrues for professional malpractice, even
though the "occurrence, act or omission complained of,"
which ultimately causes the damages, has occurred
earlier.
[21 The trial court held that the presence of the cloud on the
title to the Jerome County property constituted sufficient
damage for the plaintiffs' action to accrue and since the
complaint for professional malpractice was filed on
January 6, 1989, more than two years after March 13,
1986, when the release was filed in the wrong county, the
action was barred by the statute oflimitations.
The legal issue presented in the instant appeal is somewhat
similar to that presented in Griggs v. Nash, wherein we
first had occasion to define what "damage" is for purposes
of determining when the statute of limitations in
begins to run. The precise issue presented here is
whether the presence of the lis pendens as a cloud on the
title in and of itself, without some related or actual damage
to plaintiffs, is sufficient to cause the action to accrue.
Under the particular facts of this case we hold that the
cloud on the title is not damage sufficient to cause the
action to accrue.
Unlike Griggs and its predecessors the damage in this
instant appeal is not as easily ascertainable and
determined. In Griggs, the plaintiffs' damage was in the
form of expenses actually incurred for attorney fees. In the
early case
an action for architect malpractice, the plaintiff
suffered personal injury when she fell down an interior
stairway in an apartment complex. In
5
an action for medical
malpractice alleging negligent diagnosis of rubella, the
damage occurred at the time the infant was born with
congenital defects. In
an action for accounting malpractice, the
action did not accrue until an IRS assessment caused
damage to the taxpayers. In
an action for accounting
malpractice, the action did not accrue until damage
occurred after bankruptcy proceedings when it first
became apparent that the creditor plaintiff would not be
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an
action for legal malpractice, the action accrued for statute
oflimitation purposes when plaintifflost its opportunity to
secure post-bankruptcy confirmation interest on a secured
claim.

contemplated in
and our case law, until the
investor withdrew his financial support from the proposed
development venture.

III.
All of the above-cited cases have a common thread. The
damage, for statute of limitation purposes, occurred long
after the negligent act. The most poignant example is in
Stephens v. Stearns, where the personal injury occurred
several years after the negligent design ofthe stairway.
Applying the principles and rules of our case law to the
record before us, we conclude **880 *543 that the
proposed action against defendants accrued in March,
1987. Our review of the record clearly demonstrates that
the damage to plaintiffs did not occur when the release of
lis pendens was mistakenly recorded in Lincoln County.
Rather, the damage occurred in March, 1987, when the
investor learned of the cloud on the Jerome County
property and thereafter refused to participate in a venture
to develop the property. It was at the time the investor
refused to participate financially in the property
development that plaintiffs were damaged, rather than at
the time the release was inadvertently filed in the wrong
county.
The determination of what constitutes "damage" for
purposes of accrual of an action must be decided on the
circumstances presented in each individual case. In the
instant case there is no dispute as to dates or events
involved in the recording of the release of lis pendens or
filing of plaintiffs' action. Based on our review of the
record we hold that plaintiffs had suffered no damage, as

CONCLUSION
Under the rule established and adopted in Stephens v.
Stearns, and refined in our other cases, we therefore hold
that plaintiffs did not suffer damages, as contemplated in
and their action did not accrue until
withdrawal of the investor's financial support in March,
1987. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations of
does not bar plaintiffs' action for alleged
professional malpractice because their complaint was filed
within two years of the date the financing was withdrawn.
We reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment
and remand. Costs to appellants. No attorney fees awarded
on appeal.

BAKES,

c.J., and BISTLINE,
JJ., concur.

and

Parallel Citations
808 P.2d 876

Footnotes
The requirement of "some damage" before an action accrues has its origin in .melm,""S
In Stephens this Court stated, "[a]s a general rule the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a negligence action until some
damage has occurred. W. Prosser, Handbook a/the Law a/Torts § 301 (4th ed. 1971)." (Emphasis added.)

The recent cases referred to in Treasure Valley v. Killen & Pittenger, P.A,
I
(accountant malpractice);
(physician medical malpractice);
(architect
malpractice). In all of these professional malpractice cases, the Court has required some damage to the plaintiff before the action
accrues and the applicable statute of limitations begins to run.

816 P.2d 1009

120 Idaho 452
Court ofAppeals of Idaho.

Alfred J. BOWEN and CherylA. Bowen,
husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

Failure to issue interlocutory appeal certificate
until after request for certification was made by
appellant and his motion was heard by court was
not abuse of discretion.

David J. HETH, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18326. I Aug. 2, 1991. I Petitionfor
Review Denied Oct. 3,1991.
Prospective vendors sought release of funds held in
escrow. The First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County,
Richard G. Magnuson, 1., granted partial summary
judgment for vendors, and purchaser appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Winmill, J. pro tern., held that prospective
vendors of property were entitled to return of funds
escrowed to protect potential purchaser from sale to third
party while he investigated property's development
potential, when purchaser failed to make offer within
requisite 90 days, notwithstanding vendors' alleged failure
to provide purchaser with information necessary for his
investigation, where agreement did not expressly condition
return of funds upon vendors' cooperation.

Breach of contract plaintiffs who prevailed on
interlocutory appeal taken by defendant were
entitled to recover attorney fees even though
defendant might ultimately be found to be
prevailing party after trial on his counterclaim.
20(3).

Affirmed.
Attorneys and Law Firms
West Headnotes (3)

**1009 *452

Coeur d'Alene, for

defendant-appellant.
&
Annis,
Lukins
plaintiffs-respondents.

Prospective vendors of property were entitled to
return of funds escrowed to protect potential
purchaser from sale to third party while he
investigated property's development potential,
when purchaser failed to make offer within
requisite 90 days, notwithstanding vendors'
alleged failure to provide purchaser with
information necessary for his investigation,
where agreement did not expressly condition
return of funds upon vendors' cooperation.

Coeur

d' Alene,
argued.

for

Opinion
WINMILL, Judge, Pro Tern.

This is an appeal from a certified, partial summary
judgment ordering the release of funds held in escrow. For
reasons explained below, we affirm.
Alfred Bowen and Cheryl Bowen own real property
located in Coeur d' Alene, adjacent to the Spokane River,
and commonly known as the Harbor Center. In early 1987,
David Heth made inquiries about purchasing the property,
but determined that before making an offer he would
require time to further investigate the property **1010
*453 and its development potential. Concerned that the
property might be sold to a third party after he had
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expended considerable time and money in his
investigation, Heth persuaded the Bowens to enter into an
escrow agreement which would protect him from such an
eventuality.

On review of an order granting summary judgment, our
task is to determine whether there are genuine issues of
material fact and, if not, whether the prevailing party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The agreement required that Heth immediately commence
an investigation of the property and that the Bowens
cooperate with that investigation. The agreement also
provided that the Bowens would, upon execution of the
agreement, deposit $22,500 in an escrow account. The
agreement detailed the disposition of the escrowed funds.
In the event Heth failed to make an offer within ninety days
or made an offer within that time frame which was later
consummated, the escrow would be closed and the funds
returned to the Bowens. On the other hand, if an offer was
made by a third party during the same ninety-day period
which resulted in a sale of the property, or Heth made a
reasonable offer which was rejected by the Bowens, then
the funds would be disbursed to Heth. The agreement also
provided that any dispute between the parties as to whether
Heth's offer was "reasonable" would be resolved by
arbitration.

In this case, the facts crucial to the
district court's decision were undisputed. The agreement
provided that the funds would be returned to the Bowens if
Heth failed to make an offer for the property within ninety
days. It was undisputed that Heth failed to make such an
offer. Thus, the court determined that, as a matter of law,
the Bowens were entitled to a return of the funds.

Heth did not make an offer within ninety days. The
Bowens then filed this action to obtain an order directing
the escrow agent to disburse the funds to the Bowens. Heth
filed a counterclaim, alleging that the Bowens failed to
supply him with information necessary to value the
property, and thereby breached the provision of the
agreement which required that the Bowens cooperate with
Heth in his investigation of the property. The counterclaim
requested that judgment be entered against the Bowens for
$22,500.
The Bowens moved for partial summary judgment on their
claim for the return of the funds. Following a hearing, the
motion was granted and the escrow agent was directed to
close the escrow and return the funds to the Bowens. Heth
then filed an objection to the court's order, requesting a
modification of the language used by the court or a
certification of the order for immediate appeal pursuant to
The court granted the latter request and a
certification was attached to the partial
summary judgment. This appeal followed.
Heth raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that the
district court erred in granting partial summary judgment
in the face of his contention that the Bowens had violated
an express provision of the contract. Second, Heth argues
that the district court erred in failing to initially attach a
certificate to the order granting partial summary
judgment. For the reasons stated below, we find no merit in
either contention and affirm the decision of the district
court.

III Heth contends, however, that the Bowens were not
entitled to the funds because they allegedly breached an
express provision of the agreement by failing to provide
him with information necessary for his investigation.
Nothing in the express language of the agreement supports
Heth's argument. While the agreement did require that the
Bowens cooperate in the investigation, compliance with
that requirement was not stated as a condition of the return
of the funds. Rather, the agreement was clear and specific
that on the ninety-first day after the agreement was
executed, the funds would be returned to the Bowens if
Heth had not made an offer on the property. The agreement
imposed no other condition for the return of the **1011
*454 funds. Absent fraud or overreaching, which has not
been alleged here, the courts cannot modifY the express
terms of an agreement upon which competent parties have
agreed. Lupis v. Peoples Mortgage Co., supra;

Heth argues that even if the agreement does not expressly
so provide, it is a necessary implication of the agreement
that the Bowens would not be entitled to a return of the
funds if they failed to cooperate with Heth's investigation.
Relying on our Supreme Court's decision in
I
Heth suggests that such a proviso can be
read into the contract as part of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. While the Supreme Court in
Davis recognized that a contract should be construed to
include such implied provisions as are necessary to
effectuate the intention of the parties, the Court also
suggested that such terms may only be implied where the
contract is silent on the issue in question.
I
Here, the agreement is explicit in stating
that the funds must be returned to the Bowens if Heth
failed to make an offer on the property within the
agreed-upon time frame. No other conditions were
imposed. The Court cannot accept Heth's invitation to read
additional conditions into the agreement by implication,
because to do so would contradict the parties' clearly
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stated intent.
In summary, we conclude that the parties' agreement did
not expressly condition the return of the funds upon the
Bowens' cooperation with Heth's investigation of the
property. Nor can such a condition be implied as necessary
to effectuate the intent of the parties. Heth is still able to
pursue his counterclaim against the Bowens for breach of
contract. However, he is not entitled to prevent the close of
the escrow and the return of the funds while that claim is
resolved in further court proceedings.

121 Heth also contends that the district court erred in
pennitting disbursement of the funds without issuing a
certificate so as to provide Heth with a means to
appeal or stay the court's order. However, decisions
concerning
certification are committed to the
sound discretion of the district court and will not be
reversed on appeal unless the court's decision amounts to
an abuse of discretion. K()np}~l~(m
Such orders are not to be entered routinely,
and certification should be granted only upon a showing of
hardship, injustice or other compelling reasons.

Robertson v. Richard5, supra. Here a
certificate was issued, but not until after a request for
certification was made by Heth and Heth's motion was
heard by the court. We cannot fault the district court for
declining to issue a
certificate until a request
and an appropriate showing of necessity was made.
Accordingly, we find no error by the district court on this
issue.

!31 The Bowens have prevailed on each ofthe issues raised
by the appellant Heth in this appeal and they are entitled to
costs. The Bowens have requested that they be awarded

their attorney fees on appeal under
The
subject matter ofthis lawsuit falls under the definition of a
"commercial transaction" as defined by
20(3)
and as shown by the contract between the parties. This
action was brought upon the contract to enforce one party's
rights under the contract. Accordingly, the statute
mandates that "the prevailing party shall be allowed a
reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed
120(3);
and collected as costs."
We recognize that the appeal came to us upon a partial
summary judgment, certified by the trial court to be final
for the purposes of appeal. The issues of the defendant's
counterclaim have yet to be decided and the Bowens may
not ultimately be the **1012 *455 prevailing party in the
case. Nevertheless, Heth chose to seek appellate review on
limited issues before the case was fully decided. The
Bowens were entitled to respond and their position has
been fully upheld on the limited issues presented by the
appeal. Accordingly, we hold they are entitled to an award
offees for this appeal even though Heth may ultimately be
found to be the prevailing party after trial on his
counterclaim.
In summary, we affirm the partial summary judgment
ordering disbursement of the escrowed funds to the
Bowens. Costs and fees to the respondents, as stated above.

WALTERS, C.J., and SWANSTROM, 1., concur.
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prima facie unlawful discrimination case
without proving an employer's intent to
discriminate and thereby shift, to the employer,
the burden of producing evidence of a lawful
explanation for employer's treatment of
complainant. (Per Donaldson, C. J., with one
Justice concurring and one Justice concurring
specially.) I.e. § 67-5909.
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Supreme Court ofIdaho.
Donna BOWLES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
Marshal T. KEATING and Moscow Public
School District No. 281,
Defendants-Respondents.
No. 12524. I Sept. 11, 1979. I Rehearing
Denied Feb. 12, 1980.

Teacher sought relief on basis of contention that refusal to
employ her as vice principal resulted from sex
discrimination in violation of state statute. The Second
Judicial District Court, Latah County, Roy E. Mosman, J.,
rendered judgment for defendants, and teacher appealed.
The Supreme Court, Donaldson, C. J., held that: (1) fact
that no woman had been hired for secondary
administrative positions in school district did not make
out prima facie case of sex discrimination under
"disparate impact" theory; but (2) in such case in which
teacher established, under "disparate treatment" theory,
that refusal to employ her as vice principal for the
asserted reasons that she lacked administrative ability and
was unable to relate well with others was a prima facie
case of sex discrimination, such prima facie case was not
rebutted where defendants failed to present credible
evidence suggesting that such reasons were in fact the real
reasons; and (3) school district's rejection of eight male
applicants was irrelevant to teacher's establishing of a
prima facie discrimination claim.

[2)

Civil Rights
~Evidence

Either "disparate treatment" theory or "disparate
impact" theory may be applied to a particular set
of facts for purpose of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination in violation of state
statute. (Per Donaldson, e. J., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring
specially.) I.e. § 67-5909.

[3)

Civil Rights
~Evidence

To establish prima facie case of illegal
discrimination under "disparate impact" theory,
plaintiff need only prove that an employer's
policies and practices which are neutral on their
face and intent nevertheless discriminate in
effect against a particular group; thereafter
employer must shoulder burden to show a
business necessity for use of the policies or
practices challenged. (Per Donaldson, C. J., with
one Justice concurring and one Justice
concurring specially.) I.C. § 67-5909.

Reversed and remanded.
Bistline, J., concurred specially and filed opinion.
Shepard, 1., dissented and filed opinion in which Bakes,
J., concurred.

West Headnotes (12)

[I)

Civil Rights
...Evidence
Though ultimate burden of persuasion on issue
whether there has been discrimination in
violation of state statute remains with
c()!llp!~inatlt! the complainant m~~J'roye a
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[4)

Civil Rights
~Evidence

To establish prima facie case of discrimination
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under "disparate treatment" theory, complainant
must show that he belongs to a protected class,
that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants, and
that despite his qualifications, he was rejected
and that following his rejection, the position
remained open and employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications; at such point, burden shifts to
employer to articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for complainant's
rejection. (Per Donaldson, e. J., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring
specially.) I.C. § 67-5909.

[7]

Civil Rights
~Hiring

Subjective hiring procedures are not per se
violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of
1964. (Per Donaldson, e. J., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring
specially.) Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a),
42 U.S.e.A. § 2000e-2(a).
5 Cases that cite this headnote

[8]

Civil Rights
~Evidence

(5)

If an employer utilizes subjective and
unstructured standards in the hiring process, the
employer, in addition to presenting legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for an employment
decision, must produce credible evidence to
show that the reasons advanced were in fact the
real reasons in order for employer to rebut a
prima facie case of discrimination in violation of
state statute; if employer does produce such
credible evidence, burden of producing evidence
shifts back to plaintiff to show that employer's
reasons for rejecting plaintiff were in fact
pretext. (Per Donaldson, C. 1., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring
specially.) I.C. § 67-5909.

Civil Rights
~Evidence

Proof of significant statistical disparity may be
used to create a prima facie case of
discrimination in violation of state statute. (Per
Donaldson, C. J., with one Justice concurring
and one Justice concurring specially.) I.e. §
67-5909.

[6]

Civil Rights
~Evidence

In proceeding in which teacher sought relief on
basis of contention that refusal to employ her as
vice principal resulted from sex discrimination
in violation of state statute, fact that no woman
had been hired for secondary administrative
positions in school district did not make out a
prima facie case of sex discrimination under
"disparate impact" theory, in view of the small
number of positions in the district and the small
number of female applicants. (Per Donaldson, C.
J., with on Justice concurring and one Justice
concurring specially.) I.C. § 67-5909.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
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[9]

Civil Rights
~Evidence

In action in which teacher established under
"disparate treatment" theory, that refusal to
employ her as vice principal for the asserted
reasons that she lacked administrative ability
and was unable to relate well with others was a
prima facie case of sex discrimination in
violation of state statute, such prima facie case
was not rebutted where defendants failed to
present credible evidence suggesting that such
reasons were in fact the real reasons for
rejecting teacher's application. (Per Donaldson,
C. J., with one Justice concurring and one
2
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Justice concurring specially.) I.C. § 67-5909.

(10)

Civil Rights
~Evidence

In proceeding in which teacher sought relief on
basis of contention that refusal to employ her as
vice principal resulted from sex discrimination
in violation of state statute, school district's
rejection of eight male applicants was irrelevant
with respect to teacher's establishing of a prima
facie discrimination claim. (Per Donaldson, C.
J., with one Justice concurring and one Justice
concurring specially.) LC. § 67-5909.

plaintiff has made such showing, he has satisfied
his burden of proof without having to show an
intent to discriminate, and burden then shifts to
employer to prove by credible evidence that he
rejected plaintiffs application for legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason. (Per Donaldson, C. J.,
with one Justice concurring and one Justice
concurring specially.) I.e. § 67-5909.

Attorneys and Law Firms
*810 **460 Allen
plaintiff-appellant.

V.

Bowles,

Moscow,

for

Cope R. Gale, Moscow, for defendants-respondents.
Opinion
DONALDSON, Chief Justice.
(11)

Civil Rights
~Hiring

Where there is a claim of job discrimination by
member of a minority covered by statutory
provisions pertaining to discrimination, minority
member is not deprived of his or her cause of
action even though a person not a part of that
minority is also rejected from the same job. (Per
Donaldson, C. J., with one Justice concurring
and one Justice concurring specially.) LC. §
67-5909.

(12)

Civil Rights
~Evidence

Plaintiff, who alleges that he had been
discriminated against by employer, need only
show that plaintiff belongs to protected class,
that he applied and was qualified for job for
which employer was seeking applicants, that
plaintiff was rejected despite his qualifications
and that, following rejection, position remained
open and employer continued to seek applicants
from persons with plaintiffs qualifications; once
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Plaintiff-appellant, Donna Bowles (Bowles), brought a
claim for relief in district court in which she alleged that
the defendants-respondents, Marshal T. Keating,
Superintendent, and the Moscow Public School District
281 (school district), refused her employment for a vice
principal position as a result of sex discrimination in
violation of LC. s 67-5909. Following trial, the trial court
found that the school district did not hire Bowles because
of "her apparent lack of administrative ability and her
failure to relate well to others," that Bowles was not the
most qualified applicant for the job, and that the school
district rejected all nine official applicants and instead
hired a teacher from the Moscow Junior High School for
the vice principal position. From these findings the court
concluded that the school district's hiring process was not
unreasonable, that the school district discriminated
against all nine applicants but that such discrimination
was not based on sex and that there were justifiable
reasons for the school district to refuse to hire Bowles.
Bowles then brought this appeal. We reverse and remand
for a new trial.
The facts of this case are largely uncontested, and it is
only the conclusions which flow from the facts which are
in controversy. In the spring of 1973, there was an
opening for the position of vice principal at Moscow High
School. The school district gave notice of that opening to
colleges in the Pacific Northwest, California and to the
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Idaho State Department of Employment. Nine applicants,
including Mrs. Bowles, filed applications in response to
that announcement.
Bowles' educational qualifications for the pOSItion
include a Bachelor's Degree in Business Education with a
minor in English and a Master's Degree in School
Administration. She also held an Idaho State Certificate
for Administration. In terms of experience she had spent
seven years as a teacher of business subjects, such as
shorthand, typing and business law. She also had taught
three years in a high school of 150 students in Pierce,
Idaho, then in Benton City, Washington, in a school of
500 to 700 students and after that in a high school of
approximately 150 students in Deary, Idaho. For two
years in the winters, Bowles had taught adult education
classes in shorthand and typing.
The evidence at trial disclosed that there were four
administrative positions in Moscow's secondary school
system in existence at the time Bowles filed her
application for the vice principal position. At the time of
trial no women held those positions. Bowles was the first
woman to apply for one of the administrative positions;
although, at the time of trial, one other woman had
applied for a position. Defendant Keating did not
recommend either Bowles or the subsequent applicant for
a position.
The evidence also indicated that defendant Keating and a
John Swartz, then the principal at Moscow High School,
screened the nine applications submitted and interviewed
four to six of the nine applicants, including Mrs. Bowles.
Those interviews were unstructured in nature. Neither
interviewer formulated any standardized written questions
for the interviews. Nor did either take any formal notes of
the interviews. Defendant Keating testified that he and
Swartz utilized no objective tests or standards to evaluate
those interviewed. In the main, they evaluated the
applicants' responses subjectively.l Upon completion of
the interview process, Keating *811 **461 and Swartz
decided not to hire any of the nine applicants and instead
offered the position to a man who had never filed an
official application for the position and did not hold an
Idaho Administrator's Certificate.2
As specifically relating to Bowles and the reasons for her
rejection for the position, defendant Keating testified that
in his opinion she lacked direct experience in the
supervising of other teachers. He also expressed concern
that because she had previously worked in smaller
schools, she would be unfamiliar with computerized
scheduling and grading. He also felt that the fact that
Bowles' training was primarily in the business field might
be a handicap in her supervising others in other academic
areas. Finally, Keating, based on information from

Westlav"Next

previous employers, believed that Bowles had difficulty
in relating to others in the area of human relation skills.
Swartz testified that he formulated his impressions of
Bowles primarily from the interview. It was his opinion
that she was weak in the area of working with discipline
problems, as well as in the area of supervision of the
instruction of teachers. A former supervisor of Bowles
testified that while she thought Bowles was a good
teacher and despite the fact that she had seen Bowles
operate in a supervisory capacity only occasionally, she
did not think Bowles would make a good administrator.
Based on the above evidence the trial court held for the
defendant. On appeal, Bowles asserts that the trial court
did not adhere to a correct order and allocation of proof at
trial; that the evidence does not support the fmdings and
conclusions of the trial court relating to the justifiable
reasons for the rejection of her application: specifically,
her lack of administrative ability and her inability to relate
to others; and that the school district erroneously judged
the applicants on the basis of subjective evaluations rather
than using objective standards.
We point out initially that this action does not involve an
asserted violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. s 2000e-2(a)). Neither does this action
allege the violation of any of Bowles' constitutional rights
under either the United States or Idaho Constitution. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48
L.Ed.2d 597 (1976).
Idaho Code s 67-5909 provides:
"Acts prohibited. It shall be a prohibited act to
discriminate against a person because of, or on a basis
of, race, color, religion, sex or national origin, in any of
the following:
(1) For an employer to fail or refuse to hire, to
discharge, or to otherwise discriminate against an
individual with respect to compensation or the terms,
conditions or privileges of employment ...."
This provision clearly indicates the legislative intent to
prohibit discrimination in employment practices in Idaho
on the basis of sex. Idaho Trailer Coach Association v.
Brown, 95 Idaho 910,523 P.2d 42 (1974). In this respect
I.C. s 67-5909 is a parallel state statute to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, this Court has not had
occasion to determine the necessary quantum of proof and
applicable standards for adjudication of claims of
statutorily proscribed discrimination on the basis of sex.
*812 **462 Many federal courts, on the other hand, have
determined proof requirements and standards for
adjUdication under Title VII. Further, the state courts
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which have had occasion to construe their discrimination
statutes have done so on the basis of the quantum of proof
and standards promulgated in the federal cases dealing
with alleged Title VII sex discrimination violations. See
Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 151
N.J.Super. 15, 376 A.2d 535 (1977); General Electric
Corp. v. Commonwealth, 469 Pa. 292, 365 A.2d 649
(1976); Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19
Wash.App. 48", 573 P.2d 389 (1978). Four states have
expressly adopted the federal quantum of proof and
standards in sex discrimination cases. See State Fair
Employment Practices v. Hohe, 53 Ill.App.3d 724, 11
Ill.Dec. 158, 368 N.E.2d 709 (1977); Wheelock College
v. Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination,
371 Mass. 130, 355 N.E.2d 309 (1976); Danz v. Jones,
263 N. W.2d 395 (Minn. 1978); Scarborough v. Arnold,
379 A.2d 790 (N.H. 1977).

[I) Federal and state courts dealing with discrimination
cases have recognized that "proof of unlawful
discrimination rarely can be established by direct
evidence and that an employer's seemingly arbitrary or
pretextual explanation for a particular hiring judgment
should not be permitted to justify conduct which is in fact
unlawfully discriminatory." Wheelock College v.
Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination, supra
355 N.E.2d at 314. Thus, while we acknowledge that the
ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of
discrimination remains with the complainant, Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 569 F.2d
169 (1 st Cir. 1978), we accept the principle that a
complainant may prove a prima facie unlawful
discrimination case without proving an employer's intent
to discriminate, thereby shifting the burden of producing
evidence to the employer to give a lawful explanation for
its treatment of the complainant. We therefore adhere to
and are guided by the quantum of proof and standards
promulgated in discrimination cases arising under Title
VII.
[2) Under a Title VII analysis, once a plaintiff has carried
the burden of producing evidence as to certain facts,
certain presumptions arise in that plaintiff's favor.
Without proving an employer's intent to discriminate, a
discrimination plaintiff may make a claim for relief under
either the "disparate treatment" theory of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or the "disparate impact" theory of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849,28
L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). See generally B. Schlei & P.
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1-12 (1976).
Either theory may be applied to a particular set of facts.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324,97 S.Ct. 1843,52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). In
this case Bowles has attempted to utilize both theories.
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(3) To establish a prima facie case of illegal
discrimination under the "disparate impact" theory, a
plaintiff need only prove that an employer's policies and
practices which are neutral on their face and intent,
nevertheless discriminate in effect against a particular
group. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, supra; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra.
Thereafter, an employer must shoulder the burden to
show a business necessity for the use of the policies or
practices challenged. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra.
(4) To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
the "disparate treatment" theory, a plaintiff must show (1)
that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants, (3) that despite her qualifications, she
was rejected, and (4) that following her rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.3 *813 **463 McDonnell Douglas v.
Green, supra; Peters v. Jefferson Chemical Co., 516 F.2d
447 (5th Cir. 1975). At this point, the burden shifts to the
employer
"to
articulate
some
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, supra 411 U.S. at 802, 93
S.Ct. at 1824.

(5) (6) In attempting to establish her "disparate impact"
theory, Bowles relied upon employment statistics drawn
from the Moscow School District. Proof of significant
statistical disparity may be used to create a prima facie
case of discrimination. See, e. g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), Cert. denied,
401 U.S. 954, 91 S.Ct. 972,28 L.Ed.2d 237 (1971). See
generally, B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment
Discrimination Law 1147-96 (1976). Bowles asserts that
since no woman has been hired for secondary
administrative positions in the Moscow School District,
such is a statistical imbalance within the group hired by
the employer and is sufficient to create a prima facie case.
We disagree. Such conclusion might appropriately be
drawn if the statistical base relied on were larger, but here
the small number of positions in the district (4), coupled
with the small numbers of female applicants (2),
precludes the inference that the lack of female
administrators is attributable to discrimination, and not
chance. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, supra; Mayor of Philadelphia v.
Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 94 S.Ct.
1323,39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974); Robinson v. City of Dallas,
514 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally, Note,
Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences
Under Title VII, 59 Va.L.Rev. 463 (1973). We note a lack
of evidence in the record indicating the percentage of
qualified secondary administrators who are women. As to
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assumptions which may be drawn in the absence of such
evidence, See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, supra; Mayor of Philadelphia v.
Educational Equality League, supra; Robinson v. City of
Dallas, supra; Hester v. Southern Railway Co., 497 F.2d
1374 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally, Note Title VII and
Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73
Colum.L.Rev.
1614 (1973); Note, Employment
Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title
VII, 59 Va.L.Rev. 463 (1973). Here, we hold that Bowles
did not make a prima facie case based upon the "disparate
impact" theory.
Bowles also asserts that she established a prima facie case
of discrimination under the "disparate treatment" theory.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, supra. We agree that
Bowles did make out a prima facie case under those
standards. This is not dispositive of the case, however.
When a plaintiff establishes such a prima facie case, the
burden of producing evidence then shifts to the employer
to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the applicant's rejection. As the United States Supreme
Court recently stated in Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949-2950, 57 L.Ed.2d 957
(1978):
"A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises
an inference of discrimination only because we
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more
likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors.
"When the prima facie case is understood in light of the
opinion in McDonnell Douglas, it is apparent that the
burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of
proving that he based his employment decision on a
legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one
such as race.... To dispel the adverse inference from a
prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the
employer need only 'articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'

"
*814 **464 Hence in the instant case the burden of
producing evidence which shifted to the school district
was that of proving that the decision not to hire Bowles
was
based
on
legitimate
nondiscriminatory
considerations. It is the nature of the burden which shifts
to the defendant in this case and the proof required once
the burden does shift which causes us to reverse the
decision of the district court and remand this case for a
new trial.
(7) In the abstract, shifting the burden of producing
evidence to the employer may be no burden at all where,
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as here, the employer utilizes subjective and unstructured
standards to make an employment decision. The record
before us clearly indicates that the school district based its
decision not to hire Bowles on subjective and
unstructured standards. Bowles asserts that such standards
can be easily manipulated to disguise discrimination. We
certainly do not dispute the validity of this assertion. But
it is also true that decisions of hiring or promotion in
upper level jobs may of necessity involve assessments of
such abstractions and intangibles, as leadership,
personality, ability to relate to others and supervisory
ability, which are difficult, if not impossible, of realistic
measurement by objective technique alone. See Rogers v.
International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975),
Vacated and remanded on another issue, 423 U.S. 809, 96
S.Ct. 19,46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975), Opinion on remand, 526
F.2d 722 (1975); Note, Title VII and Employment
Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 Colum.L.Rev.
1613 (1973). We note that subjective hiring procedures
are not per se violative of Title VII. Rogers v.
International Paper Co., supra; Hester v. Southern
Railway Co., supra; see generally, B. Schlei & P.
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 166-81
(1976).
[8] But we are of the opinion that where, as in this case,
an employer utilizes subjective and unstructured standards
in the hiring process, that employer, in addition to
presenting legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for an
employment decision, must produce credible evidence to
show that the reasons advanced were in fact the real
reasons. See Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892,
895-896 (8th Cir. 1976); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir. 1975); Peters v. Jefferson
Chern. Co., supra; Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514
F.2d 651, 653-654 (8th Cir. 1975). If the employer does
not produce such credible evidence, he has failed to rebut
the plaintiffs prima facie case. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court stated it this way:
"(I)fthe reason given by the employer is
the real reason for its action and it is a
nondiscriminatory one ... the employer
has fulfilled its obligation of stating a
reason and producing support for the
stated reason, thus rebutting the prima
facie case."
Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commission against
Discrimination, supra, 355 N.E.2d at 315. If the employer
does produce such credible evidence, then the burden of
producing evidence shifts back to the plaintiff to show
that the employer's reasons for rejecting the plaintiff were
in fact pretext. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra.
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[9) Our review of the record indicates that while the
school district presented their reasons for rejecting
Bowles' application lack of administrative ability and
inability to relate well with others they failed to present
credible evidence to suggest that those reasons were
anything more than convenient reasons A
The only evidence in the record with respect to Bowles'
inability to relate well to others is the testimony of
defendant Keating. He offered testimony that based on
information which he had from other employers, he
believed that "she might have difficulty in the area of
human relation skills." While there is other testimony in
the record concerning Bowles' qualifications *815 **465
or lack of qualifications, there is no other testimony
bearing specifically on her ability to relate well to other
people.
As it relates to Bowles' administrative abilities, the record
indicates that she had a more significant administrative
background than the person who was hired. The trial
judge himself so stated at trial. In light of this, the finding
of the fact that Bowles was not the most qualified
applicant for the job becomes a meaningless fmding.
[10) We tum now to a discussion of the trial court's
conclusion of law that since all nine applicants (eight men
and one woman) were discriminated against, Bowles
could not seek relief based on a claim of sex
discrimination. The problem is that this logic effectively
forces the plaintiff to show initially, contrary to the
holding of McDonnell Douglas and Fumco, that the
employer intended to discriminate against her on the basis
of sex. The trial judge erroneously considered such a
threshold showing to be essential in order for Bowles to
make out a claim for relief. At trial he stated:
"(I)t seems to me that there must be
something that shows discrimination
directed toward your client because
she's a female. And I don't fmd that in
the record. There's no question she was
discriminated against but it seems to me
she was an outsider. And I don't think
you've shown anything just because she
was a woman."
The fact of the matter is that because Bowles claims to
have been discriminated against on the basis of sex, under
I.C. s 67-5909, she has a claim for relief. The school
district's rejection of the other eight applicants, all of
whom were male, is irrelevant to her establishing a prima
facie discrimination claim; although, it may be relevant to
the school district's attempt to rebut Bowles' prima facie
case.
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[11) [12) Where there is a claim of job discrimination by
a member of the minority covered by chapter 59 of the
Idaho Code, that minority member is not deprived of his
or her cause of action even though a person not a part of
that minority is also rejected from the same job. Quite to
the contrary, I.e. s 67-5909 opens the doors of this state's
courts to a plaintiff who alleges that an employer
discriminated against herlhim on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin with a minimum showing
on his or her part. Under McDonnell Douglas, such a
plaintiff need Only show that: (1) that person belongs to a
protected class, (2) that person applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants,
(3) that despite that person's qualifications, shelhe was
rejected, (4) and lastly, that following herlhis rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of herlhis qualifications.
Once a discrimination plaintiff has made this showing,
without any showing of an employer's intent to
discriminate, shelhe has satisfied herlhis burden of proof.
At that point the burden shifts to the defendant-employer
to prove by credible evidence that it rejected the
plaintiffs application for legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons. If the employer's reasons are legitimate
nondiscriminatory ones and if they are the real reasons for
the employer's actions, the employer has fulfilled its
obligation of stating reasons and producing support for
those reasons, thus rebutting a prima facie discrimination
case.
The proper focus in this case is on the defendants' ability
to rebut Mrs. Bowles' prima facie discrimination case, not
on Mrs. Bowles' ability to produce evidence of the school
district's intent to discriminate on the basis of sex. If the
defendants successfully rebut her case, the practical effect
of such a rebuttal would be that there was no
discrimination on the basis of sex as a matter of law.
Conversely, if the defendants fail in their burden, the
effect would be to conclude that they discriminated
against the plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of I.e.
s 67-5909 as a matter oflaw.
As is evident from the foregoing discussion of the record
and of the law to be applied, this action was tried with a
certain amount of confusion, as to the standards to be
used to guide the litigation, the burden required of the
plaintiff to establish a prima *816 **466 facie case and
the burden upon the defendants to rebut that case. Given
the confusion at trial and the resulting absence of a record
which would indicate whether the trial judge found for the
defendants because Bowles could not prove the school
district intended to discriminate against her on the basis of
sex and whether the school district did in fact rebut
Bowles' prima facie showing, a new trial is in order.
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We have taken the time to set out the nature of the proof
required and the standards to be utilized in determining
the validity ofa discrimination claim under I.C. s 67-5909
in this case because it represents one of the first
significant state job discrimination cases to reach Idaho
courts. We have no doubt that many will follow. We have
no desire to deal with these future cases in an ad hoc
manner. Nor will this Court be complacent with allowing
litigants -in such cases to build a record for appeal in the
same ad hoc manner.
This case is reversed and remanded for a new trial in
accordance with this opinion. We award costs pursuant to
I.A.R. 40(a).

McFADDEN, 1., concurs.
BISTLINE, Justice, specially concurring.
I agree that we should utilize federal case law under Title
VII to fashion the standards which, absent further
governing legislation, will apply to actions brought in this
state under I.C. s 67-5909. This serves to relieve our
district courts of the burden of forging new law in this
delicate area, and also appears to further the legislative
intention as expressed in I.e. s 67-5901:
"The general purposes of this act are: (1)
To provide for execution with the state
of the policies embodied in the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1965 (sic) and to
make uniform the laws of those states
which enact this act. ..."
I also agree that we must remand this case for a new trial,
for I am unable to completely agree with the analysis
contained in the dissenting opinion. That analysis fails to
reduce the procedure followed here by the trial court to
the category of "harmless error." As noted by the
plurality, it is evident from the trial transcript and briefs
that much confusion attended the trial not an unexpected
turn of events, given the lack of guidelines for the trial
court to follow. If Mrs. Bowles had no opportunity to
establish that the defendant employer's articulated reasons
for refusing to hire her were in fact pretextual, as appears
to be the case, this alone presents sufficient reason to
justify reversing for a second trial free of that infirmity.
E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Moreover, there is
reason to hold that the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are sufficiently confusing to warrant
reversal for clarification. A trial court's fmdings ought to
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be such as to assist the appellate court in reaching a clear
understanding of the basis for the decision. See Perry
Plumbing Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494, 531 P.2d 584
(1975); Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331, 372 P.2d 414
(1962). The judge who tried this cause has since returned
to private practice. It is appropriate in reversing,
therefore, to remand the cause for an entirely new trial.
See Walter v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 94 Idaho 738, 497
P.2d 1039 (1972).
If the plurality advocates adopting a standard of proof to
require the employer to prove his "real" reason to the
exclusion of all other reasons, as the dissent maintains,
however, I must disagree with that standard. The plurality
states that the "employer, in addition to presenting
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for an employment
decision, must produce credible evidence to show that the
reasons advanced were in fact the real reasons." This
statement is followed by a reference to five cases.
As the dissent points out, there are at least two ways to
read that standard set forth by the plurality. The first way
is to hold that the employer must do more than merely
state a reason for his decision, where such reason has no
support in the evidence. This apparently is the standard
the dissent would adopt. A second possible *817 **467
reading is to require that the employer prove his "real"
reasons to the exclusion of all other possible reasons,
including those of a discriminatory nature. After a close
examination of the cases cited by the plurality, I cannot
agree that this more stringent standard was utilized in
those cases or that it should be adopted here. I also do not
believe that this was the standard that the plurality
intended to adopt.
In the first case cited by the plurality, Garrett v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1976), the court merely held
that there was substantial evidence to support the judge's
findings that plaintiff was discharged for the reasons
stated by defendant and that those reasons were not
pretext. That court stated that once a prima facie case is
made out by the plaintiff, the "burden then shifts to
defendant to show a valid reason for the action, and
plaintiff is then afforded an opportunity to show that
defendant's asserted reason is a mere pretext." Id. at 895.
This statement that defendant must "show a valid reason"
can in no way be read to require him to prove his "real"
reason to the exclusion of all others.
The court in Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333,
348 (lOth Cir. 1975) , stated that "(d)efendant may, of
course, rebut this prima facie showing by producing
evidence of objective business reasons or necessity for its
failure to promote the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, in turn, are free
to show that this was pretextual." The only other relevant
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statement made by the court was "(a)s to the salaried
positions and the use of the totem pole, it would appear
that the defendant would have the burden of establishing
the fundamental fairness of this approach since it is
largely subjective." Id. Again, these two statements do not
place on the employer the burden of proving the real
reason to the exclusion of all others.
In Peters v. Jefferson Chemical Co., 516 F.2d 447 (5th
Cir. 1975), the court stated that" '(o)nce the plaintiff has
made out his prima facie case we look to the defendant
for an explanation since he is in a position to know
whether he failed to hire a person for reasons which
would not exonerate him.' " Id. at 450, quoting Hodgson
v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 455 F.2d
818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972). The court stated that defendant
had established legitimate non-discriminatory reasons,
that the plaintiff had not been transferred because she had
a history of back problems and the job would have
required heavy weight lifting. The court's statement that it
would "look to the defendant for an explanation" does not
amount to a shift in the burden of proof, as opposed to the
burden of going forward.
The defendant in Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514
F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975), failed to establish a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection,"
but it was not because the court required him to prove his
real reason. Rather he failed to show that the reason
advanced was at all credible. Defendant's only evidence
consisted of self-serving statements that plaintiffs work
was piling up and that other employees couldn't take care
of it. Furthermore, it was shown that in the past defendant
had used temporary help to fill in for absentees, but
defendant refused to do so in this case.
The confusion surrounding the burden of proof here was
perhaps best illustrated in the final case cited in the
plurality opinion, Wheelock College v. Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 355
N.E.2d 309 (1976). That court stated that the employer's
"some
legitimate,
burden
in
articulating
nondiscriminatory reason" requires the employer to
produce not only evidence of the reason for its action but
also underlying facts in support of that reason. However,
that court further stated that the employee then has the
burden of persuasion on the issue of whether the
articulated reason was in fact the real reason for the
employer's actions, or merely pretextual. Later in the
opinion the court also stated that "an employer must not
only give a lawful reason or reasons for its employment
decision but also must produce credible evidence to show
that the reason or *818 **468 reasons advanced were the
real reasons." Id. at 138, 355 N.E.2d at 314. The citations
after this statement showed that the court was only putting
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the burden of going forward on the defendant, however,
not the burden of proof. The only other statement made
by the court on this issue was as follows:
"(I)fthe employee has proved a prima facie case of sex
discrimination and the employer gives an explanation
for a hiring decision which has no reasonable support
in the evidence or is wholly disbelieved (and hence is
transparently pretextual), the employee should prevail.
On the other hand, if the reason given by the employer
is the real reason for its action and it is a
nondiscriminatory one, even if the commission thinks
the employer's action was arbitrary or unwise, the
employer has fulfilled its obligation of stating a reason
and producing support for the stated reason, thus
rebutting the prima facie case." Id. at 138-39, 355
N.E.2d at 315.
As I read this case, the employer must produce evidence
to show that his stated reasons are not transparently
pretextual, I.e., he must set forth evidence which would
reasonably justity the conclusion that the stated reasons
were not merely convenient rationale. This is only a
burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to rebut
the prima facie case, for the ultimate burden of proof on
the issue of discrimination remains with plaintiff. At no
time does the burden of proof itself shift to the employer.
There appear to be two reasons why some courts,
apparently aloof from the fact that the Ultimate burden of
proof remains at all times on the plaintiff, See King v.
Yellow Freight System, Inc., 523 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.
1975); Naraine v. Western Electric Co., 507 F.2d 590 (8th
Cir. 1974), seemingly place the burden of proof on the
employer at this second step. One reason is simply
through a linguistic error and a misunderstanding of the
distinction between going forward with the evidence and
having the burden of proof. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 296-98, 58 L.Ed.2d
216 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The second reason is
a feeling that only the employer knows the real reasons
for his decision, and, if it is a subjective decision, it is
very difficult for plaintiff to prove that it was a
discriminatory reason; thus the employer should have the
burden of proving that his decision was nondiscriminatory
once a prima facie case is made out. This assumes,
however, as the plurality here states, that "the practical
effect (of defendants rebutting plaintiff s prima facie
case) ... would be that there was no discrimination on the
basis of sex as a matter of law." I must disagree with this
assumption that for all practical purposes the third step,
where plaintiff can show pretext, is superfluous. There are
ways that pretext can be shown. Plaintiff can show pretext
by showing that the records relied on in support of the
advanced reason "were fraudulent, inaccurate or
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otherwise unreliable ... if they were intended or known
to be so .... " Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 468 (D.CoI.1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 524 F.2d 263 (lOth Cir. 1975). Plaintiff
could also show sufficient pretext to take the issue to the
trier of fact by showing that the reasons advanced had no
bearing on plaintiffs ability to perform on the job or by
showing that the person actually hired was even less
qualified in those areas relied on by the employer.

The plurality opinion acknowledges that the ultimate
burden of proof remains with the plaintiff. It also states
that a prima facie case shifts ''the burden Of producing
evidence to the employer to give a Lawful explanation for
its treatment of complainant" (emphasis added). A better
reading of the plurality opinion leads to the conclusion
that the standard adopted is one of producing enough
evidence to show that the advanced reasons were not
purely pretextual, for the plurality held that defendants
had not met their burden because "(t) hey failed to present
credible evidence to suggest that those reasons were
anything more than convenient reasons." The plurality did
not hold that defendants had not met their burden of
proving that the reasons advanced were in fact the real
reasons, but only that they had in effect merely stated
reasons *819 **469 without enough support in the
evidence to rebut plaintiffs prima facie case. The
statement that defendant "must produce credible evidence
to show that the reasons advanced were in fact the real
reasons," a statement taken from Wheelock College,
supra, does not to my mind place the burden on defendant
of proving that the reasons advanced were in fact the real
reasons. It merely requires him to produce enough
evidence to justifY the conclusion that his reasons
reasonably could have been the real reasons. That was the
standard adopted by the court in Wheelock College, and I
believe that is the standard which should be applied and
that it is the standard which the plurality intended to
adopt.
Although subjectiveness will always remain a part of the
hiring process for many types of jobs, "(a)bsolute
discretion over employment decisions where subjective
race prejudice may control (perhaps even without the
executive's knowledge) is no longer consistent with our
law." Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1226, 1231 (6th Cir.
1976). Employers would be better off, both legally and
probably job-wise, if they developed reasonably objective
hiring procedures and records that they could then present
to the court on being charged with job discrimination.
Even if I am incorrect in this reading of the plurality
opinion, moreover, it appears from reading both opinions
that a majority of this Court would agree with me that the
quantum and standard of proof is as follows: (1) plaintiff
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carries the initial burden of making out a prima facie case
from which it can be inferred, "if such actions remain
unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such
actions were 'based on a discriminatory criterion illegal
under the Act.' " Furno Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978),
quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52
L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); (2) defendant then must rebut that
prima facie showing by producing enough evidence to
show that his stated reasons are in fact credible, I.e., that
his decision could reasonably have been based on the
reasons set forth; and (3) plaintiff then can show that in
fact the reasons stated are pretextuaL
SHEPARD, Justice, dissenting.
I would affirm. In my view, the trial court's findings of
fact of no illegal discrimination are Not clearly erroneous
under either state or federal standards. The federal
framework for the adjudication of claims of sex
discrimination is by no means settled. It is apparent that
the majority is intent upon applying federal Title VII
analysis to the case at bar and, in my opinion, parts of the
analysis contained in the majority are either unclear or
erroneous statements of federal law.
To prove a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the plaintiff may proceed under either the
"disparate treatment" theory of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668
(l973), or the "disparate impact" theory of Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849,28 L.Ed.2d
158 (1971). Claims of disparate treatment are
distinguishable from claims of disparate impact:
"The latter involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity ...
. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not
required under a disparate impact theory." Int'I Brd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15,97
S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15,52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
I am in accord with the majority's analysis of plaintiffs
claim under the disparate impact theory.
"Disparate treatment" is the most readily understood type
of discrimination.
"The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color,
re!i~ion, sex,.()~ national()!i~.in. Proof of discrimill~t()ry
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motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences *820 **470
in treatment." Int'l Brd. of Teamsters v. United States,
supra, at 335 n. 15,97 S.Ct. at 1854 n. 15.

that the proper focus in this case is thus upon the
defendant's ability to rebut this prima facie case. I do not
agree, however, that the defendants failed to rebut the
prima facie case.

Thus, contrary to the majority, it Is necessary for Donna
Bowles to show that the defendants intended to
discriminate against her on the basis of sex. See also
Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct.
2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); Sweeney v. Bd. of Trustees
of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1978),
Rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58
L.Ed.2d 216 (1978); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College,
442 F.Supp. 593 (E.D.Pa. 1977). In recognition of the
difficulty of proving intent, however, the United States
Supreme Court has established a method by which a
plaintiff may generate an inference of discrimination upon
the showing of certain facts. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, Supra. The four elements needed for a plaintiff to
make out a prima facie case are as set forth in the majority
opinion. Once the four McDonnell Douglas factors are
met, an inference of discriminatory motive is raised.
Chavez v. Tempe Union High School Dist. No. 213, 565
F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1977).

In reaching its conclusion that the defendants failed to
rebut plaintiffs prima facie case, the majority appears to
be adopting a new standard of proof to apply to such
factual situations. Under federal pattern and practice, an
employer need only "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra at 802, 93
S.Ct. at 1824. The majority is now placing upon the Idaho
employer who uses subjective hiring practices the
additional burden of producing "credible evidence to
show that the reasons advanced were in fact the Real
reasons." (Emphasis added.) We are not told what "real"
reasons are, and how one goes about distinguishing them
from some other kind. There are at least two possible
ways to read this new standard. The majority may wish to
emphasis that the employer must do something more than
merely "state" his reasons. Under Furnco and McDonnell
Douglas "the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply
'Explains what he has done' or'Produc(es) evidence of
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.' " Bd. of Trustees
of Keene State College v. Sweeney, supra. It has never
been the law that the employer may rebut a prima facie
case by merely stating a reason which has no support in
the evidence.

If the plaintiff carries the initial burden and establishes a
prima facie case, the "burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, supra 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.
See also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, supra. The
burden which shifts is not, as the majority suggests, the
burden of persuasion but, rather, the burden of going
forward with the evidence. The ultimate burden of
persuasion on the issue of discrimination remains with the
plaintiff, who must convince the court by a preponderance
of the evidence that she has been the victim of
discrimination. Bd. of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58 L.Ed.2d 216
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sweeney v. Bd. of
Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.
1978); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F.Supp. 1138 (E.D.Pa.
1977). If the employer articulates a reason for rejection
sufficient to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, the trial
enters a third phase not treated in the majority opinion. At
this point, the plaintiff is to be "afforded a fair
opportunity to show that petitioner's (the employer's)
stated reason for respondent's (the employee's) rejection
was in fact pretext." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
supra 411 U.S. at 804,93 S.Ct. at 1825. See also Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, supra.
The majority correctly concludes that Mrs. Bowles
established a prima facie case of discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment criteria. I agree
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No

*821 **471 Another, and more logical, way to read the
majority's new standard is as an imposition upon the
employer to prove his "real" reason to the exclusion of all
other reasons including those of a discriminatory nature.
If this be the case, a defendant employer in Idaho will be
saddled with a burden more onerous than he would bear
in federal court. In Bd. of Trustees of Keene State College
v. Sweeney, supra, the Court dealt with that very issue
and reversed a Court of Appeals decision which required
the defendant employer to prove an Absence of
discriminatory motive because that party had greater
access to such evidence. The Court noted that in Furnco
and McDonnell Douglas it was stated that an employer
may dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie case
by simply articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection. The Court then
declared that "there is a significant distinction between
merely 'articulat(ing) some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason,' and 'prov(ing) absence of discriminatory
motive' . . . . (T)he former will suffice to meet the
employee's prima facie case of discrimination." 99 S.Ct.
at 295. The Court also noted that placing the burden of
proving the absence of a discriminatory motive on the
employer,
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"would make entirely superfluous the third step in the
Furnco McDonnell Douglas analysis, since it would
place on the employer at the second stage the burden of
showing that the reason for rejection was not a pretext,
rather than requiring such proof from the employee as
part of the third step." 99 S.Ct. at 295 n. 1.
If this Court wishes, as it states, to follow federal law,
then the proper question before us is simply whether the
defendants articulated or established that there was a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Mrs.
Bowles. There is no justification or basis in the case law
for imposing upon the defendants the obligation to prove
that this was the "real" reason to the exclusion of others.
To impose that additional proof burden on defendants, the
majority ostensibly uses the fact that the school district
used subjective hiring procedures. It must be noted in this
regard that the employer in McDonnell Douglas also used
a subjective criterion for refusing to hire the plaintiff
therein. Although the Court of Appeals had said that the
subjective reason would carry little weight in rebutting
charges of discrimination, the Supreme Court said that it
would suffice to meet the prima facie case. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct.
1817. At this point, then, the sole question is whether the
defendants articulated or established a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Mrs. Bowles.

in the winter season she taught adult education classes in
shorthand *822 **472 and typing under the supervision of
one Andruiza. She had made application for a teaching
position at Moscow high school and later for a position in
administration at the University of Idaho and was not
hired for either position. During 1973 and 1974, she made
application for positions as Moscow junior high school
vice-principal, Moscow high school vice-principal, and
Moscow high school principal. She was not hired for any
of these positions. Since 1973, she has worked as legal
secretary for her husband.
As stated in the majority opmlOn, appellant was
interviewed by defendant Keating and Swartz, who was
then the principal at Moscow high school. Both testified
that they felt Bowles lacked direct experience in the
supervision over the teachers; that her experience in
smaller schools would handicap her in dealing
administratively with computerized scheduling and
grading in a large school such as Moscow; that she had
little experience in working with discipline problems; and
when they checked with former supervisors of Bowles, it
was reported that she had difficulty in relating to others in
the area of human relation skills. That testimony was
supported by the testimony of one Andruiza, a former
supervisor of Bowles.
It is true, as asserted by the majority opinion, that

The district court, based upon the evidence adduced at
trial, expressly found that plaintiff was not hired "because
of her apparent lack of administrative ability and her
failure to relate well to others." He, therefore, concluded
as a matter of law that "there were justifiable reasons for
the defendant school district not to hire the plaintiff." This
Court can overturn the judge's decision only by ruling
that it was "clearly erroneous." I.R.C.P. 52(a). This same
standard is applicable to judge-tried discrimination cases
in federal court. E. g., Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531
F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1976); Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516
F.2d416 (5th Cir. 1975).
On appeal it is axiomatic that the record, the evidence,
and the inferences arising therefrom are to be viewed
most favorably to the respondent and in support of the
findings of the trial court. Matter of Estate of Webber, 97
Idaho 703, 551 P.2d 1339 (1976). As to appellant's
experience in administration, the testimony indicates that
aside from formal education she had worked
approximately seven years as a teacher of business
subjects such as shorthand, typing, and business law in
three different high schools. In two of them, she taught
under the supervision of her husband, who was the high
school principal. Two of those schools numbered
approximately 150 students as contrasted with
approximately 600 in Moscow high school. For two years
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subjective and unstructured standards were utilized in
evaluating appellant's application. However, it is also true
that decisions of hiring or promotion in upper level jobs
may necessarily involve such abstractions and intangibles
as leadership, personality, ability to relate to others, and
supervisory ability, which are difficult, if not impossible,
to realistically measure by objective techniques alone. See
Rogers v. Int'I Paper Co., 5lO F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded on another issue, 423 U.S. 809,96
S.Ct. 19, 46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975), opinion on remand, 526
F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1975), Note, Title VII and Employment
Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 Colum.L.Rev.
1614 (1973). Subjective hiring procedures are not Per se
violative of Title VII, Rogers v. Int'l Paper Co., supra;
Hester v. Southern Railroad Co., 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir.
1974).
In my judgment, the record here supports the finding of
the trial court "that the plaintiff was not hired by the
defendant, Moscow School District, as the high school
vice-principal because of her apparent lack of
administrative ability and her failure to relate well to
others." Thus, evidence Was adduced to show a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason. Thereafter, appellant had full
opportunity to produce evidence to show that defendant's
refusal to hire was, in fact, sexually premised. This she
did not do. I would hold that since the trial court's ruling
Works.
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was not clearly erroneous, we are bound to accept it.
LR.C.P. 52(a).
In my judgment, the majority opinion ignores the record
which clearly supports the ruling of the trial court and
appears to be influenced by two additional factors. The
first appears to be that the trial court did not expressly
recognize that appellant had established a prima facie case
of sex discrimination. If the trial court had dismissed
plaintiff's case at the end of her case in chief or ended his
analysis with the simple conclusion that she had not met
her burden of establishing a prima facie case, I, too,
would vote for a reversaL However, the purportedly
erroneous statement of the trial judge contained in the
majority opinion occurred at the conclusion of the entire
trial, and since the trial court at that time had heard
evidence of legitimate reasons for the refusal to hire, I
would hold that he was correct in suggesting at that point
the necessity of tendering evidence showing that the
hiring decision was sexually premised. Appellant was not
halted at the "threshold." Federal courts have held that
any error in classifying plaintiffs proof as insufficient to
create a prima facie case is harmless error. See, e. g.,
Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir.
1978); Peters v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 516 F.2d 447 (5th
Cir.1975).

administrative background than the person who was
hired." I would disagree with that Finding of the majority.
I would view the record otherwise and only note that the
trial court made no such finding. The record sustains, and
I would uphold, the finding of the trial court that the
appellant was not the most qualified of the nine applicants
for the job regardless of what her qualifications might be
when compared to those of the "insider." The conclusion
to be drawn from this is that a male who was the most
qualified of the applicants, as well as Mrs. Bowles, appear
to have been discriminated against in favor of an "insider"
who also happened to be a male. While such may be
offensive to our abstract notions of fair play, I would hold
that the trial judge was correct in ruling that it was not an
Illegal Form of discrimination. Discrimination is not
unlawful unless the form of discrimination is
constitutionally or statutorily forbidden. B. Schlei & P.
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 15 (1976). A
practice of "cronyism" or "insider" hiring may, in some
instances, be facially neutral, but also have a
discriminatory impact. See Local 53 ofInt'l Ass'n of Heat
and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Lee v. City of Richmond, 456
F.Supp. 756 (E.D.Va. 1978). However, I fmd no such
evidence of discriminatory impact in the case at bar.
I would affirm the decision of the lower court.

The second factor which I view as influencing the
majority opinion is the trial court's conclusion "that all
nine of the applicants for the job of high school
vice-principal were discriminated against, but said *823
**473 discrimination was not based on sex, and said
discrimination was not illegal." That conclusion is
probably substantiated in the record as a desire on behalf
of the defendants-respondents to hire a current employee
of the school district, or an "insider." The majority
opinion Finds that appellant "had a more significant

BAKES, J., concurs.
Parallel Citations
606 P.2d 458

Footnotes

1

At trial neither interviewer could specifically recall specific questions asked at the interviews. Swartz testified that all he could
specifically remember about Bowles' interview was that she did not go into enough detail in response to his questions whatever
they were.

2

At trial, the trial judge commented to defendant Keating that it appeared to him that Keating had intended to hire the uncertified
individual all along. The trial judge based this observation partially on the fact that Keating had signed a statement after reviewing
the nine official applications to the effect that no certified person was available for the position even though Mrs. Bowles was
certified. Keating denied any such intention. He then noted this individual's qualifications which in his, Keating's mind, better
qualified him as an administrator than Mrs. Bowles:
"He had successfully completed training as a jet flight pilot with the United States Air Force and I felt that that
experience had given him a good deal of leadership training. A good deal of experience in supervision of others.
Good deal of training in administrative responsibilities that would be very similar to a position in school
administration. I personally felt that that was a strong plus factor in his background for the position we were
considering for."

3

While there has been some suggestion that the order, nature, and burden of proof prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, a racial discrimination case under Title VII, is inapplicable to sex discrimination cases,

WestlawNexr
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Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808 (1979)
606 P.2d 458

the United States Supreme Court in Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Jurinko, 414 U.S. 970, 94 S.Ct. 293, 38 L.Ed.2d 214 (1973), has
indicated that the proof requirements in McDonnell Douglas are applicable to sex discrimination cases. See also Jacobs v. Martin
Sweets Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977).

4

Given our conclusion in this regard, we do not reach the question of whether Bowles presented evidence showing that the School
District's reasons for rejecting her were mere pretext.

End of Document
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118 S.Ct. 2257
Supreme Court of the United States
BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.
Kimberly B. ELLERTH.
No. 97-569. I Argued April 22, 1998.
Decided June 26, 1998.

I

Employee who had suffered no adverse job consequences
as result of alleged sexual harassment by supervisor
brought suit against former employer under Title VII
alleging that sexual harassment forced her constructive
discharge. The United States District Court for the
1.,
Northern District of Illinois,
entered summary judgment in favor of employer. The
reversed.
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
Employer petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court,
Justice
held that: (1) employer is subject to
vicarious liability for an actionable hostile environment
created by a supervisor with immediate or successively
higher authority over employee; (2) in those cases in which
employee has suffered no tangible job consequences as
result of supervisor's actions, employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages; and (3)
affirmative defense requires employer to show that it
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior and that employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided or to avoid harm
otherwise.
Affirmed.
Justice
Justice
joined.

filed opinion concurring in judgment.

Terms quid pro quo and hostile work
environment are not controlling for purposes of
determining employer liability for harassment by
supervisor; however, terms are helpful in making
rough demarcation between Title VII cases in
which sexual harassment threats are carried out
and where they are not or are absent altogether,
and thus terms are relevant when there is
threshold question whether employee can prove
discrimination in violation of Title VII. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,

When
employee
proves
that
tangible
employment action resulted from refusal to
submit to supervisor's sexual demands, he or she
establishes that employment decision itself
constitutes change in terms and conditions of
employment that is actionable under Title VII;
however, for any sexual harassment preceding
employment decision to be actionable, conduct
must be severe or pervasive. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq.,

filed dissenting opinion, in which Justice

West Headnotes (13)
Federal law, based on general common law
principles of agency, governs employer's
vicarious liability under Title VII for sexual
harassment by supervisor, although common law
principles may not be wholly transferable to Title
VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,
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actual power.

Employer may be liable for both negligent and
intentional torts committed by employee within
scope of his or her employment.

Under "aided in the agency relation" standard for
vicarious liability, more than mere presence of
employment relation that aids in commission of
harassment is necessary to hold employer liable
for supervisor's action; however, whatever exact
contours of standard, vicarious liability may be
found under standard when supervisor's
discriminatory
act
results
in
tangible
employment action against employee.

General rule is that sexual harassment by
supervisor is not conduct within scope of
employment for purposes of employer liability
under agency principles.

Tangible employment action taken by supervisor
becomes for Title VII purposes the act of
employer. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et
seq., 701(b),

Although supervisor's sexual harassment is
outside scope of employment because conduct
was for personal motives, employer can be liable,
nonetheless, where its own negligence is cause of
harassment; employer is negligent with respect to
sexual harassment if it knew or should have
known about the conduct and failed to stop it.

Apparent authority is relevant to principal's
vicarious Iiability where agent purports to
exercise power which he or she does not have, as
distinct from where agent threatens to misuse

Employer is subject to vicarious liability to
victimized employee for actionable hostile
environment created by supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority
over employee; when no tangible employment

(1
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action is taken, employer may raise affirmative
defense to liability or damages, subject to proof
by preponderance of the evidence. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,
§

Employer's affirmative defense to vicarious
liability for supervisor's creation of hostile work
environment comprises two necessary elements:
(a) that employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,

Employer has no affirmative defense to vicarious
liability for supervisor's harassing conduct in
violation of Title VII when supervisor's
harassment culminates in tangible employment
action, such as discharge, demotion, or
undesirable reassignment. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 70 I et seq.,

Employer might be held vicariously liable under
Title VII for supervisor's making unwelcome and
threatening sexual advances to employee, even
though conduct did not result in tangible job
consequences for employee; however, employer
could avoid liability by showing by
preponderance of evidence that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior and employee
unreasonably failed to use preventive or
corrective measures provided by employer. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,

**2259 *742 Syllabus*
Respondent Kimberly Ellerth quit her job after 15 months
as a salesperson in one of petitioner Burlington Industries'
many divisions, allegedly because she had been subjected
to constant sexual harassment by one of her supervisors,
Ted Slowik. Slowik was a midlevel manager who had
authority to hire and promote employees, subject to higher
approval, but was not considered a policymaker. Against a
background of repeated boorish and offensive remarks and
gestures allegedly made by Slowik, Ellerth places
particular emphasis on three incidents where Slowik's
comments could be construed as threats to deny her
tangible job benefits. Ellerth refused all of Slowik's
advances, yet suffered no tangible retaliation and was, in
fact, promoted once. Moreover, she never informed
anyone in authority about Slowik's conduct, despite
knowing Burlington had a policy against sexual
harassment. In filing this lawsuit, Ellerth alleged
Burlington engaged in sexual harassment and forced her
constructive discharge, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,
The District
Court granted Burlington summary judgment. The Seventh
Circuit en banc reversed in a decision that produced eight
separate opinions and no consensus for a controlling
rationale. Among other things, those opinions focused on
whether Ellerth's claim could be categorized as one of quid
pro quo harassment, and on whether the standard for an
employer's liability on such a claim should be vicarious
liability or negligence.
Held: Under Title VII, an employee who refuses the
unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a
supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible job
consequences, may recover against the employer without
showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for
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the supervisor's actions, but the employer may interpose
an affirmative defense. Pp. 2264-2271.
(a) The Court assumes an important premise yet to be
established: A trier of fact could find in Slowik's remarks
numerous threats to retaliate against Ellerth if she denied
some sexual liberties. The threats, however, were not
carried out. Cases based on carried-out threats are referred
to often as "quid pro quo" cases, as distinct from
bothersome attentions or sexual remarks sufficient to
create a "hostile work environment." Those two terms do
not appear in Title VII, which forbids only *743
"discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his
'" terms [or] conditions ... of employment, because of ...
§ 2000e-2(a)(I). In 11I,PV"'UlV
this Court distinguished between the two
concepts, saying both are cognizable under Title VII,
though a hostile environment claim requires harassment
did not discuss the
that is severe or pervasive.
distinction for its bearing upon an employer's liability for
discrimination, but held, with no further specifics, that
agency principles controlled on this point.
wake,
Nevertheless, in
Courts of Appeals held that, if the plaintiff established a
quid pro quo claim, the employer was subject to vicarious
liability. This rule encouraged Title VII plaintiffs to state
their claims in quid pro quo terms, which in tum **2260
put expansive pressure on the definition. For example, the
question presented here is phrased as whether Ellerth can
state a quid pro quo claim, but the issue of real concern to
the parties is whether Burlington has vicarious liability,
rather than liability limited to its own negligence. This
Court nonetheless believes the two terms are of limited
utility. To the extent they illustrate the distinction between
cases involving a carried-out threat and offensive conduct
in general, they are relevant when there is a threshold
question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination.
Hence, Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled threats, so
it is a hostile work environment claim requiring a showing
of severe or pervasive conduct. This Court accepts the
District Court's finding that Ellerth made such a showing.
When discrimination is thus proved, the factors discussed
below, not the categories quid pro quo and hostile work
environment, control on the issue of vicarious liability. Pp.
2264-2265.
(b) In deciding whether an employer has vicarious liability
in a case such as this, the Court turns to agency law
principles, for Title VII defines the term "employer" to
Given this express direction,
include "agents."
the Court concludes a uniform and predictable standard
must be established as a matter of federal law. The Court
relies on the general common law of agency, rather than on
the law of any particular State.

The Restatement (Second) of
Agency (hereinafter Restatement) is a useful beginning
point, although common-law principles may not be wholly
transferable to Title VII. See
Pp. 2265-2266.
(c) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his
servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment. Restatement § 219(1). Although such torts
generally may be either negligent or intentional, sexual
harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional
conduct. An intentional tort is within the scope of
employment when *744 actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the employer. Id, §§ 228(l)(c), 230.
Courts of Appeals have held, however, a supervisor acting
out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual
urges may be actuated by personal motives unrelated and
even antithetical to the employer's objectives. Thus, the
general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not
conduct within the scope of employment. Pp. 2265-2267.
(d) However, scope of employment is not the on ly basis for
employer liability under agency principles. An employer is
subject to liability for the torts of its employees acting
outside the scope of their employment when, inter alia, the
employer itself was negligent or reckless, Restatement §
219(2)(b), or the employee purported to act or to speak on
behalf of the employer and there was reliance upon
apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relation, id, § 219(2)( d).
An employer is negligent, and therefore subject to liability
under § 219(2)(b), if it knew or should have known about
sexual harassment and failed to stop it. Negligence sets a
minimum standard for Title VII liability; but Ellerth seeks
to invoke the more stringent standard of vicarious liability.
Section 219(2)(d) makes an employer vicariously liable for
sexual harassment by an employee who uses apparent
authority (the apparent authority standard), or who was
"aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation" (the aided in the agency relation
standard). P. 2267.
(e) As a general rule, apparent authority is relevant where
the agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does
not have, as distinct from threatening to misuse actual
power. Compare Restatement § 6 with § 8. Because
supervisory harassment cases involve misuse of actual
power, not the false impression of its existence, apparent
authority analysis is inappropriate. When a party seeks to
impose vicarious liability based on an agent's misuse of
delegated authority, the Restatement's aided in the agency
relation rule provides the appropriate analysis. Pp.
2267-2268.
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(f) That rule requires the existence of something more than
the employment relation itself because, in a sense, most
workplace **2261 tortfeasors, whether supervisors or
co-workers, are aided in accomplishing their tortious
objective by the employment relation: Proximity and
regular contact afford a captive pool of potential victims.
Such an additional aid exists when a supervisor subjects a
subordinate to a significant, tangible employment action,
i.e., a significant change in employment status, such as
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. Every
Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the question
has correctly found vicarious liability in that circumstance.
This Court imports the significant, tangible employment
action concept for resolution of the vicarious *745 liability
issue considered here. An employer is therefore subject to
vicarious liability for such actions. However, where, as
here, there is no tangible employment action, it is not
obvious the agency relationship aids in commission of the
tort. Moreover,
holds that agency principles
constrain the imposition of employer liability for
supervisor harassment. Limiting employer liability is also
consistent with Title VII's purpose to the extent it would
encourage the creation and use of antiharassment policies
and grievance procedures. Thus, in order to accommodate
the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused
by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's
equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by
employers and saving action by objecting employees, the
Court adopts, in this case and in

following holding: An employer is subject to vicarious
liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee. When
no tangible employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, see
The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an
employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with
complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a
matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the
employment circumstances may appropriately be
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of
the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to
fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to
avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally

suffice to satisfY the employer's burden under the second
element of the defense. No affirmative defense is available,
however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in
a tangible employment action. Pp. 2268-2270.
(g) Given the Court's explanation that the labels quid pro
quo and hostile work environment are not controlling for
employer-liability purposes, Ellerth should have an
adequate opportunity on remand to prove she has a claim
which would result in vicarious liability. Although she has
not alleged she suffered a tangible employment action at
Slowik's hands, which would deprive Burlington of the
affirmative defense, this is not dispositive. In light of the
Court's decision, Burlington is still *746 subject to
vicarious liability for Slowik's activity, but should have an
opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative defense. P.
2271.
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affirmed.

Attorneys and Law Firms
James J. Casey, for petitioner.
Chicago, IL, for respondent.
Brooklyn, NY, for United States
as amicus curiae by special leave of this Court.

Opinion
**2262 Justice
Court.

delivered the opinion of the

We decide whether, under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended,
et
*747 seq., an employee who refuses the unwelcome and
threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no
adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the
employer without showing the employer is negligent or
otherwise at fault for the supervisor's actions.

I

Summary judgment was granted for the employer, so we
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must take the facts alleged by the employee to be true.

(per curiam). The
employer is Burlington Industries, the petitioner. The
employee is Kimberly Ellerth, the respondent. From March
1993 until May 1994, Ellerth worked as a salesperson in
one of Burlington's divisions in Chicago, Illinois. During
her employment, she alleges, she was subjected to constant
sexual harassment by her supervisor, one Ted Slowik.
In the hierarchy of Burlington's management structure,
Slowik was a midlevel manager. Burlington has eight
divisions, employing more than 22,000 people in some 50
plants around the United States. Slowik was a vice
president in one of five business units within one of the
divisions. He had authority to make hiring and promotion
decisions subject to the approval of his supervisor, who
. I
signed the paperwork. See
According to Slowik's supervisor, his
position was "not considered an upper-level management
position," and he was "not amongst the decision-making or
Slowik was not Ellerth's
policy-making hierarchy."
immediate supervisor. Ellerth worked in a two-person
office in Chicago, and she answered to her office
colleague, who in turn answered to Slowik in New York.
Against a background of repeated boorish and offensive
remarks and gestures which Slowik allegedly made,
Ellerth places particular emphasis on three alleged
incidents where Slowik's comments could be construed as
threats to deny her *748 tangible job benefits. In the
summer of 1993, while on a business trip, Slowik invited
Ellerth to the hotel lounge, an invitation Ellerth felt
compelled to accept because Slowik was her boss. App.
155. When Ellerth gave no encouragement to remarks
Slowik made about her breasts, he told her to "loosen up"
and warned, "you know, Kim, I could make your life very
hard or very easy at Burlington." [d., at 156.
In March 1994, when Ellerth was being considered for a
promotion, Slowik expressed reservations during the
promotion interview because she was not "loose enough."
Id., at 159. The comment was followed by his reaching
over and rubbing her knee. Ibid. Ellerth did receive the
promotion; but when Slowik called to announce it, he told
Ellerth, "you're gonna be out there with men who work in
factories, and they certainly like women with pretty
butts/legs." Id., at 159-160.
In May 1994, Ellerth called Slowik, asking permission to
insert a customer's logo into a fabric sample. Slowik
responded, "I don't have time for you right now, Kim
... -unless you want to tell me what you're wearing." [d., at
78. Ellerth told Slowik she had to go and ended the call.
Ibid. A day or two later, Ellerth called Slowik to ask

permISSIOn again. This time he denied her request, but
added something along the lines of, "are you wearing
shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a
who Ie heck of a lot easier." I d., at 79.
A short time later, Ellerth's immediate supervisor
cautioned her about returning telephone calls to customers
in a prompt fashion.
In response,
Ellerth quit. She faxed a letter giving reasons unrelated to
the alleged sexual harassment we have described.
About three weeks later, however, she sent a letter
explaining she quit because of Slowik's behavior.
During her tenure at Burlington, Ellerth did not inform
anyone in authority about Slowik's conduct, despite
knowing Burlington had a policy against sexual
harassment.
*749 In fact, she chose not to inform her
**2263 immediate supervisor (not Slowik) because" 'it
would be his duty as my supervisor to report any incidents
of sexual harassment.' "
On one occasion, she told
Slowik a comment he made was inappropriate.
In October 1994, after receiving a right-to-sue letter from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
Ellerth filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, alleging Burlington engaged
in sexual harassment and forced her constructive
discharge, in violation of Title VII. The District Court
granted summary judgment to Burlington. The court found
Slowik's behavior, as described by Ellerth, severe and
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment, but
found Burlington neither knew nor should have known
about the conduct. There was no triable issue offact on the
latter point, and the court noted Ellerth had not used
Burlington's internal complaint procedures.
Although Ellerth's claim was framed as a hostile work
environment complaint, the District Court observed there
was a quid pro quo "component" to the hostile
Proceeding from the premise
environment.
that an employer faces vicarious liability for quid pro quo
harassment, the District Court thought it necessary to apply
a negligence standard because the quid pro quo merely
contributed to the hostile work environment. See
The District Court also dismissed Ellerth's
constructive discharge claim.
The Court of Appeals en banc reversed in a decision which
produced eight separate opinions and no consensus for a
controlling rationale. The judges were able to agree on the
problem they confronted: Vicarious liability, not failure to
comply with a duty of care, was the essence of Ellerth's
case against Burlington on appeal. The judges seemed to
agree Ellerth could recover if Slowik's unfulfilled threats
to deny her tangible job benefits was sufficient to impose
vicarious liability on Burlington .
*750
(per curiam ). With the exception of Judges Coffey and
Easterbrook, the judges also agreed Ellerth's claim could
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be categorized as one of quid pro quo harassment, even
though she had received the promotion and had suffered no
other tangible retaliation.
The consensus disintegrated on the standard for an
employer's liability for such a claim. Six judges, Judges
Flaum, Cummings, Bauer, Evans, Rovner, and Diane P.
Wood, agreed the proper standard was vicarious liability,
and so Ellerth could recover even though Burlington was
not negligent.
They had different reasons for the
conclusion. According to Judges Flaum, Cummings,
Bauer, and Evans, whether a claim involves a quid pro quo
determines whether vicarious liability applies; and they in
tum defined quid pro quo to include a supervisor's threat to
inflict a tangible job injury whether or not it was
completed.
Judges Wood and Rovner
interpreted agency principles to impose vicarious liability
on employers for most claims of supervisor sexual
harassment, even absent a quid pro quo.
Although Judge Easterbrook did not think Ellerth had
stated a quid pro quo claim, he would have followed the
law of the controlling State to determine the employer's
liability, and by this standard, the employer would be liable
here.
In contrast, Judge Kanne said Ellerth had
stated a quid pro quo claim, but negligence was the
appropriate standard of liability when the qUid pro quo
involved threats only.
Chief Judge Posner, joined by Judge Manion, disagreed.
He asserted Ellerth could not recover against Burlington
despite having stated a quid pro quo claim. According to
Chief Judge Posner, an employer is subject to vicarious
liability for "act[s) that significantly alte[r) the terms or
conditions of employment," or "company act[s)."
In the emergent terminology, an unfulfilled quid pro
quo is a *751 mere threat to do a company act rather than
the act itself, and in these circumstances, an employer can
be found liable for its negligence only.
Chief Judge
Posner also found Ellerth failed to create a triable issue of
fact as to Burlington's negligence.
Judge Coffey rejected all of the above approaches because
he favored a uniform **2264 standard of negligence in
almost all sexual harassment cases.
The disagreement revealed in the careful opinions of the
judges of the Court of Appeals reflects the fact that
Congress has left it to the courts to determine controlling
agency law principles in a new and difficult area offederal
law. We granted certiorari to assist in defining the relevant
standards of employer liability.

II

III At the outset, we assume an important proposition yet

to be established before a trier of fact. It is a premise
assumed as well, in explicit or implicit terms, in the various
opinions by the judges of the Court of Appeals. The
premise is: A trier of fact could find in Slowik's remarks
numerous threats to retaliate against Ellerth if she denied
some sexual liberties. The threats, however, were not
carried out or fulfilled. Cases based on threats which are
carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as
distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that
are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work
environment. The terms quid pro quo and hostile work
environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough
demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out
and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but
beyond this are of limited utility.
Section 703(a) of Title VII forbids
"an employer"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or *752 privileges of employment, because
of such individual's ... sex."

See generally E. Scalia, The Strange
Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Policy 307 (1998).
In
the terms served a specific and limited purpose.
There we considered whether the conduct in question
constituted discrimination in the terms or conditions of
employment in violation of Title VII. We assumed, and
with adequate reason, that if an employer demanded sexual
favors from an employee in return for a job benefit,
discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of
employment was explicit. Less obvious was whether an
employer's sexually demeaning behavior altered terms or
conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. We
distinguished between quid pro quo claims and hostile
environment claims, see
and said both were cognizable under Title VII,
though the latter requires harassment that is severe or
pervasive.
The principal significance of the
distinction is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either
explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or
conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be
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severe or pervasive. The distinction was not discussed for
its bearing upon an employer's liability for an employee's
discrimination. On this question
held, with no
further specifics, that agency principles controlled.

Nevertheless, as use of the terms grew in the wake of
they acquired their own significance. The
standard of employer responsibility turned on which type
of harassment *753 occurred. If the plaintiff established a
quid pro quo claim, the Courts of Appeals held, the
employer was subject to vicarious liability. See

work environment claim which requires a showing of
severe or pervasive conduct. See

For purposes of this case, we accept
the District Court's finding that the alleged conduct was
severe or pervasive. See supra, at 2262-2263. The case
before us involves numerous alleged threats, and we
express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat
is sufficient to constitute discrimination in the terms or
conditions of employment.
When we assume discrimination can be proved, however,
the factors we discuss below, and not the categories quid
pro quo and hostile work environment, will be controlling
on the issue of vicarious liability. That is the question we
must resolve.

The rule encouraged Title VII plaintiffs to state
their claims as quid pro quo claims, which in tum put
expansive pressure on the definition. The equivalence of
the quid pro quo label and vicarious liability is illustrated
by this case. The question presented on certiorari is
whether Ellerth can state a claim of quid pro quo
harassment, but the issue of real concern to the parties is
whether Burlington has vicarious liability for Slowik's
alleged misconduct, rather than liability limited to its own
negligence. The question presented for certiorari asks:
"Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment
may be stated under Title VII ... where the plaintiff
employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances
of the alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects
on the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment as a consequence of a refusal to submit to
those advances?" Pet. for Cert. i.

121 We do not suggest the terms quid pro quo and hostile
work environment are irrelevant to Title VII litigation. To
the extent they illustrate the distinction between cases
involving a threat which is carried out and offensive
conduct in general, the terms are relevant when there is a
threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove
discrimination in violation of Title VII. When a plaintiff
proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a
refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or
she establishes that the *754 employment decision itself
constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of
employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any
sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to
be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or
pervasive. Because Ellerth's claim involves only
unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile

III

[31 We must decide, then, whether an employer has
vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work
environment by making explicit threats to alter a
subordinate's terms or conditions of employment, based on
sex, but does not fulfill the threat. We tum to principles of
agency law, for the term "employer" is defined under Title
VII to include "agents."
see !VIPrUfW
In express terms,
Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII
based on agency principles. Given such an explicit
instruction, we conclude a uniform and predictable
standard must be established as a matter offederallaw. We
rely "on the general common law of agency, rather than on
the law of any particular State, to give meaning to these
*755 terms."
The resulting federal rule, based on a
body of case law developed over time, is statutory
interpretation pursuant to congressional direction. This is
not federal common law in "the strictest sense, i.e., a rule
of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of
a federal statute ... , but, rather, to the judicial 'creation' of a
special federal rule of decision."
7
State-court decisions, applying state employment
discrimination law, may be instructive in applying general
agency principles, but, it is interesting to note, in many
cases their determinations of employer liability under state
law rely in large part on **2266 federal-court decisions
under Title VII. E.g.,
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may violate the employer's policies. See Prosser and
Keeton on Torts § 70, at 505-506.
As
acknowledged, the Restatement (Second) of
Agency (1957) (hereinafter Restatement) is a useful
beginning point for a discussion of general agency
principles.
Since our
decision in
federal courts have explored agency
principles, and we find useful instruction in their decisions,
noting that "common-law principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII."
The
EEOC has issued Guidelines governing sexual harassment
claims under Title VII, but they provide little guidance on
the issue of employer liability for supervisor harassment.
See
§
(1997) (vicarious liability for
supervisor harassment turns on "the particular employment
relationship and the job functions performed by the
individual").

As Courts of Appeals have recognized, a supervisor acting
out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual
urges may not be actuated by a purpose to serve the
employer. See, e.g.,
I

A
Section 219(1) of the Restatement sets out a central
principle of agency law:
*756 "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his
servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment."

141 An employer may be liable for both negligent and
intentional torts committed by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment. Sexual harassment under
Title VII presupposes intentional conduct. While early
decisions absolved employers of liability for the
intentional torts of their employees, the law now imposes
liability where the employee's "purpose, however
misguided, is wholly or in part to further the master's
business." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 70, p. 505 (5th
ed.1984) (hereinafter Prosser and Keeton on Torts). In
applying scope of employment principles to intentional
torts, however, it is accepted that "it is less likely that a
willful tort will properly be held to be in the course of
employment and that the liability of the master for such
torts will naturally be more limited." F. Mechem, Outlines
of the Law of Agency § 394, p. 266 (P. Mechem 4th ed.
1952). The Restatement defines conduct, including an
intentional tort, to be within the scope of employment
when "actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
[employer]," even if it is forbidden by the employer.
Restatement §§ 228(1)(c), 230. For example, when a
salesperson lies to a customer to make a sale, the tortious
conduct is within the scope of employment because it
benefits the employer by increasing sales, even though it

(supervisor acting in scope of
employment where employer has a policy of discouraging
women from seeking advancement **2267 and "sexual
harassment was simply a way offurthering that policy").
The concept of scope of employment has not always been
construed to require a motive to serve the employer. E.g.,
Federal courts have nonetheless found
similar limitations on employer liability when applying the
agency laws of the States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, which makes the Federal Government liable for torts
committed by employees within the scope of employment.
see, e.g.,
(supervisor's unfair criticism of
subordinate's work in retaliation for rejecting his sexual
advances not within scope of employment);
(BREYER, C.J.) (sexual harassment amounting to assault
and battery "clearly outside the scope of employment");
see also 2 L. Jayson & R. Longstreth, Handling Federal
Tort Claims § 9.07[4], p. 9-211 (1998).

[51 The general rule is that sexual harassment by a
supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.
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*758 B
Scope of employment does not define the only basis for
employer liability under agency principles. In limited
circumstances, agency principles impose liability on
employers even where employees commit torts outside the
scope of employment. The principles are set forth in the
much-cited § 219(2) ofthe Restatement:
"(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his
servants acting outside the scope of their employment,
unless:
"(a) the master
consequences, or

intended

the

conduct

or

the

"(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
"(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the
master, or
"(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of
the principal and there was reliance upon apparent
authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relation."
See also § 219, Comment e (Section 219(2) "enumerates
the situations in which a master may be liable for torts of
servants acting solely for their own purposes and hence not
in the scope of employment").
Subsection (a) addresses direct liability, where the
employer acts with tortious intent, and indirect liability,
where the agent's high rank in the company makes him or
her the employer's alter ego. None of the parties contend
Slowik's rank imputes liability under this principle. There
is no contention, furthermore, that a nondelegable duty is
involved. See § 219(2)(c). So, for our purposes here,
subsections (a) and (c) can be put aside.

161 Subsections (b) and (d) are possible grounds for
imposing employer liability on account of a supervisor's
acts and must be considered. Under subsection (b), an
employer is liable when the tort is attributable to the
employer's own negligence. *759 § 2l9(2)(b). Thus,
although a supervisor's sexual harassment is outside the
scope of employment because the conduct was for personal
motives, an employer can be liable, nonetheless, where its
own negligence is a cause ofthe harassment. An employer
is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or
should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.
Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability
under Title VII; but Ellerth seeks to invoke the more
stringent standard of vicarious liability.
Section

219(2)( d)

concerns

vicarious

liability

for

intentional torts committed by an employee when the
employee uses apparent authority (the apparent authority
standard), or when the employee "was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation" (the aided in the agency relation standard). Ibid.
As other federal decisions have done in discussing
vicarious liability for supervisor harassment, e.g., HPVI"1n
we begin
with § 219(2)(d).

c
171 As a general rule, apparent authority is relevant where
the agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does
not have, **2268 as distinct from where the agent threatens
to misuse actual power. Compare Restatement § 6
(defining "power") with § 8 (defining "apparent
authority"). In the usual case, a supervisor's harassment
involves misuse of actual power, not the false impression
of its existence. Apparent authority analysis therefore is
inappropriate in this context. If, in the unusual case, it is
alleged there is a false impression that the actor was a
supervisor, when he in fact was not, the victim's mistaken
conclusion must be a reasonable one. Restatement § 8,
Comment c ("Apparent authority exists only to the extent it
is reasonable for the third person dealing with the agent to
believe that the agent is authorized"). When a party seeks
to impose vicarious liability *760 based on an agent's
misuse of delegated authority, the Restatement's aided in
the agency relation rule, rather than the apparent authority
rule, appears to be the appropriate form of analysis.

D

18) We tum to the aided in the agency relation standard. In
a sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in
accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of
the agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may
afford a captive pool of potential victims. See
Were this to
,
satisfY the aided in the agency relation standard, an
employer would be subject to vicarious liability not only
for all supervisor harassment, but also for all co-worker
harassment, a result enforced by neither the EEOC nor any
court of appeals to have considered the issue. See, e.g.,

v.
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discrimination); see also 29
(1997)
("knows or should have known" standard of liability for
cases of harassment between "fellow employees"). The
aided in the agency relation standard, therefore, requires
the existence of something more than the employment
relation itself.
At the outset, we can identifY a class of cases where,
beyond question, more than the mere existence of the
employment relation aids in commission of the
harassment: when a supervisor takes a tangible
employment action against the subordinate. Every Federal
Court of Appeals to have considered the question has
found vicarious liability when a discriminatory act results
in a tangible employment action. See, e.g.,
1
(" 'If the
plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury
from her supervisor's actions, the employer becomes
strictly liable without any further showing .. .' "). *761 In
we acknowledged this consensus. See
("[T]he courts have
consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel,
whether or not the employer knew, or should have known,
or approved of the supervisor's actions"). Although few
courts have elaborated how agency principles support this
rule, we think it reflects a correct application ofthe aided in
the agency relation standard.
In the context of this case, a tangible employment action
would have taken the form of a denial of a raise or a
promotion. The concept of a tangible employment action
appears in numerous cases in the Courts of Appeals
discussing claims involving race, age, and national origin
discrimination, as well as sex discrimination. Without
endorsing the specific results ofthose decisions, we think it
prudent to import the concept of a tangible employment
action for resolution of the vicarious liability issue we
consider here. A tangible employment action constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits. Compare
("A materially adverse change might be indicated by
a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a
decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a
material loss of benefits, significantly **2269 diminished
material responsibilities, or other indices that might be
unique to a particular situation"), with

(demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or
prestige insufficient), and

(reassignment to
more inconvenient job insufficient).
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision,
there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted
*762 absent the agency relation. A tangible employment
action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm. As a
general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person
acting with the authority of the company, can cause this
sort of injury. A co-worker can break a co-worker's arm as
easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has regular contact
with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his
or her offensive conduct. See
(MacKinnon, J., concurring). But one
co-worker (absent some elaborate scheme) cannot dock
another's pay, nor can one co-worker demote another.
Tangible employment actions fall within the special
province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been
empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to
make economic decisions affecting other employees under
his or her control.
Tangible employment actions are the means by which the
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to
bear on subordinates. A tangible employment decision
requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act.
The decision in most cases is documented in official
company records, and may be subject to review by higher
level supervisors. E.g.,
(noting that the supervisor did not
fire plaintiff; rather, the Career Path Committee did, but
the employer was still liable because the committee
functioned as the supervisor's "cat's-paw"). The
supervisor often must obtain the imprimatur of the
enterprise and use its internal processes. See
("From the perspective of the employee, the
supervisor and the employer merge into a single entity").
[91 For these reasons, a tangible employment action taken
by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of
the employer. Whatever the exact contours of the aided in
the agency relation standard, its requirements will always
be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment
action *763 against a subordinate. In that instance, it would
be implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an
employer to escape liability, as
itself appeared to
acknowledge. See, supra, at 2268.

Whether the agency relation aids in commission of
supervisor harassment which does not culminate in a
tangible employment action is less obvious. Application of
the standard is made difficult by its malleable terminology,
which can be read to either expand or limit liability in the
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context of supervisor harassment. On the one hand, a
supervisor's power and authority invests his or her
harassing conduct with a particular threatening character,
and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the
agency relation. See I!!W?""W
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("[I]t is
precisely because the supervisor is understood to be
clothed with the employer's authority that he is able to
impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates"). On
the other hand, there are acts of harassment a supervisor
might commit which might be the same acts a coemployee
would commit, and there may be some circumstances
where the supervisor's status makes little difference.
It is this tension which, we think, has caused so much
confusion among the Courts of Appeals which have sought
to apply the aided in the agency relation standard to Title
VII cases. The aided in the agency relation standard,
however, is a developing feature of agency law, and we
hesitate to render a definitive explanation of our
understanding of the standard in an area where other
important considerations must affect our judgment.
**2270 In particular, we are bound by our holding in
that agency principles constrain the imposition of
vicarious liability in cases of supervisory harassment. See
("Congress' decision to define
'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer,
surely evinces an intent to place some
limits on the acts of employees for which employers under
Title VII are to be held responsible"). Congress has not
altered
*764 rule even though it has made
significant amendments to Title VII in the interim. See
("[W]e must bear
in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily
in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free
to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation").
Although
suggested the limitation on employer
liability stemmed from agency principles, the Court
acknowledged other considerations might be relevant as
well. See
("common-law principles may not be transferable in all
their particulars to Title VII"). For example, Title VIl is
designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment
policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were
employer liability to depend in part on an employer's effort
to create such procedures, it would effect Congress'
intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in
the Title VII context, see
the EEOC's policy of encouraging the development of
grievance procedures. See
(1997);
EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 BNA
FEP Manual 405:6699 (Mar. 19, 1990). To the extent

limiting employer liability could encourage employees to
report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or
would also serve Title VII's deterrent

we have observed, Title VII
borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences

and the considerations which animate that doctrine would
also support the limitation of employer liability in certain
circumstances.
[l 0 I (11) 112) In order to accommodate the agency
principles of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse
of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's equally
basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers
and saving action by objecting employees, we adopt the
following holding in this case and in

also decided today. *765 An employer is subject to
vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor
with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to
liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance
of the evidence, see
The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an
employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with
complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a
matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the
employment circumstances may appropriately be
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of
the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to
fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to
avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally
suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second
element of the defense. No affirmative defense is available,
however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in
a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.

**2271 IV
Relying on existing case law which held out the promise of
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vicarious liability for all quid pro quo claims, see supra, at
2264-2265, Ellerth focused all her attention in the Court of
Appeals on proving her claim fit within that category.
Given our explanation that the labels quid pro quo and
hostile work environment are not controlling for purposes
of establishing employer liability, see supra, at 2265,
Ellerth *766 should have an adequate opportunity to prove
she has a claim for which Burlington is liable.

1131 Although Ellerth has not alleged she suffered a
tangible employment action at the hands of Slowik, which
would deprive Burlington of the availability of the
affirmative defense, this is not dispositive. In light of our
decision, Burlington is still subject to vicarious liability for
Slowik's activity, but Burlington should have an
opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative defense to
liability. See supra, at 2270.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, reversing the grant of summary judgment
against Ellerth. On remand, the District Court will have the
opportunity to decide whether it would be appropriate to
allow Ellerth to amend her pleading or supplement her
discovery.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

same in both instances: An employer should be liable if,
and only if, the plaintiff proves that the employer was
negligent in permitting the supervisor's conduct to occur.

I

Years before sexual harassment was recognized as
"discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex,"
), the Courts of Appeals considered whether,
and when, a racially hostile work environment could
violate Title VII.! In the landmark case
cert. denied,
the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the practice of racially segregating
patients in a doctor's office could amount to discrimination
in" 'the terms, conditions, or privileges' " of employment,
thereby violating Title VII.
(quoting
»). The principal opinion in the case
concluded that employment discrimination was not limited
to the "isolated and distinguishable events" of "hiring,
firing, and promoting."
(opinion of
Goldberg, J.). Rather, Title VII could also be violated by a
work environment "heavily polluted with discrimination,"
because of the deleterious effects of such an **2272
atmosphere on an employee's well-being.

It is so ordered.
Justice

concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court's ruling that "the labels quid pro quo
and hostile work environment are not controlling for
purposes of establishing employer liability." Ante, at 2271.
I also subscribe to the Court's statement of the rule
governing employer liability, ante, at 2270, which is
substantively identical to the rule the Court adopts in

Justice
dissenting.

with whom Justice

joins,

The Court today manufactures a rule that employers are
vicariously liable if supervisors create a sexually hostile
work environment, subject to an affirmative defense that
the Court barely attempts to define. This rule applies even
ifthe employer has a policy against sexual harassment, the
employee knows about that policy, and the employee never
*767 informs anyone in a position of authority about the
supervisor's conduct. As a result, employer liability under
Title VII is judged by different standards depending upon
whether a sexually or racially hostile work environment is
aIleged. The standard of employer liability should be the

(actionable sexual harassment occurs when the workplace
is "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult" (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
In race discrimination cases, employer liability has turned
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on whether the plaintiff has alleged an adverse
employment consequence, such as firing or demotion, or a
hostile work environment. If a supervisor takes an adverse
employment action because of race, causing the employee
a tangible job detriment, the employer is vicariously liable
for resulting damages. See ante, at 2268. This is because
such actions are company acts that can be performed only
by the exercise of specific authority granted by the
employer, and thus the supervisor acts as the employer. If,
on the other hand, the employee alleges a racially hostile
work environment, the employer is liable only for
negligence: that is, only if the employer knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the
harassment and failed to take remedial action. See, e.g.,

not even detect incidents of harassment such as the
comments Slowik allegedly made to respondent in a hotel
bar. The most that employers can be charged with,
therefore, is a duty to act reasonably under the
circumstances. As one court recognized in addressing an
early racial harassment claim:
"It may not always be within an employer's power to
guarantee an environment free from all bigotry .... [H]e
can let it be known, however, that racial harassment will
not be tolerated, and he can take all reasonable measures
to enforce this policy .... But once an employer has in
good faith taken those measures which are both feasible
and reasonable under the circumstances to combat the
offensive conduct we do not think he can be charged
with discriminating on the basis of race."

cert. denied,
Liability has thus been imposed
only if the employer is blameworthy in some way. See,
e.g.,

This distinction applies with equal force in cases of sexual
harassment.2 When a supervisor inflicts an adverse
employment consequence upon an employee who has
rebuffed his advances, the supervisor exercises the specific
authority granted to him by his company. His acts,
therefore, are the company's acts and are properly
chargeable to it. See
(Posner, C. 1., dissenting); ante, at 2269 ("Tangible
employment actions fall within the special province of the
supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the
company as a distinct class of agent to make economic
decisions affecting other employees under his or her
control").
If a supervisor creates a hostile work environment,
however, he does not act for the employer. As the Court
concedes, a supervisor's creation of a hostile work
environment is neither within the scope of his
employment, nor part of his apparent authority. See ante, at
2265-2268. Indeed, a hostile work environment is
antithetical to the interest of the employer. In such
circumstances, an employer should be liable only if it has
been negligent. That is, liability should attach **2273 only
if the employer either knew, or in the exercise of *770
reasonable care should have known, about the hostile work
environment and failed to take remedial action.3
Sexual harassment is simply not something that employers
can wholly prevent without taking extraordinary
measures-constant video and audio surveillance, for
example-that would revolutionize the workplace in a
manner incompatible with a free society. See
5 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, such measures could

*771 Under a negligence standard, Burlington cannot be
held liable for Slowik's conduct. Although respondent
alleged a hostile work environment, she never contended
that Burlington had been negligent in permitting the
harassment to occur, and there is no question that
Burlington acted reasonably under the circumstances. The
company had a policy against sexual harassment, and
respondent admitted that she was aware of the policy but
nonetheless failed to tell anyone with authority over
Slowik about his behavior. See ante, at 2262. Burlington
therefore cannot be charged with knowledge of Slowik's
alleged harassment or with a failure to exercise reasonable
care in not knowing about it.

II

Rejecting a negligence standard, the Court instead imposes
a rule of vicarious employer liability, subject to a vague
affirmative defense, for the acts of supervisors who wield
no delegated authority in creating a hostile work
environment. This rule is a whole-cloth creation that draws
no support from the legal principles on which the Court
claims it is based. Compounding its error, the Court fails to
explain how employers can rely upon the affirmative
defense, thus ensuring a continuing reign of confusion in
this important area of the law.
Injustif)ring its holding, the Court refers to our comment in

should look to "agency principles" for guidance in
determining the scope of employer liability,
The Court then interprets the term "agency
principles" to mean the Restatement (Second) of Agency
(1957). The Court finds two portions of the Restatement to
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be relevant: § 219(2)(b), which provides that a master is
liable for his servant's torts if the master is reckless or
negligent, and § 219(2)(d), which states that a master is
liable for his servant's torts when the servant is "aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation." The Court *772 appears to reason that a
supervisor is "aided ... by... the agency relation" in
creating a hostile work environment because the
supervisor's **2274 "power and authority invests his or
her harassing conduct with a particular threatening
character." Ante, at 2269.
Section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement provides no basis
whatsoever for imposing vicarious liability for a
supervisor's creation of a hostile work environment.
Contrary to the Court's suggestions, the principle
embodied in § 219(2)(d) has nothing to do with a servant's
"power and authority," nor with whether his actions appear
"threatening." Rather, as demonstrated by the
Restatement's illustrations, liability under § 219(2)(d)
depends upon the plaintiff's belief that the agent acted in
the ordinary course of business or within the scope of his
apparent authority A In this day and age, no sexually
harassed employee can reasonably believe that a harassing
supervisor is conducting the official business of the
company or acting on its behalf. Indeed, the Court admits
as much in demonstrating why sexual harassment is not
committed within the scope of a supervisor's employment
and is not part of his apparent authority. See ante, at
2265-2268.
Thus although the Court implies that it has found guidance
in both precedent and statute-see ante, at 2265 ("The
resulting federal rule, based on a body of case law
developed over time, is statutory interpretation pursuant to
congressional direction")-its holding is a product of willful
policymaking, pure and simple. The only agency principle
that justifies imposing employer liability in this context is
the principle *773 that a master will be liable for a
servant's torts if the master was negligent or reckless in
pennitting them to occur; and as noted, under a negligence
standard, Burlington cannot be held liable. See supra, at
2273.
The Court's decision is also in considerable tension with
our holding in
that employers are not strictly liable
for a supervisor's sexual harassment. See
Although the Court recognizes an affirmative
defense-based solely on its divination of Title VII's
gestalt, see ante, at 2270-it provides shockingly little
guidance about how employers can actually avoid
vicarious liability. Instead, it issues only Delphic
pronouncements and leaves the dirty work to the lower
courts:

"While proof that an employer had promulgated an
anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter oflaw, the need
for a stated policy suitable to the employment
circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element ofthe defense. And
while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid
hann is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure
to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally
suffice to satisfY the employer's burden under the
second element of the defense." Ante, at 2270.
What these statements mean for district courts ruling on
motions for summary judgment-the critical question for
employers now subject to the vicarious liability
rule-remains a mystery. Moreover, employers will be
liable notwithstanding the affinnative defense, even
though they acted reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in
question fulfilled her duty of reasonable care to avoid
harm. See ibid. In practice, therefore, employer liability
very well may be the rule. *774 But as the Court
acknowledges, this is the one result that it is clear Congress
did not intend. See ante, at 2269-2270;

The Court's holding does guarantee one result: There will
be more and more litigation to clarifY applicable legal rules
in an area in which both practitioners and the courts have
long been begging for guidance. It thus truly boggles the
mind that the Court can claim that its holding will effect
"Congress' intention to promote conciliation rather
**2275 than litigation in the Title VII context." Ante, at
2270. All in all, today's decision is an ironic result for a
case that generated eight separate opinions in the Court of
Appeals on a fundamental question, and in which we
granted certiorari "to assist in defining the relevant
standards of employer liability." Ante, at 2263-2264.

***
Popular
misconceptions
notwithstanding,
sexual
harassment is not a freestanding federal tort, but a form of
employment discrimination. As such, it should be treated
no differently (and certainly no better) than the other forms
of harassment that are illegal under Title VII. I would
restore parallel treatment of employer liability for racial
and sexual harassment and hold an employer liable for a
hostile work environment only if the employer is truly at
fault. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Parallel Citations
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118 S.Ct. 2257, 77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1, 170
A.L.R. Fed. 677, 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,340, 141
L.Ed.2d 633, 66 USLW 4634, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Servo
5029,98 Daily Journal DAR. 6991,98 CJ CAR. 3405,

11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 692

Footnotes
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion ofthe Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of
the reader. See
This sequence of events is not surprising, given that the primary goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to eradicate race
discrimination and that the statute's ban on sex discrimination was added as an eleventh-hour amendment in an effort to kill the bill.
See
The Courts of Appeals relied on racial harassment cases when analyzing early claims of discrimination based upon a supervisor's
sexual harassment. For example, when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a work environment
poisoned by a supervisor's "sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions" could itself violate Title VII, its principal
authority was Judge Goldberg's opinion in
See
); see also

I agree with the Court that the doctrine of quid pro quo sexual harassment is irrelevant to the issue of an employer's vicarious
liability. I do not, however, agree that the distinction between hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment is
relevant "when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of Title VII." Ante, at 2265. A
supervisor's threat to take adverse action against an employee who refuses his sexual demands, if never carried out, may create a
hostile work environment, but that is all. Cases involving such threats, without more, should therefore be analyzed as hostile work
environment cases only. If, on the other hand, the supervisor carries out his threat and causes the plaintiff a job detriment, the plaintiff
may have a disparate treatment claim under Title VII. See E. Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 307, 309-314 (1998).
See Restatement § 219, Comment e; § 261, Comment a (principal liable for an agent's fraud if "the agent's position facilitates the
consummation of the fraud, in that from the point of view of the third person the transaction seems regular on its face and the agent
appears to be acting in the ordinary course of business confided to him"); § 247, Illustrations (newspaper liable for a defamatory
editorial published by editor for his own purposes).
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798 F.2d 559
United States Court ofAppeals,
First Circuit.

Robert H. CALHOUN, Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.
ACME CLEVELAND CORPORATION and
the Cleveland Twist Drill Company,
Defendants, Appellants.
No. 85-1952. I Aug. 20, 1986.
Employee brought action against former employer for
alleged age discrimination in employment. The United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Joseph L. Tauro, J., entered judgment on verdict for
employee, and employer appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Bownes, Circuit Judge, held that question whether
employer's actions amounted to a constructive discharge in
violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act was
properly submitted to jury under evidence indicating that,
in connection with employer's desire to reduce its work
force, preferably by retiring older employees, employee
was asked three times in seven months whether he wished
to retire and, after indicating in negative, was demoted by
employer, reprimanded for doing something he had done
before without sanction, excluded from training sessions,
and threatened with a drastic increase in working hours.
Affirmed.

West Headnotes (6)

A case for a constructive discharge under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act is not
established unless trier of fact is satisfied that
new working conditions would have been so
difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in
employee's shoes would have felt compelled to
resign. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, § 2 et seq.,
et seq.

Allegations concerning hours worked by others
after employee was terminated, even if
eliminated, did not preclude submission of
constructive discharge issue under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act given
repeated inquiries about resignation, threat of
onerous working hours if no resignation, and
demotion of employee along with promotion of
younger coemployees. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq.,
et seq.

Evidence that employee, who always received
good work ratings and high pay raises until a new
manager arrived, was demoted after he refused to
retire, reprimanded for doing something he had
done before without sanction, excluded from
training sessions, and threatened with a drastic
increase in working hours was sufficient to
warrant submission of issue in constructive
discharge case whether a reasonable person in
employee's shoes would have felt that his
services were no longer desired. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq.,
et seq.

Question whether employer's actions amounted
to a constructive discharge in violation of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act was properly
submitted to jury under evidence indicating that,
in connection with employer's desire to reduce
its work force, preferably by retiring older
employees, employee was asked three times in
seven months whether he wished to retire and,
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after indicating in negative, was demoted by
employer, reprimanded for doing something he
had done before without sanction, excluded from
training sessions, and threatened with a drastic
increase in working hours. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq.,
et seq.

Taunton, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellee.
Before BOWNES, Circuit Judge, BROWN,* Senior
Circuit Judge, and BREYER, Circuit Judge.
Opinion
BOWNES, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, Acme Cleveland Corporation and its
subsidiary The Cleveland Twist Drill Company, appeal
from a judgment for their former employee, Robert
Calhoun, under the Age Discrimination in Employment
et
Act,
Denial of requested instruction to effect that
constructive discharge case was to be considered
and decided by jury as a case between persons of
equal standing in community was not an abuse of
discretion when trial court admonished jury twice
to avoid bias or prejudice. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq.,
et seq.

Metaphorical-alliterative reference by employee
in constructive discharge case to "corporate
claws" was within normal bounds of creative
advocacy and was not such as to warrant giving
of employer's requested instruction on
anticorporate bias. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq.,
et seq.

Calhoun had contended that, after working for appellants
and their predecessors for forty-two years, appellants
entered into a course of action designed to force him into
early retirement at age sixty-two. It was appellants'
contention that they merely asked Calhoun whether he
wished to take early retirement and that Calhoun
voluntarily decided that he would retire. Since appellants
did not actually fire Calhoun, a key legal and factual issue
in the case was whether appellants' actions could be
considered *561 to amount to a constructive discharge.
Appellants contend that, as a matter of law, the facts
alleged and proven by Calhoun did not amount to a
constructive discharge and that the district court erred
when it failed to grant appellants' motion for summary
judgment, directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. Appellants
also claim that they were denied a fair trial because the
district court failed to give a requested "anticorporate bias"
jury instruction requested by appellants.

III We consider first the constructive discharge issue. The
basic rules governing constructive discharge in this circuit
were laid down in
that the new working conditions would have been so
difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the
employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign."
This is an "objective standard,"
denied,

in which the focus is upon the "reasonable state of
mind of the putative discriminatee."
(I

Attorneys and Law Firms
*560 William P. Robinson, III with whom John A.
Houlihan, Judith C. Savage, and Edwards & Angell,
Providence, R.I., were on brief, for defendants, appellants.
Orlando F. de Abreu with whom Kevin J. McAllister,

the determination, it must be kept in mind that
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discharge .... An employee is protected from a calculated
effort to pressure him [or her] into resignation through
the imposition of unreasonably harsh conditions, in
excess of those faced by his [or her] coworkers. He [or
she] is not, however, guaranteed a working environment
free from stress.
. The question we must consider,
then, is whether, given the factual allegations and evidence
presented by Calhoun, there was no constructive discharge
as a matter oflaw. This requires a recitation of the facts.
Aside from three years in the Navy during World War IT,
Calhoun worked continuously for The Cleveland Twist
Drill Company or its predecessor from 1940 until his
resignation in 1982. By 1964, he had worked his way up to
the position of Manager of the Product Design and
Application Department. In every year prior to 1982,
Calhoun had received good reviews of his work and yearly
raises in pay.
By 1982, The Cleveland Twist Drill Company was having
financial problems, particularly because it was not
delivering orders on time and was not selling reliable
merchandise. As a result, a new plant manager, Clifford
Preuss, was hired in February of 1982. On February 17,
1982, Preuss asked all employees eligible for early
retirement, including Calhoun who was sixty-two at that
time, whether they had any intention of taking early
retirement so as to minimize layoffs of junior personnel.
Calhoun told Preuss that he wished to continue working
until he was sixty-five.
On March 10, 1982, without warning or criticism of
Calhoun's past performance, a younger man, Ronald
Sabatos, was made Manager of the Product Design and
Application Department. Although no cut in his pay was
made, Calhoun was demoted to Supervisor of the
Department. Thereafter, Calhoun was not invited to
participate in a training seminar to which both his
immediate superior and junior were invited. Next, Calhoun
was told that it was "grounds for dismissal" for him to have
brought a portable television into work on Patriot's Dayl, a
day that was a holiday for all non supervisory personnel,
and watched the start and finish of the Boston Marathon,
although similar conduct had occurred in the past without
comment.
On May 20, 1982, Calhoun had a second meeting with
Preuss concerning his retirement plans, as did all other
employees eligible *562 for early retirement. Once again,
Calhoun stated that he intended to keep on working.
Calhoun had a third meeting with Preuss on August 30,
1982, as did all other retirement-eligible employees. The
details of this meeting are in dispute as are other relevant

facts.
Calhoun claims that Preuss told him at this meeting that the
company was "ready to give him his severance pay and
terminate him," albeit with full retirement benefits. The
alternative offered by Preuss was that Calhoun would have
to be prepared to work a twelve- to fourteen-hour day and
Saturdays, as compared to the nine- and nine and
one-half-hour day he had been working. Calhoun testified
that no one at his level of management had worked such
long hours. He also testified that in 1983, after his
termination, he had a conversation with his former
assistant who told Calhoun that he was not working any
longer hours than Calhoun had worked. Preuss testified
that Sabatos, the newly hired Product Design Manager, had
been working twelve to fourteen hours a day. Preuss also
testified that during this August conversation all he did was
tell Calhoun about a "new" retirement package that the
company had authorized allowing severance for early
retirees. Company documents offered by Calhoun,
however, indicated that the severance pay provision had
been in effect since August of 1981, prior to Calhoun's
first meeting with Preuss. Preuss testified that he was
unaware of the policy prior to the August 1982 meeting.
He also testified that he did not mention any specific
number of hours that Calhoun would have to work, but said
only that if Calhoun did not choose to retire he would be
expected to work the same number of hours as those
working under him and possibly some Saturdays. Both
Preuss and Calhoun agreed that Calhoun asked Preuss at
this meeting whether he could collect unemployment
benefits while he was receiving severance pay.
The day after the August 30 meeting, Calhoun told Preuss
that he would take early retirement. After leaving The
Cleveland Twist Drill Company, where he had been
making $34,000 a year with generous benefits, Calhoun
sought similar work, but was unable to find it. He worked
as a construction worker for $6 to $8 an hour and his
income dropped to around $18,000 a year.

Summary Judgment

In his affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, Calhoun alleged that Preuss had asked him
about his retirement plans three times in seven months, that
he had been demoted and a younger man promoted to his
position, that he had been threatened with a twelve- to
fourteen-hour work day and Saturday work if he did not
resign, and that he had been informed that no employee
had been forced to work these hours after his termination.
Appellants claim first that the district court should have
struck those paragraphs of Calhoun's affidavit in which he
claimed that after his resignation other employees had not
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worked the long hours he was threatened with because this
information was not within Calhoun's personal
knowledge. Without this assertion, appellants claim that
the events alleged by Calhoun, even if shown to be true,
were not sufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the
plaintiffs summary judgment burden of proving
constructive discharge.
Appellants rely on cases in which one of these factors
standing alone was held an insufficient basis for a finding
of constructive discharge:

(loss of prestige
because of particularly precipitious replacement by trainee
insufficient);
(pranks, tricks, heavy-handed humor, and
being required to work two consecutive hitches not
sufficient).

121 Appellants' theory is that since each isolated incident
cannot as a matter of law suffice for a constructive
discharge, all of them together must also fail to do so. The
fallacy in this "divide and conquer" approach *563 is that
these events must be viewed as part of a single behavior
pattern by appellants. Even were we to omit the allegations
concerning the hours worked by others after Calhoun was
terminated, the other events taken together compare
favorably enough with fact patterns in successful age
discrimination cases so as to make a grant of summary
judgment improper. See
(choice of transfer to lower
paying job or resignation sufficient);

The facts
viewed in the light most favorable to Calhoun are:
I. Calhoun always received good work ratings and high
pay raises until Preuss arrived;
2. Cleveland Twist Drill wanted to reduce its work force,
preferably by retiring older employees;
3. Calhoun was asked three times in seven months whether
he wished to retire, despite having made it clear the first
time that he would not retire until he was sixty-five;
4. In an effort to remove Calhoun after he refused to retire,
he was demoted, reprimanded for doing something he had
done before without sanction, excluded from training
sessions, and threatened with a drastic increase in working
hours;
5. Calhoun was demoted from being in charge of the
department he had run for fourteen years and was put under
two people he had trained;
6. No specific criticism of Calhoun's work was ever made;
and
7. After his termination, Calhoun was told by a former
assistant who had taken over Calhoun's duties that he was
not working any more hours than he ever had.
This set of facts was clearly sufficient for a jury to find that
a reasonable person in Calhoun's shoes would have felt
that his services were no longer desired.

Judgment N.O. V.
(several inquiries about retirement plans
along with humiliating demotion, even with same pay and
benefits, sufficient). Tn this case, there were repeated
inquiries about resignation, demotion of the plaintiff,
promotion of a younger person and the threat of onerous
working hours ifno resignation. We cannot say as a matter
of law that these events viewed as a whole could not be
sufficient to constitute constructive discharge.

Directed Verdict

131 When deciding whether to grant a directed verdict
motion, the trial court must look at the facts in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and, if any set of facts
could result in that party's victory, the court must deny the
motion. "In doing so, we must recognize that it is for
jurors, not judges, to weigh the evidence and determine the
credibility ofwitnesses."

We have stated that
[t]he standard for granting judgment
n.o.v. in this circuit is well settled. Such a
motion should only be granted upon a
determination that the evidence could
lead reasonable [persons] ... to but one
conclusion, a determination made
without evaluating the credibility of
witnesses or the weight of the evidence at
trial.
The testimony of Sabatos was to the effect that
he had more formal engineering education than Calhoun,
that he had some special expertise in a new product line
being produced at the plant and that he generally worked a
twelve- to fourteen-hour day. Cross-examination brought
out that Sabatos' expertise was in a product that accounted
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for no more than 10-20% of the factory's output.
Calhoun's expertise, on the other hand, related to the
product that accounted for 80-90% of the factory's output.
Sabatos also testified that Combis, the man who told
Calhoun he was working the same *564 hours as before,
had essentially taken over Calhoun's duties. Preuss'
testimony focused upon the difficult financial position of
the factory and his attempts to improve it. He testified that
the company had less work than the staffing level could
justifY and that his first move was to reduce the staff. He
also testified that the plant was having problems producing
a quality product on time and that he thought Sabatos was
simply a better man for the job. Cross-examination brought
out that manufacturing deadlines did not fall within
Calhoun's department, but within the responsibility of the
Production Department. Preuss also testified that he did
not want Calhoun to leave, but was simply trying to find
out if he had any retirement plans before laying off a more
junior employee.

141 While appellants' explanation of their action is
credible, a reasonable jury could have found that the facts
amounted to a constructive discharge. Appellants offered
very little evidence to justifY Calhoun's demotion as the
result of inadequate performance and the repeated
retirement inquiries could be interpreted as harassment or
at least a broad hint that Calhoun should retire, especially
since he had expressed a clear intention not to retire at
earlier meetings. Finally, the threat of an increased work
day could be seen as a clear message that the company was
prepared to make Calhoun's life more and more miserable
as he continued to refuse to retire, especially when there
was no evidence offered to show that Calhoun had to work
long hours to get his job done. The district court did not err
in denying appellants' motion for a judgment n.o.v.
151 Appellants' final claim of error is the district court's
failure to give an "anticorporate bias" jury instruction.
Appellants submitted such an instruction2 to the court prior

to the charge and properly objected to the court's failure to
so instruct. Appellants argue that such an instruction was
made necessary by the anticorporate language used by
plaintiff's counsel during the closing: "they squeeze the
corporate claws around his neck until he has no choice but
to say, 'Well, I will retire,' " and "[s]lowly, Bob Calhoun
could feel the claw of the company clutching at his neck."
The district court instructed the jury that "[blias, prejudice,
preconceived notions have no place in a jury's
deliberations" and "[y]ou are to perfonn your duty without
any bias or prejudice as to either party."
[6) "The purpose of jury instructions is to advise the jury
on the proper legal standards to be applied in detennining
issues of fact as to the case before them."
Beyond
that, the district court's choice of jury instructions is a
matter of discretion. We see no abuse of discretion in the
district court's decision not to give the requested
instruction. The court admonished the jury twice to avoid
bias or prejudice and we believe that was sufficient under
the circumstances. Plaintiff's metaphorical-alliterative
reference to "corporate claws" seems to us to be within the
nonnal bounds of creative advocacy. It did not approach
the appeal to bias found in
where plaintiff's counsel
emphasized that the corporation was foreign, it had
substantial assets and the plaintiff would be a ward of the
state if no award was made.

Affirmed

Parallel Citations
41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1121, 41 EmpJ. Prac. Dec.
P 36,553

Footnotes
Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Patriot's Day is an indigenous Massaehusetts holiday; the Boston Marathon is traditionally run on Patriot's Day.
The instruction requested by the appellants was as follows:
You should not attach any significanee to the fact that Mr. Calhoun is an individual while Acme Cleveland and Cleveland Twist
Drill are corporations. This case should be considered and decided by you as a case between persons of equal standing in the
community. Corporations such as Acme Cleveland and Cleveland Twist Drill are entitled to the same fair trial at your hands as
a private individual such as Mr. Calhoun. You should not give any preference to Mr. Calhoun because he is an individual, nor
does the mere fact that Mr. Calhoun is an individual make his testimony any more credible than the testimony presented by
Acme Cleveland and Cleveland Twist Drill. All persons, including corporations, stand equal before the law and are to be treated
as equals in a court of justice.
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fi",,,Disparate Treatment

225 F.3d 1115

United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.

An employee alleging disparate treatment under
Title VII must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that: (1) he or she
belongs to a protected class; (2) he or she was
qualified for the position; (3) he or she was
subject to an adverse employment action; and (4)
similarly situated individuals outside the
protected class were treated more favorably.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
148 Cases that cite this headnote

Ronald Y. CHUANG and Linda Chuang,
PlaintYTs-Appellants,

v.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DA VIS,
BOARD OF TRUSTEES; and Fitz-Roy
Curry, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-15036. I Argued and Submitted
March 14, 2000. I Filed Aug. 30, 2000.
Assistant professor of pharmacology and assistant research
pharmacologist, both of Chinese origin, brought action
against state university under Title VII alleging
discrimination based on race and national origin. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California, David F. Levi, 1., entered summary judgment in
favor of university. Assistant professor and assistant
pharmacologist appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) assistant professor
was not required to show that he filed formal application
for full-time-equivalent (FTE) position to establish that
denial of FTE was adverse employment action; (2)
assistant professor's alleged lack of qualifications for
certain human genetics program, if proven, did not
preclude him from establishing he was qualified for FTE
position; (3) alleged forcible relocation of laboratory, if
proven, was adverse employment action; (4) assistant
professor and assistant pharmacologist failed to establish
prima facie claim challenging alleged failure of university
officials
to
respond
to
grievances
regarding
misappropriation of research funds; (5) alleged statement
by university official, and dean's alleged laughter in
response, if proven, constituted direct evidence of race and
national origin discrimination; (6) alleged statement by
chair of pharmacology department during forcible
relocation of laboratory, if proven, constituted direct
evidence of discrimination; and (7) post-complaint hires
were not relevant to claim challenging denial of FTE
position.

[2)

Once an employee establishes a prima facie Title
VII claim, the burden of production, but not
persuasion, shifts to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the challenged action. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et
seq.
69 Cases that cite this headnote

[3)

[11

Civil Rights

Civil Rights
Motive or Intent; Pretext
Once an employer articulates some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the action
challenged in a Title VII suit, the employee must
show that the articulated reason is pretextual
either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
226 Cases that cite this headnote

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

West Headnotes (29)

Civil Rights
···Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden

[41

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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As a general matter, an employee in a Title VII
employment discrimination action need produce
very little evidence in order to overcome an
employer's motion for summary judgment; this is
because the ultimate question is one that can only
be resolved through a searching inquiry, one that
is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder,
upon a full record. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et
seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.c.A.

he
filed
formal
application
for
full-time-equivalent (FTE) posltIon at state
university in order to establish that denial ofFTE
was adverse employment action upon which Title
VII claim could be based; assistant professor
made several written requests for FTE, university
promised him he would receive FTE once one
became available, and other faculty members had
received FTEs without submitting formal
applications. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703(a)(1), as amended, 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e2(a)(1).

50 Cases that cite this headnote

(5)

Federal Civil Procedure
"Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

(8)

The requisite degree of proof necessary to
establish a prima facie case for Title VII on
summary judgment is minimal and does not even
need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the
evidence. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,
as amended, 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.;
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 V.S.C.A.

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether assistant professor's microbiology
research and expertise fell within broad category
of "human genetics" and thus qualified him for
human genetics program, precluding summary
judgment as to whether he was qualified for
full-time-equivalent (FTE) position at state
university, as required for prima facie Title VII
case. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

28 Cases that cite this headnote

(6)

Civil Rights
Disparate Treatment
of
the
seven
Allegation
that
three
full-time-equivalent (FTE) positions awarded by
state university went to Asian professors was not
relevant to prima facie case of assistant professor
of Chinese origin challenging denial of FTE
position, inasmuch as prima facie case required
showing that university treated similarly situated
individuals outside his protected class more
favorably. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,
as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
48 Cases that cite this headnote

[71

Civil Rights
.Promotion, Demotion, and Transfer

Federal Civil Procedure
. ·.Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

2 Cases that cite this headnote

(9)

Civil Rights
Promotion, Demotion, and Transfer
Assistant
professor's
alleged
lack
of
qualifications for certain human genetics
program, if proven, did not preclude him from
establishing
he
was
qualified
for
full-time-equivalent (FTE) position, as required
for prima facie Title VII case, inasmuch as he
was challenging state university'S failure to
award him pharmacology department FTE, not
simply FTE awarded pursuant to such program.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
I Cases that cite this headnote

Assistant professor was not required to show that
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[10)

up their laboratory space for Caucasian faculty
member of junior rank, and that university had
never relocated laboratory space of any
Caucasian faculty member over a faculty
member's objections. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et
seq.
22 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
;>~Particular

Cases

Alleged forcible relocation of laboratory space
occupied by assistant professor of pharmacology
and assistant research pharmacologist at state
university, if proven, was "adverse employment
action" under Title VII, inasmuch as its alleged
results included disruption of important, ongoing
research projects, loss of experimental subjects,
withholding of research grants, new facilities
being inadequate for ongoing research, and
members of research team quitting because of
change in working conditions. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 703(a)(l), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-2(a)(l ).

(13)

Assistant professor of pharmacology and
assistant research pharmacologist, both of
Chinese origin, failed to establish prima facie
Title VII claim challenging alleged failure of
state university officials to respond to grievances
regarding misappropriation of research funds,
inasmuch as university's alleged failure to inform
assistant professor of its findings or resulting
disciplinary actions was not adverse employment
action, and there was no evidence that non-Asian
or non-Chinese complainants had received
formal responses in similar circumstances. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

12 Cases that cite this headnote

[11)

Civil Rights
~Practices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements
The removal of or substantial interference with
work facilities important to the performance of
an employee's job constitutes a material change
in the terms and conditions of employment and
thus is an "adverse employment action" under
Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
32 Cases that cite this headnote

[12)

[14)

Civil Rights
Particular Cases
State
university
articulated
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason in Title VII action for
denying assistant professor full-time-equivalent
(FTE) position by stating that because he had
full-time position, his position was not in
jeopardy, and dean was prepared to pay for his
base salary if need arose. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e et seq.

Civil Rights
cDisparate Treatment
Civil Rights
Seniority or Merit System
Assistant professor of pharmacology and
assistant research pharmacologist, both of
Chinese origin, established more favorable
treatment of similarly situated individuals
outside their protected classes, as required for
prima facie Title VII case of race and national
origin discrimination against state university, by
providing evidence that they were forced to give

Civil Rights
..i··Particular Cases

[15)

Civil Rights
Particular Cases
State

university
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beyond that constituting his or her prima facie
case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the truth of the
employer's proffered reasons for its adverse
employment action. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et
seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.c.A.

nondiscriminatory reason in Title VII action for
forcibly
relocating
assistant
professor's
laboratory by stating that relocation was required
to accommodate human genetics program. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

93 Cases that cite this headnote

(16)

Civil Rights
v.cMotive or Intent; Pretext
(19)
A Title VII plaintiff can prove pretext in two
ways: (1) indirectly, by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence because it is internally inconsistent or
otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by
showing that unlawful discrimination more likely
motivated the employer. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.CA §
2000e et seq.
236 Cases that cite this headnote

While a Title VII plaintiff always retains the
burden of persuasion, he or she does not
necessarily have to introduce additional,
independent evidence of discrimination at the
pretext stage. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

(20)
(17)

Civil Rights
cyo.Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Civil Rights
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether state university's proffered explanations
for
denying
assistant
professor
full-time-equivalent (FTE) position and forcibly
relocating his laboratory, i.e., that he had
full-time position that was not in jeopardy and
that laboratory space was needed for human
genetics program, were pretextual, precluding
summary judgment in Title VII national origin
and race discrimination case. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. §
2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28
U.S.CA

The direct and indirect approaches to proving
pretext in a Title VII action are not exclusive; a
combination of the two kinds of evidence may in
some cases serve to establish pretext so as to
make summary judgment improper. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.
19 Cases that cite this headnote

4 Cases that cite this headnote

(181

Federal Civil Procedure
. Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
A Title VII plaintiff alleging disparate treatment
can survive summary judgment without
producing any evidence of discrimination

(21)

Civil Rights
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
The principle that the same evidence may be used
at various stages of a court's analysis of a Title
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VII action applies equally to the use of such
evidence with respect to various claims of
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et
seq., as amended, 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.

Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 V.S.C.A.
19 Cases that cite this headnote

(25)

Civil Rights
and Sufficiency of Evidence

',~'/Weight

(22)

Civil Rights
;>dWeight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Federal Civil Procedure
,~,"Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
At the summary judgment stage of a Title VII
action, as well as at trial, any form of evidence of
discriminatory treatment that is otherwise
admissible may be used to support any allegation
of discrimination, whether or not there is a direct
relationship between the various claims involved.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 V.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.CA

Alleged statement by state university official that
"two Chinks" in the pharmacology department
were "more than enough," and dean's alleged
laughter in response, if proven, constituted direct
evidence of race and national ongm
discrimination in Title VII action brought by
assistant professor of Chinese origin. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
8 Cases that cite this headnote

(26)

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[23)

Alleged statement by chair of state university'S
pharmacology department during forcible
relocation of laboratory operated by assistant
professor of Chinese origin, that assistant
professor "should pray to your Buddha for help,"
if proven, constituted direct evidence of race and
national origin discrimination in Title VII action.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
I Cases that cite this headnote

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Direct evidence of pretext does not have to be
specific and substantial for an employee to
withstand summary judgment in a Title VII
action. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 V.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.CA
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[24)

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
A Title VII plaintiff is required to produce very
little direct evidence of an employer's
discriminatory intent to move past summary
judgment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,
as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.;

Civil Rights
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

[271

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
I t is not the province of a court to spin evidence in
an employer's favor when evaluating its motion
for summary judgment in a Title VII action; to
the contrary, all inferences must be drawn in
favor of the non-moving party. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28
U.S.C.A.
5 Cases that cite this headnote
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[28)

Civil Rights
Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements

"~,'='Practices

An employer's favorable treatment of "Asian"
employees does not answer a Title VII claim of
discrimination based on national origin. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.

[29)

Civil Rights
,,"Hiring
Alleged hiring of Asian professors to fill three of
seven full-time-equivalent (FTE) state university
positions was not relevant to Title VII claim by
assistant professor of Chinese origin challenging
denial of FTE position, where such hiring
occurred after assistant professor filed his
complaint. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.

Attorneys and Law Firms
*1119 Bradley G. Booth, Booth & Finch, Sacramento,
California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Dennis C. Huie, Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant,
Sacramento, California, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California; David F. Levi, District
Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-97-00613-DFLIPAN.
Before: POLITZ,IREINHARDT, HAWKINS, Circuit
Judges.

Dr. Ronald Y. Chuang and Dr. Linda Chuang contend that
officials at the University of California, Davis ("Davis")
discriminated against them on the basis of their race
(Asian) and national origin (Chinese), in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act ofl964, as amended, 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e et seq.2 The Chuangs allege that they suffered
discrimination as a result of: (1) Davis's failure and refusal
to provide Dr. Ronald Chuang with a promised tenure
position; (2) Davis's forcible relocation of the Chuangs'
laboratory during an ongoing research program sponsored
by the National Institute of Health ("NIH"); and (3)
Davis's failure to respond to Dr. Ronald Chuang'S
complaints regarding the misappropriation of some of his
research funds. *1120 The district court granted Davis
summary judgment on all three claims. We reverse on the
first two and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND3

Dr. Ronald Chuang is a microbiologist with a worldwide
reputation in his area of expertise. He has conducted
important research on the interaction between drug abuse
and AIDS, including a seminal study on the effect of
morphine on the simian immunodeficiency virus, an
important model for AIDS research. He has published his
findings in prestigious scientific journals. His research has
been continuously supported by grants from the National
Institute of Health (NIH). In 1996, when many of the
events in this case transpired, his research program was
being funded by an extraordinary $1.7 million grant from
the NIH and other external sources.
The School of Medicine at Davis is divided into two parts:
Clinical and Basic Sciences. The Basic Sciences division
consists of five departments: pharmacology, biological
chemistry, physiology, cell biology and human anatomy,
and medical microbiology.
In 1982, the School of Medicine hired Dr. Chuang as an
assistant professor of pharmacology and Dr. Linda
Chuang, his wife, as an assistant research pharmacologist.4
The Chuangs have long collaborated on various research
programs. The Chuangs joined the pharmacology
department at Davis because they had enjoyed their
graduate school experience there and wanted to contribute
to the university's educational mission. In choosing Davis,
Dr. Chuang turned down an offer for a tenure-track
position at the leading pharmacology department in the
country, at Yale University.

Opinion
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

A. Denial of FTE Position
When Dr. Chuang joined Davis, he was appointed as an
assistant "in-residence" professor. Professors in residence
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are responsible for funding most of their salaries and
research through outside grants. By contrast,
full-time-equivalent (FTE) professors-i.e., tenured
faculty-have their salaries funded directly by Davis.
When an FTE faculty member in a department retires or
resigns, the FTE position is generally returned to the
department to be reallocated to someone else. Dr. Chuang,
the only full-time faculty member in the pharmacology
department who is not Caucasian, is also the only one
without an FTE.
Shortly after Dr. Chuang joined the department, Dr. Larry
Stark, then the department chairman, supported Dr.
Chuang for a five-year NIH Research Career Development
Award (RCDA), with the understanding that if the
prestigious award were granted, Dr. Chuang would receive
an FTE position upon its completion. Dr. Chuang received
the award, completed it in 1989, but never received an
FTE.

In a letter dated April 26, 1988, Chairman Stark informed
Dr. Chuang that School of Medicine Dean Hibbard
Williams wanted to keep him on the faculty, but that no
FTE was available at the time and Davis could not provide
him one until a resignation or retirement occurred. In a
memorandum dated April 1988, Chairman Stark told an
assistant dean that "the School has committed itself to
finding [Dr. Chuang] a permanent FTE position in the
Department." The memorandum described Dr. Chuang's
promotions within the department to the level of associate
professor and concluded that in light of "recent court
decisions ... these facts also argue strongly for planning an
FTE position for Dr. Chuang."
*1121 There have been five retirements 111 the
pharmacology department since 1989. Nevertheless, Dr.
Chuang has not received an FTE.

The Executive Committee is a supervisory and
policymaking body of the Davis School of Medicine. At a
meeting of this committee in 1989, Professor Wallace
Winters asked about a Chinese~American professor (not
Dr. Chuang) whom the faculty of the pharmacology
department had previously and unanimously asked the
admiiiistratioh- to pursue as a candidate for department
chairman. The administration had never contacted this
candidate, and Dean Williams had not responded to the
faculty's request. According to Professor Winters, Dr.
Carroll Cross, sitting next to the dean, remarked that "two
Chinks" in the department were more than enough; in
response, Dean Williams laughed.
In 1989 and 1990, Davis hired two Caucasian professors as
FTEs in the pharmacology department. The second of
these two professors, Dr. Michael Hanley, a male

Caucasian with no active NIH grants, was hired as a
"Targets of Opportunity for Diversity" appointment. The
"Targets of Opportunity for Diversity" program was
designed by the University of California to recruit minority
and women faculty. It provided a special exemption by
which a department could forgo the regular full candidate
search for an open position.5 Through these hires, the
already overwhelmingly white pharmacology department
became more so.
Several more FTEs became available to Dean Williams,
but he never used them. Two and a haifFTE positions were
available in the pharmacology department due to
retirements. When Dean Gerald Lazarus took over in 1992,
he gave three FTEs to the new Rowe Program (described
infra ); four FTEs to the Basic Sciences division for
recruitment purposes; and two FTEs to the Basic Sciences
division for "compelling educational needs, retention or
requirements of the Associate Dean for Research"
(emphasis added). None of these FTEs went to Dr.
Chuang, despite the earlier assurances he had received.
After the Chuangs filed their complaint in district court in
1997, the Basic Sciences division filled a number of FTE
positions. Three were given to Asian professors, but not to
Dr. Chuang.

B. Forcible Relocation

When the Chuangs joined the faculty in 1982, they were
assigned laboratory space in Tupper Hall for their
exclusive use. Dr. Gary Henderson, a Caucasian faculty
member, refused to remove equipment and materials that
he was storing there. In spite of the requests of the Chuangs
and the department chairman, Dr. Henderson did not
remove the equipment and materials until approximately
seven years later. He was not forcibly relocated.
In 1990, when the department made its "diversity" -based
hire of Dr. Hanley, Dean Williams asked the Chuangs to
give Dr. Hanley two laboratory rooms that they were using
for ongoing research. At the time, most of the other faculty
members were using their laboratory space for storage
purposes; Dr. Chuang was the only faculty member in the
pharmacology department conducting active research.
Although Dean Williams assured the Chuangs that this
arrangement would be temporary, lasting approximately
13-18 months, the rooms were never returned. The
Chuangs had to borrow laboratories from other faculty
members to continue their research. They relocated their
equipment and research in borrowed spaces five times.
Upon becoming dean of the School of Medicine, Dr.
Lazarus decided to launch the "Rowe Program," a program
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in human genetics. The program required 5000 square feet
of space. Davis officials initially designated space in
Briggs Hall for *1122 this program. They contend,
however, that Dr. Michael Seldin, the professor who was to
be hired as the Rowe Chair, conditioned his acceptance on
receiving the space adjacent to the department of
biological sciences on the fourth floor of Tupper Hall-the
space occupied by the pharmacology department. In his
deposition, Dr. Seldin denied that he had demanded this
space.
In open meetings in December 1995, Associate Dean FitzRoy Curry assured the Basic Sciences division faculty that
no faculty member with an active research program would
be affected by the allocation of space for the Rowe
Program. Then, on January 29, 1996, Dr. Mannfred
Hollinger, the new chairman of the pharmacology
department, informed the Chuangs that the department
would be moved from the fourth floor to the basement of
Tupper Hall. If the Chuangs refused to move out, Hollinger
said, the administration would change the locks on their
doors. Dr. Tom Jue, a faculty member in the biological
chemistry department who had borrowed laboratory space
in the pharmacology department, was also told to relocate.
Like the Chuangs, Dr. Jue was Chinese-American and had
an active research program funded by the NIH. Most of the
other pharmacology laboratory rooms on the fourth floor
were not in use; they were reserved for "future
pharmacologists" or new faculty members not yet
identified.6 The administration did not require Dr.
Hanley-the Caucasian faculty member who was using the
two rooms from the Chuangs' laboratory, who had no
active NIH research grants, and who had since switched to
a different department-to relocate. No Caucasian faculty
member with active research was required to relocate.
The Chuangs protested the relocation of their laboratory
space, but to no avail. 7 Chairman Hollinger responded to
their protests in a hostile manner. He told the Chuangs that
if they did not comply, "worse things" than the
discontinuation of their research would happen to them;
that "when all the shooting is done, there will surely be a
casualty"; and that the administration would "physically
throw [them] out of the laboratory by force" if necessary.
On April 18, 1996, the move of their laboratory began.
Members of the dean's office, led by Dr. Ted Wandzilak,
began packing and moving the Chuangs' laboratory
without their consent, mishandling and damaging
expensive equipment and hazardous materials. Dr.
Wandzilak admitted to the Chuangs that the administration
was acting wrongly, but said that if they challenged the
eviction on legal grounds, it would take a long time for the
matter to be resolved. On May 6, 1996, Dr. Hollinger
observed the relocation process and told the Chuangs,
"You should pray to your Buddha for help."

The Chuangs' equipment and materials were crammed into
the basement laboratory room that they had been
assigned-still occupied by other faculty-with the
overflow put in another room. The locks to their
fourth-floor laboratory were changed. In declarations
submitted below, several Davis faculty members stated in
the strongest of terms that the forcible relocation of a
researcher's laboratory was unheard of. Several Caucasian
faculty members *1123 had, in 1996 and earlier, protested
the relocation of their laboratory space, but Davis had
never evicted them or removed their equipment.
Furthermore, an expert on NIH research grants stated that
the forcible relocation ofthe Chuangs' laboratory violated
not only Davis's commitment to Dr. Chuang, but also its
commitment to the federal agency itself.
Davis's relocation of the Chuangs' laboratory had a
calamitous effect on their research programs. The
Chuangs' overall research space was significantly reduced.
The basement of Tupper Hall was not designed for
molecular biology, Dr. Chuang'S main field of research.
The Chuangs' laboratory rooms and offices are now
located on different floors (the fourth floor and the
basement), a fact which not only complicates the
scientists' work, but also compromises experimental
designs due to the safety rules and regulations of the Center
for Disease Control and the university itself. The Chuangs
lack access to a cold room and other critical facilities. As a
result of the relocation, a technician, graduate student, and
undergraduate student quit Dr. Chuang'S research
program, and he has found it difficult to hire qualified
replacements. Scheduled experiments were delayed. A
colony of monkeys, to be used in a research project, grew
too much in the interim and had to be replaced. The NIH
withheld research grants on a particular project for eight
months, and the Chuangs could not obtain supplemental
grants, which would otherwise have been available to
them, because they no longer had sufficient laboratory
space. Another $75,000 grant was lost entirely.

C. Investigation of Misappropriated Funds

In June 1994 about $8,000 was misappropriated from Dr.
Chuang's NIH research account and diverted to the
accounts of the pharmacology department and its
chairman. Dr. Chuang made repeated attempts to have the
matter investigated by Davis's internal audit office, and
complained in writing to various administration officials in
1995 and 1996. The associate director of the internal audit
office investigated Dr. Chuang's complaints, provided a
written report to the provost, and told Dr. Chuang that the
provost would contact him with the findings. The provost
did not do so, however, and Dr. Chuang never received any
formal response from Davis. In a declaration submitted
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below, the associate director of the internal audit office
asserted that disciplinary actions were taken in response to
Dr. Chuang'S complaint, but that Dr. Chuang could not be
informed of these actions "because of privacy concerns."
The internal audit office was itself unable to respond
formally to Dr. Chuang'S complaint "because of
workload."

1410 (9th Cir.1996) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, contrary to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, the district court did not evaluate the facts in the light
most favorable to the Chuangs, but instead resolved
material facts that were disputed and disregarded other
important evidence. As we will explain, the record
supports a finding of illegal discrimination by Davis on
two of the Chuangs' claims and warrants a resolution by
trial on those claims.

D. Proceedings Below
On July 12, 1996, the Chuangs filed a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In
1997 they received a notice of right to sue and filed a Title
VII lawsuit, alleging inter alia discrimination on the basis
of race and national origin, in federal district court. Davis
filed a motion for summary judgment; the district court
granted it; and the Chuangs filed this appeal.

B. Prima Facie Case

[5) Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, "[t]he
requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima
facie case for Title VII ... on summary judgment is minimal
and does not even need to rise to the level of a
preponderance of the evidence." Wallis v. JR. Simplot Co .•
26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994) (citation omitted); accord
Godwin v. Hunt Wesson. Inc .. 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th
Cir.1998).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Framework

1. Denial of FTE Position

[I) [2) [3) The parties agree that the applicable legal
framework for considering the summary judgment motion
in the instant case is that established by McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas. a plaintiff
alleging disparate treatment under Title VII must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.ld. at 802, 93
S.ct. 1817. Specifically, the plaintiff must show that (1) he
belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the
position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment
action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his
protected class were treated more favorably. ld. The
burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
*1124 reason for the challenged action. lei. If the employer
does so, the plaintiff must show that the articulated reason
is pretextual "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of
Community Afjclirs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101
S.Ct. 1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).

[6) Dr. Chuang contends that he was unfairly denied a
promised FTE position because of his race and/or national
origin. Davis argues that Dr. Chuang failed to establish a
prima facie case because: (1) he did not apply for the FTEs
that became available; and (2) he was not qualified to
receive them.8 Davis does not challenge the other elements
of the prima facie case.

[4) As a general matter, the plaintiff in an employment
discrimination action need produce very little evidence in
order to overcome an employer's motion for summary
judgment. This is because "the ultimate question is one that
can only be resolved through a searching inquiry~one that
is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full
record." Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406,

[7) With regard to Davis's first objection, the university
contends that because Dr. Chuang did not apply for the
FTEs, the failure to grant him such status did not constitute
an adverse employment action. The record shows,
however, that Dr. Chuang made several written requests
for an FTE. Both the department chairman and the dean
promised him that he would receive an FTE once one
became available. Other faculty members have received
FTEs without submitting formal applications. One
individual, for example, received an FTE without ever
applying for one, partly as an incentive for recruiting her
husband, Dr. Seldin, to the school. Furthermore, Dr.
Chuang had completed a prestigious RCDA grant in 1989.
After a different professor at Davis, Dr. Margaret Meyer,
had completed an RCDA grant, the university had
considered itself compelled under its terms to award her an
FTE.9 Dr. *1125 Chuang's grant contained the same terms,
but Davis did not award an FTE to him. Each of these
points supports a finding that any failure by Dr. Chuang to
file a formal application as and when individual FTEs
became available was irrelevant, and that the filing of such
formal applications was not necessary in order for him to
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establish that he was the subject of an adverse employment
action.
[8) [9) As for Dr. Chuang's qualifications, the district court
concluded that Dr. Chuang had failed to establish that he
was qualified for the Rowe Program, the School of
Medicine's new program in human genetics. This analysis
is deficient in several respects. First, there is at least a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Dr.
Chuang's microbiology research and expertise fell within
the broad category of "human genetics" and thus qualified
him on that basis. Second, at least one individual without
experience in human genetics, Dr. Seldin's wife, received a
Rowe Program FTE. Third, and most important, Dr.
Chuang challenges Davis's failure to award him a
pharmacology department FTE, not simply an FTE
awarded pursuant to the Rowe Program. Davis could, for
instance, have given to Dr. Chuang directly one of the three
FTEs that it instead assigned to the Rowe Program in 1992.
Or it could have given him one of the other FTEs that
became available, such as the FTEs that went to Caucasian
individuals in the pharmacology department in 1989 and
1990. The chairman and dean had promised him an FTE at
least since 1988, and five FTEs became available in the
pharmacology department between then and 1996. On the
basis of the record at summary judgment, Dr. Chuang was
qualified for at least some, and possibly all, of these FTEs.
In view of the above, we conclude that Dr. Chuang
succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination with regard to his failure to receive an FTE.

2. Forcible Relocation
The Chuangs also established a prima facie case with
respect to the forcible relocation of their laboratory space.
Here, consistent with the district court's decision, Davis
contests the third and fourth elements of the McDonnell
Douglas test. It argues that the forced relocation did not
amount to an adverse employment action, and that the
Chuangs did not show that they were treated differently
than other employees.
[10) [11) Viewing the evidence favorably to the Chuangs,
the relocation of their laboratory space unquestionably
qualifies as an adverse employment action. Title VII
provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment." 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Supreme
Court has held that "this not only covers 'terms' and
'conditions' in the narrow sense, but 'evinces a
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment '" in employment.' " Oncale v.

~.

Sundowner Offihore Serl's., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78, 118
S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (quoting Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct.
2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). Cf Ray v. Henderson, 217
F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that for purposes
of a Title VII retaliation claim, "an action is cognizable as
an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to
deter employees from engaging in protected activity").
Here, the forcible relocation of the Chuangs' laboratory
disrupted important, ongoing research projects. Due to the
delay, experimental subjects were lost and research grants
were withheld. The Chuangs lost other grants entirely.
Both scientists rely on grants for their salary. During the
move, fragile, expensive equipment was damaged and
misplaced. The Chuangs were moved to a location with
qualities-e.g., split-level assignment, reduced space, lack
of cold storage-totally inadequate for their ongoing
research. Members of Dr. *1126 Chuang'S research team
quit because of the change in working conditions. Several
Davis professors declared that the involuntary move of Dr.
Chuang'S laboratory was unprecedented and certain to
hinder his research. It also violated the university'S
commitments to the NIH. The forcible relocation involved
far more than, as the district court characterized it, "a host
of annoyances." The removal of or substantial interference
with work facilities important to the performance of the job
constitutes a material change in the terms and conditions of
a person's employment. Assuming the truth of the
allegations, the move of the Chuangs' laboratory more
than qualified as an adverse employment action.
[12) The Chuangs also satisfy the fourth element of the
McDonnell Douglas test, the more favorable treatment of
similarly situated individuals outside their protected
classes, in at least two different ways. They were forced to
give up their laboratory space for a Caucasian faculty
member of junior rank, Dr. Seldin. Furthermore, Davis has
never relocated the laboratory space of any Caucasian
faculty member over the faculty member's objections.fo
In view of the above, a prima facie case exists as to the
forcible relocation also.

3. Investigation of Misappropriated Funds
[13) The Chuangs did not, however, establish a prima facie
case on their claim challenging the failure of Davis
officials to respond to his grievances regarding the
misappropriation of his research funds. The lack of a
response does not amount to an adverse employment
action. The record shows that Davis officials investigated
Dr. Chuang's complaint and took unspecified disciplinary
actions. While the university's failure to inform Dr.
Chuang of its findings or resulting disciplinary actions was
certainly irritating and perhaps unjustified, it did not
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materially affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of the Chuangs' employment. Nor did the
Chuangs present evidence showing that non-Asian or
non-Chinese complainants have received formal responses
in similar circumstances. I I We therefore affirm the district
court's award of summary judgment on this claim.

C. Davis's Nondiscriminatory Reasons and Pretext
Analysis
[14) (15) Because the Chuangs established a prima facie
case for the first two claims, the burden of production
shifts to Davis to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for
each adverse employment action. St. Mary's Honor
Center, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742; McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Davis contends
that it did not give Dr. Chuang an FTE because he had a
full-time position, his position was not in jeopardy, and the
dean was prepared to pay for his base salary if the need
arose. It also maintains that the forcible relocation of the
Chuangs' laboratory was required to accommodate the
Rowe Program.

By offering these explanations, Davis has articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
McDonnell Douglas requires the Chuangs in tum to raise a
genuine factual question whether, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to them, Davis's reasons are
pretextual.
*1127 [16) [17) We have stated that a plaintiff can prove
pretext in two ways: (1) indirectly, by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is "unworthy of
credence" because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise
not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful
discrimination more likely motivated the employer.
Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220-22. These two approaches are
not exclusive; a combination of the two kinds of evidence
may in some cases serve to establish pretext so as to make
summary judgment improper. In this case, while the
indirect evidence and direct evidence are independently
sufficient to allow the Chuangs to proceed to trial, it is the
cumulative evidence to which a court ultimately looks.

1. Indirect Evidence

[18] [19) It is not quite accurate to say that at this point the
burden of production shifts back to the Chuangs. As the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, a disparate treatment
plaintiff can survive summary judgment without producing
any evidence of discrimination beyond that constituting his
prima facie case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the truth of the employer's

proffered reasons. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, - - , 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2108, 147
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (holding that if factfinder rejects
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons as
unbelievable, it may infer "the ultimate fact of intentional
proof
of
discrimination"
without
additional
discrimination); see also St. Mary's Honor Center, 509
U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742. While the plaintiff always
retains the burden of persuasion, Reeves, 530 U.S. at - - ,
120 S.Ct. at 2106, he does not necessarily have to
introduce "additional,
independent evidence
of
discrimination" at the pretext stage, id. at 2109. Accord
Schnidrig, 80 F .3d at 1410--11; Washington, 10 F.3d at
1433; Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College
Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.1991); Lowe v. City of
Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008-09 (9th Cir.1985),
amended by 784 F.2d 1407 (1986).
[20) Here, we conclude that, with respect to Dr. Chuang'S
FTE claim, the evidence constituting his prima facie case is
sufficiently strong to raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the truth of Davis's proffered nondiscriminatory
reasons. Dr. Chuang's qualifications as a microbiologist
and academic are extraordinary: he has developed a
reputation as a leading AIDS researcher, published in
prestigious journals, and received large amounts of
funding from the NIH. Yet he is the only full-time faculty
member in his department at Davis who has not received
an FTE. It also happens that he is the only non-Caucasian.
He was promised an FTE, but whenever one became
available, it was assigned to someone else. Given this
evidence, a factfinder could well decide to disbelieve
Davis's explanation that (aside from his purported lack of
qualifications) it did not offer an FTE to Dr. Chuang
because his position was never in jeopardy (a fact due, of
course, to the high level of funding he had obtained). 12
[21) [22) Similarly, we hold that the Chuangs made a
sufficiently strong showing in their prima facie case to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Davis's
proffered explanation for the forcible relocation of their
laboratory is pretextual. Davis contends that Dr. Seldin, the
presumptive Rowe Chair, demanded the precise space
occupied by the Chuangs on the fourth floor of Tupper
Hall, the space adjacent to t~at occupied by the department
of biological chemistry. Dr. Seldin, however, denied this
contention in his deposition. This is the sort of evidence
that could lead a factfinder to disbelieve Davis. The refusal
of Dr. Henderson to remove equipment from the Chuangs'
*1128 laboratory, the failure of Dean Williams to return to
them the two rooms assigned to Dr. Hanley in 1990, and
the extraordinarily hostile manner in which the School of
Medicine evicted the Chuangs are additional facts which
contribute to establishing a jury issue as to the falsity of
Davis's explanation. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at
120 S.Ct. at 2110-11. In addition, the circumstances
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surrounding Davis's failure to give Dr. Chuang the
promised FTE may properly be considered in determining
whether Davis's explanation regarding the forcible
relocation is pretextual. The Reeves principle that the same
evidence may be used at various stages of a court's
analysis applies equally to the use of such evidence with
respect to various claims of discrimination. At the
summary judgment stage, as well as at trial, any form of
evidence of discriminatory treatment that is otherwise
admissible may be used to support any allegation of
discrimination, whether or not there is a direct relationship
between the various claims involved.

2. Direct Evidence
[23J [24] The Chuangs also presented direct evidence of
discriminatory motive with respect to both of the claims on
which we reverse the grant of summary judgment. In its
order, the district court held that direct evidence of pretext
had to be specific and substantial. This was error. "With
direct evidence, a triable issue as to the actual motivation
of the employer is created even if the evidence is not
substantial." Blue v. Widnall, 162 F.3d 541, 546 (9th
Cir.1998) (citing Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220-21); see also
Reeves, 530 U.S. at --,120 S.Ct. at 2111 (criticizing
lower court for failing to draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of plaintiff when analyzing direct evidence of
discriminatory animus). The plaintiff is required to
produce "very little" direct evidence of the employer's
discriminatory intent to move past summary judgment.
Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221 (quoting Lindahl v. Air France,
930 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.199l)); see also Lowe, 775
F.2d at 1009.
[25) The Chuangs easily clear this threshold. Two items of
direct evidence in this case are particularly significant.
First, a member of the Executive Committee, a
decisionmaking body for the School of Medicine, Dr.
Cross, reportedly stated in a meeting in 1989, just as Dr.
Chuang was completing his prestigious five-year NIH
Research Career Development Award, that "two Chinks"
in the pharmacology department were "more than
enough."]3 We need not dwell on the offensiveness of the
term used. It is "an egregious and bigoted insult, one that
constitutes strong evidence of discriminatory animus on
the basis of national origin." Cf Cordova, 124 F.3d at 1149
(discussing allegation that employer referred to another
employee as "dumb Mexican"). Dr. Cross's remark
establishes discriminatory intent even though it was uttered
during consideration of a different Asian-American's
potential employment. ld. ("[I]f such remarks were indeed
made, they could be proof of discrimination against
[plaintiff] despite their reference to another agent and their
utterance after the hiring decision."). Moreover, it

implicates not only the speaker. For purposes of summary
judgment, Dean Williams's laughing response to this
remark establishes adequate evidence of discriminatory
intent on his part also. Cf McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
804, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (observing that an employer's
"reaction" to plaintiffs "legitimate civil rights activities"
might be relevant to showing of pretext), cited in Lowe,
775 F.2d at 1009; see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at - - , 120
S.Ct. at 2111 (rejecting claim that, as a matter of law,
discriminatory remarks must be made "in the direct
context" of an adverse employment decision).
*1129 [26) [27) The second item of direct evidence is the
statement of Dr. Hollinger, the chairman of the
pharmacology department, during the forcible relocation
of the Chuangs' laboratory. Having already told the
Chuangs that they would be physically thrown out of their
laboratory and that "worse things" would happen if they
continued their protests, Chairman Hollinger told them on
May 6, 1996, during the eviction process, that they "should
pray to [their] Buddha for help." The district court opined
that this statement was "apparently intended as a humorous
comment on his and Dr. Chuang's joint plight in the
laboratory relocation controversy in which Dr. Hollinger
was Dr. Chuang's ally in opposing the move." In drawing
this inference in Davis's favor, the district court erred.
First, the comment was not humorous. Second, Dr.
Hollinger did not share the Chuangs' plight; the record
supports a finding that as department chairman, he was
instrumental in creating it. (It also indicates that
department chairmen play a significant role in hiring
faculty and awarding FTEs.) It is not the province of a
court to spin such evidence in an employer's favor when
evaluating its motion for summary judgment. To the
contrary, all inferences must be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party. Like the "two Chinks" incident, the
admonition of a high-ranking official to an AsianAmerican employee to "pray to your Buddha" during the
time of an adverse employment action is sufficient
evidence of discriminatory motive for purposes of
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis.

3. Cumulative Evidence
In view of the conclusions we have reached with respect to
both the indirect evidence and the direct evidence, there
can be no doubt that on the basis of the cumulative
evidence, the Chuangs have, for purposes of summary
judgment, established pretext on Davis's part.

D. Post-Complaint Hires
Lastly, with respect to Dr. Chuang's claim for denial of an
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FTE position, the district court held that he failed to show
"differential treatment regarding the denial of an FTE
position." Specifically, according to the district judge, Dr.
Chuang did not refute Davis's evidence that "of the seven
FTEs awarded in the Basic Sciences division of the School
of Medicine since 1996, three have gone to Asian
professors." Davis cites this fact in its brief, but wisely
refrains from relying on it as a basis for affirming the
district court's decision.
[28) As an initial matter, the record does not reveal the
national origin of these new hires. An employer's
favorable treatment of"Asian" employees does not answer
a claim of discrimination based on national origin. See Lam
v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1561 n. 16 (9th
Cir.1994) ("[I]t is significant that Lam and the Asian male
candidate were of different national origins-Lam being
Vietnamese-French, the male candidate, Chinese. Lam
alleged not only race discrimination but also national
origin discrimination, thereby raising this distinction as
relevant under Title VII.").

[29) More important, the three Asian professors were
hired, according to the Chuangs, long after the Chuangs
filed their complaints with the EEOC and their lawsuit in
federal court. If accurate, this timing would eliminate any
probative value the evidence might otherwise have. "Given
the obvious incentive in such circumstances for an
employer to take corrective action in an attempt to shield
itself from liability, it is clear that nondiscriminatory
employer actions occurring subsequent to the filing of a
discrimination complaint will rarely even be relevant as
circumstantial evidence in favor of the employer." Lam, 40
F.3d at 1561 n. 17 (citing Gonzales v. Police Dep 't, City of
San Jose, 901 F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir.1990)). In
Gonzalez this court reviewed rulings calling into doubt the
relevance of an employer's post-complaint promotion of
minority employees in cases seeking prospective relief

against discriminatory employment practices. 901 F.2d at
762. It then found the *1130 irrelevance of such evidence
"even more apparent" in disparate treatment cases like this
one addressing "whether discrimination occurred prior to
the commencement of a Title VII action." Id. "Curative
measures simply do not tend to prove that a prior violation
did not occur." Id.
Davis's subsequent hiring practices are therefore irrelevant
to the question whether Dr. Chuang was subjected to
discrimination from 1982 to 1997. On remand, the district
court should exclude at trial evidence of Davis's
post-complaint hiring of Asian-American professors,
unless the university can prove that it made its hiring
decisions before it became aware that the Chuangs
intended to pursue their complaints.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's
grant of summary judgment on Dr. Ronald Chuang's
challenge to the denial of his promised FTE position and
the Chuangs' challenge to the forcible relocation of their
laboratory in 1996.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.
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Footnotes
The Honorable Henry A. Politz, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.

2

Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Dr. Fitz-Roy Curry as a defendant below.

3

Because the plaintiffs appeal from an order graHting Davis summary judgment, we set forth the relevant facts in the light most
favorable to them. Some of these facts arc disputed by Davis.

4

The allegations and claims in this case relate primarily to Dr. Ronald Chuang. For purposes of clarity, we herein refer to him as "Dr.
Chuang" and his wife as "Dr. Linda Chuang."

5

Davis argues, not particularly persuasively in light of the materials in the record, that the "Targets of Opportunity for Diversity"
program was intended to recruit faculty from outside the university, not qualified minority and women faculty.

6

Even at the time the parties submitted briefs on summary judgment below, there was still enough empty laboratory space on the
fourth floor of Tupper Hall for both the Rowe Program and the Chuangs' research needs.
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7

The Chuangs made numerous formal and informal complaints with the administration. Their reasons for not wanting to relocate
were: (1) the relocation would significantly damage their ongoing research; (2) due to strongly held cultural beliefs, they could not
work in the proximity of the morgue, which is located on the basement floor; and (3) the basement is unsafe for Dr. Linda Chuang
who often has to work in the laboratory late at night. With respect to the second reason, Associate Dean Curry advised the Chuangs to
enter the basement from an entrance away from the morgue, cover their eyes with their hands as they walked past the morgue to their
laboratory, and "pretend" that the morgue was not there.

8

The district court also held that Dr. Chuang failed to show "differential treatment regarding the denial of an FTE position" because
"of the seven FTEs awarded in the Basic Sciences division of the School of Medicine since 1996, three have gone to Asian
professors." This point is not relevant to the prima facie requirement. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must show that an
employer treated similarly situated individuals outside the plaintiff's protective class more favorably, not that the employer treated all
other members within the class less favorably. We address the relevance of these post-complaint hires to the overall disparate
treatment inquiry in Section D, infra.

9

Davis incorrectly argues that the declaration relating this evidence "lacks foundation, is conclusory, and is hearsay." The statements
set forth in Professor Jerold Theis's declaration are based on his personal knowledge of faculty meetings and other events that
occurred during his twenty-eight years at the Davis School of Medicine. It is proper evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(e).

10

The Chuangs also argue that no Caucasian faculty member with an ongoing active NIH research program was asked to move during
the 1996 relocation. Davis, however, asserts that Dr. Larry Stark also had active ongoing research and was asked to relocate his
laboratory space from Tupper Hall. (He did not oppose relocation.) In response, the Chuangs contend that at the time Dr. Stark was
not conducting research at Tupper Hall, but at a different laboratory, and that his research involved only a small amount of grant
money, not NIH funds. These disputed facts also require resolution by the facttinder at trial.

11

While Dean Lazarus testified in his deposition that complaints of this nature are meticulously investigated, he did not state whether
formal responses are always provided.

12

We do not suggest that this is the only indirect evidence that supports this aspect of Dr. Chuang's claim. For example, there is also
evidence regarding misuse of the "Targets of Opportunity for Diversity" program to give a Caucasian scientist, but not Dr. Chuang,
an FTE position in the otherwise all-white phannacology department.

13

The fact that this incident was related in the declaration of a faculty member other than Ronald or Linda Chuang strengthens its value
as direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Cordova, 124 F.3d at 1149 n. 5; Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1411.
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299F.3d 838
United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.
[2)

Catharina F. COSTA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
DESERT PALACE, INC., dba Caesars
Palace Hotel & Casino,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 99-15645. I Argued and Submitted March
21,2002. I FiledAug. 2, 2002.
Former employee sued former employer for gender
discrimination under Title VII. The United States District
Court for the District of Nevada, David W. Hagen, J.,
entered judgment on jury verdict in favor of former
employee. Former employer appealed. The Court of
Appeals, William W. Schwarzer, Senior District Judge,
268 F .3d 882, vacated judgment. On en banc rehearing, the
Court of Appeals, McKeown, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
Title VII imposes no special or heightened evidentiary
burden on a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case; (2) District
Court did not abuse its discretion in giving mixed-motive
instruction: (3) issue whether discrimination was
motivating factor in terminating employee was for jury; (4)
issue whether employer would have decided to terminate
employee even if employee's gender had played no role in
termination decision was for jury; and (5) District Court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding arbitration
decisions.

Civil Rights
·,;;",Employment Practices
Civil Rights
·ifxADiscrimination by Reason of Race, Color,
Ethnicity, or National Origin, in General
Civil Rights
·.,,·?Sex Discrimination in General
An employee makes out a Title VII violation by
showing discrimination because of race, sex, or
another protected factor. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 703(a)(l), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-2(a)(l).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3J

Civil Rights
. Motive or Intent; Pretext
An "unlawful employment practice" prohibited
by Title VII encompasses any situation in which
a protected characteristic was a motivating factor
in an employment action, even ifthere were other
motives. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a).

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
Gould, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion in which
Kozinski, Fernandez, and Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges,
joined.

West Headnotes (47)

[I)

Civil Rights
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Title VII imposes no special or heightened
evidentiary burden on a plaintiff in a
mixed-motive case. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et
seq.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[4)

Civil Rights
"Defenses in General
In a mixed-motive Title VII case, if the employee
succeeds in proving only that a protected
characteristic was one of several factors
motivating the employment action, an employer
cannot avoid liability altogether, but instead may
assert an affirmative defense to bar certain types
of relief by showing the absence of "but for"
causation. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 703(m),
706(g)(2)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. §§
2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
21 Cases that cite this headnote
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[5)

Civil Rights
4:",cPresumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof

[8)

The plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a
violation through a preponderance of evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial, that a protected
characteristic played a motivating factor in the
employer's decision. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et
seq.
12 Cases that cite this headnote

Amendments to Title VII providing that an
unlawful employment practice is established
when a protected characteristic is a motivating
factor in an employment action, and providing an
affirmative defense relative to such situation, did
nothing to change the plaintiffs ultimate burden
of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 703(m),
706(g)(2)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
[9)

[6)

Evidence
,/':Circumstantial Evidence
In proving a case, circumstantial evidence is
weighed on the same scale and laid before the
jury in the same manner as direct evidence; in
other words, circumstantial evidence is not
inherently less probative than direct evidence.

Civil Rights
.,~,Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Civil Rights
,Sex Discrimination
Title VII does not impose a special evidentiary
rule on or hurdle for victims of mixed-motive
discrimination to prove their case; the inquiry is
simply that of any civil case, that is, whether the
plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for a rational
factfinder to conclude by a preponderance of the
evidence that the employer violated the statute,
that is, that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§§ 703(a, m), 706(g)(2)(B), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(a, m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Civil Rights
and Sufficiency of Evidence

'~/;~Weight

[10)

Courts
Supreme Court Decisions
It is generally undesirable, where holdings of the

Supreme Court are not at issue, to dissect the
sentences of the United States Reports as though
they were the United States Code.
I Cases that cite this headnote

4 Cases that cite this headnote

[11)

[7)

Civil Rights
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Non-circumstantial evidence is not the magical
threshold for Title VII liability. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e et seq.

Civil Rights
Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment claims under Title VII
require the plaintiff to prove that the employer
acted with conscious intent to discriminate. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
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11 Cases that cite this headnote

[15)
[12]

A Title VII plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case by showing: (1) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (2) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (3) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (4) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. §
2000e et seq.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[13)

Once an employer rebuts the presumption of
discrimination created by a prima facie Title VII
case, the burden of production shifts back to the
plaintiff to introduce evidence from which the
factfinder could conclude that the employer's
proffered reason was pretextual. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. §
2000e et seq.
5 Cases that cite this headnote

[16)

[17)

6 Cases that cite this headnote

[14)

Civil Rights
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
Civil Rights
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Nothing compels the parties to a Title VII action
to invoke the McDonnell Douglas presumption;
evidence in a Title VII action can be in the form
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, or
other
sufficient
evidence,
direct
or
circumstantial, of discriminatory intent. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.CA § 2000e et seq.
10 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
A Title VII plaintiff may make out a prima facie
case, which may be a weak showing, that entitles
her to a transitory presumption of discrimination;
the burden of production only shifts briefly to the
employer to explain why it took the challenged
action, if not based on the protected
characteristic. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
4 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
,,>Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof
In a Title VII case, the burden of persuasion
always remains with the employee to prove the
ultimate Title VII violation, that is, unlawful
discrimination. Civil Rights Actofl964, § 701 et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
4 Cases that cite this headnote

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
The legal proof structure of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case and burden-shifting
paradigm is a tool to assist plaintiffs at the
summary judgment stage so that they may reach
trial. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.CA

Civil Rights
of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden

(>~~Effect

Civil Rights
;~=Practices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements

[18)

Civil Rights
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
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Although
the
McDonnell
Douglas
burden-shifting scheme may be used in a Title
VII action where a single motive is at issue, this
proof scheme is not the exclusive means of proof
in such a case; it also might be invoked in cases in
which the defendant asserts a "same decision"
defense to certain remedies, a circumstance in
which mixed motives are at issue. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

[19)

seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.

[22)

A Title VII case need not be characterized or
labeled as a "pretext" or "mixed-motives" case at
the outset, inasmuch as the shape will often
emerge after discovery or even at trial; similarly,
the complaint itself need not contain more than
the allegation that the adverse employment action
was taken because of a protected characteristic.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
6 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
',,oQ·Instructions
Regardless of the method chosen to arrive at trial,
it is not normally appropriate to introduce the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
to the jury. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
6 Cases that cite this headnote
[23)

[20)

Civil Rights
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
Civil Rights
.Questions of Law or Fact

[24)
Civil Rights
Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof
Once at the trial stage of a Title VII action, the
plaintiff is required to put forward evidence of
discrimination "because of' a protected
characteristic. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et

Civil Rights
F Instructions
After hearing both parties' evidence at a trial of a
Title VII claim, the district court must decide
what legal conclusions the evidence could
reasonably support and instruct the jury
accordingly, and this determination is distinct
from the question of whether to invoke the
McDonnell Douglas presumption; the choice of
jury instructions depends simply on a
determination of whether the evidence supports a
finding that just one, or more than one, factor
actually motivated the challenged decision. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42
V.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
4 Cases that cite this headnote

The presumption of discrimination created by a
prima facie Title VII case retains vitality at trial
in one limited circumstance, that is, where there
is no rebuttal by the employer, but the plaintiff's
prima facie case is in factual dispute; the jury
then determines whether the prima facie case is
established, and, if it is, the jury must find
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[21J

Civil Rights
·,>"",Motive or Intent; Pretext
Civil Rights
"d""Pleading

Civil Rights
Instructions
If, based on the evidence presented in a Title VII
action, the trial court determines that the only
reasonable conclusion a jury could reach is that
discriminatory animus is the sole cause for the
challenged employment action or that
discrimination played no role at all in the
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employer's decisionmaking, then the jury should
be instructed to determine whether the
challenged action was taken "because of' the
prohibited reason. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703(a), as amended, 42 U.S.CA § 2000e-2(a).

[27]

Civil Rights
or Intent; Pretext
Civil Rights
',P" Instructions
·~Motive

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[25]

In Title VII cases in which the evidence could
support a finding that discrimination is one of
two or more reasons for the challenged decision,
at least one of which may be legitimate, the jury
should be instructed to determine first whether
the discriminatory reason was a motivating factor
in the challenged action; if the jury's answer to
this question is in the affirmative, then the
employer has violated Title VII. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. §
2000e et seq.
9 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
or Intent; Pretext

~""Motive

If, based on the evidence presented in a Title VII
action, the trial court determines that the only
reasonable conclusion a jury could reach is that
discriminatory animus is the sole cause for the
challenged employment action or that
discrimination played no role at all in the
employer's decisionmaking, and the jury
determines that the employer acted because of
discriminatory intent, the employee prevails and
may receive the full remedies available under
Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.CA § 2000e-2(a).

[28)

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[26J

If the jury finds in a Title VII mixed-motives case
that the employer has proved the "same decision"
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, the employer will escape the
imposition of damages and any order of
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, and the like,
and is liable solely for attorney fees, declaratory
relief, and an order prohibiting future
discriminatory actions. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 706(g)(2)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.CA §
2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Civil Rights
Motive or Intent; Pretext
Civil Rights
.·Defenses in General
If, based on the evidence presented in a Title VII
action, the trial court determines that the only
reasonable conclusion a jury could reach is that
discriminatory animus is the sole cause for the
challenged employment action or that
discrimination played no role at all in the
employer's decisionmaking, and the jury
determines that the employer did not act because
of discriminatory intent, the employer prevails;
in such cases the employer does not benefit from
the "same decision" defense, which, if
successful, significantly limits the employee's
remedies. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.CA § 2000e-2(a).

Civil Rights
,/e,Relief
Civil Rights
,·Monetary Relief; Restitution
Civil Rights
Proceedings, Grounds, and Objections in
General

[29)

Civil Rights
Motive or Intent; Pretext
Civil Rights
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Although the employer may be entitled to the
"same decision" affirmative defense instruction
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in some Title VII cases, and in other cases it may
not, the employee's ultimate burden of proof in
all cases remains the same: to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
challenged employment decision was "because
of' discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et
seq.
6 Cases that cite this headnote

[30)

Federal Courts
\;;?~ Instructions

Employer waived objection to form of jury
instruction in Title VII action in conceding at trial
that it was "a reasonable statement of the mixed
motive instruction." Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et
seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 51, 28 V.S.C.A.

Civil Rights
>,,·Motive or Intent; Pretext
"Single-motive" and "mixed-motive" cases are
not fundamentally different categories of cases,
and both require the employee to prove
discrimination; they simply reflect the type of
evidence offered. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701
et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[31)

[33)

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[34)

Civil Rights
\~\) Instructions
District court did not abuse its discretion in
giving mixed-motive instruction in Title VII
action; although employee did not dispute many
of events that took place, and although employee
did not wholly discount that such events may
have been part of basis for her discipline and
termination, the wide array of discriminatory
treatment was sufficient to support conclusion
that sex was also motivating factor in
decision-making process. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e et seq.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

Federal Courts
Nature or Subject-Matter ofIssues or
Questions
Federal Courts
Conduct of Trial in General
The Court of Appeals generally reviews the
formulation of jury instructions for abuse of
discretion, but whether an instruction misstates
the law is a legal issue reviewed de novo.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[35)

[32)

Court of Appeals would review de novo
appellant's challenge to district court's denial of
its motion for judgment as matter of law.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 50(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

Federal Courts
Allowance of Remedy and Matters of
Procedure in General
Determination whether evidence could be
characterized as establishing multiple motives,
thus warranting affirmative defense on part of
employer in Title VII action, was evaluation of
evidence, warranting review for abuse of
discretion.

Federal Courts
,Trial De Novo

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[36)

Federal Courts
Verdicts in General
Federal Courts
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high hurdle recognizes that credibility,
inferences, and factfinding are the province ofthe
jury, not the Court. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
50(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

The Court of Appeals can overturn a jury's
verdict and grant a motion for judgment as a
matter oflaw only if there is no legally sufficient
basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party
on that issue. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 50(a), 28
U.S.C.A.

7 Cases that cite this headnote

3 Cases that cite this headnote
[40]

[37)

Issue whether intentional discrimination on basis
of sex was motivating factor in subjecting
employee to termination and other adverse
actions was for jury in Title VII action; linking
differential treatment to employee's sex was not
difficult given that she was the only woman in
her unit, employee was terminated for physical
altercation with male coemployee who netted
only suspension, and employee was told she did
not deserve overtime because she did not have
family to support. Civil Rights Act ofl964, § 701
et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
I Cases that cite this headnote

Federal Courts
",Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict
In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment as
a matter of law, the Court of Appeals may not
substitute its view of the evidence for that of the
jury. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 50(b), 28
U.S.c.A.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

[38)

Federal Courts
Judgment N. O. v
Federal Courts
Weight or Preponderance of Evidence in
General
Federal Courts
Credibility of Witnesses in General

[41J

In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment as
a matter of law, the Court of Appeals neither
makes credibility determinations nor weighs the
evidence, and it must draw all inferences in favor
of the nonmovant. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
50(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

Federal Courts
,. Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict
In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment as
a matter of law, the Court of Appeals is required
to disregard all evidence favorable to the moving
party that the jury is not required to believe; this

Civil Rights
Hostile Environment; Severity,
Pervasiveness, and Frequency
Civil Rights
Hostile Environment; Severity,
Pervasiveness, and Frequency
For purposes of Title VII, the prevalence ofrace
or sex-based slurs does not excuse them. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
4 Cases that cite this headnote

[42)

[39)

Civil Rights
'f'Questions of Law or Fact

Civil Rights
Sex Discrimination
When abuse directed at women centers on the
fact that they are females, a jury may infer
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
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Federal Courts
·is""Instructions

[46)

[43)

Civil Rights
;'=Questions of Law or Fact
Issue whether employer would have decided to
terminate employee even if employee's gender
had played no role in termination decision was
for jury in Title VII action; although employee's
infractions may have played role in termination,
documentation of her infractions and discipline
stemmed in part from sex discrimination. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g)(2)(B), as amended,
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

[44)

Civil Rights
"",Admissibility of Evidence; Statistical
Evidence
District court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding from Title VII action arbitration
decisions relating to incident that triggered
termination; discrimination was not covered by
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and thus
was not issue in arbitration. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e et seq.

The Court of Appeals has discretion to review a
jury instruction despite a failure to object where a
solid wall of Circuit authority would have
rendered an objection futile.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
•.,•• Exemplary or Punitive Damages

[47)

Jury's finding that employer engaged in
egregious conduct did not obviate need, in course
of whether deciding whether employer was liable
for punitive damages under Title VII, to
determine whether employer acted in good faith,
inasmuch as egregious misconduct could not be
equated with lack of good faith. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. §
2000e et seq.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*844 Mark J. Ricciardi, David B. Dornak, Michael J.
Shannon, Ricciardi Law Group, Las Vegas, NY, for
defendant-appellant.

[45)

Federal Courts
,Instructions
Employer's failure to object to punitive damages
instruction during trial of Title VII action did not
preclude Court of Appeals from reviewing such
instruction to ascertain whether it complied with
Kolstad v. American Dental Association, which
provided employers with good faith defense to
punitive damages. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e et
seq.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

Robert N. Peccole, Peccole & Peccole, Ltd., Las Vegas,
NY, for plaintiff-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada; David Warner Hagen, District Judge,
Presiding. D.C. No. CV-96-00009 DWHI RJJ.
Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, REINHARDT,
KOZINSKI,
FERNANDEZ,
KLEINFELD,
SILVERMAN,
GRABER,
McKEOWN, FISHER,
GOULD, and P AEZ, Circuit Judges.
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OPINION
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McKEOWN, Circuit Judge
[1) We agreed to hear this case en banc! primarily to
examine the legal standard for proof of a violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. In this classic instance of what
has been termed a "mixed-motive" case, the employer,
Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino ("Caesars"), terminated
Catharina Costa, the only woman in her bargaining unit,
citing disciplinary problems. Costa argued, and the jury
agreed, that sex was "a motivating factor" in her
termination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Because Caesars
failed to establish that she would have been terminated
without consideration of her sex, the jury awarded back
pay and compensatory damages. Finally, the jury found
that the discrimination was "egregious" and warranted
punitive damages. Caesars argues that Costa should have
been held to a special, higher standard of "direct
evidence," a threshold it claims she did not meet. We
disagree. Title VII imposes no special or heightened
evidentiary burden on a plaintiff in a so-called
"mixed-motive" case. Consequently, we affirm the
liability finding as well as the judgment for back pay and
compensatory damages. In light of intervening Supreme
Court authority, we remand with respect to punitive
damages. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,119
S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999).

BACKGROUND
Catharina Costa is a trailblazer. She has worked most of
her life in a male-dominated environment, driving trucks
and operating heavy equipment. At Caesars, a well known
casino in Las Vegas, she worked in a warehouse and, along
with members of her bargaining unit, Teamsters Local 995,
operated the forklifts and pallet jacks to retrieve food and
beverage orders. Costa was the only woman in this job.
Costa's work was characterized as "excellent" and "good."
As her supervisor explained: "We knew when she was out
there the job would get done." Nonetheless, she
experienced a number of problems with management and
her co-workers. At first, she responded by simply focusing
on doing her job well. Slowly, Costa began to notice that
she was being singled out because she was a woman. Her
concerns not only fell on deaf ears-"my word meant
nothing"-but resulted in her being treated as an "outcast."
In a series of escalating events that included informal
rebukes, denial of privileges *845 accorded her male
co-workers, suspension, and finally discharge, Costa's
efforts to resolve problems were thwarted along the way.
The situation deteriorated so significantly that she finally

complained to the human resources department, which
declined to intervene.
There were "so many" incidents, it was difficult for her to
recount them all. Nonetheless, her testimony at trial on this
point was detailed and extensive. For example, when men
came in late, they were often given overtime to make up
the lost time; when Costa came in late-in one case, one
minute late-she was issued a written reprimand, known as a
record of counseling. When men missed work for medical
reasons, they were given overtime to make up the lost time;
when Costa missed work for medical reasons, she was
disciplined. On one occasion, a warehouse supervisor
actually suspended her because she had missed work while
undergoing surgery to remove a tumor; only the
intervention of the director of human resources voided this
action.
In another episode, corroborated at trial by a fellow
employee who was an eyewitness, a number of workers
were in the office eating soup on a cold day. A supervisor
walked in, looked directly at Costa, and said, "Don't you
have work to do?" He did not reprimand any of her
colleagues-all men. Another supervisor began to follow
her around the warehouse. Although several other
Teamsters complained about this supervisor's scrutiny,
three witnesses, in addition to Costa, testified that she was
singled out for particularly intense "stalking."
Costa presented extensive evidence that she received
harsher discipline than the men. For instance, she was
frequently warned and even suspended for allegedly
hazardous use of equipment and for use of profanity, yet
other Teamsters engaged in this conduct with impunity. In
at least one instance, such a charge against Costa was
found to have been fabricated and the suspension voided.
Supervisors began to "stack" her disciplinary record. In
one case, a supervisor issued multiple warnings on a single
day, including docking her for an absence that dated back
over eight months and for absences that occurred when
Costa was under a doctor's care. Another warehouse
manager steered a co-worker who had a dispute with Costa
to security instead of handling the matter himself because
the manager wanted to bring "this problem with Costa to a
'head.' "
Costa was also treated differently than her male colleagues
in the assignment of overtime. For example, in an analysis
of 95.5 hours of overtime assigned to eight Teamsters,
Costa received only two hours. Failure to assign overtime
was not for Costa's lack of willingness to work additional
hours. Costa was listed as "refusing" overtime when she
was on vacation. When she was offered overtime, it was at
the last minute, making it impractical for her to accept. The
situation became more blatant when Costa asked her
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supervisors point blank about the differential treatment of
another Teamster who was favored with overtime
assignments. The response: He "has a family to support."
Costa also presented evidence that she was penalized for
her failure to conform to sexual stereotypes. Although her
fellow Teamsters frequently lost their tempers, swore at
fellow employees, and sometimes had physical
altercations, it was Costa, identified in one report as "the
lady Teamster," who was called a "bitch," and told "[y]ou
got more balls than the guys." Even at trial, and despite
testimony that she "got along with most people" and had
"few arguments," Caesars' managers continued to
characterize her as "strong *846 willed," "opinionated,"
and "confrontational," leading counsel to call her "bossy"
in closing argument. Supervisor Karen Hallett, who later
signed Costa's termination order, expressly declared her
intent to "get rid of that bitch," referring to Costa.
Supervisors frequently used or tolerated verbal slurs that
were sex-based or tinged with sexual overtones. Most
memorably, one co-worker called her a "fucking cunt."
When she wrote a letter to management expressing her
concern with this epithet, which stood out from the
ordinary rough-and-tumble banter, she received a
three-day suspension in response. Although the other
employee admitted using the epithet, Costa was faulted for
"engaging in verbal confrontation with co-worker in the
warehouse resulting in use of profane and vulgar language
by other employee."
These events culminated in Caesars' termination of Costa.
The purported basis for termination was a physical
altercation in the warehouse elevator with another
Teamster, Herb Gerber. This incident began, as Gerber
admitted, when he went looking for Costa, upset about a
report that he believed she had made about his
unauthorized lunch breaks. Gerber trapped Costa in an
elevator and shoved her against the wall, bruising her arm.
Costa gave a detailed account of the altercation. Right
away she told supervisor Hallett. Reassured that Hallett
would investigate, Costa returned to work, only to have
Gerber seek her out and "come at" her a second time.
Costa's account was also corroborated by her immediate
reports to union officials, by photographs of the bruises,
and by a witness who had seen Gerber blocking the
elevator door. In contrast, Gerber did not immediately
report the incident, had no physical corroboration, and
provided few details. He first denied that the altercation
was physical, but then changed his story to state that Costa
had, in fact, hit him.
Nonetheless, Caesars did not believe Costa. Caesars
reasoned that the facts were in dispute, so it disciplined
both employees-Gerber with a five-day suspension and

............................ .... .........

Costa with termination.
Both Costa and Gerber grieved their respective disciplines
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, which did
not cover sex discrimination. The arbitrator upheld both
actions. After receiving an EEOC right to sue letter, Costa
filed this suit. The trial court dismissed her claim of sexual
harassment on summary judgment, but allowed the other
disparate treatment claim to proceed.
At trial, Caesars maintained that Costa was terminated
because of her disciplinary history and her altercation with
Gerber. Costa did not suggest that she was a model
employee, but rather that her sex was a motivating factor in
her termination. After hearing Costa's testimony, Judge
Hagen, the trial judge, admonished counsel: "This is a case
that should have settled." He denied Caesars' motion for
judgment as a matter of law at the close of Costa's case,
which was renewed at the close of the evidence. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Costa for $64,377.74 back
pay, $200,000 compensatory damages, and $100,000
punitive damages. When Judge Hagen denied defense
motions for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding
the verdict, and for a new trial, he elaborated as follows:
"At trial, the evidence showed a pattern of disparate
treatment favoring male co-workers over plaintiff in the
application of disciplinary standards, allowance of
overtime, and in her termination. From this evidence
reasonable minds could infer that plaintiffs gender played
a motivating part in Caesars's conduct towards plaintiff
.... " He did, however, *847 grant remittitur, and Costa
agreed to reduce compensatory damages to $100,000.

DISCUSSION

Title VII itself provides the benchmark for resolving the
primary question in this case. Although the road from Title
VII to resolution of Costa's case rests ultimately on a
straightforward examination of the statute, it is helpful to
examine the statute's structure and the history of the 1991
amendments to the statute. After analyzing the import of
the passing reference to "direct evidence" in Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270,109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d
268 (1989), and the framework for Title VII cases, we
address the evidence in Costa's case, including the claim
that evidence of an arbitration award was erroneously
excluded, and the propriety of giving a "mixed-motive"
jury instruction. We conclude by examining the punitive
damages award in light of Kolstad, 527 U.S. 526, 119 S.Ct.
2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494.
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I. TITLE VII STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND

payment, described in subparagraph (A).

DEVELOPMENT
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of' a protected
characteristic, such as race or sex. Such discrimination is
deemed "an unlawful employment practice":
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]
42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2(a).
The 1991 Act added § 2000e-2(m), which provides that
"an unlawful employment practice is established" when a
protected characteristic is "a motivating factor" in an
employment action:
Except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, an unlawful employment
practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.
Civil Rights Act of 1965, Title VII, § 701,42 U.s.c. §
2000e-2(m) (as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)).
The 1991 Act also provided an affirmative defense that
limits the remedies if an employer demonstrates that it
would have nonetheless made the "same decision":
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation
under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent
demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor, the court(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except
as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the
pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title;
and

[2) We think this text is crystal clear: an employee makes
out a Title VII violation by showing discrimination
"because of' race, sex, or another protected factor. Such
discrimination is characterized by the statute as "an
unlawful employment practice."
*848 [3) [4) More specifically, "an unlawful employment
practice" encompasses any situation in which a protected
characteristic was "a motivating factor" in an employment
action, even if there were other motives. In such a
case-sometimes labeled with the "mixed-motive"
moniker-if the employee succeeds in proving only that a
protected characteristic was one of several factors
motivating the employment action, an employer cannot
avoid liability altogether, but instead may assert an
affirmative defense to bar certain types of relief by
showing the absence of "but for" causation.
(5) [6) [4) The amendments to the statute have done
nothing to change the plaintiff s long-standing burden:
"The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Dep't of
Cmty, Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct.
1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); accord Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Nor can we discover anything in this
statute that warrants imposing a special evidentiary rule on
or hurdle for victims of discrimination to prove their case.
The burden of showing something by a "preponderance
of the evidence," the most common standard in the civil
law, "simply requires the trier of fact 'to believe that the
existence of a fact is more probable than its
nonexistence before [it] may find in favor of the party
who has the burden to persuade the [jury] of the fact's
existence.' ,.

Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust jor S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct.
2264,124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358,371-72,90 S.Ct. 1068,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)
(Harlan, .1., concurring) (citation omitted)). The inquiry is
simply that of any civil case: whether the plaintiff s
evidence is sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer
violated the statute-that "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice."

(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring
any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or
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A.PRICE WATERHOUSE
Although Title VII imposes no special burden of proof on
discrimination plaintiffs, some courts have fashioned a
heightened burden based not on the statute but on the case
that prompted its amendment, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268
(1989). We tum to that case. There, the Supreme Court
confronted a problem not previously encountered in the
statute's twenty-five year history: causation. The issue
presented was whether there should be liability where an
adverse employment decision was the result of mixed
motives. More specifically, the trial court found that the
failure to select Ann Hopkins for partner at an accounting
firm was motivated both by legitimate concerns about her
interpersonal skills and by "an impermissibly cabined view
of the proper behavior of women." Id. at 236-37, 109 S.Ct.
1775.
All nine justices essentially agreed that liability was
inappropriate where the employer would have made the
same decision absent sex discrimination-in other words,
the illegitimate factor was not a "but for" cause-but they
divided over the nuances of the burden of proof. Four
justices agreed that "when a plaintiff in a Title VII case
proves that her gender played a motivating part in an
employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding
of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision even if
it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account." Id. at
258, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion). These justices
*849 made clear that when "an employer considers both
gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a
decision, that decision was 'because of' sex." Id. at 241,
109 S.Ct. 1775. But, the employer could escape liability
through the "same decision" affirmative defense. The
dissent criticized the plurality for "its shift to the defendant
of the burden of proof," id. at 281, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(Kennedy, 1., dissenting), and argued that the plaintiff
should have to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that discrimination was the "but for" cause of the
challenged action. In response, the plurality emphasized
that it offered the defendant an affirmative defense to
liability only after the plaintiff established that
discriminatory animus played a role in the challenged
employment action:
[S]ince we hold that the plaintiff retains
the burden of persuasion on the issue
whether gender played a part in the
employment decision, the situation
before us is not ... one of "shifting
burdens" .... Instead, the employer's
burden is most appropriately deemed an
affirmative defense: the plaintiff must

persuade the factfinder on one point, and
then the employer, if it wishes to prevail,
must persuade it on another.
Id. at 246,109 S.Ct. 1775. Regardless of nomenclature, the
plurality agreed that if the employer showed a lack of "but
for" causation, then that showing precluded liability.

Justice 0 'Cormor and Justice White each wrote separately,
concurring in the judgment only. Justice White relied on
MI. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977),
a First Amendment case holding that a showing that
constitutionally protected conduct had been a "motivating
factor" in an employment decision was sufficient to shift
the burden to the state to prove the absence of causation.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258-59, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(White, J., concurring in the judgment). He found it
unnecessary to parse the semantic distinction whether "the
Mt. Healthy approach is 'but-for' causation in another
guise or creates an affirmative defense." Id. at 259, 109
S.Ct. 1775. Justice O'Cormor traced the burdenshifting
approach back to venerable tort cases such as Summers v.
Tice, 33 Ca1.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Ca1.l948). Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263-64, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(O'Connor, 1., concurring in the judgment).
Justice O'Connor had further gatekeeping concerns about
when what she considered to be a special "burden shift"
might be invoked, thus permitting the plaintiff to make less
than the full showing necessary for a statutory violation:
I believe there are significant differences
between shifting the burden of
persuasion to the employer in a case
resting purely on statistical proof as in
the disparate impact setting and shifting
the burden of persuasion in a case like
this one, where an employee has
demonstrated by direct evidence that an
illegitimate factor played a substantial
role in a particular employment decision.
Id. at 275, 109 S.Ct. 1775. It was in this context that she
discussed a need for "direct evidence" to show that the
employer's "decisional process has been substantially
infected by discrimination" before the special burden shift
would be triggered. Id. at 269-70,109 S.Ct. 1775. Because
it was arguably the "narrowest ground" for the decision,
Justice O'Connor's one-justice concurring opinion was
considered by some to be the controlling analysis.
Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st
Cir.1999); but see Thomas v. Nat'l Football League
Players Ass 'n, 131 F.3d 198,203 (D.C.Cir.1997) ("Justice
*850 O'Connor's concurrence was one of six votes
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supporting the Court's judgment ... , so that it is far from
clear that [it] should be taken as establishing binding
precedent."), as vacated in part on reh 'g, 1998 WL
1988451 (D.C.Cir. Feb.25, 1998); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir.1992) (" '[D]irect
evidence' was not a requirement imposed by the majority
in Price Waterhouse.").

B. 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS TO
TITLE VII
Congress quickly responded to Price Waterhouse and a
handful of other Supreme Court employment
discrimination decisions with the introduction of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, which targeted "the Supreme Court's
recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protections
that were dramatically limited by those decisions." H.R.
Conf Rep. No. 101-856, at 1 (1990). Although the 1990
legislation ultimately floundered, an amended version,
with much of the text intact, became the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which expressly overruled the basic premise that an
employer could avoid all liability under Title VII by
establishing the absence of "but for" causation.

consideration of a person's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin in
employment. The effectiveness of Title
VII's ban on discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin has been severely undercut by the
recent Supreme Court decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
Id. at 45. We do not disagree with those courts that have
noted that the legislative history does not address Justice
O'Connor's "direct evidence" comment. See, e.g., Watson
v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207,218-19
(3d Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1147, 121 S.Ct.l086,
148 L.Ed.2d 961 (2001).2 What the history does show
beyond doubt, however, is that the premise for Justice
O'Connor's comment is wholly abrogated: No longer may
*851 "employers' discriminatory conduct escapeE ]
liability," H.R. Rep. 40(1) at 47, simply by showing other
sufficient causes. Consequently, there is no longer a basis
for any special "evidentiary scheme" or heightened
standard of proof to determine "but for" causation.

C. "DIRECT EVIDENCE"
Now, under Title VII, the use of a prohibited characteristic
(race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) as simply "a
motivating factor" in an employment action is unlawful. 42
U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Congress did, however, add one
safety valve: an employer can escape damages and orders
of reinstatement, hiring, promotion and the like-but not
attorney's fees or declaratory or injunctive relief-by
proving the absence of "but for" causation as an
affirmative defense. Id. § 2000e-2(m). To the extent that
there was confusion after Price Waterhouse-semantic or
otherwise-with respect to burden shifting, the amendment
clarified (I) that a Title VII violation is established through
proof that a protected characteristic was "a motivating
factor" in the employment action and (2) that the
employer's "same decision" evidence serves as an
affirmative defense with respect to the scope of remedies,
not as a defense to liability.
The legislative history evinces a cl;~>intent to overrule
Price Waterhouse. In a subsection titled "The Need to
Overturn Price Waterhouse," the report accompanying the
1991 Civil Rights Act reflects congressional concern that
the "inevitable effect of the Price Waterhouse decision
(was] to permit prohibited employment discrimination to
escape sanction under Title VII." H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1),
at 46 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 584.
The report elaborates:
When Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, it precluded all invidious

Following Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, much has been made of Justice O'Connor's passing
reference to "direct evidence." Indeed, the reference has
spawned a virtual cottage industry of litigation over the
effect and meaning of the phrase. It is unnecessary,
however, to get mired in the debate over whether Justice
O'Connor's opinion was controlling or not because the
resolution to this conundrum lies in the 1991 amendments.
Justice O'Connor's reference must be interpreted in light
of the Court's understanding at the time of Price
Waterhouse, namely, that "but for" causation was factored
into proof of a Title VII violation, either as an affirmative
defense (plurality) or as part of the plaintiffs proof
(dissent). Justice O'Connor wrote separately in part to
"express [her] views as to when and how the strong
medicine of requiring the employer to bear the burden of
persuasion on the issue of causation should be
administered." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262, 109
S.Ct. 1775. Her reference to "direct evidence" was
intertwined with her concern about a scheme that shifted
the burden on the question ofliability from the employee to
employer, albeit through an affirmative defense. The 1991
Act eliminated any confusion about burden-shifting and
the proof necessary for a Title VII violation, so it is not
surprising that courts have had trouble converting Justice
O'Connor's reference into a legal standard under the new
statutory provision.
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The resulting jurisprudence has been a quagmire that
defies characterization despite the valiant efforts of various
courts and commentators. Within circuits, and often within
opinions, different approaches are conflated, mixing
burden of persuasion with evidentiary standards, confusing
burden of ultimate persuasion with the burden to establish
an affirmative defense, and declining to acknowledge the
role of circumstantial evidence. We see no need to get
bogged down in this debate. Rather, based on the language
of the statute-which requires proof of only "a motivating
factor" and does not set out any special proof burdens-we
conclude that Congress did not impose a special or
heightened evidentiary burden on the plaintiff in a Title
VII case in which discriminatory animus may have
constituted one of two or more reasons for the employer's
challenged actions. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(m).
This approach is consistent with recent Supreme Court
cases underscoring that no special pleading or proof
hurdles may be imposed on Title VII plaintiffs. For
example, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA., 534 U.S. 506,
122 S.Ct. 992, 997-99, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), the Court
struck down judicially imposed heightened pleading
standards. Just two years earlier, in Reeves, 530 U.S. at
148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, it declined to require independent
evidence of discrimination in addition to prima facie
evidence and sufficient evidence to rebut pretext. Instead,
the Court emphasized that the jury determines the ultimate
question of liability. Id. Sticking to the statutory wording,
in Oncale v. Sundowner OffShore Services, Inc., 523 U.S.
75, 80-81, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (l998), the
Court rejected various circuits' special requirements for
same-sex sexual harassment cases. Finally, in Burlington
Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-53, 118 S.Ct.
2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), the Court quashed
distinctions between "quid *852 pro quo" and "hostile
environment" liability structures in harassment cases.
Here, too, we believe that we are well advised to follow the
statute instead of engaging in judicial invention.
To understand why we should stick to the statute rather
than divine a new standard of proof, it is instructive to look
at the state of circuit law in this area. Judge Selya has made
an attempt to categorize the circuits' appro,!ches in a
framework that provides a useful overview. Fernandes.
199 F.3d at 582. He first discusses the "classic" position,
an approach that takes the definition of "direct evidence"
from the dictionary: " 'evidence, which if believed, proves
existence of fact in issue without inference or
presumption.' " Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc .. 833 F.2d 1525,
1529 n. 6 (II th Cir.1987) (quoting Black '50' Law Dictionary
413 (5th ed.1979» (emphasis in Rollins ). Judge Selya
notes that "only the Fifth and Tenth Circuits cling
consistently to this view, [but] other tribunals have
embraced it periodically." Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582.

Next IS the "animus plus" posltlOn, which basically
requires that the plaintiff prove a particularly strong
case-more than ordinarily would be required for an
inference of discrimination to be permissible. Our review
indicates that a majority of courts that impose a "direct
evidence" requirement adhere to this view, either explicitly
or implicitly. See, e.g., Thomas, 131 F.3d at 204 (defining
direct evidence as "a relationship between proof and
incidents"); Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 580 (explaining the
function of direct evidence as restricting the mixed-motive
analysis "to those infrequent cases in which a plaintiff can
demonstrate [discrimination] with a high degree of
assurance"); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1143 (4th
Cir.1995) (holding that the determination "hinges on the
strength of the evidence"); Bass v. Bd. ofCounty Comm 'rs,
256 F.3d 1095,1105 (lIth Cir.2001) (requiring, under the
rhetoric of banning circumstantial evidence, "only the
most blatant remarks") (citation omitted). Judge Selya
places the Fourth, D.C., Ninth,3 and Third circuits in this
camp, not without hesitation, and indicates that other
circuits indicate "occasional approval" of this approach.
Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582.
Finally, there is the "animus" poslt1on, which simply
requires evidence that bears on the alleged discriminatory
animus or, put even more simply, evidence of
discrimination. Judge Selya places the Second Circuit, the
Eighth Circuit "intermittently," and other stray cases, in
this camp. Id.
Other courts and commentators have had even more
difficulty articulating an order to the chaos. See, e.g.,
Thomas, 131 F.3d at 205 (citing Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits as taking "direct evidence" to mean
non-inferential); Christopher Y. Chen, Note, Rethinking
the Direct Evidence Requirement: A Suggested Approach
in Analyzing Mixed Motives Discrimination Claims, 86
Coruell L.Rev. 899,908-15 (2001); Robert Belton, Mixed
Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law
Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 Mercer
L.Rev. 651, 663 (2000) ("The line between McDonnell
Douglas and Price Waterhouse is very murky.").
Indeed, within circuits, cases sometimes take different
approaches. See Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287,
1294 (lith Cir.1999) (recognizing intra-circuit *853
splits). For example, the First Circuit first embraced the
animus plus approach in Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 580, but
recently implied in Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson
Hospital, 282 F .3d 60, 64 (1 st Cir.2002), that it took the
classic approach. The Eleventh Circuit first allowed "broad
statements" of discriminatory attitude, Burrell v. Bd. of
Trustees of Ga. Military ColI., 125 F.3d 1390, 1394 n. 7
(11 th Cir.1997), but later concluded that only statements
related to the decisionmaking process were sufficient to
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overcome the special "direct evidence" hurdle, Bass, 256
FJd at 1105.
In a carefully considered decision issued shortly after the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Second Circuit held that
direct evidence simply meant evidence sufficient to permit
the trier of fact to conclude that an illegitimate
characteristic was a motivating factor in the challenged
decision under Title VII. Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1185.
However, a few months later, a different panel held that
discrimination victims face the special hurdle of presenting
"evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in
the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly
reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude." Ostrowski
v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir.1992).
Although Ostrowski squarely rejected a definition of
"direct evidence" as non-circumstantial evidence, id. at
181, some cases quote it as though it supported the
noncircumstantial requirement. See, e.g., Cronquist v. City
of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir.2001).
Ostrowski was an age discrimination case, but has been
widely applied in the Title VII context, apparently without
analysis of the difference in the statutes. See, e.g., Lightfoot
v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 913 (2d Cir.1997).
In the Tenth Circuit, the court initially declined to impose a
heightened "direct evidence" requirement, only to be
ignored by a panel ruling six months later. Compare
Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 553 (lOth
Cir.1999) ("A mixed motive instruction is ... appropriate in
any case where the evidence is sufficient to allow a trier to
find both forbidden and permissible motives." (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)) with Shorter v. ICG
Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir.1999)
(imposing a "direct evidence" requirement as classically
defined, and excluding "statements of personal opinion,
even when reflecting a personal bias").
[7) We believe that the best way out of this morass is a
return to the language of the statute, which imposes no
special requirement and does not reference "direct
evidence." To the extent that courts are using "direct
evidence" as a veiled excuse to substitute their own
judgment for that of the jury, we reject that approach. In so
doing, we follow the Second Circuit's Tyler case, 958 F.2d
at 1184-85, the Eleventh Circuit's Wright case, 187 F .3d at
1301-02, the Tenth Circuit's approach in Medlock, 164
F.3d at 553, and the Eighth Circuit in Schleiniger v. Des
Moines Water Works, 925 F.2d 1100,1101 (8th Cir.1991).
We also agree with other courts to the extent that they hold
that non circumstantial evidence is not the magical
threshold for Title VII liability. See, e.g., Thomas, 131 F.3d
at 203 (collecting cases).
[8) [9) [10] Put simply, the plaintiff in any Title VII case

.·. . . . . ·~. . "~·m.... .....·.....·..·."."

•• m•••~~.···

may establish a violation through a preponderance of
evidence (whether direct or circumstantial)4 that a *854
protected characteristic played "a motivating factor." Like
the Supreme Court, "we think it generally undesirable,
where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the
sentences of the United States Reports as though they were
the United States Code." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407
(1993). The "direct evidence" quagmire results from just
such a misdirected inquiry, and we decline to be drawn in.

D. THE FRAMEWORK FOR PROVING A TITLE
VII VIOLATION
In addition to the confusion over "direct evidence," there
has been considerable misunderstanding regarding the
McDonnell
Douglas
relationship
among
the
burden-shifting analysis (sometimes referred to as
"pretext" analysis), which primarily applies to summary
judgment proceedings, and the terms single-motive and
mixed-motive, which primarily refer to the theory or
theories by which the defendant opposes the plaintiffs
claim of discrimination. The short answer is that all of
these concepts coexist without conflict.
Caesars' argument in favor of a higher evidentiary burden
is emblematic of the confusion. Caesars maintains that
without special proof, "any plaintiff who is able to
establish a prima facie showing in a pretext case would
qualify for a mixed-motive instruction, conflating the two
categories of cases." This argument mistakenly juxtaposes
the pretrial McDonnell Douglas legal framework and the
"mixed-motive" characterization.
[11] To place McDonnell Douglas in perspective, it must
be remembered that the current form of Title VII is the
result of twenty-seven years of dynamic exchange between
the Supreme Court and Congress, working toward a
framework that provides a remedy for barriers of
discrimination and inequality in the workplace. Early in
the statute's history, the Supreme Court distinguished
disparate impact claims under Title VII § 703(a)(2) from
disparate treatment claims under § 703(a)(l). Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub.L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 703 (a).
Disparate treatment claims require the plaintiff to prove
that the employer acted with conscious intent to
discriminate. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 805-06,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)
(distinguishing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
91 S.Ct. 849,28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971)).

[12J [13] McDonnell Douglas was the first in a series of
cases dealing with the difficulties of proving intent to
discriminate in a disparate treatment context. The Supreme
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Court detailed circumstances sufficient to support an
inference of discrimination, the now-eponymous
McDonnell Douglas "prima facie case and burden-shifting
paradigm."5 The Court recently reaffirmed that "the
precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary
depending on the context and were 'never intended to be
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.' " Swierkiewicz, 122 S.Ct.
at 995 *855 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)). This
legal proof structure is a tool to assist plaintiffs at the
summary judgment stage so that they may reach trial.

Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478,75 L.Ed.2d 403
(1983). Evidence can be in the form of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case, or other sufficient
evidence-direct or circumstantial-of discriminatory intent.
Id. at 714 & n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478. Thus, although
McDonnell Douglas may be used where a single motive is
at issue, this proof scheme is not the exclusive means of
proof in such a case. Indeed, it also might be invoked in
cases in which the defendant asserts a "same decision"
defense to certain remedies, a circumstance in which
mixed motives are at issue.

As the Supreme Court elaborated a few years after
McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie case "eliminates the
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's
rejection." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089.
Therefore, "we presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors." Id. (citation and
intemal quotation marks omitted). Burdine clarified,
however, that the plaintiff need not rely on this
presumption: "She may succeed ... either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089.

[19) [20) Regardless ofthe method chosen to arrive at trial,
it is not normally appropriate to introduce the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework to the jury.6 At that
stage, the framework "unnecessarily evaders] the ultimate
question *856 of discrimination vel non." Aikens. 460 U.S.
at 714,103 S.Ct. 1478.

Throughout these cases and those that followed, the court
reaffirmed the canons of proof: the plaintiff retains the
"ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been
the victim of intentional discrimination," id. at 256, 101
S.Ct. 1089; the question comes down to whether she has
made her case. See also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct.
2742; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097.
[l4J [15) [16) The plaintiff may make out a prima facie
case-which may, admittedly, be a weak showing-that
entitles her to a commensurately small benefit, a transitory
presumption of discrimination: the burden of production
only shifts briefly to the employer to explain why it took
the challenged action, if not based on the protected
characteristic. In practice, employers quickly rebut the
presumption and it "drops from the case." Burdine, 450
U.S. at 256 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment after
Hicks. 93 Mich. L.Rev. 2229,2302-04 (1995). The burden
of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to introduce
evidence from which the factfinder could conclude that the
employer's proffered reason was pretextual. The burden of
persuasion always remains with the employee to prove the
ultimate Title VII violation-unlawful discrimination.
[17J [18) It is important to emphasize, however, that
nothing compels the parties to invoke the McDonnell
Douglas presumption. United States Postal Servo Bd. v.

[21) [22) [23) Once at the trial stage, the plaintiff is
required to put forward evidence of discrimination
"because of' a protected characteristic.7 After hearing both
parties' evidence, the district court must decide what legal
conclusions the evidence could reasonably support and
instruct the jury accordingly. This determination is distinct
from the question of whether to invoke the McDonnell
Douglas presumption, which occurs at a separate, earlier
stage of proceedings, involves summary judgment rather
than jury instructions, and is unrelated to the number of
possible motives for the challenged action. Instead, the
choice of jury instructions depends simply on a
determination of whether the evidence supports a finding
that just one-or more than one-factor actually motivated
the challenged decision. Justice White, in his concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse, succinctly described how the
type of evidence presented affects the question facing the
JUry:
In [single-motive] cases, "the issue is whether either
illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the 'true'
motives behind the decision." In mixed-motive cases,
however, there is no one "true" motive behind the
decision. Instead, the decision is a result of multiple
factors, at least one of which is legitimate.
Price Waterhouse. 490 U.S. at 260, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted).8
Following
the
1991
amendments,
characterizing the evidence as mixed-motive instead of
single-motive results only in the availability of a
different defense, a difference which derives directly
from the statutory text, not from judicially created proof
structures.
As a practical matter, the question of how many motives
the evidence reasonably supports affects the jury
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instructions as follows:
[24) (25) [26) If, based on the evidence, the trial court
determines that the only reasonable conclusion a jury could
reach is that discriminatory animus is the sale cause for the
challenged employment action or that discrimination
played no role at all in the employer's decisionmaking,
then the jury should be instructed to determine whether the
challenged action was taken "because of' the prohibited
reason. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a); see also Oncale, 523 U.S.
at 79-80, 118 S.Ct. 998 (emphasizing "because of'
standard). If the jury determines that the employer acted
because of discriminatory intent, the employee prevails
and may receive the full remedies available under Title
VII; if not, the employer prevails. In such cases the
employer does not benefit from the "same decision"
defense, which, if successful, significantly limits the
employee's remedies.
[27) [28) In contrast, in cases in which the evidence could
support a finding that discrimination is one of two or more
reasons for the challenged decision, at least one of which
may be legitimate, the jury should be instructed to
determine first whether the discriminatory reason was "a
*857 motivating factor" in the challenged action. If the
jury's answer to this question is in the affirmative, then the
employer has violated Title VII. However, if the jury then
finds that the employer has proved the "same decision"
affirmative defense by a preponderance ofthe evidence, 42
U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the employer will escape the
imposition of damages and any order of reinstatement,
hiring, promotion, and the like, and is liable solely for
attoruey's fees, declaratory relief, and an order prohibiting
future discriminatory actions.
[29) Regardless of what kind of instructions are given, we
emphasize that there are not two fundamentally different
types of Title VII cases. In some cases, the employer may
be entitled to the "same decision" affirmative defense
instruction. In others, it may not. The employee's ultimate
burden of proof in all cases remains the same: to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the challenged
employment decision was "because of' discrimination.
Finally, we tum to the question of where the concept of
pretext fits in this framework. Although cases in which the
McDonnell Douglas framework is applied are sometimes
referred to as "pretext cases," and we have no wish to
change a quarter century of usage, it should be noted that
questions of pretext may arise in any Title VII case,
regardless of whether it is analyzed under McDannel!
Douglas. Cases in which the dispute is only over whether
or not the employer possessed the discriminatory motive
alleged need not involve pretext, although they often do.
For example, if the plaintiff chooses not to invoke the
i

McDonnell Douglas framework, the employer need not
proffer any explanation for the challenged action, but may
simply require the plaintiff to prove her case of
discrimination. Nor is the concept of pretext alien to cases
in which an employer asserts a "same decision" or "but
for" defense. For example, one of the employer's
purportedly legitimate reasons may be pretextual. On the
other hand, another may not. As Justice O'Connor recently
explained in writing for the Court: "Proof that the
defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of
intentional discrimination .... " Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147,120
S.Ct.2097.
[30) To summarize: McDonnell Douglas and
"mixed-motive" are not two opposing types of cases.
Rather, they are separate inquiries that occur at separate
stages of the litigation. Nor are "single-motive" and
"mixed-motive" cases fundamentally different categories
of cases. Both require the employee to prove
discrimination; they simply reflect the type of evidence
offered. Where the employer asserts that, even if the
factfinder determines that a discriminatory motive exists,
the employer would in any event have taken the adverse
employment action for other reasons, it may take
advantage of the "same decision" affirmative defense. The
remedies will differ if the employer prevails on that
defense. With this framework in mind, we tum to the
evidence in Costa's case.

II. MIXED MOTIVE INSTRUCTION AND
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Although Caesars invokes the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, that framework is not instructive at this stage of
the case. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 7l3-14, 103 S.Ct. 1478.
Rather, we are asked to review the district court's decision
to give a mixed-motive instruction and the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury's verdict, as challenged in
a motion for judgment as a matter oflaw made at the close
of the evidence.

*858 A. THE MIXED MOTIVE JURY
INSTRUCTION
[31) [32) We must first determine the applicable standard
of review. The standards are well known and often stated:
we generally review the formulation of instructions for
abuse of discretion, but whether an instruction misstates
the law is a legal issue reviewed de novo. See, e.g.,
Voohries-Larson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 241 F.3d 707,713
(9th Cir.200 I). At issue here is whether the evidence can
be characterized as establishing multiple motives, and thus
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warranting the affirmative defense. Because this
evaluation is, at bottom, an evaluation of the evidence, an
abuse of discretion standard is appropriate.
[33) The district court submitted both claims-the
tennination and the conditions of employment-to the jury.
It first instructed the jury that:
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the
following by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Costa suffered adverse work conditions, and
2. Costa's gender was a motivating factor in any such
work conditions imposed upon her. Gender refers to
the quality of being male or female.
If you find that each of these things has been proved
against a defendant, your verdict should be for the
plaintiff and against the defendant. On the other hand, if
any of these things has not been proved against a
defendant, your verdict should be for the defendant.
The jury was next given the following mixed-motive
instruction, which is central to this appeal:
You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment
of the plaintiff was motivated by the plaintiffs sex and
also by other lawful reasons. If you find that the
plaintiffs sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's
treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your
verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct
was also motivated by a lawful reason.
However, if you find that the defendant's treatment of
the plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful
reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled
to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless
the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly
even if the plaintiffs gender had played no role in the
employment decision.
Caesars first intimates that the wording of the mixed
motive instruction was invalid because it inappropriately
implied a judicial determination that sex was in fact a
motivation for the challenged treatment. Caesars, however.
waived any objection to the form of the instruction by
conceding at trial that it was "a reasonable statement of the
mixed motive instruction." Fed.R.Civ.P. 51; Shaw v. City
of Sacramento, 250 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.2001) (as
amended).
[34) As for Caesars' main contention, we are not persuaded
that the district court erred in giving a mixed-motive
instruction. In many respects, Costa's case presents a
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typical Title VII case in which a plaintiff alleges that she
was discharged or disciplined for a discriminatory reason
and the employer counters that the reason for its action was
entirely different. The evidence did not require the jury to
believe that discrimination was the only motive, nor that
Caesars' stated reasons were all bogus or pretextual. For
example, there was evidence that Hallett, Stewart, and
other decisionmakers were legitimately concerned about
Costa's behavior and altercations with co-workers, but
there was likewise significant evidence that they *859
would not have taken such drastic disciplinary measures
against a man. Similarly, the jury could reasonably have
concluded that the overtime assignment system was in a
state of disarray that allowed favoritism and that one
element of that favoritism was preferential treatment for
male workers. The fact is that Caesars may have had
legitimate reasons to terminate Costa. Indeed, unlike in
many Title VII cases, Costa does not dispute many of the
events that took place. Nor does she wholly discount that
these events may have been part of the basis for her
discipline and termination. Nonetheless, the wide array of
discriminatory treatment is sufficient to support a
conclusion that sex was also a motivating factor in the
decision-making process. Thus, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction.

B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

(35) [36) [37) [38) [39) We review de novo Caesars'
challenge to the district court's denial of its Rule 50(b)
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v.
Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1226
(9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1055, 122 S.Ct. 645,
151 L.Ed.2d 563 (2001). At the outset, we note that the
standard that Caesars must meet is very high. We can
overturn the jury's verdict and grant such a motion only if"
'there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to
find for that party on that issue.' " Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149,
120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a». Because we
"may not substitute [our1 view of the evidence for that of
the jury," Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1227, we neither make
credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence and we
must draw all inferences in favor of Costa, Reeves, 530
U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986». The Supreme Court cautions us to "disregard
all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is
not required to believe." Jd. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097. This
high hurdle recognizes that credibility, inferences, and
factfinding are the province of the jury, not this court.

1. LIABILITY DETERMINATION
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[40] Applying the analysis outlined above, we begin, not
surprisingly, with the text of the statute, asking whether a
reasonable jury could conclude that sex was "a motivating
factor" in the challenged actions. The discriminatory
treatment ran the gamut from disparate discipline and
"stacking" Costa's personnel file to stalking her, singling
her out for different treatment in the workplace, and
discriminating against her in the assigmnent of overtime.
In the final analysis, the jury heard testimony from Costa
and fifteen other witnesses. Testimony included the
chronology of escalating discipline and targeting of Costa,
co-workers who identified discrimination because of sex,
and multiple examples of disparate treatment purposefully
directed at Costa because of her sex. Lending credence to
the claim that sex was a motivating factor in her treatment,
Costa also offered evidence of sexual stereotyping and
sexual epithets. Viewing the evidence from her perspective
and drawing all inferences in her favor, we cannot
conclude that "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury," Reeves, 530 U.S. at 135, 149,
120 S. Ct. 2097, to find that intentional discrimination on
the basis of sex was "a motivating factor" in subjecting
Costa to a number of adverse employment actions, and
culminating in her termination.

Costa presents overwhelming evidence that she was more
harshly treated than her male coworkers. Because she was
the only woman in an otherwise all-male unit, linking the
differential treatment to her *860 sex was not a difficult
leap. The jury could easily infer that sex was one of the
reasons Costa was singled out for negative treatment.
Indeed, the evidence is sufficiently strong that for many of
the incidents the jury might have concluded that sex was
the only reason for the adverse action. "Proof of
discriminatory motive ... can in some situations be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15,97
S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Mindful of the
Supreme Court's admonishment to "draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of' the prevailing party, Reeves, 530
U.S. at 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097, we conclude that the jury
was entitled to view the differential treatment here as
evidence of discrimination.
In a case quite similar to this one, Sischo-Nownejad v.
Merced Community College District, 934 F.2d 1104, 1112
(9th Cir.1991), we held that a plaintiff had made a showing
sufficient to create a factual issue. The plaintiff there, the
only woman holding a full-time faculty appointment in the
art department of a community college, alleged that she
was denied a choice as to which courses to teach and that
she was deprived of supplies, whereas male co-workers
were not. The college was also nonresponsive to
reasonable requests for leave and disciplined her for petty
offenses. Id. at 1107-08. Similarly, Costa presented

evidence that she was denied overtime and medical leave
where male co-workers were not. Her work was supervised
more intensely than that of male colleagues. She was
reprimanded for minor infractions while men, sitting right
next to her and engaging in the same conduct, were not.
Thus, this is a case where "the employer's conduct carries
with it an inference of unlawful intention so compelling
that it is justifiable to disbelieve the employer's
protestations of innocent purpose." Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,311-12,85 S.Ct. 955, 13 L.Ed.2d 855
(1965) nW]here many have broken a shop rule, but only
union leaders have been discharged, the Board need not
listen too long to the plea that shop discipline was simply
being enforced.").
The most prominent example of this differential treatment
was Caesars' decision to terminate Costa for an incident
that netted her male co-worker only a five-day suspension.
Costa's claim that she was shoved against an elevator wall
and sustained bruises from the altercation is not one to be
taken lightly. The excuse that the management could not
figure out whom to believe-Costa or Gerber-is
questionable given the strong corroboration of Costa's
story and the inconsistencies in Gerber's account. The
explanation offered by Caesars was lacking in several
respects, and the jury was certainly not required to believe
it. The jury was entitled instead to infer that Costa was
fired, while Gerber was only suspended, because Costa
was a woman. This is precisely the circumstance in which
we credit the inference in Costa's favor.
Finally, the jury could easily have believed that Costa's
record was itself largely a result of discrimination because
of repeated incidents of unfair discipline that accumulated
over time. For example, her supervisor's decision to
backfill the records with prior alleged misconduct supports
such a conclusion. See Pogue v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir.1991). In Pogue, we
held that the Department of Labor acted, at least in part,
with impermissible retaliatory motives, because the
employee's "prior work performance and defiant attitude
cited by the Secretary could reasonably be attributed to the
Navy's admitted retaliation." Id. Moreover, "Pogue
presented evidence, *861 relied on by the AU, that the
disciplinary actions taken against her were substantially
disproportionate to discipline imposed by the Navy in the
past." Id.
Caesars presents us with alternate rationales for the
termination, and asks us to hold as a matter of law that
Costa's conduct was the only element motivating its
decision. We decline this invitation. Perhaps the disparities
in how Costa was treated were in part because supervisor
Hallett disliked her as a person and not as a woman.
Perhaps they were in part because Costa had a history of
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"not getting along" with her co-workers, although there
was contrary testimony. What the jury implicitly
concluded, however, was that the disparities were also in
part because she was a woman. In so finding, the jury did
not necessarily reject all of Caesars' legitimate complaints
about Costa. But even if it credited certain of these
explanations, in following the jury instructions, it
reasonably found that sex was "a motivating factor" in the
termination. The evidence of differential treatment was so
persuasive and longstanding that the judgment may be
upheld on this ground alone. "[I)t is primarily the province
of the jury to determine what inferences can be drawn from
circumstantial evidence. So long as the evidence can
reasonably support an inference of discrimination, the
court should not upset the jury's decision." Norton v.
Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir.1998).
We turn next to Costa's evidence that she was chastised for
failing to conform to the role stereotypically assigned to
women. The jury heard remarks that could reasonably be
viewed to "stem[ ] from an impermissibly cabined view of
the proper behavior of women." Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 236-37, 109 S.Ct. 1775. She was told that she did
not deserve overtime because she did not have a family to
support. In her view, the implication was that she was not a
man with a family to support. The jury could interpret this
as a comment directed to her as a woman, indicating that
the discriminatory action, a failure to assign overtime, was
based on her not being a male breadwinner. The Seventh
Circuit held similar facts to be evidence of sex
stereotyping. See Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d
355, 362 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that jury could believe
employer held sexual stereotypes when female paramedic
applicant was the only one asked about family
responsibilities).
She was also disciplined in circumstances that the jury
could reasonably infer amounted to telling her to "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely." Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 109 S.Ct. 1775. For example,
Costa was told "[y]ou got more balls than the guys." And
yet, arguably when she acted tough like the guys, she
received harsher discipline rather than an "atta boy"
reinforcement. At trial, Caesars' consistent objection to
Costa as an employee was that she was "strong-willed" and
"opinionated," a view that the jury could have reasonably
interpreted as gender stereotyping. As was clear from her
testimony, Costa sought no special treatment, only equal
treatment.
[41) Finally, reinforcing the inference that her gender
motivated the adverse view of her character, Costa
presented evidence of sexual language and epithets
directed to her. Specifically, Costa presented evidence that
Hallett, the very supervisor who signed her discharge, had

declared an intention on several occasions to "get rid of
that bitch." Whether this term is part of the everyday
give-and-take of a warehouse environment or is inherently
offensive is not for us to say. Instead, we simply conclude
that the jury could interpret it here to be one piece of
evidence *862 among many, a derogatory term indicating
sex-based hostility.9 In addition, managers encouraged
sex-based epithets directed at Costa by disciplining her for
failing to tolerate the slurs silently. Admittedly, Costa
worked in a rough and tumble and often vulgar
environment. But the prevalence of race or sex-based slurs
does not excuse them. See Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270
F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1018,
122 S.Ct. 1609,152 L.Ed.2d 623 (2002).
[42) As we explained in Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (9th Cir.1994), when abuse
directed at women "center[ s] on the fact that they[ are)
females," a jury may infer discrimination. In Steiner, a
hostile environment case, a supervisor "was indeed
abusive to men, but ... his abuse of women was different. It
relied on sexual epithets, offensive, explicit references to
women's bodies and sexual conduct." Id. at 1463 (citing
Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19, 114 S.Ct. 367,
126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). Similarly here, the evidence
supports the inference that the abuse directed toward Costa
was different in nature and degree.

In the context of this case, we need not decide whether this
sexual language is dispositive of discrimination. Rather,
this language was simply one more factor for the jury to
consider in the face of repeated differential treatment by
Hallett and others at Caesars. Viewing the evidence in
Costa's favor, the jury could have easily inferred that the
use of highly charged and offensive sexual language was
simply another means of singling Costa out because she
was a woman.
Finally, we detour briefly to address the suggestion that
Hallett was somehow incapable of discriminating against
Costa because Hallett was herself a woman. This argument
was resoundingly rejected by a unanimous Supreme Court
in Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81,118 S.Ct. 998. In a society
where historically discriminatory attitudes about women
are "firmly rooted in our national consciousness,"
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,684,93 S.Ct. 1764,
36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973) (plurality opinion), we cannot
discount that the jury perceived Hallett, a former Army
officer now placed in a supervisory position in a virtually
male-only world, as demonstrating hostility toward Costa
as a woman as a means of showing that she was "one of the
boys." See also JE.B. v. Alabama ex ref TB., 511 U.S.
127, 136-37, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994)
("[O)ur nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination .... ") (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
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684, 93 S.Ct. 1764). Life was not necessarily easy for
Hallett, but that was no excuse for visiting harsh discipline
on Costa.

2. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE-"SAME DECISION"
(43) Once the jury found liability on the part of Caesars, it
was asked to decide whether the "defendant proved by a
preponderance *863 of the evidence that the defendant
would have made the same decisions if the plaintiff s
gender had played no role in the employment decision."
The jury checked the "NO" box. This question on the
special verdict form reflects the "same decision"
affirmative
defense
provided
in
42
U.S.C.2000e-5(g)(2)(B); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 759-60 (9th Cir.1996).
Caesars, not Costa, has the burden on this question, and we
must still filter the evidence in the light most favorable to
Costa. Under this lens, much of the evidence of differential
treatment removes this question from the realm of the
hypothetical and shows what, in fact, Caesars did do when
men violated its policies. Costa's infractions may have
played a role in her termination. But the evidence also
underscores how the documentation of her infractions and
discipline stemmed in part from sex discrimination. Based
on the extensive testimony, the jury simply did not believe
that Caesars would have made the same decision "but for"
Costa's sex. There was a substantial basis for the jury to
conclude that Caesars did not meet its burden in
demonstrating that it would have made the same decision
absent consideration of sex.

III. ADMISSIBILITY OF ARBITRATION
DECISIONS
(44) Caesars argues that the trial court's exclusion of
arbitration decisions, relating to the incident that ultimately
triggered Costa's termination, was an abuse of discretion
so prejudicial that a new trial is warranted. The incident
that led to Costa's termination was the altercation with
Gerber in the elevator. In an arbitration brought pursuant to
their collective bargaining agreement, both Costa and
Gerber challenged the discipline imposed, to no avail. At
the discrimination trial, having successfully argued that
hearsay rules blocked Costa's attempt to introduce
transcripts of the arbitration hearing, Caesars later sought
to introduce the arbitrator's decisions. Costa responded by
raising a hearsay objection and arguing that admission of
the decisions would be irrelevant because the central issue
of the trial-sex discrimination-was not addressed in the
arbitration.

Costa is correct that discrimination was not covered by the
collective bargaining agreement and was not at issue in the
arbitration. Thus, the present case can be distinguished
from Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38,
94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), in which the
Supreme Court established an employee's right to pursue
both Title VII judicial remedies and arbitration "under the
nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining
agreement." Because we review for abuse of discretion the
narrow evidentiary issue before us, we need not address the
scope of Gardner-Denver or broader issues with respect to
the preclusive effects of arbitration on subsequent
discrimination
claims.
See,
e.g.,
Gilmer
v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35, 111 S.Ct.
1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). Other courts have held that
district courts have discretion to exclude arbitration awards
in similar circumstances. See, e.g. Jackson v. Bunge Corp.,
40 F.3d 239,246 (7th Cir.1994); McAlester v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249,1259 (10th Cir.1988); Perry v.
Larson, 794 F.2d 279, 284-85 (7th Cir.1986). Under these
circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to exclude the arbitration decisions. See
United States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 273 F.3d 1213,1217
(9th Cir.200l) (standard of review).

IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The jury awarded $100,000 in pumtlve damages, in
addition to the $200,000 in *864 compensatory damages
(later remitted to $100,000) and $64,377.74 in backpay.
Caesars argues that the jury instruction on punitive
damages, though a proper statement of Ninth Circuit law at
the time of trial, was in fact in error under the Supreme
Court's later ruling in Kolstad v. American Dental
Association, 527 U.S. 526,119 S.Ct. 2118,144 L.Ed.2d
494 (1999). We agree and accordingly remand for
consideration of punitive damages.
We have explained that Kolstad provided the employer
with a new "good faith" defense, enabling it to escape
punitive damages if it can show that the challenged actions
were not taken by senior managers and were contrary to the
employer's good faith implementation of an effective
antidiscrimination policy. Swinton, 270 F.3d at 810-11;
Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc.,
212 F.3d 493, 516 (9th Cir.2000). Kolstad also suggests
that" 'the court should review the type of authority that 'the
employer has given to the employee, the amount of
discretion that the employee has in what is done and how it
is accomplished.' " 527 U.S. at 543, 119 S.Ct. 2118
(quoting 1 L. Schlueter & K. Redden, Punitive Damages §
4.4(B)(2)(a), p. 181 (3d ed.1995». Understandably, in
view of the then-current Ninth Circuit authority, the
instructions here contained no such considerations, nor
were these issues considered by the district court.l 0
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[45] [46] Initially, we must detennine whether Caesars
waived the objection to the fonn of the instruction by
failing to raise it at trial. We have discretion to review an
instruction despite such a failure to object where a" 'solid
wall of Circuit authority' would have rendered an
objection futile." Knapp v. Ernst & Wh inn ey, 90 F.3d
1431, 1438-39 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Robinson v.
Heilman, 563 F.2d l304, l307 (9th Cir.1977) (per
curiam)). Consistent with our prior cases in this
transitional period, we believe that review is appropriate to
detennine whether the jury instructions comported with the
Supreme Court's command in Kolstad. See Winarto v.
Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276,
1291 (9th Cir.2001); Swinton, 270 F.3d at 809-10;
Passantino, 212 F.3d at 514.
[47] Both parties seek to avoid a remand on the punitive
damages issue. Costa argues that the jury's finding of
egregious conduct obviates the need to detennine good
faith; Caesars argues that punitive damages are unavailable
as a matter of law. Neither argument prevails. The jury
found the conduct "egregious" or reflective *865 of
"complete indifference to the safety and rights of others."
Kolstad held that "egregious" misconduct was probative
but not necessary for an award of punitive damages. 527
U.S. at 538, 119 S.Ct. 2118. Instead, the question was the
employer's "malice" or "reckless indifference" to the
employee's federally protected rights. Id. at 535-36, 119
S.Ct. 2118. The jury's findings, which were
well-supported, establish this requisite scienter and the
additional, probative factor of egregious misconduct.
However, we cannot equate "egregious" misconduct with a
lack of "good faith" as a matter oflaw. Nor can we say that
punitive damages are unavailable as a matter of law. We
therefore remand for a retrial on the issue of punitive
damages in light of Kolstad.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in
part. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.
GOULD, Circuit Judge, with whom KOZINSKI,
FERNANDEZ, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges, join,
dissenting:

I respectfully dissent because the majority does not follow
the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268
(1989), in Title VII mixed motives cases. The majority's
analysis is not persuasive and should be corrected because
it disregards the holding of Hopkins that is reflected in
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.

concluded that an employee should be able to recover
under Title VII if gender was "a factor in the employment
decision at the moment it was made," id. at 241, 109 S.Ct.
1775, unless the employer, using objective evidence, could
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have made the same decision absent the discriminatory
motive.Id. at 244-45,252,109 S.Ct. 1775.
Justice White, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in
the judgment. Justice White thought that the impennissible
motive must have been a "substantial factor" in the
employer's decision and that the employer need not use
"objective evidence" to make its same-decision showing.
!d. at 259,261, 109 S.Ct. 1775. Justice White would pennit
a mixed motive test in which the burden is shifted to the
employer, but he would be liberal on the evidence an
employer could offer. His view of when such a test should
be available, however, is broader than Justice O'Connor's.
Justice O'Connor would allow a plaintiff to use a mixed
motive test only in narrow circumstances. In concurrence,
Justice O'Connor held that she would require a Title VII
plaintiff in a mixed motive case to produce "direct
evidence" showing that "decisionmakers placed
substantial negative reliance on [the] illegitimate
criterion," id. at 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775.
I do not point to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
merely to admire its common sense, though that is
admirable. Rather, we must heed the direct evidence rule
of Hopkins as controlling, and we may not diminish it, in
the majority's terms, as a "passing reference." Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Hopkins, which in
considered language required the use of direct evidence to
prove a mixed motive case, must be viewed as the holding
of the Court, under the rule of Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)
("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds *866 .... ") (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Justice O'Connor would permit the use of the
mixed motives test only when direct evidence is present,
Justice O'Connor "concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds," see Marks 430 U.S. at 193,97 S'Ct'
990, and her concurrence is to be considered the holding of
Hopkins under the rule described in Marks. The view that
Justice O'Connor's opinion is the holding in Hopkins is
supported by Congress' actions in amending Title VII in
1991, by the holdings of other circuits on the issue, and by
sound policy.

In Hopkins, the plurality, comprised of four Justices,
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The 1991 amendments to Title VII did not modifY the
Supreme Court's prior holding on the need for direct
evidence. Subsection (m) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which
incorporates the premise of Hopkins that discrimination
can be shown in a mixed motive case so long as it is one
factor, was enacted two years after Hopkins:
Except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter [42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e et seq.],
an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the
practice.
42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2(m). Though Congress responded to
other aspects of the Court's holding in Hopkins,
specifically the holding that an employer could completely
avoid liability if it could show that it would have made the
same decision absent the discriminatory motive, see 42
U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g)(2); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137,
1142 (4th Cir.1995), Congress, in amending Title VII, did
not respond at all to Justice O'Connor's direct evidence
requirement, which had already been adopted by several
circuit courts. Instead, the statutory amendments are silent
as to that subject, neither praising nor condemning, neither
adopting nor rejecting, and clearly not modifying Justice
O'Connor's test, which is properly viewed as the holding
of Hopkins. This silence indicates that Congress left
undisturbed Justice O'Connor's holding and the prior
circuit decisions that adhered to it. As we remain bound by
the Supreme Court's precedent, we must follow the direct
evidence rule as explained in Justice O'Connor's
concurrence.
By vitiating Justice O'Connor's direct evidence
requirement, the majority's holding puts our circuit in
conflict with almost all others. See Jackson v. Harvard
Univ., 900 F.2d 464,467 (1st Cir.1990); Ostrowski v. Atl.
Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171,182 (2d Cir.1992); Starceski
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d lO89, 1096 (3d
Cir.1995); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th
Cir.1995); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d
858, 861 (5th Cir.1993); Wilson v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510,514 (6th Cir.1991); Plain. EJ
Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir.1997);
Schleiniger v. Des Moines Water Works, 925 F.2d llO0,
1101 (8th Cir.1991); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1547
(lOth Cir.1993); E.E.O.c. v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901
F.2d 920, 923 (11 th Cir.1990). As suggested in the
decision of the three-judge panel in Costa, and as reflected
in the cases cited above, these circuits have correctly

viewed Justice O'Connor's OpllllOn in Hopkins as the
holding of the Court and have followed it on that basis. See
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 886-88 (9th
Cir.2001), vacated by 274 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir.2001). I
agree with the other circuits and with the reasoning of the
prior opinion of the three-judge panel in Costa, which I
adopt because it is faithful to precedent.! We *867 should
not rush to join a decision that turns its back on our
colleagues' wisdom and engages our circuit in a fanciful
frolic of its own.
Finally, apart from our duty to abide by precedent, policy
concerns favor adhering to Justice O'Connor's view of
mixed motives analysis. Mixed motives analysis is a
departure from the well-established McDonnell Douglas
framework. Whereas McDonnell Douglas requires the
plaintiff to make a pretext showing once an employer puts
forth evidence oflegitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
the challenged employment practice, mixed motive
analysis allows a plaintiff to prevail even when she cannot
prove pretext.
To keep the mixed motive framework from overriding in
all cases the McDonnell Douglas rule and the pretext
requirement, which it clearly was not meant to do, mixed
motive analysis properly is available only in a special
subset of cases. Justice O'Connor's direct evidence
requirement meets this need: It requires the plaintiff to
produce highly probative, direct evidence, before she may
utilize the more lenient, mixed motives test. As a practical
matter, without this or some similar constraint on when a
plaintiff may invoke the mixed motives test, any plaintiff
would opt for the Hopkins framework to avoid having to
show pretext. The Supreme Court's seminal opinion in
McDonnell Douglas would be effectively overruled by an
incorrect interpretation of Hopkins that jettisons the direct
evidence requirement, an effect that could not have been
intended in Hopkins and an effect that will create
uncertainty in our settled law.
Taken with the idea that plaintiff, an unsatisfactory
employee, is a "trailblazer," the majority departs from the
path of precedent and blazes its own trail beyond the
frontiers of settled law into regions of error. I respectfully
dissent.

Parallel Citations
89 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 673, 83 Empl. Prac. Dec. P
41,122,59 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 542,02 Cal. Daily Op. Servo
6959,2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8738
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Footnotes
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.200 1), reh 'g en bane granted, 274 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir.2001).

2

For a thorough analysis concluding that the legislative history is unhelpful on the "direct evidence" requirement, see Benjamin C.
Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating Factor Test/or Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 Mich. L.Rev. 234,256-60 (2001).

3

We view this categorization of Ninth Circuit law as misplaced. The case cited in Fernandes, Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997,
1008-09 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc), does not adopt the "animus plus" approach.

4

The general rule bears repeating: in proving a case, circumstantial evidence "is weighed on the same scale and laid before the jury in
the same manner as direct evidence." United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 845 (9th Cir.1976) (citing Holland v. United States, 348
U.S. 121, 139-40, 75 S.Ct. 127,99 L.Ed. ISO (1954)). In other words, "circumstantial evidence is not inherently less probative than
direct evidence." United States v. Cruz, 536 F.2d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir.1976) (citation and iI1temal quotation marks omitted).

5

This may be done by showing "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817.

6

The presumption is thus what has been tenned a "bursting bubble" presumption. In one limited circumstance, the presumption retains
vitality at trial: where there is no rebuttal by the employer, but the plaintiffs prima facie case is in factual dispute. The jury then
determines whether the prima facie case is established. Ifit is, the jury must find discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-10, 113 S.Ct.
2742.

7

As the Supreme Court has observed, a case need not be characterized or labeled at the outset. Rather, the shape will often emerge
after discovery or even at trial. Similarly, the complaint itself need not contain more than the allegation that the adverse employment
action was taken because of a protected characteristic. See Price Waterhouse. 490 U.S. at 247 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality
opinion).

8

Although Justice White used the term "pretext cases" in the tirst sentence of this passage, it is clear from the context that he was
referring to single-motive cases, including those involving pretext. Id. at 260, 109 S.Ct. 1775.

9

See Galloway v. Gen '[ Motors Servo Parts Operations, 78 F.3d I 164, 1 168 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that the legal meaning of the word
"bitch" is context-specific; "The word 'bitch' is sometimes used as a label for women who possess such 'woman faults' as 'ill-temper
... ,' and latterly as a label for women considered by some men to be too aggressive or careerist." (citation omitted)), overntled in part
on other grounds by Nat 'I R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002); Kriss v. Sprint
Communications Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1281 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that use ofthc word "bitch" might bc cvidence of discrimination in
some contexts); Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1513 (D.C.Cir.1995) ("[T]his pejorative tenn may
support an inference that an employment decision is discriminatory under different circumstances .... ").

10

Caesars objccted to Instruction Number 15, which was a general vicarious liability instruction:
A corporation such as Caesars Palace acts through its management and it is responsible for the dccisions and actions of its
management and supervisory personnel in matters of this kind.
Instruction Number 13 related to punitive damages and read, in relcvant part:
If you find for plaintiff and if you award compensatory damages or nominal damagcs, you may, but are not required to, award
punitive damages. The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a defendant and to deter a defendant and others from
committing similar acts in the future.
Plaintiff has the burden of proving that punitive damages should be awarded, and the amount, by a preponderance of the
evidence. You may award punitive damages only if you find that Plaintiff has made a showing beyond the threshold level of
intent required for compensatory damages. An award of punitive damages is proper where defendant's illegal acts were wi llful
and egregious, or displayed reckless disregard to plaintiffs rights. Conduct is in reckless disregard of plaintiff s rights if, under
the circumstances, it reflects complete indifference to the safety and rights of others.

1

The three-judge panel held that:
Even if Costa's evidence of differential treatment were found to raise an inference of discrimination, it does not "prove that her
gender played a motivating part in an employment decision." Price WaterhOllse, 490 U.S. at 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d
268 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 280, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (O'Connor, 1., concurring) ("I read
[today's decision] as establishing that in a limited number of cases Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substantial
evidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant to show that an adverse employment
decision would have been supported by legitimate reasons:'). Costa's case comes down to the fact that she was the only woman
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in her workplace and that in some instances she was treated less favorably than her male coworkers. But she has failed to
produce evidence that she was treated differently because she was a woman-"direct and substantial evidence of discriminatory
animus." Accordingly, the district court erred in giving the jury a mixed-motive instruction. Because the court's instructions
shifted the burden of proof to Caesars, the error was not hannless. See Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th
Cir.1992). Caesars was prejudiced, moreover, by the court's instruction that the jury had "heard evidence that the defendant's
treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by the plaintiffs sex," a statement not supported by the record. Accordingly, the
judgment must be vacated.
Costa, 268 F.3d at 889-90 (footnotes omitted).

End of Document
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148 Idaho 391
Supreme Court ofIdaho,
Boise, September 2008 Term.

While
Supreme
Court
gives
serious
consideration to the views of the Court of
Appeals when considering a case on review from
that court, Supreme Court reviews the district
court's decision directly.

Mary C. CURLEE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KOOTENAI COUNTY FIRE & RESCUE,
Defendant-Respondent.
No. 34460.

I Oct. 16,2008.
[2]

Synopsis
Background: Former county fire and rescue employee
brought whistIeblower action upon her discharge
following
discovery
of
her
notes
detailing
minute-by-minute activities of two co-workers. The
District Court, First Judicial District, Kootenai County,
John T. Mitchell, J., entered summary judgment in favor of
fire and rescue. The Court of Appeals, 2007 WL 1501383,
affirmed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Horton, J., held that:
[1] as a matter of first impression, McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis is applicable at trial in cases
involving claims raised under state whistIeblower act;
[2] fact question as to whether fire and rescue's stated
reason for termination was pretextual precluded summary
judgment;
[3] fact question as to whether employee's notes
constituted a "communication" protected by whistle blower
statute precluded summary judgment, even though notes
were never presented to employee's supervisors;
[4] fact question as to whether employee acted in "good
faith" precluded summary judgment, even though
employee sought to gain personally from reporting waste,
and her notes referred to coworkers by disparaging
nicknames; and
[5] fact question as to whether employee was participating
in an "investigation" precluded summary judgment, even
though employee's note-taking was not part of an official
inquiry.

Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes (21)

Appeal and Error
",,4,Cases Triable in Appellate Court

Supreme Court reviews an appeal from an order
of summary judgment de novo, and Supreme
Court's standard of review is the same as the
standard used by the trial court in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Judgment
,Presumptions and burden of proof

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
disputed facts are construed in favor of the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from the record are drawn in
favor of the non-moving party.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[4}

Judgment
Presumptions and burden of proof
Judgment
. Showing to be made on opposing affidavit

Adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations
in the pleadings to survive motion for summary
judgment, but must set forth by affidavit specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[I}

Appeal and Error
. Scope ofInquiry in General
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1 Cases that cite this headnote
[5)

Officers and Public Employees
;y",Presumptions and burden of proof

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis
applicable to employment discrimination claims
is applicable at trial in cases involving claims
raised under state whistleblower act; however,
burden-shifting framework does not apply at
summary judgment stage. West's LC.A. § 6-2101
et seq.

(6)

(8)

Judgment
officers and employees, cases involving

~F"'Public

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether
county fire and rescue's stated reason for
terminating employee was pretextual precluded
summary judgment in favor of fire and rescue in
employee's action alleging violation of
whistleblower statute. West's I.C.A. § 6-2101 et
seq.

Courts
.o;~'" Validity

and construction of Constitutions and
statutes of other states
(9)

When confronted with matters of first impression
involving state statutes, Supreme Court may
glean insight from the interpretations of sister
states concerning similar or identical statutes;
while the construction of a statute by another
state may be persuasive, it is not conclusive and
the Court may refuse to adopt the foreign
construction.

Although there must be something more than
pure speculation or conjecture, circumstantial
evidence may provide an inference of causation
in action under whistleblower act; proximity in
time between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action is particularly
significant. West's LC.A. § 6-2101 etseq.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

I Cases that cite this headnote

(7)

Officers and Public Employees
.:·.Presumptions and burden of proof
When the McDonnell Douglas analysis is applied
to cases involving retaliatory discharge under a
whistleblower statute, the test is as follows: (I)
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
retaliatory conduct for an action protected by the
relevant whistleblower statute; (2) once the
plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, the
defendant is obligated to produce evidence
which, if taken as true, would permit the
conclusion that there was a non-retaliatory reason
for the adverse action; and (3) if the defendant
articulates a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for
discharge, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
reason the defendant offers is a pretext for
retaliatory conduct. West's LC.A. § 6-2101 et
seq.

Officers and Public Employees
'v·DPresumptions and burden of proof

[10)

Appeal and Error
.Scope and theory of case
Appellate court reviewing grant of summary
judgment may affirm the trial court on a theory
not relied upon below.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

(11)

Appeal and Error
rReview Dependent on Whether Questions Are
of Law or of Fact
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
over which Supreme Court exercises free review.
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458,28

[12]

%w",Policy and purpose of act
Statutes
'pStatute as a Whole, and Intrinsic Aids to
Construction
Statutes
,w=Giving effect to entire statute

Statutes
~~'~Literal

and grammatical interpretation

Interpretation of a statute begins with an
examination ofthe statute's literal words.

[13]

In construing a statute, Supreme Court will not
deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation,
but will ascertain and give effect to the purpose
and intent of the legislature, based on the whole
act and every word therein, lending substance
and meaning to the provisions.

Statutes
,~Existence

of ambiguity

Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as
written,
without engaging III statutory
construction.

[17]

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether
employee's keeping of notes, detailing the
allegedly wasteful activities of her coworkers,
constituted
a
"report,"
and
thus
a
"communication" protected by whistleblower
statute precluded summary judgment in favor of
county fire and rescue in employee's action
alleging violation of whistleblower statute.
West's LC.A. §§ 6-2103(2), 6-2104(1)(a).

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[14)

Judgment
.,.c,Public officers and employees, cases involving

Statutes
Existence of ambiguity
Only where statutory language is ambiguous will
courts look to rules of construction for guidance
and consider the reasonableness of proposed
interpretations.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[18)

[15)

Statutes
Meaning of Language
Unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated,
ordinary words will be given their ordinary
meaning when construing a statute.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[16)

Judgment
. Public officers and employees, cases involving
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether
employee of county fire and rescue acted in
"good faith" in recording the allegedly wasteful
activities of her coworkers precluded summary
judgment in favor of fire and rescue in
employee's action alleging violation of
whistleblower statute, even though employee
sought to gain personally from reporting waste,
and her notes referred to coworkers by
disparaging nicknames. West's LC.A. §
6-2104(1 )(b).

Statutes
Intention of Legislature
Statutes
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Opinion
[19]

Officers and Public Employees
for removal

HORTON, Justice.

,~Grounds

Although it may fall into the overall
consideration of whether public employee acted
in good faith, the fact that employee was hoping
to gain personally from reporting coworkers'
impropriety would not foreclose a finding that
her actions were protected by state whistleblower
act. West's LC.A. § 6-2104(1)(b).

[20]

Judgment
ip,Public officers and employees, cases involving
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether
employee of county fire and rescue was
participating in an "investigation" when
recording the allegedly wasteful activities of her
coworkers precluded summary judgment in favor
of fire and rescue in employee's action alleging
violation of whistleblower statute. West's LC.A.
§ 6-2104(2).

[21]

Officers and Public Employees
"Grounds for removal
An "investigation," within meaning of state
whistleblower statute, is not limited to an official
inquiry, but encompasses actions involving close
examination or observation. West's LC.A. §
6-2104(2).

Attorneys and Law Firms
**460 Rude, Jackson & Daugharty, LLP, Coeur d'Alene,
for appellant.
Ramsden & Lyons, Coeur d' Alene, for respondent.

*393 Appellant Mary C. Curlee (Curlee), a former
employee of Respondent Kootenai County Fire and Rescue
(KCFR), was discharged on October 13, 2004, after her
notes detailing the minute-by-minute activities of two of
her coworkers, Jackie Sharp (Sharp) and Lisa Wheeler
(Wheeler), to whom she assigned the fictitious names
"Muffy" and "Buffy," were discovered by Sharp on
Curlee's desk. Curlee filed suit against KCFR, alleging
that she was fired in violation of the Idaho Protection of
Public Employees Act as her notes documented the waste
of public funds, property, or manpower. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of KCFR and Curlee
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment. This Court granted
review sua sponte. We vacate the district court's grant of
summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Beginning in 1999, Curlee held several office positions
within the KCFR system. In 2002, Curlee was transferred
into the administrative offices of KCFR. When Curlee
arrived, Wheeler and Sharp were already working there as
a bookkeeper and an administrative assistant, respectively.
Initially, Curlee performed data entry duties; she was later
assigned to the front-desk receptionist position. While in
her data entry position, Curlee became displeased with
what she considered to be an inordinate amount of time
Wheeler and Sharp spent on personal conversations during
the workday. Curlee perceived the actions as wasteful and
complained to the Fire Chief, Ronald Sampert. When she
complained to Chief Sampert about Wheeler and Sharp's
behavior, Curlee also suggested that she be moved from
the receptionist position to a more important position and
that the office could be run by two, not three, employees.
After being reassigned to the receptionist position, Curlee
was in direct daily contact with Wheeler and Sharp.
Growing more frustrated with the actions of her
coworkers, Curlee eventually voiced her concerns to two
fire commissioners, two lieutenants, and the deputy chief.
Each of these individuals listened to her complaints. The
deputy chief and one of the lieutenants informed Curlee
they would discuss her concerns with Chief Sampert.
Curlee claims that both of the lieutenants told her she
should document the behavior of her coworkers that she
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believed to be wasteful.
Over the course of the next several months, Curlee
maintained a detailed, handwritten, minute-by-minute log
of the activities engaged in by her two coworkers which
Curlee deemed to be wasteful. During this time period,
Curlee again expressed her frustration to Chief Sampert. In
response, he expressed a desire to ease the tension in the
office and to have all of his employees work together. One
of the fire commissioners told Curlee that he and another
commissioner *394 **461 were "working on" Curlee's
concerns. Curlee did not discuss or disclose the contents of
her log during these conversations or at any other time to
any employee ofKCFR.
Approximately seven months after Curlee began keeping
her log, Sharp inadvertently discovered the log when she
was attending the front desk during Curlee's lunch break.
Sharp showed the log to Wheeler. Both women noticed
that, within the log, Curlee had frequently referred to them
as "Muffy" and "Buffy" rather than by their names.
Wheeler and Sharp made photocopies of the log and
submitted them to Chief Sampert. Both women were angry
that Curlee had been recording their office activities and
felt that being referred to as "Muffy" and "Buffy" was
derogatory and insulting. Chief Sampert agreed to speak
with Curlee about the log.
Chief Sampert, accompanied by the deputy chief, spoke
with Curlee about the log. When asked what she meant to
accomplish by keeping the log, Curlee responded that
everyone in the office wasted too much time and she
wanted to show how much. Curlee also informed Chief
Sampert that she could document anything she wanted to.
Chief Sampert informed Curlee that her coworkers were
upset and insulted by the derogatory names she had used
and that all offices had wasted time. ChiefSampert advised
Curlee that she was not trying to get along with the others
and that her behavior was exacerbating office tension. He
indicated that he was trying to build a team, and her actions
were detrimental to the team. Curlee advised Chief
Sampert that she and the two coworkers would never be a
team. Chief Sampert gave Curlee the remainder of the day
off as paid leave and asked her to go home and develop a
solution to ease the worKplace tension.
Curlee returned to work the next day. Chief Sampert asked
her if she had thought about the problem and what they
might do about it. Curlee responded that she did not know
what to do, that she would not apologize, and that she had
done nothing wrong. When Chief Sam pert discussed the
importance of not creating dissension in the office and
working together, Curlee responded that it was her
coworkers who found the log and gave it to him. Curlee
reiterated that she would not apologize and would never be

able to have a good working relationship with her two
coworkers. Her employment was then terminated.
Curlee filed suit against KCFR, alleging that she was
wrongfully terminated in violation of the Idaho Protection
of Public Employees Act for documenting a waste of
public funds and manpower. KCFR answered Curlee's
complaint, denied the allegations, and moved for summary
judgment. KCFR moved to strike an affidavit submitted by
Curlee from Suzanne Johnson, a former KCFR employee
who had worked with Sharp prior to Curlee's transfer into
the administrative office. The district court granted the
motion to strike and granted KCFR's motion for summary
judgment. Curlee filed a motion to reconsider, which the
district court denied.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] [2] [3] [4] "While this Court gives serious
consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals when
considering a case on review from that court, this Court
reviews the district court's decision directly." Hauschulz v.
State, 144 Idaho 834, 837, 172 P.3d 1109, 1112 (2007)
(citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d
798, 802 (2007)). This Court reviews an appeal from an
order of summary judgment de novo, and this Court's
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the
trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142
Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644 (2006). When ruling on
a motion for summary judgment, disputed facts are
construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Lockheed
Martin, 142 Idaho at 793, 134 P.3d at 644. "Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Jd. "I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the
adverse *395 **462 party may not rest upon mere
allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for triaL"
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211,868 P.2d 1224,
1227 (1994).

III. ANALYSIS
Curlee claims that she was discharged in violation of the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, I.c. § 6-2101 et
seq. (the Act), which is commonly referred to as a
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"whistleblower act." The Act "seeks to 'protect the
integrity of government by providing a legal cause of
action for public employees who experience adverse action
from their employer as a result of reporting waste and
violations of a law, rule or regulation.' " Mallonee v. State,
139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004) (quoting I.C.
§ 6-210 1). On appeal, Curlee asserts three points of error:
first, she asserts it was error to grant summary judgment to
KCFR; second, she asserts it was error to strike Suzanne
Johnson's affidavit; and third, she asserts it was error to
deny her motion to reconsider, alter, or amend. On appeal,
KCFR raises the issue of whether the district court's grant
of summary judgment can be affirmed under a different
legal theory, namely that Curlee's actions were not
protected by the Act. We consider these issues below.

A. The district court erred by granting summary
judgment to KCFR.
The primary issue in this case is whether the district court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of KCFR.
Curlee's principal argument is that the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of KCFR was improper
because the district court did not evaluate the evidence in
accordance with proper standards for deciding summary
judgment motions. Specifically, Curlee argues that the
district court usurped the function of the jury by making
findings of fact and drawing inferences from the evidence
in favor of KCFR, rather than determining whether she
demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact.
The district court ruled on KCFR's motion for summary
judgment from the bench, holding that Curlee had failed to
demonstrate a causal connection between her keeping of
the log and her tennination. The district court noted that,
although Curlee had presented evidence that she may have
been terminated for a reason protected by the Act (her
keeping of the log), KCFR presented evidence of a
legitimate reason for her discharge (her refusal to follow
Chief Sampert's order to take measures to resolve the
tension she had created with her coworkers by using the
names Muffy and Buffy in her log). The district court
stated that, once KCFR presented a legitimate reason for
her termination, the burden shifted back to Curlee to "poke
holes" in KCFR's rationale for her termination. The
district court held that Curlee had not carried her burden of
producing evidence that showed a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether she was discharged for any
reason other than her refusal to work productively with her
coworkers.
[5] Although the district court did not specifically identify
the basis for its ruling, it appears that the burden-shifting

standard that it applied is derived from McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), a U.S. Supreme Court case involving
employment discrimination, and its progeny.! A summary
of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is as
follows: (1) once a plaintiff produces evidence that she
suffered from an adverse discriminatory employment
decision; then (2) the burden shifts to the employer to
produce evidence that the employment decision was based
on a legitimate reason; and then (3) the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to prove that the legitimate
non-discriminatory reason the employer proffers is in fact
a pretext. Id. The McDonnell Douglas analysis has been
applied widely by federal and state courts (including this
Court) faced with employment discrimination *396 **463
cases. See e.g. Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 812-14,
606 P.2d 458, 462-64 (1979); Hoppe v. McDonald, 103
Idaho 33, 36, 644 P.2d 355, 358 (1982). However, this
Court has yet to extend the McDonnell Douglas analysis to
apply to cases of retaliatory discharge under Idaho's
whistleblower act.
[6] Some sister states and federal courts have applied the
McDonnell Douglas analysis in cases involving unlawful
discharge for actions protected under whistleblower
statutes similar to Idaho's. See e.g. LaFond v. General
Physics Servo Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir.1995)
(addressing the application of the McDonnell Douglas
three-part test to the Connecticut whistleblower statute);
Stevens V. St. Louis Univ. Med. Ctr., 831 F.Supp. 737, 741
(E.D.Mo.1993) (applying McDonnell Douglas standards
in the absence of state case law identifying the elements of
a whistleblower claim under Missouri law); Rosen V.
Transx Ltd., 816 F.Supp. 1364, 1369-70 (D.Minn.1993)
(analyzing Minnesota's whistleblower statute under the
l\1cDonnell Douglas test). When confronted with matters
of first impression involving Idaho statutes, this Court may
glean insight from the interpretations of sister states
concerning similar or identical statutes. See e.g. Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints V. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 418,849 P.2d 83, 91
(1993); Ada County Assessor V. Roman Catholic Diocese
of Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 431, 849 P.2d 98, 104 (1993).
However, whiJe the construction of a statute by another
state may be persuasive, it is not conclusive and we may
refuse to adopt the foreign construction. Mochel V.
Cleveland, 51 Idaho 468, 480,5 P.2d 549,553 (1930). We
find the decisions of our sister states to be well-reasoned
and conclude that the McDonnell Douglas analysis should
be applied to actions arising under Idaho's whistleblower
act.
[7] When the McDonnell Douglas analysis is applied to
cases involving retaliatory discharge under a
whistleblower statute, the test is as follows: (1) the plaintiff
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must establish a prima facie case of retaliatory conduct for
an action protected by the relevant whistleblower statute;
(2) once the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, the
defendant is obligated to produce evidence which, if taken
as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a
non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action; and (3) if the
defendant articulates a legitimate non-retaliatory reason
for discharge, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason
the defendant offers is a pretext for retaliatory conduct.
LaFond, 50 F.3d at 173.
While other courts have found the McDonnell Douglas
framework useful in approaching cases under state
whistleblower statutes, those courts have also noted that
the "burden-shifting rule of McDonnell Douglas, however,
has little or no application at the summary judgment stage.
The rule explicitly governs the burden of persuasion at
trial." Heng v. Rotech Med. Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389, 401
(ND.2004) (construing North Dakota's whistleblower
statute); see also LaFond, 50 F.3d at 174. We find this
foreign jurisprudence well-reasoned. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court erroneously held Curlee to a
higher burden of proof than is permissible at summary
judgment by requiring her to "poke holes" in KCFR's
proffered rationale for discharging her and to demonstrate
that the grounds advanced as justification for her
termination were a pretext for retaliatory conduct. While
this burden-shifting analysis is applicable at trial, it was
error for the district court to apply it at the summary
judgment stage.
[8] The role of the trial court at the summary judgment
stage is limited to discerning whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact to be tried. LaFond 50 F.3d at 174. It
does not extend to deciding them. Id. Therefore, in order to
survive summary judgment, Curlee only had the burden of
presenting evidence from which a rational inference of
retaliatory discharge under the whistleblower act could be
drawn. Id. If Curlee presented a prima facie case of
retaliatory discharge, the district court was not free to
accept as true the employer's testimony that she was fired
for some other legitimate reason. Id. We conclude that the
district court erred by accepting KCFR's justification for
discharging Curlee and requiring *397 **464 her to show
that the justification was, in fact, a pretext.
[9] We find that Curlee presented a prima facie case of
retaliatory discharge. The close relation in time between
the discovery of her documentation of her coworkers'
waste and her termination supports the reasonable
inference that Curlee was discharged for that
documentation. "Although there must be something more
than pure speculation or conjecture, circumstantial
evidence may provide an inference of causation. Proximity

in time between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action is 'particularly significant.' " Heng,
688 N.W.2d at 399 (internal citation omitted). We
recognize that a jury may well decide that KCFR did not
discharge Curlee in retaliation for her documentation of
waste. However, that determination properly belongs to the
jury at trial and not the judge at the summary judgment
stage. For that reason, we vacate the district court's order
granting summary judgment in favor of KCFR.

B. Genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether
Curlee was fired for conduct protected under the
whistleblower statute.
[10] On appeal, KCFR advances the alternative argument
that summary judgment was appropriate because Curlee
failed to establish that her conduct fell under the protection
of the Act. This issue was not addressed by the district
court. However, the appellate court may affirm the trial
court on a theory not relied upon below. McCuskey v.
Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 663, 851 P.2d 953, 959
(1993) (citing Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459,680
P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984)). Thus, we consider the issue
herein.

Under Idaho's whistleblower act, a prima facie case for
retaliatory discharge requires Curlee to show: (1) she was
an "employee" that engaged or intended to engage in
protected activity; (2) her "employer" took adverse action
against her, and (3) the existence of a causal connection
between the protected activity and the employer's adverse
action. I.C. §§ 6-2104 & 6-2105(4); see also Dahlberg v.
Lutheran Social Services of North Dakota, 625 N.W.2d
241, 253 (N.D.200 1) (identifying the elements of a prima
facie case under North Dakota's whistleblower statute);
Calvi! v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 122 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th
Cir.1997) (articulating the elements of a prima facie case
under Minnesota's whistleblower statute). There is no
question that, as defined by the Act, Curlee is an
"employee," KCFR is an "employer," and that discharge
constitutes "adverse action." I.e. § 6-2103. As we
concluded in Part III(A) , supra, Curlee has met her
summary judgment burden of demonstrating that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether her discharge
was causally related to her maintaining the log of her
coworkers' conduct. The only remaining question is
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Curlee's conduct in maintaining the log was
"protected activity."
KCFR argues that Curlee's actions are not protected
activities under I.e. § 6-2104 because (I) she did not
communicate in good faith the existence of any waste of
public funds, property or manpower, which is protected
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activity under I.e. § 6-2104(1)(a); and (2) she did not
participate or give infonnation in an investigation, hearing,
court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other fonn
of administrative review, which is protected activity under
I.C. § 6-2104(2). We disagree.

that unreasonably restrict an employee's ability to
document the existence of any waste of public funds,
property or manpower, or a violation, or suspected
violation of any laws, rules or regulations.
I.e. § 6-2104 (emphasis added).

An employee's cause of action under the whistleblower act
isdefinedinI.C. § 6-2105(4):
To prevail in an action brought under the
authority of this section, the employee
shall establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the employee has suffered
an adverse action because the employee,
or a person acting on his behalf engaged
or intended to engage in an activity
protected under section 6-2104, Idaho
Code.
KCFR's position is based primarily on its interpretation of
specific words in the whistleblower act, which provides:
(1)(a) An employer may not take adverse action against
an employee because the employee, or a person
authorized to act on behalf of the employee,
communicates in good faith the existence of any waste
of *398 **465 public funds, property or manpower, or a
violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or
regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political
subdivision of this state or the United States. Such
communication shall be made at a time and in a manner
which gives the employer reasonable opportunity to
correct the waste or violation.
(b) For purposes of subsection (1 )(a) of this section, an
employee communicates in good faith if there is a
reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good
faith is lacking where the employee knew or reasonably
ought to have known that the report is malicious, false or
frivolous.
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an
employee because an employee participates or gives
infonnation in an investigation, hearing, court
proceeding, legislative or otherlnquiry, or other fonn of
administrative review.
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an
employee because the employee has objected to or
refused to carry out a directive that the employee
reasonably believes violates a law or a rule or regulation
adopted under the authority of the laws of this state,
political subdivision of this state or the United States.
(4) An employer may not implement rules or policies

[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] Our standard of review for
statutory interpretation is well established:
The interpretation of a statute is a
question of law over which this Court
exercises free review. State v. Hart, 135
Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850,852 (2001).
Interpretation of a statute begins with an
examination of the statute's literal words.
State v. Burn igh t, 132 Idaho 654, 659,
978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the
language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, courts give effect to the
statute as written, without engaging in
statutory construction. State v. Rhode,
133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688
(1999). Only where the language is
ambiguous will this Court look to rules
of construction for guidance and consider
the
reasonableness
of
proposed
interpretations. Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho
226,231,31 P.3d 248,253 (2001).

Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of
Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006).
"Moreover, unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated,
ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when
construing a statute." Corp. ofPresiding Bishop of Church
ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 123 Idaho at 415,849
P .2d at 88 (citing Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho
427, 430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990)). In construing a
statute, this Court will not deal in any subtle refinements of
the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the
purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole
act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning
to the provisions. George W Watkins Family v.
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385,
1387-88 (1990).

1. "Communication" of waste

[17] KCFR argues that Curlee's actions fall outside the
protection of the Act because they were not a
"communication." Idaho Code § 6-2104(1 )(a) specifically
provides:
An employer may not take adverse action
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against an employee because the
employee ... communicates in good faith
the existence of any waste of public
funds, property or manpower.... Such
communication shall be made at a time
and in a manner which gives the
employer reasonable opportunity to
correct the waste or violation.
(emphasis added). The statute defines "communicate" as
"a verbal or written report." I.e. § 6-2103(2). The statute
does not, however, define "report." The dictionary
definition of "report" is to "give an account of." Delgado v.
Jim Wells County, 82 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.Ct.App.2002)
(quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (1990) to construe the ordinary meaning of
"report" under Texas's whistleblower statute).
**466 *399 KCFR argues that, while the documentation
was written, there was no evidence that Curlee prepared
the documentation as a written report or ever intended to
submit it to her supervisors. KCFR posits that Curlee failed
to establish that she was keeping these notes as part of a
report or that she ever intended to pass them along to a
supervisor. KCFR points out that it was her coworkers that
inadvertently discovered the notes that Curlee kept in
secret and that when Curlee was questioned about them by
Chief Sampert she merely stated that she could keep them
if she wanted to. Therefore, KCFR asserts that her notes
were not a communication protected by the whistleblower
act. Weare not persuaded by this argument.
It was not necessary that Curlee actually have presented

the notes to her employer in order to constitute a report.
Idaho's whistleblower act only requires that the employee
"intended to engage in an action protected under the act."
I.e. § 6-2105(4) (emphasis added). Curlee presented
evidence that her supervisors instructed her to document
the waste. By way of affidavit, she testified she "began
documenting the things in the office to support the fact that
there was waste of manpower and mismanagement in the
office" and that her "notes were part of the communication
of such wastefulness of manpower and public funds in the
office." A reasonable inference may be drawn that she
intended to deliver the report to her supervisors at some
future time, but that action was preempted by the
inadvertent discovery of her notes by Sharp. Indeed, it
appears that the district judge drew this inference, as he
stated that "it seems to me from my reading of what is
admissible the Plaintiff was assembling information that
she felt reported waste .... " We conclude that KCFR is not
entitled to summary judgment in its favor on this ground.
[18) KCFR argues in the alternative that Curlee's actions
are not protected under the Act because the notes were not

kept in "good faith." The statute defines good faith as
follows: "an employee communicates in good faith if there
is a reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good
faith is lacking where the employee knew or reasonably
ought to have known that the report is malicious, false or
frivolous." I.e. § 6-2104(1)(b) (emphasis added). KCFR
argues that that the reports were malicious because the
attribution of the names "Mufry" and "Bufry" to Wheeler
and Sharp was disparaging.
The statute does not define malice. The dictionary defines
malicious as: "harboring ill will or enmity ... proceeding
from hatred or ill will ... playfully or archly mischievous ...
[c ]lever, cunning ... having or done with, wicked or
mischievous intentions or motives '" [i]ll-disposed,
spiteful,
resentful,
bitter,
rancorous,
sinister,
unpropitious."
WEBSTER'S
THIRD
NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1367 (1966). It is
clear from the record that Curlee disliked Wheeler and
Sharp and resented working with them. Other courts have
held that animosity between the discharged employee and
the subjects of their reports compromises any finding that
the employee's complaints were made in "good faith" as
defined by whistleblower law. Cipriani v. Lycoming
County Housing Auth., 177 F.Supp.2d 303, 331
(M.D.Pa.2001) (discussing the requirement of good faith
under Pennsylvania'S whistleblower statute).
KCFR points to Baird v. Cutler, 883 F.Supp. 591 (D.Utah
1995), a case under the Utah whistleblower act, where it
was stated: "Discipline for failure to abide by reasonable
established procedures, or for rudeness or incivility, even
when it occurs in connection with 'whistleblowing,' does
not constitute a violation of the 'Whistleblower Act.' " Id.
at 606. KCFR argues that even if Curlee's log was a
communication that reported waste, her actions
nonetheless fell outside of the protection of the statute
because they were not made in good faith, and that her
incivility was the true reason for her discharge.
[19) From the factual averments contained in the
affidavits, it could be inferred that when Curlee initially
approached Chief Sampert about the wastefulness of
Wheeler and Sharp she had ulterior motives of personal
gain and promotion. Some courts have required that "we
must not look only at the contents of the report, but also at
the reporter's purpose in making the report." Dahlberg,
*400 **467 625 N.W.2d at 254. For instance, the
whistIeblower statutes of some states require that, as an
element of good faith, the employee not take the actions for
personal gain or consideration. See e.g. Cipriani, 177
F.Supp.2d at 331; Albright v. City of Philadelphia, 399
F.Supp.2d 575, 595-96 (E.D.Pa.2005). However, the Idaho
whistleblower act does not contain similar language.
Therefore, although it may fall into the overall

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

82

Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391 (2008)
P.3d

IER

529

consideration of whether she acted in good faith or not, the
fact that Curlee was hoping to gain personally from
reporting the waste of Wheeler and Sharp does not
foreclose a finding that her actions were protected by the
Idaho whistleblower act.
Curlee claims that she used the names Muffy and Buffy
because Wheeler and Sharp reminded her of characters
from a movie. Whether an employee has made a report in
good faith is a question of fact, and summary judgment is
appropriate only if, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Curlee, reasonable minds could only
conclude that her use of the names Muffy and Buffy was
indeed malicious. We conclude that the question whether
Curlee's usage of the names Muffy and Buffy shows that
the report was malicious is an issue offact to be decided by
a jury and not by this Court on appeal.

2. Participation in an "investigation"
(20) [21] Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) provides: "An employer
may not take adverse action against an employee because
an employee participates or gives information in an
investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or
other inquiry, or other form of administrative review."
(emphasis added). Curlee argues that she was participating
in an investigation of the wasteful activities of her
coworkers. In support of this claim, she asserts that two
lieutenants told her to document waste after she informed
them of Wheeler's and Sharp's conduct. KCFR asserts that
"[pJarticipation or giving information in an investigation,
hearing, court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry or
other form of administrative review requires more than
simply documenting alleged wasteful activities by
co-workers" and that Curlee "did not show the trial court
that she was participating or giving information in any
investigation or other form of administrative review."

The word "investigate" is not defined in the statute.
Therefore, we must give it its plain meaning. An ordinary
dictionary defines "investigate" as follows: "to track ... to
observe or study by close examination and systematic
inquiry ... to make a systematic examination; esp : to
conduct an official inquiry." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 616 (lOth ed.1993)
(emphasis added). The legal dictionary of first resort

defines the word as follows: "to follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation ... to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
BLACK'S
LAW
inqUlsltton;
examination.... "
DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed.1979). Although the word
"investigation" may be narrowly defined as an official
inquiry, we conclude that the plain meaning of the word is
broader and encompasses actions involving close
examination or observation. In view of the evidence that
Curlee's note-taking was the product of her superiors'
direction to "document" her allegations of waste, we
conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether she intended to give information in an
investigation.

C. The remaining issues need not be addressed by this
Court on appeal.
Curlee asserts that the district court erred by striking
Suzanne Johnson's affidavit and by denying her motion to
reconsider, alter, or amend. Because we have concluded
that the district court erred by granting KCFR's motion for
summary judgment, it is not necessary to address whether
the district court erred by striking Johnson's affidavit and
denying Curlee's motion to reconsider, alter, or amend.

IV. CONCLUSION
We vacate the district court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of KCFR. The case is remanded to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Costs are awarded to Curlee.

*401 **468 Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices
BURDICK, 1. JONES and W. JONES concur.
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Footnotes

1

Although the district court did not mention McDonnell Douglas specifically, KCFR argues in its supplemental brief that "Under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifted to Curlee to demonstrate that KCFR's alleged reason for the adverse employment
decision was a pretext for another motive which was in violation of the statute. This Curlee has failed to do."
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
sued employer under Title VII and other statutes, alleging
that employer retaliated against employee by requiring him
to sign arbitration agreement as condition of employment.
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Florence Marie Cooper, J., 122 F.Supp.2d
1080, enjoined employer from requiring arbitration as
condition of employment and from enforcing existing
arbitration agreements. Employer appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Trott, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) an employer
may require employees to arbitrate Title VII claims as a
condition of employment, abrogating Circuit City Stores v.
Banyasz, Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., Ferguson v.
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc.; (2) applicant's refusal to
sign compulsory arbitration agreement was not opposition
to unlawful employment practice, so as to be protected
conduct for purposes of retaliation claim; and (3)
applicant's refusal to sign compulsory arbitration
agreement was not participation in statutorily authorized
proceeding, so as to be protected conduct for purposes of
retaliation claim.

Alternative Dispute Resolution
,0c,Unconscionability
Not all agreements requiring arbitration of Title
VII claims as a condition of employment will be
enforced; they must still comply with the
principles of traditional contract law, including
the doctrine of unconscionability. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e
et seq.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3)

Alternative Dispute Resolution
Validity
Employer could require appropriate compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims of its applicants
and employees as condition of employment, and
could enforce those arbitration agreements
against current employees, as long as agreements
complied with traditional principles of contract
law. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
5 Cases that cite this headnote

Vacated and remanded.
Pre gerson, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion.

West Headnotes (9)

[1)

Alternative Dispute Resolution
Validity

[4J

Civil Rights
Practices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements
Labor and Employment
Wages and Hours
To establish retaliation under Title VII, ADA,
ADEA, or EPA, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) was required to prove that:
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(1) applicant engaged in protected activity; (2)
applicant suffered adverse employment decision;
and (3) there was causal link between applicant's
activity and adverse employment decision. Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, § IS(a)(3), 29
U.S.C.A. § 21S(a)(3); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(d), 29 U.S.C.A. §
623(d); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, § S03(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §
12203(a).

[7]

[8]

Civil Rights
•..··Activities Protected
Applicant's refusal to sign agreement requiring
him, as condition of employment, to arbitrate
Title VII claims, was not participation in
statutorily authorized proceeding, so as to be
protected conduct for purposes of retaliation
claim; although Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) argued that employee
reserved right to bring action in judicial forum,
no federal law guaranteed him ability to vindicate
that right in federal forum. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Civil Rights
::=Activities Protected

7 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
:·>Activities Protected
Labor and Employment
·">,,Protected Activities
Protected activities, for purposes of a retaliation
action under Title VII, the ADA, ADEA, or the
EPA, include: (1) opposing an unlawful
employment practice, and (2) participating in a
statutorily authorized proceeding. Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, § IS(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. §
21S(a)(3); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 4(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(d); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-3(a); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, § S03(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12203(a).

'".0.

It is not necessary that the policy opposed by an
employee be demonstrably unlawful for the
opposition to be protected conduct for purposes
of a Title VII retaliation claim; if the employee's
refusal to accede to an employer's policy is based
on a reasonable belief that the policy is unlawful,
the employee's conduct is a protected manner of
opposition. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704( a), 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

7 Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

..

Civil Rights
Activities Protected
Applicant's refusal to sign agreement requiring
him, as condition of employment, to arbitrate
Title VII claims, was not opposition to unlawful
employment practice, so as to be protected
conduct for purposes of retaliation claim,
inasmuch as voluminous legal precedent was to
the contrary, and employee could not have
reasonably interpreted text of any relevant
federal statute to forbid compulsory arbitration.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-3(a).
4 Cases that cite this headnote

[9]

Civil Rights
Activities Protected
Labor and Employment
Protected Activities
The protections against retaliation found in Title
VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the EPA extend to
an applicant or an employee who informs his
employer of his intention to participate in a
statutory proceeding, even if he has not yet done
so. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § IS(a)(3),
29 U.S.C.A. § 21S(a)(3); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(d), 29 U.S.C.A. §
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623(d); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42
US,C.A. § 2000e-3(a); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, § S03(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §
12203(a).
2 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*996 Charles A. Bird, Kelly Capen Douglas, Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP, San Diego, CA, for the
defendant -appellant-appellee.
Robert F. Walker, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker
LLP, Los Angeles, CA, defendant-appellant-appellee.
Dori K. Bernstein, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission,
Washington,
DC,
for
the
plaintiff-appellee-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California; Florence Marie Cooper,
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-01322-FMC.
Before PREGERSON and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and
FITZGERALD, District Judge. *

Opinion

OPINION
TROTT, Circuit Judge.
The law firm Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP
("Luce Forward") refused to hire Donald Scott Lagatree
("Lagatree") as a full-time legal secretary because he
would not sign an agreement to *997 arbitrate claims
arising from his employment. On behalf of Lagatree, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
sued Luce Forward for retaliation in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 USc. § 2000e-3, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42
U.s.c. § 12203(b), the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 ("ADEN'), 29 USc. § 623(d), and the Equal
Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), 29 USc. § 21S(a)(3). The
EEOC sought make-whole relief for Lagatree and a
permanent injunction forbidding Luce Forward from
requiring that employees sign arbitration agreements as a
condition of employment.
The district court refused to award make-whole relief and

rejected EEOC's request for an injunction based on the
ADA, the ADEA, or the EPA. Relying on Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.1998),
however, the district court enjoined Luce Forward from
requiring applicants to arbitrate Title VII claims and from
enforcing existing agreements to arbitrate those claims.
We have jurisdiction over Luce Forward's timely appeal
pursuant to 28 US.C. § 1291. In Circuit City Stores v.
Adams, S32 US. lOS, 121 S.Ct. l302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234
(2001), the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Duffield.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court and hold that
employers may require employees to sign agreements to
arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of their
employment. We vacate the district court's permanent
injunction against Luce Forward, which relied exclusively
on Duffield for the contrary proposition. We additionally
reject the EEOC's retaliation theory. Lagatree did not
engage in a protected activity when he refused to sign the
Luce Forward arbitration agreement, and consequently,
Luce Forward did not retaliate by refusing to hire him.

BACKGROUND
Lagatree applied for a position as a full-time legal
secretary with Luce Forward in September 1997.
Impressed with Lagatree's credentials and experience,
Luce Forward extended to him a conditional offer of
employment. On his first day of work, Luce Forward
presented Lagatree with its standard offer letter, which set
forth the terms and conditions of employment. The letter
specified Lagatree's salary and benefits. His employment
was at-will; "either [he] or the firm [could] terminate [his]
employment at any time, with or without cause." The offer
letter also included an arbitration provision requiring
Lagatree to submit all "claims arising from or related to his
employment" to binding arbitration. In its entirety, the
Luce Forward arbitration agreement provided:
In the event of any dispute or claim
between you and the firm (including
employees, partners, agents, successors
and assigns), including but not limited to
claims arising from or related to your
employment or the termination of your
employment, we jointly agree to submit
all such disputes or claims to confidential
binding arbitration, under the Federal
Arbitration Act. Any arbitration must be
initiated within 180 days after the dispute
or claim first arose, and will be heard
before a retired State or Federal judge in
the county containing the firm office in
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which you were last employed. The law
of the State in which you last worked will
apply.
Lagatree objected to the arbitration provision. He told
Deborah Sweeney ("Sweeney"), a Luce Forward personnel
employee, that he "couldn't sign ... the arbitration
agreement" because "it was unfair." In his deposition,
Lagatree clarified that he would not sign an arbitration
agreement under an at-will employment situation because
he believed he needed to *998 keep in place his "civil
liberties, including the right to a jury trial and redress of
grievances through the government process." Sweeney
then went to discuss the matter with Raymond W. Berry
("Berry"), the director of human resources at Luce
Forward.
Lagatree worked for Luce Forward for two days without a
contract while Luce Forward considered his vigorous
objection to the arbitration provision. After those two days,
Lagatree met with Berry and Sweeney. Lagatree asked
whether Luce Forward "could strike" the arbitration
provision from the offer letter. Berry responded that the
arbitration agreement was a non-negotiable condition of
employment at Luce Forward, and "if [Lagatree] didn't
agree to ... signing that clause, then he would not be an
employee of the firm." When Lagatree expressed his belief
that "he didn't feel that it was right," Berry again "told him
that[signing the arbitration provision] was the only way
that he could stay-or become an employee of the firm."
Initially, Lagatree agreed to sign the arbitration provision,
but a short time later Lagatree refused to do so, and
consequently, Luce Forward withdrew its job offer. It is
undisputed that Luce Forward refused to hire Lagatree
only because he would not sign the arbitration provision.

6:"Ca5e5"792 .'.~"""M"""""""'Mm"m.m."
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(1) Duffield forbade Luce Forward from requiring Lagatree
to sign an arbitration agreement, and (2) by refusing to hire
Lagatree, Luce Forward unlawfully retaliated against him
for asserting his constitutional right to a jury trial. The
EEOC sought make-whole relief for Lagatree, including
"rightful place employment," back wages and benefits, and
compensatory and punitive damages. The EEOC sought
also a permanent injunction forbidding Luce Forward from
engaging in unlawful retaliation and ordering Luce
Forward to "desist from utilizing mandatory arbitration
agreements."
The district court denied any award of damages on behalf
of Lagatree. Considering itself bound by Duffield,
however, the district court felt it was "required to issue an
injunction prohibiting [Luce Forward] from requiring its
employees to agree to arbitrate their Title VII claims as a
condition of employment and from attempting to enforce
any such previously executed agreements." The district
court did not issue an injunction forbidding compulsory
arbitration of ADA, ADEA or EPA claims. Nor did the
district court expressly rule on the EEOC's retaliation
theory. Luce Forward timely appealed the district court's
injunction. The EEOC cross-appealed, seeking to enjoin
Luce Forward from engaging in an "unlawful retaliatory
practice by denying employment to any applicant ... who
refuses to waive his right to participate *999 in statutorily
protected [ ] proceedings."

ST ANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary
judgment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th
Cir.2000) (en bane).

In February 1998, Lagatree sued Luce Forward in Los
Angeles Superior Court accusing Luce Forward of
wrongfully terminating his employment. Lagatree sought
lost wages, damages for emotional distress, and punitive
damages. The Superior Court granted Luce Forward's
motion to dismiss, holding that Luce Forward did not
unlawfully discharge Lagatree when he refused to sign a
predispute arbitration agreement as a condition of
employment. A California Court of Appeal affirmed, and
the California Supreme Court denied review. Lagatree v.
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 74 Cal.AppAth 1105,
88 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 (1999), review denied 2000 Cal.
LEXIS 262, at *1 (Ca1.2000).

An employer may not discriminate against "an employee
or applicant for employment because of su~h individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 42 USc. §
2000e-2(a)(l) (Title VII), "disability," 42 U.S.c. §
12112(a)(ADA), or "age." 42 USc. § 623(a)(l) (ADEA).
The EPA makes it unlawful to pay lower wages on the
basis of an employee's sex. 29 USc. § 206(d)(I).

While his state court suit was pending, Lagatree filed a
complaint with the EEOC, alleging that he was wrongfully
terminated for refusing to sign the Luce Forward
arbitration provision. The EEOC sued Luce Forward on
behalf of Lagatree and in the public interest, arguing that

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the Act") strengthened
Title VII by making it easier to bring and to prove lawsuits
and by expanding the available judicial remedies so that
plaintiffs could receive full compensation for injuries
resulting from discrimination. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(1), at

DISCUSSION
I DUFFIELD
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30 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N. 694, 694-96.
The Act also included a "polite bow to the popularity of
alternative dispute resolution," as governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir.1997).
Specifically, § 118 of the Act provided that "[w ]here
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including ...
arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under
this chapter." Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 118
reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 118"); Cj
42 U.S.c. § 12212 ("Where appropriate and to the extent
authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including ... arbitration is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under this chapter.").
Congress passed § 118 against the backdrop of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, III S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26
(1991). In that case, the Court held that an employer could
compel arbitration of an employee's ADEA claim pursuant
to an arbitration provision required as a condition of his
employment. The Court recognized that arbitration did not
hinder the discrimination plaintiff's ability to vindicate her
rights: "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral
forum, rather than a judicial forum." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
26, III S.Ct. 1647 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105
S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)). I By this language, the
Court judicially sanctioned the liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration.
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer and
Congress's seemingly perspicuous language that § 118
encourages arbitration, we determined in Duffield that
*1000 Congress intended to exempt Title VII claims from
compulsory arbitration. 144 F.3d at 1185. In Duffield,
Robertson Stephens required Tonya Duffield, "like every
other individual who wishes to work in the United States as
a broker-dealer in the securities industry, to agree to
arbitrate all disputes arising from her employment." ld.
Duffield signed her employment contract without
objection and began working as a broker-dealer for
Robertson Stephens. Id. at 1186.
Duffield subsequently sued Robertson Stephens for sexual
discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of Title
VII and California's Fair Employment & Housing Act
("FEHA"). Robertson Stephens sought to compel
arbitration pursuant to the compulsory arbitration
provision in Duffield's employment contract, while
Duffield sought a declaration that the compulsory
arbitration provision was unenforceable. The district court

rejected Duffield's arguments and granted Robertson
Stephen's motion to compel.
On appeal, we reversed the district court's order
compelling arbitration. The opening paragraph of our
opinion succinctly presented the issue for review:
"[W]hether employers may require as a mandatory
condition of employment ... that all employees waive their
right to bring Title VII and other statutory and
non-statutory claims in court and instead agree in advance
to submit all employment-related disputes to binding
arbitration." Id. at 1185. We believed that the answer to
this question was potentially dispositive of whether
Robertson Stephens could enforce the compulsory
arbitration agreement signed by Duffield. As we
approached the case: (1) if Robertson Stephens could not
require Duffield to sign an arbitration agreement as a
condition of her employment, it surely could not enforce
the agreement against her; whereas (2) if Robertson
Stephens could require Duffield to sign an arbitration
agreement as a condition of her employment, that
agreement might be enforceable subject to the constraints
of traditional contract law. See, e.g., First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct.
1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (".l;lpply[ ing] ordinary
statelaw principles that govern the formation of contracts"
determining the validity of an agreement to arbitrate);
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778,
784-85 (9th Cir.2002) (refusing compulsory arbitration of
Title VII claims where arbitration agreement was
unconscionable); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294
F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir.2002) (allowing arbitration);
Circuit City Stores v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th
Cir.2002) (allowing compulsory arbitration of FEHA
claims where agreement was not unconscionable);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th
Cir.1994) (refusing compulsory arbitration where plaintiff
did not knowingly agree to arbitrate).
At the outset of Duffield, we observed that reading § 118 to
allow compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims was "at
odds with" Congress's directive that Title VII be read
broadly to effectuate its remedial purposes. 144 F.3d at
1192. We thought it "at least a mild paradox" that the Act,
which expanded remedies for victims of discrimination,
encouraged the use of a process whereby employers
condition employment on their prospective employees'
surrendering of their rights to a judicial forum. Id. at
1192-93 (quoting Plyner, 109 F.3d at 363). These
observations established the opinion's foundation.
Building on this foundation, the Court undertook an
exercise in statutory interpretation, commencing with an
examination of § 118' s plain language. The Duffield Court
determined that, in context, Congress's pronouncement in
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§ 118 that "arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes
*1001 arising under [Title VII]" was ambiguous "at a
minimum." Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193. To clarifY this
ambiguity, the Court turned to § 118 's legislative history.
After picking and choosing snippets of legislative history
consistent with its desired result, which the dissent sets
forth "at some length," the Court concluded that § 118
codified the law as it was understood before Gilmer-that
employers could not compel prospective employees to
forego their right to litigate Title VII claims in a judicial
forum as a condition of employment. Id. at 1199.
Accordingly, the Duffield Court held that "under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, employers may not [through
compulsory arbitration agreements] compel individuals to
waive their Title VII right to a judicial forum." Id. at 1185.
As Robertson Stephens could not require Duffield to sign
an arbitration agreement as a condition of her employment,
the Court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement that
she signed. Id. at 1199 ("In view of the fact that the
context, language, and legislative history of the 1991 Act
together make out a conclusive case, that Congress
intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims, we think it inescapable that [Duffield's arbitration
agreement] is unenforceable as applied to such claims.").

Mago Court extended Gilmer to Title VII claims, finding
probative the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII.
!d. Mago, however, did not interpret (or even mention) §
118, even though Mago was decided months after its
passage.

Those seeking to distinguish Duffield assert that it
addressed only whether an employer may enforce
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims against its
employees. See Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d
1307, 1315 (lIth Cir.2002) ("[Duffield] ... stand[s] for the
proposition that compulsory arbitration agreements are
'unenforceable' or are 'inconsistent' with Title VI!.");
Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. EEOC, 245 F.3d
831, 835 (D.C.Cir.200 I) ("Duffield ruled only that such
agreements are 'unenforceable' with respect to Title VII
claims."). We respectfully disagree with these narrow
assessments. The Duffield Court decided whether an
employer could require compulsory arbitration as a
condition of employment-a question it believed dispositive
of the entire case. The latter portions of Duffield which
concluded that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable simply express the inevitable consequence
of holding that employers may not require arbitration of
Title VII claims as a condition of employment. See, e.g., id.
at 1199. ("The contract before us [ ] requires compulsory
arbitration ... and it is contracts of that nature we are
compelled to hold unenforceable .... ").

Since our Duffield decision in 1998, our Sister Circuits as
well as the Supreme Courts of Cali fomi a and Nevada have
unanimously repudiated its holding. See, e.g., Desiderio v.
Nat 'I Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198,206 (2d
Cir.1999) (referring to Duffield's reasoning as "the poet's
lament"); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1,7 (lst Cir.1999); Koveleskie v. SBC
Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361,365 (7th Cir.1999) ("We
respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit on this issue
.... "); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d
Cir.1998); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d
832, 837 (8th Cir.1997); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,
105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C.Cir.1997); Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882
(4th Cir.1996); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 39 F .3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.1994); Bender v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (lIth
Cir.1992); A~rord, 939 F.2d at 230; Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir.1991); see also
'Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 24
Ca1.4th 83,99 Ca1.Rptr.2d 745,6 P.3d 669,675-76 (2000)
("Aside from the fact Duffield is a minority of one, we find
its reasoning unpersuasive."); Kindred v. Second Judicial
Dist., 116 Nev. 405, 996 P.2d 903, 906 (2000). Duffield,
like Bikini Atoll, now sits ignominiously alone awaiting
remediation.

While Duffield properly considered whether an employer
could require that an employee sign a compulsory
arbitration agreement as a condition of employment,
arguably its outcome was at odds with existing Circuit
authority. In Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956
F .2d 932, 935 (9th Cir.1992), we held that Congress did
not intend to preclude arbitration of Title VII claims. The

Later in Lai, we observed: "Gilmer ... made it clear that the
ADEA does not bar agreements to arbitrate federal age
discrimination in employment claims. Our Circuit has
extended Gilmer to employment discrimination claims
brought under Title VII." Lai, 42 F.3d at 1303 (citing
Mago) (emphasis added); see also id. ("The issue before
us, however, is not whether employees may ever agree to
arbitrate statutory employment claims; they can."). Lai
discussed § 118, and contrary to Duffield, concluded that
Congress intended to allow arbitration of Title VII claims
"where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use
these methods." *1002 42 F.3d at 1304-05 (citing
H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1) (1991), reprinted in 1991
u.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635 (statement of Sen. Dole».
Although Duffield cited both Mago and Lai, it did not
address these decisions' express statements that Gilmer
and § 118 authorized compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims.

That remediation can occur, however, only if a decision of
the Supreme Court permits us to question Duffield. See
United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.1992)
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("As a general rule, one three-judge panel of this court
cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel.
An exception to this rule arises when an intervening
Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent
of the Ninth Circuit .... ") (internal citations and quotations
omitted). In Circuit City, the Supreme Court so directly
undermined the reasoning behind Duffield, that we
conclude it has lost its status as valid precedent.
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court reviewed our decision
in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th
Cir.1998) (per curiam), in which we held that the FAA was
not applicable to any contract of employment. The
Supreme Court disagreed with Craft's conclusion,
clarifying that the FAA covered all employment contracts
except those of transportation workers. Circuit City, 532
U.S. at 119, 121 S.Ct. l302. In the process, the Court
described the "real benefits to the enforcement of
arbitration provisions," including lower costs and easy
choice-of-law resolution, and it rejected "the supposition
that the advantages of the arbitration process somehow
disappear when transferred to the employment context."
Id. at 122-23, 121 S.Ct. l302. Most importantly, the Court
believed it had "been quite specific in holding that
arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA
without contravening the policies of congressional
enactments giving employees specific protection against
discrimination prohibited by federal law ... ; by agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum."
Id.
Although Circuit City did not repudiate Duffield by name,
the Supreme Court's language and reasoning decimated
Duffield's conclusion that Congress intended *1003 to
preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. In
particular, Circuit City's unambiguous proclamation that
"arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA
without contravening the policies of congressional
enactments giving employees specific protection against
discrimination prohibited by federal law" cannot be
reconciled with Duffield's holding that Congress intended
Title VII, one such "congressional enactment," to preclude
compulsory arbitration of discrimination claims.2 Circuit
City, 532 U.S. at 122-23,121 S.Ct. l302.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's emphatic reminder that the
right to a judicial forum is not a substantive right
contradicts Duffield's fundamental supposition that the Act
guaranteed a nonwaivable, substantive right to a jury trial.3
Compare Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122-23,121 S.Ct. 1302
("[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a

judicial forum.") with Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185 ("[U]nder
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employers may not [through
compulsory arbitration agreements] compel individuals to
waive their Title VII right to a judicial forum. ") (emphasis
added). In effect, Circuit City recognized that an aggrieved
employee does not lose anything by resolving his
grievances in an arbitral forum, where he may demand the
"specific protection" against discrimination afforded by
federal law, including Title VII. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at
123, 121 S.Ct. 1302.
[1) [2) Instead of trying to salvage Duffield by creatively
reconciling these inconsistencies as "different" yet
"compatible holdings," we reach the inevitable conclusion
that Duffield no longer remains good law.4 We regard
Duffield as within the *1004 category of "fruitful error."5
In Duffield's stead, we hold that an employer may require
employees to arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of
employment. Our decision is consistent with the Supreme
Court's language and reasoning in Circuit City. It also
unifies Ninth Circuit case law and brings us in line with our
Sister Circuits and the Supreme Courts of California and
Nevada. We note also that it is consistent with Congress's
pronouncement in ~ 118 that "arbitration is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under [Title VII]."6 Of course, not
all compulsory arbitration agreements will be enforced;
they must still comply with the principles of traditional
contract law, including the doctrine of unconscionability.
Our decision today should not impact the EEOC's mission
at all. As the Supreme Court recently explained in EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151
L.Ed.2d 755 (2002), a compulsory arbitration agreement
between an employer and an employee does not prevent
the employee from filing a complaint with the EEOC. Nor
does such an agreement bind the EEOC to an arbitral
forum because the EEOC is not a party to that agreement.
Id. Thus, even if an employee must arbitrate her Title VII
claims pursuant to a compulsory arbitration agreement, the
EEOC, in its ombudsman's role, remains free to seek
appropriate victim-specific relief in any suitable forum. Id.
at 769.
[3) Without further ado, we vacate the district court's
Duffield-based permanent injunction. Compelled by the
Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City, we conclude that
Duffield no longer remains good law. Luce Forward may
require appropriate compulsory arbitration of its applicants
and employees as a condition of employment. In addition,
Luce Forward may enforce those arbitration agreements
against current employees, as long as the arbitration
agreements comply with traditional principles of contract
law.

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

91

E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 (2002)

II RETALIATION
Although the EEOC asserts that Circuit City did not
implicitly overrule Duffield and that Duffield remains the
law of the Circuit, the EEOC, nevertheless, does not place
all its eggs in Duffield's basket. In fact, the EEOC
primarily argues that Luce Forward unlawfully retaliated
against Lagatree by not hiring him after he refused to sign
Luce Forward's compulsory arbitration agreement.
[4] [5] The federal laws prohibiting employment
discrimination make it unlawful for an employer to
retaliate against an applicant or employee because she has
engaged in a protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(Title VII);? *100542 U.S.c. § l2203(a)(ADA); 29 U.s.c.
§ 623(d) (ADEA); 29 U.S.C. § 2lS(a)(3)(EPA). To
establish retaliation, the EEOC, on Lagatree's behalf, must
prove that: (1) Lagatree engaged in a protected activity; (2)
Lagatree suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3)
there was a causal link between Lagatree' s activity and the
adverse employment decision. See Hashimoto v. Dalton,
118 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir.1997). Protected activities
include: (1) opposing an unlawful employment practice;
and (2) participating in a statutorily authorized proceeding.
Silverv. KCA, Inc., S86F.2d 138, 141 (9thCir.1978).
In this case, it is undisputed that Lagatree suffered an
adverse employment decision when Luce Forward
refrained from hiring him because he refused to sign Luce
Forward's compulsory arbitration agreement. Luce
Forward contests only whether Lagatree engaged in a
protected activity when he refused to sign the arbitration
agreement. See Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d
1406, 1411 (9th Cir.1987) (finding adverse employment
action and causal link were undisputed and only question
was whether employee engaged in protected opposition
conduct); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d
1008,1011-12 (9th Cir.1983) (same).

A. Opposing an Unlawful Employment Practice
[6) [7] Lagatree's refusal to sign Luce Forward's
compulsory arbitration agreement was not protected
opposition conduct. Title VII's statutory "opposition
clause" prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
applicant or employee "because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice." See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII); see also 29 U.S.c. §
623(d) (ADEA); 42 U.s.C. § 12203(a)(ADA). It is not
necessary that the policy opposed be demonstrably
unlawfu1. Crown Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1013. If the
employee's refusal to accede to an employer's policy is
based on a reasonable beliefthat the policy is unlawful, the
employee's conduct is a protected manner of opposition.

See, e.g., Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Prods., 212 F.3d 493, S06 (9th Cir.2000) ("Title VII allows
employees to freely report actions that they reasonably
believe are discriminatory, even if those actions are in fact
lawfu1.").
In September 1997, however, when Lagatree refused to
sign Luce Forward's compulsory arbitration agreement as
a condition of his employment, he could not have
reasonably believed that Luce Forward's arbitration policy
was an unlawful employment practice. Indeed, on May 13,
1991, six years before Lagatree' s stint at Luce Forward,
the Supreme Court in Gilmer expressly permitted requiring
compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims as a condition of
employment. In addition, Congress amended Title VII with
§ 118 to provide explicitly that "arbitration is encouraged
to resolve disputes ansmg under [Title VII]."
Subsequently, in 1994, Lai extended the rationale of
Gilmer to employment discrimination claims brought
under Title VII. 42 F.3d at 1303. Finally, by 1997, at least
five of our Sister Circuits had interpreted § 118 to permit
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. Until Duffield
was decided May, 13, 1998-nearly a year after Lagatree's
refusal of Luce Forward's employment offer-no Court of
Appeals had concluded that § 118 forbade compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims. Cf Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1312
(holding refusal *1006 to sign a compulsory arbitration
agreement in 1999 was not protected opposition conduct
because reliance on Duffield was not objectively
reasonable). In the face of voluminous contrary legal
precedent, Lagatree could not have reasonably believed
Luce Forward was engaged in unlawful activity when it
required arbitration as a condition of employment.
In addition, Lagatree could not have reasonably interpreted
the text of any relevant federal statute to forbid compulsory
arbitration. The EEOC argues that Lagatree's refusal to
waive his procedural right to file or litigate a civil suit was
protected opposition conduct because the ADA makes it
"unlawful to coerce ... or interfere with any individual in
the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or
protected by this chapter." 42 U.s.C. § l2203(b) (emphasis
added). The EEOC's argument, however, assumes
contrary to Supreme Court precedent that the right to a
judicial forum is a substantive right guaranteed by the
ADA.
By 1997, the Supreme Court had held repeatedly that "[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral rather than a
judicial forum." Gilmer, SOO U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647
(quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, lOS S.Ct. 3346). By
this language, the Supreme Court distinguished between
the substantive rights guaranteed by the statute and the
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right to a judicial forum.
Moreover, glaringly absent from the EEOC's argument is
any express statutory indication that arbitration of ADA
claims (or any other employment discrimination claims) is
disfavored. Section 12203 does not mention arbitration at
all, and another section of the ADA, 42 U.S.c. § 12212,
like § 118 of Title VII, provides that "arbitration is
encouraged to resolve disputes."
Lagatree could not have reasonably interpreted the ADA's
pronouncement that "arbitration is encouraged" to mean
that "compulsory arbitration as a condition of employment
is forbidden." The EEOC fails to identify a single case
from any Circuit that would have supported Lagatree' s
refusal to sign Luce Forward's compulsory arbitration
agreement. Because Lagatree could not have reasonably
believed that Luce Forward's policy of requiring
arbitration was an unlawful employment practice, his
opposition to that policy was not protected opposition
conduct. Thus, as a matter oflaw Luce Forward's refusal to
hire Lagatree for not signing a compulsory arbitration
agreement was not illegal retaliation.

B. Participating in a Statutorily Authorized Proceeding

[8] By refusing to sign Luce Forward's compulsory
arbitration agreement, Lagatree was not participating in a
statutorily authorized proceeding. Title VII, the ADA, and
the ADEA make it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate or retaliate against an employee or an
applicant for employment because that person "has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
a ... proceeding." 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII); 42
US.c. § 12203(a)(ADA); 29 U.s.c. § 623(d) (ADEA).
The EPA similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate or retaliate against any employee because
such employee has "instituted or caused to be instituted a
proceeding under or related the [the EPA], or has testified
or is about to testify in any such proceeding." 29 U.S.c. §
215(a)(3). A covered "proceeding" undoubtedly includes
instituting "a civil action ... in a court of competent
jurisdiction." 42 U.s.c. §§ 2000e-5(f)(l), (3) (Title VII);
42 U.s.c. § 12117(a)(ADA); 29 U.s.c. § 626(c)(l)
(ADEA); 29 U.S.c. § 216(b)(EPA). An *1007 individual
who files a civil action has "participated in any manner" in
a covered proceeding; thus an employer may not retaliate
against that individual.
[9] The statutory protections against retaliation also extend
to an applicant or an employee who informs his employer
of his intention to participate in a statutory proceeding,
even if he has not yet done so. See Gifford v. Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1155-56 (9th

Cir.1982) (holding employee states a retaliation claim after
being fired for writing a letter threatening an EEOC
charge). In Gifford, we saw no "legal distinction .. .
between the filing of a charge which is clearly protected .. .
and threatening to file a charge." Id. at 1156 n. 3.
Here, the EEOC argues that Luce Forward cannot refuse to
hire Lagatree because, although he did not file or threaten a
civil action, he reserved his right to bring a civil action in a
judicial forum. EEOC completes its argument as follows:
[Luce Forward]'s practice of refusing to
employ any individual who will not sign
the compulsory waiver ... is effectively a
preemptive
strike
against
future
participation conduct afforded absolute
protection under each of the federal
anti-retaliation provisions. Rather than
wait for an employee to file or litigate a
suit under a federal rights law, or to
announce his intention to do so-at which
point the employee unquestionably
would be statutorily protected from any
retaliatory adverse treatment, Luce
Forward
preemptively
denies
employment to any individual who will
not waive his right to engage in such
protected participation activity.
Critical to the EEOC's position is the notion that
Lagatree's right to a judicial forum is "afforded absolute
protection under each of the federal anti-retaliation
provisions." That notion, and thus the EEOC's entire
position, lacks merit.
Although Lagatree undoubtedly retained the right to be
free from discrimination, a right he could not prospectively
waive, see, e.g., 29 U.S.c. § 626(f)(c), no federal law
guaranteed him the ability to vindicate that right in a
judicial forum. In fact, the Supreme Court in Gilmer
condoned compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims as a
condition of employment. Reaffirming Gilmer, in Circuit
City, the Supreme Court extolled the advantages of
arbitrating employment discrimination claims and rejected
the "supposition that the advantages of the arbitration
process somehow disappear when transferred to the
employment context." 532 U.S. at 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court clarified that the
right to a judicial forum was not a substantive right: "By
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial forum." Id.
Waiving the right to a judicial forum is unlike signing a
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"yellow dog contract," by which an employer forbids an
employee from joining a union. An employee's right to
join a union is a substantive right guaranteed by the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151. No statute,
however, forbids the compulsory waiver of a judicial
forum, and thus demanding its waiver is not illegal. While
Congress might have forbidden arbitration of employment
discrimination claims, instead, it "encouraged" their
arbitration.
Along with his experience and credentials, the privilege of
a judicial forum was a valuable asset Lagatree brought to
the negotiating table. During negotiations, Luce Forward
offered Lagatree a base salary of $3,600/month plus
substantial benefits in return for his services and his
agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes.
Lagatree objected to Luce *1008 Forward's demand of
arbitration and counteroffered, asking that Luce Forward
waive its compulsory arbitration requirement. Luce
Forward refused to waive compulsory arbitration, and
Lagatree initially decided to accept Luce Forward's terms
of employment. When Lagatree ultimately refused to agree
to Luce Forward's terms of employment, he simply made a
rational economic decision that Luce Forward was asking
too much and offering too little in return. But Luce
Forward incurred no liability as a result of these failed
negotiations; it only lost the potential services of a
qualified applicant. Indeed, dickering over freely waivable
rights is not a protected activity, and the failure to agree to
the terms of an employment contract is not retaliation.

CONCLUSION

Circuit City implicitly overruled Duffield, and therefore,
we vacate the district court's permanent injunction, which
relied on Duffield. We hold that Luce Forward could
require Lagatree to arbitrate potential Title VII claims as a
condition of his employment. When Lagatree refused to
sign the arbitration agreement, Luce Forward's refusal to
hire him was not unlawful retaliation because Lagatree's
right to a judicial forum is not afTorded absolute protection
under any federal statute.
VACATED; REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT
FOR JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
LUCE FORWARD.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The maJonty concludes that in
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 S.Ct.
1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001), the Supreme Court

"implicitly overruled" Duffield v. Robertson Stephens &
Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.1998). Maj. op. at 996-97. For
the following reasons, I would find that Duffield remains
good law.

I.

The issue in Duffield was whether employers may require
their employees, as a mandatory condition of employment,
to agree to arbitrate future Title VII claims. See Duffield,
144 F.3d at 1185. Based on an analysis of Congress' intent
when it amended Title VII through the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), we held
that employers may not require employees, as a mandatory
condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate future Title
VII claims. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189-90.
The issue in Circuit City was whether the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.c. § 1 et seq., excludes
from its coverage not only employment arbitration
agreements by transportation workers, but also
employment arbitration agreements by non-transportation
workers. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109,121 S.Ct. 1302.
Without mentioning Duffield, Title VII, or the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, the Supreme Court held that the FAA
excludes from its coverage employment arbitration
agreement by transportation workers, but not employment
arbitration agreements by non-transportation workers. See
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109, 121 S.Ct. 1302.

Duffield and Circuit City are cases of the proverbial apples
and oranges: different law, different issues, and different,
yet compatible holdings. Most importantly, when the
Supreme Court concluded in Circuit City that the FAA
covers
employment
arbitration
agreements
by
non-transportation workers, it did not also implicitly
conclude, contra Duffield, that employers may require
their employees, as a mandatory condition of employment,
to agree to arbitrate future Title VII claims. Whether the
FAA covers employment arbitration *1009 agreements by
non-transportation workers-the issue in Circuit City-is one
question. Whether an employer may require an employee,
as a mandatory condition of employment, to agree to
arbitratefitture Title VII claims-the issue in Duffield-is an
entirely different question. In answering "yes" to the first
question, Circuit City did not also implicitly answer "yes"
to the second question. "Arbitration under the [FAA] is a
matter of consent, not coercion .... " Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Ed. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989). It is entirely
consistent to hold-as the Supreme Court did in Circuit
City-that non-transportation workers who consent in
advance to arbitration can later be held to that agreement
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under the FAA, and to also hold-as we did in Duffield-that
employers may not compel their employees to enter
arbitration agreements under Title VII. Accordingly,
Duffield remains good law after Circuit City, and the
District Court's injunction modeled on Duffield should be
affirmed.

II.
The majority advances two arguments in support of its
conclusion that Circuit City "implicitly overruled"
DujJield. Both arguments are unconvincing.

A.
First, the maJonty relies on dicta in Circuit City that
"arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA
without contravening the policies of congressional
enactments giving employees specific protection against
discrimination prohibited by federal law." Maj. op. at 1002
(quoting Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302)
(emphasis added). I The majority claims that this
"unambiguous proclamation ... cannot be reconciled with
Duffield's holding that Congress intended Title VII to
preclude compulsory arbitration of discrimination claims."
Maj. op. at 1003 (citing Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123,121
S.Ct. 1302) (footnote omitted, emphasis added). In reality,
there is no contradiction whatsoever between the Circuit
City dicta and the Duffield holding.
In perceiving a contradiction between the Circuit Citv
dicta and the Duffield holding, the majority ignores ~a
crucial word in the Duffield holding: "compulsory." In
Duffield, we referred to arbitration agreements as
compulsory "when individuals must sign an agreement
waiving their rights to litigate future claims in a judicial
forum in order to obtain employment with, or continue to
work for, the employer." See 144 F.3d at 1187.2 The
Supreme Court said in Circuit City only that, generally,
employees who have *1010 agreed to arbitrate future
claims under federal anti-discrimination law can be held to
such arbitration agreements without violating the policies
of federal anti-discrimination law. The Supreme Court did
not also say in Circuit City-contra Duffield-that employees
can be required, as a mandatory condition of employment,
to agree to arbitrate future claims under federal
anti-discrimination law without violating the policies of
federal anti-discrimination law. Nor is the second
statement implied in the first. Perhaps more importantly,
the Circuit City dicta that enforcement of arbitration
agreements can be compatible with the policies of federal

anti-discrimination law does not contradict the Duffield
holding that in the case of Title VII, enforcement of
compulsory arbitration agreements is always incompatible
with the text and legislative history of the § 118 of Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
We reached our holding in Duffield after closely following
instructions set forth by the Supreme Court in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct.
1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) in the context of another
federal anti-discrimination law, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEN'). In Gilmer, the Supreme
Court first reiterated that" '[h]aving made the bargain to
arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.' " 500
U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628,
105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985» (alteration in
original). The Supreme Court then placed the burden on
the plaintiff, who sought to avoid arbitration of his ADEA
claim as per agreement, "to show that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims."
Id. The Supreme Court observed that "[i]f such an
intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the
ADEA, its legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict'
between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying
purposes." Id. The Supreme Court examined the ADEA in
this regard and held that the plaintiff "ha[ d] not met his
burden of showing that Congress, in enacting the ADEA,
intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act."
Id. at 35, III S.Ct. 1647.3
In Duffield, we recited these instructions word for word:
"Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should
be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue." Mitsubishi, ... 473 U.S. [at]
628, 105 S.Ct. 3346 .... The burden, therefore, is on
Duffield to demonstrate that "Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of a judicial *1011 forum for [Title
VII] claims" in the manner mandated by the [securities
registration application]. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, III
S.Ct. 1647 .... "If such an intention exists, it will be
discoverable in the text of [the act at issue], its
legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' between
arbitration and the [act's] underlying purposes." Id. at
26, III S.Ct. 1647 ....

Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190. We moreover closely followed
these instructions in Duffield when we found that
"Congress' intent to preclude the compulsory arbitration of
Title VII claims is conclusively demonstrated in the text
and!or legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1991...." Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189-90 (emphasis added);
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compare with Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647.
Section lIS of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides:
"Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law,
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution,
including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under [Title VII]." Pub. L. No.1 02-166, § lIS, 105
Stat 1071 (1991), reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 19S1
(emphasis added). Regarding the text of § lIS, we
observed that especially in light of the limiting phrases
"[w]here appropriate" and "to the extent authorized by
law," "it would seem entirely disingenuous to fasten onto
... one word," i.e., encouraged, "and conclude that
Congress was boundlessly in favor of all forms of
arbitration." Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193. Indeed, given that
encouragement implies voluntariness and requirement
implies involuntariness, Congress' instruction in § 118 that
"arbitration ... is encouraged" if anything seems to
contradict the majority's conclusion that arbitration may be
required as a condition of employment under Title VII. We
concluded that "the text of [§ lIS] is, at a minimum,
ambiguous," and we therefore turned to the legislative
history of that section. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193. Because
our detailed discussion in Duffield of § l1S's legislative
history unequivocally supports our holding in that case,
and because the majority in the present case does not
address any part of that discussion, I reproduce that
discussion below at some length:
Congress in fact specifically rejected a proposal that
would have allowed employers to enforce "compulsory
arbitration" agreements. It did so in the most emphatic
terms, explaining that:
H.R. 1 includes a provision encouraging the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution to supplement,
rather than supplant, the rights and remedies provided
by Title VII. The Republican substitute, however,
encourages the use of such mechanisms "in place of
judicial resolution." Thus. under the latter proposal
employers could refuse to hire workers unless they
signed a binding statement waiving all rights to file
Title VII complaints .... American workers should not
be forced to choose between their jobs and their civil
rights.
H.R. Rep. No. 40(I) at 104 (emphasis added). This
rejection of the "Republican" proposal provides ...
"strong evidence" of Congress' intent ... to preclude
compulsory arbitration of civil rights claims and to
"encourage" only voluntary agreements-agreements that
do not require potential employees to waive their right to
litigate in a judicial forum as a mandatory condition of
employment.... The [House] Committee [on Education
and Labor], s view of § 118 was reiterated by key

...m'm.m.~m.mm .. ~ ... ~~..."...~.~~~~""

congressmen in the floor debates, who repeatedly stated
that § lIS encouraged arbitration only "where parties
knowingly and voluntarily elect to use those methods."
137 Congo Rec. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Dole); see *1012 also 137 Congo Rec.
H954S (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Hyde) (explaining that § lIS encourages arbitration
where "the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect" to
submit to such procedures). The most informed and
important statements were made by Representative
Edwards, the Chairman of the House Committee on
Education and Labor. Representative Edwards
unequivocally explained during the debate immediately
prior to the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1991]'s passage ... :
["]This section contemplates the use of voluntary
arbitration ... , not coercive attempts to force employees
in advance to forego statutory rights .... ["] [137 Congo
Rec. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Edwards)] (emphasis added). Finally, President Bush
echoed Congress' understanding of the arbitration
section in signing the Act, stating that "section lIS
encourages voluntary agreements between employers
and employees to rely on alternative mechanisms such
as mediation and arbitration." Statement of the President
of the United States, Signing Ceremony, Pub. L. No.
102-166 (Nov. 21, 1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769 (emphasis added).

Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1196-97 (footnote omitted).
Notwithstanding the majority's unsupported statement that
the Duffield court "pick[ed] and cho [se] snippets of
legislative history consistent with its desired result," maj.
op. at 1001, there can be little doubt in the correctness of
the conclusion by the Duffield court that arbitration
agreements required by employers from their employees
as a condition of employment are not "voluntary
arbitration agreements between employers and employees"
as envisioned by Congress for Title VII. Duffield's holding
that enforcement of compulsory arbitration agreements
violates the text and legislative history of § lIS of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 is compatible with Circuit City dicta
that enforcement of consensual arbitration agreements
does not violate the policies of federal anti-discrimination
law.

B.

Second, the majority claims that "the Supreme Court's
emphatic reminder [in Circuit City] that the right to a
judicial forum is not a substantive right contradicts
Duffield's fundamental supposition that the Act guaranteed
a nonwaivable, substantive right to a jury trial." Maj. op. at
1003. The majority attempts to support this claim by
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comparing the Supreme Court's statement in Circuit City
that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute,"
532 U.S. at 123,121 S.Ct. 1302 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 26, III S.Ct. 1647 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S.
at 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346)), with our holding in Duffield that
"under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employers may not
[through compulsory arbitration agreements] compel
individuals to waive their Title VII right to a judicial
forum," 144 F.3d at 1185. See maj. op. at 1000. Nowhere
in Duffield, however, did we suggest that this "right to a
judicial forum" is a substantive right, as the majority
claims. Indeed, our statement in Duffield that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 "increased substantially the procedural
rights and remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs," 144
FJd at 1189 (emphasis added), suggests, to the contrary,
that we perceived the right to a jury trial as a procedural
right. Duffield, then, "was not premised ... on the arbitral
forum causing a loss of substantive rights." Melton v.
Philip Morris, Inc., No. Civ. 0 1-93-KI, 200 I WL 1105046,
*3 (D.Or. Aug. 9, 2001). Instead, "Duffield found 'the
context, language and [legislative] history ... make out a
conclusive case ... that Congress intended to preclude
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims.' " Id. (quoting
*1013 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1199). Accordingly, the
Supreme Court's statement that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate
a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute," Circuit City, 532 U.S. at
123, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, III
S.Ct. 1647 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628,
105 S.Ct. 3346)), does not contradict our conclusion that
"Congress intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of
Title VII claims," Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1199.
Most damaging to the majority's argument is that already
in Duffield, we considered the very language which the
Supreme Court later quoted in Circuit City-and which the
majority now concludes "contradicts" our holding in
Duffield-and concluded that this language was compatible
with our holding there. We first wrote: "We recognize that,
as the Supreme Court has stated, agreements to arbitrate
must generally be treated not as 'forego[ing] the
substantive rights afforded by [a] statute,' but rather as
_merely changing the forum in which they are protected.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647 ... (quoting
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346 .... )" Duffield,
144 F.3d at 1199. We then explained:
Yet even assuming that the general
federal policy in favor of arbitration
would ordinarily apply to the compulsory
arbitration of civil rights claims, we are
not free to apply that policy here. Where
Congress has manifested its intent, with
regard to arbitration questions and

otherwise, the Supreme Court has made
it abundantly clear that the judiciary is
not free to "legislate" its own contrary
preferences.
!d. (citing Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398,406-07,
118 S.Ct. 805, 139 L.Ed.2d 830 (1998)).
According to the majority, Circuit City contradicted
Duffield by merely re-quoting language from Gilmer and
Mitsubishi; language which we already considered in
Duffield and found compatible with our holding there. The
majority reads too much into Circuit City. Circuit City
added nothing
to
the
interpretation of the
Gilmer!Mitsubishi language. In particular, Circuit City did
not contradict the interpretation of that language in
Duffield. In the end, the majority does no more than
register its own disagreement with this court's earlier
interpretation of the Gilmer! Mitsubishi language in
Duffield. But as the majority acknowledges, such
disagreement by one panel of this court with a prior panel
of this court is not a proper ground for reconsidering the
decision of the prior panel. See maj. op. at 1002 (citing
United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.1992)).4

*1014 III.
Less than four years ago, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Duffield. See Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens
& Co., 525 U.S. 982, 119 S.Ct. 445, 142 L.Ed.2d 399
(1998). Last year, the same Supreme Court decided a
different issue in Circuit City without as much as
mentioning Duffield. In the present case, the majority, after
brushing aside Duffield's careful statutory interpretation as
an "exercise," maj. op. at 1000, and reading into Circuit
City what isn't there, somehow reaches "the inevitable
conclusion" that Duffield has been "implicitly overruled"
and "no longer remains good law," maj. op. at 1003, 1008.
The majority recognizes that it is error for one panel of our
court to "remed[y]" the decision of another panel of our
court, unless "a decision of the Supreme Court requires
th[e] panel" to do so. Maj. op. at 1002.5 Indeed, we
observed in Gay that "one three-judge panel of this court
cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior
panel," except "when 'an intervening Supreme Court
decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth
Circuit, and both cases are closely on point.' " 967 F .2d at
327 (quoting United States v. Lancellotti, 761 F.2d 1363,
1366 (9th Cir.1985)). Because no intervening decision by
the Supreme Court has undermined Duffield's holding, it is
error for the majority to reconsider that holding.
Perhaps most disturbing is that the majority does not
consider the consequences of its holding today. By
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allowing employers to require their employees, as a
mandatory condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate
future Title VII claims, the majority allows employers to
force their employees to chose between their jobs and their
right to bring future Title VII claims in court. That choice,
of course, is no choice at all.6 There may be "real benefits
to the enforcement of arbitration provisions." Maj. op. at
1002 (quoting Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122-23, 121 S.Ct.
1302).7 *1015 That does not justifY allowing employers to
shove arbitration provisions down the throats of individual
employees as a non-negotiable precondition of
employment.

I dissent.

Parallel Citations
89 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1134, 83 Empl. Prac. Dec.
P 41,168, 13 AD. Cases 792, 24 NDLR P 206, 02 Cal.
Daily Op. Servo 8033,2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,089,
2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,055

Footnotes

*

The Honorable James M. Fitzgerald, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

1

In the wake of Gilmer, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit's decision in Alford V. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
which had held that an employee was not required to arbitrate her Title VII sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims despite
having signed a compulsory arbitration agreement. 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir.1990), vacated by 500 U.S. 930, III S.Ct. 2050, 114
L.Ed.2d 456 (1991) ("The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the ... Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of
Gilmer .... "). The Fifth Circuit reversed itself, holding that Title VIJ claims may be arbitrated pursuant to a eompulsory agreement.
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc .. 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir.1991).

2

1lle dissent claims we ignore the import of the word "compulsory" which it equates with "coercive" employer conduct. We do no
such thing. However, instead of categorically prohibiting all so-called "compulsory" arbitration agreements, as the dissent would do,
we police truly "coercive" employer conduct through the application of traditional contract law principles, including
unconscionability, which specifically examines the question of coercion. See e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psych care Servo Inc.,
24 Cal.4th 83, 113-22,99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (2000).

3

The dissent citcs Melton V. Philip Morris, Inc., No. Civ. 0 1-93-KI, 200 I WL 1105046, at *3 (D.Or. Aug. 9, 2001), for the proposition
that Duffield "was not premised ... on the arbitral forum causing a loss of substantive rights," but amazingly neglects to consider or
explain Duffield's own language to the contrary. See, e.g., Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185.

4

It seems our remedial efforts arrived not a moment too soon. Our own Court has begun to hack away at Duffield's viability. See
Circuit City Stores V. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (9th Cir.2(02) ("Duffield's continued validity is questionable."). Our Sister
Circuits have also begun to undermine Duffield. Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1315 ("Further, the viability of Duffield has been recognized to
be in considerable doubt in light of the later decided Circuit City."); Borg-Warner, 245 F.3d at 835 ("We cannot say whether the
Ninth Circuit will continue to adhere to DufJield in the face of the Supreme Court's Circuit City decision."). More noteworthy,
perhaps, our district courts are adrift, wondering whether Duffield remains valid precedent. Four district court opinions have held that
Circuit City implicitly overruled Duffield. Farac V. Permanente Med. Grollp, 186 F.Supp.2d 1042, 1045 (N.D.CaI.2002) ("Circuit
City implicitly overruled Duffield."); Eftekhari V. Peregrine Fin. & Sec., Inc., No. C 00-3594 JL, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16087, at
*25,2001 WL 1180640 (N.D.Cal. September 24,20(1); Olivares V. Hispanic Broad. Corp., No. CV 00-00354-ER, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5760, at *1-2, 2001 WL 477171 (C.O. Cal. April 26, 2(01); Scott V. Burns Int'! Sec. Servs., Inc., 165 F.Supp.2d 1133,1137
(O.Hawai'i 2(01) ("The Supreme Court's contrary statement in Circuit City that arbitration agreements do not contravene the
policies of congressional enactments of the protections of federal law ... implicitly overrules ... Duffield. "). However, three district
court opinions have expressed the contrary view that Duffield remains valid precedent. Circuit City Stores v. Banyasz, No. C-O 1-3106
WHO, 2001 U.S. Oist. LEXIS 16953, at *6-8, 200 I WL 1218406 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 11,20(1); Melton, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *6-9,
2001 WL 1105046 (D.Or. Aug. 9,20(1); Fergllson V. Countrywide Credit indus., inc., No. CVOO-13096AHM(CTX), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS, 200 I WL 867103 (C.O.Cal. Apr. 23, 200 I) afrd on other grounds 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2(02) (Pregerson J.).

5

To quote the recently-departed polymath, Stephen 1. Gould, ''[a]s the great Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto wrote: 'Give me a
fruitful error any time, full of seeds, bursting with its own cOlTections. You can keep your sterile truth for yourself.' " Stephen 1.
Gould, The Panda's Thumb, 244 (1980).

6

"We do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear." Circllit City, 532 U.S. at 119, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (quoting
RatzlaJ V. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994)).

7

All the federal anti-discrimination statutes contain similar provisions forbidding retaliation. By way of representative example, Title
VII, 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-3, provides:
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.

The above quoted passage from Circuit City is dicta because it refers only to federal anti-discrimination law and Circuit City involves
exclusively state anti-discrimination law. See 532 U.S. at 110, 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302. Needless to say, such dicta cannot overrule-not
even explicitly and much less "implicitly"-a holding, like the one in Duffield. This fact by itself invalidates the majority's first
argument in support of its conclusion that Circuit City "implicitly overruled" Duffield. But even if this were not enough, there are-as
shown below-additional reasons to reject the majority's first argument.

2

In Duffield, we thus did not use the term "compulsory arbitration" as it is traditionally defined. See Black's Law Dictionary 100 (7tb
ed. 1999) (defining "compulsory arbitration" as "[a]rbitration required by law or forced by law on the parties"). "Compulsory
arbitration," both as we used that term in Duffield and as it is traditionally defined, must furthermore be distinguished from
"mandatory arbitration." See, e.g., Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361,362 (7th Cir.1999) (employing the term
"mandatory arbitration" to reflect "the contractual situation where if one party to a dispute requests arbitration, the other party is
obliged to arbitrate").

3

It is misleading to state, as the majority does, that the Supreme Court held in Gilmer that "an employer could compel arbitration of an
employee's ADEA claim pursuant to an arbitration provision required as a condition of his employment." Maj. op. at 999. The
Supreme Court indeed stated the question presented as "whether a claim under the [ADEA] can be subjected to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, III S.Ct. 1647. But
the Supreme Court did not use the term "compulsory" in the sense given to that tenn in Duffield, i.e., requiring an employee to sign an
arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Rather, the Supreme Court used the
term "compulsory" in the sense of "mandatory," i.e., contractually required. See id. And while the arbitration provision at issue in
Gilmer was indeed required as a condition of employment, this was not made an issue by the Supreme Court, which held more
generally that the plaintiff "ha[ d] not met his burden of showing that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude
arbitration of claims under that Act." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35, II I S.Ct. 1647. Thus, there is no conflict between Gilmer and Duffield.

4

For the same reasons, the Supreme Court's subsequent statement in EEOC v. Waffle HOllse, inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754,765 n.
10, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002), that "[the Supreme Court has] held that federal statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration
agreements that are enforceable pursuant to the FAA because the agreement only determines the choice of forum" does not make
"Duffield's continuing validity ... questionable" or "cast doubt as to whether Congress precluded compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims," contrary to what a panel of this court recently suggested in Circuit City Stores, inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.2002).
See id. at 1107 (stating that "[u]ltimately," the Najd court did not have to "decide whether Duffield remains good law because Najd
did not sue under Title VII"), see also id. at 1110 (Paez, 1., concurring) (criticizing the Najd majority's "assault on the validity of
Duffield" as "entirely unnecessary" and "merely gratuitous"), In support of its statement that federal statutory claims may be the
subject of enforceable arbitration agreements because such agreements determine only the choice of forum, the Waffle House
Court-like the Circuit City Court-merely re-quoted the same passage from Gilmer and Mitsubishi which we already considered in
Duffield and found compatible with our holding there. See WajJle HOllse, 122 S.Ct. at 765 n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 754 (quoting Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 26, III S.Ct. 1647 (quoting Mitsllbishi, 473 U.S. at 628,105 S.Ct. 3346)).

5

It is, therefore, irrelevant whether "[ s]ince our Duffield decision in 1998, our Sister Circuits as well as the Supreme Courts of
California and Nevada have unanimously repudiated its holding." Maj. op. at 1001-02. Moreover, six of the ten cases from other
circuits cited in support of this statement were decided before Duffield. In none of these six cases was the question at issue in Duffield
and in the present case-whether employers may require employees, as a condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate future Title
VII claims-a question that was explicitly decided contra Duffield.

6

More than three-quarters of a century ago, Andrew Furuseth, then president of the International Seaman's Union of America, said in
opposition to the FAA as originally proposed: "Will such contracts be signed') Esau agreed, because he was hungry .... With the
growing hunger in modern society, there will be but few that will be able to resist." Proceedings ofthe 26th Annual Convention ofthe
international Seaman's Union of America 203-204 (1923). This still holds true today, if employers are allowed to require their
employees, as a condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate their future Title VII claims. It was for this reason that in 1991,
Congress rejected a "Republican substitute" for § 118 which would have allowed such compulsory arbitration agreements. Congress
explained that "American workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs and their civil rights." H.R. Rep. No. 40(1) at
104 (emphasis added).

7

There are also well-known "potential disadvantages" from the employees' point of view, such as "waiver of a right to a jury trial,
limited discovery, and limited judicial review." Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d
745,6 P.3d 669, 690 (2000) (noting also that "[v]arious studies show that arbitration is advantageous to the employers ... because it
reduces the size of the award that an employee is likely to get, particularly if the employer is a 'repeat player' in the arbitration
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system"). See also Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (l1th Cir.1998) (noting that "[a]rbitration
ordinarily brings hardship for litigants along with potential efficiency" because "[a]rbitrallitigants often lack discovery, evidentiary
rules, a jury, and any meaningful right to further review"); Katherine Eddy, Note, To Every Remedy a Wrong: The Confounding oj
Civil Liberties Through Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts, 52 Hastings L.J. 771, 776-77 (2001) (noting that
"[a]nother major disadvantage [of arbitration] to employee-plaintiffs is the lack of diversity among the arbitrators from which the
employee may choose" because, for example, "[o]fthe 50,000 arbitrators on the American Arbitration Association panels, only 6%
are women").

End of Document
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evidence that employer had a discriminatory
motive for terminating his employment as a taxi
driver, where employee presented direct
evidence that employer permanently terminated
his employment because he was over 70;
evidence that employee was 73 years old and that
employer's new auto insurance policy did not
cover drivers over the age of 70 supported
inference that employer had adopted practice of
intentionally discriminating against drivers over
70 years of age. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

389F.3d 802
United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.
David ENLOW, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
SALEM-KEIZER YELLOW CAB CO., INC.,
an Oregon corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 02-35881. I Argued and Submitted Nov.
4,2003. I Filed June 10,2004. I Amended
Nov. 2, 2004.

14 Cases that cite this headnote
Synopsis
Background: Former employee brought action against
former employer alleging discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The United
States District Court for the District of Oregon, Donald C.
Ashmanskas, United States Magistrate Judge, 2001 WL
34041899, denied employee's motion for partial summary
judgment and granted employer's motion for summary
judgment. Employee appealed.

[2]

Disparate treatment is demonstrated when the
employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion or other protected characteristics.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Alarcon, Circuit Judge,
held that:
[I] district court erroneously applied McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis, and
[2] genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
termination of employee was temporary or permanent.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

I Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Ferguson, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part.

4 Cases that cite thIS headnote

West Headnotes (8)

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
District court erroneously applied McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis in ruling on
employer's summary judgment motion in ADEA
action by requiring former employee to produce

Civil Rights
. •. Disparate Treatment
Liability in a disparate treatment claim under the
ADEA depends on whether the protected trait of
age actually motivated the employer's decision.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Opinion, 371 F.3d 645, superseded on denial of rehearing.

[I]

Civil Rights
..... Disparate Treatment
Civil Rights
/,Disparate Treatment

[4]

Federal Civil Procedure
.... Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
When an employee alleges disparate treatment
based on direct evidence in an ADEA claim, the
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104 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 301, 04 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 9817 ...

discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer
to produce evidence that the plaintiff was
rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; this
burden-shifting scheme is designed to assure that
the plaintiff has his day in court despite the
unavailability of direct evidence.

Court of Appeals does not apply the
burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell
Douglas in determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
24 Cases that cite this headnote

8 Cases that cite this headnote

[5)

Civil Rights
''''''$Age Discrimination
Direct evidence of discrimination in the context
of an ADEA claim is defined as evidence of
conduct or statements by persons involved in the
decision-making process that may be viewed as
directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory
attitude sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer
that attitude was more likely than not a
motivating factor in the employer's decision.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
38 Cases that cite this headnote

[6)

(8)

Federal Civil Procedure
'c)",Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether employer permanently terminated 73
year old employee from his taxi driver position,
or whether employee was temporarily discharged
to avoid termination of employer's business
license while it negotiated with it insurer to waive
age exclusion provisions in its auto policy,
precluding summary judgment in employee's
ADEA
action
against
employer.
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Civil Rights
,Age Discrimination
The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting formula
applies under the ADEA where an employee
must rely on circumstantial evidence that he or
she was at least 40 years old, met the requisite
qualifications for the job, and was discharged
while younger employees were retained; it
creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
11 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*804 John S. Razor, The Law Office of John S. Razor,
Salem, OR, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Robert J. Custis, Kent Custis LLP, Portland, OR, for the
defendant -appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon; Donald C. Ashmanskas, Magistrate
Judge, Presiding.* D.C. No. CV-00-OI331-AS.
Before: ALARCON, FERGUSON, and RAWLINSON,
Circuit Judges.

[7)

Civil Rights
". Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
Under McDonnell Douglas, if an employee
presents prima facie circumstantial evidence of

Opinion

Opinion by Judge ALARCON; Partial Concurrence and

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

102

Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802 (2004)
104 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 301, 04 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 9817 ...

Partial Dissent by Judge FERGUSON.

On slip op. 7623 [371 F.3d at 648], the second sentence of
the second paragraph reads:
We discuss below the conflicting
evidence presented by the parties
regarding whether the termination ofMr.
Enlow's employment was intended to be
temporary or permanent, and whether
Yellow Cab acted pursuant to a facially
discriminatory employment practice to
discharge employees over seventy years
old.

ORDER
The court's opinion, filed June 10,2004, [371 F.3d 645] is
amended as follows:
The second paragraph on slip op. 7621 [371 F.3d at 647]
that reads:
We affirm the denial of his motion
because we conclude that Yellow Cab
presented sufficient evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether it terminated Mr. Enlow's
employment
temporarily
without
discriminatory intent. We reverse the
order granting Yellow Cab's motion for
summary judgment, however, because
the district erred in concluding that Mr.
Enlow failed to present prima facie
evidence that Yellow Cab acted with a
discriminatory motive or intent.
is deleted.
The following paragraph shall be inserted on page 7621
[371 F.3d at 647] and substituted for the deleted text.
We affirm the denial of his motion
because we conclude that Yellow Cab
presented sufficient evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether, as asserted in its response to
Enlow's motion for partial summary
judgment, it terminated Mr. Enlow's
employment temporarily based on a bona
fide
occupational
qualification
("BFOQ") or because of reasonable
factors other than age ("RFOA"). We
reverse the order granting Yellow Cab's
motion for summary judgment, however,
because the district erred in concluding
that Mr. Enlow failed to present prima
*805 facie evidence that Yellow Cab
acted with a discriminatory motive or
intent.
On the sixth line of slip op. 7623 [371 F.3d at 648], delete
"seventy-two" and substitute "seventy-three" for the
deleted text.

is deleted.
The following sentence shall be inserted on slip op. 7623
[371 F.3d at 648] and substituted for the deleted text:
We discuss below the conflicting
evidence presented by the parties
regarding
whether
Mr.
Enlow's
employment
was
permanently
terminated solely to save costs, or
whether Yellow Cab intended to
interrupt his employment temporarily in
order to avoid losing its business license.
In the fifth line of the last paragraph on slip op. 7623 [371
F.3d at 648] delete "seventy-two years old" and substitute
"seventy-three years old" for the deleted text.
In the first paragraph under Part One on slip op. 7624 [371
F.3d at 649] insert the words "in order to survive a motion
for summary judgment" at the end of the second sentence.
In the first line of the paragraph beginning on line 8 on slip
op. 7627 [371 F.3d at 650] insert "In his opposition to the
motion for summary judgment," before the words "Mr.
Enlow".
On line 10 of slip op. 7627 [371 F.3d at 650] delete
"seventy-two years old" and substitute "seventy-three
years old" for the deleted text.
On line 11 of slip op. 7627 [371 F.3d at 650] insert the
following sentences after the word "seventy."
In an affidavit filed in support of his motion for
summary judgment, Mr. Enlow declared that "[a]t no
time did the defendant offer me an unconditional offer
of re-employment." He further, stated that "[m]y
understanding at the time of my termination was that I
was terminated and would no longer be working for the
Defendant. "
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On lines 15 and 16 of slip op. 7628 [371 F.3d at 651] delete
the words "by an age discriminatory employment practice"
and substitute "because he was over the age of seventy" for
the deleted text.
Beginning with line 16 of slip op. 7628 [371 F.3d at 651]
delete:
Mr. Enlow relied on the direct evidence
that his employment was terminated
because the Star Insurance policy did not
cover employees who were older than
seventy years of age. This evidence was
sufficient to support an inference that by
terminating his employment after
purchasing the Star Insurance policy,
Yellow Cab adopted a practice of
intentionally discriminating
against
employees over seventy years of age.
Beginning with line 28 on slip op. 7628 [371 F.3d at 651]
delete:
At trial, Mr. Enlow will bear the burden of persuading
the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that
Yellow Cab's motive in terminating Mr. Enlow's
employment was discriminatory. See Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (" 'The ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the *806 plaintiff.' ") (quoting Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089).
Beginning with line 15 on slip op. 7629 [371 F.3d at
651-52] delete the following text to line 16 on slip op. 7630
[371 F.3d at 652].
Accordingly, Mr. Enlow's reliance on UAWv. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113
L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) is misplaced. In Johnson Controls,
the employer was aware of the discriminatory provision
when it adopted an employment practice barring all
women, except those whose infertility was medically
documented, from jobs involving actual or potential lead
exposure exceeding governmental standards. Id. at
198-99, III S.Ct. 1196. Yellow Cab's temporary
discharge of Mr. Enlow was in reaction to an
unanticipated exigent circumstance that threatened the
suspension of its license to conduct business.
Likewise, City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d
657(1978) is readily distinguishable. In Manhart, the
Department of Water and Power knowingly and
intentionally administered a retirement, disability and
death-benefit program that required its female

employees to make larger contributions to the pension
fund that its male employees. Id. at 704, 98 S.Ct. 1370.
The decision to adopt an employment practice that
treated men differently from women was carefully
calculated, "[b ]ased on a study of mortality tables and
[the Department's] own experience." Id. at 705,98 S.Ct.
1370. Mr. Enlow has presented no evidence that
establishes that Yellow Cab had any knowledge of the
discriminatory provisions in the Star Insurance policy
when it purchased the policy. Nor has Mr. Enlow
presented any evidence that Yellow Cab deliberately
adopted an employment practice or program in order to
discriminate against persons over forty in violation of
the ADEA. Thus, Mr. Enlow failed to establish, as
required by the Supreme Court's more recent Hazen
decision, that Yellow Cab "relied upon a formal, facially
discriminatory policy requiring adverse treatment" of
older employees when it purchased the Star Insurance
policy. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701
(emphasis added) (explaining that Manhart presented a
case of disparate treatment because the employer
"relied" on a "formal" policy requiring discrimination).
Mr. Enlow has not demonstrated that his age "actually
motivated [his] employer's decision" to purchase a new
insurance policy. Id.
On line 21 and 22 of slip op. 7630 [371 F.3d at 652] delete:
"of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for temporarily terminating Mr.
Enlow's employment."
On line 21 and 22 of slip op. 7630 [371 F.3d at 652]
substitute the following for the deleted text:
"that Mr. Enlow's employment was not
permanently terminated."
On line 22 of slip op. 7630 [371 F.3d at 652] insert after
"Mr. Haley" the following text:
", Yellow Cab's personnel manager,"
One line 22 of slip op. 7630 [371 F.3d at 652] delete the
word "alleged" and substitute the word "declared" for the
deleted word.
On line 5 of slip op. 7631 [371 F.3d at 652] delete "Mr.
Anderson alleged". Insert "Mr. Gary Anderson, Yellow
Cab's Secretary! Treasurer, declared" and substitute for the
deleted text.
On line 20 of slip op. 7631 [371 F.3d at 653] insert after the
word "behalf.", "Mr. Anderson declared:".
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On line 25 of slip op. 7631 [371 F.3d at 653], delete "of his
termination from YeHow *807 Cab" and substitute "of the
termination of his employment with YeHow Cab" for the
deleted text.
On line 31 of slip op. 7631 [371 F.3d at 653], delete
"alleged" and substitute "declared".
The paragraph on slip op. 7632 [371 F.3d at 653] that
reads:
Viewed in the light most favorable to
YeHow Cab, this evidence shows that it
did not have an explicit faciaHy
discriminatory employment practice to
terminate the employment of taxi cab
drivers who were more than seventy
years old. Instead, the evidence shows
that Mr. Enlow was temporarily
discharged to avoid termination of
YeHow Cab's business license while it
negotiated with Star Insurance to waive
the age exclusion provisions in its policy.
As a demonstration of its intent to protect
Mr. Enlow's employment rights, Yellow
Cab successfuHy obtained temporary
employment for him with another cab
company. Yellow Cab also obtained Star
Insurance's tentative agreement to waive
the age-based exclusion of coverage if
Mr. Enlow would submit to a physical
examination. Mr. Enlow rejected Star
Insurance's wiHingness to consider
waiving its age exclusion provisions ifhe
could pass a physical examination. He
also declined YeHow Cab's offer to
reemploy him. The evidence offered by
Yellow Cab presents a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the
termination
of employment
was
temporary or permanent and whether
Yellow Cab acted with discriminatory
animus against employees over forty
years_ of age. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in denying Mr. Enlow's
motion for partial summary judgment.
is deleted.
The following paragraph shall be inserted on slip op. 7632
[371 F.3d at 653] for the deleted text:
Viewed in the light most favorable to YeHow Cab, this
evidence shows that it did not permanently terminate
Mr. Enlow's employment because he was more than

seventy years old. Instead, YeHow Cab's evidence
shows that Mr. Enlow was temporarily discharged to
avoid termination of YeHow Cab's business license
while it negotiated with Star Insurance to waive the age
exclusion provisions in its policy. As a demonstration of
its intent to protect Mr. Enlow's employment rights,
YeHow Cab successfuHy obtained temporary
employment for him with another cab company. YeHow
Cab also obtained Star Insurance's tentative agreement
to waive the age-based exclusion of coverage if Mr.
Enlow would submit to a physical examination. Mr.
Enlow rejected Star Insurance's wiHingness to consider
waiving its age exclusion provisions if he could pass a
physical examination. He also declined YeHow Cab's
offer to reemploy him. The evidence offered by YeHow
Cab presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether it can demonstrate at trial that its employment
decision "falls within one of the exceptions to the
ADEA's prohibitions." EEOC v. Santa Barbara, 666
F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir.1982) (citations omitted). The
ADEA provides that "[i]t shaH not be unlawful for an
employer ... to take any action otherwise prohibited
under '" this section where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the based on reasonable factors
other than age .... " 29 U.S.c. § 623(0(1). "The validity
of a BFOQ turns upon factual findings, preferably ones
by a jury." EEOC v. Boeing Company, 843 F.2d 1213,
1216 (9th Cir.1988).
*808 Whether a BFOQ or RFOA defense will sustain a
judgment in favor of Yellow Cab will depend on the
resolution of disputed factual issues which can only be
resolved by a trier of fact regarding the employment
action Yellow Cab actually took, such as, whether Mr.
Enlow's discharge was temporary or permanent, was
subject to a medical test, did he refuse an offer of
reinstatement, was he laid off solely for the time
necessary for Yellow Cab to obtain insurance coverage
for him, and whether it was prohibitively expensive to
insure drivers over seventy. We cannot decide on the
sharply disputed facts in this record which version of the
facts will be persuasive to a jury, and which party should
prevail on appeal as a matter oflaw. Thus, we express no
view at this interlocutory stage of these proceedings
regarding the principles of law that will be applicable
after the jury has made its findings and we have a
complete record of the relevant facts. The district court
did not err in denying Mr. Enlow's motion for partial
summary judgment.
Delete the paragraphs beginning after "Conclusion" on slip
op. 7632 [371 F.3d at 653] and slip op. 7633 [371 F.3d at
654] that read:
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We conclude that Mr. Enlow presented sufficient direct
evidence to support an inference that Yellow Cab's
decision to tenninate his employment was motivated by
discriminatory animus. For that reason, the district court
erred in granting Yellow Cab's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Mr. Enlow failed to present
evidence that Yellow Cab acted with discriminatory
animus.
We also hold that Yellow Cab presented sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that its temporary discharge of
Mr. Enlow was without discriminatory intent, and was
solely to avoid losing its business license based on the
fact that all of its employees were not covered by
automobile liability insurance. Mr. Enlow failed to
present any evidence that Yellow Cab acted pursuant to
an explicit facially discriminatory company practice to
fire taxi cab drivers who were over seventy years of age.
Thus, the district court did not err in denying Mr.
Enlow's partial motion for summary judgment. Because
there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we
reject Mr. Enlow's request that we instruct the district
court to grant his motion for summary judgment.
The following two paragraphs shall be inserted on slip op.
7632 [371 F.3d at 653] and slip op. 7633 [371 F.3dat654]
and substituted for the deleted material.
We conclude that Mr. Enlow presented sufficient direct
evidence to support an inference that Yellow Cab's
decision to terminate his employment was based on the
fact that he was more than seventy years of age. For that
reason, the district court erred in granting Yellow Cab's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that Mr.
Enlow failed to present any evidence that Yellow Cab
acted with discriminatory animus.
We also hold that Yellow Cab presented sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of disputed fact
regarding whether Mr. Enlow was permanently
discharged because of his age, or whether it has a viable
BFOQ or a RFOA affinnative defense based on its
evidence that a temporary discharge was necessary to
avoid losing its business license because all of its
employees were not covered by automobile liability
insurance. The district court did not err in denying Mr.
Enlow's partial motion for summary judgment. Because
there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we
reject Mr. Enlow's request that we instruct *809 the
district court to grant his motion for summary judgment.
With these amendments, Judge Alarcon and Judge
Rawlinson have voted to deny the petition for rehearing.
Judge Ferguson has voted to grant the petition for
rehearing. Judge Rawlinson has voted to deny the petition

for rehearing en banco Judge Alarcon recommended that
the petition for rehearing en banc be denied. Judge
Ferguson recommended that the petition for rehearing en
banc be granted.
The full court has been advised ofthe petition for rehearing
en banco No judge has requested a vote on whether to
rehear the matter en banco Fed. R.App. P. 35.
The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en
banc are DENIED.

OPINION
ALARCON, Circuit Judge.
David Enlow appeals from the order denying his motion
for partial summary judgment regarding his Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claim, and
the order granting Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co.'s
("Yellow Cab") cross-motion for summary judgment. Mr.
Enlow contends that he was entitled to summary judgment
because he presented direct evidence that Yellow Cab
pennanently discharged him solely because of his age.
We affinn the denial of his motion because we conclude
that Yellow Cab presented sufficient evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether, as
asserted in its response to Enlow's motion for partial
summary judgment, it tenninated Mr. Enlow's
employment temporarily based on a bona fide
occupational qualification ("BFOQ") or because of
reasonable factors other than age ("RFOA"). We reverse
the order granting Yellow Cab's motion for summary
judgment, however, because the district erred in
concluding that Mr. Enlow failed to present prima facie
evidence that Yellow Cab acted with a discriminatory
motive or intent.
We analyze the legal questions raised in this appeal
separately. In Part One, we explain why we conclude that
the district court erred in granting Yellow Cab's motion for
summary judgment. In Part Two, we consider whether
Yellow Cab presented sufficient evidence in response to
Mr. Enlow's motion for partial summary judgment to raise
a genuine issue of material fact requiring that the parties
have their day in court to determine which party should
prevail.

Facts and Procedural Background
Sometime prior to June 24, 1999, a representative from the
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Bell Anderson insurance agency in Tacoma, Washington
contacted Yellow Cab to see if it would be interested in a
new insurance product that could save Yellow Cab a
significant amount of money on its annual insurance
premiums. After considering the quoted premium, Yellow
Cab decided to accept the new policy. It is undisputed that
Yellow Cab purchased the insurance policy from
Meado wbrook Insurance Group because the cost of its new
product, Star Insurance, was more than $10,000 less than
the amount Yellow Cab had paid previously to the
Reliance Insurance Co. ("Reliance Insurance"). At the time
Yellow Cab accepted the Star Insurance offer, it had no
knowledge that the policy excluded coverage of employees
younger than twenty-three or older than seventy years of
age.
In order to obtain a business license to operate a "[v]ehicle
for hire," the City of Salem, Oregon requires that a taxi cab
company carry automobile liability insurance that covers
each person employed as a "[t]axicab driver." Salem
Revised Code, Title 3, Ch. 34.002(1), 0), 34.01O(d).
Yellow *810 Cab's liability coverage under the Star
Insurance policy was scheduled to take effect on June 25,
1999, the same date that its Reliance Insurance policy was
due to expire. Yellow Cab paid $l3,200 to Star Insurance,
representing a 20% down payment on the new policy, and
was scheduled to begin making monthly payments on that
policy on July 1,1999.
The City of Salem required Yellow Cab to inform it of the
insurance it planned to use no later than June 25, 1999.
Yellow Cab faced suspension of its business license on that
date if it could not provide proof of insurance for each taxi
cab driver in its employ.l
At 4:00 p.m. on June 24, 1999, a Star Insurance agent
called Gary Anderson, Yellow Cab's Secretary/Treasurer,
to inform him that its new policy did not cover employees
younger than twenty-three or older than seventy years of
age, and that Mr. Enlow was not eligible for insurance
under the new policy because he was seventy-three years
old. Prior to June 24, Yellow Cab had not received a copy
of the Star Insurance policy, nor had it reviewed the Star
Insurance policy's underwriting guidelines or restrictions.
After learning of the age limitation in the Star Insurance
policy, Yellow Cab's personnel manager, Richard Haley,
called Mr. Enlow into his office and discharged him. We
discuss below the conflicting evidence presented by the
parties regarding whether the termination of Mr. Enlow's
employment was intended to be temporary or permanent,
and whether Yellow Cab acted pursuant to a facially
discriminatory employment practice to discharge
employees over seventy years old.
Mr. Enlow filed a complaint in the district court on
+

September 21, 2000 in which he alleged that Yellow Cab
had violated the ADEA and Oregon Revised Statutes §
659.030(1)(a) (renumbered 659A.030(2)(a) in 2001),
Oregon's parallel age discrimination statute. He prayed for
front and back pay.
On May 18, 2001, Mr. Enlow filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on this ADEA claim in which he
argued that he had established "a prima facie case" of age
discrimination under the ADEA by presenting evidence
that he was seventy-three years old, had performed his job
to his employer's satisfaction, and was discharged when
his employer obtained less expensive automobile liability
insurance that did not cover drivers over the age of
seventy, while younger employees were retained. He
maintained that he was entitled to prevail in the action
because his age was the "but for" cause of his termination.
Yellow Cab filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on
June 1, 2001 in which it argued that it was entitled to
summary judgment because Mr. Enlow had not produced
any evidence that Yellow Cab intended to discriminate
against him based on his age. It stated: "For David Enlow
to prevail, he must not only satisfy the prima facie
requirements of an ADEA claim, but must produce
evidence that Yellow Cab 'intended' to discriminate
against him because of his age." Yellow Cab maintained
that because Mr. Enlow failed to allege or produce
evidence of discriminatory motive, he could not prevail
under a *811 disparate treatment theory of liability.
Yellow Cab asserted that Mr. Enlow failed to present any
evidence that Yellow Cab acted with discriminatory
animus, or that its proffered reasons for terminating his
employment were merely a pretext for impermissible
discrimination.
The district court denied Mr. Enlow's partial motion for
summary judgment and granted Yellow Cab's motion for
summary judgment on November 26, 2001. The district
court held that Mr. Enlow "failed to provide evidence of a
discriminatory motive [on] the part of the Defendant in the
decision to terminate Plaintiff." Mr. Enlow filed a timely
notice of appeal of the order granting Yellow Cab's
cross-motion for summary judgment, and the order
denying his motion for partial summary judgment.2

Pat:t One
[I] Mr. Enlow contends that the district court erred in
granting Yellow Cab's motion for summary judgment. He
maintains that he was not required to produce evidence that
the proof relied upon by Yellow Cab to justify the
termination of his employment was a pretext for
impermissible discrimination in order to survive a motion
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for summary judgment. He argues that the familiar
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis should not
apply to this case because he presented direct evidence that
Yellow Cab terminated his employment because of his
age.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de
novo. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 849(9th
Cir.2000). We may affirm the district court's order
granting summary judgment on any basis that is supported
in the record. San Jose Christian Coli. v. City of Morgan
Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir.2004).
Under the ADEA, employers may not "fail or refuse to hire
or ... discharge any individual [who is at least forty years
old] or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age." 29 U.s.c. § 623(a)(1). In Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338
(1993), the Supreme Court identified two theories of
employment discrimination: disparate treatment and
disparate impact. Id. at 609, 113 S.Ct. 1701 (citing Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). In this
appeal, Mr. Enlow relies solely on the disparate treatment
theory of liability.
[2] [3] Disparate treatment is demonstrated when" '[t]he
employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion [or other
protected characteristics].' " Id. (second alteration in
original) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15, 97
S.Ct. 1843). More recently, the Court instructed that"
'liability [in a disparate treatment claim] depends on
whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually
motivated the employer's decision.' " Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097,
147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Hazen,
507 U.S. at 610,113 S.Ct. 1701). The Court held that "the
plaintiffs age must have' actually played a role in [the
employer's decision-making] process and had a
determinative influence on the outcome.' " Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct.
1701).
*812 [4] [5] When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment
based on direct evidence in an ADEA claim, we do not
apply the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) in determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. In
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105
S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), the Supreme Court
instructed that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable
where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of

discrimination." Id. at 121,105 S.Ct. 613; see also AARPv.
Farmers Group, Inc., 943 F.2d 996, 1000 n. 7 (9th
Cir.l991) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, however, when there
is direct evidence of discrimination, such as when a
provision[of a pension plan] is discriminatory on its face,
the prima facie case analysis is inapplicable") Direct
evidence, in the context of an ADEA claim, is defined as "
'evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in
the decision-making process that may be viewed as
directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude ...
sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that that attitude
was more likely than not a motivating factor in the
employer's decision.' " Walton v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 167 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir.1999) (alteration in
original, emphasis added) (quoting Radabaugh v. Zip Feed
Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir.l993)).
[6] [7] The McDonnell Douglas formula applies under the
ADEA where an employee must rely on circumstantial
evidence that he or she was at least forty years old, met the
requisite qualifications for the job, and was discharged
while younger employees were retained. Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097. It "creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee."
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Under
McDonnell Douglas, if an employee presents prima facie
circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the burden
shifts to the employer to " 'produc[ e] evidence that the
plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.' " Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (alteration in original) (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089). This
burden-shifting scheme is designed to assure that the "
'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of
direct evidence.' " Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 121,
105 S.Ct. 613 (alteration in original) (quoting Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (lst Cir.1979».
In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr.
Enlow presented direct evidence that Yellow Cab
permanently terminated his employment because he was
seventy-three years old and the new insurance policy did
not cover employees over the age of seventy. In an
affidavit filed in support of his motion for summary
judgment, Mr. Enlow declared that "[a]t no time did the
defendant offer me an unconditional offer of
re-employment." He further, stated that "[m]y
understanding at the time of my termination was that I was
terminated and would no longer be working for the
Defendant." Thus, Mr. Enlow carried his "initial burden of
offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an
employment decision was based on a discriminatory
criterion illegal under the Act." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
358, 97 S.Ct. 1843.
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[W]hen a plaintiff has established a
prima facie inference of disparate
direct
or
treatment
through
circumstantial
evidence,
he
will
necessarily have raised a genuine issue
of material fact with respect to the
legitimacy or bona fides of the
employer's articulated reason for its
employment decision.... When [the]
evidence, *813 direct or circumstantial,
consists of more than the McDonnell
Douglas presumption, a factual question
will almost always exist with respect to
any claim of a nondiscriminatory reason.
The existence of this question of material
fact will ordinarily preclude the granting
of summary judgment.

Schnidrig V. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 141O(9th
Cir.1996) (alterations in original, first emphasis added,
internal
quotation
marks
omitted)
(quoting
Sischo-Nownejad V. Merced Cmty. Coil. Dist., 934 F.2d
1104, 1111 (9th Cir.1991)).
Yellow Cab presented evidence in opposItion to Mr.
Enlow's motion for partial summary judgment that the sole
reason it temporarily terminated Mr. Enlow's employment
was to prevent the City of Salem from closing its business
doors because it lacked proof that each of its drivers was
insured. In reviewing the district court's decision to grant
Yellow Cab's motion for summary judgment, we must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Enlow.
Coleman V. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1287 (9th
Cir.2000).
The district court granted Yellow Cab's motion for
summary judgment because it concluded that Mr. Enlow
failed to produce evidence that Yellow Cab had a
discriminatory motive for terminating Mr. Enlow's
employment. In reaching this conclusion, the district court
McDonnell
Douglas
erroneously
applied
the
burden-shifting analysis. Mr. Enlow presented direct
evidence that would support an inference that his
employment was terminated because he was over the age
of seventy. By granting summary judgment in favor of
Yellow Cab, the district court denied Mr. Enlow his day in
court" 'with respect to the legitimacy or bona fides of
[Yellow Cab's] articulated reason for its employment
decision.' " Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 111 I (quoting
Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th
Cir.1985) ).

Part Two

Mr. Enlow also seeks reversal of the order denying his
motion for partial summary judgment in his ADEA claim.
He maintains that he is entitled to summary jUdgment
without a trial because he has presented direct evidence
that his employment was terminated because employees
who are more than seventy years old are not covered under
the Star Insurance policy. He requests that we instruct the
district court to enter judgment in his favor.
It is undisputed that Yellow Cab did not purchase the Star

Insurance policy in order to discriminate against
employees younger than twenty-three and older than
seventy years of age. In his supplemental brief to this court,
Mr. Enlow concedes that Yellow Cab was not aware of the
Star Insurance policy's discriminatory provision when it
purchased it.
In reviewing the denial ofMr. Enlow's motion for partial
summary judgment, we must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to Yellow Cab. Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1287.
In response to Mr. Enlow's motion, Yellow Cab offered
evidence that Mr. Enlow's employment was not
permanently terminated. Mr. Haley, Yellow Cab's
personnel manager, declared in his affidavit that "the only
reason why Mr. Enlow was terminated was because the
company made a switch in auto insurance carriers and the
new carrier did not insure drivers under twenty-three years
of age or over the age of seventy. The saving in annual
premium expense was the only reason why Yellow Cab
switched insurance." He also alleged that "[a]t no time did
Yellow Cab search for an insurance carrier who did not
insure older workers in order to terminate Mr. Enlow's
position with the company." Mr. Haley further stated that:
*814 Mr. Enlow was ... a commissioned
employee. He was paid a percentage of
the fares he took in. All of his taxes and
expenses were paid out of his share of the
gross fares. Terminating Mr. Enlow did
not have any direct economic benefit in
that Yellow Cab did not experience a
savings in unpaid salaries or benefits.
Indeed, terminating a driver actually
made Yellow Cab one more driver short.
Mr. Gary Anderson, Yellow Cab's Secretary/Treasurer,
declared that Yellow Cab adopted the new Star Insurance
policy without knowledge that it did not insure drivers over
the age of seventy or under the age of twenty-three. He
stated that Yellow Cab did not learn of the age limitation
until 4:00 p.m., on the day before it was required to provide
proof of insurance to the City of Salem or face the loss of
its business license. Mr. Anderson declared that the
possibility of renewing its old insurance policy "was no
longer available" at the time Yellow Cab learned of the
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new policy's age limitation.
Yellow Cab also produced evidence that Mr. Haley had
indicated to Mr. Enlow that the termination of his
employment was only "temporary until coverage could be
resolved or obtained." Immediately following Mr. Enlow's
termination, Mr. Anderson made several phone calls on
Mr. Enlow's behalf. Mr. Anderson declared: "I personally
called Cherry City cab company in order to find Mr. Enlow
work while we sorted out the insurance coverage
problem." Mr. Anderson was successful in securing a job
interview for Mr. Enlow with the Blue Jay Cab Company.
Mr. Enlow was hired to begin work with the Blue Jay Cab
Company within a week of the termination of his
employment with Yellow Cab.
Finally, Yellow Cab introduced evidence that after it
discharged Mr. Enlow, Mr. Anderson spoke with
representatives at Star Insurance to see if they would waive
the age restriction in their policy so that Mr. Enlow could
be reemployed. Mr. Anderson declared: "I was able to talk
the insurance carrier into considering Mr. Enlow for
insurance ifhe would be willing to consider submitting to a
medical check-up." Yellow Cab then presented Mr. Enlow
with the option of taking a physical examination with the
hope that Star Insurance would agree to insure Mr. Enlow
on the basis of a clean bill of health. Mr. Anderson stated in
his affidavit that "Mr. Enlow indicated that he would not
agree to a physical and declined the offer to return to
Yellow Cab." This evidence directly conflicts with Mr.
Enlow's allegation that he was permanently terminated
from his employment solely because of his age.
(8) Viewed in the light most favorable to Yellow Cab, this
evidence shows that it did not permanently terminate Mr.
Enlow's employment because he was more than seventy
years old. Instead, Yellow Cab's evidence shows that Mr.
Enlow was temporarily discharged to avoid termination of
Yellow Cab's business license while it negotiated with Star
Insurance to waive the age exclusion provisions in its
policy. As a demonstration of its intent to protect Mr.
Enlow's employment rights, Yellow Cab successfully
obtained temporary employment for him with another cab
company. Yellow Cab also obtained Star Insurance's
tentative agreement to waive the age-based exclusion of
coverage if Mr. Enlow would submit to a physical
examination. Mr. Enlow rejected Star Insurance's
willingness to consider waiving its age exclusion
provisions ifhe could pass a physical examination. He also
declined Yellow Cab's offer to reemploy him. The
evidence offered by Yellow Cab presents a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether it can demonstrate at
trial that its *815 employment decision "falls within one of
the exceptions to the ADEA's prohibitions." EEOC v.
Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir.1982) (citations

omitted). The ADEA provides that "[i]t shall not be
unlawful for an employer ... to take any action otherwise
prohibited under ... this section where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business, or where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age .... " 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). "The validity of a BFOQ
turns upon factual findings, preferably ones by a jury."
EEOC V. Boeing Company, 843 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th
Cir.1988).
Whether a BFOQ or RFOA defense will sustain a
judgment in favor of Yellow Cab will depend on the
resolution of disputed factual issues which can only be
resolved by a trier of fact regarding the employment action
Yellow Cab actually took, such as, whether Mr. Enlow's
discharge was temporary or permanent, was subject to a
medical test, did he refuse an offer of reinstatement, was he
laid off solely for the time necessary for Yellow Cab to
obtain insurance coverage for him, and whether it was
prohibitively expensive to insure drivers over seventy. We
carmot decide on the sharply disputed facts in this record
which version of the facts will be persuasive to a jury, and
which party should prevail on appeal as a matter of law.
Thus, we express no view at this interlocutory stage of
these proceedings regarding the principles of law that will
be applicable after the jury has made its findings and we
have a complete record of the relevant facts. The district
court did not err in denying Mr. Enlow's motion for partial
summary judgment.

Conclusion
We conclude that Mr. Enlow presented sufficient direct
evidence to support an inference that Yellow Cab's
decision to terminate his employment was based on the
fact that he was more than seventy years of age. For that
reason, the district court erred in granting Yellow Cab's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that Mr.
Enlow failed to present any evidence that Yellow Cab
acted with discriminatory animus.
We also hold that Yellow Cab presented sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of disputed fact regarding
whether Mr. Enlow was permanently discharged because
of his age, or whether it has a viable BFOQ or a RFOA
affirmative defense based on its evidence that a temporary
discharge was necessary to avoid losing its business
license because all of its employees were not covered by
automobile liability insurance. The district court did not err
in denying Mr. Enlow's partial motion for summary
judgment. Because there are genuine issues of material fact
in dispute, we reject Mr. Enlow's request that we instruct
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the district court to grant his motion for summary
judgment.
We VACATE the order granting Yellow Cab's motion for
summary judgment and AFFIRM the order denying Mr.
Enlow's motion for partial summary judgment.
Each side shall bear its own costs.
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge, concurring
dissenting in part.

ill

part and

I concur in the majority's decision to vacate the grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant Salem-Keizer
Yellow Cab. But I dissent from the majority's denial of
summary judgment to plaintiff David Enlow. The majority
have bought Yellow Cab's implosive position that when it
purchased a new insurance policy that reduced its premium
payments by more than $10,000 per year, it did not know
the terms or conditions of the new policy or *816 why it
was so much less expensive than its old policy. The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") does not
protect an employer whose deliberate indifference toward
its business policies leads it to terminate employees in
violation of the ADEA.
Additionally, the majority have bought another implosive
belief that the ADEA does not apply when an employee
covered under the ADEA is discharged only temporarily
for economic reasons. Temporary termination is not a
defense under the ADEA; it qualifies under neither the
bona-fide-occupational-qualification ("BFOQ") exception
nor the reasonable-factor-other than-age ("RFOA")
exception to the ADEA. Whether the termination was
temporary or permanent will have an effect on the amount
of damages eventually awarded but is not a factor in
determining liability.
The uncontested facts establish a violation of the ADEA.
Mr. Enlow, a 72-year-old cabdriver, was discharged from
Yellow Cab because the company's new insurance policy
did not cover drivers over 70. The majority remands this
case to district court to determine whether Yellow Cab
terminated Mr. Enlow temporarily on the basis- of an
ADEA exception. Yet it makes no difference regarding
liability for discrimination whether the termination was
permanent or temporary. The only question to be resolved
is whether, as a matter oflaw, the ADEA is violated where
an employer terminates a 72-year-old employee because
the company's chosen insurance policy does not cover
drivers over 70.
The answer to that question is without question. Where an
employer intentionally uses age as a criterion for an

employment decision, it is not a defense that the employer
sought only to save costs. Nor can the employer escape
liability by claiming that exigent circumstances excused its
actions. The ADEA prohibited age discrimination while
carefully enumerating several exceptions to the rule. See
29 U.S.c. § 623(f). None of these exceptions applies here.
The majority's implicit creation of a new exception for age
discrimination taken to reduce insurance costs dilutes the
protections that Congress sought to provide for older
workers.

I.

Yellow Cab contends that Mr. Enlow did not establish the
discriminatory intent required for an ADEA disparate
treatment claim, as described by Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338
(1993). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an
employer does not violate the ADEA by terminating an
older employee in order to prevent his pension benefits
from vesting, even if pension status is correlated with age.
Id. at 611-12, 113 S.Ct. 1701. The Court reasoned that age
and pension status are "analytically distinct" and noted that
a younger employee who has worked for a particular
employer his entire career might be closer to qualifying for
pension benefits than an older employee newly hired. ld. at
611,113 S.Ct. 1701.
Yellow Cab claims that here, too, it discharged Mr. Enlow
based on a classification-insurability-that is analytically
distinct from age. Unlike the situation in Hazen, however,
there is not merely a correlation between age and
qualification for insurance coverage, but absolute
identification: Mr. Enlow did not qualify for Yellow Cab's
new insurance policy because he was over 70, and as a
result, the company fired him. The cab company
acknowledged that but for Mr. Enlow's age, he would not
have been discharged. Thus, Mr. Enlow meets Hazen's
requirement that an employee show that age "actually *817
played a role in [the employer's decision-making] process
and had a determinative influence on the outcome." 507
U.S. at 610,113 S.Ct. 1701.
Yellow Cab's attempt to separate out insurability from age
is unavailing. In City ol Los Angeles Dep't. ol Water &
Power v. Manhart, the Supreme Court rejected the
employer's argument that a plan requiring women to make
larger monthly contributions to a pension plan than men
was "based on the factor oflongevity rather than sex." 435
U.S. 702, 712, 98 S.Ct. 1370,55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). The
Court stated: "It is plain ... that any individual's life
expectancy is based on a number of factors, of which sex is
only one .... [O]ne cannot say that an actuarial distinction
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based entirely on sex is based on any other factor other
than sex. Sex is exactly what it is based on." Id. at 712-13,
98 S.Ct. 1370(intemal citations omitted). Here, too, an
individual's insurance risk is based on numerous factors,
but Mr. Enlow's inability to qualify for insurance coverage
was based solely on age. The cab company cannot splice
out insurability from age where, as in Manhart, the
proffered basis for its employment practice coincides
absolutely with a protected trait.
Nor can Yellow Cab escape liability by shifting blame to
the insurance carrier that established the coverage limits.
The Supreme Court held more than twenty years ago that
an employer violated Title VII where the retirement plans
offered to its employees provided lower monthly benefits
to women, even though the discriminatory conditions were
supplied by private insurers. Ariz. Governing Comm. for
Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compo Plans V. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 3492, 77 L.Ed.2d 1236 (1983).
The employer "cannot disclaim responsibility for the
discriminatory features of the insurers' options" and
violates Title VII "regardless of whether third parties are
also involved in the discrimination." Id. at 1089, 103 S.Ct.
3492. Here, too, Yellow Cab is no less responsible for
violating the ADEA because it did so in response to an
insurance policy that it selected from a third party.
Furthermore, even assuming that the company was not
motivated by stigmatizing stereotypes of older workers,
Yellow Cab has violated the ADEA. Hazen explains that
"[ilt is the very essence of age discrimination for an older
employee to be fired because the employer believes that
productivity and competence decline with old age." 507
U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701. Congress enacted the ADEA
in order to address the concem that "older workers were
being deprived of employment on the basis of inaccurate
and stigmatizing stereotypes." Id. Hazen further stated that
where an employer's decision is "wholly motivated by
factors other than age," the problem presented by such
stereotyping "disappears." Id. at 611, 113 S.Ct.
170 I (emphasis added).
This interpretation of the ADEA's rationale, however, does
not shield Yellow Cab. The majority believes that to
establish disparate treatment, Mr. Enlow must still
persuade a trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence
that Yellow Cab's motive in terminating him was
intentionally discriminatory. But precedent is clear that in
a case of facial discrimination, the explicit use of a
protected trait as a criterion for the employer's action
establishes discriminatory intent, regardless of the
employer's subjective motivations. "Whether an
employment practice involves disparate treatment through
explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the
employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of
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the discrimination." *818 Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113
158
(1991)
(finding
an
employer's
L.Ed.2d
fetal-protection policy to be sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII where it excluded women of child-bearing
capacity from jobs exposing them to lead). There, the
Supreme Court noted that "the absence of a malevolent
motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy
into a neutral policy.... " Id. See also Frank v. United
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir.2000)
(reaffirming that "where a claim of discriminatory
treatment is based upon a policy which on its face applies
less favorably to one gender ... a plaintiff need not
otherwise establish the presence of discriminatory intent").
This Court has applied the principle, first established in
Title VII cases, that an employer's subjective motivations
are not controlling in a case of facial discrimination to
claims under the ADEA. In EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., for
example, we stated that where a severance policy denied a
benefit to workers 55 and older, no showing of the
employer's ill will toward older people was required.l 724
F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir.1984), overruled on other
grounds in Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492
U.S. 158, 109 S.Ct. 2854, 106 L.Ed.2d 134 (1989),
superseded by revision to 29 U.S.c. §§ 621,623.
Indeed, there is good reason to find discriminatory intent
where an employer's decision or policy discriminates on
its face: where differential treatment based on a protected
trait is open and explicit, older workers are stigmatized on
account of their age regardless of the employer's
subjective motivations. Moreover, although there is no
evidence that Yellow Cab itself espoused stereotypes of
older workers, by dismissing Mr. Enlow because of an
insurance policy that did not cover drivers over 70, Yellow
Cab ratified the insurance company's categorical judgment
that drivers over 70 were not competent.
Whatever the rights of the insurance business to set
coverage limits as it deems appropriate, Yellow Cab's
termination of an older employee based on the new
policy's age exclusion implicated the stigmatizing
stereotypes to which Hazen refers. Mr. Enlow's dismissal
falls squarely within the range of -discriminatory
employment actions that the ADEA sought to prevent.

II.

Although Mr. Enlow's dismissal constitutes facial
discrimination under the ADEA, the majority believes that
Yellow Cab's decision to terminate Mr. Enlow potentially
falls within an established ADEA exception. In particular,
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the majority suggests that Yellow Cab qualifies for a
BFOQ or a RFOA exception to the ADEA, both of which
insulate a defendant from liability for discrimination. The
majority, however, misconstrues both ADEA exceptions:
discharging an employee, even if only temporarily, to save
costs never justifies age-based discrimination under any
exception.

A. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification ("BFOQ',)
Exception

As a preliminary matter, the affinnative BFOQ defense set
forth in § 4(f)(1) of the ADEA is inapplicable in this case
because Yellow Cab failed to raise it in its motion *819 for
summary judgment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
described the BFOQ defense as an affirmative defense,
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 206, III S.Ct. 1196,
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111,112,
105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), which the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires to be specifically
pleaded. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). Failure to plead an affinnative
defense therefore results in a waiver of that defense. See
Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 235 (7th
Cir.1991). Since Yellow Cab did not specifically plead the
BFOQ defense in its motion for summary judgment,
Yellow Cab effectively waived this defense.
More importantly, even if Yellow Cab were permitted to
raise the BFOQ defense in district court, the defense would
nonetheless fail as a matter of law. The majority believes
that to establish a BFOQ defense, Yellow Cab need only
prove that it tenninated Mr. Enlow temporarily and not in
bad faith. The majority repeatedly states that according to
Yellow Cab, the tennination of Mr. Enlow was to be
temporary. The opinion does not explain, however, why
this would make a difference. The ADEA prohibits age
discrimination "with respect to ... compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment ... ". 29 U.s.c. §
623(a)(1). It does not only prohibit "pennanent"
termination. Thus, although this fact is contested, it is not a
material fact requiring us to remand the case.
The Supreme Court has established that the BFOQ defense
is a'narrow exception to the ADEA that only applies in
special situations. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at
201, III S.Ct. 1196; Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,
472 U.S. 400, 412,105 S.Ct. 2743, 86 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,334,97 S.Ct. 2720,
53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). In particular, the BFOQ defense
applies only in situations where an employer who
discriminates on the basis of age demonstrates that "age is
a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Thus, one of the elements

that a defendant invoking the BFOQ defense must satisfy
is that its age-based discrimination relates to a "particular
business," which the Supreme Court defined in Thurston
as the particular job from which the protected individual is
excluded. 469 U.S. at 122, 105 S.Ct. 613.
In Thurston, more specifically, the Supreme Court held
that Trans World Airlines' ("TWA's") discriminatory
transfer policy was not pennissible under § 4(f)(1) because
age is not a BFOQ for the "particular" position of flight
engineer. Id. The transfer policy explicitly allowed
airplane captains displaced for reasons other than age to
"bump" less senior flight engineers. Id. Those captains
disqualified from their position after reaching the age of
60, however, were denied the transfer privilege altogether
because of their age. Id. The Court detennined that a
BFOQ defense was meritless because age is not a BFOQ
for the position of flight engineer. Id. at 123, 105 S.Ct. 613.
TW A had actually employed at least 148 flight engineers
who were over 60 years old, thereby defeating the
contention that captains over 60 years old were too old or
incapable of perfonning as flight engineers. Id. n. 18.
Here, too, Yellow Cab's discriminatory insurance policy is
not pennissible under § 4(f)(1) because age is not a BFOQ
for the particular position of cab driver. Yellow Cab's own
pleadings acknowledge that Mr. Enlow, a nineteen-year
employee of the company, maintained a solid job
perfonnance. In addition, Yellow Cab's supplemental brief
to this Court reiterated that the cab company did not
consider Mr. *820 Enlow to be an unsafe driver.
Accordingly, Mr. Enlow's age did not affect his ability to
carry out his duties for Yellow Cab; he was neither
incapable of perfonning his job, see Johnson Controls, 499
U.S.at20I, III S.Ct.1l96(explainingthatanage-based
BFOQ defense must relate to the employee's occupation,
including his ability to do the job) (emphasis added), nor a
potential safety risk, see Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419, 105
S.Ct. 2743 (finding that an age-based BFOQ purportedly
justified by safety interests must be "reasonably necessary"
to the overriding interest in public safety). Thus, Mr.
Enlow's dismissal, despite his continued ability, violated
the "particular business" requirement of the BFOQ
defense.
Furthermore, we have refused to consider economic costs
as a basis for a BFOQ defense. The majority opinion
recites at length Yellow Cab's claim that it laid off Mr.
Enlow solely for the time necessary for Yellow Cab both to
avoid tennination of its business license and to negotiate
with Star Insurance to waive the age exclusion provisions
in its policy. In EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d
1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1983), however, we stated that
"[ e ]conomic considerations ... [could notJ be the basis for a
BFOQ-precisely those considerations were among the
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targets of the ACt."2 As a result, it is irrelevant whether
Yellow Cab terminated Mr. Enlow temporarily or because
it failed to exercise rational business judgment in
purchasing an insurance policy the terms and conditions of
which it did not know.
In an effort to save costs, Yellow Cab ultimately adopted a
new insurance policy that did not cover drivers over 70,
and, consequently, discriminated against Mr. Enlow. Even
though Yellow Cab's previous insurance policy covered
drivers over 70, Yellow Cab nonetheless chose a new
policy that effectively saved the company $10,000 in
annual insurance premiums. But Yellow Cab made this
business decision at Mr. Enlow's discriminatory expense.
An employer's deliberate indifference toward a new
discriminatory policy it chooses to adopt is therefore no
excuse for age discrimination.

B. Reasonable Factors Other than Age ("RFOA '')

Exception
Although Yellow Cab invoked, and both parties addressed,
the affirmative RFOA defense in their motions for
summary judgment, the defense fails as a matter of law as
well. Yellow Cab asserted below that its employment
decision fell within the ADEA exception for actions taken
"where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Here, however,
Yellow Cab differentiated Mr. Enlow from other drivers
precisely and only because of his age-making the defense
inapplicable. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91
F.3d 1529, 1541 (2d Cir.1996) ("By its terms, the statute
supplies an exception for 'age-neutral' decisions based on
other factors such as health or even education that might be
correlated with age ... not an exception for policies that
explicitly but reasonably discriminate based on age.").
Moreover, *821 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") regulations interpreting the ADEA
state that the "reasonable factors other than age" defense is
unavailable where an "employment practice uses age as a
limiting criterion .... " 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c).

The EEOC regulations also provide that a "differentiation
based on the average cost of employing older [workers] ... "
does not qualify under this exception. 29 C.F.R. §
1625.7(f). Citing that regulation, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected a cost-savings defense in a case with almost
identical facts as the case before us. In Tullis V. Lear Sch.,
Inc., 874 F.2d 1489 (1Ith Cir.1989), a private school fired
a 66-year-old bus driver because its insurance carrier only
covered drivers 65 or younger. The Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the school's decision to dismiss the driver was based
on his age, id. at 1490-91, and that the increased insurance
cost for the school did not exempt it from complying with
the ADEA. Id. at 1490.

III.
Mr. Enlow's claim of age discrimination should be granted
on summary judgment. There are no material facts for a
trier of fact to determine. As a matter of law, the
termination of an employee because he is older than the
age limitation of his employer's insurance policy violates
the ADEA, even if the employer chose that policy to save
money. Had Yellow Cab terminated a female employee
because its insurance policy did not cover women, or
discharged an Asian employee because its insurance
excluded Asians, we would surely have repudiated those
actions. As certainly, Yellow Cab's decision to terminate a
72-year-old cabdriver because its new insurance excluded
drivers over 70 deserves our censure. Anti-discrimination
law would mean nothing if an employer could justify a
facially discriminatory action by invoking the bottom line
of its profit and loss statement.
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Footnotes

*

Pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Fed.R.Civ.P., the parties con,;ented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all
proceedings in this case.
Salem Revised Code, Title 3, Ch. 30.124 requires as follows:
Whenever any ... policy of insurance is required in connection with any license required by this title, the maintenance thereof in
full force and effect shall be a condition of the validity of any license issued under this chapter. Upon receiving information that
such ... insurance is, for any reason, no longer in full force and effect, the director shall summarily suspend such license.

2

On this appeal, Mr. Enlow has abandoned his state age discrimination claim. See Big Bear Lodging Ass 'n v. Snow Summit, inc., 182
F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir.1999) ('"Issues appealed but not briefed are deemed abandoned.").

1

Borden's held that a policy that denied severance pay only to employees who were eligible for retirement constituted disparate
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treatment. 724 F.2d at 1393. While that holding may not survive Hazen, the Borden's analysis of the intent required in facial
discrimination cases is still apt. Moreover, in a case decided after Hazen, the Third Circuit found a separate inquiry into an
employer's subjective motivations unnecessary in a case of facial age discrimination. See DiBiase V. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48
F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir.1995).

2

Other circuits agree that economic considerations, unlike job-related safety concerns, are not a basis for the BFOQ defense. See
Leftwich V. Harris-Stowe State Coli., 702 F.2d 686, 692 (8th Cir.1983) (stating that "economic savings derived from discharging
older employees cannot serve as legitimate justification under the ADEA for an employment selection criterion"); Smallwood v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir.1981) (holding that the economic burdens involved in hiring older pilots was not
grounds for a BFOQ exception that justified United Airlines' age-based discrimination policy against hiring older pilots).
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
WM. FREMMING NIELSEN, Senior District Judge.
*1 Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10). A hearing on the
Motion was held July 13,2010. Plaintiffs were represented
by Larry Purviance; Defendants were represented by Peter
Erbland. The Court has reviewed the file and written
pleadings and heard oral argument from counsel. For the
reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jeffrey Ennis contends that Defendant Greg
Sprungl terminated Ennis because he ran against Sprung I
in the 2008 election for Boundary County Sheriff.
Defendants contend that Ennis was terminated because he
lacked POST certification as a peace officer, which Idaho

Ennis was employed as a detention deputy for the
Boundary County Sheriffs Office from March 3, 1997
through March 19,2009. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 9). Sprungl was
the Sheriff of Boundary County at the time of Ennis' hiring
and termination. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 5). However, Sprungllost
his re-election and position as Sheriff to Greg Voyles in
2000. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 4). Sprungl was not Sheriff between
January 2001 and November 2004, after which he was
re-elected. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 5). One of a sheriffs duties is
to oversee the training and certification of all detention
officers. (Sprungl Aff. ~ 7).
Under Idaho law, any county detention officers employed
before July 1, 1997 must be trained and certified through
the Peace Officer's Standards and Training ("POST")
Academy by July 1, 1999. (Idaho Code § 19-5117(2)).
Additionally, a sheriff does not have the power to retain a
deputy if the deputy has not become POST certified within
one year of his employment. (Fegert Aff., Exh. A). Ennis
was not POST certified as a peace officer during the course
of his employment. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 18).
Sprungl alleges that he advised Ennis about POST
certification when Ennis was initially hired. (Sprungl Aff.,
'110). Ennis alleges that he did not receive notice about his
lack of POST certification until January 2005. (Ennis Aff.,
~ 4). Ennis announced his intention to run against Sprungl
for county Sheriff sometime in either June or early July
2008. (Ennis Aff. ~ 4). Ennis ran against Sprungl, but
Sprungl was again re-elected and re-took title as Sheriff.
(Sprungl Affidavit, ~ 6). After his announcement, Ennis
contends that Sprungl took immediate action to terminate
him. (Ennis Aff., ~ 4).
On June 20, 2008, Sprungl notified Ennis in writing that he
must complete certain requirements to obtain proper
certification. (Sprungl Aff, ~ 13, Exh. A). Ennis attempted
to complete the applications for both POST training and
certification, as well as a certification waiver during this
time. (Sprungl Aff. '116, Exh. C). For the next six months,
correspondence between Sprungl, Ennis and the POST
Academy indicates disagreements as to whether Ennis
completed his application for certification. (Sprungl Afr,
'1'117-23, Exhs. D-G).
*2 Ennis withdrew his application for new POST
certification in January 2009. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 22; Ennis
Aff., '1 8). Sprungl submitted Ennis' application to the
POST Academy anyway. (Sprungl Aff., ~ 24, Exh. H). The
POST Academy later notified Sprungl that Ennis did not
meet minimum health and administrative standards
(Sprungl Aff., ,: 24, Exh. H), therefore Ennis was not
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eligible for certification. (Id.). Sprung I placed Ennis on
suspension then terminated him on March 19, 2009.
(Sprungl Aff., ~ 29, ~ 32, Exh. J). Sprungl cited lack of
POST certification as the reason for termination. (Sprungl
Aff., ~ 32, Exh. L).

ANALYSIS

Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d lO26, lO29 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting
Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409,
1418 (9thCir.1988». Instead, the "party opposing
summary judgment must direct [the Court's] attention to
specific triable facts." Southern California Gas Co. v. City
ofSanta Ana, 336 F.3d 885,889 (9th Cir.2003). Statements
in a brief, unsupported by the record, cannot be used to
create an issue of fact. Barnes v. Independent Auto.
Dealers, 64 F.3d 1389, 1396 n. 3 (9th Cir.1995).

1. Summary Judgment Standard of Law
One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is
to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims .... "
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3l7, 323-24, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It is "not a disfavored
procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[ ] by
which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be
isolated and prevented from going to trial with the
attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private
resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue
of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242,247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505,91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, id. at 255, and the Court must not
make credibility findings. Id. Direct testimony of the
nonmovant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie
v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir.1999). On the
other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable
inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v.
Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir.1988).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux
v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, lO76 (9th Cir.200l) (en banc). To
carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any
affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition
excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v.
Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F .3d 528, 532 (9th
Cir.2000).
This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce
evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor.
Id. at 256-57. The non-moving party must go beyond the
pleadings and show "by her affidavits, or by the
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on
file" that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Ce/otex,
477 U.S. at 324. The Court is "not required to comb
through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for
summary judgment." Carmen v. San Francisco Unified

2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
*3 Defendants move for summary judgment in this case,
and dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety. In his
Complaint, Plaintiff raises First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants under
42 U.s.C. § 1983. Defendants' Motion addresses the First
and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and raises various
other challenges to Defendants' liability. Plaintiff s
Response addresses only his First Amendment claim.

A. Plaintiff's First Amendment claim
In alleging violations of his constitutional rights, Ennis
invokes 42 U.s.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983,
the plaintiff must (1) establish the deprivation of a right
secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law and (2)
establish that the deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. Amer. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50,119 S.Ct. 977,143 L.Ed.2d
130 (1999). Ennis claims that the Defendants deprived him
of his First Amendment right to free speech by terminating
him after he announced his intention to run for public
office.
To evaluate a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim,
the Court must conduct a five-step inquiry. Eng v. Cooley,
552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir.2009). First, the plaintiff
bears the burden of showing: (1) whether the plaintiff
spoke on a matter of public concern, (2) whether the
plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee and
(3) whether the plaintiffs protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment
action. Id. If the plaintiff satisfied the first three steps, the
burden shifts to the government to show (4) whether the
state had an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from other members of the general
public and (5) whether the state would have taken the
adverse employment action regardless of the protected
speech. Id.
Using the test outlined in Eng is appropriate for two
reasons. First, in a § 1983 action that involves both
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political patronage and retaliation under the First
Amendment, conducting a retaliation analysis goes to the
heart of the case. Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828,829
(9th Cir.1989). In Thomas, plaintiff was a lieutenant
officer who ran against his supervisor, Sheriff Carpenter,
in a public election. After Thomas lost the election, he
alleged that Carpenter retaliated against him by banning
Thomas from department meetings and the like. ld. The
court found an inquiry into First Amendment retaliation
and not political patronage-which involves a completely
different analysis-was proper.
Second, the Ninth Circuit recognized that "[i]n the forty
years since Pickering, First Amendment law has evolved
dramatically, if sometimes inconsistently." Eng, 552 F.3d
at 1070. The Ninth Circuit created this test after
"unraveling Pickering's tangled history" and thus the test
is appropriate to use for First Amendment retaliation cases.
1d.1

(1) Public concern and private citizel1

*4 First, the parties do not dispute that running for public
office is a public concern. Conduct must be related to
issues of political, social or other concerns to the
community sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-147, 103 S.Ct. 1684,
75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Ennis announced his intention to
run, then ran, as a candidate in the 2008 election for sheriff
of Boundary Countya public concern. Second, the parties
do not dispute that Ennis acted as a private citizen when he
ran for sheriff in 2008. A public employee acts like a
private citizen when he performs acts outside of his daily
professional responsibilities. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, 422, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006).
Running for public office was not part of Ennis'
professional responsibilities as a detention deputy.
Therefore, Ennis' speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection. ld.

(2) Substantial or motivating factor

Third, Ennis must show that running for sheriff against
Sprungl was a substantial or motivating factor in the state's
action to terminate him. This is an element of causation
and "purely a question of fact." Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d at
1071. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has listed three ways
in which a plaintiff can raise a genuine issue of material
fact. Keyser v. ,Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265
FJd 741, 744 (9th Cir.2001). First, a plaintiff may
introduce evidence regarding proximity in time between
the protected action and the retaliatory employment
decision, from which a jury could infer retaliation. ld.
Second, a plaintiff may introduce evidence that his

employer expressed opposition to his speech. !d. Finally,
the plaintiff may introduce evidence that his employer's
proferred explanations for the adverse employment actions
were false and pre-textual. ld. Defendants do not dispute
that they had knowledge of Ennis' speech.
Ennis showed that despite his lack of POST certification
for almost eleven years, Sprungl did not take formal action
to demand certification until after Ennis ran against
Sprungl in the 2008 election. About eight months passed
between Ennis' announcement running against Sprungl
and Ennis' termination. Depending on the circumstances,
an eleven month gap can support an inference of First
Amendment retaliation. Allen v. lranon, 283 F.3d 1070,
1078 (9th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit cautions that
mechanical application of a specified time period is
unrealistically simplistic, however this only applies when a
court states that a time period is too lengthy to support an
inference of retaliation. Anthoine v. North Central
Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 751 (9th Cir.20l0)
(citing Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 978-979
(9th Cir.2003». Given Sprungl's inability to enforce the
certification policy for ten years prior, an eight month and
two week period could reasonably lead a jury to infer
retaliation from protected speech.
Ennis alleges that Sprung I sabotaged Ennis' attempts to
apply for a POST certification waivers throughout his
employment. However, the plaintiff must show evidence
that his termination was "designed to retaliate against and
chill political expression." Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014,
1028 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Gibson v. United States, 781
F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.1986». To support a retaliation
claim, the record must demonstrate a constitutional
violation.ld. The alleged sabotage does not relate to Ennis'
First Amendment claim because his waiver attempt
occurred three years before running against Sprungl. It is
beyond the scope of his cause of action and is not evidence
of retaliation. Additionally, while Defendants assert that
Ennis had the burden of submitting his own application,
the point is moot under Butler.2
*5 At hearing, Plaintiff focused largely on whether
Defendants adequately assisted his pursuit of a waiver of
POST certification requirements. However, Plaintiff made
no mention of the waiver argument in briefing to the Court,
except for references in Ennis' Affidavit. Additionally,
Sprungl was not Sheriff for several years of Ennis'
employment in Boundary County. This casts doubt on
Ennis' allegations. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate bad faith on the part of Defendants 111
failing to submit Plaintiff's waiver packet.
Regardless, Ennis has fulfilled his burden of proof under
Eng. He meets the first two steps of the Eng test and has
raised a genuine issue of material fact on the third step. The

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

118

Ennis v. Boundary County, Slip Copy (2010)

burden thus shifts to Defendants to prove the fourth and
fifth prongs of the Eng test.

(3) Adverse employment action regardless ofprotected
speech

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment if they can
demonstrate that they would have terminated Ennis
regardless of his protected conduct. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072.
Again, Defendants bear the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux,
263 F.3d at 1076. While courts will normally look into the
fourth prong of the Eng test, Defendants did not address it.
However, Defendants have shown that Ennis would have
been terminated absent his running in an election against
Sprungl.
The fifth prong asks whether the Defendants can show
Ennis' protected speech was not a but-for cause of the
adverse employment action. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072. Even if
the protected conduct was a substantial factor in deciding
to terminate, the Constitution "is sufficiently vindicated if
such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if
he had not engaged in the conduct." Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist.
Bd. o[Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-286, 97 S.Ct. 568,
50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). This principle is especially true if
the consequences of allowing the terminated employee to
continue employment are significant. Id. at 286.
However, the Defendants must show that it would have
terminated Ennis, not that it could have. Settlegoode v.
Portland Public Schools, 371 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir.2004)
(see also Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194 (9th
Cir.1989». Again, this inquiry is "purely a question of
fact." Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir.2009).
At the same time, district courts have broad discretion to
determine an official's intent with regards to alleged ~
1983 violations at the summary judgment stage.
Crawford-EI v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,600-601, 118 S.Ct.
1584,140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998).
Under ~ 19-5117 (2), all detention deputies must be POST
trained and POST certified to have the authority to act as
peace officers. Defendants have shown that Ennis was
required by law to be POST certified. Ennis was not
qualified for certification because he failed to meet
minimum health and application requirements. Because
Ennis never attained certification, he had no authority to be
a peace officer in Boundary County. The Parties agree that
Ennis has received no POST certification.
*6 Defendants assert two additional facts to show a lack of
but-for causation.
First, the parties agree that Ennis had notice of the

certification requirement at least three years before he
exercised his protected speech. Second, allowing Ennis to
continue his employment as an uncertified officer would
involve significant consequences. Employing an
uncertified officer would subject Ennis, Sprungl and
Boundary County to "grave consequences[,]" such as civil
and criminal penalties. (Fegert Af£ Exh. A).
Defendants have not justified why it took ten years to
terminate Ennis under § 19-5117(2) when they had
statutory authority to do so. However, no reasonable juror
could find that Ennis was entitled to a job that he held
unlawfully. Even if Ennis can show triable facts of
improper motive, his termination placed him in no worse
position than ifhe had not run for sheriff's office.
In his response, Ennis cites generally to Allen v. !rano as
"indistinguishable" from the facts at hand. When
responding to a motion for summary judgment, the
non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show
that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324. Ennis expects his First Amendment retaliation
claim to be vindicated without analysis. However, he has
not shown how Allen raises a genuine issue of fact.
A salient difference between this cause of action and Allen
is that Allen was legally entitled to his job, unlike Ennis.
283 F.3d at 1079. Based on this brief analysis, and lack
direction from Ennis, the case is not sufficient to establish
a genuine issue of material fact as to Ennis' claim.
Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants' motion
for summary judgment on Ennis' First Amendment claim.

B. Defendants' immunity claims

(1) Qualified immunity: Sheriff Sprungl

"Qualified immunity serves to shield government officials
'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.' " San Jose Charter of Hells Angels
Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 971
(9th Cir.2005) (quoting Harlow 4'. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
However, a state official may be held personally liable in a
~ 1983 action ifhe knew or should have known that he was
violating plaintiff's constitutional rights. Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 818.
A qualified immunity analysis consists of two prongs.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,
232, III S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991». First,
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whether taken in a light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, the facts alleged show that the
defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right. ld.
Second, whether that right was clearly established. ld. The
relevant, dispositive inquiry into the second prong is
whether it would be clear to a reasonable defendant that his
conduct was unlawful in the particular situation he
confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
*7 Courts may use their sound discretion to decide which
of the two prongs should be addressed first. Pearson v.
Callahan,
U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d
565 (2009). Finally, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that his rights were clearly established at the time
of the alleged First Amendment violation. Moran v. State
o.fWashington, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir.1998).
Defendants contend that Sheriff Sprung1 is entitled to
qualified immunity on Ennis' First Amendment claim.
Ennis did not respond to the qualified immunity claims in
Defendants' motion. Offering no evidence that specifically
rebuts facts submitted by a defendant is not sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Kardoh v. u.s.,
572 F.3d 697, 702 (9th Cir.2009) (see Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e)(2». Also, when viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to Ennis, no First Amendment violation can be
found. Thus, Ennis has failed to meet the first prong of
Saucier. Even if the Court finds a potential constitutional
violation, Defendants allege that it would not be clear to a
reasonable official that terminating Ennis was unlawful.
Defendants have shown that Sprungl was compelled to
terminate Ennis because Ennis failed to become POST
certified.
While the timing of the termination is suspect, given ~
19-5117 (2), a reasonable officer would consider the act
lawful. In fact, it would have been unlawful not to
terminate Ennis. Additionally, Ennis has not met his
burden of responding to Defendants' claims under the
second prong of Saucier. Thus, the Court will grant
Defendants' motion as to Sprungl's qualified immunity
claim.

(2) Eleventh Amendment immunity: Defendants

Dinning, Smith, Kirby, and Stevens
Defendants assert that Dan Dinning, Ron Smith, Walt
Kirby, and Richard Stevens are immune trom Ennis'
claims under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh
Amendment bars suits in federal court "by private parties
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from
public funds." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,663,94
S.Ct. 1347,39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). State officials acting in
their official capacity cannot be sued under ~ 1983. Hafer

v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301
(1991). As a result, these suits "should be treated as suits
against the state." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166,
105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Finally, liability
under § 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal
participation by each defendant. Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d
858, 862 (9th Cir.1979).
Under the Eleventh Amendment, Dinning, Smith, Kirby,
and Stevens are immune from suit for actions performed in
their official capacities. Further, Ennis raises no allegations
against these individuals in their personal capacities; the
Complaint only asserts specific allegations against Sheriff
Sprungl. The Court finds that Defendants Dinning, Smith,
Kirby, and Stevens are immune under the Eleventh
Amendment.

C. Municipal liability

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 when
execution of its policy or custom inflicts a constitutional
injury. Burke v. County ofAlameda, 586 F.3d 725, 734 (9th
Cir.2009) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611
(1978). A municipality cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Ennis
has not shown how a policy or custom of Boundary County
compelled Sprungl to terminate Ennis for exercising his
First Amendment rights. On the contrary, state law gave
Sprungl the authority to terminate Ennis because he lacked
POST certification. Thus, the court will grant Defendants'
motion for summary judgment with respect to Boundary
County.

D. Plaintiff's Due Process Claims
*8 Ennis makes general allegations in his Complaint that
Defendants violated his due process rights. Defendants
adequately countered his claim, to which the Plaintiff did
not respond.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution bars states from depriving any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw. Nordyke v.
King, 563 F.3d 439, 449 (9th Cir.2009); U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, ~ 1. A procedural due process claim has two
distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally
protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of
adequate procedural protections." Hufford v. },JcEnaney,
249 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir.200 1). "A protected property
interest is present where an individual has a reason-able
expectation of entitlement deriving from existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such
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as state law." Stiesberg v. California, 80 F.3d 353, 356 (9th
Cir.1996).
The Court assumes Ennis contends that he was illegally
terminated from his job as a detention officer. However,
his j ob was not a protected property interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is not reasonable for Ennis to
expect entitlement to his job because Idaho law expressly
conditions peace officer employment on meeting POST
certification. Ennis has not provided any evidence too
show he actually obtained certification. Therefore, he did
not lose a protected property interest and his due process
claim fails.
In addition to Fourteenth Amendment due process claims,
Ennis asserts that the Defendants violated his Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights. Complaints must allege more
than unadorned accusations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ---U.S. ----,
----, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949,173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing
Bel! Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007». A complaint fails
when it offers "labels and conclusions" or " 'naked
assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' "
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Resting on allegations
without factual support makes summary judgment proper.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202.
Here, Ennis asserted blanket allegations regarding his
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, and did not enhance
them with any facts. Although the Defendants did not
address these claims, the Court finds it appropriate to
dismiss them here, for failure to state claims on which
relief can be granted.

E. Department of Labor's decision not preclusive

In his Response, Ennis showed how the Idaho Department
of Labor found Ennis' discharge was not motivated by
misconduct on his part. (Ennis Aff., '13, Exh. A; See Idaho
Code § 72-1366( e». Defendants understand Ennis to assert
that they are collaterally estopped from moving for
summary judgment. In their Reply, Defendants assert that
the Idaho Department of Labor findings are not preclusive
in law nor in application. (Dkt. No. 17).

A state agency's determination of an issue is preclusive if it
acts "in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of
fact properly before it which the parties have had an
adequate opportunity to litigate." Astoria Federal Savings
and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct.
2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991) (quoting United States v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct.
1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966». The purpose of collateral
estoppel is to enforce repose among litigants. University of
Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798,106 S.Ct. 3220, 92
L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). However, the issue to be precluded
must be identical in substance to the issue subsequently
raised. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108. Ennis has not shown how
the Department of Labor resolved the facts in dispute in his
First Amendment retaliation claim. Particularly, it is
unclear how a finding of "no misconduct" resolves the
issue of being terminated regardless of protected speech.
Additionally, Defendants have shown that the
determination of no misconduct does not defeat their
motion for summary judgment.
*9 Idaho Code § 72-1366(e) defines the term "discharged
for misconduct" as "willful, intentional disregard of the
employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the
employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior
which the employer has a right to expect of his
employees." Puckett v. Idaho Dep't of Corrections, 107
Idaho 1022, 1023, 695 P.2d 407 (1985). Because the
Department of Labor indicated that Ennis was terminated
because he lacked POST certification yet found no
misconduct, it seems both issues are not mutually
exclusive. It was not Boundary County Sheriffs Office's
'rule,' 'standard of behavior,' or 'interest' that compelled
Ennis' termination, but rather state law. Thus, Ennis has
not overcome his burden to show that a genuine issue of
material fact exists, particularly under the fifth prong of
Eng. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 10) is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to file this Order, provide
copies to counsel and CLOSE this file.

Footnotes
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) was a landmark Supreme COUli case that
established the law for First Amendment retaliation cases for § 1983 actions.

2

In sUPPOJi, Defendants seem to claim that IOAP A II. 11.01.072 obligated Ennis, not Sprungl, to submit his application. However,
the law does not mention anything about a duty specific to a person in Ennis' shoes.
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8oF.3d954
United States Court ofAppeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Christine EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and moving party is entitled to judgment as
matter oflaw.

TECHNOLOGIES APPLICATIONS &
SERVICE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 95-1697. I Argued Jan. 3 1, 1996.
Decided April 5, 1996.

I

Female employee brought action against her employer for
sex and age discrimination. The United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, Alexander Williams,
Jr., J., granted summary judgment for employer, and
employee appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) employee failed to satisfY her
burden of proving that her employer refused to promote
her because of her gender; (2) summary judgment could be
granted without discovery; (3) district court did not abuse
its discretion in striking portion of opposing party's
affidavit before deciding summary judgment motion; and
(4) employee's age discrimination, sexual harassment and
pay and benefit discrimination claims did not relate back to
her timely filed administrative complaint alleging only
failure to promote.

While courts must take special care when
considering motion for summary judgment in
discrimination case because motive is often
critical issue, summary judgment disposition
remains appropriate if plaintiff cannot prevail as
matter oflaw.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (22)

Court of Appeals reviews district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo, applying same legal
standards as district court and viewing facts and
inferences drawn from facts in light most
favorable to nonmoving party.

Female employee failed to satisfy her burden of
proving that her employer refused to promote her
because of her gender, though she alleged
differential treatment in pay, benefits and
seniority, where she did not provide supporting
proof for allegations, and alleged statement by
her supervisor, who hired her initially, that he
would not allow her to become supervisor was
not discriminatory on its face.

Under three-step framework for proving
employment discrimination, without direct
evidence of discrimination, under McDonnell
Douglas, plaintiff-employee must first prove
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prima facie case of discrimination by
preponderance of evidence; defendant-employer
would then have opportunity to present
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment action; if employer does so,
presumption of unlawful discrimination created
by prima facie case "drops out of the picture" and
burden shifts back to employee to show that
given reason was just pretext for discrimination.

that she was better qualified candidate for
position sought as proof that company's
explanation is pretextual and that she was victim
of intentional discrimination.

As general rule, summary judgment IS
appropriate only after adequate time for
discovery.

Plaintiff employee claiming discrimination
always bears ultimate burden of proving that
employer intentionally discriminated against her.

Summary judgment must be refused where
opposing party has not had opportunity to
discover essential information.

2
Female employee failed to satisfY her obligation
to prove that her employer intentionally
discriminated against her by failing to promote
her, though she was qualified for promotion,
where management did not consider her ready for
supervisory
position,
and
consolidated
supervisory position was assigned to person they
considered best qualified to assume those tasks
based on his computer and prior supervisory
experience;
employee's
bald
assertions
concerning her own qualifications and
shortcomings of her co-workers failed to
disprove employer's explanation or show
discrimination.

Summary judgment was properly granted
without discovery, though opposing party's
memorandum referred to her lack of discovery,
where she did not file any discovery requests,
move for continuance to conduct discovery, or
file affidavit.

9

In failure to promote case, plaintiff must establish

Nonmoving party cannot complain that summary
judgment was granted without discovery unless
that party attempted to oppose motion on grounds
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that more time was needed for discovery or
moved for continuance to permit discovery
before district court ruled.

District court did not abuse its discretion in
striking portion of opposing party's affidavit
before deciding summary judgment motion,
where those portions consisted of party's own
self-serving
opInIOns
without
objective
corroboration, and other statements that were
found to be hearsay, irrelevant or conclusory.

Summary judgment may be denied or
continuance ordered if nonmovant shows
through affidavits that it could not properly
oppose motion for summary judgment without
chance to conduct discovery.

Generally, affidavit filed in opposition to motion
for summary judgment must present evidence in
substantially same form as if affiant were
testifying in court.

Party may not simply assert in its brief that
discovery was necessary and thereby overturn
summary judgment when it failed to comply with
requirement that it set out reasons for need for
discovery in affidavit.
Affidavits submitted on summary judgment must
contain admissible evidence and be based on
personal knowledge.

While courts generally are concerned about
granting summary judgment when opposing
party has not had fair opportunity to discover
essential information, they reasonably expect
notification and explanation when more time for
discovery is needed.

Female employee's age discrimination, sexual
harassment and pay and benefit discrimination
claims did not relate back to her timely filed
administrative complaint, and were thus time
barred, where only allegation made in her
original administrative charge was that employer
failed to promote her because of her sex. Civil
§
Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e)(l),
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Before
and
Circuit Judges, and
STAMP, Chief United States District Judge for the
Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
Discrimination charges filed outside time frame
for administrative charges of discrimination are
barred, but discriminatory allegation may still be
relevant background evidence for valid claims.

Opinion

Affirmed by published opInIOn. Judge
wrote the opinion, in which Judge
and Chief Judge
STAMP joined.

OPINION
Circuit Judge:
Allegations contained in administrative charge of
discrimination generally operate to limit scope of
any subsequent judicial complaint.

Only discrimination claims stated in initial
charge, reasonably related to original complaint,
and developed by reasonable investigation of
original complaint may be maintained in
subsequent Title VII lawsuit. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq.,

*956 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams,
Jr., District Judge. (CA-94-1767-A W).

Appellant Christine Evans appeals a district court order
granting summary judgment to her employer in a Title VII
discrimination case. She argues that the district court erred
by failing to apply the appropriate legal standards in
analyzing the motion for summary judgment, by striking
much of her affidavit and by barring several of her
discrimination claims as not proceeding from or relating to
her original charge of failure to promote because of sex
discrimination. We find her challenges meritless.

I. BACKGROUND

Evans was a temporary worker assigned to the Norden
Service Company, Inc., when Technologies Applications
and Services Company, Inc. ("T AS"), purchased it in April
1991 Two months later, Gary Houseman, TAS's Director
of Quality Assurance, recommended that TAS hire Evans
full-time as an Inspector/Quality Control Analyst in his
department.2 Upon assuming the position in June 1991,
Evans was assigned to inspect TAS computer hardware
products, such as consoles for naval ship combat centers at
various stages of production. As early as December 1991,
Evans informed company officials that she was interested
in obtaining a supervisory position.
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Overall, Evans received good evaluations at TAS.
Houseman described her as an excellent employee in a
September 1992 performance review, but also indicated
that her attitude and "moodiness" would affect her
promotability. In addition, Evans and another quality
control inspector, Winston Samuel, both received
reprimands in February 1993 for squabbling on the job.
Several personnel changes took place at TAS, some of
which were related to financial difficulties at the company.
In February 1992, the Quality Control Supervisor ("QCS")
resigned. TAS officials selected James Thompson, a
supervisor and long-time Field Service Engineer, to
assume the QCS duties and work in a dual capacity as
QCS/Field Engineer. Neither Evans nor Samuel was given
an opportunity to apply for the supervisory position. A year
later, Thompson resigned as QCS. T AS officers never
advertised the QCS job as open, but instead eliminated the
position and assigned its duties to Ronald Lewis, a man
already performing software engineering functions. Again,
neither Evans nor Samuel had a chance to apply for the
reconfigured position.
On April 21, 1993, Evans filed a discrimination charge
with the Montgomery County, Maryland, Human
Relations Commission ("HRC"). In the charge, Evans
alleged that T AS denied her a promotion because of her
gender. She asserted that Houseman's February 1993
decision to eliminate the QCS position and merge its duties
into the software engineering position held by Lewis
constituted sex discrimination. On April 4, 1994, Evans
amended her charge to allege that the February 1993
decision amounted to age discrimination as well.
The following month, Evans filed suit in the Circuit Court
of Montgomery County, Maryland, claiming that T AS had
discriminated against her because of her sex and age in
violation oflocallaws and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, *958
Evans made
numerous allegations: that another employee harassed her
in 1990; that she was "ripe" but not selected for promotion
in 1991 that she received different pay, benefits, and
seniority than younger males; that T AS failed to promote
her in 1993 because of her age and her gender; and that
TAS failed to take adequate affirmative steps to correct its
unlawful practices.
After removal to the United States District Court, T AS
moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that all
of Evans's claims-except for the sex discrimination
allegation-should be dismissed because they were never
raised in a timely administrative charge. T AS also
maintained that Evans failed to make out a primafacie case
to support her claim of sex-based failure to promote and
ultimately failed to establish that she was the victim of sex

discrimination. In support of its position, TAS submitted
an affidavit from Evans's immediate supervisor,
Houseman, and other exhibits.
Evans opposed TAS's motion and submitted her own
affidavit attesting to her qualifications for the QCS
position. Although the memorandum of law in support of
her motion indicated that she had not had the opportunity
to conduct discovery, Evans had never requested discovery
nor sought a continuance to enable her to gather
information to refute T AS's motion.
The district judge issued a memorandum and order in
February 1995, granting TAS's motion for summary
judgment. The judge examined Evans's affidavit and
struck portions of it as "not based on personal knowledge,"
"containing hearsay statements," or "irrelevant,
conclusory, or both." He dismissed Evans's claims of
sexual harassment, failure to promote in 1991, and
discrimination in pay and benefits as outside the scope of
Evans's administrative charge and not "reasonably
proceeding from a sex discrimination claim based on
failure to promote." The judge also dismissed Evans's age
discrimination claim as untimely, finding that the
allegation was belated and unrelated to her original
administrative charge of sex discrimination. He noted that
"Evans never mentioned her age or indicated in any
manner that age was a factor" in the original charge.
Finally, the district judge found that Evans had not
established a prima facie case offailure to promote in 1993
because of sex discrimination nor provided any evidence
that T AS's articulated reasons for assigning the QCS
duties elsewhere were pretextual or "unworthy of
credence." Determining that no issue of material fact
existed for a jury to resolve, the district judge granted
summary judgment to T AS. Evans filed a timely notice of
appeal.

II. CLAIM OF SEX DISCRIMINATION BY FAILURE
TO PROMOTE
Evans rests on two grounds her contention that the district
court erred in granting T AS's motion for summary
judgment on her claim that she was denied promotion
because of her sex: that the court failed to apply the
appropriate legal standards and that she had not received
adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. We consider
each in tum.

A. Summary Judgment Analysis

III 12)131 We review the district court's grant of summary

& ~t>'nI"r:t>
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judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the
district court and viewing the facts and inferences drawn
from the facts in the light most favorable to Evans, the
nonmoving party.

Summary judgment is
appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to ajudgment
as a matter oflaw."
see also

special care when considering a motion for summary
judgment in a discrimination case because motive is often
the critical issue, summary judgment disposition remains
appropriate if the plaintiff *959 cannot prevail as a matter
of law.
cert. denied,
If, after
reviewing the record as a whole, however, we find that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for Evans, then a
genuine factual dispute exists and summary judgment is
improper.
141 Evans's charge that TAS refused to promote her
because of her gender is a claim of disparate treatment. To
meet her burden on summary judgment, Evans might have
offered direct or circumstantial evidence, or proceeded
under the proof scheme set forth in

Our analysis reveals
that Evans failed to meet her various burdens under either
approach. In reaching the same conclusion, the district
court set forth the appropriate governing standards then
analyzed the evidence before it, primarily using the
burden-shifting scheme established by McDonnell
Douglas and its progeny.
To satisfy ordinary principles of proof, Evans must provide
direct evidence of a purpose to discriminate or
circumstantial evidence of sufficiently probative force to
raise a genuine issue of material fact.
reveals little, if any, direct or indirect evidence of
discriminatory motive. Evans alleges differential treatment
in pay, benefits and seniority but fails to provide
supporting proof. She also alleges, without offering
corroborating evidence, that she was discriminated against
in previous promotion decisions. Evans offers an alleged
comment by Houseman that he would not allow her to
become a supervisor. However, the statement is not
discriminatory on its face, as it could have been made in
reference to any male or female employee seeking

promotion. Nor is it placed in any context that makes it so.
In addition, because Houseman is the same person who
hired Evans, there is a "powerful inference" that the failure
to promote her was not motivated by discriminatory
animus.
);
see also
8. Evans also submitted
her own affidavit, mostly made up of conclusory
statements about her qualifications and the deficiencies of
her colleagues. However, Evans's "own naked opinion,
without more, is not enough to establish aprimafacie case
of [ ]discrimination."
For
Evans to prevail, then, it must be by using the proof
scheme established in McDonnell Douglas.
[51 161 171 Under that three-step framework, the
plaintiff-employee must first prove a prima facie case of
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. If she
succeeds, the defendant-employer has an opportunity to
present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
employment action. If the employer does so, the
presumption of unlawful discrimination created by the
primafacie case "drops out of the picture" and the burden
shifts back to the employee to show that the given reason
was just a pretext for discrimination.

plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of proving that
the employer intentionally discriminated against her.

the record before us, Evans has failed to satisfy her
obligation.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment,
Evans must prove a set of facts enabling the court to
conclude that it is more likely than not that TAS's failure to
promote her was motivated by discrimination.
She must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2)
her employer had an open position for which she applied or
sought to apply; (3) she was qualified for the position; and
(4) she was rejected for the position under circumstances
*960
rise to an inference of unlawful

While the evidence creates a close call as to Evans's
qualification for the QCS position, we must remember that
"the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment is not onerous."
Thus, for purposes of this appeal, we find
that Evans has satisfied the "relatively easy test" of
rlllr(J,'np
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showing that she, a qualified applicant, "was rejected
under circumstances which give rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination."
(internal quotations and citations omitted),
cert. denied,
2

Our inquiry is not over, however, for TAS has articulated
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for choosing a man
to fill the QCS position instead of Evans. The company
offered substantial evidence that management considered
Evans not yet ready for a supervisory position, including
the September 1992 performance review indicating that
while she was good at her job, Evans had problems with
"moodiness," Evans's February 1993 reprimands, and
Houseman's statements that Evans lacked the education
and training needed for the QCS position. In addition, T AS
provided proofthat company officials decided for financial
reasons to eliminate the QCS position by merging it into
another position, and then did so by assigning the QCS
duties to Lewis, the person they considered best qualified
to assume the QCS tasks. Unlike Evans and Samuel, Lewis
was well-versed in computer hardware and software and
possessed prior supervisory experience. He also had
seniority in the company, having joined it in 1982.

181 Job performance and relative employee qualifications
are widely recognized as valid, non-discriminatory bases
for any adverse employment decision. See K1!'"/HPJP
Because "the employer has discretion to choose
among equally qualified candidates provided the decision
is not based upon unlawful criteria,"
(citing
Evans must present proof that
the company's explanation is pretextual and that she was
the victim of intentional discrimination.
In a failure to promote
case, the plaintiff must establish that she was the better
qualified candidate for the position sought.
I

Evans's evidence falls far short ofthat needed to overcome
summary judgment. She has failed to show that she was
more qualified for the promotion than the man selected or
that, as between her sex and TAS's explanation, her sex
was the more likely reason for her failure to be promoted.
While a Title VII plaintiff may present direct or indirect
evidence to support her claim of discrimination,
unsupported speculation is insufficient.
Evans's
unsubstantiated allegations and bald assertions concerning
her own qualifications and the shortcomings of her

co-workers fail to disprove TAS's explanation or show
(plaintiff's
discrimination. See
own opinions and conc1usory allegations do not have
sufficient "probative force to reflect a genuine issue of
material fact");

evidence shows that Evans was treated like the only other
similarly situated individual at TAS-Samuel also held the
position of inspector and was denied the opportunity to
apply for the QCS opening-and that her supervisor thought
she did not merit a promotion. The demonstrated facts
remain therefore that TAS management found Lewis to be
the most qualified employee and shifted to him the QCS
responsibilities. Evans simply has failed to demonstrate
that she was more qualified than that employee and thus
more deserving of the duties. "It is the perception of the
decision maker *961 which is relevant," not the
self-assessment of the plaintiff.
Based on our review of the record, then, we find that Evans
has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.

B. Summary Judgment Without Discovery

110) Ill) As a general rule, summary judgment is
appropriate only after "adequate time for discovery."
17,

denied,
"[S]ummary judgment must be refused where the
nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover
information that is essential to his opposition."
Evans first
argues not only that the principle is a hard and fast rule, but
also that her lack of discovery placed extra burdens on
T AS to prove that there was no issue for trial. However,
she has provided no legal support for her contentions.

1121 1131 114J We have held that the nonmoving party
cannot complain that summary judgment was granted
without discovery unless that party had made an attempt to
oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was
needed for discovery or moved for a continuance to permit
discovery before the district court ruled. See
a court to deny summary judgment or to
continuance if the nonmovant shows through affidavits
that it could not properly oppose a motion for summary
judgment without a chance to conduct discovery. We, like
other reviewing courts, place great weight on the
affidavit, believing that "[a] party may not simply
assert in its briefthat discovery was necessary and thereby

i"~mrin'"

&
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overturn summary judgment when it failed to comply with
the requirement of
to set out reasons for the
need for discovery in an affidavit." /\lom"""
(citing

(if plaintiffs arguing
summary
judgment was premature because they had inadequate time
for discovery were "genuinely concerned," then they
should have sought relief under
The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly explained that "[a]
reference to
and to the need for additional
discovery in a memorandum of law in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment is not an adequate substitute
for a
affidavit ... and the failure to file an
is itself sufficient grounds to
affidavit under
that the opportunity for discovery was

The record shows that Evans never filed any discovery
requests, moved for a continuance so she could conduct
In
discovery, or filed an affidavit as required by
short, Evans never informed the district court that she
needed time to develop the factual record so that she could
properly oppose TAS's motion. Evans concedes that she
but
did not file an affidavit in accordance with
argues that she made her discovery concerns known in her
memorandum in opposition to TAS's summary judgment
motion by noting her lack of discovery in two passages.4
While Evans's memorandum refers to her lack of
discovery, the effort is insufficient to compel denial of
T AS's summary judgment motion.
(15) While courts generally are concerned about granting
summary judgment when the opposing party has not had a
fair opportunity to discover essential information, they
reasonably expect notification and explanation when more
time for discovery is needed. In light of Evans's failure to
take any affirmative steps regarding discovery, we *962 do
not find the district court's grant of summary judgment to
T AS improper.

1171 1181 Generally, an affidavit filed in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment must present evidence in
substantially the same form as ifthe affiant were testifying
in court.
specifically
requires that affidavits submitted on summary judgment
contain admissible evidence and be based on personal
knowledge. See also
(evidence submitted in opposition to
summary judgment motion must be admissible and based
on personal knowledge). Thus, summary judgment
affidavits cannot be conclusory, f{/,lwfvH,lah
or based upon hearsay,

Because the district court followed such principles when it
struck many portions of Evans's affidavit, it acted
properly. The district judge did not strike the entire
affidavit and did not grant all ofTAS's requests to strike,
but instead struck and disregarded only those portions it
deemed inadmissible or improper in accordance with
Furthermore, the district judge carefully specified
which parts of the affidavit would be stricken and why.
Several of the portions struck consisted of Evans's own
unsupported assertions of her qualifications and the
abilities of her colleagues.s Because, again, we generally
consider self-serving opinIOns without objective
corroboration not significantly probative, the decision to
strike and disregard as irrelevant Evans's assertions was
not improper. The district court's determination that
portions of the affidavit contained statements that were not
based on personal knowledge does not appear to be clearly
erroneous.6 Finally, the court correctly found other
statements to be hearsay, irrelevant, or conclusory, and
properly struck those sections pursuant to

IV. CLAIMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT, PAY AND
BENEFITS DISCRIMINA TION AND AGE
DISCRIMINATION
III. EVANS'S AFFIDAVIT

1161 Evans next charges that the district court improperly
struck much of the affidavit she submitted in support of her
opposition to TAS's motion for summary judgment. We
review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion,
1
cert. denied,
and the factual determinations underlying the
evidentiary ruling for clear error,

Finally, Evans challenges the district court's dismissal
of her other claims as time-barred and outside the scope of
the original charge filed with the Montgomery County
HRC. She maintains that those claims should have been
permitted as amended to or relating back to her original
charge.
(20) /211 122) Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"),
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provide a maximum of 300 days from the occurrence of an
alleged discriminatory event for a claimant to file a timely
charge with the EEOC, if she first instituted proceedings
with a state or local agency,
);
26(d)(2), while Montgomery County law allows
one year, Mont. Co., Md., Code § 27-7. Charges filed
outside that time frame are barred, but a discriminatory
allegation may still constitute relevant background
evidence for valid claims.
The allegations contained in the administrative
charge of discrimination generally operate to limit the
*963 scope of any subsequent judicial complaint.
Only those discrimination claims stated in the
initial charge, those reasonably related to the original
complaint, and those developed by reasonable
investigation of the original complaint may be maintained
in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit.
see also
(affirming lower court's determination of
untimeliness because charge of illegal layoff does not
encompass allegations of illegal failure to rehire), cert.
denied,
(finding job transfer and salary claims
not contained in EEOC charge barred).
The only allegation that Evans made in her original
administrative charge was that T AS failed to promote her
in February 1993 because of her sex. Evans never filed a
charge with the EEOC or the Montgomery County HRC
alleging sexual harassment or discrimination in pay and
benefits. Furthermore, the harassment claim alleges
conduct that occurred in 1990-well beyond the scope of the
applicable laws. See
); Mont. Co.,
Md., Code § 27-7. The district court properly determined
therefore that Evans's additional claims were time-barred.
Evans also contends, however, that she brought those
additional allegations in order to show illegal motive and a
pattern of discrimination because "all ofthe discriminatory
events and incidents surrounding Evans's employment are
closely interrelated with TAS's discrimination and
unwillingness to promote her." Even so, the district court
ruled properly, recognizing that while the later allegations
cannot stand as separate charges of discrimination for
which T AS may be liable, they might be admissible as
evidence at trial to support her properly asserted sex
discrimination claim. See

promotion. Evans added the age discrimination accusation
after the charge had been pending for nearly a year, and
more than a full year after the alleged discriminatory
activity took place. Thus, on its face, the age
discrimination claim is time-barred, having been filed well
after both the ADEA and the county time limit had expired.
See
Mont. Co., Md., Code § 27-7. Evans
maintains, however, that the age discrimination claim
arose from the same facts and circumstances as her sex
discrimination charge and thus relates back to the original
filing date. EEOC regulations provide that when an
amendment is filed outside the applicable limitations
period, it may be considered timely if it involves claims
"related to or growing out of' the original charge.
However, age discrimination does not
necessarily flow from sex discrimination and vice versa.
See, e.g.,
(untimely amendment alleging
discrimination does not relate back to original sex
discrimination charge since not flowing from it);
(untimely amended claim of sex
discrimination does not relate back to the original charge
of age discrimination because the allegations could not be
inferred from it). Moreover, Title VII and ADEA claims
arise from completely distinct statutory schemes. See
(denying amendment adding age discrimination
allegation to charge of discrimination based on national
origin). Other courts have observed that permitting a late
amendment to an original discrimination charge adding an
entirely new theory of recovery "would eviscerate the
administrative charge filing requirement altogether" by
depriving the employer of adequate notice and resulting in
a failure to investigate by the responsible agency.
Such was the outcome here: Evans
filed her lawsuit only one month after she filed her
amendment, depriving the HRC of time to investigate the
age discrimination allegation and TAS of notice of the
claim.
*964 For these reasons, we find that the district court
properly dismissed Evans's claims of sexual harassment,
pay and benefit discrimination, and age discrimination as
time-barred or outside the scope of her administrative
charge. Because we conclude that the district court
properly granted summary judgment to TAS, its order is
AFFIRMED.

Parallel Citations
Again, Evans's original charge alleged only sex
discrimination. It never mentioned age or alleged that age
was a factor in TAS's alleged discriminatory denial of

72 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1222,68 Empl. Prac. Dec.
P 44,010,34 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1033
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Footnotes
TAS is a government contractor that builds and supplies high technology equipment for the United States Government.
Both Houseman and Evans were 42 years old at the time.
Evans's complaint alleges promotion discrimination in 1991, but the relevant QCS position was vacated and filled by Thompson in
1992.
Evans's memorandum in opposition states that TAS's assertions that she could not prove the McDonnell Douglas elements are
without merit and inappropriate for argument "at this early stage in the litigation-especially when plaintiff has not yet been afforded
the opportunity to conduct discovery," and that "[e]ven without the aid of discovery," she could make a prima facie case of sex
discrimination.
In those sections, Evans details her own qualifications, disparages the qualifications and work experiences of two of her colleagues,
and discusses the qualifications of her supervisor.
The district court detennined that Evans, a low-level employee, would not have had infonnation about TAS's financial affairs or the
criteria for a position that was never posted, and consequently struck her statements about those matters.
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When there are two permissible views of
evidence, district court's choice of one view
cannot be clearly erroneous.

Pretext in Title VII action is not established by
virtue of fact that employee has received some
favorable comments in some categories or has, in
past, received some good evaluations. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended,
to
7.

In Title VII discrimination case, district court's
resolution of ultimate issue whether employer's
reason for denying promotion to employee was
pretext is finding of fact subject to clearly
erroneous standard. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended,
to

7

Female attorney failed to show that law firm's
failure to admit her as partner violated Title VII,
as record did not show that firm applied its
partnership admission standards unequally to
male and female associates, nor that diminished
ability in area of legal analysis was improper
reason for denying admission; district court's
belief that firm's high standard of analytical
ability was unwise did not make firm's standard a
pretext for discrimination, district court's
comparison of plaintiff with successful male
candidates in categories other than legal analytic
ability did not lend support to its ultimate finding
of pretext, and district court ignored evidence
firm
produced
to
compare
plaintiff's
shortcomings with strengths of successful male
candidates in category of legal analytic ability.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as
amended,
7;

Title VII plaintiff does not establish pretext by
pointing to cntlclsms of members of
nonprotected class, or commendation of plaintiff,
in categories defendant says it did not rely upon
in denying promotion to member of protected
class, although such comments may raise doubts
about fairness of employer's decision. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended,
to

In Title VII discrimination case, evidence
establishing incredibility of employer's reason
must show that standard or criterion employer
relied on was obviously weak or implausible.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as
amended,
to

In Title VII discrimination case, court should not
ignore evidence which sheds light on whether
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employer treated similarly situated males and
females alike. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended,
to

to

7.

7.

Even if female attorney received "small" cases at
beginning of her tenure at law firm, no violation
of Title VII was shown, as there was no evidence
that such assignments were result of sex
discrimination; her evaluations indicated that it
may have been her academic credentials that
contributed to her receipt of less complex
assignments. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended,
to

Statistical evidence of employer's pattern and
practice with respect to minority employment
may be relevant to showing of pretext in Title VII
case. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as
amended,
to

Female attorney's raw numerical comparisons of
small number of women admitted to partnership
throughout law firm's history were not probative
offirm's alleged discriminatory motive in failing
to admit her to partnership; her comparisons were
not accompanied by any analysis of either
qualified applicant pool or flow of qualified
candidates over relevant time period. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended,

District court's findings that female attorney was
evaluated negatively for being too involved with
women's issues, specifically her concern about
law firm's treatment of paralegals, and that male
partner was not criticized for encouraging
discussion of "women's issue" of part-time
employment, were of marginal value in
supporting finding that firm's failure to admit
female attorney to partnership was for pretextual
reason in violation of Title VII; partner testified
that he was not criticizing plaintiff for raising
paralegal issue, but for her misperception that it
was "women's issue." Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§§ 701-718, as amended,
to

Record did not support district court's finding, in
Title VII action against law firm by female
attorney who was not admitted to partnership,
that male associate's sexual harassment offemale
employees at firm was not mentioned in its
consideration of that male associate for
partnership; chairman of associates committee
met with male associate concerning those
incidents and placed memorandum in his
personnel file, and incident occurred after
associates committee decided it was unlikely to
recommend him for partnership in any event.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as
amended,
to
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District court's
finding
in
Title
VII
discrimination case that female attorney who was
not made partner was evaluated negatively for
being "very demanding," while several male
associates who were made partners were
evaluated negatively for lacking sufficient
assertiveness in their demeanor, did not support
court's conclusion that female attorney was
treated differently because of her gender;
criticisms of her assertiveness related to way in
which she handled administrative manners such
as office and secretarial space, while criticism of
male associates for lacking assertiveness was
related to their handling of legal matters. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended,
to
7.

just pretext to cover up sex discrimination; other
evidence of sex discrimination was lacking and,
although partner was at one time decision maker
and eventually supported female attorney's
admission to partnership, he took no part in final
votes or evaluations concerning her because he
had by that time left firm. Civil Rights Act of
1964, §§ 701-718, as amended,
to

Attorneys and Law Firms
*512
(argued), Vladeck, Waldman, Elias
& Engelhard, P.c., New York City, for Nancy O'Mara
Ezold.
(argued), Schnader, Harrison, Segal &
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
PA, for Wolf, Block, Schorr and

Law firm partner's alleged statement to female
attorney during selection process that she did not
fit firm's mold since she was a woman did not
support district court's conclusion that firm's
subsequent failure to admit female attorney to
partnership violated Title VII; other evidence of
sex discrimination was lacking, partner made that
comment five years before partnership decision,
and partner himself left firm before partnership
decision was made, although he had consistently
supported female attorney's candidacy. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended,
to

Law firm partner's six alleged crude and
unprofessional statements to female attorney
over period of five years were insufficient to
sustain district court's finding that law firm's
reason for denying female attorney admission to
partnership, i.e., her legal analytical ability, was
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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen (Wolf) appeals from
a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting relief in favor of
Nancy O'Mara Ezold (Ezold) on her claim that Wolf
intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of her
sex in violation ofTitIe VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(TitIe VII),
to
when it decided not to admit her to the
firm's partnership effective February 1, 1989. At trial Wolf
contended that it denied Ezold admission to the partnership
because her skills in the category of legal analysis did not
meet the firm's standards. The district court disagreed and
found that this articulated reason was a pretext contrived to
mask sex discrimination. Wolf argues on appeal that the
district court improperly analyzed the evidence before it
and that the evidence, properly analyzed, does not support
the district court's ultimate finding of pretext.
This case raises important issues that cut across the
spectrum of discrimination law. It is also the first in which
allegations of discrimination arising from a law firm
partnership admission decision require appellate review
after trial. Accordingly, we have given it our closest
attention and, after an exhaustive examination ofthe record
and analysis of the applicable law, have concluded that the
district court made two related errors whose combined
effect require us to reverse the judgment in favor of Ezold.
The district court first impermissibly *513 substituted its
own subjective judgment for that of Wolf in determining
that Ezold met the firm's partnership standards. Then, with
its view improperly influenced by its own judgment of
what Wolf should have done, it failed to see that the
evidence could not support a finding that Wolfs decision
to deny Ezold admission to the partnership was based upon
a sexually discriminatory motive rather than the firm's
assessment of her legal qualifications. Accordingly, we
hold not only that the district court analyzed the evidence
improperly and that its resulting finding of pretext is
clearly erroneous, but also that the evidence, properly
analyzed, is insufficient to support that finding and
therefore its ultimate conclusion of discrimination cannot
stand. We will therefore reverse and remand for entry of
judgment in favor of Wolf. This disposition makes it
unnecessary to address the issues raised in Wolfs appeal
concerning the remedy the district court awarded to Ezold
or those in Ezold's cross-appeal concerning her claim of
constructive discharge.

I.

Ezold sued Wolf under Title VII alIeging that Wolf

intentionalIy discriminated against her because of her sex
when it decided not to admit her to the firm's partnership.
She further alIeged that she was constructively discharged
by reason of the adverse partnership decision. The court
bifurcated the issues of liability and damages. After a
lengthy bench trial the district court rendered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 29, 1990.
(Ezold 1). It entered judgment
in favor of Ezold on her claim for intentional
discrimination and against her on her claim for
constructive discharge.
The district court held that the nondiscriminatory reason
articulated by Wolf for its rejection of Ezold's
candidacy-that her legal analytical ability failed to meet the
firm's partnership standard-was a pretext. It stated:
Ms. Ezold has established that the
defendant's purported reasons for its
conduct are pretextual. The defendant
promoted to partnership men having
evaluations substantiaIly the same or
inferior to the plaintiffs, and indeed
promoted male associates who the
defendant claimed had precisely the lack
of analytical or writing ability upon
which Wolf, Block purportedly based its
decision concerning the plaintiff.... Such
differential treatment establishes that the
defendant's reasons were a pretext for
discrimination.
ld. at 1191-92 (Conclusion of Law (COL) 11). The district
court also held that four instances of conduct by Wolf
supported its finding of pretext: (J) Ezold was evaluated
negatively for being too involved with women's issues in
the firm; (2) a male associate's sexual harassment of
female employees at the firm was seen as "insignificant"
and not mentioned to the Associates Committee prior to
the partnership decision; (3) Ezold was evaluated
negatively for being very demanding, while male
associates were evaluated negatively for lacking
assertiveness; and (4) Ezold "was the target of several
comments demonstrating [Wolfs] differential treatment of
her because she is a woman." ld. at 1192 (COL 12).

In holding that Ezold had failed to establish that she was
constructively discharged, the district court stated:
A reasonable person in Ms. Ezold's
position would not have deemed her
working conditions to be so intolerable
as to feel compelIed to resign.
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Id. (COL 16). This holding became relevant to the issue of

damages. By way of relief, Ezold sought backpay as well
as instatement in the firm as a partner, and if such
instatement was impractical, front pay. Wolf argued to the
district court that its holding that Ezold was not
constructively discharged limited her relief to back pay
covering the period from her unlawful denial of admission
to the partnership, effective February 1, 1989, until the date
of her voluntary resignation from the firm on June 7, 1989.
On March 15, 1991, the district court decided that its
holding against Ezold on her constructive discharge *514
claim did not preclude her from obtaining relief for the
period following her voluntary resignation. See

The parties then briefed the issue of whether Ezold
properly mitigated her damages as required by section
706(g)(l) of Title VII,
On
July 23, 1991, the district court issued its final
memorandum and order. It ruled that Ezold had properly
mitigated her damages and that her rejection of Wolf's
offer to admit her as a partner as of February 1, 1990 if she
accepted responsibility for its domestic relations practice
did not toll Wolf's liability for back pay. The court then
awarded Ezold back pay in the amount of$131,784.00 for
the period from her resignation on June 7, 1989 to January
31,1991. The parties agreed that if the court's November
27, 1990 and March 15, 1991 orders were affirmed on
appeal, Ezold would be instated as a partner.2 The court
incorporated this agreement into its orders. The district
court also awarded Ezold attorney's fees and costs. Wolf
timely appealed from the district court's orders. Ezold filed
a protective cross-appeal from the district court's denial of
her constructive discharge claim.

II.
Ezold was hired by Wolf as an associate on a partnership
track in July 1983. She had graduated in the top third of her
class from the Villanova University School of Law in 1980
and then worked at two small law firms in Philadelphia.
Before entering law school, Ezold had accumulated
thirteen years of administrative and legislative experience,
first as an assistant to Senator Edmund Muskie, then as
contract administrator for the Model Cities Program in
Philadelphia, and finally as Administrator of the Office of
a Special Prosecutor of the Pennsylvania Department of
Justice.
Ezold was hired at Wolf by Seymour Kurland, then
chairman of the litigation department. The district court
found that Kurland told Ezold during an interview that it

Ezold was assigned to the firm's litigation department.
From 1983-87, Kurland was responsible for the
assignment of work to associates in the department. He
often delegated this responsibility to partner Steven
Arbittier. As Ezold acknowledged, many partners
bypassed the formal assignment procedure and directly
assigned matters to associates. The district court found that
Arbittier assigned Ezold to actions that were "small" by
Wolf standards.
Ezold's performance was reviewed regularly throughout
her tenure pursuant to Wolf's evaluation process, which
operates as follows: The Associates Committee, consisting
often partners representing each ofthe firm's departments,
first reviews the performance of all the firm's associates
and makes recommendations to the firm's five-member
Executive Committee as to which associates should be
admitted to the partnership. The Executive Committee then
revIews the partnership recommendations of the
Associates
Committee
and
makes
its
own
recommendations to the full partnership. The firm's voting
partners consider only those persons whom the Executive
Committee recommends for admission to the partnership.
Senior associates within two years of partnership
consideration are evaluated annually; non-senior
associates are evaluated semi-annually. The firm's partners
are asked to submit written evaluations on *515
standardized forms.3 The partner is asked the degree of
contact he has had with the associate during the evaluation
period. Partners were instructed that the evaluations were
to be completed regardless of the extent of the evaluating
partner's contact or familiarity with the associate's work.
Ten criteria of legal performance are listed on the forms in
the following order: legal analysis, legal writing and
drafting, research skills, formal speech, informal speech,
judgment, creatIvIty, negotIatmg and advocacy,
promptness and efficiency. Ten personal characteristics are
also listed: reliability, taking and managing responsibility,
flexibility, growth potential, attitude, client relationship,
client servicing and development, ability under pressure,
ability to work independently, and dedication. As stated by
Ian Strogatz,4 Chairman of the Associates Committee:
"The normal standards for partnership include as factors
for consideration all of the ones ... that are contained [on]
our evaluation forms." Joint Appendix (App.) at 1170.
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Despite format changes, legal analysis was always listed as
the first criterion to be evaluated. This criterion was
defined on the evaluation forms used in 1987 and 1988 as
the "ability to analyze legal issues; grasp problems; collect,
organize and understand complex factual issues." Id at
3728. Partners provide grades as well as written comments
on these criteria. The evaluation forms describe the grades
as follows:
-DISTINGUISHED:
Outstanding,
exceptional;
consistently demonstrates extraordinary adeptness and
quality; star.
-GOOD: Displays particular merit on a consistent basis;
effective work product and performance; able; talented.
-ACCEPT ABLE: Satisfactory; adequate; displays
neither particular merit nor any serious defects or
omissions; dependable.
-MARGINAL: Inconsistent work product and
performance; sometimes below the level of what you
expect from Associates who are acceptable at this level.
-UNACCEPTABLE: Fails to meet minimum standard
of quality expected by you of an associate at this level;
frequently below level of what you expect.

Id at 3464 (emphasis in original).
The form asks the evaluating partner to describe any
particular strengths or weaknesses of an associate. Partners
are also asked to indicate their views on the admission of
each senior associate to the partnership. The evaluation
lists five possible responses: "with enthusiasm," "with
favor," "with mixed emotions," "with negative feelings" or
"no opinion." Partners are also asked to respond "yes" or
"no" to the following question: "I would feel comfortable
turning over to this Associate to handle on hislher own a
significant matter for one of my clients." Id at 3467. Given
the number of reviewing partners, the evaluations often
contain a wide range of divergent views.
These evaluations are then compiled and summarized by
the firm's administrative staff and organized in books for
review by the Associates Committee.
Each member of the Associates
Committee is asked to make an initial assessment of the
evaluations pertaining to one of the associates or
candidates for partnership. That committee member
prepares a form entitled "Committee Member's Associate
Evaluation Summary" summarizing his or her personal
view of each associate's evaluations. This form is
colloquially referred to as the "bottom line" memo. As
found by the district court, the bottom line memo "is
intended to be [the Associates Committee member's] own

personal view of what he has gleaned from the evaluations
submitted at the time by the partners who submitted
evaluation forms, plus anything in addition that [the
Associates Committee member} has *516 gleaned from
any interviews that he has conducted with respect to those
evaluations."
(emphasis in original).
The bottom line memo also contains a "grid" reflecting the
Associates Committee member's summary of the
evaluated associate's grades in legal and personal skills.
The bottom line memo also assesses a senior associate's
prospects for regular partnership (Category VI) under the
following ratings: "more likely than not," "unclear," "less
likely than not" or "unlikely." In 1987 and 1988, similar
rankings were used to determine the associate's potential
for special partnership (Category VII). The Category VII
partnership then in existence conferred a non-equity
"partnership" status upon associates who fell below the
normal standard for admission as equity partners but
whose work nevertheless was making a valuable
contribution to the firm. See
Each member of the Associates Committee receives copies
of the bottom line memo for all associates before meeting
formally to discuss evaluations. The bottom line memo
serves as a starting point for the Associates Committee's
discussion of each candidate. The Committee members
using both the bottom line memo and the administrativ~
summaries of the grades and comments, engage in a
process of weighing and comparing each associate's legal
skills and personal characteristics. The Committee also
conducts interviews of those partners who failed to submit
written evaluations of an associate during an evaluation
period, submitted an evaluation that requires clarification
or asked for an opportunity to supplement the written
evaluation in an interview.5 Strogatz testified that the
Committee has no formal voting procedure.
It ultimately reaches its own consensus as to
each senior associate's partnership potential and as to each
associate's performance. It also formulates a performance
review that will be given to each associate and senior
associate by a member of the Committee.
The firm's partners evaluated Ezold twice a year as an
associate and once a year as a senior associate from
October 1983 until the Associates Committee determined
that it would not recommend her for partnership in
September 1988. The district court found that "[i]n the
period up to and including 1988, Ms. Ezold received
strongly positive evaluations from almost all of the
partners for whom she had done any substantial work." Id
at 1182 (FOF 60).6 In making this finding the district court
relied on the evaluations of Wolf partners Seymour
Kurland, Robert Boote, Steve Goodman, Barry Schwartz,
Alan Davis and Raymond Bradley. Ezold's overall score in
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legal skills in the 1988 bottom line memorandum before
the Associates Committee was a "G" for good. It was noted
that "overall" that year she received "stronger grades in
intellectual skills than last time." Id. at 1183 (FOF 71).
Evaluations in Ezold's file not mentioned by the district
court show that concerns over Ezold's legal analytical
ability arose early during her tenure at the firm. In an
evaluation covering the period from November 1984
through April 1985, Arbittier wrote:
I have discussed legal issues with Nancy
in connection with [two cases]. I found
her analysis to be rather superficial and
unfocused. I am beginning to doubt that
she has sufficient legal analytical ability
to make it with the firm .... She makes a
good impression with people, has
common sense, and can handle routine
matters well. However these traits will
take you just so far in our firm. I think
that due to the nature of our practice
Nancy's future here is limited.
App. at 3392. That same year Schwartz wrote:
*517 I have worked a great deal with
Nancy since my last evaluation .... Both
cases are complex, multifaceted matters
that have presented novel issues to us.
While her enthusiasm never wanes and
she keeps plugging away-I'm often left
with a product that demonstrates
uncertainty in the analysis of a problem.
After extensive discussions with me, the
analysis becomes a little more focused,
although sometimes I get the sense that
Nancy feels adrift and is just marching as
best she can to my analytical tune .... In
my view her energy, enthusiasm and
fearlessness make her a valuable asset to
us. While she may not be as bright as
some of our best associates, her talents
will continue to serve us well.

Id. at 3392. Also in 1985, partner Donald Joseph rated
Ezold's legal analytical ability as marginal and wrote "[i]ts
[sic] too early to tell but I have been disappointed on her
grasp of the problem, let alone performance." Id.
During her next evaluation period from April through
November 1985, Ezold received similar negative
evaluations. Arbittier, Robert Fiebach and Joseph rated her
legal analytical abilities as marginal. Arbittier wrote:

She took a long time getting [a summary
judgment brief] done and I found it to be
stilted and unimaginative. One of the
main issues-dealing with the issue of
notice-she missed completely and did not
grasp our position .... Also, in considering
whether to file a defensive motion ... she
failed to cite me to a clause in the
agreement that was highly relevant
leaving me with the impression that the
motion could not succeed. I think Nancy
tries hard and can handle relatively
straight-forward matters with a degree of
maturity and judgment, but when she
gets into more complicated areas she
lacks real analytical skill and just does
what she is told in a mechanical way. She
is not up to our minimal Wolf, Block
standards.

Id. at 3376. Boote made the following report on his
performance review with Ezold after this evaluation
period:
Nancy appeared to accept the judgment,
albeit a little grudgingly, that her
analytical, research and writing ability
was not up to our standards and that she
should focus on the types of matters that
she can handle effectively .... We made it
very clear to Nancy that if she pursues
general civil litigation work she is not on
track toward partnership and that her
only realistic chance for partnership in
our opinion is to develop a good
reputation for herself in one of the
specialized areas of practice.

Id. at 3375.
In the evaluation period covering November 1985 to April
1986, Boote wrote the following to the Associates
Committee:
Nancy continues to get mixed reviews.
Her pluses are that she is mature,
courageous, pretty good on her feet and
has the capacity to inspire confidence in
clients. Her minuses are that there is
doubt about her analytic and writing
ability....
In considering Nancy's
prospects for the long range, I think we
should bear in mind that we have made
mistakes in the past in letting people go
to other firms who really could have
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filled a valuable niche here. Whether
Nancy is such a person, of course,
remains to be seen.

Id. at 3365.
A summary of Ezold's performance review from October
1986 prepared by Schwartz stated:
Nancy was advised that several of the
lawyers feel she has made very positive
progress as a lawyer, Sy [Kurland] being
one of them. However, he told her that
other lawyers had strong negative
sentiments about her capabilities and
they feel she has a number of
shortcomings in the way of complicated
analysis of legal problems and in being
able to handle the big complicated
corporate litigation, and therefore, does
not meet the standard for partnership at
Wolf, Block .... Both Sy and I urged
Nancy to seriously consider looking for
employment elsewhere as she may not be
able to tum the tide.

Although several partners saw improvement in Ezold's
work, negative comments *518 about her analytical ability
continued up until, and through, her 1988 senior associate
evaluation, the year she was considered for partnership. A
summary of her evaluations for 1987 and 1988, focusing
on the grades and comments she received in the category of
legal analysis, follows:?
*519 During the 1987 evaluation period, two partners
viewed Ezold's eventual admission to the partnership
"with enthusiasm," sixteen "with favor," eight "with mixed
emotions" and seven with "negative feelings." Id. at 3346.
The Associates Committee formed a consensus that
Ezold's analytical ability fell below the firm's standards. It
predicted her partnership chances as "unclear" and if she
was made a partner it would most likely be a Category VII
partner because there was substantial doubt as to her legal
ability. Id. at 3349. At trial Ezold acknowledged that
during her evaluation meeting for this period she was told
that "there were partners who criticized [her] writing
ability and questioned [her] ability to handle complex
litigation, perhaps criticized or questioned [her] ability in
the area oflegal analysis." Id. at 666.

Id. at 3364.

1988 Evaluations

Partner
Name

Grade
(Legal

C
0

m
m

e
n
t
Analysis) s
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Rosenblum

A

"On a very complicated matter primarily involving financial analysis, I
am not sure whether or not [Ezold] grasped analysis fully. (I am not
sure that others working on project did either. ... )." Recommended
partnership with "mixed emotions." Id. at 3488-91.

Temin

A

Slight contact. Recommended partnership "with mixed emotions." Id.
at 3508-11.

Davis

A

"She will never be a legal scholar-but we have plenty of support in that
area." Recommended partnership with "enthusiasm." Id. at 3512-15.

Arbittier

A "Barely adequate legal skills"; "Her abilities are limited. She makes a
good impression but she lacks real legal analytical ability."
Recommended partnership with "mixed emotions." Id. at 3520-23.

Fiebach

M "Nancy has certain strengths .... If directed, she will do a good
job-except that she has limitations with respect to complex legal
issues. However, when left on her own she does not do what has to be
done until [the] case is in crisis and she does a poor job in keeping [the]
client informed." Recommended partnership with "negative feelings."
Id. at 3544-47.

Goldberger

Would feel comfortable turning over a significant matter for one of his
clients "if not too complex." "Nancy reputedly can handle many of our
matters on her own. If so and reliable others bear these rumors out,
partnership may be in the cards." Recommended partnership with
"mixed emotions." Id. at 3552-55.

Joseph

"[H]er abilities to grasp legal issues from the little I observed was
insufficient to trust her in major litigation on her own." Recommended
partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at 3560-63.

Poul

Simon

G

Slight contact. Recommended partnership "with favor." Id. at 3580-83.

"Probably ancient history-but I do recall my perception that she does
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not write well and lacks intellectual sophistication." Recommended
partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at 3596-99.

Fala

G

"Nancy handled a moderate sized lawsuit for a client of mine. Job was
done well and responsibly. Result was good." Id. at 3656.

Roberts

G

Slight contact; recommended partnership with "mixed emotions." Id. at
3688-91.

Garber

"Experience with her years ago was unsatisfactory." No opinion on
partnership recommendation. Id. at 3756-59.

Berriman

G

Slight contact; recommended partnership "with enthusiasm." Id. at
3776-79.

Kaplinsky

A

"She has done a very nice job on the Home Unity shareholder
litigation .... I am probably not as complimentary as Alan [Davis] might
be. I was never convinced that she had a complete grasp of the
accounting issues in the case." Recommended partnership "with
favor." Id. at 3452-55.

McConomy

G

"Only worked on one matter for me. She is doing a super job."
Recommended partnership "with favor." Id. at 3464-67.

*520 In 1988, ninety-one partners submitted evaluations of
Ezold. Thirty-two, a little more than one-third, made
recommendations with varying degrees of confidence, for
Ezold's admission to partnership. Seven of those partners
recommended that Ezold be made a partner "with
enthusiasm," fourteen "with favor," six with "mixed
emotions," four with "negative feelings," and one with
"mixed emotions/negative feelings." Id at 3318. Three of
the four partners who voted for partnership with negative
feelings were members of Ezold's department. After
reviewing Ezold's evaluations and conducting interviews,
the Associates Committee voted 9-1 not to recommend
Ezold for Category VI partnership.

In a discussion initiated by Davis, the Associates
Committee also debated modifYing the partnership
standard as a matter of general policy or specially in
Ezold's case because of her other positive attributes. Davis
believed:
although [Ezold] was not up to par on her
legal analytical ability, ... deficiencies in
a particular area, even though it was a
traditional area where we required a
certain superior level, could be
overlooked or relaxed to where there
were sufficiently compensating skills in
other areas, because I felt as chairman
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that in staffing a case, I could put
together the right skills, and we had
enough business where we could fit
everybody in usefully and productively.
Id. at 1665, 1686. He thought the firm "just ought to come

off [its] standards and be a little more creative in melding
different abilities that different people might bring." Id. at
1685. The other Committee members ultimately rejected
this suggestion.
The Associates Committee told Ezold that she would not
be recommended for admission as a "Group VI" regular
partner effective February 1, 1989 because "too many
partners did not believe she had sufficient legal analytical
I
ability to handle complex legal issues."
It did vote, however, to
recommend her for the status of "Group VlI" special
partner that the firm had heretofore made available to
associates who are valuable but fall below the firm's high
standards for full partnership. The continuing existence
of that category was, however, then under review by the
finn's Executive Committee. It was in fact later
eliminated.
Out of a total of eight candidates in Ezold's class, five male
associates and one female associate were recommended for
regular partnership. One male associate, Associate X, was
not recommended for either regular or special partnership.
The Executive Committee decided to review the
Associates Committee's negative recommendation of
Ezold and also to conduct an independent review of the
negative *521 recommendation of Associate X. William
Rosoff, former chairman of the Executive Committee,
conducted the inquiry. Rosoffreviewed Ezold's evaluation
documents and interviewed four litigation department
partners: Schwartz, Boote, Arbittier and Fiebach. Rosoff
had learned of the policy disagreement among some of the
firm's partners as to whether the partnership standard
should be relaxed in light of Ezold's other attributes. He
reported to the Executive Committee that it should not
recommend Ezold's admission unless it was prepared to
reduce the finn's partnership standards. The 5-member
Executive Committee voted unanimously not to
recommend Ezold's admission as a regular partner.
On November 16, 1988 Executive Committee Chairman
Charles Kopp met with Ezold and informed her of the
decision. He also told her that two domestic relations
partners had informed the Committee several days earlier
that they were leaving the firm and that this immediate
vacuum presented an opportunity for her. Id. at 1189 (FOF
137). He promised that if she agreed to work in this
department, she would be made a regular partner in one

year. Other associates passed over for partnership in the
past had sometimes agreed to specialize in a certain area
where the need arose and had later made partner. Although
Kopp had little contact with Ezold, he believed that Ezold
could handle the work because of the positive evaluations
of her skills with clients and in the courtroom and because
the practice area did not require the same complex analysis
as the firm's commercial litigation practice. See id. at 1189
(FOF 137-38).14 Ezold declined the offer. Kopp told Ezold
that the firm nevertheless wanted her to stay and she could
stay on as a litigation associate as long as she wanted. Id. at
1189 (FOF 139).
Ezold also met with Rosoff concerning the domestic
relations offer. The district court found that Rosoff "told
her that although he could not assure her of a partnership in
the future if she declined the domestic relations partnership
offer, she would be considered for partnership in the
future."
He also told her that she
would receive a substantial pay raise the following July
when semi-annual raises are given to associates, but she
would not receive the pay raise being given to the other
members of her class who were recommended for
partnership.
Ezold remained at the firm, none of her cases were taken
away from her, and Davis, then chair of the Litigation
Department and one of Ezold's supporters, continued to
assign her new cases. On January 25, 1989, one day after
the firm's partners voted on the admission of new partners,
Ezold began looking for other employment. She ultimately
signed a one-year contract as president of an
environmental consulting firm, a former client of Wolf,
and also took an "of counsel" position with a suburban law
firm. Ezold resigned from the firm on June 7,1989.

III.
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under
and
(West 1981). We have jurisdiction over the
*522 final orders of the district court pursuant to

IV.
Ezold claims Wolf intentionally discriminated against her
because of her sex. Intentional discrimination in
employment cases fall within one of two categories:
"pretext" cases and "mixed-motives" cases. See
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pretext cases, the familiar McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
analysis applies. In a mixed motives case the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine analysis does not apply, and the plaintiff
has the burden of showing by evidence tied to a
discriminatory animus that an illegitimate factor had a
"motivating" or "substantial" role in the employment
decision.
This theory has been
codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See
(West Supp.1992). Jfthe plaintiff makes such
a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence "that it would have reached
the same [employment] decision ... even in the absence of'
the impermissible factor.
There is some uncertainty in the law
about the sort of evidence a plaintiff must show to shift the
burden to an employer in a mixed motives case, see
cert. denied,
but we need not address that issue here as Ezold
proceeded only under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
framework. See Transcript of Oral Argument, at 46-47
("Your Honor ... [ intended to say that this case followed
standard McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.... This is a
pretext case."). This is not a mixed-motive case. The issue
in this case is "whether illegal or legal motives, but not
both, were the 'true' motives behind the [partnership]

II I Therefore, before considering Wolf's contentions, we
think it wise to revisit the alternating burdens of proof in a
Title VII discrimination case under the now familiar

Ezold relied on this particular method of
circumstantial proof of discrimination at trial. The plaintiff
must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence a
prima facie case of discrimination.
t<m0/j,,?O

(

The plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing
that she is a member of a protected class; that she was
qualified for and rejected for the position; and that
non-members of the protected class were treated more
favorably.
(citing

see
After the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.

genuine issue of fact, the presumption of discrimination
drops from the case.
plaintiff, since she retains the ultimate
persuasion, must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant's proffered reasons were a
pretext for discrimination. *523

12) The parties do not dispute the district court's
conclusion of law that Ezold demonstrated a prima facie
case, in particular that she was "qualified" for admission to
the partnership. While "more than a denial of promotion as
a result of a dispute over qualifications" must be shown to
prove pretext, see
such a dispute will satisfY the plaintiff's
prima facie hurdle of establishing qualification as long as
the plaintiff demonstrates that "[s]he was sufficiently
qualified to be among those persons from whom a
selection, to some extent discretionary, would be made."
I (quoting
In Title VII cases involving a dispute over
"subjective" qualifications, we have recognized that the
qualification issue should often be resolved in the second
and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
analysis, to avoid putting too onerous a burden on the
plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case, but we have
refused to adopt a blanket rule.
Because the prima facie case is
it is rarely the focus of the ultimate

cert. denied,
We agree with
the district court's conclusion that favorable evaluations
from partners with whom Ezold worked, and a score of
"0" on her 1988 bottom line memo, demonstrate that she
was qualified for partnership consideration. See

The defendant may rebut the presumption of
discrimination arising out of the plaintiff's prima facie case
by producing evidence that there was a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" why the plaintiff was rejected.
The Supreme
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Court in Burdine said:
[T]he defendant must clearly set forth,
through the introduction of admissible
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's
rejection. The explanation provided must
be legally sufficient to justify a judgment
for the defendant. If the defendant carries
this burden of production, the
presumption raised by the prima facie
case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry
proceeds to a new level of specificity.
Placing this burden of production on the
defendant thus serves simultaneously to
meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by
presenting a legitimate reason for the
action and to frame the factual issue with
sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will
have a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext.. ..

131 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
defendant's articulated reasons are pretextual.
This burden merges into the plaintiff's
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been
the victim of intentional discrimination. Id. The plaintiff
must demonstrate "by competent evidence that the
presumptively valid reason [ ] for [the alleged unlawful
employment action] [was] III fact a coverup for a ...
discriminatory decision."
Explicit evidence of
discrimination-i.e., the "smoking gun"-is not required. See
A plaintiff can
establish pretext in one of two ways: "either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of
credence."

141 In proving that the employer's motive was more likely
than not the product of a discriminatory reason instead of
the articulated legitimate reason, sufficiently strong
evidence of an employer's past treatment of the plaintiff
may suffice. See *524

decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the
evidence produced by the plaintiff may be sufficient to
prove the ultimate fact of discriminatory intent."

Wolf's articulated nondiscriminatory reason for denying
Ezold's admission to the partnership was that she did not
possess sufficient legal analytical skills to handle the
responsibilities of partner in the firm's complex litigation
practice. Ezold attempted to prove that Wolf's proffered
explanation was "unworthy of credence" by showing she
was at least equal to, if not more qualified than, similarly
situated males promoted to partnership. She also
contended that her past treatment at the firm showed
Wolf's decision was based on a discriminatory motive
rather than the legitimate reason of deficiency in legal
analytical ability that the firm had articulated.

v.
From this overview of the law, we tum to the specifics of
the district court's analysis, its findings and the parties'
contentions concerning them. The district court compared
Ezold to eight successful male partnership candidates,
Associates A-H. It found:
The test that was put to the plaintiff by
the Associates Committee that she have
outstanding academic credentials and
that before she could be admitted to the
most junior of partnerships, she must
demonstrate that she had the analytical
ability to handle the most complex
litigation was not the test required of
male associates.
The district court
then concluded:
Ms. Ezold has established that the
defendant's purported reasons for its
conduct are pretextual. The defendant
promoted to partnership men having
evaluations substantially the same or
inferior to the plaintiff's, and indeed
promoted male associates who the
defendant claimed had precisely the lack
of analytical or writing ability upon
which Wolf, Block purportedly based its
decision concerning the plaintiff. The
defendant is not entitled to apply its
standards in a more "severe" fashion to
female associates.... Such differential
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treatment establishes that the defendant's
reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Id. at 1191-92 (COL II ) (citations omitted).
Wolf says this finding of pretext is wrong. Analyzing its
contentions, we perceive two reasons why this is so. First,
the district court's finding that Ezold was required to have
outstanding academic credentials before she could be
admitted to partnership is without factual support in the
record. The only evidence in the record that Wolf
considered Ezold's academic record is limited to the
original decision to hire Ezold and to assignments given to
Ezold early in her employment with Wolf, issues we
consider in Part IX, infra. Second, in its analysis, the
district court did not focus on Wolfs articulated reason for
denying Ezold partnership-lack of analytic ability to
handle complex litigation. Instead, the district court first
substituted its own general standard for the qualities Wolf
believed were essential to law firm partnership. Then,
applying its own incorrect standard of comparison, the
district court did not realize that a comparison of Ezold's
legal analytic ability with that of the successful *525 males
could not support a finding of pretext. Overall, Ezold's
evaluations in that category were not as good as that of
even the least capable male associate who was offered a
partnership position.

legal error in the selection of the appropriate standards for
determining discrimination. In Logue the defendant
asserted on appeal that the district court incorrectly applied
the legal standard for sex discrimination by failing to
address and make findings of fact on all of the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons it offered in support of its
termination of the plaintiff's employment. /d. at 153. We
held that by failing to address all of the defendant's
proffered reasons the district court erred as a matter oflaw,
misapplied the legal standard governing sex discrimination
and deprived the defendant of the full trial process
contemplated by Burdine.

151 This case is distinguishable from Logue. Here, the
district court did consider Wolf's articulated
nondiscriminatory reason and did make findings upon it.
Wolf contends the district court's findings are incomplete
and that those it did make do not support its ultimate
finding of pretext. Plenary review is appropriate in order to
determine the extent to which essential findings are
missing. The district court's refusal to credit or make
findings concerning all of Wolf's proffered evidence,
however, does not subject its express findings to plenary
review. Those findings cannot be set aside unless they are
clearly erroneous. A finding becomes clearly erroneous
"when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

VI.

Wolf contends that in all aspects of its analysis the district
court improperly substituted its own subjective
judgment-not only concerning what the firm's partnership
standard should be-but also concerning whether Ezold met
this standard. Specifically, it alleges that the district court
ignored the negative evaluations concerning Ezold's legal
analytical ability that are in the record; looked beyond the
criterion of legal analysis, Wolf's articulated
nondiscriminatory reason, in comparing Ezold to male
associates admitted to the partnership; failed to make
findings concerning male associates denied admission to
the partnership based on their deficient legal analytical
ability; and excluded from evidence the evaluation files of
female associates admitted to the partnership who received
criticisms similar to male associates admitted to the
partnership in areas other than legal analysis. Initially,
Wolf argues our review of these issues is plenary.
Wolf relies on
proposition that we exercise plenary review over the
district court's determinations on these questions. Ezold
responds that Wolf is trying to obtain plenary review by
couching a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as

When there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
district court's choice of one view cannot be clearly
erroneous.
The district court's resolution of the ultimate issue
whether Wolf's reason for denying Ezold's admission to
the partnership was a pretext is a finding of fact subject to
the clearly erroneous standard set forth in
See id. at 573,
We may reverse the district
court on this finding of fact only if the evidence is
insufficient to permit a rational factfinder to infer that
Wolf's assertion that Ezold was wanting in legal analytic
ability was a mask for unlawful sex discrimination.
Wolfs disagreement with the method of analysis the
district court employed leads naturally to its challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district
court's finding of pretext and its ultimate conclusion of
unlawful discrimination. *526 Thus, Wolf contended at
oral argument before this Court: "[t]here is no proof, in this
case, of a gender-driven result." Transcript at 59. In
considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
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we must determine based on our own "comprehensive
review of the entire record" whether Ezold has satisfied her
ultimate burden of proving intentional sex discrimination.
In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to Ezold. See
(citing
cert. denied,
We again defer to the district court's
factual findings, including once more its ultimate finding,
and we cannot reverse any of them unless they are clearly
erroneous.

VII.

171 Wolfs articulated reason for refusing to offer Ezold a
partnership was its belief, based on a subtle and subjective
consensus among the partners, that she did not possess
sufficient legal analytic ability to handle complex
litigation. Wolf never contended that Ezold was not a good
courtroom lawyer, dedicated to her practice, and good with
clients. Instead, many partners felt, because of the level of
her legal analytical ability, that she could not handle
partnership responsibilities in the firm's complex litigation
practice. Absent evidence to show that legal analytic
ability was not a necessary precondition for partnership at
Wolf, the district court's opinion about Ezold's
comparative strengths in the other categories on the
evaluation form is immaterial.

A.
The record does not show that anyone was taken into the
partnership without serious consideration of their strength
in the category of legal analytic ability. The evaluations
specifically asked each partner whether he or she would
feel comfortable turning over to the partnership candidate
"to handle on his/her own a significant matter for one of
my clients." See App. at 3423. Several of the partners'
responses to this question on Ezold's evaluations show
clear concern about the depth of her legal analytical
capabilities. See, e.g., App. at 3348 ("I would not want her
in charge of a large legally complex case, the traditional
measure of a Wolf, Block partner."). This same question,
reflecting a requirement that an applicant exhibit analytical
abilities sufficient to meet Wolfs perception of the firm's
standard, was considered throughout the firm's evaluations
of the male associates with whom Ezold was competing.
See, e.g., App. at 4257 ("I just am concerned if he could
'first chair' a case."); App. at 4823 ("He [Associate H] can
handle the most complex litigation we have."); App. at

4532 ("Based on [Associate C's] ability to analyze a legal
problem 1 could feel comfortable in turning over my best
client to him for a significant matter."); App. at 5044
("[There are] questions about his intellectual strength, his
ability to manage complex transactions and his level of
attention to detail"); App. at 4696 ("[H]e just doesn't have
the high level of intelligence we need to handle complex
legal questions."). Ezold herself acknowledged at trial that
because of the nature of Wolf's litigation practice, its
litigators devote much more time to legal analysis than
in-court trial work.
Davis, a member of the Associates Committee who
favored partnership for Ezold, testified that he recognized
her shortcomings in the area oflegal analytic ability. Thus,
he advocated a relaxation of the partnership standard to
accommodate her because he believed that her other skills
"outweighed whatever deficiencies she had in the legal
ability area." App. at 1684. The Associates Committee and
the Executive Committee ultimately refused to relax the
firm's standards. Such a refusal to relax *527 standards,
however, is not evidence of discrimination.
Wolf reserves for itself the power to decide, by consensus,
whether an associate possesses sufficient analytical ability
to handle complex matters independently after becoming a
partner. It is Wolf's prerogative to utilize such a standard.

fu

~an

age discrimination case, we stated that "[b Jarring
discrimination, a company has the right to make business
judgments on employee status, particularly when the
decision involves SUbjective factors deemed essential to
We stated again that "[a]
certain positions."
plaintiff has the burden of casting doubt on an employer's
articulated reasons for an employment decision. Without
some evidence to cast this doubt, this Court will not
interfere in an otherwise valid management decision."
(citing
(a court will not second guess
business decisions made by employers, in the absence of
some evidence of impermissible motives)); see
("While an employer's judgment or course of action may
seem poor or erroneous to outsiders, the relevant question
is simply whether the given reason was a pretext for illegal
discrimination. ").
The partnership evaluation process at Wolf, though
formalized, is based on judgment, like most decisions in
human institutions. A consensus as to that judgment is the
end result of Wolf's formal process. In that process, the
Associates Committee has the role of collecting and
weighing hundreds of evaluations by partners with diverse
views before reaching its consensus as to a particular
associate's abilities. The consensus the Associates
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Committee reaches is then passed on to the Executive
Committee. After its review and, at least in Ezold's case,
additional independent investigation, the Executive
Committee submits its final recommendation to the
partners for a vote.
The differing evaluations the partners first submit to the
Associates Committee are often based on hearsay or
reputation. No precise theorem or specific objective
(not
criterion is employed. Cj
"unwarranted invasion" of college's tenure process for
district court "to determine that [professor] was held to
higher standards in objective terms, i.e. number of
publications") (emphasis added). We have cautioned
courts on several occasions to avoid unnecessary intrusion
into sUbjective promotion decisions in the analogous
context of academic tenure. While such decisions are not
insulated fromjudicial review for unlawful discrimination,
it is clear that courts must be vigilant not
to intrude into that determination, and
should not substitute their judgment for
that of the college with respect to the
qualifications of faculty members for
promotion and tenure. Determinations
about such matters as teaching ability,
research scholarship, and professional
stature are subjective, and unless they
can be shown to have been used as the
mechanism to obscure discrimination,
they must be left for evaluation by the
professionals ....

B.
In Ezold's case, the district court correctly recognized the
legal premise that should have governed its result: Title
VII prohibits only "discrimination." Therefore,
"consideration of the practices of the [firm] toward the
plaintiff must be evaluated in light of its practices toward
the allegedly more favored group, in this case males."
The district court, however, failed to apply this legal
premise to the evidence before it. It disagreed not only with

Wolf's assessment of Ezold's ability to meet Wolf's
standards, but also with Wolf's *528 partnership standards
themselves. For example, it found:
In the magnitude of its complexity, a case
may have a senior partner, a younger
partner, and an associate(s) assigned to a
case. Accordingly, requiring the plaintiff
to have the ability to handle on her own
any complex litigation within the firm
before she was eligible to be a partner
was a pretext.
The district court
disagreed with Wolf's decision not to overlook Ezold's
deficiency in legal analysis because of her other skills and
attributes, but the court is not a member of Wolf's
Associates Committee or Executive Committee. Its belief
that Wolf's high standard of analytical ability was unwise
in light of the staffing of senior partners on complex cases
does not make Wolf's standard a pretext for
discrimination.

181 The evaluations that the district court did rely upon in
making its finding of pretext praised Ezold for skills other
than legal analysis, such as client relations and ability in
court, that Wolf never disputed she possessed. Where an
employer produces evidence that the plaintiff was not
promoted because of its view that the plaintiff lacked a
particular qualification the employer deemed essential to
the position sought, a district court should focus on the
qualification the employer found lacking in determining
whether non-members of the protected class were treated
more favorably. Without such a limitation, district courts
would be routinely called upon to act as members of an
employer's promotion board or committee. It would
subjectively consider and weigh all the factors the
employer uses in reaching a decision on promotion and
then make its own decision without the intimate
knowledge of the history of the employer and its standards
that the firm's decisionmakers use in judging the degree to
which a candidate exhibits a particular qualification that
the employer has decided is of significance or primary
importance in its promotion process. Pretext is not
established by virtue of the fact that an employee has
received some favorable comments in some categories or
has, in the past, received some good evaluations. See, e.g.,

("An employer rating an employee as
competent discredits the employer's stated reason for
discharging the employee, however, only when the
employer's stated reason is the employee's general
incompetence.") (emphasis added). It was not for the
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district court to determine that Ezold's skills in areas other
than legal analysis made her sufficiently qualified for
admission to the partnership.
The district court's method of comparing Ezold to
"similarly situated" male associates admitted to the
partnership points up this initial flaw in its analysis. It
engaged in a "pick and choose" selection of various
comments concerning the male associates' personalities,
work habits, and other criteria besides legal analysis,
conducted its own subjective weighing process and then
found that "[m]ale associates who received evaluations no
better than [Ezold] and sometimes less favorable than [her]
were made partners."
In doing so, the district court made no reference to the
many favorable evaluations of the analytical ability of
these male associates.
ajJ'd in relevant part,
rev'd on other grounds,

(plurality), is
instructive. There the dispute centered in part on whether
Price Waterhouse's concern about the plaintiff's
interpersonal skills was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason to deny her partnership, or whether it was unworthy
of credence. The district court held that "[i]t is clear that
the complaints about the plaintiff's interpersonal skills
were not fabricated as a pretext for discrimination."
Contemporaneous evaluations
"conducted well before the plaintiff was proposed for
partnership" reflected numerous criticisms of her
interpersonal skills, *529 and "[e ]ven partners who
strongly
supported
her
partnership
candidacy
acknowledged these deficiencies." ld. The plaintiff in
Hopkins had contended that men with problems in
interpersonal skills were invariably admitted to the
partnership. The district court disagreed, stating:
[T]he plaintiff has identified two male
candidates who were criticized for their
interpersonal skills because they were
perceived
as
being
aggressive,
overbearing, abrasive or crude, but were
recommended by the Policy Board and
elected partner. Price Waterhouse points
out that in both cases the Policy Board
expressed substantial reservations about
the candidates' interpersonal skills but
ultimately made a "business decision" to
admit the candidates because they had
skills which the firm had a specific,
special need [for] and the firm feared that
their talents might be lost if they were put
on hold .... In addition, these candidates

received fewer evaluations from partners
recommending that they be denied
partnership and the negative comments
on these candidates were less intense
than those directed at the plaintiff.
ld. at 1115.18
The district court's comparison of Ezold with the
successful male candidates in categories other than legal
analytic ability does not lend support to its ultimate finding
of pretext. The district court could not overturn Wolf's
judgment that Ezold did not meet its standards for legal
analytic ability without finding that Wolf's conclusions as
to Ezold's legal analytic ability were pretextual. That
finding, in order to stand, has to be based on evidence
showing either that Wolf's asserted reason for denying
Ezold a partnership position was not credible-either
through comparison of her ability in that category, as Wolf
perceived it, with the successful male associates, or by
evidence showing that Wolf's decision not to admit Ezold
to the partnership was more likely motivated by a
discriminatory reason than by her shortcomings in legal
analytic ability.

c.
Were the factors Wolf considered in deciding which
associates should be admitted to the partnership objective,
as opposed to subjective, the conflicts in various partners'
views about Ezold's legal analytical ability that this record
shows might amount to no more than a conflict in the
evidence that the district court as factfinder had full power
to resolve. The principles governing valid comparisons
between members of a protected minority and those
fortunate enough to be part of a favored majority reveal an
obvious difficulty plaintiffs must face in an unlawful
discrimination case involving promotions that are
dependent on an employer's balanced evaluation of
various subjective criteria. This difficulty is the lack of an
objective qualification or factor that a plaintiff can use as a
yardstick to compare herself with similarly situated
employees. In Bennun, the reason Rutgers assigned for
denying Bennun's promotion to the position of tenured
professor was the "poor quality and insufficient quantity of
his research."
Because Bennun's
research product could be measured against the judgment
of his academic peers and, by that judgment, objectively
compared with the research of a successful candidate for
professor, Bennun was able to show the reason the
University advanced for denying him the rank of professor
was incredible. He did so by proving that he had published
a higher number of articles than the similarly situated
non-hispanic member ofthe faculty who had been granted
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professorial rank and that his articles had received more
favorable reviews from internationally known scholars. fd.
By objectively comparing Bennun's published research
with that of the favored candidate, the district court
rationally found that Bennun was held to higher standards
than a non-Hispanic. This Court held that this *530 finding
was not clearly erroneous and thus laid a proper foundation
for the district court's circumstantial inference that
Rutgers' articulated reason for denying Bennun promotion
was a pretext. fd. at 179-80.
Similarly, in Kunda, the district court held that
Muhlenberg's asserted reason for not promoting Kunda,
lack of a master's degree, "was pretextual in view of its
promotion of male members of the department who did not
have masters' degrees."
We affirmed,
stating:
Muhlenberg's attempt to explain and
distinguish each of the three situations
[in which male members without
master's degrees were promoted] raised a
factual issue which the trier of fact
decided against it. We cannot say that the
record is barren of any evidence to
support the trial court's findings, and
therefore will affirm its ultimate
conclusion
that
plaintiff
was
discriminated against on the basis of sex
in the denial of a promotion.
fd. at 545.

The record shows a 9-1 consensus among the members of
the Associates Committee that Ezold's admission to the
partnership was "unlikely" because of their overall
assessment of her legal analytical ability. It was followed
by the unanimous negative vote of the Executive
Committee and the entire partnership. The positive
evaluations of some partners concerning Ezold's skills in
areas other than legal analysis do not show the reason Wolf
advanced for denying partnership to Ezold was incredible
and so a pretext for discrimination.
Ezold, unlike the plaintiffs in Bennun and Kunda, is not
able to point to an objectively quantifiable factor by which
Wolf compared her qualifications against those of the male
associates considered for partnership. Wolfs articulated
reason, lack of legal analytic ability to handle complex
litigation, like all its other criteria, involves subjective
assessment of an associate's manifested behavior and
performance.

D.

Here, the district court not only based its finding of pretext
on invalid comparisons, but it also ignored evidence Wolf
produced to compare Ezold's shortcomings with the
strengths of the successful male candidates in the category
of legal analytic ability.
Thus, Wolf also argues the district court ignored
significant evidence by focusing only on the positive
evaluations in Ezold's files and turning a blind eye to the
many negative criticisms concerning her analytic ability.
Compare
with supra at
516-20. Wolfs attack in this respect is even more serious
in its consequence than its attack on the court's use of
comparisons between Ezold and the successful male
candidates in categories other than legal analytic ability.
The court's improper comparison of Ezold and the
successful males in categories other than legal analytic
ability would merely require a remand for appropriate
comparison. If, however, Ezold is unable to show that she
compared favorably in the category oflegal analytic ability
with at least one ofthe successful male candidates, she will
have failed to show that Wolf did not pass her over for the
legitimate reason it asserted. If she fails in that respect, she
loses the benefit of the inference of unlawful
discrimination that arises when the employer's legitimate
articulated reason is shown not to be the real reason for the
employer's discriminatory action. Absent that inference,
Ezold cannot prevail on her McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
theory unless she has produced direct evidence
independently sufficient to show discriminatory animus,
an issue we consider in Part IX, infra. See
Compare W!LULmntc!
I.
("The broad,
overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and
consumer, is efficient *531 and trustworthy workmanship
assured through fair and ... neutral employment and
personnel decisions.") with
("Title VII, however, does not demand that
an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or
women.") (citing
§ kV'JV';-kl
HUV/f,,"o

We are not unmindful of the difficult task a plaintifffaces
in proving discrimination in the application of subjective
factors. It arises from an inherent tension between the goal
of all discrimination law and our society's commitment to
free decisionmaking by the private sector in economic
affairs.
The fact that Wolfs articulated reason for rejecting Ezold,
lack of legal analytical ability, involves subjective and not
objective factors subject to easy measurement does not,
therefore, insulate the partnership decision from all review.
When an employer relies on its subjective evaluation of the
plaintiffs qualifications as the reason for denying
promotion, the plaintiff can prove the articulated reason is
unworthy of credence by presenting persuasive
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comparative evidence that non-members of the protected
class were evaluated more favorably, i.e., their deficiencies
in the same qualification category as the plaintiffs were
overlooked for no apparent reason when they were
promoted to partner.20

be excused in the face of the credence the district court
gave to positive comments about Ezold's ability from
those who likewise had little or no contact with her. While
a factfinder can accept some evidence and reject other
evidence on the basis of credibility, it should not base its
credibility determination on a conflicting double standard.
Moreover, the district court never made a finding that the
critical evaluations were themselves incredible or a pretext
for discrimination. There is no evidence that Wolfs
practice of giving weight to negative votes and comments
of partners who had little contact and perhaps knew
nothing about an associate beyond the associate's general
reputation was not applied equally to female and male
("Regardless
associates. Cf
of its wisdom, the firm's practice of giving 'no' votes [by
partners who had only limited contact with the candidate]
great weight treated male and female candidates in the
same way."). Ezold's preliminary contention that the
district court did not have to consider these negative
comments lacks merit. We turn therefore to an
examination of the evidence comparing Ezold and the
successful male candidates in the category oflegal analytic
ability.

make this showing.

*532 The district court's failure to consider the negative
evaluations of Ezold's legal analytic ability because the
partners making them had little contact with Ezold cannot

A sampling of comments from the negative evaluations of
Ezold's legal analytic ability reveals the extent to which
the district court's refusal to consider them flawed its
analysis. For example, Fiebach was one of those with
negative comments about Ezold's legal analytic ability. He
consistently rated Ezold's analytical skills as "marginal"
long before a 1988 disagreement in the Carpenter matter.22
See App. at 3190-91, 3025. Fiebach had experienced
"substantial" contact with Ezold during her final two years
as an associate. He recommended Ezold for partnership,
with professed "negative feelings." See App. at 3544-47.
Fiebach was not alone in his negative comments about
Ezold's legal analytic ability. Arbittier also strongly and
consistently criticized Ezold in the category of legal
analysis.23 Arbittier had opposed hiring Ezold in the first
instance because he did not think she had the academic
credentials to make it at the firm. See App. at 3414 ("[p ]oor
academic record-well below our standards"). In a 1984
evaluation Arbittier wrote "she is doing much better than I
thought she would .... "24 App. at 3397. Ezold later did work
for Arbittier, and his contemporaneous evaluations
indicate he was not impressed by her performance. See id.
at 1488-89, 3380 (her brief was "stilted and
unimaginative"; "she failed to cite me to a clause in the
agreement that was highly relevant"; "she missed [the
main issue] completely"). He ultimately recommended
Ezold's admission to the partnership "with mixed
emotions."
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Even Ezold's strongest supporters acknowledged the
shortcomings in her legal analytical ability. See, e.g., App.
at 3894 (Boote) ("I would not want her in charge of a large
legally complex case, the traditional measure of a Wolf,
Block partner."); id. at 3878 (Kurland) ("Nancy is an
exceptionally good courtroom lawyer ... except there *533
seems to be serious question as to whether she has the legal
ability to take on large matters and handle them on her
own."); id. at 3512 (Schwartz) ("Nancy is adequate in
[legal analysis], but is not a legal scholar."); id. at 3956
(Davis) ("She remains a little weak in her initial analysis of
complex legal issues."). These contemporaneous criticisms
support Wolfs contention that the final consensus among
its partners that Ezold did not, in the perception of the firm,
possess the legal analytical capacity requisite to becoming
a partner, and not her sex, was the reason for denying her a
partnership position.

VIII.
The district court's error in failing to consider the many
negative evaluations of Ezold's legal analytic ability, like
its error in comparing Ezold's strengths in other categories
with the successful male candidates, is not dispositive of
Wolfs argument that Ezold failed to produce evidence
sufficient to show she was manifestly as good as the least
capable of the favored males. The failure to consider these
negative comments would not be fatal to Ezold's case if
there were evidence in the record that could rationally
support a finding of unequal treatment by Wolfin applying
its articulated reason for the screening of candidates for
partnership. Thus, it remains necessary for us to examine
the record in that respect.
We note at once that it shows the evaluation process at
Wolf is demanding. Cf
("[ 0 ]pinions
managers and supervisors are evaluated, and the same can
be said for many jobs that involve ... complex and subtle
tasks like the provision of professional services .... ");
(
"Where a broad spectrum of views is sought ... a file
composed of irreconcilable evaluations is not unusual....
[T]enure files typically contain positive as well as negative
evaluations, often in extravagant terms, sufficient to
support either a grant or denial of tenure."). The firm may
have been wrong in its perception ofEzold's legal analytic
ability and, if so, its decision to pass over Ezold would be
unfair, but that is not for us to judge. Absent a showing that
Wolfs articulated reason oflack of ability in legal analysis
was used as a tool to discriminate on the basis of sex, Ezold
cannot prevail. See

(Powell, J.,
concurring) ("The qualities of mind, capacity to reason
logically ... and the like are unrelated to race or sex.").

A.
Always having in mind that the issue before us is whether
the firm passed over Ezold because she is a woman, we
begin our specific comparative analysis with male
Associate A.
Associate A worked in Wolf's litigation department. He
was recommended for partnership by the Associates
Committee in the fall of 1988. He is closest to Ezold in the
category of legal analysis, and, like her, received some
negative evaluations over the years.25 In its findings
concerning A's evaluations, however, the district court
failed to point out that no partner actually rated A lower
than Ezold in the criterion of legal analysis. No partner had
expressed serious problems with A's analytical ability as
of 1988, the year he was up for partnership, as in Ezold's
case. In fact, no partner gave A a grade below
acceptable/marginal in the category of legal analysis
during his final evaluation period.
Associate A received at least one and sometimes several
marks of "distinguished" in this category during each
evaluation period from April 1984 through 1988. Gregory
Magarity, Ezold's most ardent advocate, rated A as
"distinguished" in legal analysis in 1987 and 1988, higher
than the grade of "good" he gave Ezold in those years. He
wrote:
*534 [Associate A] did a magnificent job
in the preparation and trial of [a case] in
Indianapolis, Indiana. His written
product was excellent; his support and
legal analysis were likewise excellent.. ..
You can assign [Associate A] to any of
my cases.
App. at 5127. Barry Schwartz, David Doret, Donald
Joseph and Donald Bean also consistently rated A as
distinguished. Boote, a supporter of Ezold, also rated A
higher than Ezold in this category. The record is replete
with positive comments from many partners about
Associate A that the district court did not refer to. In 1987
and 1988, not one partner ever gave Ezold an unqualified
rating of "distinguished" in the category of legal
analysis.26
Although Fiebach rated A as just "acceptable" in legal
analysis in 1988 (App. at 6385), the district court
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incorrectly compared his single rating to Ezold's "bottom
line" rating of "good" which was prepared not by Fiebach,
but by Associates Committee member Arthur Block based
on Block's own shorthand summary of a large number of
individual evaluations of Ezold's analytic ability.27 See
That same year
Fiebach gave Ezold a rating of "marginal," lower than the
acceptable rating he gave A in that criterion.
Strogatz had also made a critical evaluation of A in 1987,
the year prior to his admission to the partnership, but
Strogatz viewed A's admission to the partnership "with
favor" in 1988. He wrote that "[A] is over the line," App. at
4354, and graded him as "good/acceptable" in the category
oflegal skills. Strogatz did not grade Ezold in this category
in 1987 or 1988 because of no contact with her other than
administratively. He did state, however, that "[m]y
impression from others is that her legal skills are at best
average and more probably marginal." App. at 3975.
Finally, in 1988, eight partners viewed A's admission to
the partnership "with enthusiasm," one "with
enthusiasm/favor," thirty-two "with favor," six "with
mixed emotions," one "with negative feelings" and the rest
had no opinion. Davis was the only partner in the firm to
vote for A's admission to the partnership with a negative
view. He gave A the same grade as Ezold, however, in the
category of legal analysis. In 1988, seven partners viewed
Ezold's admission "with enthusiasm," fourteen "with
favor," six "with mixed emotions," four "with negative
feelings" and one "with mixed emotions/negative
feelings." A's analytical skills, while criticized by various
partners, were never as consistently questioned as Ezold's.
The criticisms of A, found among the comments of the
partners evaluating Ezold and A, do not support a finding
that Wolfs legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
refusing a partnership position to Ezold was incredible. In
a comparison of subjective factors such as legal ability, it
must be obvious or manifest that the subjective standard
was unequally applied before a court can find pretext. See
supra at 525-26;
Unequal
application of the criterion of legal ability is not manifest
between Ezold and Associate A on this record.2S It does
not contain evidence *535 sufficient to show that Ezold
was held up to a higher standard than Associate A because
she was a woman.
Ezold's ability in legal analysis suffers even more in the
partners' eyes when compared with the individual
evaluations of the other successful male candidates. All of
the other males that Wolf accepted for partnership in 1988
received many scores of distinguished in the category of
legal analysis, and none of them ever received a grade of
marginal in this category during his final evaluation period
prior to admission to the partnership. We summarize them
as follows.29

The Associates Committee recommended Male Associate
B, an associate in the litigation department, for partnership
in July 1989. The critical comments upon which the district
court relied with respect to Associate B have nothing to do
with B's legal analytical skills but focus instead upon his
work habits. B's legal analysis, on the other hand, was
often rated as distinguished. See, e.g., App. at 4724 (Poul)
("[H]e does a remarkable job. I expect him to take over the
client some day."); id at 4249-51, 4268, 4280. In his last
evaluation as a senior associate, six partners rated B as
"distinguished" in legal analysis, and not one partner rated
him below "acceptable" in this category. Davis and
Magarity, Ezold's strongest supporters, graded B higher
than Ezold in the category of legal analysis, recognizing
his ability as "distinguished." Davis wrote on B's final
evaluation that "he has produced elegantly written legal
work." App. at 428l. Several partners, even those
criticizing B' s work habits, characterized him as "very
bright." Not one partner viewed B's admission to the
partnership with negative feelings.
Associate C, an associate in the real estate department, was
recommended by the Associates Committee in 1987 and
became a partner in February 1988. With respect to
Associate C, the district court made one finding:
94.... In the 1987 Associates Committee bottom line
memo, he received an overall grade of"G," the same as
that which Ms. Ezold had received. The summary of
evaluations used by the Associates Committee noted
that Henry Miller, a partner in the Real Estate
Department, had changed Associate C's legal analysis
score to ["acceptable"] and suggested that an "adequate
[score] may well be sufficient in his mind for regular
partnership. "

Contrary to this single limited finding by the district court,
C's legal analysis was uniformly rated as "good" or
"distinguished." The district court ignored the consensus in
C's department that he had a high level of legal analytical
ability. See App. at 4542; id at 4532 (Weintraub) ("Based
on his ability to analyze a legal problem, I could feel
comfortable in turning over my best client to him for a
significant matter.") In citing Miller's grade of
"acceptable" in 1987, the district court fails to point out
Miller's comments that any problems with B were based
on earlier work and that he had improved from that time.
Twelve partners viewed C's admission "with enthusiasm,"
twenty-six "with favor," eight "with mixed emotions" and
one "with negative feelings."
Associate D, an associate in the corporate department, was
recommended for partner by the Associates Committee in
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1988. In addition to other comments unrelated to D's legal
analytical ability, the district court relied on the fact that in
1988 three partners said D needed help with his writing
skills.
The district
court failed to note that the partners who said D needed
help with writing did so on the basis that English is not D's
native language, as he was born and raised in a foreign
country. One of the partners criticizing D's writing ability
also wrote: "I'd want a close look at his drafting skills-and
perhaps we should make a special effort to cultivate
them-in *536 view of the language issue." App. at 4460.
Very few partners ever questioned D's legal analytical
ability and he received several marks of "distinguished"
during his evaluations from 1986-88. The following
comments from D's file are typical: "Can handle very
confusing complex structural and strategic issues .... Is a
superb strategist on corporate acquisition matters." Id. at
4503; "[D] is unusually smart and has an instinctive grasp
of business. I believe he is a star." Id. at 4481. Eight
partners voted for his admission "with enthusiasm,"
twenty-seven "with favor," twelve "with mixed emotions,"
one "with favor/mixed emotions" and one "with negative
feelings."
Associate E, an associate in the estates department, was
admitted to the partnership in 1987. The district court made
one finding concerning Associate E:
10 I. Mr. Strogatz stated that Associate E was not a star
and that an associate did not need to be a star to be a
partner. He also wrote that he thought of Associate E "as
a guy just to do work."
Strogatz made this comment
based on "no contact" with E. See id. Strogatz wrote:
"Although not a star, [E] meets our standards." App. at
4438. The district court points to no criticism of E's legal
analysis because there is none in the record and, in fact, E's
ability was often rated as distinguished. See, e.g., App. at
4417 (Olyn) ( "His analytic abilities are exceptional."); id.
at 4414 (Kamens) ( "[E] exhibits a willingness to
understand certain legal problems and analyzes them quite
well."). The district court's reliance on Strogatz's
evaluation in finding pretext further demonstrates the
inconsistency with which it compared evaluations in this
case, relying only on positive evaluations by partners
Ezold had done "substantial" work for, while relying on
negative evaluations of male associates based on no
contact.
The following findings of the district court concerning
Associate F, an associate in the corporate department,
related to his legal analytical ability:
103. The grid on Associate F's bottom line memo in

1988, the year before his consideration for partnership,
reflected a composite grade of "0-" for legal analysis.

107. The prior year Donald Joseph, a partner in the
Litigation Department, had rated Associate F's legal
skills as acceptable, noting "a shoddiness in clear
thinking or maybe lack offull experience."
108. At the same time, Michael Temin, a partner in the
Corporate Department, recommended that Associate F
receive help in his writing and drafting skills.
110. In 1986, William Rosoff evaluated Associate F:
[H]e is sometimes too fast or flip or not
attentive enough. In one matter, he failed
to collect on a letter of credit on the
grounds that he supposed Al Braslow
would handle that part of the matter,
when it was an inappropriate assumption
to make especially without talking to Al.
In another matter, the time for answering
a complaint expired. While he might
have thought someone else was seeing to
it, he should have double checked.

In fact, Joseph's full comment about "a shoddiness in clear
thinking" stated:
Acceptable-I have used ... [acceptable] in
the old [Wolf, Block] terms; a good
lawyer, practical and valuable. I can't
describe precisely my hesitancy-perhaps
a shoddiness in clear thinking or maybe
lack of full experience ....
App. at 4606. In F's final evaluation period, Joseph
recommended F's admission "with favor." Id. at 4611.
While Temin wrote that F needed help with writing skills
in 1988, he gave him a grade of "good" in legal and
professional skills. With respect to Rosoffs 1986
criticism, the district court omitted the following statement
by Rosoff in the same evaluation: "[F] seems to be fine
substantively .... I don't cite these as experiences which
mean he cannot make the grade here, but he does *537
have to make a more careful and expansive view of his role
and responsibilities." Id. at 4602. Associate F's legal
analytical ability was never called into question. In
addition, F received a "distinguished," numerous "goods,"
and no "marginals" on his final review. Five partners
viewed his admission to the partnership "with
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enthusiasm," twenty-two "with favor," four "with mixed
emotions" and three "with negative feelings." While the
number of negative votes is close to the four Ezold
received, the record shows that F had greater overall
support from the partners in his department than Ezold did
in hers.3o
The district court cited the following comments regarding
the legal analytical ability of Associate G, an associate in
the corporate department admitted to the partnership In
February 1988:
112. In the bottom line memorandum on Associate G for
1987, the year before he became partner in the Corporate
Department, his grid reflected no composite score
higher than "G," In four of the legal skills, including
legal research and promptness, Associate G was rated
only "acceptable."
113, In his 1987 evaluation Associate G was rated
"acceptable" in legal analysis by Alan Molod, a partner
in the Corporate Department. Mr. Molod added that
Associate G was "Not a Star" and was "Sloppy at times
and [showed] occasional lapses in judgment."

The district court did not credit or consider the many
favorable evaluations of G, such as, "[G] is one of the
brightest lawyers in our firm." App. at 4676. While Molod
rated G as only acceptable in legal analysis in 1987, this
score should be viewed against the many "good" and
"distinguished" grades he received in this category.
Molod's full comments stated: "Good solid lawyer. Not a
star. Very hard worker. Sloppy at times and occasional
lapses in judgment." ld. at 4677. Despite rating G as only
"acceptable" in legal analysis in 1987, Molod
recommended G's admission to the partnership "with
favor." Overall, thirteen partners viewed G's admission to
the partnership "with enthusiasm," thirty "with favor," six
"with mixed emotions" and two "with negative feelings."
The district court relied on one partner's criticisms of
Associate H in concluding that Wolf applied its standards
in a more severe fashion to Ezold. It found:
116. Mr. Arbittier wrote in his 1987 evaluation of
Associate H:
[Associate H] has really let me down in his handling
of a case for General Electric Pension Trust. He
missed the crux of the case in the beginning and
dragged his feet terribly in getting it back on track ....
[Associate H] works very hard, but hard work alone is
not enough. I have my doubts that he will ever be
anything but a helper who does what he is told

adequately but with no spark.
Mr. Arbittier wrote that Associate H was trying "to
change my view of him and I am giving him a second
chance. He [has] brains. Maybe he can change." Mr.
Arbittier also called Associate H "phlegmatic, diffident,
nonassertive and unimaginative," and in 1988 wrote that
he was "[not] real strong in legal analysis or in focusing
on the key issues (dividing the wheat from the chaft)."
117. In 1989, Mr. Arbittier concluded that Associate H
was a "nice guy" who had made improvement; he
supported Associate H for partnership. Mr. Arbittier
explained Associate H's "redemption"; Associate H told
Mr. Arbittier how he had been overworked.

While the district court credited Arbittier's criticism of H,
it chose to ignore Arbittier's continuing criticism of Ezold
on the same grounds between 1984 and 1988. See supra at
516-17, 518-19. The district court also ignored the fact that
in H's final two evaluations, Arbittier viewed his
admission to the partnership with favor and wrote the
following comments: "[s]ignificant *538 improvement";
"A good lawyer. ... In the past I had some problems with
[H]. He seems to have overcome them .... " App. at 4845,
4858. This change in viewpoint was based on H's handling
of a specific case for Arbittier. Goldberger specifically
wrote in his evaluation of H that Arbittier's critical
evaluation was "aberrational... [H] is a talented,
hard-working lawyer who deserves to make it." ld. at 4828.
Moreover, the district court failed to acknowledge H's
grades of "distinguished" in legal analysis throughout his
tenure at the firm. Twelve partners viewed his admission to
the partnership "with enthusiasm," seventeen "with favor,"
one "with mixed emotions" and zero "with negative
feelings."
Finally, we note that three of the four partners who
expressed "negative feelings" towards Ezold's candidacy
were members of her own department, while none of the
eight male associates was viewed with "negative feelings"
by more than one member of their department.
The district court's finding that Wolf applied its
partnership standards in a more "severe" fashion to female
associates is clearly erroneous. The comparative evidence
of more favorable treatment for male employees contained
in this record does not support that finding. See
(holding pretext "clearly erroneous
because [plaintiff] failed to make any showing of disparate
treatment and because [defendant] proved that male
attorneys were treated the same as she in the disputed
areas,"). Our review of the entire evaluation files of the
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eight male associates discloses that, unlike Ezold, whose
staunchest supporters persistently expressed doubts about
her ability to meet the firm's criterion of legal analysis,
Associates A to H faced no comparable degree of criticism
about their legal analytical skills. The snippets of
comments critical of these male associates culled from
dozens of evaluation forms do not show that Wolfs
articulated reason for declining to recommend Ezold for
partnership was "obviously weak or implausible" or that
the standards were "manifestly unequally applied."
(citations omitted).

B.
Despite Wolf's request, the district court failed to make
findings concerning other male associates who, like Ezold,
were passed over for partnership. The evidence concerning
their evaluations adds support to our conclusion that the
district court's finding that Wolf's asserted legitimate
reason for denying Ezold a partnership position was a
sham cannot be supported on a theory of discriminatory
application.

II J I Male Associates 1 and 2, who were comparable to
Ezold in the category of legal analysis, were also rejected
for regular partnership. Again, we recognize that the
district court, as factfinder, "can accept some parts of a
party's evidence and reject others." fV'.mnln
But when the evidence sheds light on whether the
employer treated similarly situated males and females
alike, it should not be ignored. See
(comparison of whether male attorneys treated same as
discharged female attorney in disputed categories).
Male Associates I and 2 were highly rated by a number of
partners, but, as with Ezold, the Associates Committee
determined their ability in legal analysis fell below the
firm's standards. The Associates Committee expressed its
views on Male Associates 1 and 2 in a letter to the
Executive Committee stating that, although they were
"valuable associates," they nevertheless fell below the
firm's "historically accepted standards for admission to the
partnership." App. at 2586. The partners' comments about
Male Associates 1 and 2 were very similar to those
criticizing Ezold. This is illustrated by the following
sampling of comments about Male Associate I: "[He] has
good talents although he is not as capable in legal analysis
as others," id at 4632 (Brantz); "[His] best skills are in
client relations and desire to please, rather than legal
analysis or intellectual genius," id at 4630 (Schneider);
"[H]e has great difficulty analyzing and drafting complex
business transactions," *539 id at 4642 (Wiener); "[There
are] questions about his intellectual strength, his ability to

manage complex transactions and his level of attention to
detail," id at 5044 (Baer). The partners' comments with
regard to Male Associate 2 are also similar to those the
partners made about Ezold: "[H]e lacks the minimum level
of analytic ability which is required to succeed at WB," id
at 4696 (Chanin); "[His legal analysis is] just fair. Came up
with little in the way of new ideas .... Seemed to miss key
points at times," id at 4695 (Arbittier); "[Legal analysis is]
[n]ot penetrating or focused. I do not feel comfortable
relying on his legal judgment," id at 4697 (Arbittier);
"[H]e just doesn't have the high level of intelligence we
need to handle complex legal questions," id at 4696
(Arbittier); "[He] is an enigma to me. His writing ability is
substandard, and I have no confidence in his analytic skill.
On the other hand, my client [] likes him very much," id at
4725 (Brantz).
If the district court had employed the appropriate
comparative analysis by focusing on whether Wolf's
articulated reason of legal analysis was a pretext, it should
have reached a different result. Our review of the whole
record leaves us with a "definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed" by the district court in its
comparative analysis.
The record does not show that Wolf
applied its partnership admission standards unequally to
male and female associates, nor that diminished ability in
the area of legal analysis was an improper reason for
denying admission.3 We sympathize with Ezold's
situation and the long hours and efforts she put toward her
partnership goal. On the record before us, however, we
cannot affirm the district court's finding that Wolf's
asserted reason for denying Ezold's admission to the
partnership was unworthy of credence based on her theory
that its standard of legal analytic ability was applied to her
in an unlawfully discriminatory manner.
Because the evaluation files contain insufficient evidence
to show that Ezold was evaluated more severely than the
male associates, Ezold has not shown that Wolf's proffered
reason for failing to promote her was "unworthy of
credence." We therefore hold that the district court's
ultimate finding of pretext cannot be sustained on this
basis.

IX.
We must, however, still consider certain additional
evidence which Ezold says directly establishes that Wolf's
articulated reason was a pretext by showing that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated its decision
not to admit her to the partnership.
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As stated at the outset of our pretext analysis, sufficiently
strong evidence of an employer's past treatment of a
plaintiff may prove pretext. See
An employer's general policy and practice
with regard to minority employment may also establish
pretext.
The district court held that four instances of
conduct "supported" the finding of pretext that it otherwise
based on its comparison of Ezold with Associates A-H.
The four instances of conduct by Wolf that the district
court held supported its finding of pretext were: (1) Ezold
was evaluated negatively for being too involved with
women's issues in the firm; (2) a male associate's sexual
harassment of female employees at the firm was seen as
"insignificant"; (3) Ezold was evaluated negatively for
being very demanding while male associates were
evaluated negatively for lacking assertiveness; *540 and
(4) Ezold "was the target of several comments
demonstrating [Wolf's] differential treatment of her
because she is a woman."
They are discussed in Part IX C. infra. In
addition, it made findings of fact concerning Wolf's
assignment process that Ezold claims support its finding of
pretext. We discuss that contention in Part IX A. Ezold's
contention that the ratio of male to female partners at Wolf
shows a pattern of illegal discrimination is the subject of
Part IX B. Finally, Ezold points to other evidence in the
record, upon which the district court made no findings, as
evidence that shows Wolf's asserted reason for passing her
over was pretextual. She contends that this evidence,
considered as a whole, would entitle the district court to
find that Wolf "more likely" denied her admission to the
partnership because of her sex than because of Wolf's
asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reason. See
That evidence
is the subject of discussion in Part IX D.
In order to succeed on this theory, Ezold must show that it
is more likely that the firm denied her a partnership
position because of her sex than because of its perceptions
of her legal analytic ability. With this causal requirement in
mind, we will analyze each of the incidents or practices at
Wolfwhich Ezold alleges shows directly that Wolf passed
her over because she is a woman rather than because of any
deficiency Wolf might have perceived in her legal ability.

A.
(12) Ezold contends illegal discriminatory treatment based
on sex deprived her of equal opportunities to work on
significant cases or with a wide variety of partners and that
this unequal treatment IS evidence of gender

discrimination. From 1983 to 1987, Kurland was
responsible for the assignment of work to associates in the
litigation department. He often delegated this
responsibility to Arbittier. Though Ezold acknowledges
that many partners bypassed the formal assignment
procedure and directly assigned matters to associates, the
district court found that Arbittier assigned Ezold to actions
that were "small" by
Ezold complained to Kurland and
others about the quality of her assignments and that she had
opportunities to work only with a limited number of
partners.
This Court has recognized that when an employer
discriminatorily denies training and support, the employer
may not then disfavor the plaintiff because her
performance is affected by the lack of opportun ity.

Even if we assume that Ezold
received "small" cases at the beginning of her tenure at
Wolf, however, there is no evidence this was the result of
sex discrimination. Her evaluations indicate, rather, that it
may have been her academic credentials that contributed to
her receipt of less complex assignments. For example,
Davis stated that "[t]he Home Unity case was the first
really fair test for Nancy. I believe that her background
relegated her to ... matters (where she got virtually no
testing by Wolf, Block standards) and small matters." App.
at 3514. It is undisputed that Arbittier opposed hiring
Ezold because of her academic history and lack of law
review experience. In one of Ezold's early evaluations,
Kurland wrote: "She has not, in my view, been getting
sufficiently difficult matters to handle because she is not
the Harvard Law Review type .... We must make an effort
to give her more difficult matters to handle." Id. at 3400.
He also stated: "I envisioned ... her when I hired her as a
'good, stand-up, effective courtroom lawyer.'" Id. at 3348.
In urging the Executive Committee to reconsider Ezold's
candidacy Magarity wrote:
*541 [The] perception [that she is not
able to handle complex cases] appears to
be a product of how Sy Kurland viewed
Nancy's role when she was initially
hired. For the first few years Sy would
only assign Nancy to non-complex
matters, yet, at evaluation time, Sy, and
some other partners, would qualifY their
evaluations by saying that Nancy does
not work on complex matters. Nancy was
literally trapped in a Catch 22. The
Chairman of the Litigation Department
would not assign her to complex cases,
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yet she received negative evaluations for
not working on complex matters.
Jd. at 5576-77.33
While it would be unfortunate if these academic and
intellectual biases were perpetuated after the decision was
made to hire Ezold, academic or intellectual bias is not
evidence of sex discrimination. The district court made no
finding that Ezold was given small assignments because of
her sex. In fact, its findings contradict unlawful
discrimination in that respect. It found:
She worked for partners in the Litigation
Department on criminal
matters,
insurance cases, general commercial
litigation and other areas, and also did
work for some partners in other
departments. She handled matters at all
stages of litigation, and was called upon
by partners to go to court on an
emergency basis.
At trial Ezold
characterized many of the cases she worked on as
"complex" by either her standards or Wolf standards. In
advocating Ezold for partner, Magarity stated that "from
1986 through the present, Nancy has worked on numerous
significant complex cases." App. at 5577.
The district court found that when Ezold suggested to
Schwartz in her early years at Wolf that an unfairness in
case assignments may have occurred because she was a
woman, Schwartz replied: "Nancy, don't say that around
here. They don't want to hear it. Just do your job and do
well."
App. at
657. This statement, made years before the 1988 decision
to deny Ezold partnership, does not show that Wolf's
evaluation of her legal ability was pretextual. Ezold's
testimony that she "didn't know of any other reason" than
gender for Wolf's treatment of her in the assignment
process adds little.
Ezold also points to a preliminary injunction matter early
in her career that was reassigned to a man after she had
been the sole volunteer. The district court found that
Arbittier reassigned the injunction to a man "without
Arbittier,
explanation." See
however, testified that he realized the case needed a more
senior associate and so reassigned it. This too occurred
early in Ezold's employment at Wolf and there is nothing
in the record to show that it had any connection with
Ezold's failure to attain partnership. The district court's
finding does not support a conclusion that Wolf's reason
for denying Ezold admission to the partnership is
pretextual.

The district court also found that when Ezold first got to
the firm in 1983, she and a male associate not on
partnership track were assigned to sort out a large group of
minor cases previously handled by an associate who had
left the firm. This finding fails to support the district
court's ultimate finding of pretext. The assignment was
made on an as-needed basis to fill the void created when
the associate working on the matters had left. Additionally,
the district court failed to recognize that Arbittier gave
Ezold full authority to reassign the matters to other male
associates and administer the whole affair. The small
bankruptcy matters to which the district court refers were
later reassigned by Kurland at Ezold's request. Kurland
testified that he did this "both to free Nancy up a little and
to give some demonstration that we [were] making an
effort to change the nature of her assignments." App. at
3375.
*542 Concerns about associates being exposed only to
"small" matters were not unique to Ezold. In fact,
numerous partners expressed similar concerns about
exposure to partners and assignment to complex cases with
respect to male Associates A and B. See App. at 4920
("The Department should try to give A some assignments
as second man on a large case .... If we fail to do this, [A]
will continue to slip along operating independently on
cases and we will have to confront, too late, the question of
whether or not he meets partnership standards."); id at
4324 ("[A] has not been tested on large matters because of
early perceptions that he was cavalier."); id at 4928 (B
must get broader exposure); id at 4926 ("somehow [B]
must get broader exposure-even his Dep't. Chairman
knows nothing about him."). Ezold's assignment to a
disproportionate number of small matters may have
reflected academic or intellectual bias. Beyond her own
perceptions, however, Ezold offered no evidence showing
that she was treated differently from male associates in
getting assignments or exposure. The findings of the
district court concerning Wolf's assignment process are in
fact gender-neutral and do not support its ultimate finding
of pretext.
With respect to the district court's finding that the firm
prevented Ezold from gaining wide exposure to partners,
the record shows that sixty-five partners expressed "no
opinion" on the admission of Associate B, a litigator,
which was more than the fifty-nine "no opinion" votes
Ezold received. Fifty-nine partners also expressed "no
opinion" on the admission of Associate H.
The district court's finding that Ezold did not work for
more than five hundred hours in any year on anyone
matter, while "virtually all the male associates in the
department" worked for six hundred hours on a single
matter, is belied by the record.
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The record shows that Ezold billed 701.2 hours
on a major litigation matter in 1985 and that a majority of
male associates in the litigation department did not bill six
hundred hours or more on any single matter.
Finally, the district court found that by allowing partners to
bypass the formal assignment system, Kurland and
Arbittier "prevented the plaintiff from securing improved
assignments ... [and] impaired her opportunity to be fairly
I
evaluated for partnership."
The fact that Wolfs formal assignment
process was often bypassed does not support the district
court's finding ofpretext.34 Title VII requires employers to
avoid certain prohibited types of invidious discrimination,
including sex discrimination. It does not require employers
to treat all employees fairly, closely monitor their progress
and insure them every opportunity for advancement.
"[O]ur task is not to assess the overall fairness of [Wolf's]
actions."
55 5. It is a sad fact oflife
in the working world that employees of ability are
sometimes overlooked for promotion. Large law firms are
not immune from unfairness in this imperfect world. The
law limits its protection against that unfairness to cases of
invidious illegal discrimination. This record contains no
evidence that Wolf's assignment process was tainted by a
discriminatory motive.

span of years during which the pool of
available qualified women has changed.
Women have only recently entered the
accounting and related fields in large
numbers and there is evidence that many
potential women partners were hired
away from Price Waterhouse by clients
and rival accounting firms.

(in disparate impact case, proper
comparison is between racial composition of at-issue jobs
and racial composition of qualified population in relevant
job market).
Because no conclusion can be drawn from Ezold's raw
numbers on underrepresentation, they are not probative of
Wolf's alleged discriminatory motive. See
(statistics showing small percentage of
minority faculty members inadequate absent some other
indication of relevance);
("Because the considerations affecting promotion
decisions may differ greatly from one department to
of
a
general
another,
statistical
evidence
underrepresentation of women in the position of full
professor adds little to a disparate treatment claim"). We,
like the district court, do not consider them material to
Ezold's Title VII claim.

B.
Ezold also tries to reinforce her claim of pretext by
pointing to the small number of women admitted to the
partnership throughout the firm's history. The record
shows that in 1989, only five of Wolf's 107 partners were
women and there was only one woman among the
twenty-eight partners in the litigation department in which
Ezold had sought partnership. The district court made no
finding based upon these numbers.35

1141 Statistical evidence of an employer's pattern and
practice with respect to minority employment may be
relevant to a showing of pretext. See
*543 Ezold's raw
numerical comparisons, however, are not accompanied by
any analysis of either the qualified applicant pool or the
flow of qualified candidates over a relevant time period.
The district court in Hopkins recognized the weakness of
this type of evidence:
[Plaintiff's] proof lacked sufficient data
on the number of qualified women
available for partnership and failed to
take into account that the present pool of
partners have been selected over a long

c.
Finally, the district court held that the four specific
instances of conduct mentioned supra at 540 evidenced a
discriminatory animus and supported its finding of pretext.
See
It did not hold
that these instances of conduct provided an independent or
alternative basis for its finding, but viewed them only as
support therefor.

I.

(lSI The first instance of conduct on which the district
court relied was that Ezold "was evaluated negatively for
being too involved with women's issues ... specifically her
concern about the [firm's] treatment of paralegals," while
Fiebach was not reproached for raising the "women's
issue" of part-time employment. Jd. Ezold's perception
was that the firm mistreated its paralegals by overworking
and underpaying them and that treatment would not have
occurred but for the fact that they were predominantly
women. The court's finding on this matter refers to a 1986
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evaluation submitted by Schwartz, one of Ezold's
partnership supporters, in which he wrote: "Judgment is
better, although it still can be clouded by over-sensitivity to
what she misperceives as 'womens' [sic] issues." App. at
3366. Schwartz testified, however, that he was not
criticizing Ezold for raising the issue of the firm's
treatment of paralegals, but for her misperception that this
was a "women's issue." Ed at 1585-86. Moreover, the fact
that Fiebach, a male partner, was not criticized for
encouraging discussion of part-time employment is not
probative of whether the partnership decision concerning
Ezold was gender-based. This evidence is of marginal
value in supporting the district court's finding of pretext.

2.

1161 The second instance of conduct on which the district
court relied was "the fact that a male associate['s] sexual
harassment of female employees at the Firm was seen as
insignificant and not worthy of mention to the Associates
Committee in its consideration of that male associate for
partnership."
While it is undisputed that the male associate, Associate X,
engaged in some form of harassment offemale employees,
the district court's finding about Wolfs attitude towards it
is unsupported by the *544 evidence and thus clearly
erroneous. The record shows that Strogatz, then Chairman
of the Associates Committee, met with Associate X
concerning these incidents, and that a memorandum was
placed in his personnel file. There was testimony that the
incident was reported to the associate's department
chairman and to the Associates Committee. The record
also indicates that the incident occurred after the
Associates Committee decided it was unlikely to
recommend Associate X for partnership in any event.
There is no evidence Wolf viewed the incident as
"insignificant." This incident is not evidence that the firm
harbored a discriminatory animus against either women
generally or Ezold specifically. It lends no support to the
district court's finding of pretext.

3.

!
The district court found that Ezold was "evaluated
negatively for being 'very demanding,' while several male
associates who were made partners were evaluated
negatively for lacking sufficient assertiveness in their
demeanors."
(emphasis in original). The criticisms of Ezold's
assertiveness related to the way in which she handled
administrative matters such as office and secretarial space,

and not legal matters. See App. at 2206-11 ("Very difficult
to deal with on administrative matters. Very demanding.");
see also id. at 3365, 3389. In particular, David Hofstein's
evaluation of Ezold in 1984 stated:
My one negative experience did not
involve legal work. When my group
moved to the south end of the 21st floor,
Nancy had a fit because she had to move.
As 1. Strogatz and our [Office Manager]
know,
Nancy's
behavior
was
inappropriate and I think affected
everyone's perception of her. Dealing
with
administrative
matters
professionally is almost as important as
dealing with legal matters competently,
and at least in that instance, Nancy blew
it.
App. at 3393.
The district court refers to criticisms of male associates for
lacking assertiveness, but in connection with their handling
of legal matters. The district court was comparing apples
and oranges. The record shows that male associates were
also criticized for their improper handling of
administrative problems. See App. at 3388 ("He has had a
series of run ins with administration .... "); id. at 5099
(associate not admitted to partnership criticized for "lack
of tact, being arrogant or undiplomatic or unconciliatory");
id. at 4778 ("[h]e is quarrelsome"). The district court also
quotes an evaluation of Ezold as a "prima donna" on
administrative matters, but leaves out the full context ofthe
statement which compares her to a male associate:
"Reminds me of[a male associate]-very demanding, prima
donna-ish, not a team player." Ed. at 3209.36
The district court's finding that this evidence supports its
conclusion that Ezold was treated differently because of
her gender is clearly erroneous. An "unfortunate and
destructive contlict of personalities does not establish
sexual discrimination."
Further, by the time of Ezold's final evaluation
in 1988, there was no mention of her attitude on
administrative matters. Rosoff testified that III
independently reviewing the Associate Committee's
decision not to recommend Ezold for partnership, he
disregarded the criticisms of her handling of administrative
matters from earlier years as "ancient history." App. at
2410. There is again no evidence that this incident *545
played any role in Wolf's decision to deny Ezold's
admission to the partnership.

4.
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1181 Finally, the district court found that Ezold was the
target of several comments demonstrating the firm's
differential treatment of women. The district court found
the fo llowing:
During the selection process ... Mr.
Kurland told Ms. Ezold that it would not
be easy for her at Wolf, Block because
she did not fit the Wolf, Block mold
since she was a woman, had not attended
an Ivy League law school, and had not
been on law review. Mr. Kurland and
Ms. Ezold stated that at one of the
meetings with Ms. Ezold, only Ms. Ezold
and he were present.
See
Ezold did not
raise this reference at a subsequent lunch with associate
Liebenberg, a woman, and Schwartz, nor did she express
concern over Wolf's treatment of women. Although
Kurland denied making the statement, the district court
resolved this credibility issue in Ezold's favor and we will
not disturb it.
Wolf argues that this comment made in 1983 before Ezold
accepted the job is not probative on whether its partnership
decision five years later was gender-based. In ?/hOy",,~1/
the plaintiff alleged
racial discrimination in the denial of tenure and we
considered the probative value of evidence of a
discriminatory attitude on the part of a key decisionmaker.
There, the president of the university exercised a
significant influence on the decisionmakers and had made
the final tenure decision. He had also made two statements
reflecting racial bias.ld. We held, although the "statements
standing alone, occurring as they did over five years before
the final denial of tenure, could not suffice to uphold a
finding [of discrimination], they do add support, in
combination with the other evidence, to the ultimate
conclusion." Id.; see
(alleged
derogatory comments made to plaintiff by dean before she
began teaching "were made well before the plaintiff's
tenure review process began and are manifestly too remote
from the tenure decision-making process to have any
relevance in this action"), ajJ'd,
cert. denied,
Here, however, as we have painstakingly pointed
out, other evidence of sex discrimination is lacking. In any
event, Kurland made this comment before Ezold began her
employment at Wolf, five years before the partnership
decision. The comment's temporal distance from the
decision Ezold says was discriminatory convinces us it is
too remote and isolated to show independently that
unlawful discrimination, rather than Wolf's asserted

reason, more likely caused the firm to deny Ezold the
partnership she sought in 1988.
Kurland himself had left the firm in January 1988, before
Ezold's 1988 evaluation and before the Associates
Committee and the Executive Committee denied her
admission to the partnership. Thus, he did not take part in
the final decision to deny Ezold's admission to the
partnership, although he had consistently supported her
candidacy despite his recognition of other partners'
perceptions about her legal analytical ability. See
("I think she has proven her
case."). Stray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by
decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely
given great weight, particularly if they were made
temporally remote from the date of decision. See Hflnl/iVlc
(O'Connor, J.,
cert. denied,
We
decline to depart from this principle in the present case.

D.
[191 In her brief on appeal, Ezold points to several other
alleged sexist comments by Kurland to which she testified
at trial but upon which the district court made no findings.
Thus, the remaining issue on sufficiency is whether all of
the sexist comments *546 Ezold attributes to Kurland
taken together, are enough to establish pretext. Ezold
testified that at the close of a litigation department dinner,
Kurland singled her out for interrogation on the issue of
sex discrimination at the firm. Kurland testified that he
addressed the topic to the entire group because he was Vice
Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association and
everyone was discussing the issue at the time. Ezold also
testified and Kurland did not deny that Kurland would give
her instructions in the hallway to "smile" and crudely ask
whether she had any romantic encounters the night before.
She also testified that at a litigation associates' breakfast
Kurland recounted a judge's comments about a murder
case involving the rape of a corpse. Kurland testified:
I looked around at the young people and
at the time I was in the middle of a
murder trial and I thought, my God, my
young people here, have such a narrow
fragmented aspect of what law is today,
interrogatories and depositions in
Federal Court, dealing in money matters
and they don't really have a
comprehension of what happens in law,
that we have a whole state court system
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and criminal system, that they do not
even come in contact with and I thought
it would be beneficial for them to
broaden their horizon to give them some
exposure to hear firsthand from me what
it was like to be involved in an actual
murder trial ... [and that] the judge was
telling me about other cases he had ... and
he told me about this one case and I
talked about a case that a man had killed
a woman and had sex with her
afterwards.
App. at 1756-57.
Ezold additionally testified that Kurland told her not to
refer a talented female attorney to the firm for employment
because he did not want the problems caused by another
female attorney working in the litigation department.
Kurland did not recall Ezold talking to him about hiring
anyone but denied making the statement about women
associates. Finally, Ezold points to an alleged statement by
Kurland cautioning female attorneys with children from
traveling on business. Kurland denied making this
statement and in fact often assigned Liebenberg, a female
partner who had small children, to cases requiring
extensive travel.
Although the district court made no findings that these
statements were actually made or whose version of the
facts it believed, we must consider them on the sufficiency
issue in the light most favorable to Ezold. In doing so, we
recognize that proof of a discriminatory atmosphere may
be relevant in proving pretext since such evidence "does
tend to add 'color' to the employer's decisionmaking
processes and to the influences behind the actions taken
with respect to the individual plaintiff."
We must
therefore decide whether these six alleged comments by
Kurland over a period offive years are sufficient to sustain
the district court's finding that Wolf's reason for denying
Ezold admission to the partnership-her legal analytical
ability-was just a pretext to cover up sex discrimination.
In Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., we considered
the relevance in an age discrimination case of a statement
made by a corporate vice-president after the plaintiff's
termination. The vice-president stated: "[This company]
was a seniority driven company with old management and
that's going to change, 'I'm going to change that.' "
We said:
When a major company executive
speaks, "everybody listens" in the
corporate hierarchy, and when an

executive's comments prove to be
disadvantageous to a company's
subsequent litigation posture, it can not
compartmentalize this executive as if he
had nothing more to do with company
policy than the janitor or watchman.
ld. This case is superficially similar to Lockhart in that
Kurland, as the chairman of the litigation department, was
a company executive until he left the firm in 1987. It is
distinguishable, however, in several material respects. The
other evidence supporting the verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs in Lockhart, unlike the evidence in the *547
present case, was substantia1.37 In addition, though
Kurland was at one time a decisionmaker and eventually
supported Ezold's admission to the partnership, he took no
part in the final votes or evaluations concerning Ezold
because he had by that time left the firm.
Though Kurland's comments, if made, were crude and
unprofessional, we do not believe they are sufficient in and
of themselves to sustain the district court's judgment in
favor ofEzold. They may reflect unfavorably on Kurland's
personality or his views, but they are not sufficient to show
that there was such a pervasive hostility toward women at
Wolf sufficient to show that Ezold's partnership decision
was more likely the result of discriminatory bias than
Wolf's perception38 of Ezold's legal ability. Ezold has
made no claim that Kurland's comments created a hostile

If we were to hold that several stray remarks
by a nondecisionmaker over a period of five years, while
inappropriate, were sufficient to prove that Wolf's
associate evaluation and partnership admission process
were so infected with discriminatory bias that such bias
more likely motivated Wolf's promotion decision than its
articulated legitimate reason, we would spill across the
limits of Title VII. See nnnKIlV1'
(Title VII strikes a balance between protecting
employees from unlawful discrimination and preserving
for employers their remaining freedom of choice.).

x.
We have reviewed the evidence carefully and hold that it is
insufficient to show pretext. Despite Ezold's disagreement
with the firm's evaluations of her abilities, and her
perception that she was treated unfairly, there is no
evidence of sex discrimination here. The district court's
finding that Wolf's legitimate non-discriminatory reason
was incredible because Ezold was evaluated more severely
than male associates because of her gender, as well as its
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finding that Wolf's requirement that she possess analytical
skills sufficient to handle complex litigation was a pretext
for discrimination, are clearly erroneous and find no
support in the evidence. Finally, this record also lacks
sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus to sustain a
finding that Wolf more likely had a discriminatory *548
motive in denying Ezold's admission to the partnership.

XI.

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the district
court in favor ofEzold and remand for entry of judgment in
favor of Wolf.

The petition for rehearing filed by Nancy O'Mara Ezold in
the above captioned matter having been submitted to the
judges who participated in the decision of this court and to
all the other available circuit judges ofthe circuit in regular
active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision
having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit
judges of the circuit in regular active service not having
voted for rehearing by the court in bane, the petition for
rehearing is denied.

Parallel Citations
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

60 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 849, 61 Fair
EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1000, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. P
41,921,61 USLW 2398

Feb. 3, 1993
PRESENT:

Chief

Judge,

Footnotes
involved an accounting firm's denial of
partnership to a female accountant. That case did proceed to trial but thc appellate decisions provide guidance only on the parties'
burdens of proof in a mixed motives casco This case was not tried on that theory.
The district court's order also stated that if its prior orders were affirmed on appeal, it would thereafter determine back pay for the
period from February I, 1991 to the date of Ezold 's instatement as a partner.
There was little change beyond format in the evaluation forms used throughout Ezold's tenure. We will describe the evaluation forms
in effect in 1987 and 1988, the years Ezold was a senior associate being evaluated for admission to the partnership.
At all relevant times, Strogatz served as chairman ofthe Associates Committee.
The evaluation form asks the reviewing partner whether he or she would like to "supplement and/or explain [the] written evaluation
in an oral interview with a member of the Associates Committee." See, e.g., App. at 3889,6467.
The district court quoted Ezold's evaluations in FOF 61-71.

7

Because the reason Wolf articulated for denying Ezold partnership was lack oflegal analytic ability, this summary includes neither
positive evaluations in other categories upon which the district court made findings nor evaluations in which there was neither grade
nor comment in the category of legal analysis. Many of Ezold's evaluations in other categories were highly complimentary and
compared quite favorably to the partners' evaluations of male candidates for partnership in the same categories. The district court's
use of these other favorable evaluations in the comparative analysis in support of its ultimate finding of pretext is discussed in Part
VII of this opinion, infra.

1987 Evaluations
Partner

Grade

Name

(Legal

c
o

Analysis) m
m
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e
n

ts
Promislo

M

Kurland

"I had minimal contact with Nancy, but 1 thought she did not generate ideas ... or pull the facts
together well and exercise the best lawyerly judgement. She seemed somewhat over her head, but I
don't think she should have been." Recommended partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at
3854-57.

"[T]here seems to be serious question as to whether she has the legal ability to take on large matters
and handle them on her own. We have been over this many times and there is nothing 1 can add to
what I've already said about Nancy. What I envisioned about her when I hired her as a "good,
stand-up effective courtroom lawyer" remains to be true and 1 think she has proven her case.
Apparently she has not proved to the satisfaction ofthe firm the other qualities considered necessary
to rise to the top of the firm." Recommended partnership "with mixed emotions." Id. at 3878-81.'

Alderman

A

Slight contact. Recommended partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at 3886-89.

Boote

A

"Nancy has avoided demonstrating ability in th[e] area [oflegal analysis] because I believe she lacks
it. On the other hand, in Nancy's case, other qualities redeem her .... I would not want her in charge
ofa large legally complex case, the traditional measure ofa Wolf Block partner." Recommended
partnership "with favor." Id. at 3894-97.'

Flaherty

A

Slight contact. Recommended partnership with "mixed emotions." Id. at 3918-21.

Joseph

"I have been singularly unimpressed with the level of her ability.... She may be fine to keep for
certain smaller matters, but I don't see her skills as being those for our sophisticated practice." Id. at
3930-33. Recommended partnership with "negative feelings." Id. at 3933.

Schwartz

G

"She is excellent in court and loves to be in that arena .... She remains a little weak in her initial
analysis of complex legal issues." Id. at 3954-56.'"

Dubrow

A

"[I]n my one experience we lost a client, but I think Nancy performed satisfactorily." No opinion as
to partnership admission. Id. at 3990-93.

Roberts

G

Slight contact. Recommended partnership "with favor." Id. at 4052-55.

Spitzer

G

"Little contact, most favorable impression." Recommended partnership "with favor." Id. at
4060-63.

8

FN8. The district court omitted from its findings this portion of Kurland's evaluation concerning Ezold's legal analytical ability.

9

FN9. The district court omitted this portion of Boote's evaluation from its finding.

10

FNIO. The district court omitted this comment on legal analysis from its finding.
Roberta Liebenberg, a female litigation partner, voted against Ezold's admission. The only Associates Committee member voting in
favor of Ezold was her former neighbor, Ronald Weiner.
"Special partners," in contrast to regular partners, do not have the right to vote, do not have any equity in the partnership and may be
removed by the Executive Committee. In addition, the benefits provided are inferior to those of regular partners.
1
I
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It is not clear from the record whether such an inquiry is a matter of course in connection with negative partnership recommendations.

Ezold testified that Kopp told her that she could learn the area of the law in a week. Ezold contended that the offer of a position in
domestic relations, a position with allegedly less esteem in the firm, is also evidence of discrimination. The district court found this
department was formerly headed by a male, and is currently headed by two male senior partners.
We believe this abrogates the inference of discrimination Ezold would have us draw.
After the Associates Committee determined that it would not be recommending Ezold for partnership, it was decided not to give her
the September 1988 raise given to those in her class who were promoted. Ezold's salary as a senior associate was $73,000.00. The
lowest level regular partner earns between $125,000.00 and $140,000.00 a year.
This statement in Patterson is in conformity with the law that pre-existed Patterson and is not affected by the Civil Rights Act of
1991. See
(section !OI of Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturns
portion of Patterson holding that proscription of racial discrimination in making of contract under
applies only to
refusals to hire and promotions rising to level of opportunity for "new and distinct relation" between employer and employee)
I
(quoting
Though the record indicates that perceived legal analytic ability is a necessary condition for partnership at Wolf, it, in and of itself, is
not a necessary and sufficient condition. Otherwise, thc remaining categories on the evaluation form would be superfluous.
We recognize that the conclusions in the statement we quote from Hopkins were made by the factfinder. Nevertheless, we think the
quoted language, correctly setting forth the basis on which comparison must be made, reflects the legal standard that the district court
was required to apply to the evidence before it in Ezold's case.
Among the factors other than legal analytic ability that Wolf considered are "creativity," "negotiating and advocacy," "attitude,"
"ability under pressure" and "dedication." See supra at 515 (listing criteria of legal performance and personal characteristics
appearing on evaluation form).
As discussed infra, the plaintiff can also prove that despite the employer's articulated reason, a discriminatory reason "more likely"
motivated the employer's decision.
I
The defendant is not required to prove that those promoted are "better qualified" than the plaintiff See

Ezold argues the district court appropriately declined to consider Fiebach's objections because they were gender-based. Ezold refers
to an Apri I 1988 disagreement over case strategy in the Carpenter case. The district court made a general finding that Ezold
was criticized for being "very demanding" and was expected by some members of the Firm to be nonassertive and acquiescent
to the predominantly male partnership. Her failure to accept this role was a factor which resulted in her not being promoted to
partner.
This general finding does not permit the court to ignore Fiebach's assessment. It does,
however, illustrate again that the court did not consider the whole record relating to Wolfs articulated reason for denying Ezold a
partnership position.
The record shows that Arbittier was a tough critic of many associates. male and female, when he felt they did not measure up to
Wolfs standards on analytic ability.
The most damning motive that these comments reveal is lack of confidence based on academic credentials. This is a far cry from sex
discrimination.
The district court's findings recited these comments. See FOF 76-86.
Ezold did receive one "distinguished/good" from Stephen Goodman, who had substantial contact with her, in May 1987. In addition,
she received a "distinguished" in legal analysis in 1983 and 1984 from Bean and in 1985 from Magarity. Wolf contended that one of
the factors taken into account by the Associates Committee was whether a partner had a reputation as an especially hard or easy
grader. There is strong evidence supporting Wolfs contention that Magarity was an "easy grader". The record is full of glowing
memos that he wrote on behalf of male associates, including Associates A and B. See App. at 5126, 5128.
The 1988 bottom line memos on Ezold and A were both prepared by Block. His summary of both of their legal analysis grades was
"good."
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The record also shows that A had stronger support from the partners within the litigation department than Ezold did. In 1988, ofthe
twenty-eight partners in the litigation department, thirteen partners viewed A's admission "with favor" and three "with enthusiasm";
only two partners had mixed emotions and only one viewed his admission negatively. Ezold, on the other hand, had much less
support from the litigation department partners. Only five partners viewed Ezold's admission "with favor" and only three "with
enthusiasm"; four partners had mixed emotions and three viewed her admission negatively.
The district court's findings concerning the evaluations of the other associates with whom it compared Ezold are found in FOF
87-118.
Ofthe twenty-eight partners in the corporate department, nine partners viewed F's admission "with favor," two "with enthusiasm,"
and one negatively.
Wolf contends additionally that the district court erred in its post-trial decision to exclude from evidence the evaluation files ofthree
successful female partnership candidates.
Assuming, without deciding, that these files were relevant, we note the district court did not exclude them on grounds of relevancy.
Rather, when they were offered on redirect, it ruled they were "beyond the scope" that could have been anticipated on direct
examination and were not proper redirect. In any event, in view of our disposition we need not resolve this issue.
The district court's complete findings concerning Wolfs assignment process as it related to Ezold are found in FOF 21-40.
Magarity also testified that he saw nothing in Ezold's evaluations indicating any bias against her because of her gender.
Ezold did not complain when she benefitted from the informal assignment process.
The district court failed to do so despite Ezold's proposed finding on the issue.
The district court made no finding concerning another incident involving Ezold. In that respect, the record indicates that Ezold was
chastised for her handling of a request to reassign a case. Kurland had told Ezold that she should not handle any more small cases so
she could free herself up for more substantial matters. He said that if she was assigned small cases she should come to him about
reassignment. When Arbittier sent her the file in a simple bankruptcy case she sent it back with a note asking that it be reassigned.
The record indicates that Ezold was criticized for just sending the file back with a note instead of talking to someone first. There is,
however, no mention of this incident in any of Ezold's evaluations.
In Lockhart, there was sufficient indirect evidence to support the jury's verdict that age was the determinative factor in Lockhart's
discharge. This evidence included: (I) Lockhart had received satisfactory performance evaluations and merit salary increases in each
year over his twenty-two year career with the company; (2) he had never received a reprimand or demotion; (3) the alleged reason for
his discharge was discrepancies found in an audit of his office, however, he was never given an opportunity to explain these
discrepancies prior to his tennination; (4) his immediate supervisor testified that he was a good and dependable worker and that the
standard company policy was to proceed through a series of reprimands before an employee would be dismissed; (5) the second
person responsible for his termination also testified that Lockhart was never insubordinate and never deliberately violated company
policy; and (6) there was evidence that the company had decided to undertake a major restructuring which resulted in the
consolidation of several locations and the filling of new management positions by mueh younger and inexperienced individuals.

It bears repeating in this final stage of diseussion that Wolfs impression of Ezold's legal analytic ability, informed but at the same
time subjeetive, is the focal point in this case and that Wolfis entitled to fonn its own subjeetive judgment on that faetor. Wolfis also
entitled to be wrong in its judgment so long as it does not base its ineorrect decision on unlawful sex discrimination or stereotype.

For hostile environment to be actionable under Meritor, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the
plaintiffs] employment and create an abusive working environment."
(quotation omitted); see also
("mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings
in an employee" would not sufficiently affect conditions of employment to violate Title VII), cert. denied,
(evidence of casual atmosphere and
loose conversation that sometimes had sexual connotations or implications insufficient to prove hostile working environment).
Hon. Collins 1. Seitz, Senior Circuit Judge ofthe United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, was limited to voting for panel
rehearing.
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868 F.Supp. 1422
United States District Court,
E.D. Wisconsin.
Malcolm D. FLAVEL, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Group Representative Plaintiff
and
Robert F. Cnare, James R. Conradt, Major
Coxhill, Robert K. Elbel, Malcolm D. Flavel
(deceased), Russell H. Graff, Robert L.
Isferding, Robert E. Jones, Chalasani C.
Rayan (deceased), Richard Spoonamore
and Ronald J. Weiss, Individual Plaintiffs,
and
The United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Intervenor
PlaintiIfrepresenting the 11 named
plaintiIfs above, plus Robert W. Belling,
Conrad Heinemann, William D. Meager,
Byron K. Smay, and Robert Van Dyke, as
additional plaintiIfs represented by the
United States,
v.
SVEDALA INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED,
and Svedala Incorporated, Defendants.

Standard that, where record taken as a whole
could not lead rational trier of fact to find for
nonmoving party, there is no genuine need for
trial and summary judgment is proper, is applied
with extra rigor in employment discrimination
cases, where intent and credibility are crucial
issues. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.c.A.

[2)

Federal Civil Procedure
. 'Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Plaintiff's presentation of more than a scintilla of
evidence supporting existence of illegitimate
motive is enough to preclude summary judgment
on ADEA claim. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
56, 28 U.S.C.A.

No. 92-C-1095. I Nov. 10, 1994.
Tenninated employees brought individual and class claims
against employer under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). On employer's motion for
summary judgment, the District Court, Warren, 1., held
that: (1) employees established prima facie case of
discrimination; (2) employees established that employer's
proffered reasons for termination were pretextual; (3)
plaintiffs would be allowed to call each named plaintiff in
establishing their prima facie case; and (4) plaintiffs would
not be allowed to adjust analytical framework of Teamsters
by requiring defendants to present all defense evidence
relevant to liability during prima facie stage of trial.

[3)

Federal Civil Procedure
Burden of Proof
On motion for summary judgment, neither party
may rest on mere allegations or denials in
pleadings or upon conclusory statements in
affidavits, and both parties must produce proper
documentary evidence to support their
contentions. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28
U.S.C.A.

Motion denied.

West Headnotes (55)

[1)

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

[4)

Federal Civil Procedure
Presumptions
In deciding summary judgment motion, court
need not draw every inference from the record,
but only reasonable references. Fed.Rules
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Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.

[5)

Civil Rights
,j/*Age Discrimination
Civil Rights
"~'''Age Discrimination
In age discrimination cases where disparate
treatment of single employee is at issue, plaintiff
may prove age discrimination in one of two
different ways; she may either produce direct or
circumstantial evidence that age was determining
factor in her discharge, or, as is more common,
she may utilize the indirect, burden-shifting
method of proof for Title VII cases originally set
forth in McDonnell Douglas, and later adapted to
age discrimination under ADEA. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e
et seq.; Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq.

[6)

facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1)
she was member of protected class; (2) she was
doing the job well enough to meet employer's
legitimate expectation; (3) she was discharged or
demoted; and (4) employer sought replacement
for her.

Civil Rights
Age Discrimination

[8]

If plaintiff succeeds in establishing prima facie
case of age discrimination, this creates rebuttable
presumption of discrimination, and burden of
production shifts to employer to articulate
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason
for
employee's discharge; if employer is successful,
presumption dissolves, and burden shifts back to
employee to show that employer's proffered
reasons are pretext for age discrimination. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq.

[9)

Direct evidence of discrimination includes any
acknowledgement
by
defendant
that
discriminatory intent was behind its treatment of
plaintiff; circumstantial evidence, in tum, may
involve, inter alia, proof of suspicious timing,
ambiguous
statements
and
behavior,
inappropriate remarks, and comparative evidence
of systematically more favorable treatment
toward similarly situated employees not sharing
the protected characteristic.

Civil Rights
Prima Facie Case
Under burden shifting approach of McDonnell
Douglas, plaintiff must initially establish prima

Civil Rights
!Age Discrimination
If age discrimination plaintiff successfully shows
that employer has offered pretext, that is, a phony
reason, for firing employee, then trier of fact is
pennitted, although not compelled to infer, that
real reason was age. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

[10)
(7)

Civil Rights
"",",Age Discrimination

Civil Rights
Age Discrimination
In attempting to show that employer's proffered
reasons are pretext for discrimination, plaintiff
might be well advised to present evidence of
discrimination in addition to that required to
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operating procedure, that is, the regular rather
than the unusual practice.

demonstrate pretext, because ultimate burden of
persuading trier of fact that defendant
intentionally discriminated against plaintiff
remains at all times with plaintiff, and because
fact finder is not required to find in plaintiff s
favor simply because she establishes prima facie
case and shows that employer's proffered reasons
are false.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

(14)

Civil Rights
Discrimination
Civil Rights
'v"Age Discrimination
,~>sAge

(11)

Plaintiffs who raise pattern or practice class
claim meet their burden of demonstrating that
unlawful discrimination has been regular policy
of employer by either producing direct or
circumstantial evidence that their employer
effectuated pattern of discriminatory age-based
decision making, or utilizing burden-shifting
method of proof similar to that articulated in
McDonnell Douglas.

Federal Civil Procedure
"",Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
In employment discrimination action, for
summary judgment purposes, nonmoving
plaintiff must only produce evidence from which
rational fact finder could infer that employer lied
about its proffered reasons for dismissal.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.c.A.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[15]
(12)

Civil Rights
,Disparate Treatment

Civil Rights
"Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Federal Civil Procedure
• Damages

In ADEA representative action brought by either
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) or individual plaintiff alleging pattern or
practice of disparate treatment, analytical
framework which applies is analogous to
framework in individual age discrimination
claim. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Under burden-shifting approach, pattern or
practice discrimination actions are generally
bifurcated at trial into two parts, which are
liability, or prima facie phase, where plaintiffs
must
prove
discriminatory
policy
by
preponderance of evidence, and remedial phase,
where scope of relief awardable to each
individual plaintiff is litigated.
I Cases that cite this headnote

[13)

Civil Rights
"Pattern or Practice" Claims
Plaintiffs who raise pattern or practice class
claim have as their initial burden the task of
demonstrating that unlawful discrimination has
been regular policy of employer, i.e., that
discrimination
was
company's
standard

(16)

Federal Civil Procedure
Damages
Under burden-shifting approach applicable to
pattern or practice discrimination actions,
efficiency is best enhanced if same jury makes
liability and remedial factual findings, as: (1)
plaintiffs need not reintroduce in remedial phase
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anecdotal evidence already presented during
liability phase; (2) defendants need not
reintroduce in remedial phase defenses already
presented in liability phase; and (3) conflicting
discrimination findings as to plaintiffs whose
cases are litigated in liability phase are avoided.

[17]

Absence of statistical evidence must not
invariably prove fatal in every pattern or practice
employment discrimination case; where overall
number of employees is small, anecdotal
evidence may suffice.

Civil Rights
,Prima Facie Case

[21]

Civil Rights
,\",Prima Facie Case
In some pattern or practice employment
discrimination cases, plaintiff's statistical
evidence alone might constitute prima facie case.

[22]

In prima facie phase of employment
discrimination trial, plaintiffs need not offer
evidence that each person for whom they will
ultimately seek relief was victim of employer's
discriminatory policy; their burden is to establish
prima facie case that such policy existed.

[19]

Civil Rights
,;n,Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Civil Rights
~:","Pattern or Practice" Claims
Formal written policy is not required to establish
pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination on
part of employer; informal or unstructured
method of decision making may be sufficient to
invoke this doctrine.

[18]

[20]

Civil Rights
,Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Neither statistical nor anecdotal evidence IS
automatically entitled to reverence to the
exclusion of the other in pattern or practice
employment discrimination case; however, when
one type of evidence is missing altogether, the
other must be correspondingly stronger for
plaintiffs to meet their burden.

Civil Rights
Prima Facie Case
[23]
In establishing prima facie case of pattern and
practice discrimination, plaintiffs should produce
statistical evidence demonstrating substantial
disparities in application of employment actions
as to protected and unprotected group, buttressed
by anecdotal evidence of general policies or
specific instances of discrimination.

Civil Rights
Prima Facie Case
Where plaintiff class in pattern or practice
employment discrimination case is prohibitively
large for each plaintiff to provide individual
testimony of alleged discriminatory conduct,
plaintiffs regularly present anecdotal testimony
from subset of plaintiffs in seeking to establish
their prima facie case; in order to establish prima
facie case, anecdotal evidence must suggest
broad-based discrimination, and providing mere
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70

isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts by
employer is insufficient.

strength of plaintiffs' proof.

(27)
(24)

Civil Rights
"~':,Prima Facie Case

In rebutting employee's prima facie case of
pattern or practice employment discrimination,
employer's defense must be designed to meet
prima facie case of employee; although court
does not mean to suggest that there are any
particular limits of type of evidence employer
may use, at liability stage the focus often will not
be on individual hiring decisions, but on pattern
of discriminatory decision making.

During liability, or prima facie, stage of pattern
or practice employment discrimination action,
defendants may counter plaintiffs' proof through
cross-examination and presentation of rebuttal
evidence, both statistical and anecdotal, in
attempt to show that plaintiffs' proof is either
inaccurate or insignificant.

[25J

Civil Rights
... Practices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements

(28)

To counter plaintiffs proof during prima facie
stage of pattern or practice age discrimination
action, employer might show, as an example, that
claimed discriminatory pattern is product of
hiring which occurred prior to ADEA rather than
unlawful post-Act discrimination, or that during
period employer is alleged to have pursued
discriminatory policy it made too many
employment decisions to justify inference that it
III
regular practice
of
had
engaged
discrimination.
Age
Discrimination
III
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Civil Rights
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

In employment discrimination action, strength of
rebuttal evidence that defendants must produce to
prevent plaintiffs from carrying burden of
persuasion as to disparity in treatment among
employee groups depends, as in any case, on

Civil Rights
Prima Facie Case

At prima facie stage of pattern or practice
employment discrimination action, while
defendants
may
attempt
to
establish
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
adverse
employment decision against testifying plaintiff,
they need not do so depending on their
assessment of strength of plaintiffs' evidence;
focus is on presence or absence of company-wide
discriminatory policy, and not on individual
employment decisions.

129)

126)

Civil Rights
'i'"Prima Facie Case

Civil Rights
Age Discrimination

In rebutting plaintiffs prima facie case in pattern
or practice employment discrimination action,
defendant may, as an example, simply question
accuracy of testifying plaintiffs recollection, or
attempt to show absence of any age-based
references toward that employee.
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[30]

Civil Rights
,:;y,,,"Pattern or Practice" Claims

[33]

In pattern or practice employment discrimination
action, it is only during the second, or remedial,
phase of trial that defendants must establish that
individual plaintiffs were not, in fact, victims of
discriminatory practice in order to escape
liability.

[31]

Civil Rights
of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden

~~~Effect

In pattern or practice employment discrimination
action, effect of jury's determination that
plaintiffs did not meet their burden of
establishing that defendants engaged in pattern or
practice of discrimination is to leave plaintiffs
with burden of proving, without assistance from
pattern and practice evidence, that each
actionable termination suffered by plaintiffs was
product of intentional discrimination on part of
defendant; plaintiffs, in other words, can neither
bolster their individual claims for relief with
proof that defendants engaged in systemwide
practice of racial discrimination, nor can they
shift burden of proof to defendants.

Civil Rights
;r,Age Discrimination
Throughout prima facie stage of pattern or
practice age discrimination action, plaintiffs bear
burden of persuasion as to establishing prima
facie case. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

[34]

[32]

Where jury determines that plaintiffs have met
their burden of establishing that defendants
engaged in pattern or practice of age
discrimination, in order to determine scope of
individual relief to which plaintiffs might be
entitled, court must move to second, or remedial,
phase of trial.

Civil Rights
"Practices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements
At close of liability phase of pattern or practice
age discrimination trial, jury is asked through
appropriate instructions whether or not plaintiffs
have met their burden of establishing by
preponderance of evidence that defendants
engaged in pattern or practice of age
discrimination during relevant time frame; if jury
responds negatively, then trial of plaintiffs , claim
is completed and plaintiffs are left to pursue
individual discrimination claims, presumably
before different fact finder, but if, on the other
hand, jury responds affirmatively, court may
award prospective relief to plaintiffs. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Federal Civil Procedure
Damages

[35]

Civil Rights
.. Age Discrimination
If plaintiffs prevail in liability, or prima facie,
phase of pattern or practice employment
discrimination trial, then proceedings move into
the second, or remedial phase, where proof of
pattern or practice supports inference that any
particular employment decision, during period in
which discriminatory policy was enforced, was
made in pursuit of that policy; under such
circumstances, it IS presumed that each
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individual plaintiff has been vIctIm of age
discrimination at hands of defendant.

[39)

Civil Rights
\r~Presumptions,

Inferences, and Burden of

Proof

[36)

To rebut presumption of discrimination during
remedial phase of pattern or practice
discrimination action, defendants may present
evidence demonstrating that plaintiffs' proof is
either inaccurate or insignificant, or that
nondiscriminatory explanation exists
for
presumed discrimination termination of each
plaintiff.

Civil Rights
~····Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
During remedial phase of pattern or practice
employment discrimination action, presumption
of discrimination shifts to defendants the burden
of demonstrating that individual plaintiffs were
not victims of the discriminatory practice; this
includes not only burden of production, but also
burden of persuading trier of fact that it is more
likely than not that employer did not unlawfully
discriminate against individual.

[40)

Civil Rights
,(;AcMeasure and Amount
Amount of damages awardable to each plaintiff
is litigated during remedial phase of pattern or
practice employment discrimination trial.

(37)

Civil Rights
Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
Teamsters approach to pattern or practice
employment discrimination action differs from
traditional McDonnell Douglas analysis in that,
under Teamsters approach, burden of persuasion
can shift from plaintiffs to defendants.

[38)

[41)

During remedial stage of pattern or practice
employment discrimination action, plaintiffs
may counter defendants' proof through
cross-examination and presentation of rebuttal
evidence in attempt to show that defendants'
nondiscriminatory justifications for employment
decisions are merely pretext for discrimination.

Civil Rights
Age Discrimination
During remedial phase of pattern or practice age
discrimination action, to rebut presumption of
discrimination as to each plaintiff, defendants
must establish by preponderance of evidence that
age discrimination was not determining factor or
but-for element in their employment decisions.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
~ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. ~ 621 et seq.

Civil Rights
,"Pattern or Practice" Claims

[42]

Civil Rights
Motive or Intent; Pretext
As general rule, employment discrimination
plaintiff may establish that defendants'
nondiscriminatory justification
for
their
employment decision is pre textual directly with
evidence that defendants were more likely than
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not motivated by discriminatory reason, or
indirectly by evidence that defendants'
explanation is not credible.

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

[46)
[43)

Civil Rights
,,""",Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof
Unlike McDonnell Douglas format applied to
individual employment discrimination claims,
Teamsters model applicable to pattern or practice
claims imposes no burden on plaintiffs to
produce evidence that defendants' proffered
nondiscriminatory reason for employment
decisions is pretextual, and burden of persuading
fact finder that age discrimination was not
determining factor in each of defendants'
employment decisions remains with defendant.

[44}

Civil Rights
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Strength of rebuttal evidence that plaintiffs must
produce to prevent defendants from carrying
their burden of persuasion during remedial phase
of pattern or practice employment discrimination
trial will depend, as in any case, on strength of
defendants' proof.

[45J

Civil Rights
Instructions
At end of remedial phase of pattern or practice
age discrimination trial, jury is asked through
appropriate instructions whether defendants
willfully violated ADEA, and whether
defendants have proven by preponderance of
evidence that each individual plaintiff was not
victim of age discrimination; they are also asked
to assess damages for each named plaintiff. Age

Civil Rights
'·'J>Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
Civil Rights
',/AAdmissibility of Evidence; Statistical
Evidence
Where individual and class claims of
employment
discrimination
are
brought
contemporaneously, court should consider
evidence relating to individual claims in their
assessment of class claim, and vice versa, since
evidence relevant to one is also relevant to the
other; class claim, however, is to be considered
first, since if class claim has merit, named and
unnamed individual class members are entitled to
burden-shifting presumption of Teamsters.

[47J

Civil Rights
Age Discrimination
Terminated employees established prima facie
case of pattern or practice age discrimination;
manager who was asked to calculate average age
of salaried employees at facility expressed
concern that such request was part of overall
program to get rid of older workers, general
manager commented when receiving list of
employees who were age 60 and older that there
were many long service employees and there was
need for new blood in organization, general
manager stated that problem with facility was
that "we have too many old people in their jobs
too long," and general manager stated that
average age of sales force of 55-56 years old was
too high and that younger and more aggressive
sales force was needed. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
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[50]
[48]

Civil Rights
F,~Motive or Intent; Pretext

Terminated employees met their burden of
establishing that employer's explanations for
their "retirements" were pretext for age
discrimination; although employer maintained
that employees voluntarily retired, evidence
indicated that employees were constructively
discharged after employer imposed inflated sales
quota on first employee during recessionary year
and unduly criticized his performance, created
new job description for district sales managers
which included "trumped up" physical
requirements for second employee who had
medical condition, and subjected third employee
to verbal harassment and adverse treatment. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Terminated employees met their burden of
demonstrating that employer's explanations for
their termination was merely pretext for age
discrimination; employee who was terminated
allegedly because he did not have in place
adequate safety programs had history of
satisfactory performance, employee who was
terminated allegedly because his responsibilities
were transferred and funding for his research was
eliminated was passed over for several open
positions by employer, and employee who was
terminated allegedly because he resisted
implementation of Total Quality Management
(TQM) principles merely expressed doubts about
applicability of certain specific management
strategies to his small department. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq.
[51]

149J

Labor and Employment
Constructive Discharge

Demonstrating constructive discharge requires
showing that reasonable employee would have
felt compelled to resign under circumstances of
case.

Civil Rights
Motive or Intent; Pretext

Terminated employee met his burden of
establishing that employer's proffered reason for
his termination was pretext for age
discrimination; although employer maintained
that employee was dismissed after his
responsibilities were transferred in response to
customer complaints and
after further
consolidation of operation obviated need for
on-site manager at employee's facility, employee
was not notified as to concerns over his
performance, employee received merit pay
increase, employee had not recently received
performance appraisals, and- termination letter
did not mention performance problems as cause
for termination. Age Discrimination III
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Civil Rights
'rc0Motive or Intent; Pretext

[52J

Labor and Employment
Constructive Discharge

Constructive discharge involves more than mere
Illconvenience
or
alteration
of
job
responsibilities; it is instead established by
indicating demotion evidenced by decrease in
wage or salary, less distinguished title, material
loss of benefits, significantly diminished material
responsibilities, or other indices that might be
unique to a particular situation.
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[53)

Civil Rights
,,,,,,,Admissibility of Evidence; Statistical
Evidence

In pattern or practice age discrimination action,
district court would allow plaintiffs to call each
named plaintiff as witness in establishing prima
facie case, given relatively small size of plaintiff
class, plaintiffs' need to present more than
isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts to meet
their prima facie case, and general reluctance to
limit degree of evidence deemed necessary by
plaintiffs to meet their evidentiary burden. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

claims, and, should jury determine that employer
did not engage in pattern or practice of
discrimination,
employees
could
pursue
individual discrimination claims in subsequent
proceedings which would require court
resolution under McDonnell Douglas format
rather than Teamsters format utilized in pattern
or practice case.

Attorneys and Law Firms
*1428 Stephen J. Snyder, David P. Pearson, and Craig A.
Brandt, Winthrop & Weinstine, St. Paul, MN, for
plaintiffs.

[54)

Civil Rights
'.""Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
Plaintiffs in pattern or practice employment
discrimination action who intended to have each
named plaintiff testify in presenting their prima
facie case would not be allowed to adjust
analytical framework of Teamsters by requiring
defendants to present all defense evidence
relevant to liability, including nondiscriminatory
reasons for each plaintiffs termination during
prima facie stage of trial; such adjustment could
prejudice defendants by lengthening trial and
lead to complication of special verdict form used
by jury.

Brian C. Tyndall, Senior Trial Atty., U.S. E.E.O.C.,
Milwaukee, WI, and Lloyd B. Zimmerman, Senior Trial
U.S.
E.E.O.c.,
Minneapolis,
MN,
for
Atty.,
plaintiff-intervenors.
Steven P. Handler, Daniel J. Donnelly, McDermott, Will &
Emery, Chicago, IL, Howard A. Pollack, Godfrey & Kahn,
Milwaukee, WI, and John J. Fons, Svedala Industries, Inc.,
Corporate Counsel, Waukesha, WI, for defendants.

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER
WARREN, District Judge.

I Cases that cite this headnote

[55)

Federal Civil Procedure
Time for Consideration of Motion
In employment discrimination action in which
plaintiffs brought pattern and practice claim as
group, and brought individual discrimination
claims as well, employer's motion for summary
judgment as to individual discrimination claims,
which it brought contemporaneously with motion
for summary judgment as to pattern or practice
claims, was premature; finding of pattern or
practice discrimination would obviate need to
separately pursue individual discrimination

Before the Court are the defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment as to (1) the Age Discrimination Claim of
Plaintiff Robert Van Dyke, (2) the Age Discrimination
Claims of Plaintiffs Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel and
Richard Spoonamore, and (3) those Plaintiffs Alleging
Constructive Discharge-Byron Smay, William Meagher,
Robert Isferding, Robert Jones, Major Coxhill, and James
Conradt. For the following reasons, these motions are
denied.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Plaintiffs Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel, and
Richard Spoonamore:
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The Appleton operation of defendant Svedala Industries,
Inc. ("SI") was responsible for the design, engineering,
manufacturing and marketing of crushing equipment and
screens. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 1.) Crushing
equipment takes large mined rocks, some up to eight feet in
diameter, and crushes them into small pieces; screens are
then used to segregate rock particles by size. (Jd.)
In April of 1989, William Farnsworth, who had been
General Manager of the Appleton facility for many years,
retired. (Jd. at ~ 2.) Mr. Farnsworth was replaced on
November 15,1989 by William Guernsey, who had been
General Manager of Consolidated Diesel, a *1429 joint
venture between Cummins Engine Company and J.1. Case.
(Jd. at ~ 3.)

1. Ronald Weiss:
When Mr. Guernsey interviewed for the general manager
position with officers of Svedala Industri A.B. ("SlAB"),
SI's Swedish parent corporation, various shortcomings of
the Appleton management team were discussed, including
the performance of plaintiff Ronald Weiss, Appleton'S
Manager of Manufacturing. (Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 46-47.) Mr. Weiss had started with
SI's predecessor, Allis-Chalmers, in 1972, and was
employed as the Manager of Manufacturing at Appleton
since 1981. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~I 8.) Each
written performance review prepared by Mr. Farnsworth
for the five years before Mr. Guernsey was hired rated Mr.
Weiss at the second from the top of six rating levels; none
mentioned any "improvement needs," and all listed "upper
management" or "general management" as Mr. Weiss'
"long range career objectives." (Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 2.) Mr. Weiss received favorable annual
performance appraisals every year until 1990; it is disputed
whether Mr. Farnsworth ever expressed dissatisfaction to
anyone about his performance. (Jd. at ~~ 4-6.) Mr.
Farnsworth nominated Mr. Weiss to attend the personnel
development center to be conducted by SlAB at Nordic
Hills Training Center; Mr. Weiss and all other Appleton
nominees over forty (40) years of age were rejected, and
only the youngest, Pat Quinn-then age thirty-eight
(38)-was invited to attend. (Jd. at ~l~ 39-40.) Mr.
Farnsworth also recommended Mr. Weiss, along with Jim
Gregor or Hugh Foy, as his replacement. (Jd. aqI38.) The
1989 performance review for Mr. Quinn describes him as a
"solid young manager with very high potential," and the
1989 performance review for Mr. Gregor, Appleton's
Manager of Sales, lists the "need to develop young
generation of salesmen & mgt. candidates" as his
improvement needs; the progress review for Mr. Weiss
dated February 8, 1990 dropped him from a near-top

ranking to the bottom. (Id. at ~ 50.)
According to the defendants, Mr. Guernsey, upon arriving
at Appleton, concluded that costs relating to quality
control, purchasing, and inventory were too high, and that
plant safety was a problem. (Def.Proposed Findings of
Fact ~~ 10-13; 15, 17). Mr. Guernsey believed that Mr.
Weiss did not have in place an adequate safety
improvement program, and held him responsible for cost
problems. (Jd. at ~~ 14, 16-20.) Under Mr. Weiss'
management, the Appleton facility had in place a
management safety council, a safety brigade, safety tours,
weekly safety programs, safety posters, periodic safety
contests, safety awards, and a full-time nurse. (Pl.Resp. to
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 21.) The plaintiffs also
reference Mr. Guernsey's November 8, 1991 deposition
testimony, where he stated that the Appleton facility "had a
safety record that was average in the industry," and the fact
that the manufacturing operation at Appleton under Mr.
Weiss' supervision had been rated as outstanding during
the last audit of the program in 1987-88. (Jd. at ~~ 12,14.)
Appleton stalIs1tcs on safety under Mr. Weiss'
management were within OSHA requirements. (Jd. at ~
22.)
The defendants indicate that Mr. Guernsey "is a proponent
of the managerial philosophy known as Total Quality
Management ("TQM")," which espouses teamwork,
accountability, and quantifiable performance goals and
objectives. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~I~ 4-5). The
plaintiffs indicate that, in connection with the sale of the
mineral systems division of Allis-Chalmers, John Platner,
SI's North American President, eliminated the total quality
assurance department at Appleton as a cost-savings
measure, reassigning TQM to the engineering department,
and that Mr. Weiss preserved as much of the TQM
program in manufacturing as he could. (Pl.Resp. to
Def.Proposed Findings ofFact~~ 15-16.) According to the
plaintiffs, Mr. Guernsey never discussed TQM or the
safety program at Appleton with Mr. Weiss. (Jd. at ~~ 1720.)
During the period preceding Mr. Guernsey's arrival at
Appleton, Mr. Weiss was working on the largest cost
reduction plan that had ever been approved during the
eighteen years he had been with the company; he had also
received prior approval before *1430 traveling to China in
October of 1989 regarding a sourcing castings project. (Jd.
at ~1'128-32.) Inventory levels at Appleton were not set by
the manager of manufacturing operations; instead, a formal
master scheduling meeting was held each month involving
the general manager and his entire staff, with the former
granting final approval for the monthly master schedule,
including inventory levels. (Jd. at ~~ 33-35.) The
manufacturing operations at Appleton under Mr. Weiss
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produced inventory and other products in accordance with
the approved master schedule. (Jd. at ~ 36.)
In December of 1989, one month after he had replaced Mr.
Farnsworth, Mr. Guernsey decided to remove Mr. Weiss as
Manager of Manufacturing. (DefProposed Findings of
Fact ~~ 21, 25.) Mr. Guernsey replaced Mr. Weiss with
Gerald Dircks, a forty-nine (49) year old former colleague
at Consolidated Diesel familiar with TQM principles. (Jd.
at ~~ 22-24, 28-29.) Mr. Dircks was interviewed in
December, and his hiring was approved by Mr. Planter and
Swedish parent manager Jan Knuttson before Christmas.
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 41.) Mr.
Guernsey announced Mr. Weiss' impending termination to
Mr. Gregor and other SI managers; according to Mr.
Gregor, Mr. Guernsey stated that "there could be some
legal implications involved in this so none of you is to
discuss any of this with anybody." (Jd. at ~ 42.) According
to Mr. Weiss, Mr. Guernsey stated to him in a January of
1990 conversation that "the problem with Appleton is that
we have too many old people in their jobs too long." (Jd. at
~ 54.) While he had initially considered placing Mr. Weiss
in another position, Mr. Guernsey terminated his
employment on February 12, 1990. (DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 26-28.) Mr. Weiss was fifty-four (54)
years old when terminated. (Jd. at ~ 28.) His final rate card,
signed by Mr. Guernsey, has the "retire" box marked as the
reason for "separation from force," rather than "term." or
"layoff" (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 7.)
On November 2, 1990, Mr. Weiss filed an age
discrimination charge with the Wisconsin Department of
Industry, Labor and Human Relations ("DILHR"). (Jd. at ~
8.) On November 16, 1990, SI, through its General
Counsel John Fons, responded to Mr. Weiss' charge,
stating that:
"After his start with Boliden Allis, Inc.,
Mr. Guernsey reviewed the past and
current performance of each manager
and, based on Mr. Weiss's performance
and willingness to be a team player,
determined that Mr. Weiss would not be
able to meet his expectations. Rather than
insult Mr. Weiss by demoting him, Mr.
Guernsey offered Mr. Weiss a severance
package
which
included
salary
continuation to age 55, enabling Mr.
Weiss to then qualify for retiree health
benefits."
(Jd. at ~ 9.) On January 9, 1991, DILHR made a probable
cause finding in favor ofMr. Weiss. (Jd. at ~ 10.)

2. Malcolm Flavel:
Before SI acquired the Appleton unit out of the AllisChalmers bankruptcy on January 1, 1988, plaintiff
Malcolm Flavel participated in the international marketing
of Appleton products, working extensively in the Far East,
and was involved in comminution research, the study of
how rocks and minerals break up. (Def.Proposed Findings
of Fact ~~ 30-31.) Shortly before the acquisition, Mr.
Platner had rated Mr. Flavel first among the fifteen (15)
key employees at Appleton, stating that he "[ did not] think
there is any way [SI] could replace his knowledge."
(Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 63-64.) Mr.
Flavel had received significant awards for his work and
held mining equipment patents. (Jd. at ~ 65.) On October
17, 1990, Mr. Guernsey terminated Mr. Flavel; Mr. Flavel
was fifty-four (54) years of age. (Jd. at ~ 40; Pl.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 61.) Mr. Quinn, Mr.
Flavel's supervisor at the time of his termination, noted
that he "worked hard, was very dedicated and had no
performance problems." (Jd. at ~ 82.) On September 30,
1992, in response to an administrative charge brought by
Mr. Flavel, the EEOC issued a finding of discrimination
against SI. (Jd. at ~ 57.)
The parties disagree as to the circumstances surrounding
Mr. Flavel's dismissal. *1431 According to the defendants,
Minco International A.B. ("Minco") was created as the
international sales arm for SlAB, representing its products
in areas where the latter had no sales or marketing
companies. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 33.) They
claim that Minco took over Mr. Flavel' s responsibilities
for marketing Appleton products in the Far East and the
Pacific Rim. (Jd. at ~ 34.) They also indicate that, in late
1989 and early 1990, funding for comminution research at
Appleton was eliminated. (Jd. at '1 35.) Pursuant to these
changes, Minco purportedly agreed to split Mr. Flavel's
time and expenses with Appleton. (Jd. at ~~ 36-37.)
According to the defendants, Mr. Flavel introduced Peter
Kohle, president of Minco, and Lars Strom, another Minco
employee, to various Pacific Rim contacts; in the fall of
1990, however, Minco discontinued funding for Mr.
Flavel's position. (Jd. at ~l'; 38-39.) The defendants
indicate that, since Mr. Flavel's termination, no one from
Appleton has been employed primarily to travel to Asia to
sell Appleton products or to engage in comminution
research and development. (Jd. at ~ 41.)
According to the plaintiffs, when SI initially responded
through then Human Resources Manager Paul Stelter to
the administrative charge that Mr. Flavel filed with the
EEOC, no mention was made of international sales or
Minco; instead, SI stated:
"Specifically, Mr. Flavel was employed
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by the Allis-Chalmers Corporation (AC) as a Consultant, Comminution
Systems. His was a "one of a kind"
research oriented position which, simply
put, studied how rocks fractured. In 1988
certain assets of A-C were purchased,
including the Appleton operation which
produces rock crushing equipment and
remains part of an international
corporation. Since that time, the basic
research and development of our rock
crushing machinery has been done in
Sweden. Over the last several years it
became apparent that we had no work for
Mr. Flavel, within his area of expertise."
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 56,67.) The
plaintiffs indicate that Mr. Flavel's immediate supervisor
when he was terminated was Mr. Quinn, who told Mr.
Weiss in late 1989 that Ted Thomas, then age thirty-three
(33), would be given additional responsibility in the
comminution area. (Jd. at ~~ 66, 70.)
Mr. Quinn also purportedly admitted that the departure of
another comminution consultant, Hugh Rimmer, in May of
1990 had created an open position for an application
engineer at the company. (Jd. at ~~ 58-59.) According to
the plaintiffs, Mr. Quinn admitted that Mr. Flavel was fully
qualified to perform such duties; however, instead of
offering him the position, SI first offered the job to Joe
Pirozzoli, who was younger than Mr. Flavel, and then hired
David Urbanek, age twenty-eight (28), on April 1, 1991.
(ld. at ~~ 60-62.) The plaintiffs also indicate that, since Mr.
Flavel's termination, Mr. Thomas has traveled to China in
connection with sales at the Anshan mining project, on
which Mr. Flavel had previously been working, and to
other countries. (Jd. at ~ 69.)
Finally, the plaintiffs note that during 1990, when Minco
had supposedly rejected Mr. Flavel as a participant in its
international sales efforts, it was advertising for an open
sales position for Latin America; the job requirements
stated that applicants be "between 30 and 40, with a
background in business and engineering, preferably with a
degree from a college or institute of technology." (Jd. at '1'1
71-72.) Mr. Flavel's international sales experience
included Latin America; however. Minco hired Ed Pronk
then age thirty-three (33). (Jd. at ~'173-75.) In making thi~
decision, the plaintiffs claim that Mr. Stelter and Mr.
Quinn were influenced by a fax received from Minco
which stated that the ideal candidate's age would be in the
30's; in a June 20, 1990 letter from Mr. Stelter to Mr.
Guernsey recommending a termination arrangement for
Mr. Flavel, Mr. Stelter noted in the first paragraph that
"Mal was born May 8, 1936 and is 54 years old." (Jd. at':

..... . .

~~ ~ ~~~~.~~~~~~

.

79.)

3. Richard Spoonamore:
Plaintiff Richard Spoonamore, whose date of birth is May
11, 1935, was hired by Allis-Chalmers, S1's predecessor,
in July of 1979 as a field service representative.
(DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 42; P1.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 84.) Mr. *1432
Spoonamore was based in Tucson, Arizona, and travelled
both internationally and domestically approximately sixty
(60) percent of the time. (Jd. at ~ 85.) Mr. Spoonamore
continued in this capacity when SI purchased the Appleton
business on January 1, 1988, reporting to James Gregor,
national sales manager for the Appleton facility. (Jd. at ~
86.) Mr. Spoonamore had technical, sales, and managerial
experience with other firms involved in the mining and
construction industries, had a bachelor of science degree in
mechanical engineering, and had received a certificate in
quality control courses from the American Society of
Quality Control. (Jd. at ~ 92.)
In late March or early April of 1990, at the
recommendation of Mr. Gregor, Mr. Spoonamore was
promoted to manager of the field service department at
Appleton; he relocated to Appleton while his family
remained in Arizona, and continued to report to Mr.
Gregor. (Jd. at ~~ 87-88, 93; Def.Proposed Findings of
Fact '143.) While unhappy with Sl's first-year salary offer
of$43,200, Mr. Spoonamore agreed to accept the position,
noting his desire to have his salary reviewed within one
year. (PI. Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 9091.)
One of Mr. Spoonamore's duties as manager of field
service was to coordinate the activities of the field service
representatives. (Jd. at '1'1 94-95.) According to plaintiffs,
however, his ability to perform this task was "seriously
undermined" by Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Quinn, and Mr.
Dircks, who "routinely" contacted field service
representatives directly, ordered them to perform field
service work without notifying Mr. Spoonamore, and
"verbally abused [Mr. Spoonamore1 in a very severe
fashion in front of others." (Jd. at ~'195-97.) The plaintiffs
also indicate that Mr. Spoonamore's attempts to hire a
Wan·anty Administrator and to obtain a computer system
for his department to improve performance were "denied
without any explanation"; his request for a training room
was also delayed. (Jd. at 'I~ 98-104.) Mr. Spoonamore also
recommended that additional field service representatives
be hired to cover increasing workloads; he was told,
however, that he could not hire any additional persons
because they "weren't in the budget." (Id. at ~ 105.)
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The plaintiffs indicate that, within several months after
coming to Appleton, Mr. Spoonamore, through Mr. Gregor
and other employees, discovered that Mr. Guernsey was
upset with Mr. Gregor for promoting him because he was
"too old," "younger people [ ] could take his job," and "he
had this young, professional-type guy waiting in the wings
who could just step right in and hit the road running." (Jd.
at ~ 107-109.) Later in 1990, Mr. Gregor told Mr.
Spoonamore that, despite his satisfaction with Mr.
Spoonamore's performance, Mr. Guernsey had told him
that Joe Quinn and William Meagher, two salesmen for the
Appleton business, were also "too old," that he had
"lumped [them] all together," and that Mr. Gregor had to
"get rid of you guys." (Jd. at ~~ 110-113.) In August of
1990, Appleton parts manager Gary Wichtel purportedly
told Mr. Spoonamore that Mr. Guernsey was not happy
with him and other field representatives because of their
age, and that he was glad that the people in the parts
department were young. (Jd. at ~~ 114-115.)
In 1990, Appleton employees, including managers, were
scheduled to attend classes in TQM principles taught at
Fox Valley Institute, located three miles from SI's
Appleton facility. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 44.)
According to the defendants, Mr. Spoonamore was critical
of TQM philosophy, calling it "hogwash," as well as the
TQM consultant retained to teach the Fox Valley classes,
and his attendance at the classes was "sporadic." (Jd. at ~~
45-47.) The plaintiffs, however, indicate that Mr.
Spoonamore merely expressed doubts about the
applicability of certain specific management strategies to
his small department, that he is conversant with TQM
principles and believes they can be effective in assisting
businesses like Appleton, and that Mr. Guernsey never
discussed TQM principles with Mr. Spoonamore.
(P1.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~l 173, 175177.) Moreover, they claim that his "sporadic" attendance
only resulted from instructions by Mr. Guernsey and Mr.
Stelter that business service, including answering *1433
phones, should take priority over course attendance. (Jd. at
~ 178.)
In late December of 1990 or early January of 1991, Mr.
Spoonal1!ore purportedly recommended to Mr. Gregor that
each of the field service representatives in his department
receive substantial raises in their annual salaries; at that
time, two were under age forty (40), Steve Cadieux and
Ron Monfils, and two were over age forty (40), Scott Hiller
and Al Peterson. (Jd. at ~ 119.) Mr. Guernsey endorsed Mr.
Spoonamore's recommendation for the two younger
employees, approving substantial raises, but overruled his
recommendation as to the two older employees, approving
only token raises. (Jd.) Mr. Peterson had begun
employment with SI five years after Mr. Monfils and three
years after Mr. Cadieux; in 1990, Mr. Hiller received a

substantially higher salary than the others, and in 1991 Mr.
Peterson received a substantial raise. (DefReply to
P1.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 119.)
Mr. Spoonamore expected to receive a pay increase
effective April 1, 1991; when he received his April 15,
1991 paycheck, however, he realized that Mr. Guernsey
had not approved a raise in salary. (DefProposed Findings
of Fact ~ 48; P1.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~
120, 125.) Mr. Guernsey had never conducted a
performance review of Mr. Spoonamore, articulated to Mr.
Spoonamore concerns about his performance, or provided
written notice of alleged performance deficiencies. (Id. at ~
126.) The defendants attribute the raise denial to Mr.
"resistance
to
Guernsey's
TQM
Spoonamore's
management philosophy, as well as other problems
Guernsey perceived with his performance." (Def.Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 48.) On April 16, 1991, Mr.
Spoonamore hand-delivered to Mr. Gregor a letter of
resignation from his management position; in his letter and
in a conversation with Mr. Gregor, he noted that he hoped
to return to Tucson to "serve [the company] well in the
Field Service Representative function," that he would
assist his managerial successor during transition, and that
he was upset over being denied a raise despite his
satisfactory performance. (P1.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 121-123.) Mr. Gregor and his
immediate supervisor, Joe Valitchka, had a conversation
regarding Mr. Spoonamore's desired raise; in late April or
early May of 1991, Mr. Spoonamore also spoke with Mr.
Valitchka, telling him that he would have to return to
Arizona ifhis salary in Appleton were not adjusted. (Jd. at
~~ 124, 127; DefProposed Findings of Fact 'l~ 50--51.)
On Memorial Day weekend of 1991, Mr. Spoonamore
packed up his personal belongings and moved from
Appleton to Tucson; it is not clear whether he had
previously notified Mr. Gregor of his intention to do so.
(Jd. at ~~ 52-53; P1.Resp. to DefProposed Findings ofF act
~~l 130--131; DefReply to P1.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~ 130.) The following Tuesday, Mr.
Gregor called Mr. Spoonamore in Tucson, and Mr.
Spoonamore agreed to return to Appleton, at SI's expense,
to assist in the transfer of his former job as manager of field
service; it is not clear whether Mr. Spoonamore was
offered a position as a field representative. (DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 54-57; P1.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 132-135.) During the next week in
Appleton, at the request ofMr. Valitchka, Mr. Spoonamore
compiled information relating to the costs to be incurred in
"starting up" unused equipment sold by SI several years
earlier to a Mexican customer; some time earlier, he had
estimated the total start-up cost at $50,000, or twice that
originally anticipated by Sl. (Jd. at ~~ 136-144;
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 58-68.) Mr. Guernsey
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and Mr. Spoonamore had met in January or February of
1991 about this estimate; while the defendants claim that
Mr. Guernsey limited Mr. Spoonamore to spending
$40,000 on such costs, (ld. at ~~ 67-68), the plaintiffs
indicate that Mr. Spoonamore was informed by Mr. Gregor
that Mr. Guernsey authorized completion of the start-up,
without use of Appleton employees, even if expenses
approached $70,000. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings
of Fact ~'1 145-148.) The start-up of the equipment in
Mexico was completed by Memorial Day of 1991 at a cost
of over $67,000. (ld. at ~ 153-154.)
Before completion ofthe start-up project, Mr. Spoonamore
sent a letter to the Mexican *1434 customer advising them
of the updated cost figures, acknowledging the contract
terms calling for $25,260 in start-up charges, and
indicating that he would advise them if "costs exceed[ ed]
the contract figure so [they] will know of any back charges,
to expect from the office." (ld. at ~~ 151-152.) In early
June of 1991, after Mr. Spoonamore had returned to
Appleton, Mr. Guernsey was informed of the total actual
cost expended on the project, approximately $67,000; the
defendants indicate that Mr. Guernsey was "extremely
upset at Spoonamore's disobeying his directive on the
costs relating to the" project. (DefProposed Findings of
Fact ~ 71.) Mr. Gregor, however, testified that he
"emphatically" believes that Mr. Spoonamore did not "go
beyond his authority" in connection with the project.
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 149.) SI
sought cost recovery from the equipment purchaser;
ultimately, the parties reached a $60,000 settlement. (ld. at
'r~ 154-155.)
On Friday of that week, Mr. Spoonamore's employment
was terminated in a meeting with Mr. Valitchka and Mr.
Stelter. (ld. at ,r'1157-159; DefProposed Findings of Fact
'172.) At this meeting, either Mr. Valitchka or Mr. Stelter
stated that Mr. Spoonamore's "resignation was being
accepted"; Mr. Spoonamore insists that he never
voluntarily resigned. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings
ofFact ~~ 159-160, 162-163; Def Reply to PI.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ,r 160.) According to the
plaintiffs, at the request of Mr. Valitchka and Mr. Stelter,
Mr. Spoonamore granted permission for his briefcase and
rented vehicle to be searched before leaving. (PI.Resp. to
Del.Proposed Findings of Fact ,r 161.) According to the
plaintiffs, Mr. Spoonamore was never told that he was
being terminated because of his purported resistance to
TQM principles espoused by Mr. Guernsey. (ld. at'1174.)
Mr. Spoonamore tiled an unemployment compensation
claim in Arizona; on February 19,1992, an Appeals Board
of the Arizona Department of Economic Security found
that Mr. Spoonamore "did not express an intention to quit
working entirely for the company," and that, when SI told

him on May 28, 1991 that "he would be paid field service
pay at his old rate, [it] had accepted [his] resignation from
the position of manager of field service and had accepted
[his] request to be hired as a field service representative."
(ld. at ~~ 163-164.) This finding was affirmed on April 20,
1992 by the Arizona Appeals Board. (ld. at ~ 165.) On July
24, 1991, Mr. Spoonamore filed an age discrimination
charge with the EEOC, specifically referencing purported
ageist statements made by Mr. Guernsey. (ld. at ~ 182.) In
October of 1992, the EEOC issued a Letter of Violation
against SI, concluding that they "exercised a preference for
younger employees and that preference had its origins with
Swedish corporate affiliates," that Mr. Guernsey had
"expressed and exercised a preference regarding the
retention and promotion of younger staff," and that there
was "substantial evidence" of a "campaign of harassment
of older employees at the Appleton facility." (ld. at ~ 184.)

B. PLAINTIFF ROBERT VAN DYKE:
The Standard Steel Corporation of Los Angeles, California
was acquired by Allis-Chalmers in the early 1970's and
renamed Stansteel. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact '1'1 78.) On January 1, 1988, as part of its acquisition of the
Milwaukee unit of Allis-Chalmers, SI acquired the
Stansteel operation. (ld. at ~~ 1-9.) Plaintiff Robert Van
Dyke joined Standard Steel in 1966 and performed duties
relating to export sales and licensing programs. (ld. at ~
10.) At that time, Standard Steel employed approximately
400-500 employees. (ld. at ~ 11.) Due to declining
business, that number decreased to approximately 300-400
by 1977. (ld. at ~ 12.) In 1977, Mr. Van Dyke, by then the
sales administration manager for Stansteel, was terminated
as part of a reduction in force caused by the closing of
Stansteel's manufacturing facility; approximately forty
(40) people were retained to perform non-manufacturing
tasks. (ld. at ~~ 13-14.) Mr. Van Dyke was rehired by
Stansteel in 1979, and became the on-site manager in 1984;
at that time, Stansteel employed approximately thirty (30)
people. (ld. at ~~ 1, 15-17.) As manager, Mr. Van Dyke
was responsible for overseeing the entire business group
including engineering, parts sales, quality assurance,
*1435 sales, contract administration and field service. (ld.
at~18.) The Vice-President and General Manager of SI's
Milwaukee facility is Dr. Ki Joung. (Pl.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact '1 7.) Mr. Van Dyke
reported directly to Dr. Joung from January I to November
30, 1988, when he began reporting to Bobby Faulkner,
manager ofthe product and processes area ofthe "Minerals
Systems Company" at the Milwaukee facility. (ld. at ~ 8.)
In November of 1988, a further reduction of the Stansteel
work force took place; the parties dispute whether it
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resulted from declining sales and whether Mr. Faulkner
participated in termination decisions. (Id. at ~~ 21-22, 26;
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 19.) Several employees
were discharged and responsibility for purchasing, quality
assurance,
field
service,
invoicing,
accounting,
engineering, parts sales, and contract administration were
transferred to Milwaukee. (Jd. at ~ 20; Pl.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 9.) According to the
plaintiffs, Mr. Faulkner assumed responsibility for one of
Mr. Van Dyke's normal managerial duties: resolving
holdbacks on certain equipment contracts. (Jd. at ~ 10.) The
defendants, however, contend that Mr. Faulkner so acted
only after receiving customer complaints and determining
that
Stansteel's
outstanding
holdbacks
were
inappropriately high. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~
23-24; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of
Fact ~ 10.) The plaintiffs indicate that Mr. Van Dyke was
not consulted in any way prior to making these changes;
according to the defendants, however, Dr. Joung and Mr.
Faulkner advised Mr. Van Dyke about these and other
concerns throughout 1989. (DefProposed Findings of Fact
~ 25; Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 24.)
After the November of 1988 reduction-in-force, six
employees remained at Stansteel-Mr. Van Dyke, Ed
Simonian, Edward (Craig) Turner, Mary Ham, Bernice
Wingerson, and Santiago (Jim) Rodriguez. (DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~ 22.) Stansteel also retained three former
employees, Marcus Rouchaud, Roy Heacock, and Warren
Vetter, as consultants. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings
ofFact ~ 27.)
According to the defendants, the Stansteel operation
"continued to show disappointing results during 1989."
(DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 26.) Nevertheless, in
August of 1989, Mr. Faulkner authorized a 7.1 % merit pay
increase for Mr. Van Dyke, which was approved in writing
by Dr. Joung. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~
13.) The defendants claim that, at the end of 1989, Mr.
Faulkner and Dr. Joung decided to further consolidate the
Stansteel operation with the Milwaukee unit, determining
that an on-site manager was not needed at Stansteel
because Mr. Faulkner could supervise the operation from
Milwaukee. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 27-28.)
They indicate that this, plus Mr. Faulkner's concerns about
Mr. Van Dyke's performance, resulted in a decision to
terminate Mr. Van Dyke; they claim that his age was never
discussed. (Jd. at';~ 29-31.) While the plaintiffs indicate
that neither Dr. Joung nor Mr. Faulkner had ever
questioned Mr. Van Dyke's performance in any way, the
defendants claim that Mr. Faulkner discussed with Mr.
Van Dyke his concerns regarding customer complaints and
performance. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact
~~ 14, 23, 28; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~ 28.)

Mr. Van Dyke did not receive any performance appraisals
as manager of Stansteel after approximately 1984.
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 29.)
However, in a confidential memo to Mr. Planter pertaining
to incentive compensation for Dr. Joung's first reports, Dr.
Joung placed Mr. Van Dyke ahead ofMr. Faulkner in his
list of incentive compensation candidates. (Jd. at ~ 17.)
On January 9, 1990, Mr. Faulkner travelled to Stansteel to
terminate Mr. Van Dyke; according to the plaintiffs, he
made no mention of any performance problems, instead
handing Mr. Van Dyke a termination letter citing
restructuring as the cause for elimination of his position.
(Jd. at ~~ 15-16, 32-33, 36.) Mr. Van Dyke's age was not
discussed during the termination meeting. (DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~135.) Mr. Van Dyke was sixty-one (61)
when he was terminated. (Jd. at ~ 37.) The parties agree
*1436 that it was Dr. Joung's decision to discharge Mr.
Van Dyke. (Id. at ~ 31; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 31.) After Mr. Van Dyke
was
terminated,
four employees remained at
Stansteel-Mr. Simonian, age fifty-five (55); Mr. Turner,
age fifty-three (53); Ms. Hamm, age fifty-two (52); and
Mr. Wingerson, age fifty-three (53). (Pl.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 38.) Mr. Van Dyke
believes that Stansteel should have terminated Mr. Turner
in its restructuring, as specific performance deficiencies
had been identified regarding Mr. Turner and Mr. Faulkner
had been advised by Mr. Van Dyke that he was unhappy
with his performance; the defendants, however, stress that
Mr. Van Dyke did not "take any action" against Mr. Turner
"even though he was his manager for several years." (Jd. at
~~ 37-38; DefProposed Findings ofFact ~~139-40.) As of
January of 1990, Mr. Faulkner was aware of co-workers'
complaints about Mr. Turner; as part of the February 1991
reduction-in-force at the Milwaukee facility, Mr. Turner
was placed on probation and told that he had to focus on his
job duties in order to maintain his employment. (Pl.Resp.
to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 41-42.)
In a set of notes pertaining to the business objectives of the
Mineral Systems Company which predated Mr. Van
Dyke's termination, Dr. Joung expressed concern that the
engineering and sales personnel at Stansteel were too old.
(Jd. aqjI8.) In a report to the Swedish parent corporation
of SI in October of 1989, Dr. Joung noted that "[t]he
average age of BA/Milwaukee employees is quite high ...
[t]herefore, we initiated a program in 1989, in which the
positions vacated by either retirement or departure were
filled with younger people as much as possible." (ld. at ~
19.) According to the plaintiffs, Dr. Joung called Mr. Van
Dyke from time to time to discuss the age of his staff,
which Dr. Joung said was "up in age," and suggested that
Mr. Van Dyke hire younger people to replace Stansteel
personnel. (Jd. at ~I 20.) Mr. Van Dyke also contends that
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Stansteel had a reasonable backlog of business when he
was terminated, and good prospects for future business; the
defendants dispute this claim. (Id. at ~ 25; Def.Reply to
Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 25.) Mr. Van
Dyke believes that he had more experience with
Stansteel's products than Mr. Turner, and that a manager
was still needed on site at the Stansteel operation when he
was terminated. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of
Fact ~ 45.)

reports, called "C-Reports," to SlAB on a monthly basis.
(Id. at ~ 6.)

Six plaintiffs allege that they were constructively
discharged; Byron Smay, William Meagher, Robert
lsferding, Robert Jones, James Conradt, and Major
Coxhill. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 1.) Each was
employed at the Appleton unit, which was responsible for
the design, engineering, manufacturing, and marketing of
crushing equipment and screens. (Id. at ~~ 2,3.)

The parties dispute whether the SlAB's involvement in the
management of the Appleton and Milwaukee units
extended to employment policies and decisions, and
whether SlAB has been involved in key management and
employment policy decisions at the American subsidiaries.
(Id. at ~~ 8-9, 12; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 8-9, 12.) When Mr. Guernsey was
being interviewed in Sweden by Mr. Older and Mr.
Knuttson for the general manager position at Appleton, he
discussed specific personnel in Appleton, including Mr.
Weiss. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 11.)
Mr. Planter was also directly involved in employment
decisions and in the formulation of employment policies at
the American subsidiaries; the parties dispute whether he
was aware of and approved of the termination and/or
demotion "of numerous senior and mid-level managers
both at the Appleton and Milwaukee Units." (Id. at ~ 13.)
As to the Milwaukee terminations which occurred on
February 13, 1991, it was Mr. Planter who first met with
Wayne Clark from Clark and Kevin to seek personnel
consulting services in connection with the terminations;
Mr. Clark's handwritten notes reflect that the topic of age
was discussed in this meeting. (Id. at ~ 14.)

In their voluminous submissions, the plaintiffs present the
following facts as evidence demonstrating a pattern or
practice of age discrimination by the defendants. Thomas
Older, the president of SlAB, and other Swedish managers
have been corporate directors of the defendants since SlAB
purchased Allis-Chalmers' assets in early 1988. (Pl.Resp.
to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 3.) The interlocking
management relationship between SlAB and the Appleton
and Milwaukee units involve direct, frequent and
substantive communication between senior Swedish
management and senior American management. (Id. at 'i~
4, 7.) Business consolidations, staff reorganizations and
realignments, business plans and other significant business
issues confronting the American subsidiaries are submitted
to SlAB for consideration and approval by senior Swedish
management. (Id. at " 7.) After the January 1, 1988
acquisition of the solids processing business of AllisChalmers, Swedish senior management put in place an
annual budget review process, conducted in Sweden, to
which each of the general managers for the *1437 United
States facilities was "summoned to attend." (Id. at"5.) On
a regular basis, and at least annually, Mr. Guernsey and Dr.
Joung submitted detailed business plans or reports for
consideration and approval by SlAB. (Id. at ~ 6.) Mr.
Older, Jan Knuttson, and other senior Swedish managers
traveled on a regular basis to the United States to discuss
business planning issues with American management. (Id.
at '1'16-7.) The Appleton unit submitted detailed financial

According to the plaintiffs, both Dr. Joung and Mr.
Soriano, another senior manager at the Milwaukee unit,
after returning from a conference for senior managers ofSI
in Sweden, reported that Swedish management was
concerned about the high average age of the workforce at
the Milwaukee facility, and wanted action taken to bring in
younger workers; Swedish management purportedly stated
that the Milwaukee unit had an "age problem." (Id. at ~~
15-16.) Mr. Soriano also allegedly stated that, while SlAB
management believed that Milwaukee had a problem with
older workers, it found the "age problem" at Appleton to
be even worse. (Id. at ~ 17.) The written business plan
submitted to SlAB by Dr. Joung on October 1, 1988 noted
the "high average age" of SI's employees as a "principle
weakness." (Id. at ~ 18.) In his annual business plan for
1990--91, which was also submitted to senior management
at SlAB, Dr. Joung reported that the average age of
employees at the Milwaukee unit was still high and that a
program had been initiated to fill positions with younger
people, which had decreased the average age of
employees. (Id. at ~~ 19-20.) On November 3, 1989, in a
written response to questions raised by Mr. Older during
the budget review process, Dr. Joung noted that the $7,000
annual salary differential between American and Canadian
employees was due to "age, experience, and project and
process related expertise and experience." (Id. at "21.) Mr.
Older acknowledges that he and Dr. Joung discussed the
"high average age" problem. (Id. at ~~ 22-23.)

Mr. Van Dyke never filed an age discrimination charge
with the EEOC. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 42.) He
did not become involved in this action until he was
contacted by the EEOC in late 1993. (Id. at ~ 43.)
C. PLAINTIFFS ALLEGING CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE:
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Plaintiff James Conradt had worked in the human
resources area of the Appleton unit for approximately
eighteen (18) years and had been the manager of human
resources for four years prior to the end of his employment
in May of 1990; he observed employment policies and
practices at Sl in 1989 which, in his opinion, indicated that
Sl and senior management at the Appleton facility were
implementing a policy of age discrimination against older
workers. (Id. at ~~ 24-26.) Bruce Merten was the manager
of human resources for the Milwaukee unit and the
manager for human resources at the corporate level for SI
in the United States at the time of their acquisition by
SlAB. (ld. at ~~ 27-29.) On several occasions in or about
the spring and summer of 1989, Mr. Conradt and Mr.
Merten discussed Sl's employment practices and their
mutual concern that, based on a "youth cult" being
imposed by SlAB management, SI management favored
younger employees and discriminated against older
workers. (Id. at ~~ 30-33.) Mr. Conradt claims that he was
told by Mr. *1438 Merten that Sl had a policy which
favored younger workers and discriminated against older
employees. (ld. at ~ 33.)
When Mr. Farnsworth retired as general manager at
Appleton in April of 1989, senior management at SlAB
and the American subsidiaries sought a replacement; Mr.
Merten indicated "off the record" to Mr. Conradt that a
particular applicant had been rejected because he was "too
old." (ld. at ~~ 35-36.) Mr. Gregor, age forty-five (45) and
the general sales manager for the Appleton unit in 1989,
was recommended for the position by Mr. Knuttson. (Jd. at
~~ 37-39.) Mr. Gregor traveled to Sweden in early March
of 1989 to interview with senior executives of SlAB,
including the manager for corporate human resources, who
told him that SI was "looking for a guy in his late 30's."
(ld. at 'l~ 40-41.) 1 Mr. Gregor was also interviewed by Mr.
Older, who, inter alia, emphasized the many
accomplishments he had achieved at a young age and
commented about the young ages of other senior
executives at SlAB. (Jd. at ~'I 44-45.) In Mr. Gregor's
opinion, he was not given the promotion because he was
viewed as too old. (Jd. at ~ 46.)
Neither Mr. Weiss and Mr. Foy, ages fifty-four (54) and
forty-eight (48), respectively, both of whom had been
recommended as replacements by Mr. Farnsworth, were
promoted to general manager. (ld. at ~'147-48.) SI retained
a professional executive search firm, Erwin & Associates,
in conjunction with its search for a new general manager at
Appleton; Mr. Planter and Mr. Knuttson met with Ron
Erwin, informing him that (1) the Appleton business had
been populated by "people who had been in the business 30
years or more, and the message was we need to get new
and different thinking and leadership that in looking
toward the future that isn't just a prologue to the past," and

(2) in conducting the general manager search, the
managers of the Swedish parent company wanted to avoid
"calcified" candidates, which Mr. Erwin considered to
mean people who were "resistant to change" or who lacked
"adaptability." (Jd. at ~~ 49-53.) Mr. Erwin formally
recommended ten candidates to Mr. Planter for the
position, and his written reports noted each candidate's
age: 51,49,44,49,42,39,39,45,42, and 37. (Id. at ~ 55.)
The last candidate, Mr. Guernsey, was hired for the
position; while SlAB management received copies of each
candidate's resume, the parties dispute whether senior
SlAB managers made the final hiring decision. (ld. at ~~
56-60; Def.Reply to PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of
Fact ~ 58.)
Shortly after Mr. Guernsey began employment in early
November of 1989, he met with SlAB management to
discuss business objectives, planning, personnel issues and
related matters. (PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact
~~ 62-63.) Mr. Guernsey was in regular and direct
communication with senior SlAB executives and
submitted regular and detailed reports to SlAB regarding
the Appleton facility; he also consulted with and reviewed
personnel decisions with Mr. Planter. (Id. at ~~ 64-65.)
Mr. Conradt claims that, within the first five months ofMr.
Guernsey's tenure, he observed events exhibiting
discriminatory policies on the part of SI and the Appleton
unit. (Jd. at ~ 66.) In or about the summer of 1989, Mr.
Gregor told Mr. Conradt that he had been denied the
general manager's position because he was too old and
because SlAB management wanted a younger person. (Id.
at ~ 67.) In or about the fall of 1989, Mr. Conradt was
asked by Mr. Merten to calculate the average age of
salaried employees at the Appleton facility; Mr. Conradt
was concerned that this request was part of an overall
program to get rid of older workers. (Id. at ~ 68.) As he had
done in prior years, Mr. Conradt compiled a list of
employees sixty (60) years of age or older, which he
submitted to Mr. Guernsey in December of 1989. (Jd. at ~
69-71.) After receiving the list, Mr. Guernsey purportedly
told Mr. Conradt that "[w]e've got an awful lot of long
service employees. We need to get some young-ah, new
blood into the organization." (Id. at ~ 73.) In January of
1990, Mr. Guernsey *1439 purportedly stated to Mr. Weiss
that "rt]he problem with Appleton is that we have too many
old people in their jobs too long." (Jd. at ~ 74.) Mr. Conradt
reported Mr. Guernsey's statements to Mr. Merten, who
responded that Mr. Guernsey's view regarding older
employees was standard procedure for SI. (Id. at ~ 77.)
In December of 1989, SI held a management assessment
conference at the Nordic Hills Conference Center near
Chicago, Illinois. (Jd. at
78.) In preparation for the
conference, SlAB management instructed managers of the
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manufacturing facilities to select candidates for the
conference and to provide Swedish management with
biographical information, including age. (Id. at ~ 79.) Mr.
Farnsworth submitted the names of four candidates,
including Mr. Weiss and Mr. Foy, and their biographical
information; only the youngest candidate, Mr. Quinn, who
was in his thirties, was selected to attend by Swedish
management. (Id. at ~~ 80--81,83.) The only information
submitted to Swedish management was the nominees' job
location, name, present title and age; all those selected to
attend were in their thirties and forties, and all candidates
in their fifties were rejected. (Id. at'182.)
In or about February of 1990, Mr. Conradt became aware
that SI intended to terminate Mr. Weiss. (Id. at ~ 85.) Mr.
Conradt felt that Mr. Weiss had been an excellent
performer and had not been subject to any negative
performance reviews justifying termination. (Id. at ~ 88.)
When Mr. Conradt objected to Mr. Guernsey that Mr.
Weiss' termination would be a mistake, Mr. Guernsey
purportedly told him that he had "two choices, [ ] do as I
tell you or there is the door." (Id. at ~ 91.) According to Mr.
Conradt, he feared that age discrimination would be
directed at him for raising such objections, and he felt that
he had no choice but to resign. (Id. at ~~ 92-93.)
On or about February 8, 1990, Mr. Guernsey conducted his
first performance review of Mr. Gregor, establishing
written performance objectives including the development
of a "young generation of salesmen and manager
candidates." (Id. at ~'1 94, 96--99.) During their meeting,
Mr. Guernsey told Mr. Gregor that (1) he had calculated
the average age of the sales force at Appleton to be 55-56
years old, (2) the average age was too high in his opinion,
(3) they needed to hire a younger and more aggressive
sales force, (4) the sales staff was "old and stale," and (5)
he was not comfortable working with such an "old" group
of employees. (Id. at '1100.) The parties dispute whether
Mr. Platner played any role in establishing any
performance objectives. (Id. at ~'i 95-96; Def.Reply to
Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 95-96.) Mr.
Guernsey purportedly repeated these sentiments to Mr.
Gregor in the months following this meeting, informing
Mr. Gregor that, ifhe could not get rid of those people, Mr.
Guernsey would instruct Mr. Stelter to do so. (PI.Resp. to
Def.Proposed Findings ofFact '1'1104-106.) On a number
of occasions, Mr. Guernsey ordered Mr. Gregor to
terminate Mr. Meagher, a salesman in the Florida region
who was in his sixties and who Mr. Guernsey referred to as
the "old incompetent in Florida"; he wanted to replace Mr.
Meagher with some "young blood." (Id. at ~ 107.)
In or about July of 1990, Mr. Guernsey conducted a
mid-year performance review of Mr. Gregor, reminding
him of his performance objective to develop a younger

generation of salesmen and management candidates. (Id. at
113-114.) Mr. Gregor objected, telling Mr. Guernsey
that, in his opinion, the older salesmen were doing a good
job. (Id. at ~ 127.) During that review, Mr. Guernsey
criticized Mr. Gregor's decision to promote Mr.
Spoonamore, noting that he had a better candidate who was
a "very young, professional guy." (Id. at ~~ 115-116.)
Approximately eleven (11) months later, Mr. Spoonamore
was terminated. (Id. at ~ 151.) As previously discussed,
Mr. Guernsey and Mr. Gregor dispute the reasons for Mr.
Spoonamore's termination. (Id. at ~~ 152-153.) Mr.
Gregor felt that Mr. Guernsey was "fixated" on age as an
employment criterion. (Id. at ~ 117.)
~~

Shortly after starting as sales and marketing manager for
the Appleton facility in April of 1991, Mr. Valitchka
indicated to Mr. Gregor that Sl's program was to reduce
the average age of its sales force by bringing in *1440
younger employees. (Id. at ~~ 120-123.) That same month,
a meeting was held in the engineering conference room
with Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Quinn, Mr. Gregor and several
other employees. After Mr. Gregor noticed some old
pictures of equipment on the wall and stated to Mr. Quinn
that "you've got some real antiques there," Mr. Guernsey
responded "Oh, I thought you were referring to Pat
rQuinn's] people." (Id. at ~ 124.)
After Mr. Quinn, age 39, replaced Mr. Coxhill, age 60, as
manager of engineering, Mr. Gregor and other managers
observed him verbally abuse, intimidate, unfairly criticize,
yell obscenities, and humiliate older workers, including
Mr. Flavel, Mr. lsferding, Mr. Jones, and others. (Id. at ~~
132-133.) Several employees, some at senior management
positions, complained about the age discrimination and the
harassment of older workers that was occurring at Svedala.
(Id. at ~ 134.) Mr. Foy, the controller of the Appleton
facility, learned of Mr. Quinn's behavior and, after
discussing it with Mr. Gregor, reported it to Mr. Guernsey.
(Id. at ~~ 135-136.) Mr. Gregor also complained to Mr.
Fons, general counsel for SI, and Mr. Stelter about age
discrimination and harassment directed towards him and SI
salesmen, including harassment and abuse being carried
out by senior management at Appleton, including Mr.
Guernsey and Mr. Valitchka. (Id. at ~~ 137-138.) After
voicing his complaints, Mr. Gregor perceived that
discrimination and harassment against him and others
intensified. (Id. at '1140.)
Mr. Gregor filed a charge of age discrimination with the
EEOC in late June of 1991. (Id. at '1 142.) Several days
thereafter, he was fired by Mr. Guernsey, who purportedly
admitted that he had been terminated for, among other
things, filing a discrimination charge. (Id.) After Mr.
Gregor was fired, Mr. Valitchka and Mr. Stelter revised the
job description for the regional sales representatives,
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adding new requirements that the sales representatives be
physically able to climb into mines and quarries and
engage in other similar kinds of physically demanding
activities, and that the regional sales manager be in
excellent physical condition. (Id. at ~ 143.) In or about the
summer or early fall of 1991, the revised job description
for salesmen was sent by Mr. Stelter, at Mr. Valitchka's
instruction, to the physicians for the three oldest sales
managers: Mr. Meagher, who underwent quintuple-bypass
heart surgery; Mr. Pape, who had leukemia, and Mr. Smay,
who had told Mr. Valitchka that he could not travel
because he was having surgery; the revised job description
was not sent to the doctors of the younger salesmen. (Id. at
~'1144-145, 147; DefReply to Pl.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 144-145, 147.) The physicians were
asked to submit a report confirming that these employees
could meet the physical requirements set forth in the new
job description. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact
at ~ 144.) The revised job requirements were not included
in advertisements for new salesmen. (Id. at ~ 146.) Mr.
Gregor viewed these new physical requirements as part of
SI's program to rid itself of older employees. (Id. at ~~
148-149.)

interviewed in Sweden, and after he was asked by the
acting human resources manager about his qualifications
and experience, Mr. Lenhart was asked whether he was
married, whether he had any children, and what his date of
birth was-he was also told that, "in Sweden they have no
laws against asking folks for their date of birth." (Id. at ~
170-17l.) When Mr. Platner selected Mr. F ons as the new
general counsel for SI, he utilized Mr. Fons' college
graduation date to compute his age, which did not appear
on his resume; Mr. Platner acknowledges that he would ask
the age of any applicant for a senior management position.
(Jd. at ~ 173.) Mr. Older similarly acknowledges
requesting age information for employees hired by SlAB
in Sweden, and SlAB management routinely lists
applicants with their ages when hiring new personnel. (Id.
at ~ 174-176.) At the Milwaukee unit, applications for
employment from older individuals were rejected with
handwritten notations on resumes such as "No! 56 yrs old",
"No! 53 year", and "MUST BE 65 year old!". (Id. at ~~
177, 19l.) Several ofSI's personnel forms made reference
to age, including its Salary Review Worksheet, Salaried
Employee Listings, and Salaried Employee Rate Card. (Id.

In or around May of 1990, in response to instructions by
Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Coxhill, then the Manager of
Engineering at Appleton, compiled an organizational chart
for the engineering department at Appleton which included
each employee's name, years of service, date of birth, as
well as the average age. (Id. at ~~ 160, 162.) At Mr.
Guernsey's instruction, Mr. Coxhill presented this
information to Swedish management at the international
conference of Svedala engineers and technicians in Brazil
later that month. (Id. at ~~ 161, 163.) Mr. Coxhill was later
terminated and replaced by Mr. Quinn. (Jd. at ~ 165.)
Within two (2) years after Mr. Guernsey became general
manager of the Appleton unit, at least eleven (11)
employees age fifty (50) or older were no longer
employed: Mr. Weiss, age 54; Mr. Flavel, age 54; Mr.
Spoonamore, age 56; Mr. Gregor, age 47; Jim Danielson,
age 51; John Bandholtz, age 52; Mr. Jones, age 60; Mr.
Isferding, age 64; Mr. Meagher, age 65; Mr. Smay, age 59;
Mr. Conradt, age 53; and Mr. Coxhill, age 60. (Id. at ~
166.) SI considered the age of candidates for v~rious
employment positions in the company, including those for
sales, engineering, human resources, legal, and other jobs.
(Id. at~ 167.)

On February 13, 1991, the Milwaukee facility carried out a
reduction in force ("RIF") which resulted in the
termination of twenty (20) employees; eighteen of the
twenty were over age forty (40), and one of the two under
age forty (40) and the youngest of the other eighteen were
subsequently rehired by SI. (Jd. at ~~ 180-181.) Prior to the
Milwaukee unit RIF, senior management from the unit
met, together with certain consultants, to identify the
specific employees who would be terminated; notes
prepared by the consultants had a listing titled "Issues:
Age." (Jd. at ~ 182.) A series of large flip charts were
generated during the RIF planning meetings in Milwaukee
containing notes of the discussions from the meetings,
including notes about the persons under consideration for
termination. (Jd. at ~ 183.) After the RIF planning meetings
were concluded, the flip charts and notes were collected by
Fred Cummings, the acting human resources manager for
SI. (Jd. at ~ 184.) On July 29, 1992, in response to an
EEOC request for information concerning age
discrimination charges from two of those terminated in the
February of 1991 RIF in Milwaukee, Mr. Lenhart wrote to
SI's general counsel as follows: "I have the notes from
Fred Cummings involvement, 2 inches worth. We need to
sift through those and decide what to retain." (Jd. at ~ 185.)
The flip charts have been destroyed, lost, or are otherwise
missing. (Id. at ~ 186.) Handwritten notes from two
persons in attendance at the RIF meetings in Milwaukee
include the age and/or date of birth for each person
considered for termination; most of the terminated
employees were fifty years of age or older. (Id. at ~ 187.)
After some of the terminated employees planned an age

*1441 Bruce Merten was the human resources manager for
SI when the United States facilities were purchased by
SlAB from Allis-Chalmers; he was involuntarily
terminated at age fifty (50), and replaced by William
Lenhart, age forty-four (44), on June 30, 1992. (Id. at 'l~
168-169, 172.) The resume submitted by Lenhart to SI and
SlAB did not include his date of birth; before he was
j

at~179.)
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discrimination class action, SI prepared written
performance "evaluations" for several of them explaining
the reasons for their departure; Robert Jermyn, MPSI sales
manager, was asked to prepare one such report, even
though he had not participated in the RIF planning
meeting. (Id. at~~ 189-190.)
After they were involuntarily terminated, six of the
plaintiffs and several other SI employees filed
administrative charges of age discrimination, including
Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel, Mr. Gregor, Mr. Jones, Robert
Cnare, Robert Elbel, and Mr. Spoonamore; DILHR and
two separate offices of the EEOC found probable cause to
conclude that SI engaged in a practice of age
discrimination against its older employees. (Id. at ~ 197.)

1. Byron Smay:

Plaintiff Byron Smay was a district sales manager
stationed in St. Louis, Missouri. (Def.Proposed Findings of
Fact ~ 4; Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~
198-200.) His territory included Arkansas, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri *1442 and part of
Kentucky. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 5.) Mr.
Gregor was Mr. Smay's direct supervisor until his
temlination and replacement by Mr. Valitchka in July of
1991. (Jd. at ~~ 15-16.) In February of 1990, after Mr.
Guernsey had been general manager of the Appleton unit
for four months, he told Mr. Gregor that he "had calculated
the average age of our sales force, that it was too high, that
he was accustomed to working with much younger people,
and that [Mr. Gregor] needed to get younger, aggressive
people in [the] sales force." (Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 201.) Mr. Guernsey emphasized this
point in Mr. Gregor's February of 1990 performance
evaluation, writing that he should develop a "young
generation of salesmen and manager candidates." (Jd. at "
202.) Mr. Gregor believed that the district sales managers
reporting to him were knowledgeable, experienced, and
doing a good job; however, he felt "tremendous pressure"
from Mr. Guernsey to get "young and aggressive type
salespeople," and believed that Mr. Guernsey was "fixated
completely on the subject of age." (Jd. at ~~ 203-204.)
Prior to replacing Mr. Gregor in April of 1991, Mr.
Valitchka was interviewed by an executive search firm
retained by SI, which told him that the age of SI's sales
force, and its older group of sales representatives, posed a
challenge. (Jd. at ~ 205.) In April of 1991, following a
meeting with Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Valitchka told Mr. Gregor
that the sales force was too old, and that the "average age
of those people needed to be driven down and we needed to
get young salespeople there, period, and that was the

strategy." (Jd.)
Mr. Smay disagreed with Mr. Valitchka's vision of the role
of a district sales manager, and, along with the other
district sales managers, disliked him and had little regard
for his abilities. (Def.Proposed Findings off act ~~ 18-19.)
According to the plaintiffs, SI imposed an inflated sales
quota on Mr. Smay for 1991, a year when the industry was
in a recession. (Pl.Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact
~~ 218-219.) In October of 1991, either Mr. Valitchka or
Mr. Guernsey requested that Mr. Smay come to Appleton
to discuss his poor sales performance for new equipment;
through September of 1991, he had only achieved 15% of
his target goal for new equipment sales. (Jd.; Def.Proposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 21-22.) Mr. Smay met with Mr.
Valitchka, Mr. Stelter, and Mr. Guernsey, and was
criticized for failing to meet his sales quota; no comments
were made about his age, and he was not threatened with
termination. (Jd. at ,,~ 23-25; Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 218-219.) Mr. Valitchka sent Mr.
Smaya memorandum in November of 1991 advising him
that his performance was "unacceptable and cannot be
tolerated"; in an internal memorandum generated months
earlier, Mr. Smay was described as "extremely thorough,
dedicated, and competent ... one of our best people." (Id. at
~ 220.) According to Mr. Smay, this criticism left him
"very hurt and ... rhe] knew rhe] was gone." (Jd. at ~ 221.)
In the summer of 1991, Mr. Smay underwent surgery at
Barnes Hospital in the St. Louis area. (Jd. at ~ 229;
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact "6.) He did not advise his
superiors in Appleton or any other Appleton unit employee
about his surgery or any resulting limitations on his work
activities. (Jd. at '1 7.) When Mr. Valitchka subsequently
learned that Mr. Smay had experienced medical problems,
he asked for the name of Mr. Smay's doctor so SI could
ensure that he was assigned to a position appropriate for his
medical condition. (Jd. at ~ 8.) Mr. Smay provided his
doctor's name, and Mr. Stelter sent to his doctor a job
description for his position of district sales manager,
asking him to relate Mr. Smay's condition and prognosis to
such position. (Jd. at ~~ 9, 11-12.) According to the
plaintiffs, the physical attributes listed in the "new" job
description were not included in the version issued th_e
previous year, and were intended to assure that the doctors
of older employees would declare them to be unfit.
(Pl.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 227-229.)
These attributes included excellent physical health, the
ability to travel 80 to 90 percent of the week, a usual work
week of ten and often 12 hours per day, regular weekend
work, and the ability to climb onto structures and mines;
according to the plaintiffs, these attributes were not *1443
included in the job descriptions of other sales managers
who did similar work or in advertisements for these jobs.
(Jd.) SI sent similar letters to the doctors of district sales
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managers Bernie Pape and William Meagher, who were
suffering from cancer and heart disease, respectfully.
(Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 13.) Mr. Smay's position
was not altered after the letter was sent to his doctor. (ld. at
~ l3.)
In late 1991, Greg Joseph was hired to fill the sales
manager position formerly held by Mr. Gregor, and Mr.
Smay began reporting to Mr. Joseph. (Id. at ~~ 27-28.) In
March of 1992, Mr. Joseph met with Mr. Smay to give him
his performance review and territory assignment. (ld. at ~
29.) Mr. Smay told Mr. Joseph that he disagreed with the
review in light of his performance in prior years; age was
not discussed and Mr. Joseph did not indicate that Mr.
Smay would be terminated. (ld. at ~~ 30-31.) Mr. Joseph
also advised Mr. Smay that his territory was being
reconfigured to include Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and part of
Kentucky. (Id. at ~ 32.) Mr. Smay had first suspected that a
territorial reconfiguration was likely when, a few weeks
before the review meeting, a customer in Indianapolis
showed him an advertisement by SI seeking to fill a
newly-created sales position to be stationed in Southern
Ohio; although he did not cover Ohio, he suspected that the
addition of a new salesman would result in a territorial
reassignment. (ld. at ~~ 33-34; PI.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~ 223.) Mr. Smay was upset about the
territorial reassignment because he lost his prime states,
Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois, and gained four southern
states generally understood to have "zero potential";
however, he did not call the salesman who previously
covered his reconfigured territory to confirm this fact. (ld.
at ~~ 223-224; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 35-36.)
Mr. Smay believed that SI was trying to get rid of him.
(PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact '1225.)
In early May of 1992, Mr. Smay advised Mr. Joseph that he
was retiring after twenty-six years of employment with SI
and its predecessor, Allis-Chalmers. (Id. at ~ 37; PI.Resp.
to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 200.) He was replaced
by Richard Robinson, age thirty-seven (37). (ld. at ~ 230.)
Nobody from SI asked him to retire and he did not tell Mr.
Joseph of his age discrimination concerns. (DefProposed
Findin~s of Fact ~ 38.) In a subsequent conversation with
Mr. Stelter, Mr. Smay indicated that he wanted to look
after some personal investments. (ld. at ~ 39.) Mr. Smay
does not recall telling Mr. Stelter that he was coerced to
leave. (Jd. at ~ 40.) At the time his employment ended,
nobody was criticizing him for his 1992 sales performance.
(Jd. at ~ 41.) Mr. Smay was fifty-nine (59) when he retired.
(ld. at ~ 42.) On May 11, 1992, Mr. Joseph sent a letter to
Mr. Smay asking him to "reconsider and continue [his]
employment with Allis Mineral Systems"; he did not
respond. (Jd. at ~~ 43-44.) With Mr. Smay's assistance, SI
closed its St. Louis sales office. (ld. at ~ 45.)

On June 15, 1994, Mr. Smay began work with LippmanMilwaukee Company-a competitor of SI; his boss at
Lippman is Mr. Gregor. (Id. at ~~ 46-47.) He had
discussed the possibility of working for Lippman prior to
leaving SI. (ld. at ~ 48.) Although he was aware of age
discrimination claims being alleged by Mr. Flavel and
others when he retired, Mr. Smay did not contact the
EEOC or any state agency about his age discrimination
concerns. (Jd. at ~ 49-50.) Mr. Smay did not initially
pursue legal action after leaving SI because he was
"concerned about getting on with [his] life ... trying to
move forward at basically 60 years old is not the easiest
thing in the world to do." (PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 231.) In November of 1993, the EEOC
contacted Mr. Smay about becoming involved in this
action; Mr. Smay agreed. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact
~~ 51-52.)

2. William Meagher:

Plaintiff William Meagher was a district sales manager at
Appleton; his office was in Tarpon Springs, Florida, and
his territory included Florida, Georgia and Alabama. (Jd. at
~~ 53-54.) In 1987, prior to SI's acquisition of the
Appleton unit, he had been asked to list his expected
retirement date on a form and return it to the Manager of
Employee *1444 and Community Relations, Jim Conradt.
(ld. at ~ 55.) Mr. Meagher indicated that he intended to
retire at age sixty-two (62). (Id. at ~ 56.)
Mr. Gregor was the national sales manager directly
supervising Mr. Meagher until April of 1991, when he was
replaced by Mr. Valitchka; Mr. Joseph replaced Mr.
Valitchka in December of 1991. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~ 200.) In February of 1990, after Mr.
Guernsey had been general manager of the Appleton unit
for four months, he told Mr. Gregor that he "had calculated
the average age of our sales force, that it was too high, that
he was accustomed to working with much younger people,
and that [Mr. Gregor] needed to get younger, aggressive
people in rthe] sales force." (Jd. at '1 201.) Mr. Guernsey
emphasized this point in Mr. Gregor's February of 1990
performance evaluation, writing that he should develop a
"young generation of salesmen and manager candidates."
(ld. at ~ 202.) Mr. Gregor believed that the district sales
managers reporting to him were knowledgeable,
experienced, and doing a good job; however, he felt
"tremendous pressure" from Mr. Guernsey to get "young
and aggressive type salespeople," and believed that Mr.
Guernsey was "fixated completely on the subject of age."
(ld. at ~~ 203-204.) Mr. Meagher was asked about his
retirement plans in 1990 by Mr. Gregor, who indicated that
he needed to know whether he should budget for a
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replacement; Mr. Meagher indicated that he was planning
on retiring in March of 1992, on his sixty-fifth (65)
birthday. (DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 57-59;
PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 217.)
Although the industry in which SI sold equipment was in a
recession, Mr. Guernsey imposed a $1 million sales goal
for Mr. Meagher's territory, despite a contrary assessment
that, due to the poor economy, an attainable goal was
$250,000. (ld. at ~ 212.) Mr. Gregor told Mr. Guernsey
that, if Mr. Meagher was going to "increase sales even
remotely in the direction of the stretch goals," he would
need support in the form of products and designs. (ld. at ~
213.) Mr. Guernsey told Mr. Gregor that Mr. Meagher was
an "old incompetent," and told Mr. Gregor to fire that "old
son-of-a-bitch in Florida" and to replace him with "young
blood"; when Mr. Gregor protested, Mr. Guernsey said
he'd get Mr. Stelter "to figure out a way to do rit]." (ld. at
~~ 207-208,213.) Mr. Meagher, unable to meet his sales
goal, was informed in October of 1991 that his sales were
"obviously unacceptable and below standard," and that
"we are taking steps to replace you as soon as possible."
(ld. at " 214.) Mr. Gregor advised Mr. Meagher that Mr.
Guernsey thought he should be fired because of poor sales
performance; no mention was made of age. (DefProposed
Findings of Fact ';"60-61.) Mr. Gregor told Mr. Meagher
not to worry because he was not going to fire him. (ld. at',
62.) According to Mr. Meagher, however, his knowledge
that Mr. Guernsey had prejudged him as incompetent and
wanted him fired "helped make rhis] decision to retire."
(PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~'1209-210.)
Prior to replacing Mr. Gregor in April of 1991, Mr.
Valitchka was interviewed by an executive search firm
retained by SI, which told him that the age of SI's sales
force, and its older group of sales representatives, posed a
challenge. (ld. at ~ 205.) In April of 1991, following a
meeting with Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Valitchka told Mr. Gregor
that the sales force was too old, and that the "average age
of those people needed to be driven down and we needed to
get young salespeople there, period, and that was the
strategy." (ld.)
On May 13, 1991, while traveling in Alabama on business,
Mr. Meagher suffered a heart attack and underwent
quintuple-bypass surgery. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact
'i 63.) Mr. Meagher was unable to work for several months,
during which time he received disability payments. (ld. at ~
64.) On July 1, 1991, he returned to work on a part-time
basis; he was paid on an hourly basis until he resumed
full-time status at his fonner salary. (ld. at ~'166-67.) For
several months after he returned to work, Mr. Meagher was
limited in his ability to perfonn his job, including the
ability to travel. (ld. at " 68.) After returning to work in
July of 1991, Mr. Valitchka asked Mr. Meagher to provide

a list of his doctors so that SI could *1445 ensure that he
was assigned to a position that was appropriate for his
medical condition. (ld. at ~ 69.) Mr. Meagher provided
such names, and Mr. Stelter sent letters to his doctors
asking for his current status and prognosis for purposes of
job placement. (ld. at ~~ 70-71.) According to the
plaintiffs, the physical attributes listed in his "new" job
description were not included in the version issued the
previous year, and were intended to assure that the doctors
of older employees would declare them to be unfit.
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 227-229.)
These attributes included excellent physical health, the
ability to travel 80 to 90 percent of the week, a usual work
week of ten and often 12 hours per day, regular weekend
work, and the ability to climb onto structures and mines;
according to the plaintiffs, these attributes were not
included in the job descriptions of other sales managers
who did similar work or in advertisements for these jobs.
(ld.) Mr. Meagher's position was not altered after this
correspondence. (Def.Proposed Finding of Fact ~ 72.)
After his heart attack and surgery, Mr. Meagher reiterated
his desire to retire upon his sixty-fifth (65) birthday. (ld. at
~ 73.) He specifically encouraged a colleague in his
mid-fifties to pursue his job, and he advised another
colleague to apply for the position, stating that SI was a
good company for which to work. (ld. at ~~ 76-78.) While
disappointed that he was not consulted about the process,
Mr. Meagher believed it was reasonable for SI to advertise
for his replacement, although he believed that SI exhibited
poor judgment by not hiring his replacement at least six
months before his retirement so he could properly train the
new salesman. (ld. at ~~ 74-75.) In January of 1992, Mr.
Meagher closed down the Tarpon Springs office and
arranged for all the files to be shipped to Atlanta, Georgia,
where his replacement, Mike Scheible, age twenty-eight
(28), was to be located. (ld. at " 79; Pl.Resp. to
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 230.) Mr. Scheible spent
several days with Mr. Meagher for training purposes,
including attending an industry trade show in New Orleans
in February of 1992. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~'I
80-82.)
Mr. Meagher retired in March of 1992, on or about his
sixty-fifth (65) birthday. (ld. at ~ 84.) SI subsequently flew
him and his wife to Appleton for a retirement party. (ld. at
~ 85.) According to Mr. Meagher, he retired because he felt
"that they wanted to force me out." (PI.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 217.) Mr. Meagher did
not file an age discrimination charge with the EEOC
because of his limited income after leaving employment,
and became involved in this action after being contacted by
the EEOC in October of 1993. (ld. at '1231; Def.Proposed
Findings ofFact ~~ 86-87.)
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3. Robert Isferding:
Plaintiff Robert Isferding was born on October 12,1927,
and joined Allis-Chalmers on September 15, 1973 as a
Senior Application Engineer in Appleton. (Def.Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 88; Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings
of Fact ~~ 292-293.) In 1977, Mr. Isferding transferred to a
field sales position in Charleston, West Virginia; in 1985,
he returned to Appleton as a Senior Project and
Application Engineer. (ld. at ~~ 294-295.) Mr. Isferding
specialized in the sizing and application of screens. (ld. at ~
296.) Mr. Isferding reported to Mr. Quinn from September
of 1985 until July of 1991, and his performance was
reviewed yearly. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 8990.) His performance was always satisfactory. (Pl. Resp. to
Def Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 297.) Mr. Quinn would
only allow Mr. Isferding to read the front page of his
review, and Mr. Isferding never saw any of Mr. Quinn's
comments discussed with him the specific items set forth
in the progress review. (ld. at ~ 321.) In each progress
review by Mr. Quinn from 1985 through 1989, Mr. Quinn
identified "finishing his career in his present position" as
Mr. Isferding's long-term career objective; from 1980 to
1983, however, Mr. Farnsworth always included
advancing into management in his long-term career
objective. (ld.) Mr. Isferding testified that his goal had
always been to obtain a management position with the
company. (ld.) On December 22,1989, Mr. Guernsey sent
a memo to all of his managers asking that they identify the
projected retirement dates of certain listed individuals; Mr.
Quinn, when asked to identify the retirement dates of Mr.
*1446 Isferding, Mr. Jones, and Don Hagen, responded
that "all my people underlined in red plan on going till 65!"
(ld. at '1298.)
Shortly after Mr. Guernsey was hired as general manager
at Appleton, Mr. Isferding claims that he began to
experience harassment from Mr. Quinn, including kicking
objects, screaming, cussing, abusive language, pounding
his desk, and throwing books. (ld. at'l 300.) Mr. Quinn
would use foul language, including "God damn" and
"fucking," and Mr. Isferding would sometimes back away
from Mr. Quinn for fear of being struck. (ld.) This conduct
continued on an average of "at least once a month until
July of 1991." (ld.) Mr. Isferding observed Mr. Quinn
engage in abusive conduct toward Mr. Jones and Mr.
Hagen; while he also observed abusive behavior towards
the younger engineers, it was "not as bad as it was with us
older engineers." (ld. at ~~ 301-302.) Mr. Isferding
specifically recalls an incident where he and Mr. Jones
were in Mr. Quinn'S office working on a contract; after
asking Mr. Quinn some questions, Mr. Quinn started
"throwing a tantrum, swearing and cussing. He kicked the
file cabinet, kicked the door, and just humiliated us in
public, because the door was open and the whole office

could hear what was going on." (ld. at ~ 303.) After Mr.
Quinn "went off into a rage" when being questioned by
Mr. Isferding about a project, Ron Him, a purchaser,
approached Mr. Isferding and said that he "ought to go
down and knock that son of a bitch on his ass." (ld. at ~
304.) Mr. Isferding did not tell anyone else about these
incidents, and did not report them to Mr. Guernsey.
(Def.Proposed Findings ofFact~ 95.) None ofMr. Quinn's
outbursts ever included comments regarding Mr.
Isferding's age. (ld. at ~ 98.) When Mr. Quinn would swear
and rage at Mr. Isferding, it would cause Mr. Isferding to
"shrink down in his chair." (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~ 305.) After several such instances, Mr.
Isferding began avoiding Mr. Quinn. (ld. at ~ 306.) Other
employees witnessed such behavior, and SI management
was aware of Mr. Quinn's conduct toward Mr. Isferding
and other older employees. (ld. at ~~ 307-310.)
During their January 31, 1991 meeting regarding
performance, Mr. Isferding informed Mr. Quinn that he
intended to retire after putting twenty (20) years in with the
company; Mr. Quinn did not ask him to retire or indicate
that he would be fired or that his job was in jeopardy, and
told him that his performance was fine. (ld. at ~ 323;
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 91-93.) In the spring of
1991, Mr. Isferding commented to Mr. Gregor that Mr.
Quinn's behavior was occurring frequently and was
wearing on him; he was losing sleep and behavioral
changes were noticed by his wife. (Pl.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact 'l~ 311,319.) Mr. Gregor
told Mr. Quinn that "the way he was treating these people
was completely inappropriate"; Mr. Quinn wanted to know
which employees were complaining about him, and
indicated that he had no intention of changing his style. (ld.
at ~ 312.) Mr. Foy was also aware of, and spoke with Mr.
Guernsey regarding, Mr. Quinn's abusive behavior. (ld. at
~ 313.) Mr. Platner acknowledged that he knew that Mr.
Quinn was an "abusive" manager. (ld. at ~ 315.) During his
performance review, Mr. Quinn was told that he could be
"blunt" and "direct," and that he "should aim to be more
tactful." (ld. at'1316.)
Mr. Isferding observed that young engineers would sit in
Mr. Quinn's office to discuss matters for several hours at a
time, while Mr. Quinn never had time to answer his
questions. (ld. at '1 317; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~
99.) Mr. Isferding and Mr. Jones were excluded from
distributor meetings in 1990 and 1991; the younger
Application Engineers, however, were invited. (P1.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 318.) Mr. Isferding had
participated in such meetings prior to 1991. (ld.) He never
inquired as to why he was not invited. (Def Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 100.) Mr. Isferding spoke with Mr.
Jones and Mr. Hagen about the treatment they were
receiving from Mr. Quinn; they concluded that Mr. Quinn
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"just didn't want to get involved with the older people."
(Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 320.) Mr.
Isferding was also offended that he was not individually
invited to a company picnic in the fall of 1990.
(DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 101.)
*1447 In July of 1991, the Application Department was
reorganized; Mr. Quinn was promoted to Manager of
Engineering, taking with him three young engineers, and
Mr. Hagen and Mr. Isferding, the two oldest engineers,
were transferred to the parts department as customer
service representatives, reporting to Gary Wichtel. (Id. at ~
324; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 102.) The parties
dispute whether this constituted a demotion. (Jd. at ~~ 102104; Pl.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 324325.) Mr. Hagen and Mr. Isferding were given
responsibility for taking parts orders, a function handled
prior to reorganization by clerical people in the parts
department; they were no longer involved in the sizing of
equipment, a duty transferred to the engineers in Mr.
Quinn's department and done primarily by computers. (Jd.
at ~ 325-326; DefProposed Findings ofFact ~ 106.) Prior
to the reorganization, Mr. Isferding had manually
performed the sizing of screens; the plaintiffs claim that
afterwards, even though he no longer had this duty, he was
nonetheless required to train the younger engineers on how
to perform this function. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~ 327.) Mr. Isferding's salary did not
change as a result of the reorganization, and he no longer
had contact with Mr. Quinn. (DefProposed Findings of
Fact 'I~ 103, 108-109.) Unlike Mr. Quinn, Mr. Wichtel
never screamed at Isferding or other employees. (Id. at ~~
110-111.)
Mr. Isferding claims that after the reorganization, he could
see no future with the company, his job had become
unbearable because of the harassment and the demotion of
himself and other older employees, and he believed he
would be fired. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact
" 330.) After three weeks in the Parts Department, Mr.
Isferding gave Mr. Wichtel verbal notice that he would be
leaving the company in October of 1991. (Id. at ~ 331;
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 112.) Mr. Isferding and
his wife had planned to stay in Wisconsin for at least two
more years while she finished her schooling. (PI.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact " 332.) He did not advise
anyone in management that he was being forced out;
according to him, he "was kind of humiliated and [ ] felt
bad, [and] didn't want to have to tell them that after [his]
years of service that they would do something like this to
[him]." (Id. at ~ 333; DefProposed Findings of Fact " 116.)
Before leaving, Mr. Isferding trained another employee to
perfonn his duties; the defendants indicate that his position
was not refilled, while the plaintiffs claim that he was
replaced by Randall Fischer, age thirty-five (35). (Jd. at ~

113; P1.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 337.) An
in-house retirement party was held for him on his last day
and he received several gifts. (Id. at ~ 336; DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~ 114.) Mr. Isferding was sixty-four (64)
years of age when he left employment with SL (Jd. at ~
115.) The company did not give him an exit interview
before he left. (PI.Resp. to DefProposed Findings of Fact ~
335.)
When Mr. Isferding left SI, Mr. Wichtel recommended to
Mr. Guernsey that SI's Nitro facility in West Virginia use
him for consulting work; Mr. Isferding had previously
worked for Nitro, was very interested in working there
again, and did not want to jeopardize that opportunity. (Id.
at ~ 334.) After building a house on land they owned, he
and his wife moved to West Virginia in January of 1992.
(Id. at ~ 338.) Mr. Isferding has sought employment since
leaving SI. (Id. at ~ 339.)
In the late summer or early fall of 1992, Mr. Isferding
received two phone calls from Rita Bums of the EEOC; he
did not tell her that he believed that he had been forced out
of the company, that he had been a victim of age
discrimination, or that Mr. Quinn's conduct and abusive
language were age-related or affected his decision to leave
SI. (Id. at" 340; Def.Proposed Findings of Fact 'I~ 117121.) According to Mr. Isferding, he kept these beliefs to
himself out of embarrassment and to save face. (PI.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 340.) After he spoke with
the EEOC, he discussed the matter with his wife and
"began to put the pieces together and view more clearly all
that had happened." (Id. at ~ 341; DefProposed Findings
of Fact ~ 122.)

*14484. Robert Jones:
Plaintiff Robert Jones was born on August 20, 1930, and
joined Allis-Chalmers of Canada in 1955. (P1.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~~ 232-233.) Except for a
four-month period in 1965, Mr. Jones worked
continuously for Allis-Chalmers and its successors from
1955 until May 31, 1991. (ld. at "234.) In 1975, Mr. Jones
transferred from Canada to Appleton because he was
looking for '"more responsibilities," "more challenges,"
and he wanted to "improve his position"; he accepted the
position of Senior Project Application Engineer. (Id. at ~
235; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 124.) Mr. Jones
specialized in primary gyratory crushers, which cost
several million dollars each. (Pl.Resp. to DefProposed
Findings of Fact ,j 236.)
From 1985 until he left SI, Mr. Jones was supervised by
Mr. Quinn. (ld. at ~ 237; DefProposed Findings of Fact ~
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125.) During his 1987 performance review, Mr. Jones
claims that Mr. Quinn told him that he thought Mr. Jones
was only putting in time until retirement; Mr. Jones,
insulted, told Mr. Quinn that that was not true. (PI.Resp. to
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 238.)
According to the plaintiffs, after Mr. Guernsey became
general manager of Appleton in November of 1989, Mr.
Quinn's behavior toward Mr. Jones became very abusive;
Mr. Jones was subjected to outbursts from Mr. Quinn at the
rate of approximately twice a month. (Id. at ~ 239;
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 128-129.) Mr. Quinn
would yell, scream, belittle, and swear at Mr. Jones in front
of others; he pounded his desk, and kicked filing cabinets;
and he would fly into a rage over a minor incident or when
Mr. Jones asked for clarification. (Pl.Resp. to
Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 240-24l.) On one such
occasion, Mr. Quinn purportedly "flew into a rage" over
questions of freight charges; in another incident, Mr.
Quinn yelled at Mr. Jones at the coffee machine after Mr.
Jones prepared a chronological list of events occurring on a
project with SI's sister company in Australia. (Id. at ~ 242.)
On another occasion, Mr. Quinn demonstrably rebuked
Mr. Jones for adopting a different method than suggested
in doing a feed analysis; in another incident, Mr. Quinn
"went into a rage" when Mr. Jones asked the manager of
Svedala in Canada to assist him in allocating freight costs
in returning a primary crusher. (Id.)
Other employees witnessed this behavior toward Mr.
Jones; for example, Mr. Spoonamore overheard Mr. Quinn
yell at Mr. Jones "You dumb son-of-a-bitch, what are you
doing there" and kick a cabinet, and Mr. Foy and Mr.
Gregor observed Mr. Quinn act abusive toward Mr. Jones,
Mr. Isferding, Mr. Flavel, Mr. Hagen, and other older
employees. (Id. at ~~ 258, 260-263, 266.) When Mr.
Gregor told Mr. Quinn that he was acting inappropriately,
Mr. Quinn was surprised, wanted to know which
employees were complaining about him, and indicated that
he did not intend on changing his approach. (Id. at '1265.)
Mr. Jones also observed Mr. Quinn exhibit similar
behavior toward other older employees, including Mr.
Hagen and Mr. Isferding, but not toward younger
engineers; he believed the severity of these outbursts to be
unwarranted and unprofessional. (Id. at '1'1 249, 270;
DefProposed Findings of F act ~~ 130-131.) While the
defendants claim that Mr. Jones did not report Mr. Quinn's
conduct to anyone at SI, the plaintiffs argue that Mr. Jones
spoke to Mr. Foy about it, and that SI management,
including Mr. Guernsey and Mr. Platner, had knowledge of
Mr. Quinn's abusive behavior toward Mr. Jones. (Id. at '1
132; PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 259,
266-268.) During his performance review, Mr. Quinn was
told that he could be "blunt" and "direct," and that he
"should aim to be more tactful." (Id. at ~ 269.)

Mr. Quinn testified that Mr. Jones' performance was
satisfactory. (Id. at ~ 243.) Mr. Jones found performance
reviews by Mr. Quinn to be very uncomfortable and
intimidating, with Mr. Quinn raising his voice and making
negative remarks. (Id. at ~ 248.) Mr. Jones did not discuss
his performance evaluations with Mr. Quinn. (Def.
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 133.) During his 1989
performance review, Mr. Quinn asked Mr. Jones whether
he had any plans to retire. (Id. at ~ 126; PI. Resp. to Def
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 244.) Mr. Jones told Mr.
*1449 Quinn that he would stay as long as possible, and
that he would give one year's notice ifhe intended to retire.
(Id.; Def. Proposed Findings ofFact ~ 127.) Mr. Jones did
not tell Mr. Quinn his career goals; nevertheless, Mr.
Quinn wrote on Mr. Jones' 1989 performance review that
his "long-range career objective" was to "finish [his]
career at Boliden-Allis." (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 245.) Even though Mr. Jones never gave
Mr. Quinn a specific retirement date, Mr. Quinn wrote to
Mr. Guernsey in response to the latter's December 22,
1989 request for the projected retirement date for Mr.
Jones, Mr. Isferding and Mr. Hagen that "all my people
underlined in red plan on going till 65!" (Id. at ~ 246.) In
Mr. Jones' performance review for the calendar year 1990,
which was given to him during a meeting in January of
1991, Mr. Quinn wrote down as his long-term career
objective: "organize and publish gyratory crusher
information for future generations"; Mr. Jones had not
given any indication that he intended to retire or otherwise
leave the company. (Id. at ~ 247.)
Mr. Jones and the other older engineers also felt that the
younger engineers received favorable treatment and more
individualized attention from Mr. Quinn. (Id. at ~~ 250,
256.) For example, when an application conference
regarding hydro cones was held in Sweden, SI sent the two
youngest project engineers from the Application
Department, even though one had been in the department
for only one month. (Id. at ~ 252.) In addition, while Mr.
Jones and Mr. Isferding had in the past participated in SI's
annual two-day meeting in Appleton for its distributors,
they were not invited to the meetings during their last two
years, even though the younger engineers were, in fact,
invited. (Id. at ~ 253.) Mr. Quinn also refused to allow Mr.
Jones to take an extra day of vacation, instead docking him
a day of pay, when Mr. Jones was one day late in returning
from a vacation because of a snow storm in Appleton; that
same day, SI closed its office and sent all of its employees
home with pay because of the weather. (Id. at ~ 251.) When
Mr. Jones mentioned to Mr. Hagen that Mr. Quinn was
pretty hard on him, Mr. Hagen responded: "Oh, I'm the
same, I have the same problem, I just think he has
something against older people"; Mr. Isferding shared this
conclusion. (Id. at'1255-256.)
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Mr. Jones believed that the treatment he was receiving
from Mr. Quinn was part of a company-wide policy
implemented when Mr. Guernsey was hired to force out
older employees. (ld. at ~ 271.) Mr. Jones found Mr.
Quinn's treatment distressing, and believes that it affected
his health and disposition. (ld. at ~ 272.) In early to
mid-February of 1991, Mr. Jones asked Mr. Quinn if they
could talk; after Mr. Quinn responded that "you've got 30
seconds," Mr. Jones stated that he was leaving. (ld. at ~
273; Def Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 134-135.) At about
noon that day, Mr. Quinn asked Mr. Jones if he would
mind if Mr. Quinn announced his retirement to the rest of
the staff at the three o'clock department meeting; Mr.
Jones reluctantly agreed. (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 274.) At that meeting, Mr. Quinn
announced that Mr. Jones was leaving and invited Mr.
Jones to state the reasons; Mr. Jones, reluctant to recite Mr.
Quinn's abusive treatment, indicated that he wished to
pursue other interests, was interested in working as a
consultant for SI, and intended to eventually move to
Colorado to be closer to his daughters. (ld.; Def Proposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 136-137.) Mr. Jones had no further
discussions with Mr. Quinn or Mr. Stelter regarding his
reasons for leaving; after the meeting, Alice Cordes, the
department secretary, told Mr. Jones that he did not have to
let Mr. Quinn "push him out." (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed
Findings ofFact ~~ 275-276.)
After Mr. Jones' retirement announcement, Mr. Quinn's
abusive behavior towards him allegedly stopped. (ld. at ~
277.) Against his wishes, Ms. Cordes organized a
retirement party for him; Mr. Jones (unsuccessfully)
instructed her not to invite Mr. Quinn, and forty (40) to
fifty (50) Appleton employees attended. (Id. at" 279; Def
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 139.) Mr. Jones did not tell
anyone before he left that he felt he had been forced out
because of harassment and age discrimination; he claims
that he did not want to jeopardize any opportunity *1450 to
do consulting work for SI. (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 278.)

from Appleton for Allis-Chalmers Canada and Iron Ore
Company of Canada. (PI. Resp. to Def Proposed Findings
of Fact ~~ 288-289.) He is currently employed as a
downhill ski instructor in Frisco, Colorado. (ld. at ~ 290;
Def Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 143.) He cross-country
skis approximately eight (8) hours a week and participates
in ski races during the winter, and bikes approximately ten
(10) hours a week during the summer. (Id. at ~ 144; PI.
Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 291.)
Mr. Jones filed a charge of age discrimination with the
EEOC on December 2,1991, approximately seven months
after he left SI, alleging that Mr. Quinn's harassment
forced him to leave. (ld. at ~ 282; Def Proposed Findings
of Fact ~ 145.) Upon learning of Mr. Jones' charge, Mr.
Stelter contacted Mr. Jones to discuss reemployment,
offering him his job back at his prior salary. (ld. at ~ 146;
PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 283.)
According to the plaintiffs, Mr. Jones received no
assurances from Mr. Stelter that Mr. Quinn's behavior had
changed, or that anyone had talked to Mr. Quinn about his
abusive behavior; instead, Mr. Jones was told "you'll have
to work this out with Pat Quinn, he doesn't hold a grudge
against you." (Id. at ~ 284.) The defendants, however,
indicate that Mr. Stelter offered to set up a meeting with
Mr. Quinn to discuss the prior problems, offered Mr. Jones
the opportunity to work full or part time, and advised Mr.
Jones that he would report to Mr. Thomas rather than Mr.
Quinn if he agreed to return. (Def Proposed Findings of
Fact '1~ 147-149.) According to the defendants, Mr. Jones
did not accept reinstatement because he and his wife were
eager to move to Colorado. (ld. at "150.) The plaintiffs,
however, claim that, while Mr. Jones was eager to return to
SI, he was uncomfortable having to continue working with
Mr. Quinn, and feared that the offer was simply being
made so that he would drop his EEOC charges. (PI. Resp.
to Def Proposed Findings ofFact "'1285-286.)

5. Major Coxhill:
Mr. Jones retired on May 31, 1991, at age sixty (60). (Def
Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 138, 140.) While he was not
individually replaced, his duties were spread among
several employees, including Carol Cihak, Mr. Isferding,
Mr. Hagen, Randy Fischer, and Sherry McGlin. (Jd. at ~
141; PI. Resp. to Def Proposed Findings of Fact " 281.)
After Mr. Jones left SI, Mr. Gregor purportedly told him
that "no matter what you did, you didn't have a chance,
[Quinn] was out to get you." (ld. at ~ 280.) Mr. Jones
subsequently sold his house in Appleton and moved to
Colorado where his son and two daughters live. (Def
Proposed Findings of Fact "142.) Mr. Jones talked with a
number of individuals and companies regarding consulting
work; he did some consulting work after his departure
1

Plaintiff Major Coxhill began his career with AllisChalmers in 1964; although he left the company briefly to
work for another business, he worked there cumulatively
for twenty-four (24) years and worked in the Engineering
Department of the Appleton unit since 1972. (PI. Resp. to
Def Proposed Findings of Fact "342.) Mr. Coxhill became
Manager of Engineering for the Appleton unit, and a first
report to the general manager, in 1986; he remained in this
position when Mr. Guernsey replaced Mr. Farnsworth as
general manager in November of 1989. (Id. at ~~ 343,346;
Def Proposed Findings ofFact,1151.)
Prior to 1989, Mr. Coxhill received very positive
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performance reviews from Mr. Farnsworth. (PI. Resp. to
Def. Proposed Findings ofF act ~ 345.) In late 1989 or early
1990, Mr. Guernsey informed Mr. Quinn that he would
replace Mr. Coxhill as Manager of Engineering; Mr.
Guernsey had been in his position for only several months,
had conducted no formal performance review of Mr.
Coxhill, and had not indicated in any way that Mr.
Coxhill's performance was not acceptable. (Id. at ~~ 347348.) In February of 1990, Mr. Guernsey reviewed Mr.
Coxhill's performance for 1989, giving him a very
favorable performance rating and assuring him that,
although some management changes might be made, his
job was not in jeopardy. (ld. at ~ 349.) Mr. Guernsey did
not inform Mr. Coxhill that he had already told Mr. Quinn
that Mr. Quinn would be *1451 replacing Mr. Coxhill as
Manager of Engineering. (ld. at ~ 350.)
In approximately May of 1990, Mr. Guernsey asked Mr.
Coxhill to prepare information for SlAB management
regarding the individual and average ages of each of the
employees in the Engineering Department. (ld. at ~ 351.)
In response to this request, Mr. Coxhill prepared an
organizational chart which showed the name, birth date,
and years of service of each employee in the Engineering
Department as well as the average age of all employees in
the department; the chart was presented by Mr. Coxhill to
Swedish management of SlAB at an international product
meeting held in Brazil that month. (ld. at ~ 352.) The chart
revealed that Mr. CoxhilI, at age sixty (60), was the oldest
member of the department. (ld. at ~~ 352-353.) In
approximately November of 1990, Mr. Guernsey, along
with members of management at Appleton, attended a
conference in Sweden regarding product development;
while Mr. Coxhill would normally have attended such a
meeting, he was told by Mr. Guernsey not to attend. (!d. at
~ 354.) At the conference, Mr. Guernsey told SlAB
management that he wanted to "give Major a rest" and that
Mr. Coxhill would be removed from his position as
Manager of Engineering. (ld. at ~ 355.)
In February of 1991, Mr. Coxhill received a review of his
performance in 1990; Mr. Guernsey rated him a 2-plus,
but told Mr. Coxhill that he rated all of his managers
stringently and that Mr. Coxhill should _not worry about it,
and did not tell Mr. Coxhill that his performance was
unacceptable or that he was in jeopardy of losing his
position. (ld. at ~'I 356-357, 359.) Mr. Coxhill believed
that this rating was unfair and unjustified, and expressed
his objections. (Id. at ~ 358.)
On April 1, 1991, Mr. Guernsey summoned Mr. Coxhill to
his office, and informed him that, as part of a departmental
reorganization, he was being removed from his position as
Manager of Engineering, and replaced by Mr. Quinn. (ld.
at ~ 361; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 152, 156.)

According to Mr. Coxhill, Mr. Guernsey then asked him
whether he had considered retirement, and told him that
Mr. Stelter was "standing by" to discuss with him that
option; Mr. Guernsey then instructed Mr. Coxhill to take
the rest of the day off from work to consider his options.
(PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 362; Def.
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 164.) Mr. Guernsey also
purportedly told Mr. Coxhill that he was going to prepare
an announcement regarding the job change, and asked Mr.
Coxhill whether he would like to "fluff it up." (PI. Resp. to
Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 363.) According to Mr.
Coxhill, he had no interest in retiring and was not told that
he would be reassigned to another position or given any
other job at Appleton. (ld. at~~364-365, 367.) Mr. Coxhill
was not told that he was being terminated. (Def. Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 166.) Mr. Coxhill met with Mr. Stelter
as instructed, told him he did not wish to retire, and took
the remainder of the day off. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed
Findings of Fact '1'1 366-368.) Mr. Coxhill claims that he
was given no other alternative from Mr. Guernsey other
than retirement, and believed that he would be fired if he
did not retire. (ld. at ~~ 369-370.) At no time prior to this
meeting had Mr. Coxhill been informed by Mr. Guernsey
or any other senior manager of SI that his performance was
unsatisfactory or that his position was in jeopardy. (Id. at ~
372.)
The next day, Mr. CoxhiIl called Mr. Platner; while the
plaintiffs indicate that he informed Mr. Platner that he was
very angry and considering legal action, the defendants
claim that he did not indicate to Mr. Platner that he
believed he had been discriminated against on the basis of
age. (ld. at ~~ 373-374; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~
157.) Mr. CoxhiII then left Appleton for a short vacation.
(PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 375.) On
April 3, 199 I, Mr. Guernsey issued a company-wide
memorandum announcing various changes in the
organizational structure of the Appleton unit, including
Mr. Coxhill's replacement as Manager of Engineering by
Mr. Quinn. (lei. at ~ 376.) When Mr. Coxhill returned, Mr.
Guernsey advised him that the company had a new
assignment for him as Chief Engineer of Product Quality;
although Mr. Coxhill considered this to be a "concocted"
position *1452 and a demotion, and believed that it
prevented him from competing for other positions in the
company including Business Manager (a position he
admits ideally required skills he did not possess), his salary
did not change and he retained the same benefits and bonus
plan. (lei. at ~'1377-379. 382-383; Def. Proposed Findings
of Fact ~~ 153-155; Def. Reply to PI. Resp. to Def.
Proposed Findings of Fact '1 382.) As Manager of
Engineering, Mr. Coxhill had supervisory responsibility
over thirty (30) engineers, and was a first report to the
general manager; as Chief Engineer of Product Quality,
Mr. Coxhill had no supervisory responsibility over any
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engineers, was no longer a first report to the general
manager, and no longer participated in senior management
staff meetings. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of
Fact ~~ 380-383.)
According to Mr. Coxhill, this series of events left him
devastated and humiliated, and mistrustful of SI
management. (fd. at ~ 384.) In addition, he claims that he
observed a pattern of discrimination against himself and
other older employees at Appleton, and believed that he
would be fired. (fd. at ~~ 385-386.) Mr. Coxhill informed
others in the company, including Mr. Danielson, Mr.
Brock, and Mr. Bandholz, that he believed that he was
being discriminated against on the basis of age and that his
demotion was the result of age discrimination. (fd. at ~
387.) While on a business trip in France in July of 1991,
Mr. CoxhiIl was told by Arvid Svensson, one of the
managers of engineering for SlAB in Sweden, that he was
sorry to have heard that Mr. Coxhill lost his position and
that he had been aware of the change since November of
1990, when he and other SlAB managers had been told by
Mr. Guernsey that he was going to "give Major a rest" by
replacing him with Mr. Quinn. (fd. at ~~ 388-391; Def.
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 165.) According to Mr.
Coxhill, this reinforced his view that Mr. Guernsey wanted
him to retire all along, and that he was being discriminated
against on the basis of his age. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed
Findings of Fact ~~ 391-392.)
After Mr. Spoonamore was fired in June of 1991, Mr.
Coxhill was asked to take on additional responsibilities as
Field Service Manager. (fd. at ~ 393; Def. Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 158.) Mr. Valitchka indicated to Mr.
Coxhill several times that someone with his skills was
needed in the position. (fd. at'l 159.) According to Mr.
Coxhill, this position would have further removed him
from engineering activities, would not have allowed him to
utilize his experience and expertise as an engineer, and
would have taken him further away from the management
track of the company; therefore, he denied the request. (PI.
Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact '1393.) In October
of 1991, Mr. Coxhill met with Mr. Guernsey and was again
asked to consider the position ofField Service Manager; he
viewed this as another demotion, but nevertheless accepted
the job. (fd. at ~ 394-395, 404--406; Def. Proposed
Findings of Fact ~ 160.) The parties dispute whether Mr.
Coxhill remained in his previous position as Chief
Engineer of Product Quality. (ld. at ~ 160; PI. Resp. to Def.
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 396-397.) Mr. Coxhill was
told that he would be reporting directly to Mr. Valitchka.
(ld. at ~ 399.)
On January 1, 1992, SI again reorganized its Appleton unit,
and Mr. Coxhill began reporting to Mr. Quinn. (ld. at 'I~
400-401; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 161.) Mr.

Quinn had a reputation at SI for abusive behavior, and had
previously been abusive towards Mr. Coxhi1l; Mr. Coxhill
did not want to work with or report to Mr. Quinn because
he considered Mr. Quinn'S conduct to be unprofessional,
even though he recalls only one incident where Mr. Quinn
used abusive language towards him. (fd. at ~ 163; PI. Resp.
to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 402--403.) According
to Mr. Coxhill, his role and responsibility at SI continued
to diminish, and any efforts on his part to become involved
in engineering or management would be futile. (fd. at ~
408.)
During 1990 and 1991, Mr. Coxhill witnessed the
termination or departure of senior managers or employees
who had been his colleagues and had been employed by SI
or its predecessors for many years, including Mr. Weiss,
Mr. Flavel, Mr. Gregor, Mr. Conradt, Mr. Bandholz, and
Mr. Danielson. (fd. at ~ 407.) Mr. Coxhill concluded that
SI was *1453 engaged in age discrimination and that such
discrimination had been and was being directed against
him, and that he may be fired in the future. (fd. at ~ 410.) In
May of 1992, Mr. Coxhill advised Mr. Quinn that he was
retiring from SI. (fd.; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~
167-168.) Mr. Coxhill did not tell anyone that he was
voluntarily retiring, and only indicated that he was leaving
SI. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 411,
413.) Mr. Coxhill was sixty-one (61) when he retired, and
had worked at SI and its predecessors for almost twenty
(20) years. (Id. at '1412; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~
169.) Soon after he had spoken with Mr. Quinn, Mr. Stelter
approached Mr. Coxhill and indicated that his departure
would leave a big gap in the organization and that he could
still change his mind about leaving. (fd. at ~ 170.) In
August of 1992, a retirement party was held for Mr.
Coxhili. (fd. at '1171; PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings
of Fact ~ 412.)
During his employment at SI, Mr. Coxhill complained
about the employment actions that were being taken,
objected to what he perceived to be age discrimination, and
objected to his job changes. (ld. at ~ 414.) He did not,
however, tell anyone that he was being forced to retire.
(Def. Proposed Findings of Fact '1172.) Since leaving SI,
Mr. Coxhill has been actively seeking other employment.
(PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings ofFact ~ 415.) He did
not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (De£
Proposed Findings of Fact '1174.)

6. James Conradt:

Plaintiff James Conradt was born on February 19, 1937.
(PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact '1 416.) He
started with Allis-Chalmers in Appleton in 1958 as an
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employee in the accounting department; he transferred to
human resources, where he was employed from 1972 to
1990. (ld. at ~ 417.) In 1986, he was promoted to Manager
of Human Resources for the Appleton unit, a senior
management position with "first report" responsibility to
the general manager; he remained in this position when
Mr. Guernsey arrived in November of 1989. (ld. at ~ 418;
Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 175-176.) In this
position, Mr. Conradt participated in senior staff
management meetings and was responsible for formulating
and implementing human resources and employment
policies and practices for the Appleton unit. (PI. Resp. to
Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 419.) He also negotiated
union contracts and maintained compliance with state and
federal laws and regulations. (ld.)
After the Appleton and Milwaukee facilities were acquired
by SlAB from Allis-Chalmers, Mr. Conradt began to
observe things which indicated to him that SlAB had
employment practices that discriminated against older
workers and favored younger workers. (Id. at ~ 420--421.)
Mr. Conradt reviewed the annual statement of Trelleborg
AB, the predecessor of SlAB, and observed that the
document contained the ages of directors and senior
managers; he also observed that many of the managers
were in their early or mid thirties. (ld. at ~ 422.) He
received information about SlAB's employment policies
and practices in 1989 and 1990 from Bruce Merten, who
was then the human resources manager for the Milwaukee
unit and SI. (ld. at ~ 423.) Mr. Merten and Mr. Conradt
communicated regularly about human resources issues,
policies and practices; they discussed Swedish
management's emphasis on the age of its employees, and
the favoring of younger employees over older ones. (Id. at
~ 424.) According to Mr. Conradt, Mr. Merten told him
directly that Swedish management had a policy favoring
younger workers. (ld. at ~ 425.) Mr. Gregor told Mr.
Conradt that, during his interview in Sweden for the
general manager position at Appleton, he was told that
SlAB wanted to hire someone young, preferably in his
thirties. (ld. at ~ 426.) Mr. Merten also purportedly told
him that another candidate for that position had been
rejected because he was too old. (ld. at ~ 427.) Mr.
Guernsey, age thirty-seven (37), was eventually hired; the
three candidates recommended by Mr. Farnsworth, Mr.
Gregor, age forty-five (45), Mr. Weiss, age fifty-four (54),
and Mr. Foy, age forty-eight (48), were not selected. (ld. at
~ 428.)
Mr. Guernsey implemented several practices and
procedures that were different from *1454 those utilized
by Mr. Farnsworth; Mr. Conradt was not comfortable with
Mr. Guernsey's style and believed him to be a poor
communicator, as he did not consult Mr. Conradt or
involve him in certain decisions to the extent he desired.

(Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 177-178, 181.) In the
fall of 1989, Mr. Merten instructed Mr. Conradt to
calculate the average age of the salaried employees at the
Appleton unit; Mr. Conradt had never before been asked to
conduct this type of calculation, and was concerned that
the information may be used inappropriately. (PI. Resp. to
Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 429.) In late 1989, Mr.
Conradt became aware, as a result of discussions with Mr.
Merten, that SI was going to conduct a management
conference at a conference center near Chicago. (ld. at ~
430.) According to Mr. Conradt, he was told that this
conference was only for the "young" and up and coming
managers, and he was aware that the age of SI employees
had been a factor in the process of selecting attendees; the
only person selected to attend from Appleton was Mr.
Quinn, a young manager in his thirties. (ld. at ~~ 430--431.)
Mr. Guernsey asked Mr. Conradt to investigate the
possibility of having certain Appleton employees attend
MBA classes at a college near Appleton. (ld. at ~ 432.)
Later, Mr. Guernsey indicated that the only two people he
was considering for the program were Mr. Quinn and Mark
Geyer, both in their thirties. (ld. at ~~ 432--433.) In
December of 1989, Mr. Conradt prepared a list of
employees who were sixty (60) or older, identified as
employees who were potentially going to retire; Mr.
Conradt had gathered such information in previous years.
(ld. at ~ 434.) According to Mr. Conradt, Mr. Guernsey
used the list to ask senior managers to specifically find out
when those individuals planned to retire; he believed that
this use departed substantially from the use to which this
information had been put in the past by Mr. Farnsworth,
and that it was used to pressure older employees to leave
the company. (ld. at ~~ 435--436.) On December 15, 1989,
after Mr. Conradt had provided Mr. Guernsey with
information regarding employees' names and ages, Mr.
Guernsey told him that "we've got an awful lot of long
service employees. We need to get some young-ah, new
blood into the organization." (ld. at ~, 437.) Mr. Conradt
made a handwritten note of the conversation to record
verbatim Mr. Guernsey's statement, and believed that Mr.
Guernsey intended to get rid of long-term employees,
including himself. (Jd. at ~ 438, 448.)
In February of 1990, after being involved in several
meetings, Mr. Conradt was informed by Mr. Guernsey that
SI was going to terminate Mr. Weiss. (ld. at ~ 439; Def.
Proposed Findings of Fact ~1182.) Mr. Guernsey indicated
to Mr. Conradt, and then to Mr. Weiss, that Mr. Weiss was
being terminated because "he doesn't fit in." (Jd. at ~1183.)
Mr. Conradt was aware that Mr. Weiss had not received
any negative performance reviews and that his
performance had not been formally reviewed by Mr.
Guernsey. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~
440.) Mr. Conradt believed this action to be the
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implementation of a program to get rid of older, longer
term employees. (Jd. at ~ 441.) In a meeting with Mr.
Guernsey, Mr. Conradt stated that the termination of Mr.
Weiss was a terrible mistake, was discriminatory, and was
wrong. (Jd. at ~ 442; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~
186.) Mr. Guernsey purportedly responded "I've decided
to terminate him and you have two choices, you do as I tell
you or there is the door." (Jd. at ~ 187; PI. Resp. to Def.
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 443.) Mr. Guernsey did not
indicate to Mr. Conradt that older employees did not fit in,
or that Mr. Weiss was (or was not) terminated because of
his age. (Jd. at ~ 444; Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~~
184-185.) Prior to the day Mr. Weiss was terminated, Mr.
Conradt attended a meeting with Mr. Guernsey and an
out-placement consultant who was retained by SI to
provide employment counseling for Mr. Weiss after the
termination; during this meeting, Mr. Guernsey stated that
the company was concerned that the termination of Mr.
Weiss would result in some type of legal action or age
discrimination claim, and the outplacement consultant
promised to strongly advise Mr. Weiss against filing a
lawsuit. (PI. Resp. to Def. Proposed Findings of Fact ~
445.)
*1455 Mr. Conradt was concerned in early 1990 that he
would be terminated as a result of his age. (!d. at ~~ 449,
453.) In December of 1989, Mr. Conradt was given
incorrect information pertaining to a benefits presentation
for employees at SI plants in Pennsylvania and Kansas; as
a result, he told several hundred employees at the facilities
the wrong information about their benefits. (Jd. at'1 451.)
Mr. Guernsey reprimanded him, telling him it was his
responsibility to know that the information was wrong
even though it was provided by Mr. Merten. (Jd.) In
February of 1990, Mr. Guernsey criticized Mr. Conradt for
negotiating union contracts previously approved by Mr.
Famsworth. (Jd. at '1 450.) According to Mr. Conradt, his
job responsibilities were being downgraded and reduced as
of early 1990. (Id. at ~ 452; Def.Proposed Findings of Fact
'1l79.) While the defendants claim that Mr. Conradt only
told Mr. Guernsey about this belief, the plaintiffs indicate
that he complained to Mr. Merten. (Jd. at ~ 180; PI.Resp. to
DefProposed Findings of Fact ~ 455.) Mr. Guernsey
expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Conradt's performance
and was actively seeking a replacement for him. (Jd. at ~
454.) According to Mr. Conradt, he was also concerned
about being forced to participate in "illegal and immoral"
employment discrimination policies involving Mr. Weiss
and other older employees, and feared personal liability for
carrying out such policies despite his objections. (Jd. at ~'1
455-459.)
Mr. Conradt decided to leave SI shortly after Mr. Weiss
was terminated; at the end of March of 1990, he gave
notice of his intention to leave the company.
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(Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~~ 188, 190.) Mr. Conradt
did not tell co-workers that he was voluntarily leaving his
employment with SI. (PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings
of Fact ~ 460.) Mr. Conradt felt he had no choice but to
leave SI, even though he enjoyed his work and wanted to
continue his employment; however, he acknowledges that
he was not fired. (Jd. at ~~ 459, 461; DefProposed
Findings of Fact ~ 191.) When Mr. Guernsey asked him
why he was retiring, Mr. Conradt did not tell him that he
was the victim of age discrimination. (Jd. at ~ 192.) Mr.
Conradt was fifty-three (53) years of age when he left his
employment at SI; he was replaced by Mr. Stelter, age
thirty-nine (39). (PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of
Fact ~~ 462-463.) Mr. Conradt was given a retirement
party which was attended by about seventy-five (75)
people. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 193.) At the time
he made the decision to leave SI, Mr. Conradt anticipated
receiving an inheritance under his father's will; he did not
know the amount, which totalled approximately $300,000.
(Jd. at ~ 189; PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~
464.)
Mr. Conradt did not file a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC. (Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 195.) While the
defendants claim that he never informed any government
agency that SI was engaging in discriminatory practices,
the plaintiffs indicate that he did so on December 5, 1991.
(Id. at ~ 194; PI.Resp. to Def.Proposed Findings of Fact ~
466.) Mr. Conradt indicates that he did not leave his
employment with SI to engage in church work or
missionary work. (Jd. at ~ 465.) Since leaving SI, he has
sought employment as a human resources specialist; when
no such employment ensued, he started his own
woodworking business. (Jd.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

[IJ [2J Rule 56(c) deems summary judgment appropriate
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A
genuine issue of fact exists only where a reasonable jury
could make a finding in favor of the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Santiago v.
Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 221 (7th Cir.1990). An issue of fact
must also be material, as "only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
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See also Clifton v. Schafer, *1456 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th
Cir.1992); Local 1545, United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288, 1293 (7th Cir.1989).
The presence of a genuine issue of material fact is to be
determined by the substantive law controlling that case or
issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55, 106 S.Ct. at 25l3-14;
Santiago, 894 F.2d at 221. Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no genuine need for trial and
summary judgment is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co ..
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct.
l348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). This standard is
"applied with extra rigor in employment discrimination
cases, where intent and credibility are crucial issues."
McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d
368,370-71 (7th Cir.1992). A plaintiffs presentation of
more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the existence
of an illegitimate motive is enough to preclude summary
judgment on an ADEA claim. Visser v. Packer Eng 'g
Assoc., 909 F.2d 959, 961-62 (7th Cir.1990).
(3) (4) The moving party has the initial burden of
demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323,106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Local
1545, 876 F.2d at 1292. Once this burden is met, the
non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and
designate specific facts to support or defend each element
of the cause of action, showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 255253; Local 1545, 876 F.2d at 1293. Neither party may rest
on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Koclanakis v.
Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 673, 675 (7th
Cir.1990), or upon conclusory statements in affidavits,
Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568,1572 (7th
Cir.1989); First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007,1011 (7th Cir.1985),
and both parties must produce proper documentary
evidence to support their contentions. Whetstine v. Gates
Rubber Co., 895 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir.1990); Local 1545,
876 F.2d at 1293. In deciding a summary judgment motion,
the Court must view the record in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences
shall be drawn in that party's favor. Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; Santiago, 894 F.2d at 221. A
court need not draw every inference from the record, only
reasonable inferences. Local 1545, 876 F.2d at 1292-93;
Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 886
(7th Cir.1989).

III. DISCUSSION

A. PARTIES' ARGUMENTS:

1. Plaintiffs Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel and Richard
Spoonamore:

The defendants argue that, to prevail on their ADEA claim,
each plaintiff must show that SI would not have fired him
"but for" the motive to discriminate on the basis of age.
According to the defendants, "[t]he undisputed facts in this
case demonstrate that age had nothing to do with any of
these three involuntary terminations." They contend that
Mr. Weiss, age fifty-four (54), was terminated in early
1990 because Mr. Guernsey found his performance,
including his purported inability to embrace TQM
principles, to be unacceptable; he was replaced by Mr.
Dircks, a forty-nine (49) year old former colleague of Mr.
Guernsey's at Consolidated Diesel. The defendants also
indicate that, although Mr. Guernsey was not entirely
satisfied with Mr. Flavel' s performance, he was terminated
in late 1990 because the decision was made to eliminate his
position by assigning international marketing functions to
Minco International AB ("Minco"), SlAB's foreign
subsidiary, and to eliminate funding for comminution
research in Appleton. Finally, they argue that Mr.
Spoonamore "quit his managerial position after not getting
a raise due to his resistance to the new management [TQM]
philosophy," and was later terminated in spring of 1991 for
failure to follow orders regarding cost assessment in a
start-up project in Mexico. These reasons, the defendants
contend, preclude Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel, and Mr.
Spoonamore from meeting the "but for" test.
*1457 The plaintiffs respond that the defendants
inappropriately limit their discussion to the McDonnell
Douglas analytical framework applicable to individual
discrimination claims involving indirect proof, ignoring
the direct evidence indicating a "pattern or practice" of
discrimination in this matter. According to the plaintiffs,
contrary to the McDonnell Douglas approach, "[ e]vidence
supporting a pattern or practice claim shifts both the
burdens of production and persuasion to the employer."
They further argue that direct evidence of age
discrimination against Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel, and Mr.
Spoonamore renders the "mixed motives" analysis, rather
than McDonnell Douglas framework, applicable to their
individual discrimination claims; under this app_roach, a
grant of summary judgment is normally not appropriate.
Finally, the plaintifTs claim that Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel, and
Mr. Spoonamore nevertheless have established a prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas and have raised
significant issues of material fact with respect to the true
reasons for the terminations. According to the plaintiffs,
Mr. Weiss was terminated despite a long history of solid
performance due to a companywide policy of age
discrimination emanating from SlAB through Mr. Platner
and Mr. Guernsey; they claim that SI's explanation for his
termination has changed several times since the filing of
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this lawsuit. They also claim that SI has been changing its
explanation for Mr. Flavel's termination, and that another
younger application engineer was hired after Mr. Flavel
was fired. Finally, they argue that Mr. Guernsey referred to
Mr. Spoonamore as being "too damn old" and suggested
that he be replaced with a younger person, and that the
reasons given by SI for his termination are pretextual.

Dyke's termination have changed since filing of this
lawsuit. Finally, the plaintiffs indicate that, under Kralman
v. Illinois Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 23 F.3d 150 (7th
Cir.1994), "the Seventh Circuit held that a prima facie case
of age discrimination can be *1458 established where an
employer has replaced one over--40 worker with another."

3. Plaintiffs alleging constructive discharge:
2. Plaintiff Robert Van Dyke:
The defendants claim that Mr. Van Dyke cannot establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination because no
employee outside the protected class was treated more
favorably than him. They indicate that, when Mr. Van
Dyke became the on-site manager of SI's Stansteel
operation in Los Angeles, he was responsible for
overseeing the entire business group including
engineering, parts sales, quality assurance, sales, contract
administration and field service; in November of 1988,
most of these functions were transferred to the Milwaukee
facility, with Mr. Van Dyke reporting to Mr. Faulkner, age
fifty-two (52). According to the defendants, Mr. Faulkner
became concerned about several customer complaints
relating to Mr. Van Dyke and Stansteel, and considered the
amount of Stansteel's outstanding holdbacks to be too
high. The defendants claim that, "[a]fter the Stansteel
operation continued to show disappointing results during
1989," further consolidation occurred; Dr. Joung decided
that an on-site manager was no longer needed at Stansteel,
and Mr. Van Dyke was terminated in January of 1990.
Four employees remained at Stansteel, each over the age of
fifty (50). Furthermore, the defendants claim that, even if
Mr. Van Dyke can establish a prima facie case, he cannot
prove that these reasons are a pretext for discrimination.
The plaintiffs again respond that the defendants are
ignoring the fact that, in a pattern or practice
discrimination involving direct evidence, the three-part
McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable, and the
defendants, rather than the plaintiffs, bear the burden of
establishing that Mr. Van Dyke was fired for a legitimate
purpose after the plaintiffs establish their prima facie case.
The plaintiffs further argue that there is abundant direct
evidence that Mr. Van Dyke's performance was
exemplary, that SI was engaged in an effort to reduce the
average age of its workforce, and that SI' s alleged reasons
for firing Mr. Van Dyke were, in fact, pre textual. For
example, Dr. Joung purportedly acknowledged in his
1990-91 business plan that he had made progress in
meeting the company's goal of filling positions "with
younger people as much as possible," and wrote notes
asking whether Stansteel's employees were "too old." The
plaintiffs further claim that SI's explanations for Mr. Van

The defendants claim that the undisputed facts reveal that
Mr. Smay, Mr. Meagher, Mr. Isferding, Mr. Jones, Mr.
Conradt, and Mr. Coxhill were neither the victims of age
discrimination nor constructively discharged. They assert
that Mr. Smay, a district sales manager at Appleton, retired
in May of 1992 after clashing with Mr. Valitchka, being
criticized for low sales volume, and having his sales
territory reassigned; he purportedly made no statement
about being the victim of age discrimination. Mr. Meagher,
also a district sales manager at Appleton, retired after being
told that Mr. Guernsey viewed his sales performance as
poor and after telling Mr. Gregor that he had planned on
retiring in March of 1992 on his sixty-fifth (65) birthday.
Mr. Isferding, a senior application and project engineer at
Appleton, retired in October of 1991 after being verbally
abused by Mr. Quinn on at least two occasions and being
transferred to the parts department; again, he purportedly
made no statement about being the victim of age
discrimination. Robert Jones, also a senior project and
application engineer, retired in May of 1991 after being
verbally abused by Mr. Quinn with some regularity and
notifying management that he wished to pursue other
interests and to work as a consultant at a later time; after
filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, he
reportedly declined an offer of reinstatement. Mr. Coxhill
was the Manager of Engineering at Appleton when Mr.
Guernsey was hired; he retired in July of 1992 after being
transferred to the position of Chief Engineer of Product
Quality and being verbally abused by Mr. Quinn on at least
one occasion. He purportedly made no statement about
being the victim of age discrimination. Finally, Mr.
Conradt, the Manager of Employee and Community
Relations at Appleton, retired in March of 1990 after
disagreeing with Mr. Guernsey over management style,
performance reviews, and the termination of Mr. Weiss;
again, he purportedly made no statement about being the
victim of age discrimination. Based on these facts, the
defendants claim that none of the six plaintiffs can prove
constructive discharge by demonstrating that he (I)
suffered a materially adverse employment action, (2)
incurred a work environment that was so intolerable that a
reasonable person would feel compelled to quit, and (3)
sought redress while still employed.
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The plaintiffs respond that each of these plaintiffs were
targets of SI's pattern of age discrimination, which was
implemented in this country shortly after SlAB's
acquisition of Allis-Chalmers in 1989 through Mr.
Guernsey. According to the plaintiffs, Mr. Guernsey and
other senior managers were hired based on age-based
criteria, and Mr. Guernsey told several of his managers that
younger employees were needed and implemented a
scheme to rid SI of older employees. The plaintiffs claim
that Mr. Meagher and Mr. Smay only retired, despite years
of exemplary performance, after hearing of Mr.
Guernsey's contempt for older employees (including
specific references to Mr. Meagher), having grossly
inflated and clearly unattainable sales goals thrust upon
them, and being subjected to demeaning performance
reviews and trumped-up job descriptions. They also assert
that, in conformity with Mr. Guernsey's expressed
sentiments regarding older employees, Mr. Quinn targeted
Mr. Jones and Mr. Isferding, despite their respective
histories of satisfactory performance, through verbal
abuse, physical intimidation, public humiliation, and
adverse treatment which lasted until each announced his
retirement. The plaintiffs further argue that Mr. Guernsey,
when removing Mr. Coxhill from the position of Manager
of Engineering, made very clear his intention that Mr.
Coxhill retire despite his years of solid performance, and
only reassigned him to the "concocted" position of chief
engineer, with little authority, to "warehouse" him after he
voiced his shock and disapproval; in that position, he was
placed under the authority of Mr. Quinn, whose abusive
style was well-known. Finally, they indicate that Mr.
Conradt resigned only after (I) witnessing SI's plan of age
discrimination, (2) "repeatedly observing Guernsey
implement Svedala's plan of age discrimination, over his
objection" in the termination of Mr. Weiss, (3) being
threatened *1459 with termination "if he failed to support
plainly age-based actions taken by Guernsey," and (4)
having his own job responsibilities downgraded and being
subjected to unfair criticism by Mr. Guernsey.

Title VII), "[a] plaintiff may prove age discrimination in
one of two different ways"; she may either produce direct
or circumstantial evidence that age was the determining
factor in her discharge, or, "as is more common, she may
utilize the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof for
Title VII cases originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d
668 (1973), and later adapted to age discrimination claims
under the ADEA." Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare Corp.,
13 F.3d 1120,1122 (7th Cir.1993) (citing McCoy v. WGN
Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371 (7th
Cir.1992). Direct evidence of discrimination, of course,
includes any acknowledgement by the defendant that
discriminatory intent was behind its treatment of the
plaintiff; circumstantial evidence, in tum, may involve,
inter alia, proof of suspicious timing, ambiguous
statements and behavior, inappropriate remarks, and
"comparative evidence of systematically more favorable
treatment toward similarly situated employees not sharing
the protected characteristic." Loyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc.,
25 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir.1994) (gender discrimination
case under Title VII). Accord Troupe v. The May Dep't
Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.1994) (gender
discrimination case under Title VII).
[7J [8J [9J [10] [l1J Under the burden shifting approach of
McDonnell Douglas,
"the plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case
of discrimination. In order to establish a prima facie
case, the plaintiff must show: (1) she was a member of
the protected class (age 40 or over), (2) she was doing
the job well enough to meet her employer's legitimate
expectations, (3) she was discharged or demoted, and (4)
the employer sought a replacement for her. Sarsha v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th
Cir.1993).

("ADEN'), it is "unlawful for an employer '" to discharge [

If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie
case, this creates a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination, and the burden of production shifts to
to
articulate
a
legitimate,
the
employer
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's discharge.
If the employer is successful, the presumption dissolves,
and the burden shifts back to the employee to show that
the employer's proffered reasons are a pretext for age
discrimination. Weihaupt v. American Medical Ass 'n,
874 F .2d 419, 426-27 (7th Cir.1989)."

] or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age." 29 U.S.c. ~ 623(a)(1). In discrimination cases where
the disparate treatment of a single employee is at issue, see,
e.g., Kirk v. Federal Property Management Corp., 22 F.3d
135,138 (7th Cir.1994) (race discrimination case under

Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122. If the plainti ff successfully
shows that the employer has offered "a pretext-a phony
reason-for why it fired the employee, then the trier of fact
is permitted, although not compelled, to infer that the real
reason was age." Visser v. Packer Eng'g Ass'n, Inc., 924
F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir.1991) (en banc) (citing Shager v.

B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK:
1. Individual Discrimination Claims:

[5J [6J Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
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Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir.l990». Accord
Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122-24. However, because" 'the
ultimate burden' of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff ... the plaintiff might
be well advised to present additional evidence of
discrimination, because the factfinder is not required to
find in her favor simply because she establishes a prima
facie case and shows that the employer's proffered reasons
are false." Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124 (citing St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, - - , 113 S.Ct. 2742,
2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993». For summary judgment
purposes, a non-moving plaintiff must only "produce
evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer that
[her employer] lied" about its proffered reasons for *1460
dismissal. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124; Shager, 913 F.2d at
401.

2. Pattern or Practice Discrimination Claims:
[12) [13) [14) An analogous analytical framework applies
to an ADEA representative action brought by either the
EEOC or an individual plaintiff alleging a pattern or
practice of disparate treatment. See, e.g., Coates v. Johnson
& Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 531 (7th Cir.1985) (race
discrimination case under Title VII). In the Seventh
Circuit, "[p ]laintiffs who raise a pattern or practice class
claim have as their initial burden the task of demonstrating
that unlawful discrimination has been the regular policy of
the employer, i.e., that 'discrimination was the company's
standard operating procedure-the regular rather than the
unusual practice.' " Coates, 756 F.2d at 532 (quoting
International Bhd. o{Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324,336,97 S.Ct. 1843,1854-55,52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977».
Again, such plaintiffs meet their burden by either
producing direct or circumstantial evidence that their
employer effectuated a pattern of discriminatory age-based
decisionmaking, or utilizing a burden-shifting method of
proof similar to that articulated in McDonnell Douglas.
[15) [16) Under the burden-shifting approach, pattern or
practice discrimination actions are generally bifurcated at
trial into two parts; a liability, or prima facie phase, where
the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory policy by a
preponderance of the evidence, and a remedial phase,
where the scope of relief awardable to each individual
plaintiff is litigated. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324,361,97 S.Ct. 1843,1867-68,52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977);
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S.
867, 876, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 2799-2800, 81 L.Ed.2d 718
(1984); In re W. Dist. Xerox Litigation, 850 F.Supp. 1079,
1081--82 (W.D.N.Y.1994); Forehand v. Florida State
Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 839 F.Supp. 807, 813

(N.D .Fla.1993). Under this procedure, efficiency is best
enhanced if the same jury makes liability and remedial
factual findings, as (I) the plaintiffs need not reintroduce in
the remedial phase anecdotal evidence already presented
during the liability phase, (2) the defendants need not
re-introduce in the remedial phase defenses already
presented in the liability phase, and (3) conflicting
discrimination findings as to plaintiffs whose cases are
litigated in the liability phase are avoided.

a. Liability phase:
1) Plaintiffs' proof:
[17) [18] In the liability, or prima facie phase, of trial, the
plaintiffs "have as their initial burden the task of
demonstrating that unlawful discrimination has been the
regular policy of the employer, i.e., that 'discrimination
was the company's standard operating procedure-the
regular rather than the unusual practice.' " Coates, 756
F.2d at 532 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336,97 S.Ct.
at 1854-55). Accord King v. General Elec. Co., 960 F.2d
617,623 (7th Cir.1992); Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813. A
formal written policy is not required to establish such a
pattern or practice; an informal or unstructured method of
decision-making may be sufficient to invoke this doctrine.
See Reed v. Lockheed Aircrafi Corp., 613 F.2d 757, 76061 (9th Cir.1980); Glass v. IDS Fin. Serv., Inc., 778
F.Supp. 1029, 1052 (D.Minn.1991). At this stage, the
plaintiffs need not "offer evidence that each person for
whom [they] will ultimately seek relief was a victim ofthe
employer's discriminatory policy. [Their] burden is to
establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed."
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 1867. Accord
Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081.
[19) [20) [21) [22) [23) In establishing their prima facie
case, the plaintiffs should produce "statistical evidence
demonstrating substantial disparities in the application of
employment actions as to [the protected] and the
unprotected group, buttressed by [anecdotal] evidence of
general policies or specific instances of discrimination."
Coates, 756 F.2d at 532.2 *1461 Where the plaintiff class
is prohibitively large for each plaintiff to provide
individual testimony of alleged discriminatory conduct,
plaintiffs regularly present anecdotal testimony from a
subset of plaintiffs in seeking to establish their prima{acie
case. See, e.g., Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 338,357,97 S.Ct. at
1855-56, 1865-66 (prima fc/cie case met where plaintiff
class of over three-hundred employees provided specific
evidence of company-wide discrimination against only
forty plaintiffs); King, 960 F.2d at 619 (prima facie case
not met where plaintiff class of fifteen employees provided
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testimony of six such employees in support of pattern or
practice claim); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv.,
665 F.2d 482, 495 (4th Cir.1981) (prima facie case met
where plaintiffs provided testimony of subset of twenty
plaintiffs in support of discrimination claim). Anecdotal
evidence must suggest broad-based discrimination,
however, as providing mere "isolated or sporadic
discriminatory acts by the employer is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of
discrimination." King, 960 F.2d at 622. See also
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 1854-55;
Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813.

case. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267. While defendants may
attempt to establish a nondiscriminatory reason for an
adverse employment decision against a testifying plaintiff,
see Coates, 756 F .2d at 532, they need not do so depending
on their assessment of the strength of the plaintiffs'
evidence; again, the focus is on the presence or absence of
a company-wide discriminatory policy, and not on
individual employment decisions.4 It is only during the
second, or remedial, phase of trial that the defendants must
establish that individual *1462 plaintiffs were not, in fact,
victims of the discriminatory practice to escape liability.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362,97 S.Ct. at 1868; Craik, 731
F.2d at 470; Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081-82; Forehand,
839 F.Supp. at 813.

2) Defendants' rebuttal:
[24J [25J [26] During the liability, or prima facie, stage of
proceedings, the defendants may, of course, counter the
plaintiffs' proof through cross-examination and the
presentation of rebuttal evidence, both statistical and
anecdotal, in an "attempt to show that the plaintiff's 'proof
is either inaccurate or insignificant.' " Craik v. Minnesota
State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 1867). See also
Coates, 756 F.2d at 532.3 The strength of rebuttal evidence
that the defendants must produce "to prevent the
plaintiffTs] from carrying the burden of persuasion as to
disparity [in treatment among employee groups] depends,
as in any case, on the strength of the plaintiffs' proof."
Coates, 756 F.2d at 532 (quoting Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
1249,1268 (D.C.Cir.1984».
[27J [28J [29J [30] As previously indicated, because
plaintiffs at this stage generally elicit anecdotal evidence
from only a subset of the plaintiff class, defendants in most
cases do not provide rebuttal evidence against every named
plaintiff; instead, their proof is limited to evidence and
testimony which counters the plaintiffs' prima facie
presentation. As noted in Teamsters,
"[t]he employer's defense must, of
course, be designed to meet the prima
facie case of t,he [plaintiffs]. We do not
mean to suggest that there are any
particular limits of the type of evidence
an employer may use. The point is that at
of
a
the
liability
stage
pattern-or-practice trial the focus often
will not be on individual hiring decisions,
but on a pattern of discriminatory
decisionmaking. "
(Emphasis added). During this stage, then, the defendants'
rebuttal evidence is tailored to the plaintiffs' prima facie

3) Jury determination:
[31] [32] [33 J [34 J Throughout this stage of proceedings,
the plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion as to
establishing a prima facie case of pattern or practice age
discrimination. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at
1867; King, 960 F.2d at 623; Coates, 756 F.2d at 532;
Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081-82; Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at
813. At the close of the liability phase of trial, the jury is
asked through appropriate instructions whether or not the
plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendants engaged
in a pattern or practice of age discrimination during the
relevant time frame. If the jury responds negatively, then
trial of the plaintiffs' pattern or practice claim is completed
and the plaintiff" are left to pursue individual
discrimination claims, presumably before a different
factfinder.5 If, on the other hand, the jury responds
affirmatively, the Court may award prospective relief to
the plaintiff" as sought by the EEOC. Teamsters, 431 U.S.
at 361, 97 S.Ct. at 1867-68; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470. As to
the scope of individual relief to which the plaintiffs might
be entitled, the Court must move to the second, or
remedial, phase of trial. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361, 97
S.Ct. at 1867-68; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470; Forehand, 839
F.Supp. at 813.

b. Remedial phase:

[35J If the plaintiffs prevail in the liability, or prima facie
phase, of trial, then the proceedings move into the second,
or remedial phase, of trial, where "[t]he proof of the pattern
or practice supports an inference that any particular
employment decision, during the period in which the
discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of
that policy." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362,97 S.Ct. at 1868.
Under such circumstances, it is presumed that each
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individual plaintiff has been the vlctlm of age
discrimination at the hands of the defendant. Cooper, 467
U.S. at 875, 104 S.Ct. at 2799; King, 960 F.2d at 623;
Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081.

1) Defendants' proof:
[36J [37] This presumption of discrimination shifts to the
defendants the burden of demonstrating that the individual
plaintiffs were not victims of the discriminatory practice.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362, 97 S.Ct. at 1868; King, 960
F.2d at 623; Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081-82. This includes
"not only the burden of production, but also the burden of
persuading the trier of fact that it is more likely than not
that the employer did not unlawfully discriminate against
the individual." Craik, 731 F.2d at 470. Accord King, 960
F.2d at 623; Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813.6 "The
Teamsters approach thus differs from the traditional
McDonnell Douglas analysis in that the burden of
persuasion can shift from plaintiffs to defendants." Xerox,
850 F.Supp. at 1082.
[38J [39] [40] To rebut the presumption of discrimination
as to each plaintiff, the defendants *1463 must establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that age discrimination
was not a "determining factor" or a "but-for" element in
their employment decisions. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993); Fisher v. Transco
Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th
Cir.1992). In attempting to meet this burden, the
defendants may again present evidence demonstrating that
the plaintiffs' "proof is either inaccurate or insignificant,"
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 36 I, 97 S.Ct. at 1867-68; Coates,
756 F.2d at 532; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470, or that a
nondiscriminatory explanation exists for the presumed
discriminatory termination of each plaintiff. See Coates,
756 F.2d at 532. The amount of damages awardable to each
plaintiff is also litigated during this phase of trial. See
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361, 97 S.Ct. at 1867-68; Craik,
731 F.2dat470;Forehand, 839F.Supp. at813.

2) Plaintiff\" rebuttal:

(41) (42) [43) [44) During the remedial stage of
proceedings, the plaintiffs may, of course, counter the
defendants' proof through cross-examination and the
presentation of rebuttal evidence in an attempt to show that
the defendants' non-discriminatory justifications for their
employment decisions are merely a pretext for
discrimination. See, e.g., Sarsha, 3 F.3d at 1039; Fisher,
979 F.2d at 1243. As a general rule, "[p]retext may be

established directly with evidence that [the defendant] was
more likely than not motivated by a discriminatory reason,
or indirectly by evidence that the employer's explanation is
not credible." Sarsha, 3 F.3d at 1039. As previously
indicated, however, unlike in the McDonnell Douglas
format applied to individual discrimination claims, the
Teamsters model imposes no burden on the plaintiffs to
produce such evidence, and the burden of persuading the
factfinder that age discrimination was not a determining
factor in each of the defendants' employment decisions
remains with the defendant. See Teamsters, 431 US. at
362, 97 S.Ct. at 1868; King, 960 F.2d at 623; Craik, 731
F.2d at 470; Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1081-82. The strength
of rebuttal evidence that the plaintiffs must produce to
prevent the defendants from carrying their burden of
persuasion again will depend, as in any case, on the
strength of the defendants' proof. See Coates, 756 F.2d at
532 (quoting Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1268
(D.C.Cir.1984)). In addition, the plaintiffs are required to
litigate the amount of damages awardable to each named
party during this stage of proceedings. See Teamsters, 431
US. at 361,97 S.Ct. at 1867-68; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470;
Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813.

3) Jury determination:
[45J At the end of the remedial phase of trial, the jury is
asked through appropriate instructions whether the
defendants "willfully" violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and whether the defendants have proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that each individual
plaintiff was not a victim of age discrimination; they are
also asked to assess damages for each named plaintiff.

C. ANALYSIS:

[46J Where individual and class-claims are bought
contemporaneously, courts should "consider the evidence
relating to the individual claims in [their] assessment of the
class claim, and vice-versa, since evidence relevant to one
is also relevant to the other." Coates, 756 F.2d at 533. The
class claim, however, "is to be "Considered first, since if the
class claim has merit, the named and unnamed individual
class members are entitled to the burden-shifting
presumption of Teamsters." ld.

1. Pattern or Practice Discrimination:

Because the Court finds that a reasonable jury could
conclude that the defendants engaged in a pattern or
practice of age discrimination, and that this practice was
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the determining factor, or "but for" cause, for the
termination or "retirement" of each plaintiff named in this
motion, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
must be denied.

the ten finalists selected by the search firm, Mr. Guernsey,
age thirty-seven (37), was given the position. Mr.
Guernsey maintained regular communication with SlAB
management regarding business objectives, planning,
personnel issues, and related matters.

a. Plaintiffs' prima facie case:

Mr. Conradt observed employment policies and practices
at SI in 1989 which he found to be discriminatory against
older workers. Mr. Conradt was asked by Mr. Merten to
calculate the average age of salaried employees at the
Appleton facility; he was concerned that this request was
part of an overall program to get rid of older workers. As
he had done in prior years, he also compiled a list of
employees ages sixty (60) and older; after receiving the
list, Mr. Guernsey commented that "we've got an awful lot
of long service employees. We need to get some
young-ah, new blood into the organization." In January
of 1990, Mr. Guernsey told Mr. Weiss that "the problem
with Appleton is that we have too many old people in their
jobs too long." When Mr. Conradt later objected to the
termination ofMr. Weiss, Mr. Guernsey responded that he
had "two choices, [ ] do as I tell you or there is the door." In
February of 1990, Mr. Guernsey conducted his first
performance review of Mr. Gregor, establishing written
performance objectives including the development of a
"young generation of salesmen and manager candidates."
Mr. Guernsey told Mr. Gregor that he had calculated the
average age of the Appleton sales force to be 55-56 years
old, that this number was too high, that they needed to hire
a younger and more aggressive sales force, that the current
force was "old and stale," and that he was not comfortable
working with older employees. On a number of occasions,
Mr. Guernsey ordered Mr. Gregor to terminate Mr.
Meagher, an "old incompetent" who needed to be replaced
with some "young blood." Mr. Guernsey also criticized
Mr. Gregor for promoting Mr. Spoonamore, noting that he
had a better candidate who was a "very young, professional
guy." Mr. Guernsey further instructed *1465 Mr. Gregor
that, if he could not get rid of certain employees, he would
have Mr. Stelter find a way to do so.

[47} Viewing (as we must) the factual submissions of the
parties in a light most favorable to the non-movants, it is
clear that *1464 the plaintiffs present adequate evidence to
establish a prima facie case of pattern or practice
discrimination by SI against older employees which
emanated from its Sweden parent, SlAB. The jury may
adopt as true the following factual summary. SlAB and SI
had interlocking management structures and had direct,
frequent, and substantial contact with one another through
business and financial planning arrangements. When Mr.
Guernsey was interviewed in Sweden by Mr. Older and
Mr. Knuttson for the general manager position at
Appleton, they discussed specific personnel in Appleton,
including Mr. Weiss. While interviewing for the same
position in Sweden, Mr. Gregor was told that SI was
"looking for a guy in his late 30's." Dr. Joung and Mr.
Soriano, after returuing from a conference for senior
managers in Sweden, reported that Swedish management
was concerned about the high average age of the workforce
at the Milwaukee facility, and wanted action taken to bring
in younger workers. Mr. Soriano also stated that, while
SlAB management believed that Milwaukee had a problem
with older workers, it found the "age problem" at Appleton
to be even worse. Written business plans submitted to
SlAB by Dr. Joung noted the "high average age" of SI's
employees as a "principal weakness" of the Milwaukee
unit, and indicated that a program had been initiated to fill
position with younger people, thereby decreasing the
average age of employees.
Mr. Conradt, the Manager of Human Resources at the
Appleton unit, and Mr. Merten shared a mutual concern
over the perceived "youth cult" being imposed on SI by
SlAB management, and Mr. Merten told Mr. Conradt that
SI had a policy which favored younger workers over older
employees. Mr. Merten also told Mr. Conradt "off the
record" that an applicant for the Appleton General
Manager job had been rejected because he was "too old."
SI retained a professional executive search firm in its
general manager search; Mr. Platner and Mr. Knuttson
informed the firm that (1) the Appleton business unit had
been populated by "people who had been in the business 30
years or more, and the message was we need to get new
and different thinking and leadership that in looking
toward the future that isn't just a prologue to the past," and
(2) in conducting the general manager search, SlAB
wanted to avoid "calcified" candidates. The youngest of

Only managers in their thirties and forties were selected by
SlAB management to attend the Nordic Hills management
assessment conference; nominees' job location, name,
present title and age were primary factors considered in
selection. Mr. Quinn was the only manager from Appleton
selected to attend; Mr. Weiss and Mr. Foy were rejected.
Mr. Quinn was later promoted to Mr. Coxhill's position of
Manager of Engineering. In approximately April of 1991,
Mr. Valitchka told Mr. Gregor that SI's program was to
reduce the average age of its sales force by bringing in
younger employees. In a meeting later that month, Mr.
Gregor commented that pictures of equipment on Mr.
Quinn's wall included some "real antiques"; Mr. Guernsey
responded that he thought Mr. Gregor was referring to Mr.
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Quinn's sales force. Mr. Quinn's conduct toward
subordinates was abusive, especially toward older
employees; SI management was aware of his behavior.
There is evidence suggesting that Mr. Valitchka and Mr.
Stelter revised the job description for regional sales
representatives, adding new physical and endurance
demands which were not necessary to the position and
were designed to discriminate against older employees
with medical conditions, including Mr. Smay, Mr.
Meagher, and Mr. Pape. Before he was terminated, Mr.
Coxhill was instructed by Mr. Guernsey to present
information as to each Appleton engineer's age, date of
birth, and years of service. Within two years after Mr.
Guernsey arrived at Appleton, at least eleven employees
above age fifty were no longer employed at the facility.
When Mr. Lenhart was interviewed in Sweden as Mr.
Merten's replacement, he was asked for his date of birth,
and was told that "in Sweden they have no laws against
asking folks for their date of birth." When Mr. Platner
selected Mr. Fons as general counsel for SI, he used Mr.
Fons' college graduation date to compute his name, which
did not appear on his resume. At the Milwaukee unit,
applications for employment from older individuals were
routinely rejected with handwritten notes emphasizing the
applicants' ages.
On February 13, 1991, the Milwaukee facility carried out a
reduction-in-force (RIF) which resulted in the termination
of twenty (20) employees. Eighteen of these workers were
over age forty; one of the two below-forty people released,
as well as the youngest of the remaining eighteen
employees, were subsequently rehired by SI. Notes from
the management meeting preceding the RIF indicate that
the age of employees considered for termination was
discussed. Most of the employees terminated were fifty
years of age or older.

despite the presumption of age discrimination, age
discrimination was not a "but for" cause, or determining
factor, in the termination of any of the named plaintiffs.

1) Plaintiffs Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel and Richard
Spoonamore:
[48) Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude that SI's
explanations for the termination of Mr. Weiss, Mr. Flavel
and Mr. Spoonamore are merely a pretext for age
discrimination. As to Mr. Weiss, Appleton's Manager of
Manufacturing, the defendants suggest that he was
terminated because he did not have in place adequate
programs to improve plant safety and reduce quality
control, *1466 purchasing, and inventory costs, and
resisted Mr. Guernsey's TQM management philosophy.
The plaintiffs, however, present evidence that Mr. Weiss
had a history of satisfactory performance and had instituted
numerous safety measures, including a management safety
council, a safety brigade, safety tours, weekly safety
programs, safety posters, periodic safety contests and
awards, and a full-time nurse. They also indicate that Mr.
Platner had eliminated the total quality assurance
department at Appleton as a cost-savings measure,
reassigning TQM to the engineering department, that Mr.
Weiss preserved as much of the TQM program in
manufacturing as he could, and that, in the period
preceding Mr. Guernsey's arrival, Mr. Weiss was working
on a large cost reduction plan. Given these facts, a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that SI has not met its
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that Mr. Weiss was not terminated due to his age.

b. Defendants' rebuttal:

The defendants present evidence that, while his
perfonnance was satisfactory, Mr. Flavel was terminated
because his international marketing responsibilities were
transferred to Minco and funding for his comminution
research was eliminated. The plaintiffs, however, indicate
that, despite his qualifications, Mr. Flavel was passed over
for several open positions at Appleton and Minco. They
also indicate that, when initially responding to Mr. Flave1's
EEOC charge, the defendants claimed that Mr. Flavel was
terminated because comminution research had been
transferred to Sweden, and made no mention of decreases
in funding or the transfer to Sweden of international
marketing functions. Again, the jury could reasonably
conclude that SI's proffered explanations are simply a
pretext for age discrimination, and that the defendants have
not met their burden.

A reasonable jury could further conclude that the
defendants have not met their burden of establishing that,

According to the defendants, Mr. Spoonamore was
terminated because he resisted the implementation ofTQM

If inadequately rebutted by the defendants, and found to be
true by the jury, these facts, coupled with the particular
termination decisions made as to each plaintiff, adequately
(though not overwhelmingly) establish the adoption of a
pattern or practice of age discrimination at SI at the behest
of its corporate parent, SlAB. Because a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the plaintiffs have met their
prima facie case, we presume for the purposes of this
motion that the individual plaintiffs are entitled to the
burden-shifting presumption of Teamsters previously
discussed.
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principles espoused by Mr. Guernsey and had disobeyed
Mr. Guernsey's directives on the costs relating to the
above-referenced project in Mexico. The plaintiffs,
however, indicate that Mr. Spoonamore's performance
was "seriously undermined" by Mr. Guernsey, Mr. Quinn,
and Mr. Dircks, who, inter alia, routinely contacted his
subordinates without his notification and verbally abused
him, including making ageist comments, in front of others.
They also assert that Mr. Spoonamore did not resist TQM
at Appleton, is conversant with TQM principles, believes
that they can be effective, and merely expressed doubts
about the applicability of certain specific management
strategies to his small department. They also present
evidence that Mr. Guernsey was critical of his
performance, and denied him a raise, even though he had
never conducted a performance review of him or provided
written notice of alleged performance deficiencies, and
that Mr. Spoonamore followed Mr. Guernsey's
instructions on the Mexican project. A reasonable jury may
reject the defendants' explanation of Mr. Spoonamore's
termination/constructive discharge as pretextual; as a
result, their summary judgment motion must be denied as
to this plaintiff.

2) Plaintiff Robert Van Dyke:

[49) Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude that SI's
explanation for the termination of Mr. Van Dyke was
merely a pretext for age discrimination. According to the
defendants, Mr. Van Dyke was dismissed after his
responsibility for resolving holdbacks on certain
equipment contracts was transferred to Milwaukee in
response to customer complaints and after further
consolidation of the Stansteel operation with the
Milwaukee facility obviated the need for an on-site
manager at Stansteel. They also indicate that Mr. Faulkner
harbored serious concerns about Mr. Van Dyke's
performance, and that sales volume at Stansteel had
steadily declined. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim
that Mr. Van Dyke was not notified as to concerns over his
performance, that he received a 7.1 % merit pay increase in
August of 1989, and that he never received any
performance appraisals after 1984. They also indicate that
the termination letter handed to Mr. Van Dyke by Mr.
Faulkner did not mention performance problems as a cause
for termination, and that SI retained a younger employee at
the Stansteel operation who had a history of performance
deficiencies. The plaintiffs also contend that Stansteel
*1467 had a reasonable backlog of business when Mr. Van
Dyke was terminated, and good prospects for future
business.

In our view, a jury assessing this evidence is likely to
conclude that the defendants have met their burden of
establishing that Mr. Van Dyke was terminated for just
cause, namely, a decrease in sales volume and
consolidation of managerial functions to the Milwaukee
facility. Nevertheless, we are unable to fmd that a
reasonable jury could not make a contrary determination.
Mr. Van Dyke may, for example, convince the jury that
business prospects at Stansteel were, in fact, good, or that
the decision to terminate him rather than the
previously-referenced younger Stansteel employee was
based, at least in part, on age. Accepting either proposition,
the jury may conclude that the defendants' proffered
justifications are merely a pretext for age discrimination.
Again, the defendants' summary judgment request must be
denied.

3) Plaintiffs alleging constructive discharge:
[50] [51) [52) Viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude
that SI's explanations for the "retirements" of Mr.
Meagher, Mr. Smay, Mr. Jones, Mr. Is ferding , Mr.
Coxhill, and Mr. Conradt are merely a pretext for age
discrimination. In the Seventh Circuit, "[ d]emonstrating
constructive discharge requires a showing that 'a
reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign
under the circumstances of the case.' " Darnell v. Target
Stores, 16 F.3d 174, 177 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Rodgers
v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 677 (7th
Cir.1993». A constructive discharge involves more than a
mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities;
it is instead established by indicating "a demotion
evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly
diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that
might be unique to a particular situation." Crady v. Liberty
Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993).

According to the defendants, Mr. Smay voluntarily retired
because he was unhappy with his performance review and
the reconfiguration of his sales territory, .and wished to
"look after some personal investments." The plaintiffs, on
the other hand, indicate that Mr. Smay was constructively
discharged only after (1) Mr. Gregor was pressured into
reducing the average age of his workforce and was
replaced by Mr. Valitchka, (2) SI imposed an inflated sales
quota on him during a recessionary year, and unduly
criticized his performance, and (3) mindful ofMr. Smay's
medical condition, Mr. Stelter created a "new" job
description for district sales managers which included
"trumped up" physical requirements. Given these facts, a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that SI has not met its
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burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that Mr. Smay was not constructively discharged due to his
age.
The jury may reach a similar conclusion regarding Mr.
Meagher. The defendants assert that Mr. Meagher
voluntarily retired at age sixty-five (65), as he had planned,
after his sales performance had been criticized as subpar,
and that he encouraged a colleague to apply for his
position. The plaintiffs respond that, like Mr. Smay, Mr.
Meagher was constructively discharged only after (1) Mr.
Gregor was pressured into reducing the average age of his
workforce and was replaced by Mr. Valitchka, (2) SI
imposed an inflated sales quota on him during a
recessionary year, and unduly criticized his performance,
(3) mindful of his medical condition, Mr. Stelter created a
"new" job description for district sales managers which
included "trumped up" physical requirements, and (4) Mr.
Guernsey told Mr. Gregor that Mr. Meagher was an "old
incompetent," and instructed him to fire that "old
son-of-a-bitch in Florida" and replace him with "young
blood." Again, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr.
Meagher was forced to retire as a result of discriminatory
conduct on behalf of the defendants; there tore, the
defendants' summary judgment request must be denied as
to Mr. Meagher.
According to the defendants, Mr. Isferding voluntarily
retired because he was unhappy with his transfer to the
parts department in a company reorganization at Appleton,
despite the fact that he received the same pay as in *1468
his previous position. The plaintiffs respond that Mr.
Isferding had always received positive employment
reviews, and that he was constructively discharged after
being subjected to verbal harassment and adverse
treatment by Mr. Quinn based solely on his age and being
demoted to the parts department. They also indicate that
Mr. Isferding believed that he would soon be tIred given
company-wide harassment of himself and other older
eruployees. A reasonable factfinder could agree with the
plaintiffs that Mr. Isferding was targeted for harassment
based on his age, and that the age hostility in his work
environment became so unbearable that he felt he had no
choice but to retire. For this reason, the defendants' motion
must -be denied.
The defendants present evidence that Mr. Jones, on his
own admission, voluntarily retired because he wished to
move to Colorado to be closer to his daughters and to
pursue recreational and consulting interests. According to
the plaintiffs, Mr. Jones was constructively discharged,
despite a long history of satisfactory performance, after
being subjected to verbal harassment and adverse
treatment by Mr. Quinn based solely on his age. Neither
party paints a particularly compelling picture;

nevertheless, a jury could reasonably conclude that age
hostility in his work environment effectively forced Mr.
Jones out of his position. Again, the defendants' request
for summary judgment must be denied.
The defendants indicate that Mr. Cox hill voluntarily
retired because he was unhappy with his transfer to the new
position of Chief Engineer of Product Quality, and then to
Field Service Manager, in a company reorganization at
Appleton, despite the fact that he received the same pay as
in his previous position. The plaintiffs, on the other hand,
present evidence that Mr. Coxhill was constructively
discharged on the basis of age, despite a history of solid
performance, as (1) Mr. Guernsey decided to replace him
as Manager of Engineering with Mr. Quinn before he had
ever given Mr. Coxhill a performance review (2) when
demoting him to the position of Chief Engineer of Product
Quality in April of 1991, Mr. Guernsey "suggested" to him
that he consider retirement, and indicated that Mr. Stelter
was "standing by" to discuss that option with him (3) he
was forced to report to Mr. Quinn, whose abusive behavior
toward him and other older employees was well
documented, and (4) he feared that he would be fired based
on a pattern of age discrimination he observed being
imposed on him and other older employees. A reasonable
jury may reject the defendants' proffered explanation for
Mr. Coxhill' s retirement, and conclude that he was forced
out of the organization on the basis of his age. The
defendants may therefore not meet their burden, and
summary judgment is inappropriate.
Finally, as to Mr. Conradt, the defendants indicate that he
voluntarily retired after (1) his job responsibilities were
reduced and he was reprimanded for several performance
deficiencies (2) he and Mr. Guernsey had experienced a
conflict in management style, and (3) he had become aware
that he would receive an inheritance under his father's will.
According to the plaintiffs, however, he was constructively
discharged after (1) he had observed a pattern of
discriminatory practices against older employees at SI (2)
Mr. Guernsey told him that we need to get some
young-ah, new blood into the organization (3) he
unsuccessfully resisted the age-based termination of Mr.
Weiss (4) he concluded that SI management wanted him to
partIcIpate in "illegal and immoral" employment
discrimination policies, and feared personal liability for
carrying out such policies, and (5) he feared that he would
be fired based on his age. Mr. Conradt testifies that he felt
he had not choice but to leave SI, even though he enjoyed
his work and wanted to continue his employment. Again, a
jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Conradt was
effectively forced out of his position due to age hostility by
the defendants, and that the defendants have therefore not
met their burden. As a result, the defendants' motion must
be denied.
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c. Bifurcation procedure to be used at trial:
[53) In their letter briefs, the plaintiffs in this matter stress
that, unlike the plaintiffs in *1469 Teamsters and in most
pattern or practice cases, their representative class is
relatively small. See, e.g., Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813.
As a result, they indicate that
"every living Plaintiff will testify in the
first phase of trial as part of Plaintiffs'
evidence of Defendants' pattern or
practice of discrimination. In other
words, the evidence of discrimination
against every Plaintiff in this lawsuit will
be part of the Plaintiffs' pattern or
practice case."
By adopting this added degree of caution in providing
anecdotal evidence of discrimination, the plaintiffs, no
doubt, are mindful of the above-referenced admonishment
in King and Teamsters, that plaintiffs highlight the "
'manifest' difference between individual claims of
discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern
or practice." King, 960 F.2d at 622. See also Cooper, 467
U.S. at 876, 104 S.Ct. at 2799-2800; Forehand, 839
F.Supp. at 813. Given the relatively small size of the
plaintiff class, the plaintiffs' need to present more than
"isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts" to meet their
prima facie case, and our general reluctance to limit the
degree of evidence deemed necessary by the plaintiffs to
meet their evidentiary burden, the Court shall allow the
plaintiffs to call each of the named plaintiffs as witnesses
in establishing their prima facie case.7
[54) Because the plaintiffs in this matter intend on having
each named plaintiff testify in presenting their prima facie
case, they suggest that the Court "adjust" the Teamsters
analytical framework by requiring the defendants to
present all defense evidence relevant to liability, including
non-discriminatory reasons for each plaintiffs termination
or constructive discharge, during the liability, or prima
/clcie, stage of trial. According to the plaintiffs,
"because Defendants will need to tailor their defense to
the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs at the liability
phase, the only new evidence to be presented by
Defendants in the remedial stage will be their damages
evidence '"
In their letter brief to the Court, Defendants argue that a
finding as to whether the Plaintiffs were the victims of a
pattern or practice of discrimination can only be made in
the remedial phase of the trial. However, it makes no
sense to wait until after the second phase of the trial to

submit questions to the jury regarding evidence
submitted in the first phase of the trial. To proceed in
that fashion would not only confuse the jury as to what it
was to decide and on what evidence, but would also
invite the parties to resubmit their evidence and thereby
substantially lengthen the time required for trial.
Clearly, because all of the liability evidence will be
presented in the first phase, efficiency would be
enhanced if the jury were asked to decide the existence
of the pattern or practice of discrimination and whether
Plaintiffs were a victim of that pattern or practice at the
end of Phase I of trial."
This procedure, of course, is commonplace m
single-plaintiff Title VII cases where discrimination is
alleged by only one employee.
While mindful of the differences between this case and
Teamsters,8 and cognizant of the intuitive appeal of the
approach advanced by the plaintiffs,9 the Court shall
nevertheless institute the Teamsters analytical framework
in trying this case. We do so for several reasons. First of
all, implementation *1470 of the plaintiffs' approach may
unduly prejudice the defendants by unnecessarily
lengthening the number of days spent in trial. A significant
component of the Teamsters framework is potential
cost-savings in defending a pattern or practice charge; the
employer assesses the strength of the plaintiffs' prima
facie proof, produces the volume and strength of rebuttal
evidence it deems necessary to defeat that charge (which,
as previously indicated, often does not include giving
non-discriminatory reasons for employment decisions
regarding testifying plaintiffs), and gets a jury
determination as whether the plaintiffs have met their
prima facie case. Requiring the defendants to use all of
their ammunition during the first phase of trial, including
glvmg nondiscriminatory explanations for adverse
employment decisions, eradicates this cost-containment
strategy established in Teamsters, and may unnecessarily
lengthen the first stage 0 f trial if the plaintiffs' prima facie
proof is ultimately rejected by the jury. Secondly, should
the jury find that the plaintiffs failed to prove their prima
facie case, the plaintiffs may nevertheless be entitled to
pursue individual discrimination claims under the
McDonnell Douglas format in separate jury trials for each
business unit; under such circumstances, the defendants
would be forced to defend themselves against the same
discrimination charges twice in three different lawsuits.
Again, adoption of the traditional Teamsters format may
eliminate otherwise-unnecessary litigation costs in the first
stage of proceedings without compromising the plaintiffs'
right to bring individual claims, and seems more fair to the
defendants. Finally, the defendants raise justifiable
concerns regarding undue complication of the special
verdict form to be issued to the jury.
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The Court, then, shall adopt the traditional Teamsters
model in conducting proceedings in this case. The
defendants will be permitted to rebut the plaintiffs' prima
facie proof during the liability phase with any evidence
they deem necessary to establish the absence of a
company-wide policy of age discrimination. They need
not, however, "lay all their cards on the table" as to
justifications for the termination or constructive discharge
of testifying plaintiffs if they believe that such evidence is
not necessary to defeat the plaintiffs' prima facie case.
Should the jury determine that the plaintiffs have not met
their burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination, then the defendants may, in fact, have
preserved resources and costs accruing to the litigants and
the Court in these proceedings, although they may be
required to expend those resources in subsequent
individual discrimination actions.
If, on the other hand, the jury finds that the plaintiffs have
met their prima facie case, then the defendants may
introduce appropriate defenses not presented in the liability
phase to meet their burden of proving non-discriminatory
terminations regarding each plaintiff in the remedial stage
of proceedings. This may include justifications for the
termination of particular plaintiffs, and may require the
defendants to recall certain witnesses to the stand for
further testimony. Because the same jury will decide these
issues, neither the defendants nor the plaintiffs will be
permitted to elicit duplicative testimony or reintroduce
evidence already presented during the first stage of
proceedings. This will ensure that the trial proceeds in an
efficient and orderly fashion.

2. Individual discrimination claims:
ISS] The Court shall defer ruling on the defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment as to the plaintiffs'
individual discrimination claims until after completion of
the liability, or prima facie, phase of trial. If the jury finds
that the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of age
discrimination, then the plaintiffs would be entitled to the
burden-shifting presumption of Teamsters which, unlike
the McDonnell Douglas format in individual
discrimination cases, obligates the defendants to prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that age discrimination
was not a "but for" cause, or determining factor, in any
particular employment decision. Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at
l082. Presumably, because the burden of persuasion may
shift to the defendants under the Teamsters approach, but
not under the McDonnell Douglas format, a finding of
pattern or practice discrimination obviates the need to
separately pursue individual discrimination claims. See
Coates, 756 F.2d at 533. Should the jury, however,
determine *1471 that the defendants did not engage in a
pattern or practice of age discrimination, we previously
saw that the plaintiffs may pursue individual
discrimination claims in subsequent proceedings before
two different juries; under these circumstances, the
defendants' motion as to individual discrimination claims
would require Court resolution under the McDonnell
Douglas format. Until completion of the liability stage of
trial, then, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
as to individual discrimination claims brought by the
plaintiffs is premature; as a result, the Court will not
address it at this time, and will consider it in subsequent
proceedings only if required to do so pursuant to the jury's
determination in the liability phase of the pattern or
practice trial and at the request of either party.

IV. SUMMARY
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment as to
(1) the Age Discrimination Claim of Plaintiff Robert Van
Dyke (2) the Age Discrimination Claims of Plaintiffs
Ronald Weiss, Malcolm Flavel and Richard Spoonamore,
and (3) those Plaintiffs Alleging Constructive
Discharge-Byron Smay, William Meagher, Robert
Isferding, Robert Jones, Major Coxhill, and James Conradt
be DENIED in the above-captioned matter.
SO ORDERED.
Parallel Citations
70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1088

Footnotes

1

An April 18, 1990 memorandum to Swedish personnel manager Lars Reverman similarly listed a pre felTed age range of " late 30's or
early 40's" for the replacement for the general manager of Boliden Allis UK, Ltd., a British subsidiary of SlAB. (PI. Resp. to Def.
Proposed Findings of Fact ~ 61.)

2

This is not to say, however, that '·the absence of statistical evidence must invariably prove fatal in every pattern or practice case.
Where the overall number of employees is small, anecdotal evidence may sutlice." Xerox. 850 F.Supp. at 1084. Accord Pitre v.
Western £lee. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir.1988); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984). In other cases, "a
plaintiffs statistical evidence alone might constitute a primajacie case." Coates, 756 F.2d at 532 n. 6 (citing Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
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1249, 1278) (D. C. Cir.1984 )). "Neither statistical nor anecdotal evidence is automatically entitled to reverence to the exclusion of the
other," id. at 533; however, "[w]hen one type of evidence is missing altogether, the other must be correspondingly stronger for
plaintiffs to meet their burden." Xerox, 850 F.Supp. at 1085.

3

"An employer might show, for example, that the claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful
post-Act discrimination, or that during the period it is alleged to have pursued a discriminatory policy it made too few employment
decisions to justify the inference that it had engaged in a regular practice of discrimination." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at
1867.

4

The defendants, for example, may simply question the accuracy of a testifying plaintiffs' recollection, or attempt to show the absence
of any age-based references toward that employee.

5

The effect of such a determination on the plaintiffs' individual discrimination claims "is to leave the plaintiffs with the burden of
proving-without assistance from the pattern and practice evidence--that each actionable [termination] suffered by the plaintiffs was
the product of intentional discrimination on the part of the defendants. The plaintiffs, in other words, can neither bolster their
individual claims for relief with proof that the defendants engaged in a systemwide practice of racial discrimination, nor can they [ ]
shift the burden of proof to the defendants." Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 813.

6

Citing Coates. 756 F.2d at 532-33 and Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir.1981), the defendants argue that the burden
of persuasion remains with the plaintiffs throughout both phases oftrial. The Coates decision, however, is limited to a discussion of
the burden of persuasion during the liability phase of a pattern or practice trial. and does not directly address the issue of burden
shifting during the remedial phase of trial, where a presumption of discrimination exists. See Coates, 756 F.2d at 532 (noting that
"[ n]onetheless, at the liability stage of a pattern or practice suit, the plaintiff always bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
discrimination"). Croker, on the other hand, is a Third Circuit decision whose efficacy in the Seventh Circuit is questionable after the
decision in King, 960 F.2d at 623.

7

This matter is currently scheduled for a six-week trial; because the Court may limit both the time used by the plaintiffs to prove their
prima facie case and the introduction of duplicative evidence, the plaintiffs, of course, may be required to adjust their prima facie
presentation, including limiting the number of plaintiffs called to present anecdotal evidence, accordingly.

8

The Court recognizes that pattern or practice cases do not always fit comfortably into the standard proof sequences. See, e.g.,
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 1866; Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267 n. 12; Craik, 731 F.2d at 470 n. 7.

9

The plaintiff:, correctly note that, should we adopt the Teamsters approach and the jury finds at the end of the prima facie stage of trial
that the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of age discrimination, then trial efficiency may be lost by allowing the defendants
to potentially "reserve" justification arguments for the second phase of trial; however, it is by no means certain that the defendants
will withhold such arguments, and the Court nevertheless intends on honoring its promise to the parties that duplicative testimony
will be kept at a minimum.

End of Document
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685 F.2d 1149
United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.

[2)

Ruby J. GIFFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE
RAILWAYCOMPANY, a Corporation;
Brotherhood of Railway and Airline
Clerks, Defendants-Appellees.

Federal Civil Procedure
\}",Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

In female employee's discrimination action
against employer and union, issues of material
fact existed on question whether employee was
guilty of laches, precluding summary judgment.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.

Nos. 80-5074, 80-5169 and 80-5246. I
Argued and Submitted Sept. 9,1981. I
Decided Aug. 31, 1982. I As Modified on
Denial ofRehearing Oct. 25, 1982. I As
Corrected Nov. 9,1982. I Rehearing En Banc
Denied Dec. 20, 1982.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3)

Civil Rights
\r,~'Operation;

Female employee brought action against her employer and
union for sex discrimination. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California, Harry
Pregerson, 1., granted summary judgment for the employer
and union, and employee appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Fletcher, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) challenge to policy
requiring clerks to accept assignments at all locations in
their district was time-barred; and (2) issues of material
fact existed on questions whether requiring heavy lifting
for position of wire chief was bona fide occupational
qualification, and whether employer's reasons for firing
employee were pretextual, precluding, summary judgment.

Accrual and Computation

Challenge to policy requiring clerks to accept
assignments at any location in their district as
disadvantageous to women was time-barred
where plaintiff was not employed in position
subject to allegedly discriminatory policy at any
time within 300 days of date on which she filed
charges with Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et
seq. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
7 Cases that cite this headnote

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
Opinion on remand, 549 F.Supp 1.
Wright, Circuit Judge, concurred specially and filed
opinion.

[4)

Female employee's allegation that making
application for promotion to position of wire
chief would have been futile because of
employer's prior refusal to hire women for that
position was sufficient to state claim of
- employment discrimination. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.

West Headnotes (10)

[11

Civil Rights
Persons Protected and Entitled to Sue

8 Cases that cite this headnote

Ordinarily, if Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission retains control over charge of
employment discrimination, private plaintiff will
not be charged with its mistakes.
5 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
.. Pleading

[5)

Civil Rights
Defenses in General
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Bona fide occupational qualification defense to
employment discrimination
complaint is
affirmative defense. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.

[9)

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[6)

Federal Civil Procedure
,W""Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
In female employee's action against employer for
sex discrimination, issues of material fact existed
on question whether employer's reason for firing
employee was pretextual or in retaliation for her
partIcIpation in investigation, precluding
summary judgment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

Federal Civil Procedure
~~'Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

5 Cases that cite this headnote
In female employee's action against employer
alleging that failure to promote her to position of
wire chief was result of sex discrimination, issue
of material fact existed on question whether
lifting requirement for position was bona fide
occupational qualification, precluding summary
judgment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e)(l),
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e)(l).
7 Cases that cite this headnote

[7)

Civil Rights
Practices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements
To establish claim of discrimination against
employee in retaliation for employee's
participation in any investigation or proceeding
under the Civil Rights Act, employee need only
show that she was discharged following conduct
on her part that constituted protected activity and
that employer was aware of conduct. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).
20 Cases that cite this headnote

[8)

Federal Civil Procedure
Matters Affecting Right to Judgment
Summary judgment is generally not proper when
intent of party is placed in issue.

[10)

Civil Rights
,·,Activities Protected
Female employee's opposition to provlslOn in
collective bargaining agreement which she
reasonably believed was discriminatory was
protected activity under civil rights statute
making it illegal for employers to retaliate
against employees for opposing illegal practices.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42
U.S.c.A. § 2000e et seq.
16 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*1151 Bennett Rolfe, LeBel & Rolfe, Santa Monica, Cal.,
for Gifford.

Mitchell M. Kraus, Rockville, Md., argued for
defendants-appellees; Richard L. Rosett, Raymond W.
Thomas, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.
Before WRIGHT and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and
EAST,* District Judge.
Opinion
FLETCHER, Circuit Judge.
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Plaintiff Gifford appeals from the grant of summary
judgment to defendants Santa Fe and the Brotherhood of
Railway and Airline Clerks (Union) in her Title VII action,
42 U.s.C. s 2000e et seq. We note jurisdiction under 28
U.s.C. s 1291. We conclude that summary judgment was
proper as to one of plaintiffs claims, but improper as to
both defendants on the remaining claims. Accordingly, we
affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's
judgment.

I

Plaintiff was hired by Santa Fe on April 20, 1944. In 1965,
she was working as an "extra board printer clerk." On
October 1, 1965, Santa Fe and the Union signed a new
collective bargaining agreement which required extra
board printer clerks to accept assignments at all locations
in their district. Prior to the 1965 agreement, extra board
printer clerks could elect to accept assignments only at
their home point without loss of seniority. For the purposes
of summary judgment the parties stipulated that both the
Union and the employer recognized that the new rule
would probably cause several female printer clerks to quit
and that more women than men, in fact, resigned or were
discharged as a result ofthe new policy.
On three occasions in 1966, plaintiff was asked to accept
assignments at points other than her home point of
Bakersfield. On all three occasions, she refused the
assignment and immediately resigned. The parties
stipulated that if she had not resigned, she would have been
fired. On all three occasions she was rehired almost
immediately by Santa Fe. Because of her resignation and
rehire, she lost all of her accrued seniority rights and other
benefits.
In 1967, plaintiff stopped paying the union dues required
by the contract. According to plaintiff, her failure to pay
was the result of her continuing dispute with the Union and
Santa Fe over the changed work rule and her consequent
loss of benefits. During 1967 the Union sent her three
notices that her dues were delinquent. On November 20,
1967, the Union requested Santa Fe to terminate plaintiff
for nonpayment of dues, pursuant to the Union security
clause. On November 29, plaintiff wrote to Santa Fe and to
the Union, stating that she was tendering her delinquent
dues under protest, and that she intended to file a charge
with the EEOC. The Union did not accept the tendered
dues. On December 4, she sent a letter to the EEOC.
On December 6, Santa Fe wired plaintiff to inquire
whether her November 29 letter constituted a request for a
hearing on her termination. She responded by wire the

same day, although for some reason the wire did not reach
Santa Fe until December 21, after the time for requesting a
hearing had expired. Plaintiff was terminated without a
hearing on December 22, 1967.
Plaintiff filed a formal charge with the EEOC on January 4,
1968. The EEOC did not issue a right-to-sue letter until
August 24, 1977. The EEOC was apparently pursuing
conciliation efforts and considering filing suit itself during
the nine years' delay. Plaintiffs suit was timely filed after
her receipt of the right-to-sue letter.
Defendants moved in the district court for dismissal,
asserting untimely filing of the suit and laches. The motion
was denied *1152 by minute order. Defendants then
moved for summary judgment on the ground that
plaintiff s charge to the EEOC was not timely filed and that
plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The trial court granted
summary judgment to both defendants on January 24,
1980. On appeal, plaintiff argues that her charge to the
EEOC was timely filed, and that there were unresolved
issues of material fact so that summary judgment was
improper. Defendants argue that the charge was not timely,
that plaintiff failed to state a claim and that although they
did not appeal the denial of summary judgment on the basis
of laches, even if plaintiff timely filed the charge with the
EEOC and has stated a claim in the complaint, the
judgment below should be affirmed on the alternate basis
that plaintiff was guilty of laches as a matter of law.

II

LACHES
The district court, in denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the ground of laches, must have
concluded either that there were disputed issues of material
fact or that plaintiff was not guilty of laches as a matter of
law. This court could affirm the judgment for defendants
on the grounds of laches only if we conclude that there are
no remaining issues of fact, and that plaintiff was guilty of
laches as a matter oflaw.
[I) Laches is an equitable doctrine, its application
depending on the facts of the particular case. This court has
affirmed the dismissal on the ground of laches of both
private Title VII suits, Boone v. Mechanical Specialities
Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979), and suits brought by the
EEOC, EEOC v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir.
1980). In both cases, the district court had found
unreasonable and unexplained delays in bringing suit. In
Boone, this court emphasized that "(I)n the present case we
state the exception and not the general rule. Normally, it
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may be reasonable for an aggrieved employee to allow the
EEOC to retain jurisdiction over a Title VII action." 609
F.2d at 960 (footnote omitted). Boone involved a plaintiff
who, the court found, had deliberately delayed seeking a
right-to-sue letter. Ordinarily, if the EEOC retains control
over a charge, a private plaintiff will not be charged with
its mistakes. See, e.g., Watson v. Gulf & Western
Industries, 650 F.2d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 1981).
(2) In the instant case, plaintiff's attorney submitted an
extensive affidavit in response to defendants' motion for
summary judgment, detailing repeated and continuous
efforts of plaintiff and her attorneys to monitor the
progress of her charge through the EEOC. Documents
were also submitted showing that the EEOC had found
reasonable cause to believe that plaintiff had been
discriminated against. Plaintiff's attorney also alleged that
the EEOC had informed him on several occasions that it
intended to file suit on plaintiff's behalf The district court
did not err in denying summary judgment on the ground of
laches because it is apparent there are material factual
issues to be resolved. Accordingly, we decline to affirm on
the alternate basis oflaches.

III

THE MERITS
In her complaint, Gifford alleges four distinct violations of
Title VII. She alleges: (1) that the provisions of the 1965
bargaining agreement had a discriminatory effect on her
continuing until the day she was terminated; (2) that the
employer continually refused to promote her to the
position of wire chief, a position for which she was at all
times eligible until the time of her termination; (3) that her
termination for nonpayment of union dues was actually in
retaliation for her threat to file a charge with the EEOC,
rather than for nonpayment of dues; (4) that her
termination resulted from her continued opposition to
policies she considered discriminatory. Summary
judgment was granted defendants on the first claim on the
ground that the charge was not timely filed with the EEOC.
As to the remaining three, there was no *1153 contention
that the charge was untimely. Summary judgment was
granted to defendants on the merits. We conclude that the
charge on the first claim was not timely filed and that
summary judgment was proper on the first claim only.
Summary judgment on the merits of each of the other three
claims was improper.

A. The 1965 Agreement

Plaintiff alleges that the policy on extra board printer
clerks contained in the 1965 bargaining agreement was
instituted with the knowledge and intent on the part of the
Union and the employer that the policy would be
disadvantageous to women. The parties stipulated that the
policy did cause a larger number of women than men to
resign. Plaintiff alleges that this was because more of the
women were unwilling and unable to travel long distances
on short notice to accept temporary assignments. The
women, including plaintiff, either resigned to avoid being
fired, or were fired for violating a rule on insubordination.
The facts alleged by plaintiff constitute both disparate
impact and disparate treatment claims under Title VII. See
Heagney v. University of Washington, 642 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1981).
(3) Before reaching the merits of these claims, however,
we must determine whether the challenge to the extra
board printer clerk policy was timely filed with the EEOC.
At the time plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC, the
statute permitted only 90 days after a discriminatory act in
which to file a charge. The statute was amended in 1972,
however, to allow 180 days. The new limit is applied to
charges pending in 1972. Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
565 F.2d 554, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1977). In states such as
California that have their own enforcement agencies, a
complainant has 300 days in which to file a charge. See
Watson v. Gulf & Western, 650 F.2d at 992. Accordingly,
plaintiffs charge was timely if filed within 300 days after
any discriminatory act. Delaware State College v. Ricks,
449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 504, 66 L.Ed.2d 431
(1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555,
97 S.Ct. 1885, 1887,52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1971).

Plaintiff characterizes her challenge to the extra board
printer clerk policy as one based on a continuing violation
of Title VII. She contends that because the policy
continued in effect and was never discontinued during her
tenure, she could have been disadvantaged by it any time
by being forced to resign or accept distant assignments.
Plaintiff is correct in arguing that an employment policy
may constitute a continuing violation of Title VII and
hence support a charge of discrimination filed at any time
the policy is jn effect by an employee subject to the policy.
In Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th
Cir. 1982), we noted by way of illustration that:
[a] minority employee who is not
promoted in 1973, for example, and is
subject to a continuing policy against
promotion of minorities, may then file a
timely charge in 1976, because the policy
against promoting him or her continued
to violate the employee's rights up to the
time the charge was filed.

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

216

Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149 (1982)
29mFai;:Empi:prac:"Cas.~(BNA)1345:34Fair"Em~plprac. Cas.(BNAT240~:~m"_""

Thus if plaintiff was employed by Santa Fe in a position
subject to the allegedly discriminatory extra board printer
clerk policy at any time within 300 days of the date on
which she filed charges with the EEOC, her challenge to
the policy would be timely.
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agrees that such legislation existed and had not yet been
held invalid. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444
F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971). However, she also
contends that lifting was not necessary to the job of wire
chief, and that Santa Fe could and should have required
other employees to do what little lifting was necessary.

It appears beyond dispute from the record in this case,

however, that plaintiff was last employed by Santa Fe in a
position subject to the extra board printer clerk policy in
April of 1966, more than 300 days before she filed charges
challenging the policy. Although plaintiff was rehired by
the Railway in May of 1966 and continued to work for the
company until December of 1967, this last reemployment
was in a regular position not subject to the extra board
provision of the 1965 agreement.
As we noted in Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
[a] refusal to hire or a decision to fire an employee may
place the victim out of *1154 reach of any further effect
of company policy, so that such a complainant must file
a charge within the requisite time period after the refusal
to hire or termination, or be time-barred. If in those cases
the victims can show no way in which the company
policy had an impact on them within the limitations
period, the continuing violation doctrine is of no
assistance or applicability, because mere "continuing
impact from past violations is not actionable.
Continuing violations are."
665 F.2d at 924 (quoting Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
613 F.2d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1980)). In the instant case,
plaintiffs reemployment with Santa Fe in a regular
position placed her "out of reach of any further effect" of
the allegedly discriminatory extra board printer clerk
policy.! There was no longer a continuing violation with
respect to her. She therefore had 300 days from her last
employment on the extra board in which to file charges
challenging the assignment away from home provisions of
the 1965 agreement. This she failed to do and we are
accordingly compelled to hold that her challenge to the
extra board printer clerk policy is time-barred.

B. Refusal to Promote
Plaintiffs second claim is that defendant Santa Fe
consistently failed to promote her to the position of wire
chief, a position for which she was qualified, although she
never applied. She contends that her failure to apply was
the result of Santa Fe's well-known policy of excluding
women from the job. Santa Fe responds that the position of
wire chief required the lifting of 25 pounds or more, and
that at the time, state protective legislation prevented it
from hiring women in jobs requiring lifting. Plaintiff

[4] The threshold question is whether it was necessary for
plaintiff to allege that she applied for the position of wire
chief in order to make out a prima facie case. Plaintiff
contends that it was not. She is correct if the employer's
promotional policies made application futile, or if the
employer normally initiated the promotion. Reed v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 757, 761 (9th Cir.
1980). Plaintiffs allegation that an application would have
been futile because of Santa Fe's prior refusal to hire
women for the position of wire chief is sufficient to state a
claim.
As to Santa Fe's defense of reliance on a state statute, this
court held in 1971 that state protective legislation which
restricts the employment opportunities of women based on
stereotyped characteristics of the sexes is invalid under
Title VII. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d at
1224-25. One of the statutes held invalid in that case was
the very California statute at issue here. The question of
what relief could appropriately be given the plaintiffs was
not addressed in Rosenfeld, because no individual
plaintiffs remained before the court. In a subsequent case,
however, this court held that while reliance on an invalid
state statute is not a defense to a Title VII suit, good-faith
reliance on the part of the employer may in some cases
make it inequitable to award back pay. *1155 Schaeffer v.
San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F .2d 1002, 1006-07 (9th
Cir. 1972).2
Plaintiffs argument here is somewhat different than that
confronted in Rosenfeld and Schaeffer. In both those cases,
the protective legislation unquestionably prevented the
employment of women in the jobs at issue (heavy lifting in
Rosenfeld, 9 hour days in Schaeffer ). Gifford argues that
the lifting requirement was not necessary to the job. Even
if one were to assume the good-faith reliance of Santa Fe
on the statute, it is irrelevant since Santa Fe should not
have included heavy lifting as a job requirement for wire
chiefs.
What the court should examine, then. is whether heavy
lifting capability is a "bona fide occupational
qualification" (BFOQ) for the position of wire chief under
the BFOQ exception in Title VII. 42 U.S.c. s
2000e-2(e)(l). Since the lifting element effectively made
sex a requirement for the job under then-existing state law,
the question to be addressed is whether lifting was
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business." Id. See Diaz v. Pan American World
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Airways, 442 F.2d 385,388 (5th Cir. 1971).
[5] [6] The district court held that Gifford had failed to
produce any facts to support her assertion that whatever
lifting was necessary to the wire chiefs job could have
been assigned to other available male employees, and that
therefore defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
What the court failed to recognize, however, is that the
BFOQ defense is an affirmative defense. Defendants were
required to produce facts in support of the BFOQ claim,
rather than plaintiff being required to disprove it. See
Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d
670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980). If lifting was not "reasonably
necessary" to this particular job, then Santa Fe may not
plead good-faith reliance on the statute. The facts
underlying the BFOQ defense have not yet been addressed
by the district court. We conclude that summary judgment
on this claim was improper. The district court should
consider the merits of plaintiff s claim. Both damages and
injunctive relief may be appropriate if the requirement was
not a BFOQ. If it was a BFOQ, injunctive relief may still
be appropriate since the statute is invalid.

C. Retaliation for Threat to File Charge

Section 2000e-3(a) of Title 42 makes it unlawful to
discriminate against an employee in retaliation for the
employee's participation in any investigation or
proceeding under Title VII. 42 U.s.C. s 2000e-3(a); Sias v.
City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 694-96 (9th
Cir. 1978). Plaintiff here contends that she was both
wrongfully fired and not rehired by Santa Fe, not because
she failed to pay her union dues but because she threatened
to file a charge with the EEOC. In support of this claim, she
alleges that at least two male employees retained their jobs
under similar circumstances. The district court held that
plaintiff had failed to raise any issues of material fact on
these claims because: (1) plaintiff was not similarly
situated to the two male employees who were not
terminated; (2) plaintiff did not show that it would have
been futile to request Santa Fe to rehire her.
[7] [8] Although the district court made no finding, it is
clear that plaintiffs allegations were enough to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation. To do so, she need only
show that she was discharged following conduct on her
part that constituted protected activity and that the
employer was aware of the conduct. Kauffman v. Sidereal,
667 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1982); Aguirre v. Chula Vista
Sanitary Service, 542 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam). It is undisputed *1156 that Gifford wrote a letter
to Santa Fe and the Union prior to her firing, in which she
threatened to file a charge with the EEOC.3 Defendants
then advanced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

the firing, i.e., Gifford's failure to pay her union dues. The
issue here, then, centers on pretext: did Gifford come
forward with enough evidence to create an issue of fact as
to whether her failure to pay union dues was merely a
pretext for her firing. See Aguirre, 542 F.2d at 781. This
question involves a determination of the intent of the
Union in requesting and the employer in discharging
plaintiff. Summary judgment is generally not proper when
the intent of a party is placed in issue. Haydon v. Rand
Corp., 605 F.2d 453, 455 & n. 2 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam).
[9] We conclude that Gifford offered sufficient evidence to
raise an issue offact. The district court erred in deciding as
a matter of law that Gifford and the two male employees
who were not fired were not similarly situated. Gifford's
allegations and her opposition to defendants' motion for
summary judgment were supported by the "reasonable
cause" determination made by the EEOC.4 The EEOC,
after an impartial investigation, found reasonable cause to
believe that Gifford had been treated differently than
similarly situated male employees. See Plummer v.
Western International Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th
Cir. 1981); Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego,
569 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1978). The EEOC's report
was sufficient at least to create an issue of fact on this
question. It was therefore improper for the trial court to
resolve the issue on summary judgment.
We reach the same conclusion on the issue of futility.
Gifford argues that it would have been futile to apply for
rehire. In support of this argument, Gifford submitted an
affidavit in which she stated that a Santa Fe employee had
told her that neither she nor anyone with the surname
Gifford would ever again work for Santa Fe. Additionally,
she submitted a copy of a Santa Fe employment form
noting her discharge, and marked "Do Not Rehire." The
Santa Fe Superintendent of Communications stated in his
deposition that the "Do Not Rehire" notation on the form
was unusual, and that he did not understand it.
Furthermore, it is stipulated that on the prior occasions
when Gifford had resigned and been rehired, Santa Fe had
initiated the rehire.
On remand, the district court should permit plaintiff to
proceed on her claim that the defendants retaliated against
her for threatening a Title VII proceeding.

D. Retaliation for Opposition to Illegal Practice
[10] Title VII also makes it illegal for employers and
unions to retaliate against employees for opposing
practices made illegal by Title VII. 42 U.s.C. s 2000e-3(a).
Plaintiff claims that one of the reasons for her termination
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was her opposition to the collective bargaining agreement.
The district court held that plaintiff lacked a good-faith
belief that the agreement was discriminatory, so that she
could not rely on this section. The district court reasoned,
based on Gifford's deposition testimony, that Gifford
believed that the 1965 bargaining agreement discriminated
against old but not new female employees, and that
although she had complained about the policy since its
inception, she did not label it "sex discrimination" until
1967. The court concluded that her initial failure to label
the policy as sex-discrimination indicated that her
opposition to it was actually based on other grounds.
We conclude that the district court analyzed the opposition
issue incorrectly. This *1157 circuit has held that an
employee who opposes employment practices reasonably
believed to be discriminatory is protected by the
"opposition clause" whether or not the practice is actually
discriminatory. Sias, 588 F.2d at 695. It does not follow
that the employee must be aware that the practice is
unlawful under Title VII at the time of the opposition in
order for opposition to be protected. It requires a certain
sophistication for an employee to recognize that an
offensive employment practice may represent sex or race
discrimination that is against the law. Here, Gifford argued
from the outset that the collective bargaining agreement
had a harsher impact on some of the women than it had on
men. It is not necessary that a practice disadvantage all
women in order for it to be unlawful under Title VII. See,
e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720,
53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). A fortiori, an employee who
complains of a practice that has a disproportionate impact
on a protected group complains of unlawful discrimination
and is protected by the opposition clause.
Here, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe the
practice objected to was discriminatory. We have held that
Gifford's allegations and supporting evidence are
sufficient to survive summary judgment on this issue. This
is enough to make Gifford's opposition to the collective
bargaining agreement activity protected under Title VII.
See Sias, 588 F.2d at 695; Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004-07 (5th Cir. 1969). The
district court erred in dismissing this charge for failure to
state a claim.

IV

We conclude that summary judgment was proper with
respect to plaintiffs challenge to the extra board printer
clerk policy contained in the 1965 collective bargaining
agreement. As to each of plaintiffs other three claims,
however, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and

remand to the district court for trial.
AFFIRMED in
REMANDED.

part,

REVERSED

in

part,

and

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring specially:

I agree with the result reached by the majority, but the
application of laches to a backpay claim deserves some
discussion.
The delays in this case are astounding. They deserve a
detailed recital.
Gifford filed charges with the EEOC in January 1968.
Sante Fe received a copy of those charges in June 1968.
The EEOC completed its field investigation by February
1969. Then ended any effort to attend promptly to the
matter. Almost two years passed before the EEOC
determined that reasonable cause supported Gifford's
charges. Gifford and Sante Fe received notice of the
reasonable cause determination in January 1971.
In October 1971, the EEOC notified Gifford that a
representative would be in Bakersfield soon to meet with
her and Santa Fe. No one came. Almost a year and a half
later, in February 1973, Gifford wrote to EEOC inquiring
about her case. She received no answer.
Gifford employed counsel in January 1974, and some
efforts at conciliation followed. But in February 1974
Santa Fe notified the EEOC that under no circumstances
would it reinstate her. Santa Fe last heard from the EEOC
in October 1974, when the agency officially notified it that
conciliation had ended.
In April 1974, Gifford's attoruey requested that a right to
sue letter be issued. When he called the EEOC in June
1974, he was told that it was considering filing suit itself
and that, if it did so, Gifford could intervene at little
additional cost. Gifford and her attorney then awaited the
EEOC's decision.
From June 1974 to June 1977 the EE9C continually
misassigned and mishandled Gifford's file. It was sent to
the wrong places, forgotten on desks, and transferred
through numerous personnel changes. An affidavit filed
with the district court by Gifford's attorney details his calls
and letters to the EEOC urging action. The saga *1158 was
indeed, as one EEOC analyst stated, a "flying dutchman
odyssey."
Despite the efforts of Gifford's attorney, the EEOC took
three years to decide thaat it would not file suit. Had it
ddone so in 1977, it faced a strong possibility of dismissal
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for laches. See EEOC v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86 (9th
Cir. 1980) (delay of 20 months after conciliation ended
before EEOC filed suit and 62-month delay in total from
when charges were filed found unreasonable.).
The EEOC finally issued Gifford a notice of right to sue in
August 1977, and she brought action soon thereafter. By
then, the events underlying the suit were almost ten years
old. The clock has not stopped running. After remand here,
the case returns for trial. Even with expeditious handling,
the trial could not be held before 1983 or later. The
prospect oflitigation over 15 or 16 year-old facts must give
pause, as must the prospect of 15 or 16 years of backpay
should Gifford prove her claims.
Viewed abstractly, and without assigning blame, the delay
clearly is shocking. But laches is an equitable defense, and
cannot be applied in the abstract. Nor can it be decided, as
Santa Fe urges, as a matter oflaw on a record that presents
unresolved issues of fact.
Affidavits from both sides chronicle the defendant's
prejudice and plaintiff's actions to expedite the case. But
these merely reveal factual disputes and, of greater
importance, are insufficient to resolve a laches claim.
Dismissal for laches requires inexcusable delay by the
plaintiff and resulting prejudice to the defendant. Boone v.
Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979).
Laches applies both to suits brought by the EEOC, EEOC
v. Alioto Fish Co. Ltd., 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1980), and to
those brought by private plaintiffs. Boone v. Mechanical
Specialties Co., supra.
It may bar the entire complaint or only certain claims, the

whole remedy sought or only a portion of it. Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372-73, 97 S.Ct.
2447,2457-58,53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) (may bar backpay);
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424, 95
S.Ct. 2362, 2374, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (may bar
backpay); EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271,
276 (7th Cir. 1980) (may bar entire complaint, certain
claims, or backpay); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
567 F.2d 429,469 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (may limit or preclude
backpay); Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282,
1288 (9th Cir. 1977) (may bar or limit backpay); Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747,96 S.Ct. 1251,47
L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (may bar entire claim or only portion
or just backpay).
A district court must examine each claim alleged and
remedy sought to determine if sufficient prejudice and
delay support defendant's request for dismissal or
limitation.

Issues of delay and prejudice are intertwined closely.
Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 807
(8th Cir. 1979). Shorter delays require greater prejudice.
Longer delays require less. Id. Similarly, greater prejudice
requires more reason for delay, and less prejUdice will
allow longer delays for less compelling reasons.
A defendant's showing of prejudice will necessarily differ
for each claim or remedy it seeks to bar or limit. For
example, if a defendant asserts laches to bar a claim of
disparate treatment, the court will ordinarily examine the
availability of witnesses and records to counter that claim.
See, e.g., Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d
956 (9th Cir. 1979).
Proof of the reasonableness of delay will not necessarily
differ for the various claims and remedies sought. But,
because of delay's relationship to prejudice, if delay in
seeking a certain type of claim or remedy causes more
prejudice than normal, the proof of excuse required may
vary accordingly.
In addition to the usual prejudice from lost records and
dimmed memories associated with defending substantive
claims, delay *1159 in asserting backpay claims presents
the defendant with a distinct prejudice. After an allegedly
discriminatory discharge or failure to hire, an employer
soon loses touch with the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
mitigate any damage, but the defendant bears the burden of
proving a failure to mitigate. Sangster v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 633 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980). As time passes,
meeting this burden becomes progressively more difficult,
if not impossible.
To prove failure to mitigate, the defendant must show the
availability of suitable positions and plaintiff's lack of due
diligence in seeking them. Sias v. City Demonstration
Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1978). Once an
employer has lost contact with the plaintiff, showing
availability of positions and plaintiff's lack of diligence
could become nearly impossible.
Nor is this prejudice to the defendant's burden of proof
balanced by a similar prejudice to the plaintiff's proof, as
occurs with the plaintiff's substantive claims. A long delay
may prejudice a plaintiff in proving her claims as much as
a defendant in countering them. See Harris v. Ford Motor
Co., 487 Supp. 429 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
But once the substantive claim is made, little additional
proof is needed for a backpay claim. He or she need only
introduce pay scales to show what he or she should have
earned. To defend, however, an employer must show other
jobs were available and that the plaintiff could havelocated
them. The defendant is unlikely to have any of this
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information in its files.
The Seventh Circuit may have assumed prejudice to the
defendant when it reduced a Title VII plaintiffs backpay
award by the four years from the time she could have
requested a right to sue letter and the time of filing suit.
Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc., 603 F.2d 598,
603 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060, lO2 S.Ct.
612, 70 L.Ed.2d 599 (1981). Because the plaintiff knew
she could request a right to sue letter 180 days after she
filed charges, the court concluded that she could not
increase her award by taking advantage of the EEOC's
slowness in processing claims. Id. The court did not
discuss prejudice.
Kamberos at least suggests that the analysis of laches in
asserting backpay claims differs from that in asserting
substantive claims. See also Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d
634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The potential for prejudice to
the defendant is great and the plaintiff bears little
additional prejudice over and above the burden of proving
the underlying claim. Should this defendant reassert laches
on remand, as it is free to do, the court should have the
distinction in mind.

In addition, it should consider whether a plaintiff s delay
after conciliation, pending EEOC decision to sue, is
reasonable. Gifford argues that she waited for the EEOC
because if it filed suit, she could intervene at little or no
extra cost. Her affidavit states that she had limited funds
for a law suit. Inability to pay legal fees normally does not
excuse a delay in filing suit. Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d
634, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Because Title VII provides for
attorney's fees, the excuse is even less persuasive.
I concur in the remand because the record is inadequate to
support finding laches as a matter of law. But I stress that
the issue remains open. Should Gifford prove her
substantive claims of discrimination, the district court may
feel compelled to award backpay for 15 or 16 years. I
cannot believe Congress intended such a result.

Parallel Citations
29 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1345, 34 Fair
Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 240, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,118

Footnotes

*

Honorable William G. East, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

1

Gifford claims that even though in May of 1966 she was rehired by Santa Fe in a regular position, she was still subject to the allegedly
discriminatory printer clerk policy because, at any time, a more senior regular employee of Santa Fe could "bump" her from regular
employment so that she would return to an extra board position. This potential application of the extra board policy to plaintiff is too
speculative. It is akin to a terminated employee arguing that because he or she might be rehired, a charge filed more than 300 days
after termination is nonetheless timely. See Williams, 6!3 F.2d at 760. Were plaintiff able to show that her regular position with
Santa Fe was limited in duration or that, for some other reason, she would necessarily be returned to an extra board position, we
would face a substantially different question.

2

The district court treated Plaintiffs claim as one solely for damages, and therefore found SchacHer controlling on the question of
relief. Plaintiff in her complaint, however, also sought reinstatement and injunctive relief. Schaeffer is not relevant to the merits of
her claim of discrimination, nor to those forms of relief.

3

We see no legal distinction to be made between the filing of a charge which is clearly protected, Sias v. City Demonstration Agency,
588 F.2d 692, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1978), and threatening to file a charge.

4

This court held in Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502,505 (9th Cir. 1981) that a Title VII plaintiff has an absolute
right to introduce the EEOC's reasonable cause detennination into evidence.

End of Document

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

221

80 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 890, 98-2 USTC P 45,470, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 6275 ...

150 F.3d 1217
United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.

v.

Nos. 96-56830. I Argued and Submitted
April 8, 1998. I Decided Aug. 11, 1998. I As
Amended Aug. 31, 1998.
Female employee who was denied promotion brought sex
discrimination action against employer pursuant to
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) The
United States District Court for the Central District of
California,
1., granted employer's
summary judgment motion, and employee appealed. The
Circuit Judge, held that: (I)
Court of Appeals,
employee's direct evidence of sex discrimination raised
genuine issues of fact as to whether employer's
nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting employee
were pretext, and (2) employee provided substantial
circumstantial evidence that employer's proffered reasons
for not promoting employee were pretext for sex
discrimination, and thus, employer was not entitled to
summary judgment.

Female employee established a prima facie case
of sex discrimination under California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), where
employee belonged to protected class, employee
was performing according to employer's
legitimate expectations, employee suffered
adverse employment action, and other employees
with qualifications similar to her own were
treated
more
favorably.

Employee may establish pretext in a sex
discrimination action either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq.,

Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes

California law under the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) mirrors federal law under
Title VII, and thus, federal cases are instructive.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et

When
an
employee,
alleging
gender
discrimination, offers direct evidence of
discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the
actual motivation ofthe employer is created even
if the evidence is not substantial.

8

"Direct evidence" is evidence that, if believed,
proves the fact of discriminatory animus without
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inference or presumption.

Female employee's direct evidence of sex
discrimination in violation of California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) raised
genuine issues of fact as to whether employer's
nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting
employee were pretext, where employee offered
manager's statement that director did not want to
deal with another female after dealing with
current female manager and evidence that former
female manager was not invited on employer
sponsored hunting and fishing trips and was
given doll kit containing dildos and oil.

employer's
circumstantial
evidence
that
proffered reasons for not promoting employee,
that males promoted had better experience and
more easy going personalities, were pretext for
sex discrimination in violation of California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and thus,
employer was not entitled to summary judgment,
where all evidence supporting employer's
reasons came from statements prepared after
employment decision was made and while
litigation was in progress and such statement
were inconsistent with statements made at time
of
employment
decision.

Circumstantial evidence that an employer's
proffered motives for adverse employment action
were not the actual motives because they were
inconsistent or otherwise not believable must be
specific and substantial in order to create a triable
issue with respect to whether the employer
intended to discriminate on the basis of sex in
violation of the California Fair Employment and
Housing
Act
(FEHA).
Manager's statement that director did not want to
deal with another female after dealing with
current female manager was properly admitted as
admission by agent in sex discrimination action
under California Fair Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA), where comment was not stray
remark uttered in ambivalent manner but was
instead related directly to positions employee
sought.
I

*1218
Sunil, Lewis, Vatave,
Newport Beach, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Irvine,
California, for the defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California;
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-95-00178-AHS.
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Circuit Judge:

The issue in this case is a familiar one: what showing of
pretext by a plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit is
sufficient to overcome a defendant's motion for summary
judgment, where the defendant asserts that its refusal to
promote the plaintiff was based on legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons? This is an issue that has
troubled the courts in their endeavors to follow the
in this field. See

("The federal courts ... have not been entirely
clear on what constitutes a showing ofpretext.").
The district court granted the employer's summary
judgment motion, holding that the plaintiff did not offer
sufficient evidence that the employer's conduct was
discriminatorily motivated. A close review of our
decisions reveals that in this circuit a plaintiff who offers
substantial evidence that the employer's proffered reasons
were not reliable, see, e.g.,

showing to create triable issues with respect to the
employer's motivation. The plaintiff-appellant in this case
did both. We therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND
The plaintiff-appellant, Marsha Godwin, had been a
member of the Hunt Wesson sales force for nine years
when two marketing manager positions became available
in the Rosarita and Wesson brands division. AIcy Grimes,
the most senior female executive for the defendant,
resigned from her position as senior marketing manager for
the Wesson brand, creating a vacancy. Jim Ruschman, the
marketing manager for the Rosarita brand, took her
position, and therefore, the Rosarita marketing manager
position became available. In addition, Ruschman
persuaded Ron Guthier, the Director of Marketing, to
create another Wesson marketing manager position to
assist Ruschman. Godwin applied for both the Rosarita and
Wesson positions.
Guthier and Ruschman had primary responsibility for

selecting the qualified candidates for the marketing
manager positions. Guthier and Ruschman considered
Godwin and Jim Rossi for the Wesson position and
Godwin and Mark Smith for the Rosarita position. They
selected the male candidates over Godwin for both jobs.
Although Guthier and Ruschman offer facially
nondiscriminatory explanations for their selection of the
male candidates, Godwin contends she has direct and
circumstantial evidence to support her allegations that
Guthier and Ruschman wanted to give the positions to
males. She relies upon evidence that the selected
candidates would reside on the almost all-male 10th floor
and that the only female marketing manager on the 10th
floor, Louise De Pre Fontaine, had caused dissension
among the all-male employees, in support of her position
that Guthier and Ruschman discriminatorily refused on
account of her gender to consider Godwin seriously for
either marketing position.
Godwin seeks general and punitive damages for gender
discrimination in employment in violation of the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) Cal. Gov't
Code 33 12.900-12.955.

DISCUSSION
Because California law under the FEHA mirrors
federal law under Title VII, federal cases are instructive.
See

We review the district court's decision to grant summary
*1220 judgment de novo. See
We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, whether any genuine
issues of material fact exist and whether the district court
correctly applied the relevant substantive law. See
The parties debate the required showing to create a triable
issue with respect to the employer's motivation at the
so-called "pretext" stage of the McDonnell Douglas
shifting analysis. The McDonnell Douglas analysis
imposes on the plaintiff an initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination.
To establish a prima facie
case, a plaintiff must offer evidence that "give[ s] rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination."
"The prima facie case may be based
either on a presumption arising from the factors such as
those set forth in McDonnell Douglas, or by more direct
evidence of discriminatory intent."
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"The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a
prima facie case for Title VII .. , on summary judgment is
minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a
preponderance of the evidence."

121 Here, Godwin unquestionably established the
McDonnell Douglas factors for a prima facie case: (1) she
belongs to a protected class, (2) she was performing
according to her employer's legitimate expectations, (3)
she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) other
employees with qualifications similar to her own were
treated more favorably. See

Once Godwin established her prima facie case, the burden
then
shifted
to
the
defendant
to
articulate
nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly discriminatory
conduct. See id Hunt Wesson, in its motion for summary
judgment, produced evidence that it chose the male
candidates because of their better experience and more
"easygoing" personalities.
The
employer's
articulation
of
a
facially
nondiscriminatory reason shifts the burden back to the
plaintiff to show that the employer's reason was a pretext
for discrimination. See
"The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Jd
The district court required Godwin to present substantial
direct evidence of discrimination at the pretext stage. After
reviewing our cases, we conclude that this ruling is
incorrect for it conflates the standards we have articulated
for two different types of evidence-circumstantial and
direct-available at the pretext stage to prove discriminatory
motive.
Confusion is understandable, because although we
have articulated two different ways in which a plaintiff
may prove pretext, we have not expressly recognized the
difference. Our law stems from the Supreme Court's
holding that the plaintiff may establish pretext "either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence."

We have held, clearly, that a plaintiff at the pretext stage
must produce evidence in addition to that which was
sufficient for her prima facie case in order to rebut the
We have
defendant's showing. See

been less clear about what additional showing is required.
We have said that the plaintiff "need produce very little
evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue
of material fact."
see also,

(quoting
Lindahl);
(when a
plaintiff introduces "direct or circumstantial" evidence "a
factual question will almost always exist with respect to
any claim of a nondiscriminatory *1221 reason");
775
("[a]ny indication of discriminatory motive ... may suffice
to raise a question that can only be resolved by a
factfinder").
We have also said, however, that the plaintiff must produce
"specific, substantial evidence of pretext." See

("plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the proffered reasons are pretexts" in a Title
VII retaliation case);
"sufficiently probative").
These apparently differing standards, however, are
reconcilable, for they depend upon the nature of the
plaintiff's evidence. When the plaintiff offers direct
evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the
actual motivation of the employer is created even if the
evidence is not substantial. As we said in Lindahl, it need
(direct evidence
be "very little."
of sexual stereotyping where employer believed that the
female candidates get "nervous" and "easily upset"); see
(direct evidence of race
also
discrimination
where
employer referred
to
a
Mexican-American employee as a "dumb Mexican.");
(direct evidence of sex
stereotyping where employee referred to female plaintiff as
"an old warhorse" and to her students as "little old ladies").
"Direct evidence is evidence which, ifbelieved, proves the
fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or
presumption."
(alterations
quotations and citations omitted).
As did the plaintiffs in Cordova and Lindahl, Godwin
produced evidence of direct discrimination. See
at
She presented
a statement made by Ruschman to Hunt Wesson's national
sales manager, Bernie Stipetic, that Guthier "did not want
to deal with another female after having dealt with ...

80 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 890, 98-2 USTC P 45,470, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 6275 ...

Louise De PreFontaine." This comment directly suggests
the existence of bias and no inference is necessary to find
discriminatory animus. See

Hunt Wesson raises a number of arguments to counter
that evidence, but none are availing at this stage. Hunt
Wesson is incorrect in asserting that this statement is
inadmissable hearsay. We have held that an admission by
an agent within the scope of his employment is admissable.
See
(multiple hearsay is admissable if each of the
speakers was involved in the employer's decision). Hunt
Wesson also disputes that Stipetic was involved in the
employment decision, but this dispute is for the trier offact
to resolve. Furthermore, the comment is not a "stray
remark" that is "uttered in an ambivalent manner and [is]
not tied directly to [the plaintift]'s termination," which we
have held to be insufficient. See n4,wvu'//

,}

(statement of
corporate officer having no direct relationship to plaintiff
that "[W]e don't necessarily like grey hair" in age
discrimination suit not sufficient to withstand summary
judgment);
(employer's "old
timers" comment was ambivalent and not tied to
termination and thus insufficient to establish age
discrimination). Ruschman's comment was not ambivalent
and it is related directly to the positions that Godwin
sought.
The record also contains direct evidence of discriminatory
animus toward women as employees. Alcy Grimes, the
former senior marketing manager for the Wesson brand,
testified that while she was giving a presentation at a sales
meeting, someone gave her a "Barbie doll kit" containing
two dildos and a bottle of Wesson oil. She also testified
that the company sponsored hunting and fishing trips to
which she was not invited and other women did not attend.
Godwin testified that the president of the company,
Marshall Ransam, made derogatory comments about
women at meetings. In sum, Godwin's direct evidence of
discriminatory animus satisfies the required showing at the
pretext stage. See

* 1222

In those cases where direct evidence is
unavailable, however, the plaintiff may come forward with
circumstantial evidence that tends to show that the
employer's proffered motives were not the actual motives
because they are inconsistent or otherwise not believable.
Such evidence of "pretense" must be "specific" and
"substantial" in order to create a triable issue with respect
to whether the employer intended to discriminate on the
(no evidence
basis of sex. See
beyond that produced for the prima facie case presented);

(no evidence beyond that
produced for the prima facie case presented);
(no evidence beyond that produced for the
prima facie case); see also
(circumstantial evidence of shifting explanations are not
"sufficiently probative").
In this case, Godwin did show substantial evidence of the
unreliability of the reasons proffered by the employer. All
of the evidence supporting the employer's proffered
reasons came from statements, depositions, and
declarations prepared after the employment decision was
made and while this litigation was in progress. This alone
is not disqualifying. "Simply because an explanation
comes after the beginning of litigation does not make it
The
inherently incredible."
evidence in this record of the contemporaneous reasons for
the selection of the male applicant, however, is
inconsistent in material ways with the statements upon
which the employer relies.
In their declarations prepared for litigation, Guthier and
Ruschman explain that they selected Rossi for the Wesson
position because he had demonstrated creativity in
marketing and they believed he would work well with both
sales and marketing personnel. They explain further that
they did not select Godwin because Guthier had concerns
about Godwin's ability to get along with Ruschman and
the sales force. As to the Rosarita position, Guthier and
Ruschman assert that they selected Smith not only because
of his marketing experience, but also because of his
easygoing personality.
Although the employer's declarations and depositions
indicate that "creativity" was the most important criterion
for selecting the male Wesson marketing manager, the
criterion of "creativity" does not appear in the
contemporaneous memorandum prepared at the time of the
selection. Although "shifting explanations are acceptable
when viewed in the context of other surrounding events
such weighing of the evidence is for a jury, not a judge."
< ••

Moreover, the recommendations received during the
review of Godwin described her repeatedly as getting
along well with others and also referred to her as being
"creative." In fact, the only negative recommendations
with respect to Godwin's personality in the
contemporaneous notes of her application reflect an
inability to get along with persons on the "tenth floor." The
tenth floor housed all the marketing executives' offices.
Because all of the marketing executives were male with
only one exception, we cannot assume those generic
negative references are necessarily gender neutral.
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Godwin also presented evidence that one of the male
candidates had received poor evaluations on his
personality. Facts tending to show that the chosen
applicant may not have been the best person for the job are
probative as they "suggest that [the explanation] may not
have been the real reason for choosing [the chosen
applicant] over the [plaintiff]."
Godwin's indirect evidence of discriminatory motive, as
well as her direct evidence was sufficient to raise genuine
issues of fact as to whether Hunt Wesson's
nondiscriminatory explanations were the true reasons or
whether they masked discriminatory motives. See
3

conclude that summary judgment should not have been
granted.

CONCLUSION

The district court's decision is REVERSED and
REMANDED. Each side shall bear its own costs on
appeaL

Parallel Citations
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to substantiate constructive discharge claim.

48F.3d22
United States Court ofAppeals,
First Circuit.

53 Cases that cite this headnote

Harvey R. GREENBERG, Plaintiff,
Appellant,

v.
UNION CAMP CORPORATION, Defendant,
Appellee.
No. 94-1312. I Heard Nov. 9,1994. I Decided
Feb. 17, 1995.
Fonner sales representative brought suit against employer
alleging that employer violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) by constructively discharging
him, and further violated the Act by retaliating against him
for invoking his ADEA rights. The United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, Edward F.
Harrington, J., granted directed verdict in favor of
employer, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Stahl, Circuit Judge, held that: (I) plaintiff did not
establish that he was constructively discharged when
employer required him to spend two additional days a
week making sales calls in his sales territory, and (2)
plaintiff did not establish that employer acted with a
retaliatory motive in requiring plaintiff to work five days a
week in his sales territory.

[2]

Civil Rights
·,,?,,,Particular Cases
Fonner sales representative did not establish that
employer acted in retaliation against him for
invoking his ADEA rights when employer
required plaintiff to work five days a week, rather
than three days as fonneriy, in his sales territory;
rather, order was inexorable result of plaintiffs
persistence in refusing to modify his work
schedule. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
22 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*22 Douglas G. Moxham, with whom Geoffrey R. Bok and
Lane & Altman, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellant.
John T. Murray, with whom Jeffrey K. Ross, Seyfarth,
Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, John A.
Nadas, Kevin P. Light, Karen L. Cartotto and Choate, Hall
& Stewart, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellee.

Affinned.

West Headnotes (2)
Before CYR, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit
Judge, and STARL, Circuit Judge.
[1)

Civil Rights
Constructive Discharge
Former sales representative failed to establish in
age discrimination suit that he was constructively
discharged when employer required him to spend
two additional days a week making sales calls in
his sales territory; plaintiff did not assert that new
conditions would be humiliating or demeaning,
and it was not unreasonable for employer to
expect sales representatives to spend their work
days making sales calls; moreover, single inquiry
concerning plaintiffs retirement plans, and fact
that no employee over age 40 had been hired in
Maine plant during tenure of plant manager was
not sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus

Opinion
ST ARL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Harvey Greenberg appeals from a
directed verdict granted in favor of defendant-appellee
Union Camp on Greenberg's claims of wrongful
tennination due to age and retaliatory discrimination.
Because Greenberg failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
support a finding of constructive discharge or retaliatory
motive, we affirm.
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Background
In October of 1971, Harvey Greenberg, at age thirty-five,
began working as a sales representative for Union Camp.!
Union Camp hired Greenberg primarily to cover the Maine
sales territory for its Dedham, Massachusetts, plant. Union
Camp manufactures (and Greenberg sold) corrugated
cardboard boxes for industrial and commercial use.
Throughout his career at Union Camp, Greenberg resided
in Swampscott, Massachusetts.
When Union Camp hired Greenberg, it had virtually no
existing customer base in the State of Maine. Greenberg
initially spent one week a month prospecting for new
accounts in Maine and the rest of the month selling to
existing Massachusetts customers. Greenberg, however,
successfully built up Union Camp's client base in Maine
and in short order concentrated his sales efforts almost
exclusively in Maine. Indeed, Greenberg was primarily
responsible for securing the Maine client base which was a
prerequisite for Union Camp to open a corrugated
container plant in Auburn, Maine. By 1977, Union Camp's
client base in Maine had grown such that Greenberg's sales
territory was narrowed to approximately the southern half
of the State of Maine.2
Greenberg increased his sales every year, from $190,000 in
1972 to over $5,400,000 in 1989. Greenberg's profit
contribution (roughly a measure of how much money
Union Camp earned on the sales) consistently compared
very favorably with that of other Union Camp sales
representatives. Moreover, at least by some measures,
Greenberg successfully sold not only to established
accounts, but also to new customers.3 Greenberg received
annual pay increases with his compensation rising from
about $12,500 in 1972 to almost $65,000 in 1989. In July
of 1990, at his annual performance review, Greenberg,
who like all Union Camp sales representatives worked on a
salary rather than a commission basis, received the largest
merit increase of his career.
Throughout most of his nineteen years at Union Camp,
Greenberg called on his Maine customers only on
Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. He attributed this
work schedule, at least in part, to his basic sales philosophy
that prospective customers were generally too busy for and
unreceptive to sales pitches on Mondays and Fridays.
During a typical week, Greenberg would leave his home in
Massachusetts at 5:30 a.ill. on Tuesdays, meet his first
customer in Maine at 7:00 a.m. and continue to make sales
calls until around 3:00 p.m., when he would check into a
motel where he would spend Tuesday and Wednesday
nights. Often he would entertain clients on the company

expense account during the evenings. Wednesdays, he
typically left his hotel at 8:00 a.m. and would call on
customers until the middle of the afternoon. On Thursdays
starting sometime after 8:00 a.m., he would visit customers
while working his way back to Massachusetts, generally
arriving home sometime near the middle of the afternoon.
Early in his career, Greenberg reported to the Dedham,
Massachusetts, plant on Mondays to speak to supervisors,
tum in expense reports and meet with box designers about
customer orders. After Greenberg began reporting to the
Maine plant in 1983, he still periodically went to the
Dedham plant to work with designers until the facility
closed around 1986. From 1986 until he left the company,
Greenberg generally worked out of *24 his home on
Mondays and Fridays, completing paperwork4 and making
telephone calls to the plant and to customers. Greenberg
normally finished this work before noon, usually leaving
the rest of the day for personal matters. Greenberg
periodically did visit a New Hampshire customer on
Mondays.
In 1987, Union Camp assigned Gerald Redman to the
Auburn, Maine, plant as plant manager. In the summer of
1987 at Greenberg'S annual performance review, Redman
told Greenberg that, "[y]our reputation goes all the way to
Wayne [ (Union Camp's headquarters) ], you don't work
Monday and Friday. Ifit ever gets to be a problem, I will be
the first to tell you about it." Bob Ritter, the Maine plant
sales manager, testified that, at this meeting and at
Greenberg'S 1988 performance review, Greenberg stated
that he intended to retire at age fifty-five.
In November 1989, Redman and Ritter required Greenberg
and the other sales representatives to make presentations
regarding their top five new-account prospects. Redman
was extremely dissatisfied with Greenberg's performance
at his individual meeting, and Greenberg described the
meeting as "two hours of insults and threats." At one point
during the meeting, Greenberg stated, "I don't have to
listen to this garbage anymore," and threatened to walk
out. At another, Greenberg commented to Redman that
there seemed to be "[a] sword of[D]amocles hanging over
my head in my best sales year." To which Redman
responded, "You'd better believe it." Ritter testified that at
this meeting he told Greenberg that his three-day schedule
was not satisfactory. Though Greenberg maintained that he
was not ordered at this point to make sales calls on
Mondays and Fridays, he admitted that his work schedule
may have been discussed. Following the meeting,
Greenberg avoided speaking with Redman and Ritter
except as business required.5
Greenberg asked Ritter to visit some customers with him in
February of 1990. During the trip, the two discussed the
previous November meeting. Greenberg testified that they
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also discussed Greenberg's own belief that Union Camp's
sales force was too 01d.6 He also admitted that they may
have discussed his work schedule and sales philosophy,
but he did not specifically recall.

that successful salesmen have different methods and if they
are successful they should be rewarded [and] not made to
walk to the same beat of some drummer." (Second ellipsis
added).

At a meeting in May 1990, Ritter asked Greenberg, who
would tum fifty-four the following July, whether he had
plans to retire early at age fifty-five. Though Greenberg
testified that he had never told anyone at Union Camp that
he intended to retire early, he admitted that a story he often
told about his father might have suggested that he wished
to do so.7 During the meeting, Greenberg told Ritter that
there was no way he could afford to retire early. Directly
following the meeting, Ritter informed Redman that
Greenberg did not intend to retire early. Redman testified
that this fact increased the need to do something about
Greenberg's work schedule.

Redman replied to Greenberg with a short letter stating:

In July 1990, Ritter gave Greenberg his annual review, at
which he told Greenberg *25 about his raise, which was
the largest of Greenberg'S career, and about areas of his job
performance that needed improvement. Following the
meeting, Ritter sent Greenberg a letter purporting to
summarize the main points of the review. Ritter noted in
the letter that he had informed Greenberg that he must
show improvement "in the immediate future" in areas of
"base accounts, new account development, communication
with management, work schedules, expenses and
communication." More specifically, Ritter wrote:
New account penetration in recent years
has been unsatisfactory. Regardless of
base account level, new account focus,
planning
and
development
must
improve. Work habits and methods must
be reviewed with action taken to better
utilize open available weekly time to
achieve job
responsibilities.
Not
communicating
with
management
because of the difference of opinion is
unacceptable, and actions such as these
cannot occur again.
Greenberg testified that he could not recall Ritter
counselling him about any significant performance
problems in past reviews.8
Greenberg responded with a four-page missive of his own,
dispatched to Ritter and Redman, in which he contested the
substance of Ritter's complaints. Though Greenberg
testified at trial that the fact that he only called on
customers on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays was
not discussed at his review, in his letter he specifically
responded: "[']Work habits and methods [ (referring to
Ritter's letter) ] .... ['] We have talked about this before and
my position has never changed .... It's been my experience
.
,

.~

~

We received your letter of August 18, 1990, and we
would prefer not to continue a letter writing exchange
regarding your Sales Philosophy.
Bob Ritter's memo of August 8, 1990 was written to
document the fact that your performance has not been up
to expected standards in the areas of: expenses, expense
reporting, communications, work schedules and new
account penetration. The memo also intended to
emphasize the seriousness of continued resistance to
change and critical opposition to suggestions for
improvement.
After receiving this letter, Greenberg consulted a lawyer,
who, on September 13, 1990, wrote to Redman's superior
suggesting that Greenberg was being subjected to age
discrimination. On September 19, 1990, shortly after
Union Camp received this letter, Redman and Ritter met
with Greenberg and informed him that, from that point on,
he was expressly required to spend five days a week in his
sales territory. Greenberg requested time to consider this
requirement and Redman agreed, telling Greenberg to "
'take time to think about it.' "
Finally, at a meeting nearly a month later on October 15,
1990, Greenberg refused to sign a letter that explicitly
listed six conditions of employment that he would be
required
to
meet,
including
the
five-days-in-the-sales-territory requirement. 9 Greenberg's
*26 decision not to sign the letter ended his employment
relationship with Union Camp. Subsequently, no other
sales representative, including Greenberg's replacement,
was required to sign a similar document. Moreover, Union
Camp has never made five days in the sales territory an
explicit job requirement for any other sales representative.
Greenberg brought this action in the district court alleging
that Union Camp terminated his employment in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
29 U.s.c. §§ 621-634. Greenberg alleged that Union
Camp's actions were motivated by an anti-age animus and
a desire to retaliate against Greenberg for seeking to
invoke his ADEA-protected rights. Following the close of
Greenberg's case, the district court granted Union Camp's
motion for a directed verdict, holding that Greenberg had
failed to show any evidence of age discrimination and that
Union Camp "did not terminate [Greenberg] but that
[Greenberg] left [Union Camp's] employment because he

~
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blatantly refused to work five days a week in the territory
of Maine as required by his employer." This appeal
followed.

II.

Discussion
We review de novo a district court's decision to grant a
motion for a directed verdict (or more properly judgment
as a matter oflaw), employing the "same stringent standard
incumbent upon the trial court in the first instance."
Favorito v. Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 719 (1st Cir.1994). In
performing this task, we take the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion and ask whether a rational
jury could find in that party's favor. E.g., Murray v.
Ross~Dove Co., 5 F.3d 573,576 (1st Cir.1993).

A. Age Discrimination Claim
[1) In a wrongful termination case under the ADEA the
plaintiff must establish " 'that his years were' the
determinative factor in his discharge, that is, that he would
not have been fired but for his age.' " Mesnick v. General
Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting
Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 (1 st
Cir.1988», cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119
L.Ed.2d 586 (1992); see also Vega v. Kodak Caribbean,
Ltd., 3 F.3d476, 478 (1st Cir.1993). Where direct evidence
of discriminatory animus is lacking, the burden of
producing evidence is allocated according to the
now-familiar McDonnell Douglas framework. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05,
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Sanchez v.
Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 719 (1st Cir.1994).

Under the McDonnel! Douglas framework, the employee
must initially come forward with sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
Thus, here, Greenberg needed to establish that (i) he is a
member of a protected class, i.e., over forty years of age,
(ii) his job perfonnance was sufficient to meet Union
Camp's legitimate job expectations, (iii) he was actually or
constructively discharged, and (iv) Union Camp sought a
replacement with roughly equivalent qualifications. Vega,
3 F.3d at 479; see also Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 719. Once the
plaintiff has met this relatively light burden, a presumption
of discrimination arises and the onus is then shifted to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823. If the
employer produces such a justification, the presumption of

discrimination vanishes and the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that the employer's alleged justification is
merely pretext for discrimination. *27 Woods v. Friction
Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255,260 (1st Cir.1994).
Greenberg's termination claim fails at the outset, however,
because he has not adduced sufficient evidence from which
a jury could reasonably conclude that he was
constructively discharged. Greenberg maintains that Union
Camp constructively discharged him by requiring him to
sign the October 15 letter, which explicitly listed six job
requirements that he needed to fulfill. Except for the
requirement that he make sales calls in his territory five
days a week, Greenberg testified that he was substantially
complying with the conditions listed in the letter.
Primarily, Greenberg contends that, by requiring him to
spend two additional days a week making sales calls in
Maine, Union Camp constructively discharged him. We
disagree.
It is well settled in this Circuit that, to establish a claim of

constructive discharge, the evidence must support a
finding that " 'the new working conditions would have
been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in
the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign.'
" Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561
(I st Cir.1986) (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago,
562 F.2d 114, 119 (I st Cir.1977»; see also Vega, 3 F.3d at
480 (new conditions must make work so "arduous"
"unappealing" or "intolerable" that a reasonable pers;n
would resign). The legal standard to be applied is
"objective," with the inquiry focused on "the reasonable
state of mind of the putative discriminatee." Calhoun, 798
F.2d at 561 (internal quotations omitted). Consequently,
"an employee may not be unreasonably sensitive to his or
her working environment." Jd. (internal quotations
omitted); see also Vega, 3 F.3d at 476.
Within the context of this case, we believe that no rational
jury could find that requiring Greenberg to spend two
additional days in Maine making sales calls to be so
intolerable that a reasonable person in Greenberg'S shoes
would have felt compelled to resign. Initially, we note that
Greenberg does not assert that the new conditions would
be humiliating or demeaning, often an important factor in
evaluating a claim of constructive discharge. See, e.g.,
Aviles-Martinez v. Monroig, 963 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir.1992)
(sufficient evidence to find constructive discharge where
evidence included scolding and ridiculing plaintiff in front
of clients on a daily basis). Moreover, in explicitly
imposing the six conditions on Greenberg, Union Camp
did not demote Greenberg or reduce his payor total
compensation. See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747
F.2d 885, 888-89 (3d Cir.1984) (constructive discharge
where, along with other factors, change in sales
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representative's territory constituted substantial cut in
pay); cf Nunez-Soto v. Alvarado, 918 F.2d 1029, 1030-31
(1st Cir.1990) (demotion without salary cut insufficient for
constructive discharge). Indeed, at his July 1990 review,
just prior to imposing the conditions of employment,
Union Camp gave Greenberg the largest merit increase of
his career. In effect, Greenberg contends that the
requirement is intolerable because it would require him to
spend more time on the road, and possibly (though not
necessarily) another weeknight or two away from home. In
the context of this case, this is not enough.
Greenberg was a sales representative. It is hardly
unreasonable for an employer to expect its sales
representatives to spend their workdays making sales calls.
That calling on his customers meant spending time on the
road is more an unhappy aspect of Greenberg's vocation
than an unreasonable or intolerable working condition. See
Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1254-56 (4th
Cir.1985) (no constructive discharge where conditions,
though unpleasant, are part and parcel to the job), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 1461, 89 L.Ed.2d 718
(1986).
Requiring Greenberg to spend two additional days in
Maine appears-burdensome only if we focus narrowly on
the fact that Greenberg resides in Massachusetts. The
degree to which requiring Greenberg to work two
additional days in Maine is unreasonable, however, must
be measured within the context of this case. Union Camp
originally hired Greenberg specifically to be its sales
representative for the State of Maine. Therefore,
Greenberg, who lived in Massachusetts at the time,
accepted employment knowing that he was hired to sell to
Maine *28 customers. 10 Thus, this case is distinguishable
from one in which an employee who lives and works in one
city is offered the choice between tennination and a
transfer to another city. See Hazel v. United States
Postmaster Gen., 7 F.3d 1, 5 (1 st Cir.1993) (suggesting
that transfer from one city to another would support
finding of constructive discharge); but see Cherchi v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 693 F.Supp. 156, 162-64 (D.N.J.) (no
constructive discharge where employer offered transfer
from New Jersey to Baltimore), afJ'd, 865 F.2d 249 (3d
Cir.1988). Because Greenberg voluntarily chose to work as
the sales representative for the Maine territory, while
living in Massachusetts, he cannot now complain of
changes in his work schedule that would not be
burdensome but for that choice.
Nonetheless, Greenberg makes much of the fact that Union
Camp did not explicitly impose the mandatory
five-day-a-week-sales-call condition on any of its other
sales representatives or his younger replacement. He
argues that this disparate treatment amply supports a
finding of constructive discharge. Union Camp officials,

however, all testified that the condition was a basic, albeit
unwritten, requirement of the sales representative position.
Moreover, Greenberg does not point to any other sales
representative who similarly made calls in his or her
assigned territory only three days a week that Union Camp
treated differently. At most, Greenberg elicited testimony
from his replacement that, due to the need to finish
paperwork, handle customer requests and/or complaints,
and tend to other vagaries of the job, he occasionally
passed a day without making sales calls, but nonetheless
was
not
required
to
sign
a
similar
conditions-of-employment statement. This evidence is
insufficient. See Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d
11, 17 (1 st Cir.1994) ("In a disparate treatment case, the
plaintiff has the burden of showing that she was treated
differently from persons situated similarly in all relevant
aspects." (internal quotations omitted». I I
Moreover, our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that
Greenberg couples his allegation of constructive discharge
with virtually no evidence that Union Camp's motives
stemmed from an animosity towards age. Direct or
circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory animus could
help substantiate a claim that one's working conditions had
become intolerable to an unreasonable degree. See, e.g.,
Acrey v. American Sheep Indus., 981 F.2d 1569, 1574-75
(10th Cir.1992) (employer request that employee quit on
account of age cited as evidence of both animus towards
age and unreasonable working conditions); Goss, 747 F.2d
at 888 (verbal abuse that conveyed animosity towards
employee's gender supported finding of constructive
discharge). As evidence of age discrimination, Greenberg,
however, essentially points to just two factors-( 1) the
single May 1990 inquiry concerning Greenberg's
retirement plans, and (2) the fact that no employee over age
forty had been hired by Union Camp at the Maine plant
during Redman's tenure as plant manager.
A single inquiry by an employer as to an employee's plans
for retirement, however, does not necessarily show
animosity towards age. See Colosi v. Electri-Flex Co., 965
F.2d 500, 502 (7th Cir.1992). An employer may
legitimately inquire about an employee's plans so that it
can prepare to meet its hiring needs. Though repeated
and/or coercive inquiries can clearly give rise to a
reasonable inference of an anti-age bias (and lend support
*29 to a finding of constructive discharge), see Calhoun,
798 F.2d at 562-63 (three inquires over seven months
coupled with demotion requiring employee to report to
younger person employee had previously trained, and
threat of onerous working conditions if no resignation),
that is not the case here. Greenberg alleges only that Ritter
made a single inquiry at the May 1990 meeting as to
whether Greenberg had plans to retire at age fifty-five.
Moreover, though Greenberg testified that he never told

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

232

Greenberg v. Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22 (1995)
'h"h'_N~,w,mmm·"'''~·m''··N''m.N~·'''·~~~''Y~''~''''~''''h~~''~'~~_=~~='~~~~""~'~m~~'¥N"~"~~'_""'~'~YmNN=M"'='''''_~~~''~YY~Nh~"'H~N"~

".vNYh/h~N"MMh.·_.~,~»~N_~~*'''~','''m~'''''~'=,~~Y_hN.mm~~N~'''''NN~A'YmNm''''~'~~~~'~~N_~_/'''>'N='hY~~~o

67 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 120, 129 Lab.Cas. P 57,842

Ritter or Redman that he intended to retire early, he
admitted that an anecdote he frequently recounted could
have led them to think he desired to do so.
The fact that Union Camp's Maine plant did not hire any
employees over age forty during Redman's tenure as plant
manager adds little to Greenberg's claim. As we have
noted before, without any attempt to establish the
demography of the available hiring pool, this evidence has
little probative value. See LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins .• 6 F.3d
836,848 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114
S.Ct. l398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994); cf Goldman v. First
Na!'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1119 n. 5 (1st
Cir.1993). Moreover, Greenberg offered no evidence at
trial concerning the number of employees actually hired,
thus precluding any reasonable evaluation of the statistical
data in terms of sample size. Finally, that two years after
his departure three of seven sales representatives employed
at the Maine plant were over age forty, and that Redman,
himself, was five years older than Greenberg, makes any
inference of animosity towards age on this evidence
dubious at best. Therefore, Greenberg's proffered evidence
of anti-age bias provides little support for his claim of
intolerable
working
conditions
and
consequent
constructive discharge, and thus his age-bias claim falls
short.

has never changed.... It's been my experience that
successful salesmen have different methods and if they are
successful they should be rewarded [and] not made to walk
to the same beat of some drummer." (Emphasis added).
Furthermore, Redman's August 28 letter clearly warned
Greenberg that Ritter's letter "was written to document the
fact that [Greenberg's] performance ha[d] not been up to
expected standards in the areas of: expenses, expense
reporting, communications, work schedules and new
account penetration." Redman concluded by stating that
Ritter's letter was "intended to emphasize the seriousness
of continued resistance to change and critical opposition
to suggestions for improvement." (Emphasis added).
Any rational view of these interchanges makes clear that
Greenberg'S continued refusal to adapt his work schedule
would result in further action by Union Camp. Hence, no
rational jury could conclude that the September 19 order
directing Greenberg to spend five days a week in his sales
territory ensued because Union Camp sought to retaliate
against Greenberg for invoking his ADEA rights. Rather,
the order was the inexorable result of Greenberg's
persistence in refusing to modify his work schedule. See
Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 828 (ADEA should not permit a
disgruntled employee to "inhibit a well-deserved discharge
[or other sanction] by *30 merely filing, or threatening to
file, a discrimination complaint.").

B. Retaliatory Claim

[2] Greenberg's claim of retaliatory discrimination
likewise fails because no rational jury could conclude on
this evidence that Union Camp acted with a retaliatory
motive in requiring Greenberg to work five days a week in
his sales territory. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 827 (plaintiff
must show that employer's reason for adverse action taken
against employee is pretext masking retaliation for
employee invoking his ADEA-protected rights). Even
taking the evidence in the light most favorable to
Greenberg, it is clear that his work schedule had been an
issue with his superiors at Union Camp since at least the
November 1989 meeting. Moreover, it is not disputed that
Greenberg did not adjust his work schedule in response to
the August 8 letter, in which Ritter unequivocally wrote,
"Work habits and methods must be reviewed with action
taken to better utilize open available weekly time to
achievejob responsibilities." (Emphasis added).

III.
Conclusion
In sum, because Greenberg failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge or
retaliatory motive, the district court did not err in granting
Union Camp's motion for a directed verdict on the claims
of age and retaliatory discrimination. Accordingly, the
decision of the district court is

affirmed.
Parallel Citations
67 Fair Emp1.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 120, 129 Lab.Cas. P 57,842

Greenberg responded to this directive with his own letter
stating, "We have talked about this before and my position
Footnotes

1

In 1971, the entity that retained Greenberg was a subsidiary of Union Camp operating under the name Allied Container. About 1985,
the Allied Container subsidiary adopted the Union Camp logo. For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to Greenberg'S employer,
whether before or after 1985, as Union Camp.
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2

By 1977, Greenberg had essentially discontinued calling on any Massachusetts customers.

3

The parties disputed Greenberg's performance in securing and selling new accounts. In maintaining that he perfonned well in this
area, Greenberg pointed out that he ranked third, second and first for the years 1987, 1988 and 1989, respectively, in terms of square
feet of corrugated cardboard sold to new accounts. Union Camp, on the other hand, pointed to other measures, that indicated whether
the new-account customers were one-time purchasers or became recurring customers, which shed a less favorable light on
Greenberg's performance.

4

The paperwork consisted of expense and sales-call reports. Greenberg testified that, for the last several years of his career, he filled
out identical sales-call reports every other week. He stated that, though in general they reflected his activities, they did not accurately
state on a day-to-day basis the clients he visited.

5

Greenberg also testified that his expenses were discussed during this meeting. He recalled stating "I never pocketed a nickel."
Redman replied, "It better be that way."
At trial, Greenberg admitted that he often entertained individuals who were not Union Camp customers and later attributed the cost
of the entertainment on his expense reports to actual clients. Greenberg resolutely maintained, however, that the expenditures
always benefitted Union Camp, albeit sometimes indirectly.

6

Greenberg had previously brought this point to both Redman and Ritter's attention. Deposition testimony of Greenberg's
replacement read into the record at trial established that, at the time of the deposition, three of seven sales representatives at the Maine
plant were older than age forty. Though not elicited as a fact in Greenberg's case-in-chief, Redman, who testified and was present for
the four days of trial, is five years older than Greenberg.

7

Greenberg's written performance reviews dated February 1989 and February 1990, include the statement "Retirement in the near
future," under a section entitled "Career Development." Greenberg neither signed nor saw these reviews prior to leaving the
company.

8

Greenberg's unsigned performance reviews from 1987 to 1990 rate him as either an excellent or effective employee. Areas needing
attention or improvement, however, are listed as "[pJrospecting and attention to detail" (February 1987); '·time in marketplace,
tolerance/understanding to differing opinions" (April 1987); "[aJcknowledgement and adaptability to changing conditions. Time
Management and prospecting" (February 1989); "[aJcknowledgement & adaptability to changing conditions. Time management and
prospecting." (February 1990). The February 1990 review also states, "Salesman understands consequences of performance level
drop with present inclination not to change work methods & time management issues presented to him:'

9

The six conditions were stated as follows:
I. You must present a plan analyzing your top 10 new account prospects as to total dollar potential, how each account fits our
mix and volume profile, our present sales position with each project, and an immediate action plan for penetrating the accounts.
2. Call the Sales Manager or General Manager every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday (or on a daily basis whenever conditions
warrant) to communicate account problems or concerns, review competitor actions, and update management on market
conditions.
3. Provide Sales Manager with written feedback on customer reaction to quotations within 30 days of the quotations being
issued.
4. Increase weekly sales calls from current average of 12-13 to a minimum of 20 per week.
5. Maintain 5 day sales schedule in your telTitory and bc actively involved in making customer calls Monday through Friday.
6. Accurately repOli expenses incurred in entertaining customers. Reduce customer entertainment expenses by 15% in July
through December, 1990 from January through June, 1990's expenses.

10

Nowhcre does Greenberg assert that he originally accepted employment with Union Camp on the condition that he spend no more
than three days a week calling on Maine customers.

11

Greenberg relies on Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins. 507 U.S. 604, ----, 113 S.Ct. 170 I, 1708, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993), which he asserts
establishes that an employee who refuses to sign an onerous job contract not imposed on a younger replacement is constructively
discharged. While this premise may be true (though we do not agree that the Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue),
Greenberg has failed to show that the "contract" here was sufficiently onerous. In Hazen, the contract included a non-compete clause
that would have prohibited the employee, who was a trained chemist, from working in his field of expertise for two years after
leaving the company. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1411 (I st Cir.1992), vacated, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S.Ct. 170 I, 123
L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). Union Camp sought no such restriction on Greenberg's future employment.
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included therein. Age Discrimination III
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq.
60 I Cases that cite this headnote

129S.Ct.2343
Supreme Court of the United States
Jack GROSS, Petitioner,

v.
FBL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
No. 08-441. I Argued March 31, 2009.
Decided June 18, 2009.

I

[2]

When conducting statutory interpretation,
Supreme Court must be careful not to apply rules
applicable under one statute to different statute
without careful and critical examination.

Synopsis
Background: Employee brought action against employer
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) ,
alleging he was demoted because of his age. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
Thomas 1. Shields, 1., rendered judgment on jury verdict
for employee. Employer appealed. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Colloton, Circuit Judge,
526 F.3d 356, reversed. Certiorari was granted.

Statutes
\,vConstruction with Reference to Other Statutes

10 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

[Holding:] The Supreme Court, Justice Thomas, held that
mixed-motives jury instruction is never proper in ADEA
case.

Statutes
Amendatory and amended acts
When Congress amends one statutory provision
but not another, it is presumed to have acted
intentionally.

Vacated and remanded.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined.
Justice Breyer filed dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Souter and Ginsburg joined.

[4]

Negative implications raised by disparate
statutory prOVISIOns are strongest when
provisions were considered simultaneously when
language raising the implication was inserted.

West Headnotes (7)

[1]

Federal Courts
Review on Certiorari
Although petition for certioraii, asking Supreme
Court to decide whether a plaintiff had to present
direct evidence of discrimination in order to
obtain mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title
VII discrimination case, did not specifically
frame the question to include threshold inquiry of
whether burden of persuasion ever shifted to
party
defending
alleged
mixed-motives
discrimination claim brought under ADEA,
statement of question presented was deemed to
comprise every subsidiary question fairly

Statutes
Implications and inferences

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

Civil Rights
Motive or intent; pretext
Civil Rights
Disparate treatment
Civil Rights
Age discrimination
ADEA does not authorize mixed-motives age
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discrimination claim, since ordinary meaning of
ADEA's requirement that employer took adverse
action "because of' age is that age was the
"reason" that employer decided to act; therefore,
to establish disparate-treatment claim, plaintiff
must prove that age was "but-for" cause of
employer's adverse decision, and burden of
persuasion does not shift to employer to show
that it would have taken the action regardless of
age, even when plaintiff has produced some
evidence that age was one motivating factor in
that
decision.
Age
Discrimination
in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(1), 29 US.C.A.
§ 623(a)(1).

Gross if he proved, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that he was demoted and his age was a motivating factor in
the demotion decision, and told the jury that age was a
motivating factor if it played a part in the demotion. It also
instructed the jury to return a verdict for FBL if it **2345
proved that it would have demoted Gross regardless of age.
The jury returned a verdict for Gross. The Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury
had been incorrectly instructed under the standard
established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, for cases under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when an employee alleges
that he suffered an adverse employment action because of
both permissible and impermissible considerations-i.e., a
"mixed-motives" case.

632 Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Statutes
;r,Meaning of Language
Statutory construction must begin with language
employed by Congress and assumption that
ordinary meaning of that language accurately
expresses legislative purpose.
23 Cases that cite this headnote

[7]

Evidence
Party asserting or denying existence of facts
Where statutory text is silent on allocation of
burden of persuasion, ordinary default rule is that
plaintiffs bear risk of failing to prove their
claims.
120 Cases that cite this headnote

**2344 *167 Syllahus*
Petitioner Gross filed suit, alleging that respondent (FBL)
demoted him in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which makes it
unlawful for an employer to take adverse action against an
employee "because of such individual's age," 29 U.S.c. §
623(a). At the close of trial, and over FBL's objections, the
District Court instructed the jury to enter a verdict for

Held: A plaintiff bringing an ADEA disparate-treatment
claim must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
age was the "but-for" cause of the challenged adverse
employment action. The burden of persuasion does not
shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the
action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has
produced some evidence that age was one motivating
factor in that decision. Pp. 2348 2352.
(a) Because Title VII is materially different with respect to
the relevant burden of persuasion, this Court's
interpretation of the ADEA is not governed by Title VII
decisions such as Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa, 539 US. 90, 94-95, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156
L.Ed.2d 84. This Court has never applied Title VII's
burden-shifting framework to ADEA claims and declines
to do so now. When conducting statutory interpretation,
the Court "must be careful not to apply rules applicable
under one statute to a different statute without careful and
critical examination." Federal Express Corp. v.
Holowecki, 552 US. 389,
128 S.Ct. 1147,1153, 170
L.Ed.2d 10. Unlike Title VII, which has been amended to
explicitly authorize discrimination claims where an
improper consideration was "a motivating factor" for the
adverse *168 action, see 42 U.s.c. §§ 2000e-2(m) and
2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the ADEA does not provide that a
plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age
was simply a motivating fa~tor. Moreover, Congress
neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it
added §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g) (2)(B) to Title VII,
even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in
several ways. When Congress amends one statutory
provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted
intentionally, see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
US. 244, 256, III S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274, and
"negative implications raised by disparate provisions are
strongest" where the provisions were "considered
simultaneously when the language raising the implication
was inserted," Lindh v. Murphy, 521 US. 320, 330, 117
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S.Ct. 2059,138 L.Ed.2d481. Pp. 2348

2349.

(b) The ADEA's text does not authorize an alleged
mixed-motives age discrimination claim. The ordinary
meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer
took adverse action "because of' age is that age was the
"reason" that the employer decided to act. See Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701,
123 L.Ed.2d 338. To establish a disparate-treatment claim
under this plain language, a plaintiff must prove that age
was the "but-for" cause of the employer's adverse
decision. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.,
553 U.S. 639,
128 S.Ct. 2l31, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012. It
follows that under § 623(a)(1), the plaintiff retains the
burden of persuasion to establish that "but-for" cause. This
Court has previously held this to be the burden's proper
allocation in ADEA cases, see, e.g., Kentucky Retirement
Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. l35, - - - - , - - - -, 128 S.Ct. 2361, 171 L.Ed.2d 322, and nothing in the
statute's text indicates that Congress has carved out an
exception for a subset of ADEA cases. Where a statute is
**2346 "silent on the allocation of the burden of
persuasion," "the ordinary default rule [is] that plaintiffs
bear the risk of failing to prove their claims." Schaffer v.
Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387.
Hence, the burden of persuasion is the same in alleged
mixed-motives cases as in any other ADEA
disparate-treatment action. Pp. 2350 - 2351.
(c) This Court rejects petitioner's contention that the
proper interpretation of the ADEA is nonetheless
controlled by Price Waterhouse, which initially
established that the burden of persuasion shifted in alleged
mixed-motives Title VII claims. It is far from clear that the
Court would have the same approach were it to consider
the question today in the first instance. Whatever Price
Waterhouse's deficiencies in retrospect, it has become
evident in the years since that case was decided that its
burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. The
problems associated with its application have eliminated
any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to
ADEA claims. Cf. Continental T. V, Inc. 1'. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36,47,97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568. Pp.
2351 2352.
526 F.3d 356, vacated and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
ROBERTS, C.1., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO,
n., joined. STEVENS, 1., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, n., joined.
BREYER, 1., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.
Attorneys and Law Firms

Eric Schnapper, Seattle, W A, for petitioner.
Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, DC, for United States as amicus
curiae, by special leave of Court, supporting the petitioner.
Carter G. Phillips, for respondent.
Beth A. Townsend, Townsend Law Office, West Des
Moines, lA, Michael 1. Carroll, Babich, Goldman, Cashatt
& Renzo, P.C., Des Moines, lA, Eric Schnapper, Counsel
of Record, School of Law, University of Washington,
Seattle, W A, for petitioner.
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Hansell, Nyemaster, Goode, West, Hansell & O'Brien,
P.c., Des Moines, Iowa, for Respondent.
Opinion
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

*169 The question presented by the petitioner in this case
is whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age
discrimination *170 in order to obtain a mixed-motives
jury instruction in a suit brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81
Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.s.c. § 621 et seq. Because we
hold that such a jury instruction is never proper III an
ADEA case, we vacate the decision below.

I

Petitioner Jack Gross began working for respondent FBL
Financial Group, Inc. (FBL), in 1971. As of 2001, Gross
held the position of claims administration director. But in
2003, when he was 54 years old, Gross was reassigned to
the position of claims project coordinator. At that same
time, FBL transferred many of Gross' job responsibilities
to a newly created position-claims administration
manager. That position was given to Lisa Kneeskem,
**2347 who had previously been supervised by Gross and
who was then in her early forties. App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a
(District Court opinion). Although Gross (in his new
position) and Kneeskem received the same compensation,
Gross considered the reassignment a demotion because of
FBL's reallocation of his former job responsibilities to
Kneeskem.
In April 2004, Gross filed suit in District Court, alleging
that his reassignment to the position of claims project
coordinator violated the ADEA, which makes it unlawful
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for an employer to take adverse action against an employee
"because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
The case proceeded to trial, where Gross introduced
evidence suggesting that his reassignment was based at
least in part on his age. FBL defended its decision on the
grounds that Gross' reassignment was part of a corporate
restructuring and that Gross' new position was better
suited to his skills. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a (District
Court opinion).
At the close of trial, and over FBL's objections, the District
Court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict for
Gross if he proved, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that FBL "demoted [him] to claims projec[t] coordinator"
and *171 that his "age was a motivating factor" in FBL's
decision to demote him. App. 9-10. The jury was further
instructed that Gross' age would qualifY as a " 'motivating
factor,' if [it] played a part or a role in [FBL]'s decision to
demote [him]." Id., at 10. The jury was also instructed
regarding FBL's burden of proof. According to the District
Court, the "verdict must be for [FBL] ... if it has been
proved by the preponderance of the evidence that [FBL]
would have demoted [Gross] regardless of his age." Ibid.
The jury returned a verdict for Gross, awarding him
$46,945 in lost compensation. Id., at 8.
FBL challenged the jury instructions on appeal. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury
had been incorrectly instructed under the standard
established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). See 526 F.3d 356,
358 (2008). In Price Waterhouse, this Court addressed the
proper allocation of the burden of persuasion in cases
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.s.C. § 2000e et seq., when an
employee alleges that he suffered an adverse employment
action because of both permissible and impermissible
considerations-i.e., a "mixed-motives" case. 490 U.S., at
232, 244-247, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion). The
Price Waterhouse decision was splintered. Four Justices
joined a plurality opinion, see id., at 231-258, 109 S.Ct.
1775, Justices White and O'Connor separately concurred
in the judgment, see id., at 258-261, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(opinion of White, J.); id., at 261-279, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(opinion of O'Connor, J.), and three Justices dissented, see
id., at 279-295, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (opinion of KENNEDY,
J.). Six Justices ultimately agreed that if a Title VII
plaintiff shows that discrimination was a "motivating" or a
" 'substantial' " factor in the employer's action, the burden
of persuasion should shift to the employer to show that it
would have taken the same action regardless of that
impermissible consideration. See id., at 258, 109 S.Ct.
1775 (plurality opinion); id., at 259-260, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(opinion of White, J.); id., at 276,109 S.Ct. 1775 (opinion
*172 of O'Connor, 1.). Justice O'Connor further found that

to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer, the
employee must present "direct evidence that an illegitimate
criterion was a substantial factor in the [employment]
decision." Id., at 276, 109 S.Ct. 1775.
**2348 In accordance with Circuit precedent, the Court of
Appeals identified Justice O'Connor's opllllOn as
controlling. See 526 F.3d, at 359 (citing Erickson v.
Farmland Industries, Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 724 (C.A.8
2001)). Applying that standard, the Court of Appeals found
that Gross needed to present "[ d]irect evidence ... sufficient
to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an
illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse
employment action." 526 F.3d, at 359 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the Court of Appeals' view, "direct
evidence" is only that evidence that "show[ s] a specific
link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the
challenged decision." Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Only upon a presentation of such evidence, the
Court of Appeals held, should the burden shift to the
employer" 'to convince the trier of fact that it is more
likely than not that the decision would have been the same
absent consideration of the illegitimate factor.' " Ibid.
(quoting Price Waterhouse, supra, at 276, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(opinion of O'Connor, 1.)).
The Court of Appeals thus concluded that the District
Court's jury instructions were flawed because they allowed
the burden to shift to FBL upon a presentation of a
preponderance of any category of evidence showing that
age was a motivating factor-not just "direct evidence"
related to FBL's alleged consideration of age. See 526
F.3d, at 360. Because Gross conceded that he had not
presented direct evidence of discrimination, the Court of
Appeals held that the District Court should not have given
the mixed-motives instruction. Ibid. Rather, Gross should
have been held to the burden of persuasion applicable to
typical, non-mixed-motives claims; the jury thus should
have been instructed * 173 only to determine whether
Gross had carried his burden of "prov [ing] that age was
the determining factor in FBL's employment action." See
ibid.
We granted certiorari, 555 U.S. - - , 129 S.Ct. 680, 172
L.Ed.2d 649 (2008), and now vacate the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

II

[1) The parties have asked us to decide whether a plaintiff
must "present direct evidence of discrimination in order to
obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII
discrimination case." Pet. for Cert. i. Before reaching this
question, however, we must first determine whether the
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burden of persuasion ever shifts to the party defending an
alleged mixed-motives discrimination claim brought under
the ADEA.! We hold that it does not.

A
Petitioner relies on this Court's decisions construing Title
VII for his interpretation of the ADEA. Because Title VII
is materially different with respect to the relevant burden
of persuasion, however, these decisions do not control our
construction of the ADEA.
**2349 In Price Waterhouse, a plurality of the Court and
two Justices concurring in the judgment determined that
once a "plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that [the
plaintiff's membership in a protected class I played a
motivating part in an *174 employment decision, the
defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not taken [that
factor I into account." 490 U. S., at 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775; see
also id., at 259-260,109 S.Ct. 1775 (opinion of White, J.);
id, at 276,109 S.Ct. 1775 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). But
as we explained in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S.
90, 94-95, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003),
Congress has since amended Title VII by explicitly
authorizing discrimination claims in which an improper
consideration was "a motivating factor" for an adverse
2000e-2(m)
employment decision. See 42 U.S.c.
(providing that "an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating filctor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice"
(emphasis added»;
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (restricting the
remedies available to plaintiffs proving violations of §
2000e-2(m».

*

*

[21 This Court has never held that this burden-shifting
framework applies to ADEA claims. And, we decline to do
so now. When conducting statutory interpretation, we
"must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one
statute to a different statute without careful and critical
examination." Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552
U.S. 389, ---,128 S.Ct. 1147, 1153, 170 L.Ed.2d 10
(2008). Unlike Title VII, the ADEA's text does not provide
that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing
that age was simply a motivating factor. Moreover,
Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA
when it amended Title VII to add
2000e-2(m) and
2000e-5(g)(2)(B), even though it contemporaneously
amended the ADEA in several ways, see Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 115, 105 Stat. 1079; id., § 302, at 1088.

**
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(3) (4) We cannot ignore Congress' decision to amend
Title VII's relevant provisions but not make similar
changes to the ADEA. When Congress amends one
statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have
acted intentionally. *175 See EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256, III S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d
274 (1991). Furthermore, as the Court has explained,
"negative implications raised by disparate provisions are
strongest" when the prOVISIOns were "considered
simultaneously when the language raising the implication
was inserted." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330, 117
S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). As a result, the
Court's interpretation of the ADEA is not governed by
Title VII decisions such as Desert Palace and Price
Waterhouse.2

**2350 B
(5) (6) Our inquiry therefore must focus on the text of the
ADEA to decide whether it authorizes a mixed-motives
age discrimination claim. It does not. "Statutory
construction must begin with the language employed by
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of
that language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose." *176 Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air
Quality Management Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252, 124 S.Ct.
1756, 158 L.Ed.2d 529 (2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The ADEA provides, in relevant part, that "[ilt
shall be unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age." 29 U.S.c. 623(a)(1) (emphasis
added).
The words "because of' mean "by reason of: on account
of." 1 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 194
(1966); see also 1 Oxford English Dictionary 746 (1933)
(defining "because of' to mean "By reason of, on account
of" (italics in original»; The Random House Dictionary of
the English Language 132 (1966) (defining "because" to
mean "by reason; on account"). Thus, the ordinary
meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer
took adverse action "because of' age is that age was the
"reason" that the employer decided to act. See Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,610, 113 S.Ct. 1701,
123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (explaining that the claim "cannot
succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually
played a role in [the employer's decisionmaking] process
and had a determinative influence on the outcome "
(emphasis added». To establish a disparate-treatment
claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a
plaintiff must prove that age was the "but-for" cause of the
employer's adverse decision. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond
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& Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, - - , 128 S.Ct. 2l31,
2141-2142,170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008)(recognizing that the
phrase, "by reason of," requires at least a showing of "but
for" causation (internal quotation marks omitted»; Safeco
Ins. Co. ofAmerica v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63-64, and n. 14,
127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007) (observing that
"[i]n common talk, the phrase 'based on' indicates a
but-for causal relationship and thus a necessary logical
condition" and that the statutory phrase, "based on," has
the same meaning as the phrase, "because of' (internal
quotation marks omitted»; cf. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts
265 (5th ed. 1984) *177 ("An act or omission is not
regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event
would have occurred without it").3

**2351 (7) It follows, then, that under § 623(a)(l), the
plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to establish that
age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's adverse
action. Indeed, we have previously held that the burden is
allocated in this manner in ADEA cases. See Kentucky
Retirement Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. l35, - - - - - , 128,128 S.Ct. 2361, 2363-2366, 2369-2371, 171
L.Ed.2d 322 (2008); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. l33, 141, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097,
147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). And nothing in the statute's text
indicates that Congress has carved out an exception to that
rule for a subset of ADEA cases. Where the statutory text is
"silent on the allocation of the burden of persuasion," we
"begin with the ordinary default rule that plaintiff" bear the
risk of failing to prove their claims." Schaffer v. Weast, 546
U.S. 49, 56, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005); see
also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 554
U.S. 84, - - , 128 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-2401, 171 L.Ed.2d
283 (2008) ("Absent some reason to believe that Congress
intended otherwise, ... we will conclude that the burden of
persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party
seeking relief' (internal quotation marks omitted». We
have no warrant to depart from the general rule in this
setting.
Hence, the burden of persuasion necessary to establish
employer liability is the same in alleged mixed-motives
cases as in any other ADEA disparate-treatment action. A
plaintiff: must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
(which may *178 be direct or circumstantial), that age was
the" but-for" cause of the challenged employer decision.
See Reeves, supra, at 141-143, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097.4

III
Finally, we reject petitioner's contention that our
interpretation of the ADEA is controlled by Price
Waterhouse, which initially established that the burden of

persuasion shifted in alleged mixed-motives Title VII
claims.S In any event, it is far **2352 from clear that the
Court would have the same approach were it to consider
the question today in the first *179 instance. C£ 14 Penn
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. - - , - - , 129 S.Ct. 1456,
1472, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (declining to "introduc[ e] a
qualification into the ADEA that is not found in its text");
Meacham, supra, at - - , 128 S.Ct., at 2406 (explaining
that the ADEA must be "read ... the way Congress wrote
it").
Whatever the deficiencies of Price Waterhouse in
retrospect, it has become evident in the years since that
case was decided that its burden-shifting framework is
difficult to apply. For example, in cases tried to a jury,
courts have found it particularly difficult to craft an
instruction to explain its burden-shifting framework. See,
e.g., Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1179
(C.A.2 1992) (referring to "the murky water of shifting
burdens in discrimination cases"); Visser v. Packer
Engineering Associates, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (C.A.7
1991) (en banc) (Flaum, J., dissenting) ("The difficulty
judges have in formulating [burden-shifting] instructions
and jurors have in applying them can be seen in the fact
that jury verdicts in ADEA cases are supplanted by
judgments notwithstanding the verdict or reversed on
appeal more frequently than jury verdicts generally").
Thus, even if Price Waterhouse was doctrinally sound, the
problems associated with its application have eliminated
any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to
ADEA claims. C£ Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977)
(reevaluating precedent that was subject to criticism and
"continuing controversy and confusion"); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 839-844, III S.Ct. 2597, 115
L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (SOUTER, 1., concurring).6

*180 IV
We hold that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment
claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that age was the "but-for"
cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The
burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to
show that it would have taken the action regardless of age,
even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age
was one motivating factor in that decision. Accordingly,
we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER, Justice
GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), **2353 29 U.s.c. § 621 et seq., makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any
employee "because of' that individual's age, § 623(a). The
most natural reading of this statutory text prohibits adverse
employment actions motivated in whole or in part by the
age of the employee. The "but-for" causation standard
endorsed by the Court today was advanced in Justice
KENNEDY's dissenting opinion in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,279, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d
268 (1989), a case construing identical language in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 US.c. § 2000e2(a)(I). Not only did the Court reject the but-for standard
in that case, but so too did Congress when it amended Title
VII in 1991. Given this unambiguous history, it is
particularly inappropriate for the Court, on its own
initiative, to adopt an interpretation of the *181 causation
requirement in the ADEA that differs from the established
reading of Title VII. I disagree not only with the Court's
interpretation of the statute, but also with its decision to
engage in unnecessary lawmaking. I would simply answer
the question presented by the certiorari petition and hold
that a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of age
discrimination to obtain a mixed-motives instruction.

I

The Court asks whether a mixed-motives instruction is
ever appropriate in an ADEA case. As it acknowledges,
this was not the question we granted certiorari to decide.l
Instead, the question arose for the first time in respondent's
brief, which asked us to "overrule Price Waterhouse with
respect to its application to the ADEA." Brief for
Respondent 26 (boldface type deleted). In the usual course,
this Court would not entertain such a request raised only in
a merits brief: " 'We would normally expect notice of an
intent to make so far-reaching an argument in the
respondent's opposition to a petition for certiorari, cf. this
Court's Rule 15.2, thereby assuring adequate preparation
time for those likely affected and wishing to participate.' "
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 660, n. 3, 122 S.Ct.
1764,152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting South Central Bell
Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 171, 119 S.Ct.
1180, 143 L.Ed.2d 258 (1999». Yet the Court is
unconcerned that the question it chooses to answer has not
been briefed by the parties or interested amici curiae. Its
failure to consider the views of the United States, which
represents the agency charged with administering the
ADEA, is especially irresponsible.2

*182 Unfortunately, the majority's inattention to
prudential Court practices is matched by its utter disregard
of our precedent and Congress' intent. The ADEA
provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer ... to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.c.
§ 623(a)(I) (emphasis added). As we recognized in Price
Waterhouse when we construed the identical "because of'
language of Title VII, see 42 US.c. § 2000e-2(a)(I)
(making it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual ... with respect to his
compensation, terms, **2354 conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin" (emphasis added», the
most natural reading of the text proscribes adverse
employment actions motivated in whole or in part by the
age ofthe employee.
In Price Waterhouse, we concluded that the words "
'because of' such individual's ... sex ... mean that gender
must be irrelevant to employment decisions." 490 U.S., at
240, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 260,
109 S.Ct. 1775 (White, J., concurring in judgment). To
establish a violation of Title VII, we therefore held, a
plaintiff had to prove that her sex was a motivating factor
in an adverse employment decision.3 We recognized that
the employer had an affirmative defense: It could avoid a
finding of liability by proving *183 that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not taken the
plaintiff's sex into account. Id., at 244-245, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(plurality opinion). But this affirmative defense did not
alter the meaning of "because of." As we made clear, when
"an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors
at the time of making a decision, that decision was
'because of' sex." Id., at 241,109 S.Ct. 1775; see also id.,
at 260, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (White, 1., concurring in judgment).
We readily rejected the dissent's contrary assertion. "To
construe the words 'because of' as colloquial shorthand for
'but-for' causation," we said, "is to misunderstand them."
Id., at 240, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion).4
Today, however, the Court interprets the words "because
of' in the ADEA "as colloquial shorthand for 'but-for'
causation." ibid. That the Court is construing the ADEA
rather than Title VII does not justify this departure from
precedent. The relevant language in the two statutes is
identical, and we have long recognized that our
interpretations of Title VII's language apply "with equal
force in the context of age discrimination, for the
substantive provisions of the ADEA 'were derived in haec
verba from Title VII.' " Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 US. 111,121,105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d
523 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 US. 575, 584,
98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978». See generally
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Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412
US. 427,428,93 S.Ct. 2201, 37 L.Ed.2d 48 (1973) (per
curiam). For this reason, Justice KENNEDY's dissent in
Price Waterhouse assumed the plurality's mixed-motives
framework extended to the ADEA, see 490 U.S., at 292,
109 S.Ct. 1775, and the Courts of Appeals *184 to have
**2355 considered the issue unanimously have applied
Price Waterhouseto ADEA claims.5
The Court nonetheless suggests that applying Price
Waterhouse would be inconsistent with our ADEA
precedents. In particular, the Court relies on our statement
in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113
S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993), that "[a
disparate-treatment] claim 'cannot succeed unless the
employee's protected trait actually played a role in [the
employer's decisionmaking] process and had a
determinative influence on the outcome.' " Ante, at 2350.
The italicized phrase is at best inconclusive as to the
meaning of the ADEA's "because of' language, however,
as other passages in Hazen Paper Co. demonstrate. We
also stated, for instance, that the ADEA "requires the
employer to ignore an employee's age," id., at 612, 113
S.Ct. 1701 (emphasis added), and noted that "[w]hen the
employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other
than age," there is no violation, id., at 611 (emphasis
altered). So too, we indicated the "possibility of dual
liability under ERISA and the ADEA where the decision to
fire the employee was motivated both by the employee's
age and by his pension status," id.. at 613, 113 S.Ct.
170 I-a classic mixed-motives scenario.
Moreover, both Hazen Paper Co. and Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097,
147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), on which the majority also relies,
support the conclusion that the ADEA *185 should be
interpreted consistently with Title VII. In those
non-mixed-motives ADEA cases, the Court followed the
standards set forth in non-mixed-motives Title VII cases
including McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248, 101
S.Ct. 1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). See, e.g., Reeves, 530
US., at 141-143, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Hazen Paper Co., 507
US., at 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701. This by no means indicates,
as the majority reasons, that mixed-motives ADEA cases
should follow those standards. Rather, it underscores that
ADEA standards are generally understood to conform to
Title VII standards.

II

The conclusion that "because of' an individual's age

means that age was a motivating factor in an employment
decision is bolstered by Congress' reaction to Price
Waterhouse in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. As part of its
response to "a number of recent decisions by the United
States Supreme Court that sharply cut back on the scope
and effectiveness of [civil rights] laws," H.R.Rep. No.
102-40, pt. 2,p. 2 (1991), U.S.Code Congo & Admin.News
1991, p. 694 (hereinafter H.R. Rep.), Congress eliminated
the affirmative defense to liability that Price Waterhouse
had furnished employers and provided instead that an
employer's same-decision showing would limit only a
plaintiffs remedies. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Importantly,
however, Congress ratified Price Waterhouse's
interpretation of the plaintiffs burden of proof, rejecting
the dissent's suggestion in that case that but-for causation
was the proper standard. See **2356 § 2000e-2(m) ("[A]n
unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice").
Because the 1991 Act amended only Title VII and not the
ADEA with respect to mixed-motives claims, the Court
reasonably declines to apply the amended provisions to the
*186 ADEA.6 But it proceeds to ignore the conclusion
compelled by this interpretation of the Act: Price
Waterhouse's construction of "because of' remains the
governing law for ADEA claims.
Our recent decision in Smith V. City of Jackson. 544 U.S.
228, 240, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005), is
precisely on point, as we considered in that case the effect
of Congress' failure to amend the disparate-impact
provisions of the ADEA when it amended the
corresponding Title VII provisions in the 1991 Act. Noting
that "the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the
coverage of Title VII [but] did not amend the ADEA or
speak to the subject of age discrimination," we held that
"Wards Cove's pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII's
identical language remains applicable to the ADEA." 544
U.S., at 240, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (discussing Wards Cove
Packing CO. V. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104
L.Ed.2d 733 (1989»; see also Meacham V. Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory, 554 U.S. 84, - - , 128 S.Ct. 2395,
2405-2406, 171 L.Ed.2d 283 (2008). If the Wards Cove
disparate-impact framework that Congress flatly
repudiated in the Title VII context continues to apply to
ADEA claims, the mixed-motives framework that
Congress substantially endorsed surely applies.
Curiously, the Court reaches the opposite conclusion,
relying on Congress' partial ratification of Price
Waterhouse to argue against that case's precedential value.
It reasons that if the 1991 amendments do not apply to the
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ADEA, Price Waterhouse likewise must not apply because
Congress effectively codified Price Waterhouse's holding
in the amendments. Ante, at 2348 2349. This does not
follow. To the contrary, the fact that Congress endorsed
this Court's *187 interpretation of the "because of'
language in Price Waterhouse (even as it rejected the
employer's affirmative defense to liability) provides all the
more reason to adhere to that decision's motivating-factor
test. Indeed, Congress emphasized in passing the 1991 Act
that the motivating-factor test was consistent with its
original intent in enacting Title VII. See, e.g., H.R. Rep.,
pt. 2, at 17 ("When enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Congress made clear that it intended to prohibit all
invidious consideration of sex, race, color, religion, or
national origin in employment decisions"); id., at 2 (stating
that the Act "reaffirm[ ed] that any reliance on prejudice in
making employment decisions is illegal"); see also H.R.
Rep., pt. I, at 45; S.Rep. No. 101-315, pp. 6, 22 (1990).
The 1991 amendments to Title VII also provide the answer
to the majority's argument that the mixed-motives
approach has proved unworkable. Ante, at 2351 - 2352.
Because Congress has codified a mixed- **2357 motives
framework for Title VII cases-the vast majority of
antidiscrimination lawsuits-the Court's concerns about
that framework are of no moment. Were the Court truly
worried about difficulties faced by trial courts and juries,
moreover, it would not reach today's decision, which will
further complicate every case in which a plaintiff raises
both ADEA and Title VII claims.
The Court's resurrection of the but-for causation standard
is unwarranted. Price Waterhouse repudiated that standard
20 years ago, and Congress' response to our decision
further militates against the crabbed interpretation the
Court adopts today. The answer to the question the Court
has elected to take up--whether a mixed-motives jury
instruction is ever proper in an ADEA case-is plainly yes.

III

Although the Court declines to address the question we
granted certiorari to decide, I would answer that question
by following our unanimous opinion in Desert Palace, Inc.
v. *188 Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d
84 (2003). I would accordingly hold that a plaintiff need
not present direct evidence of age discrimination to obtain
a mixed-motives instruction.
The source of the direct-evidence debate is Justice
O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment in Price
Waterhouse. Writing only for herself, Justice O'Connor
argued that a plaintiff should be required to introduce

"direct evidence" that her sex motivated the decision
before the plurality'S mixed-motives framework would
apply. 490 U.S., at 276, 109 S.Ct. 1775.7 Many courts have
treated Justice O'Connor's opinion in Price Waterhouse as
controlling for both Title VII and ADEA mixed-motives
cases in light of our statement in Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 193,97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977),
that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.' " Unlike the cases
Marks addressed, however, Price Waterhouse garnered
five votes for a single rationale: Justice White agreed with
the plurality as to the motivating-factor test, see supra, at
2354, n. 3; he disagreed only as to the type of evidence an
employer was required to submit to prove that the same
result would have occurred absent the unlawful
motivation. Taking the plurality to demand objective
evidence, he wrote separately to express his view that an
employer's credible testimony could suffice. 490 U.S., at
261, 109 S.Ct. 1775. Because Justice White provided a
fifth vote for the "rationale explaining the result" of the
Price Waterhouse decision, Marks, 430 U.S., at 193, 97
S.Ct. 990, his concurrence is properly understood as
controlling, and he, *189 like the plurality, did not require
the introduction of direct evidence.
Any questions raised by Price Waterhouse as to a direct
evidence requirement were settled by this Court's
unanimous decision in Desert Palace, in which we held
that a plaintiff need not introduce direct evidence to meet
her burden in a mixed-motives case under Title VII, as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In construing
**2358 the language of § 2000e-2(m), we reasoned that
the statute did not mention, much less require, a heightened
showing through direct evidence and that "Congress has
been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof
requirements." 539 U.S., at 99, 123 S.Ct. 2148. The
statute's silence with respect to direct evidence, we held,
meant that "we should not depart from the '[c]onventional
rul[ e] of civil litigation ... [that] requires a plaintiff to prove
his case by a preponderance of the evidence', ... using
'direct or circumstantial evidence.' "Ibid. (quoting Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S., at 253, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality
opinion), and Postal Service Ed. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711,103 S.Ct. 1478,75 L.Ed.2d403 (1983)). We
also recognized the Court's consistent acknowledgment of
the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination
cases.
Our analysis in Desert Palace applies with equal force to
the ADEA. Cf ante, at 2351- 2352, n. 4. As with the 1991
amendments to Title VII, no language in the ADEA
imposes a heightened direct evidence requirement, and we
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have specifically recognized the utility of circumstantial
evidence in ADEA cases. See Reeves, 530 U.S., at 147,
120 S.Ct. 2097 (cited by Desert Palace, 539 U.S., at 99100, 123 S.Ct. 2148). Moreover, in Hazen Paper Co., we
held that an award of liquidated damages for a "willful"
violation of the ADEA did not require proof of the
employer's motivation through direct evidence, 507 U.S.,
at 615, 113 S.Ct. 1701, and we have similarly rejected the
imposition of special evidentiary rules in other ADEA
cases. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N A., 534 U.S.
506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); 0 'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116
S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). Desert Palace thus
confirms the answer provided by the plurality *190 and
Justice White in Price Waterhouse: An ADEA plaintiff
need not present direct evidence of discrimination to obtain
a mixed-motives instruction.

IV

The Court's endorsement of a different construction of the
same critical language in the ADEA and Title VII is both
unwise and inconsistent with settled law. The but-for
standard the Court adopts was rejected by this Court in
Price Waterhouse and by Congress in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. Yet today the Court resurrects the standard in an
unabashed display of judicial lawmaking. I respectfully
dissent.
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice SOUTER and Justice
GINSBURG join, dissenting.

I agree with Justice STEVENS that mixed-motive
instructions are appropriate in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act context. And I join his opinion. The
Court rejects this conclusion on the ground that the words
"because of' require a plaintiff to prove that age was the
"but-for" cause of his employer's adverse employment
action. Ante, at 2350. But the majority does not explain
why this is so. The words "because of' do not inherently
require a showing of "but-for" causation, and I see no
reason to read them to require such a showing.
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show

·'but-for" causation. In that context, reasonably objective
scientific or commonsense theories of physical causation
make the concept of "but-for" causation comparatively
easy to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an
entirely different matter to determine a "but-for" relation
when we consider, not physical forces, but the
mind-related characterizations that constitute motive.

Sometimes we speak of determining or discovering
motives, but more often we **2359 ascribe motives, after
an event, to an individual in light *191 of the individual's
thoughts and other circumstances present at the time of
decision. In a case where we characterize an employer's
actions as having been taken out of multiple motives, say,
both because the employee was old and because he wore
loud clothing, to apply "but-for" causation is to engage in a
hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if
the employer's thoughts and other circumstances had been
different. The answer to this hypothetical inquiry will often
be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows
less than does the employer about what the employer was
thinking at the time, the employer will often be in a
stronger position than the employee to provide the answer.
All that a plaintiff can know for certain in such a context is
that the forbidden motive did playa role in the employer's
decision. And the fact that a jury has found that age did
play a role in the decision justifies the use of the word
"because," i.e., the employer dismissed the employee
because of his age (and other things). See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,239-242, 109 S.Ct.
1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion). I
therefore would see nothing wrong in concluding that the
plaintiff has established a violation of the statute.
But the law need not automatically assess liability in these
circumstances. In Price Waterhouse, the plurality
recognized an affirmative defense where the defendant
could show that the employee would have been dismissed
regardless. The law permits the employer this defense, not
because the forbidden motive, age, had no role in the
actual decision, but because the employer can show that he
would have dismissed the employee anyway in the
hypothetical circumstance in which his age-related motive
was absent. And it makes sense that this would be an
affirmative defense, rather than part of the showing of a
violation, precisely because the defendant is in a better
position than the plaintiff to establish how he would have
acted in this hypothetical situation. See id., at 242, 109
S.Ct. 1775; cf. ante, at 2356 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)
(describing *192 the Title VII framework). I can see
nothing unfair or impractical about allocating the burdens
of proof in this way. The instruction that the District Court gave seems
appropriate and lawful. It says, in pertinent part:
"Your verdict must be for plaintiff if all the following
elements have been proved by the preponderance of the
evidence:
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"[TheJ plaintiff s age was a motivating factor in
defendant's decision to demote plaintiff

reason for defendant's decision to demote plaintiff"
App.9-1O.

"However, your verdict must be for defendant ... if it has
been proved by the preponderance of the evidence that
defendant would have demoted plaintiff regardless of
his age.

For these reasons as well as for those set forth by Justice
STEVENS, I respectfully dissent.
Parallel Citations
129 S.Ct. 2343, 106 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 833, 92
Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,584, 174 L.Ed.2d 119, 77 BNA
USLW 4531, 09 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 7539,2009 Daily
Journal D.A.R. 8888,21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 958

"As used in these instructions, plaintiffs age was 'a
motivating factor,' if plaintiffs age played a part or a
role in the defendant's decision to demote plaintiff
However, plaintiffs age need not have been the only
Footnotes

*

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of
the reader. See United States V. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.C!. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

1

Although the parties did not specifically frame the question to include this threshold inquiry, "[t]he statement of any question
presented is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein." This Court's Rule 14.1; see also City ofSherrill
v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 544 U.S. 197, 214, n. 8, 125 S.C!. 1478, 161 L.Ed.2d 386 (2005) (" 'Questions not explicitly
mentioned but esscntial to the analysis of the decisions below or to the correct disposition of the other issues have been treated as
subsidiary issues fairly comprised by the question presented' " (quoting R. Stem, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, & K. Geller, Supreme
Court Practice 414 (8th ed.2002»); Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40, 46-47, and n. 2, 125 S.C!. 1270, 161 L.Ed.2d 227 (2005)
(evaluating "a question anterior" to the "questions the parties raised").

2

Justice STEVENS argues that the Court must incorporate its past interpretations of Title VII into the ADEA because "the substantive
provisions of the ADEA werc derived in haec verba from Title VII," post. at 2354 (dissenting opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted), and because the Court has frequently applied its interpretations of Title VII to the ADEA, see post, at 2354 2356. But the
Court's approach to interpreting the ADEA in light of Title VII has not been unifonn. In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 124 S.C!. 1236, 157 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2004), for example, the Court declined to interpret the phrase "because of ...
age" in 29 U.S.c. 623( a) to bar discrimination against people of all ages, even though the Court had previously interpreted "because
of ... race [or] sex" in Title VII to bar discrimination against people of all races and both sexes, see 540 U.S., at 584, 592, n. 5, 124
S.C!. 1236. And the Court has not definitively decided whether the evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792,93 S.C!. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), utilized in Title VlI cases is appropriate in the ADEA context. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,142,120 S.C!. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311,116 S.C!. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). In this instance, it is thc textual differences between
Title VII and the ADEA that prevent us trom applying Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace to federal age discrimination claims.

*

3

Justice BREYER contends that there is "nothing unfair or impractical" about hinging liability on whether "forbidden motive ... play
[ed] a role in the employer's decision." Post, at 2359 (dissenting opinion). But that is a decision for Congress to make. See Florida
Dept. of Revenue j'. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, - - , 128 S.C!. 2326, 2338-2339, 171 L.Ed.2d 203 (2008). Congress
amended Title VII to allow for employer liability when discrimination "was a motivating.factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice," 42 U.S.c. 2000e-2(m) (emphasis addcd), but did not similarly amend the ADEA,
see supra, at 2348 - 2349. We must give efIect to Congress' choicc. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. - - , - - , 129 S.C!.
1456,1472,173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009).

*

4

Because we hold that ADEA plaintifIs retain the burden of persuasion to prove all disparatc-treatment claims, we do not need to
address whethcr plaintiffs must present direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence to obtain a burden-shifiing instruction. There is no
heightened evidentiary requirement for ADEA plaintifIs to satisfy their burden of persuasion that age was the "but-for" cause of their
employer's adverse action, sec 29 U.s.c. § 623(a), and we will imply none. "Congress has been unequivocal when imposing
heightencd proof requirements" in other statutory contexts, including in other subsections within Title 29, when it has seen fit. See
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99, 123 S.C!. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003); see also, e.g., 25 U.s.c. § 2504(b)(2)(B)
(imposing "clear and convincing evidence" standard); 29 U.s.c. § 722(a)(2)(A) (same).

5

Justice STEVENS also contends that we must apply Price Waterhouse under the reasoning of Smith v. City ofJackson, 544 U.S. 228,
125 S.C!. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005). See post, at 2356. In Smith, the Court applied to the ADEA its pre-1991 interpretation of
Title VII with respect to disparate-impact claims despite Congress' 1991 amendment adding disparate-impact claims to Title VII but
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not the ADEA. 544 U.S., at 240, 125 S.Ct. 1536. But the amendments made by Congress in this same legislation, which added the
"motivating factor" language to Title VII, undermine Justice STEVENS' argument. Congress not only explicitly added "motivating
factor" liability to Title VII, see supra, at 2348 2349, but it also partially abrogated Price Waterhouse's holding by eliminating an
employer's complete affirmative defense to "motivating factor" claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). If such "motivating
factor" claims were already part of Title VII, the addition of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) alone would have been sufficient. Congress' careful
tailoring of the "motivating factor" claim in Title VII, as well as the absence of a provision parallel to § 2000e-2(m) in the ADEA,
confirms that we cannot transfer the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework into the ADEA.

6

Gross points out that the Court has also applied a burden-shifting framework to certain claims brought in contexts other than pursuant
to Title VII. See Brieffor Petitioner 54-55 (citing, inter alia, NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.. 462 U.S. 393,401-403,
103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983) (claims brought under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA»; Mt. Healthy City Bd. ofEd.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568,50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (constitutional claims». These cases, however, do not require the
Court to adopt his contra statutory position. The case involving the NLRA did not require the Court to decide in the first instance
whether burden shifting should apply as the Court instead deferred to the National Labor Relation Board's determination that such a
framework was appropriate. See NLRB, supra, at 400-403, 103 S.Ct. 2469. And the constitutional cases such as Mt. Healthy have no
bearing on the correct interpretation of ADEA claims, which are governed by statutory text.

1

"The question presented by the petitioner in this case is whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age discrimination in order
to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction in a suit brought under the [ADEA]." Ante, at 2346.

2

The United States filed an amicus curiae brief supporting petitioner on the question presented. At oral argument, the Government
urged that the Court should not reach the issue it takes up today. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 20~21, 28~29.

3

Although Justice White stated that the plaintiff had to show that her sex was a "substantial" factor, while the plurality used the term
"motivating" factor, these standards are interchangeable, as evidenced by Justice White's quotation of Mt. Healthy City Bd. ofEd. v.
Doyle. 429 U.S. 274,287,97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977): " '[T]he burden was properly placed upon [the plaintiff to show that
the illegitimate criterion] was a "substantial factor"-or, to put it in other words. that it was a "motivating factor" , " in the adverse
decision. Price Waterhouse. 490 U.S., at 259, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (emphasis added); see also id., at 249, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality
opinion) (using "substantial" and "motivating" interchangeably).

4

We were no doubt aware that dictionaries define "because of' as "by reason of' or "on account of." Ante, at 2350. Contrary to the
majority's bald assertion, however, this does not establish that the term denotes but-for causation. The dictionaries the Court cites do
not, for instance, define "because of' as "solely by reason of' or "exclusively on account of.'· In Price Waterhollse, we recognized
that the words "because of' do not mean "solely because of," and we held that the inquiry "commanded by the words" of the statute
was whether gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision. 490 U.S., at 241, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion).

5

See Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57 (C.A.I 2000); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171 (C.A.2
1992); Starceski v. Westinghouse £lec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 (C.A.3 1995); EEOC 1'. Warfield Rohr Casket Co., 364 F.3d 160 (C.A.4
2004); Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (C.A.5 2004); Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture. Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (C.A.6
2003); Visser v. Packer Eng. Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655 (C.A.7 1991) (en bane); Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771
(C.A.8 1995); Lewis v. YMCA, 208 F.3d 1303 (C.A.II 2000) (per curiam); sec also Gonzagowski v. Widnall, 115 F.3d 744, 749
(C.A.IO 1997).

6

There is, however, some evidence that Congress intended the 1991 mixed-motivcs amendments to apply to the ADEA as well. See
H.R. Rep., pt. 2, at 4 (noting that a "number of other laws banning discrimination, including ... the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.c. § 621, et seq., are modeled after and havc bcen interprcted in a manner consistent with Title
VII," and that ·'these other laws modeled after Title VII [should] be interpretcd consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII as
amended by this Act," including the mixed-motives provisions).

7

While Justice O'Connor did not define precisely what she meant by "direct evidence," we contrasted such evidence with
circumstantial evidence in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). That Justice O'Connor
might have intended a different definition does not affect my conclusion, as I do not believe a plaintiff is required to introduce any
special type of evidcnce to obtain a mixed-motives instruction.
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Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618 (2002)
51

432

[2]
137 Idaho 618
Court ofAppeals ofIdaho.

Idaho Tort Claims Act (!TCA) subjects
government entities to liability for negligent or
wrongful acts committed by the entity or its
employees where a private person would also be
liable. I.e. § 6--901 et seq.

Alan HAGY, PiaintijJ-Appellant,

v.
STATE ofIdaho, Bannock County, City of
Pocatello, Idaho, DefendantsRespondents.

No.

27015.

Municipal Corporations
•.pNature and grounds ofliability

I May 8, 2002. I Review Denied
Aug. 1, 2002.

Brother of mentally ill vIctIm brought negligent
investigation action against city and county, alleging that
they failed to properly investigate circumstances
surrounding victim's death, and brought a wrongful death
action against state, asserting that it breached its duty to
involuntarily commit victim to mental health institution.
The Sixth Judicial District Court, Bannock County, Peter
D. McDermott, J., granted defendants' motions to dismiss
and requests for Rule 11 sanctions, and brother appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Perry, e.J., held that: (1) negligent
investigation was not recognizable cause of action; (2)
county coroner did not owe duty to order autopsy; (3)
brother did not have standing to bring wrongful death
action against state; (4) brother's letter to state requesting
investigation into victim's death was insufficient to put
state on notice that he was filing wrongful death action;
and (5) imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was warranted for
claims against city and county only.

[3]

Coroners
Autopsy
County coroner did not have actionable duty to
perform autopsy after victim's body was
discovered in river; rather, coroner had statutory
discretion to order medical doctor to perform an
autopsy and give opinion as to cause of death.
I.e. § 19-430lB.

[4]

Statutes
General and special statutes
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the
more specific statute or section addressing the
issue controls over the statute that is more
general.

Affirmed in part; vacated in part; remanded.

West Headnotes (15)

[I]

Counties
. Acts of officers or agents
Municipal Corporations
Health and education
Brother's claim against city and county for
negligent investigation of mentally ill sister's
death was not cause of action recognizable under
Idaho law. I.e. § 6-901 et seq.

[5]

Death
Death of plaintiff or beneficiary
Brother did not have standing to bring wrongful
death action against state, based on its alleged
failure to involuntarily commit sister to mental
health facility prior to her death; action, which
was brought by brother as personal representative
of mother's estate, abated when mother died prior
to bringing claim. I.e. § 5-311.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
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[6]

the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (3)
whether the trial court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 11.

Death
;;;ccHeirs and next of kin
If there are no heirs, no right of action for
wrongful death vests in anybody.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[10]

[7)

Rule 11 sanctions against attorney of brother for
filing action against city and county alleging
negligent investigation into sister's death after
her body was found in river, where attorney
failed to provide evidentiary support for
allegations in complaint, failed to produce
reports of private investigator hired by brother
and could not recall investigator's name, failed to
request copy of police report concerning its own
investigation of sister's death, and failed to make
reasonable inquiry as to law involved, but instead
filed suit based on claim that was not
recognizable under state law. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule II(a)(l).

Appeal and Error
"""",Scope and theory of case
An appellate court may affinn a lower court's

decision on a legal theory different from the one
applied by that court.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[8]

States
io··,Fonn and sufficiency
Brother's letter to state requesting investigation
into mentally ill sister's death, stating that
circumstances surrounding sister's death and
individuals responsible for death were unknown,
was insufficient to put state on notice that brother
was filing wrongful death claim as personal
representative of mother's estate, where brother
made only one reference to mother, near bottom
of notice, that mother's heart attack, which
caused her death, was result of trauma from
sister's death.

Attorney and Client
",Liability for costs; sanctions

[11)

Costs
Nature and Grounds of Right
Pleadings, motions, and other papers signed by
an attorney must meet certain criteria, and failure
to meet such criteria will result in the imposition
of sanctions. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule ll(a)(l).

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[9]

Appeal and Error
Costs and Allowances
In detennining whether a district court's
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is proper, an
appellate court shall detennine: (1) whether the
trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within

[12)

Attorney and Client
Liability for costs; sanctions
In evaluating an attorney's conduct in filing a
pleading for the purposes of detennining whether
an imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is justified,
the district court must detennine whether the
attorney exercised reasonableness under the
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circumstances and made a proper investigation
upon reasonable inquiry into the facts and legal
theories before signing and filing the document.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule II(a)(1).

[13]

or defended, frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation, but attorney fees will not be
awarded where the losing party brought the
appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of
law was presented. I.c. § 12-121; Appellate Rule
41.

Attorney and Client
,./"Liability for costs; sanctions
Rule 11 sanctions were not warranted against
attorney of brother who filed wrongful death
action against state based on brother's status as
personal representative of mother's estate, even
though brother had no standing to bring claim
and he failed to provide adequate notice to state
that he was filing wrongful death action in
addition to claims against city and county;
brother could have raised legitimate arguments as
to legal issues of standing and adequate notice.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 11 (a)( 1).

Attorneys and Law Firms
**434 *620 Richard D. Vance, Pocatello, for appellant.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Jack H. Robison,
Special Deputy Attorney General, Pocatello for
respondent, State ofIdaho. Jack H. Robison, argued.
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, Idaho Falls, for
respondents, Bannock County and City of Pocatello.
Donald L. Harris argued.
Opinion
PERRY, ChiefJudge.

[14]

Costs
Nature and form of judgment, action, or
proceedings for review
Brother's appeal from dismissal of claims against
city and county for negligent investigation into
mentally ill sister's death was pursued
frivolously, unreasonably, and without legal or
factual foundation, and thus, city and county
were entitled to award of attorney fees incurred
on appeal, where brother urged appellate court to
grant relief for cause of action that did not exist.
I.c. § 12-121; Appellate Rule 41.

[151

Costs
Right and Grounds
An award of attorney fees may be granted to the
prevailing party on appeal, if appellate court is
left with abiding belief that appeal was brought,

Alan Hagy appeals from the district court's orders
dismissing his complaint against defendants State ofIdaho,
Bannock County, and the City of Pocatello. Hagy's
counsel, Richard D. Vance, challenges the district court's
order imposing sanctions against Vance, individually,
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11. We affirm in part, vacate in part,
and remand.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 5, 1998, the body of Hagy's sister, Karen, was
found in the Portneuf River in Pocatello. Approximately
three weeks later, Hagy's mother, Delores, suffered a heart
attack and died. On October 13, Hagy mailed a letter to the
Secretary of State's office, requesting that all agencies
undertake appropriate inquiry in order to determine who
was responsible for Karen's death. On April 17, 2000,
Hagy filed a complaint against the state, county, and city.
Specifically, Hagy alleged that the city police and county
sheriff negligently investigated Karen's death and that the
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county coroner was negligent in failing to conduct an
autopsy on Karen's body. With regard to the state, Hagy
contended that the state breached its duty to involuntarily
commit Karen to a mental health facility.
Hagy also purported to bring a civil action of homicide
alleging that, approximately five months prior to Karen's
death, she purchased a life insurance policy and that it was
unknown to Hagy where Karen was able to acquire the
money to purchase the policy. Hagy further alleged that,
because two of the beneficiaries of the life insurance policy
were two of Karen's mental health care providers, those
two mental health care providers directly or indirectly
intentionally caused Karen's death. However, Hagy did not
allege which of the three defendants these two mental
health care providers were employed by. Hagy's complaint
alleged that as a result, the state was responsible for the
deaths of Karen and his mother. Hagy sought
compensation for the "suffering and emotional **435 *621
distress that he has suffered and will suffer for the death of
his sister and mother" and compensation for the
"emotional distress that he has incurred because of his
inability to know the cause of his sister's death."
The state, county and city each filed a motion to dismiss
Hagy's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted and requested Rule 11 sanctions.
After a hearing, the district court dismissed Hagy's
complaint against the county and city, concluding that
Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent
investigation. The district court took the remainder of the
motions under advisement pending the filing of an
amended complaint by Hagy.
Hagy filed a motion to reconsider the order dismissing the
complaint against the county and city and a motion to
amend his complaint. The district court denied Hagy's
motion to reconsider and his motion to file an amended
complaint and dismissed Hagy's complaint against the
state with prejudice. Additionally, the district court ordered
Vance to pay Rule 11 sanctions of$3,000. Hagy appeals.

II.

judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we exercise free
review in determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc.,
III Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279,1280 (Ct.App.1986).
When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all
controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of
the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.,
119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991); Sanders v.
Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154,
156 (Ct.App.1994).

III.

ANALYSIS
A. Claim Against the City
[1) [2) Hagy contends that the district court erred in
dismissing his complaint against the city, asserting that the
cause of action alleged is a valid claim pursuant to I.C. § 6~
903. The Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), I.c. §§ 6-901 to
929, subjects government entities to liability for negligent
or wrongful acts committed by the entity or its employees
where a private person would also be liable. Limbert v.
Twin Falls County, 131 Idaho 344, 346, 955 P.2d 1123,
1125 (Ct.App.1998), Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012,
1021,729 P.2d 1075, 1084 (Ct.App.1987). When a trial
court is considering a motion for dismissal of a complaint
against a governmental entity and its employees under the
ITCA, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that:
[A] trial judge should first detem1ine whether the
plaintiffs' allegations and supporting record generally
state a cause of action for which "a private person or
entity would be liable for money damages under the
laws of the state ofldaho." Walker v. Shoshone County,
112 Idaho 991, 995, 739 P.2d 290,294 (1987) .... In
consideration of the initial inquiry as to whether a
private individual or entity could be held liable under the
facts alleged in the complaint, we essentially ask "is
there such a tort under the laws ofldaho?" Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a trial court's order granting a motion to
dismiss, our standard of review is the same as our summary
judgment standard. Rim View Trout Co. v. Idaho Dep't of
Water Res., 119 Idaho 676, 677, 809 P.2d 1155, 1156
(1991). We first note that summary judgment under
I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231, 116 Idaho
326,330,775 P.2d 640, 644 (1989).
In this case, the district court concluded that under Wimer
v. State, 122 Idaho 923, 841 P.2d 453 (Ct.App.1992),
Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent
investigation. In Wimer, the appellants brought a claim
against the state under the ITCA contending that two
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Department of Fish and Game officers had negligently
conducted **436 *622 their investigation into the
appellant's alleged poaching of elk. This Court stated:
Our own research has uncovered no
states that have held that a cause of action
for negligent investigation exists.
Therefore, we accept the statement in
Dirienzo v. United States, 690 F.Supp.
1149 (D.Conn.1988), that the common
law did not impose liability upon even a
private person for mere negligence in
instituting or continuing a criminal
prosecution for a crime which has
actually occurred.
ld. at 925, 841 P.2d at 455. Because Idaho does not
recognize a cause of action for negligent investigation, the
district court did not err in dismissing Hagy's complaint
against the city.

B. Claim Against the County

With regard to the county, Hagy first argues that the
district court abused its discretion when it determined that
negligent investigation is not a cause of action recognized
in this state. Based on our analysis of this issue with regard
to the city, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion with regard to this issue as it also applies to
the county sheriff.
[3) Hagy further argues that the district court erred when it
dismissed his claim that the county is liable due to the
county coroner's failure to perform an autopsy. Hagy
contends that I.e. § 19-4301 (b) imposes a duty on a county
coroner to investigate a death that occurs under unknown
or suspicious circumstances and that the coroner in this
case breached that duty by not performing an autopsy on
Karen.
Idaho Code Section 19-4301(b) requires that, when a
coroner is informed that a person in the county has died
under unknown circumstances, the coroner must refer the
investigation to either the county sheriff or chief of police.
There is no dispute between the parties in this case that an
investigation was conducted.
[4) However, Idaho Code Section 19-4301B provides that
a coroner may request a medical doctor to perform an
autopsy and give a professional opinion as to the cause of
death. As this section deals directly with the issue of when
an autopsy may be ordered, it is the more specific statute in
this case. A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the
more specific statute or section addressing the issue

controls over the statute that is more general. See Mulder v.
Liberty Northwest Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52, 58,14 P.3d 372,
378 (2000). Therefore, I.e. § 19-430lB controls in this
case and dictates that the performance of an autopsy is not
mandatory, but rather falls within the discretion of the
coroner. We conclude that based on the language of this
statute, the district court did not err when it determined that
the coroner did not owe a duty to perform an autopsy on
Karen and properly dismissed Hagy's complaint against
the county.

C. Claims Against the State

[5) Hagy next argues that the district court erred when it
dismissed his complaint against the state. The district court
dismissed the complaint on the basis that Hagy's letter sent
to the state was insufficient to constitute an effective notice
of tort claim under the ITCA. The state responds on appeal
that Hagy did not have standing to sue and that he failed to
provide proper notice of his claims under the ITCA.
Hagy's claims were wrongful death actions brought
pursuant to I.e. § 5-311. That section defines who may
pursue a wrongful death action and states, in pertinent part:
(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal
representatives on their behalf may maintain an action
for damages against the person causing the death ...
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section,
"heirs" mean:
(a) Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to
the property of the decedent according to the provisions
of subsection (21) of section 15-1-201, Idaho Code.
(b) Whether or not qualified under subsection (2)(a) of
this section, the decedent's spouse, children,
stepchildren, parents, and, when partly or wholly
dependent on the decedent for support or services, any
**437 *623 blood relatives and adoptive brothers and
sisters.
With regard to the claim for Karen's death, Hagy is not an
heir entitled to maintain an action under I.e. § 5-311.
Hagy contends that his mother was an heir of Karen under
the terms of the statute and that her right to maintain a
wrongful death action passed to her estate when she died.
Hagy argues that he, as personal representative of his
mother's estate, is thus entitled to bring a claim for Karen's
death on behalf of his mother's estate. However, we
construe 1. e. § 5-311 (1) to use "personal representative"
to mean the personal representative of the decedent, not of
the heirs. Thus, an action may be maintained for wrongful
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death of a person by the decedent's heirs or the decedent's
personal representative on behalf of the heirs.

that all agencies induce appropriate inquiry in order to
determine who is responsible for Karen's death.

[6] A number of courts in other states have held that where
no wrongful death action is commenced during the life of
the beneficiary, the action is abated upon the death of the
beneficiary. See Re Estate of Dillman, 8 Il1.App.2d 239,
l31 N.E.2d 634 (1956); Pedro Ii v. Missouri P. Railroad,
524 S.W.2d 882 (Mo.Ct.App.1975); Simons v. Kidd, 73
S.D. 280,41 N.W.2d 840 (1950); Carterv. Van Meter, 495
S.W.2d 583 (Tex.Civ.App.1973); Murray v. Dewar, 6
Wis.2d 411, 94 N.W.2d 635 (1959). Furthermore, the
Idaho Supreme Court has held that no right of action is
given to the estate of the victim of a tort, but is granted only
to his or her heirs. See Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 605,
151 P.2d 765, 770 (1944), overruled on other grounds by
Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., Inc., 93 Idaho 888,
477 P.2d 511 (1970). If there are no heirs, no right of action
vests in anybody. Id.

The only mention of Hagy's mother in the notice occurs
near the end and consists of one reference: "After Karen's
death, her mother suffered a heart attack and died because
of Karen's death. The events and circumstances
subsequent to Karen's death are unfortunate and are also a
result of these defendant's responsibility." We conclude
that this passing reference to Hagy's mother was
insufficient to put the state on notice that Hagy was also
filing a claim for the death of his mother. Therefore, we
find no error in the district court's dismissal of Hagy's
complaint against the state.

[7] Upon our review of the law, we conclude that the
wrongful death action for Karen's death abated with the
death ofHagy's mother. For this reason, Hagy did not have
standing to pursue a claim against the state for Karen's
death. Although argued by the parties below, the district
court did not dismiss Hagy's complaint on that precise
reasoning. However, an appellate court may affirm a lower
court's decision on a legal theory different from the one
applied by that court. Matter ofEstate ofBagley, 117 Idaho
1091,1093,793 P.2d 1263,1265 (Ct.App.1990). Thus, we
conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing
Hagy's complaint against the state for Karen's death.

[8] With regard to Hagy's claim against the state for his
mother's death, Hagy is an heir under the terms ofI.C. § 5311 and had standing to bring such a claim. However, the
record lacks evidence that Hagy sent the state a sufficient
notice of tort claim as required by the !TCA. Hagy asserts
that the notice sent regarding his sister's death was detailed
enough to put the state on notice regarding his claim for his
mother's death. The notice, in the form of a letter from
Hagy's attorney, stated, "I have been retained by Alan
Hagy to represent him with regard to the wrongful death of
his sister Kathy [sic] Hagy." The remaining portions of the
notice deal exclusively with the circumstances of Karen's
death and only request that the state, county and city
conduct an investigation into the circumstances of Karen's
death. The notice further stated:
The events prior to and subsequent to Karen's death are
questionable, unknown and potentially criminal. The
individuals responsible for her death, at this point, are
unknown.
As Mr. Hagy's attorney, I would respectfully request

D. Rule 11 Sanctions
[9] [10] Vance, as counsel for Hagy, challenges the district
court's order imposing **438 *624 Rule 11 sanctions
against him individually. In determining whether a district
court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is proper, we
determine: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun
Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho
87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
[11] [12] Pursuant to I.R.C.P. II(a)(1), pleadings, motions,
and other papers signed by an attorney must meet certain
criteria, and failure to meet such criteria will result in the
imposition of sanctions. See Durrant v. Christensen, 117
Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990). Rule l1(a)(1)
requires that pleadings be: (1) well grounded in fact; (2)
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3)
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or cause unnecessary delay or needless increases in the
costs of litigation. In evaluating an attorney's conduct in
filing a pleading, the district court must determine whether
the attorney exercised reasonableness under the
circumstances and made a proper investigation upon
reasonable inquiry into the facts and legal theories before
signing and filing the document. Riggins v. Smith, 126
Idaho 1017, 1021,895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995).
The district court ordered sanctions against Vance after
finding that Hagy's complaint was commenced without
conducting any investigation. The district court concluded,
as a matter oflaw, that sanctions were proper based on the
frivolous and unsupported pursuit of the action and
Vance's failure to provide the district court with any
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evidence to support the allegations made in the complaint.

591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979).

After a review of the record in this case, we conclude that
the district court did not err in imposing sanctions in favor
of the city and county. At a hearing held on September 11,
2000, Vance represented to the district court that a private
investigator had been hired and that the county's and city's
actions after Karen's death had been investigated
thoroughly. Vance was unable to produce the private
investigator's reports or even recall the investigator's
name. Vance never requested a copy of the police report
regarding Karen's death. The record reveals that Vance did
not make a reasonable inquiry into the facts prior to filing
Hagy's initial complaint. It is also clear from the record
that Vance failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the law
involved as required by Rule 11. Hagy alleged a civil case
against the city and county for a cause of action that, under
clear precedent, is not recognized in this state.

**439 *625 After having thoroughly reviewed all the
issues raised and the arguments presented on this appeal,
we are left with the abiding belief that Hagy's appeal
against the city and county was brought frivolously,
unreasonably, and without legal or factual foundation. As
he did below, Hagy urged this Court to grant relief for a
cause of action that is not recognized in this state.
Therefore, we award the county and city attorney fees on
appeal. For the same reasons that we vacate the Rule 11
sanction awarded below, no attorney fees will be awarded
to the state on appeal.

[13) Rule 11 sanctions, however, were not proper to be
awarded in favor of the state. Although we have
determined that Hagy had no standing to file suit on behalf
of his mother's estate and did not give any notice to the
state that he was filing a claim regarding his mother's
death, a legitimate argument can be proffered on those
issues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order
imposing Rule 11 sanctions against Vance in favor of the
city and county, but vacate as to any award in favor of the
state. Because the district court did not delineate individual
amounts awarded to each defendant, we must remand for a
determination of such.

CONCLUSION

E. Attorney Fees on Appeal
(14) (15) On appeal, the state, county, and city seek an
award of attorney's fees, claiming that Hagy's appeal was
pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.
An award of attorney fees may be granted to the prevailing
party pursuant to I.e. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. Excel
Leasing Co. v. Christensen, 115 Idaho 708,712,769 P.2d
585, 589 (Ct.App.1989). Such an award is appropriate
when the court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal
has been brought, or defended frivolously, unreasonably,
- or without foundation. Id. However, attorney fees will not
be awarded where the losing party brought the appeal in
good faith and where a genuine issue oflaw was presented.
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918,
End of Document

IV.

The district court did not err in dismissing Hagy's
complaint against the state, county, and city. Negligent
investigation is not a recognized cause of action in this
state. Hagy did not have standing to bring a claim for
Karen's death on behalf of his mother's estate.
Furthermore, although Hagy had standing to pursue a tort
claim against the state for the death of his mother, his
notice of tort claim failed to give adequate notice to the
state regarding that claim. Accordingly, the district court's
orders dismissing Hagy's complaint are affirmed. In
addition, the district court's order imposing sanctions
against Vance in favor of the city and county is affirmed.
Costs and attorney fees on appeal are awarded to the
county and city. The Rule 11 sanctions awarded to the
state, however, are vacated and remanded. Costs, but not
attorney fees, on appeal are awarded to the state.

Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, concur.

Parallel Citations
51 P.3d 432
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reason for the challenged action, and if defendant
meets that burden, plaintiffs must then raise a
triable issue of material fact as to whether the
defendant's proffered reasons for their
terminations are mere pretext for unlawful
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703,
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.

615 F.3d 1151

United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Gregory S. HAWN; Michael R. Prince; Aric
A. Aldrich, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
EXECUTIVE JET MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
No.

29 Cases that cite this headnote

I Argued and Submitted Jan.
I Filed Aug. 16, 2010.

08-15903.
12,2010.

[2]
Synopsis

To establish a prima facie case in a Title VII
action, plaintiffs must offer evidence that gives
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.

Background: Terminated airline pilots brought Title VII
action against employer, alleging that they were
discriminated against on basis of gender, race, and national
origin when they were discharged for allegedly sexually
harassing flight attendant. Employer moved for summary
judgment. The United States District Court for the District
of Arizona, Stephen M. McNamee, 1., 546 F.Supp.2d 703,
granted employer's motion. Pilots appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Wallace, Senior Circuit
Judge, held that:
[1] pilots were required to show that they were similarly
situated to female flight attendants;
[2] pilots failed to show that they were similarly situated to
flight attendants; and
[3] pilots were not entitled to strike Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) probable cause
determination.

6 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

West Headnotes (12)

Civil Rights
Effect of prima facie case; shifting burden
Court of Appeals analyzes plaintiffs' Title VII
claims through the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas, under which plaintiffs must
first establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination; if plaintiffs establish a prima
facie case, the burden of production, but not
persuasion, then shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

Civil Rights
Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements
Civil Rights
Prima facie case
Plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case in a
Title VII action based on circumstantial evidence
by showing: (1) that they are members of a
protected class; (2) that they were qualified for
their positions and performing their jobs
satisfactorily; (3) that they experienced adverse
employment actions; and (4) that similarly
situated individuals outside their protected class
were treated more favorably, or other
circumstances
surrounding
the
adverse
employment action give rise to an inference of
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703,
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.c.A. § 1981.

Affirmed.

[1]

Civil Rights
~,Prima facie case

25 Cases that cite this headnote

[4]

Civil Rights
Discrimination against men; reverse
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discrimination
Male airline pilots who brought Title VII action
against employer after they were terminated for
alleged sexual harassment of female flight
attendant, were required, as part of prima facie
case, to show that they were similarly situated to
female flight attendants who were not terminated
for allegedly engaging in similar conduct, where
plaintiffs themselves invoked the comparison to
make out a claim of disparate treatment. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.

(5]

703, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1981.
7 Cases that cite this headnote

[7]

I Cases that cite this headnote

For purposes of making prima facie case in Title
VII case, similarity between two persons or
groups of people is a question of fact that cannot
be mechanically resolved by determining
whether they had the same supervisor without
attention to the underlying issues. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1981.

Civil Rights
"",Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof

1 Cases that cite this headnote

A Title VII plaintiff may show an inference of
discrimination in whatever manner is appropriate
in the particular circumstances, and may do so
through comparison to similarly situated
individuals, or any other circumstances
surrounding the adverse employment action that
give rise to an inference of discrimination. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.

[81

Civil Rights
Discrimination against men; reverse
discrimination
Strict "same supervisor" requirement did not
apply to male airline pilots who brought Title VII
claims against employer after they were
terminated for alleged sexual harassment of
female Hight attendant, alleging that similarly
situated female flight attendants received more
favorable treatment despite similar behavior;
whether plaintiffs and the female Hight
attendants shared the same direct supervisor
should not have been determinative of whether
they were similarly situated, because plaintiffs'
direct supervisor was excluded from the decision
to terminate them. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §

Civil Rights
.,·,Prima facie case
Under McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework, a Title VII plaintiff s burden is much
less at the prima facie stage than at the pretext
stage. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.

II Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Civil Rights
"lv"'Questions oflaw or fact

12 Cases that cite this headnote

[9]

Civil Rights
.. Effect of prima facie case; shifting burden

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
in a Title VII action is not intended to be rigid,
mechanized, or. ritualistic; rather, it is merely a
sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in
light of common experience as it bears on the
critical question of discrimination. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42
U.S.c.A. § 1981.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
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(10)

Civil Rights
,)'"Discrimination against men; reverse
discrimination

Male airline pilots who brought Title VII action
against employer after they were terminated for
alleged sexual harassment of female flight
attendant failed to demonstrate that female flight
attendants who allegedly engaged in similar
behavior but were not terminated were similarly
situated; although pilots alleged that flight
attendants engaged in sexualized banter and other
conduct similar to what pilots were accused of,
only the pilots' conduct gave rise to a complaint
of sexual harassment, and pilots never
complained of discriminatory treatment or sexual
harassment to employer contemporaneous to the
alleged conduct by the female flight attendants or
otherwise indicated that the conduct was
unwelcome or harassing. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 703, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e-2; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1981.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

(11)

Civil Rights
.. Admissibility of evidence; statistical evidence

General rule that a plaintiff has a right to
introduce an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
(EEOC)
probable
cause
determination in a Title VII lawsuit is not
applicable to all EEOC determinations, and
district court should exercise its discretion to
admit or exclude a letter of violation. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.c.A. § 2000e-2; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1981.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

(12)

.............•.~.

charge by flight attendant, which found evidence
of a hostile work environment; pilots' motion to
strike was made in the context of a summary
judgment proceeding where there could be no
jury and pilots made no showing of prejudice
from its admission. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.c.A. §
1981.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
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*1153 Tod F. Schleier, Schleier Law Offices, P.c.,
Phoenix, AZ, for the plaintiffs-appellants. Bradley H.
Schleier, Schleier Law Offices, P.c., Phoenix, AZ, on the
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Celeste M. Wasielewski, Duane Morris LLP, Washington,
D.C., for the defendant-appellee. Lorraine P. Ocheltree,
Duane Morris LLP, San Francisco, CA, and Maureen
Beyers, Osborne Maledon PA, Phoenix, AZ, on the brief
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona, Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge,
Presiding. D.C. No. 2:04-CV-02954-SMM .
Before ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, J. CLIFFORD
WALLACE, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAM H. ALSUP,
District Judge. *
Opinion

OPINION

WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge:
Gregory Hawn, Michael Prince and Aric Aldrich
(collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from the district court's
summary judgment in favor of their former employer,
Executive Jet Management (Executive Jet). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.s.c. § 1291, and we affirm.

Federal Civil Procedure
Admissibility

Terminated male airline pilots who brought Title
VII action against employer after they were
terminated for alleged sexual harassment of
female flight attendant were not entitled to strike
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) probable cause determination based on

I.

Plaintiffs are male pilots who were employed by Executive
Jet, which is in the business of aircraft management and
charter operations. All of the plaintiffs were terminated
after a female flight attendant, Robin McCrea, alleged that
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plaintiffs had sexually harassed her and created a hostile
work environment through an array of conduct including
sexualized banter, crude jokes, and the sharing of crude
and/or pornographic emails and websites. According to
plaintiffs, however, McCrea was an active participant in,
or initiator of, much of the conduct of which she accused
them. Plaintiffs contend that their terminations were illegal
because McCrea and other Executive Jet female flight
attendants engaged in similar conduct but were not
terminated because they were females.
Plaintiffs and McCrea were stationed at Executive Jet's
base at Williams Gateway Airport in Arizona. On January
6,2003, McCrea complained to her immediate supervisor,
Amy Jackson, that Aldrich had behaved inappropriately
during a training seminar a few days earlier. Jackson
reported the complaint to Executive Jet's Human
Resources Director, Cynthia Brusman. On January 10,
2003, McCrea faxed a letter to Brusman that stated she had
experienced a hostile work environment at *1154 the
Williams Gateway base and requested a transfer.
In response, Executive Jet's Chief Pilot, Michael
Chakerian, interviewed McCrea, Aldrich, Prince, and
several other Executive Jet employees. Chakerian
submitted the results of his interviews in a written report to
Executive Jet. Chakerian's report reflected that Prince and
Aldrich were "shocked" by McCrea's allegations because
she had participated in, and often encouraged, the banter
and joking of which she complained. Chakerian's report
also reflected that another male pilot stationed at the
Williams Gateway base was similarly surprised by
McCrea's allegations. A female flight attendant
interviewed by Chakerian described McCrea as
short-tempered, aggressive, and negative. A female pilot
interviewed by Chakerian similarly described McCrea as
personally insecure and moody, and also described
McCrea as flustered during the training exercise. Both this
female pilot and the female flight attendant implied to
Chakerian that McCrea's allegations may have been
motivated by her desire for a transfer to a different
Executive Jet base.
On January 14, 2003, McCrea faxed another letter to
Brusman. This time, McCrea attached a twelve-page
document that detailed her allegations against Aldrich
stemming from the training seminar. This document also
contained new allegations of sexual harassment against
Aldrich, Prince, Hawn, and others. Following receipt of
these new and more detailed allegations, Executive Jet
hired an independent investigator, James Sterling, to look
into McCrea's accusations. This investigation lasted
approximately two months. In the meantime, on January
27, 2003, McCrea filed a discrimination charge against
Executive Jet with the United States Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Around March 31, 2003, Sterling'S report was submitted to
Executive Jet. In the "Synopsis" of his report, Sterling
stated:
The results of this investigation indicate
that there have been confirmed instances
of a few of the behaviors indicated in Ms.
McCrea's document of complaint.
However, there are also a greater number
of incidents that she has alleged
happened that have been unconfirmed,
denied or told to me in a different light,
implying that Ms. McCrea either
participated in the actions or m some
instances initiated them.
In the concluding "Summary" of his report, Sterling stated
that "[t]hroughout the duration of this investigation, I have
continually found there to be some items in Ms. McCrea's
document of complaint to be verified." Sterling continued,
"in the same vein, I must say that there have been
numerous items, which have not been corroborated by this
investigation." He concluded: "The bottom line is that
there appears to be some fact as well as some fiction
interwoven throughout Ms. McCrea's document of
complaint.... To conclude this investigation I believe that
the company will have to 'sift the wheat from the [chaff],'
in Ms. McCrea's document of complaint...."
On April 18,2003, all three plaintiffs were terminated. A
few months later, in July 2003, the EEOC issued a
determination of the merits of McCrea's complaint,
finding in part that "the evidence revealed that Respondent
fostered a hostile work environment created by demeaning,
crude, derogatory sex-based remarks."
In February 2004, each of the plaintiffs filed a claim of
discrimination with the EEOC. All of these claims were
dismissed. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action,
alleging discrimination on the basis of race, sex and
national origin in violation of Title *1155 VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2 and 42 U.s.c. §
1981.
Plaintiffs complain that Executive Jet was aware that a
group of five female flight attendants, one of whom was
McCrea, had "engaged in sexual e-mails [and] sexual
discussions" similar to the conduct that led to plaintiffs'
terminations. Unlike plaintiffs, however, the female
employees were not disciplined in any way, much less
terminated. Plaintiffs argue that their terminations were
thus discriminatory because, in effect, Executive Jet
singled them out for termination because they were "risk
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free" young, white, American males, while it failed to
terminate females who had engaged in the same
objectionable behavior. Plaintiffs point, in particular, to
Executive Jet's position statement in its response to
McCrea's EEOC charges. In that document, the company
represented that "virtually all" of McCrea's claims were
denied or uncorroborated and that, in many instances,
McCrea was a participant in or initiator of the conduct at
issue. According to plaintiffs, McCrea's allegations came
suspiciously on the heels of a training exercise in which
she exhibited an abysmal performance.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of
Executive Jet, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish
a prima facie case of employment discrimination. The
district court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise a
triable issue of material fact that their terminations were a
pretext for unlawful discrimination. Plaintiffs seek review
of the summary judgment and the district court's denial of
their motion to exclude all evidence of and references to
the EEOC's determination regarding McCrea's charge.
Although plaintiffs' complaint states claims for gender,
race, and national origin discrimination, plaintiffs press
only their gender discrimination claims before us.
Similarly, although plaintiffs asked the district court to
strike all references to the EEOC's determination in
McCrea's charge and the EEOC's dismissal of their
complaints, plaintiffs here press only for the exclusion of
evidence relating to the EEOC's determination of
McCrea's charges.

II.

We review the district court's summary judgment de novo.
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013,
1019 (9th Cir.2004). "We must determine, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact
and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
substantive law." EEOC V. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir.2003). We may affirm
the district court's summary judgment on any ground
supported by the record. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C \'.
Local Joint Exec. Bd. ofLas Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 941 (9th
Cir.200 1).
[1] We analyze plaintiffs' Title VII claims through the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668
(1973). Under this analysis, plaintiffs must first establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination. Noyes V.
Kelly Sen1s., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir.2007). If
plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, "[t]he burden of

production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the challenged action." Chuang V. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd.
of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir.2000). If
defendant meets this burden, plaintiffs must then raise a
triable issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's
proffered reasons for their terminations are mere pretext
for unlawful discrimination. Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1168; see
also Coleman *1156 V. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271,
1282 (9th Cir.2000) (plaintiffs must "introduce evidence
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact" as to
pretext).
[2] [3] To establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs "must
offer evidence that 'givers] rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.' " Godwin V. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d
1217, 1220 (9th Cir.1998) (alteration in original), citing
Tex. Dep't ofCmty. Affairs V. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253,
101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Plaintiffs may
establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial
evidence by showing: (1) that they are members of a
protected class; (2) that they were qualified for their
positions and performing their jobs satisfactorily; (3) that
they experienced adverse employment actions; and (4) that
"similarly situated individuals outside [their] protected
class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances
surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an
inference of discrimination." Peterson V. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir.2004); see also Wallis V.
JR. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.l994).
The focus in the case before us is on the fourth element of
plaintiffs' prima facie case: whether similarly situated
employees engaged in similar conduct but received more
favorable treatment by Executive Jet. The district court
concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie
case because they did not show that the female employees
who allegedly received more favorable treatment by
Executive Jet were in fact similarly situated to plaintiffs.
The district court offered two primary reasons for this
conclusion: First, the female flight attendants were not
similarly situated because they did not report to the same
supervisor as plaintiffs, and second, even if the female
flight attendants had reported to the same supervisor as
plaintiffs, they were not similarly situated because
plaintiffs' conduct gave rise to a complaint, while the
female flight attendants' alleged conduct did not.

A.
[4] At the outset, plaintiffs assert that the district court
engaged in an overly narrow inquiry in conducting its
examination of their prima facie case. Plaintiffs complain
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that the district court erroneously focused on whether
similarly-situated persons received more favorable
treatment. Instead, according to plaintiffs, the district court
should have looked more broadly at whether the record as a
whole gave rise to an inference of discrimination.
[5] It is true that the elements and contours of a prima facie
case will differ according to the facts at hand. In
McDonnell Douglas, the Court explained that a prima facie
case will vary according to the unique factual
circumstances presented in every action: "the prima facie
proof required from respondent is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations."
411 U.S. at 802 n. 13,93 S.Ct. 1817. We have also stated
that a plaintiff may show "an inference of discrimination in
whatever manner is appropriate in the particular
circumstances." Diaz v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356,
1361 (9th Cir.1985). A plaintiff may do so through
comparison to similarly situated individuals, or any other
circumstances "surrounding the adverse employment
action [that] give rise to an inference of discrimination."
Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603.

Here, however, plaintiffs' case relies on a comparison
between themselves and a group of female employees.
Plaintiffs' action sounds in disparate treatment and seeks to
raise an inference of discrimination based solely on
circumstantial evidence. Plaintiffs' proof of discrimination
is that McCrea engaged in or encouraged the *1157
language and conduct of which she later complained, and
that she and other female flight attendants engaged in lewd
and inappropriate conduct but were not disciplined or
terminated as were plaintiffs. Plaintiffs invoke the
comparison to a group of allegedly similarly situated
female employees to make out a claim of disparate
treatment. The district court did not err by focusing on the
inference of discrimination that is central to plaintiffs'
case.

B.
Plaintiffs next take issue with the district court's analysis
insofar as it determined that plaintiffs and the suspect
female flight attendants were not similarly-situated
because they did not report to the same supervisor. The
district court held that to be similarly situated, "coworkers
must have been dealt with by the same supervisor, subject
to the same standard, and engaged in similar conduct"
Plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly focused
on whether the female employees had the same supervisor
as them.

[6] It was error for the district court to impose a strict

"same supervisor" requirement. We have stated that
"whether two employees are similarly situated is ordinarily
a question of fact." Beck v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 885 n. 5 (9th
Cir.2007). The employees' roles need not be identical; they
must only be similar "in all material respects." Moran v.
Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir.2006); see also Aragon v.
Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 660
(9th Cir.2002). Materiality will depend on context and the
facts ofthe case.
Generally, we have determined that "individuals are
similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display
similar conduct." Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349
F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.2003). In Vasquez, for example, we
considered that employees were not similarly situated
where the type and severity of an alleged offense was
dissimilar. Id. Likewise, in Nicholson v. Hyannis Air
Service, Inc., a case decided after entry of summary
judgment here, we held that an alleged distinction between
a female pilot and several male pilots was not material. 580
F.3d 1116, 1125-26 (9th Cir.2009). Under the allegations
of that case, we concluded that a female pilot, who had
deficient communication and cooperation skills, was
similarly situated to male pilots, who had deficiencies in
their technical piloting skills, because both types of
deficiencies could be addressed through retraining. Any
distinction between the two types of skill sets was "not
material for purposes of determining whether the male
pilots were 'similarly situated' to" the plaintiff; therefore,
the female pilot had made out a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that the male pilots received
remedial training for their deficiencies while she received
no such instruction. Id. at 1126. Nicholson again
demonstrates that whether employees are similarly
situated-i.e., whether they are "similar in all material
respects," id. at 1125 (internal quotation marks
omitted)-is a fact-intensive inquiry, and what facts are
material will vary depending on the case.
[7] We do not exclude the possibility that the presence or
absence of a shared supervisor might be relevant in some
cases. But here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that
whether plaintiffs and the female flight attendants shared
the same direct supervisor should not have been
determinative of whether they were similarly situated,
because plaintiffs' direct supervisor, Chakerian, was
excluded from the decision to terminate them. Instead, the
decision to terminate plaintiffs was made directly by
Executive Jet's president, Albert Pod. The fact that
plaintiffs and the female flight attendants had different
*1158 direct supervisors did not render them dissimilar in
a material respect, because the relevant decision-maker,
Albert Pod, was aware of both the allegations against
plaintiffs and the allegations plaintiffs had made against
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the female flight attendants. Similarity between two
persons or groups ofpeople is a question offact that cannot
be mechanically resolved by determining whether they had
~he same supervisor without attention to the underlying
Issues.

III.
Therefore, we tum to the alternate ground on which the
district court concluded that plaintiffs were not similarly
situated to the female flight attendants. The district court
held that, even assuming the female flight attendants
reported to the same supervisor as plaintiffs, the two
groups were not similarly situated because the female
employees' alleged conduct was not unwelcome and never
resulted in a complaint. This consideration provides an
independent and sufficient basis to affirm the district
court's summary judgment. See Venetian Casino Resort,
257 F.3d at 941.

A.
The concept of "similarly situated" employees may be
relevant to both the first and third steps of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. In this case, plaintiffs sought to
establish that the relevant female flight attendants were
"similarly situated" to them but received more favorable
treatment in step one of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
See, e.g, Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603. Turning to step three
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, plaintiffs alleged that
Executive Jet's explanation for their terminations was
pretextual because, among other things, the company
failed to discipline or terminate McCrea even though she
was similarly situated to them. See Vasquez. 349 F.3d at
641; see generally Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz.,
inc., 374 F.3d 840,849 (9th Cir.2004) (describing different
ways in which an employment discrimination plaintiff
might establish pretext).
(8) Even though a comparison to "similarly situated"
individuals may be relevant both to plaintiffs' prima facie
case and proof of pretext, these inquiries constitute distinct
stages of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.
See generally Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567,577,98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); Lynn v.
Regents of the Univ. of Ca !. , 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir.1981)
(first and third stages must remain distinct because, "[t]o
do otherwise would in many instances collapse the three
step analysis into a single step at which all issues would be
resolved"); Nicholson, 580 F.3d at 1124. The difference
between the first and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas

........................................................................." .......

framework is not without some consequence. Among other
things, a plaintiff s burden is much less at the prima facie
stage than at the pretext stage. Compare Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct.
1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889,
with Godwin, 150 F .3d at 1220-22, and Steckl v. Motorola,
Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.1983) (requiring "specific,
substantial evidence of pretext" to defeat employer's
motion for summary judgment); see also Wheeler v.
Aventis Pharm., 360 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir.2004)
(describing pretext stage as "rigorous," but prima facie
stage as "not onerous").
The
district
court
considered
the
relevant
inquiry-whether plaintiffs and the subject female
employees were similarly situated-in the context of both
plaintiffs' prima facie case and at the pretext stage. Insofar
as the district court considered Executive Jet's argument in
the context of plaintiffs' prima facie case of
discrimination, *1159 this was unusual. Our cases
generally analyze an employer's reasons for why
employees are not similarly situated at the pretext stage of
McDonnell Douglas, not the prima facie stage. See, e.g,
Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. It may well be that the present
inquiry is more appropriate for resolution at the third stage
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis rather than that of
pretext. The pretext determination is often cast in terms of
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by the
employer for taking adverse employment action against a
plaintiff. See, e.g, Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641; Wall v. Nat 'I
R.R. Passenger Corp., 718 F.2d 906,909 (9th Cir.1983).
(9) Although we seek to conduct our inquiry at the proper
McDonnell Douglas step, we keep in mind that "[t]he
prima facie case method established in McDonnell
Douglas was 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it
bears on the critical question of discrimination.' " u.s.
Postal Servo Bd. ofGovernors V. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,715,
103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), citing Fumco, 438
U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943. Thus, we keep sight of the
ultimate issue in this case: "whether the employer is
trea~ing some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Furnco,
438 U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). In this case, there is no need to discuss
the issue further. The district court held that plaintiffs had
not made out a prima face case because, among other
reasons, they had not shown they were similarly situated to
the female employees in question. The district court then
went on to hold that Executive Jet's argument was not
pre textual for the same reasons. We may therefore tum to
the substance of plaintiffs' claims.
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B.

[10] Turning to the substance of the issue, plaintiffs seek to
blunt the relevance of the complaints made against them.
They argue that the presence or absence of a complaint is
not a sufficient justification for differential treatment and
that McCrea's complaint was not actually the basis for
their terminations. Plaintiffs point to (I) the Sterling report,
which reflected that many of McCrea's allegations were
uncorroborated; (2) Executive Jet's position statement
submitted to the EEOC, in which it maintained that
McCrea could not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because the "overwhelming majority" of
the incidents could not be corroborated and McCrea could
not show that the conduct was unwelcome; and finally, (3)
Brusman's testimony that the use of sexual language or the
telling of sexual jokes to coworkers was inappropriate
behavior warranting termination, "whether anybody is
offended by it or not."
Executive Jet management was aware, at the time of
plaintiffs' terminations, of plaintiffs' accusations that
McCrea and several female flight attendants had engaged
in sexualized banter and other similar conduct.
Chakerian's report to his superiors indicated that plaintiffs
Aldrich and Prince found McCrea's allegations surprising
because she had participated in the conduct giving rise to
her complaint. Sterling'S report reflected an allegation by
Prince that McCrea had "hit him on the butt twice," an
allegation by Aldrich that McCrea asked "quite frequently
about his sex life," and allegations that McCrea
participated in "raunchy" banter, as well as some
sexually-oriented emails sent by another flight attendant.
Plaintiffs' accusations, nevertheless, do not demonstrate
that the designated female employees were similarly
situated to *1160 plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cite the Sterling
report selectively. The report confirmed several of
McCrea's complaints, including that Hawn pinched
McCrea on the buttocks; that Prince forwarded obscene
emails to his coworkers; that pilots, including Prince, had
romantic relationships with flight attendants; and that
Aldrich called the lead flight attendant a "fat cow."
Sterling's report concludes that "the company will have to
'sift the wheat from the [chaff]' in Ms. McCrea's
document of complaint...." Even if Executive Jet believed
that the majority of McCrea's allegations were not
corroborated, and that McCrea participated in some of the
complained-of conduct, several instances of sexually
harassing behavior by Aldrich, Prince and Hawn were
undisputed.
Moreover, plaintiffs and the female flight attendants are
distinguishable because plaintiffs' conduct gave rise to a
complaint of sexual harassment, while the female flight
attendants' alleged conduct did not. Plaintiffs never
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complained of discriminatory treatment or sexual
harassment to Executive Jet contemporaneous to the
alleged conduct by the female flight attendants. When
plaintiffs did report such conduct, it was made defensively
in the context of the company's investigations into
McCrea's accusations against them. Even in the context of
the company's investigations, plaintiffs did not lodge a
complaint at any time, and they did not report that they
found the female flight attendants' alleged conduct
harassing or unwelcome. We have distinguished
misconduct by one employee from misconduct by another
employee on the basis of whether it prompted complaints
or consternation by other employees. In Meyer v.
California and Hawaiian Sugar Co., we upheld summary
judgment for an employer where the female plaintiff had
been terminated after making racially insensitive remarks,
even though male employees also had made racist remarks
but received no discipline, because the female plaintiffs
comments "had such an adverse impact on minority
employees that they impaired her usefulness in her
sensitive duties in the Personnel Department and, coming
from her, reflected unfavorably on [the employer's]
policies toward its minority employees." 662 F.2d 637,
640 (9th Cir.1981). We concluded that, where there was no
evidence that the male employees' remarks had "provoked
anything comparable to the vigorous reaction" that resulted
from the plaintiffs comments, the other incidents were
"not such parallels to her case as to raise a genuine issue of
pretext." Id.
The presence of complaints has also been deemed a valid
distinguishing factor by other circuits. See Yeager v. City
Water & Light Plant, 454 F.3d 932, 934 (8th Cir.2006)
("An employer that promulgates a sex harassment policy
may reasonably distinguish between sexually oriented
conduct that elicits a complaint from an offended
co-worker, and arguably comparable conduct that is
nonetheless tolerated by co-workers without complaint").
In a case presenting similar facts to this action, Morrow v.
Waf-Mart Stores. Inc., two male employees were
terminated after complaints of sexual harassment were
brought against them. 152 F .3d 559, 560 (7th Cir.1998).
They filed an action, complaining that their employer had
enforced its sexual harassment policy more strictly against
males than against similarly-situated females. Id. at 560.Affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor
of the employer, the Seventh Circuit stated,
Wal-Mart's quick decision to terminate
the plaintiffs may seem unfair in a work
environment that appears rife with
similarly off-color conduct.... Although
some of Wal-Mart's female employees
seem to have engaged in questionable
behavior, there is no evidence that any of

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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this behavior sparked complaints of
*1161 harassment like those that WalMart received concerning [plaintiffs].
Without evidence of similar employee
complaints, Wal-Mart cannot be faulted
for failing to respond to these incidents in
the same way that it responded to
[plaintiffs'] situations.

ld. at 564.
We do not support a "race to the Human Resources office"
as the sole determinant of the relevance of a complaint.
The existence of a complaint may not always be material or
determinative in light of the facts in a given case. We stress
again that the determination whether a plaintiff and a
coworker are similarly situated will generally be a question
of fact. But in the case before us, plaintiffs' conduct was
the subject of a complaint to Executive Jet, while the
conduct of McCrea and other female flight attendants was
not. Moreover, plaintiffs' reports of inappropriate conduct
by female employees were made only in the context of the
independent investigation by an outsider, and contain no
indication that the conduct was unwelcome or harassing to
them. In the course of that investigation, several
allegations of harassing conduct by plaintiffs was not only
corroborated, but also admitted by plaintiffs. That
difference was properly taken into consideration when the
district court entered summary judgment.

IV.
[11] In Plummer v. Western International Hotels Co., we
held that a plaintiff has a "right to introduce an EEOC
probable cause determination in a Title VII lawsuit." 656
F .2d 502, 505 (9th Cir.198l). But Plummer's rule was
created in the context of the admissibility of an EEOC
probable cause determination in a Title VII action by the
same plaintiff who complained to the EEOC. The Plummer
rule is not applicable to all EEOC determinations. In
Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., we held that a letter
of violation was a "substantially different" document than
an EEOC probable cause determination in that a letter of
violation represented the EEOC's conclusion that a
violation has occurred. The letter of violation thereby
posed a much greater risk of unfair prejudice, because a
"jury may find it difficult to evaluate independently

evidence of age discrimination after being informed that
the EEOC has already examined the evidence and found a
violation." 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir.1986). We
therefore concluded that Plummer did not establish a per se
rule of admissibility for all EEOC documents, and that the
district court should instead exercise its discretion to admit
or exclude a letter ofviolation.Id.
[12] Plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its
discretion by denying their motion to strike all reference to
the EEOC's determination in the McCrea charge. They
assert that, because the rule of per se admissibility of
EEOC findings applies "only in cases in which the issue in
the court proceeding was identical to that which the EEOC
had earlier investigated," the EEOC's detennination
should not have been admitted here. Further, plaintiffs
assert that the McCrea determination is irrelevant because
it was issued months after they were terminated.
Admission of the EEOC determination was not an abuse of
discretion. As Plummer stated, there is little reason to fear
prejudice in a bench trial, where "the admission of
incompetent evidence over objection will not ordinarily be
a ground of reversal if there was competent evidence
received sufficient to support the findings. The judge will
be presumed to have disregarded the inadmissible and
relied on the competent evidence." Plummer, 656 F.2d at
505 (internal quotation marks omitted). The same rationale
applies here, where plaintiffs' motion to strike was made in
the *1162 context of a summary judgment proceeding
where there could be no jury, thereby reducing the danger
of the type of prejudice expressed in Gilchrist. See
Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505 ("[T)here is support for the
general proposition that the admissibility of evidence
varies between jury and non-jury trials"). The district court
exercised its discretion in weighing the admissibility of the
document, as required under Gilchrist, and plaintiffs have
made no showing of prejudice from its admission.
AFFIRMED.

Parallel Citations
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pOrganization and Jurisdiction of Lower Court

Appeal and Error

103

Idaho 33
Supreme Court ofIdaho.

pFailure to State Cause of Action

Betty HOPPE, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Ordinarily an objection not made at trial will not
be considered on appeal unless objection raises a
question of jurisdiction or that pleading fails to
state cause of action.

v.
Scott McDONALD, Director of the Idaho
Department ofEmployment and the
IdahoDepartment ofEmployment,
Defendants-Respondents.

6 Cases that cite this headnote

(3)

Appeal and Error
...Mode and Conduct of Trial or Hearing
Trial
e-Conclusiveness

After the Supreme Court, 100 Idaho 133, 594 P.2d 643,
reversed and remanded judgment of the District Court in
favor of former female employee in sex discrimination
suit, the District Court, Twin Falls County, Theron W.
Ward, 1., on remand, held that employer had not
discriminated against former employee on the basis of her
sex, and she appealed. The Supreme Court, Shepard, J.,
held that: (1) trial court had authority to try case of
advisory jury on its own motion; (2) substantial evidence
supported finding that female employee was not denied
promotion by reason of her sex; and (3) substantial and
competent evidence supported finding that female
employee was not denied equal pay to that of male
employees on the basis of her sex.

Although sex discrimination action was one
triable of right by jury and neither party
demanded jury trial, trial court had authority on
its own motion to try the case with an advisory
jury, because neither party objected to the
advisory jury; in addition, the court's action did
not constitute "plain" or "fundamental" error.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 39(c).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

Affirmed.
Bistline, J., filed opinion concurring and dissenting.

[4]

Civil Rights
pEmployment Practices
Record did not support rmding of sex
discrimination suit that trial court depended
upon advisory jury's answers to the court's
interrogatories, rather, it demonstrated that trial
court did not believe itself bound by advisory
jury's findings and instead made its own
independent findings of fact.

West Headnotes (8)

[I)

Appeal and Error
pNecessity of Objections in General
A litigant may not remain silent as to claimed
error during trial and later urge his objections
thereto for the first time on appeal.
11 Cases that cite this headnote

[5)

Civil Rights
"'Employment Practices

[2]

Appeal and Error

A plaintiff alleging unlawful discrimination
must prove by preponderance of evidence that

...Necessity of Objections in General

Appeal and Error

WestlawNexr
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she applied for an available position for which
she was qualified but was rejected under
circumstances which give rise to inference of
unlawful discrimination.
(8)

I Cases that cite this headnote

(6)

Civil Rights
~Employment

Practices

Evidence, including proof that female employee
was not rated among top three candidates for job
promotion and that she was not even the
top-rated female applicant, that employee was
rejected because of her lack of qualifications
relative to the other applicants, that is, that she
had no experience in field of unemployment
insurance, she had no supervisory experience,
and that individual selected for position had
experience in all of employer's programs and
had exhibited superior performance in
supervisory position for nearly three years,
supported finding that promotion was not denied
to female employee on basis of her sex.

Civil Rights
~Employment

Practices

Substantial and competent evidence supported
findings that female employee did not perform
work equivalent in nature to work being
performed by male employees in higher pay
grades, and that therefore she was not denied
pay equal to that of male employees on the basis
of her sex. I.C. § 67-5909; Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 703(a)(l), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l);
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 6(d) as
amended 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d).

Attorneys and Law Firms
*34 **356 Lloyd
plaintiff-appellant.

J.

Walker,

Twin

Falls,

for

David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., R. LaVar Marsh, Jeanne T.
Goodenough, Carol Lynn Brassey, Deputy Attys. Gen.,
Boise, for defendants-respondents.
(7)

Labor and Employment
~Equal Work; Skill, Effort, and Responsibility
Labor and Employment
~Presumptions and Burden of Proof

Opinion

Claimant has burden of proving that she did not
receive equal pay for equal work but is not
required to show that jobs performed were
identical, rather, unlawful discrimination may be
shown by proving that the skill, efforts and
responsibility required in performance of the
jobs are substantially equal;
in that
determination, it is the actual job performance in
content which is significant rather than job titles,
classifications or descriptions, so that it is the
overall job, and not its individual segments,
which must form the basis of comparison. Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 6(d) as amended
29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d); I.C. § 67-5909.

This is an appeal from a judgment which denied claims of
sex discrimination brought by plaintiff-appellant, Betty
Hoppe,
against
her
former
employers,
defendants-respondents. Hoppe asserted that while she
was employed by the Department she was, on the basis of
her sex, denied a promotion, and also that she did not
receive pay equal to male co-employees, although her
work was substantially equal in nature to male
co-employees. Following trial, the district court held that
Hoppe had failed to prove that she had been the victim of
any unlawful discrimination. We affIrm.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

WestlawNexr
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SHEPARD, Justice.

Hoppe was employed in the Twin Falls office of the
Department from October 1, 1970, through December l3,
1973. She had no college education but had graduated
from high school and had a significant amount of prior
work experience. She was hired in the highest job
Works
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classification for which she was qualified in view of her
prior work experience, i.e. "Interviewer II", in pay grade
7. It is not disputed that Hoppe was an outstanding
employee and received excellent job performance
evaluations. Although she received no promotions as
such, she did receive several in-grade, or "step" pay
increases, which were granted automatically upon an
employee's satisfactory job performance. As a result of
those pay increases, her salary increased over the
three-year period of her employment from $527 to $673
per month.
Hoppe was initially assigned the duties of "Selection and
Referral Officer" and she worked in that capacity until
January, 1972, when she became an "Employer Relations
Representative". In May, 1973, Hoppe was additionally
assigned a portion of the duties of "Twin Falls Labor
Market Analyst". Prior to Hoppe's employment, one
Siotten had performed the duties of "Selection and
Referral Officer". Siotten's actual job classification was
that of "Employment Counselor", and he was in pay grade
10. Hoppe replaced Siotten as "Selection and Referral
Officer", In January, 1972, Hoppe was replaced as
"Selection and Referral Officer" by one Clark. Clark held
a job title of "Employment Counselor" and was in pay
grade 10. When Hoppe was assigned to the position of
"Employer Relations Representative", she replaced one
Omlid, whose job title was "Employment Consultant II",
and was in pay grade 10.
*35 **357 During the summer of 1973, an opening was
announced for the position of manager of the
Department's office in Jerome. Twelve applicants,
including Hoppe, applied for the position. A promotional
review board was convened and the applicants were rated.
The top three rated applicants were certified to a selecting
official, and the top rated applicant, a male, was appointed
to the position. Hoppe was not rated among the top three
applicants, nor was she the highest rated female applicant.

promotional policies denied women equal opportunity
with men, and concluded that the Department had
discriminated against Hoppe, recommending, among
other measures, that Hoppe be awarded back pay. The
Department refused to conciliate and this action resulted.
Upon motion for summary judgment, the district court
held that it was bound by the findings of the Commission
and granted judgment in favor of Hoppe. On appeal, this
court held that the findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Human Rights had no binding effect on
the district court, and therefore reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. Hoppe v. Nichols, 100 Idaho 133,
594 P.2d 643 (1979). On remand, a trial de novo was held
by the district court, sitting with an advisory jury. The
district court held that the Department had not
discriminated against Hoppe on the basis of her sex and
entered judgment in favor of the Department.
Hoppe first asserts that the district court erred in its
utilization of an advisory jury. I.R.C.P. 39(c) provides:
"In all actions not triable of right by a
jury the court upon motion or of its own
initiative may try any issue with an
advisory jury or, the court, with the
consent of both parties, may order a trial
with a jury whose verdict has the same
effect as if trial by jury had been a
matter of right."
Here the action was one triable of right by a jury and
neither party demanded a jury trial. Hence Hoppe argues
that the court was without authority to, on its own motion,
try the case with an advisory jury.

[I) [2) [3) Although neither party requested a jury trial or
explicitly consented to the use of an advisory jury, neither
party objected to the advisory jury. A litigant may not
remain silent as to claimed error during a trial and later
urge his objections thereto for the first time on appeal.
In the fall of 1973, Hoppe applied for a promotion to the
Bradford v. Simpson, 97 Idaho 188,541 P.2d 612 (1975).
classification of "Consultant I" in pay grade 8. That
Ordinarily an objection not made at trial will not be
position was to be filled from a register of the individuals
considered on appeal, Kock v. Elkins, 71 Idaho 50, 225
who met the minimum qualifications and who had passed
P.2d 457 (1950), unless the objection raises a question of
an examination. Hoppe took and passed the exam, was
jurisdiction, Briggs v. Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co.,
approved for the promotion, would have received the
97 Idaho 427, 546 P.2d 382 (1976), or that the pleading
promotion in February, 1974, but she resigned from the
fails to state a cause of action, Webster v. Potlatch
Department on December 13, 1973.
Forests, 68 Idaho 1, 187 P.2d 527 (1947). The instant case
falls into none of the exceptions to the rule. Nor is this a
Thereafter Hoppe filed a complaint with the Idaho State
case in which the trial court committed "plain" or
Commission on Human Rights, alleging sex
"fundamental" error so substantial as to result in injustice
discrimination in the promotion and pay practices of the
or to take from the appellant a right essential to her case.
Department and also asserting that she had been
Johnson v. Elliott, 112 Ariz. 57, 537 P.2d 927 (1975);
constructively discharged. That Commission found that
Heacock v. Town, 419 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1966); cf. State
the practices and procedures of the Department' s~_.~.~~_._Y.~?~~~(lt~: 94 Idaho 24~., 486 ~:?~2.~gQ 97 ~)~
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(4) Hoppe asserts that the trial court erred in depending
upon the advisory jury's answers to the courts
interrogatories, rather than making its own independent
findings of fact, but this argument is not supported *36
**358 by the record. The trial court's memorandum
decision contains a detailed discussion of the jury's
answers to each interrogatory as well as the court's own
factual findings in regard to those interrogatories. While
the court's fmdings are largely in agreement with those of
the advisory jury, there is some specific disagreement
with the jury's answers and it is thus clear that the trial
court did not believe itself bound by the advisory jury's
findings and made its own independent fmdings of fact.

(5) [6] Hoppe next asserts that the trial court erred in its
finding that Hoppe was not denied promotion to the
position of manager of the Department's Jerome office by
reason of her sex. I.e. s 67-5909, upon which Hoppe's
claim is based, provides in pertinent part:
"Acts prohibited. It shall be a prohibited act to
discriminate against a person because of, or on the
basis of, race, color, religion, sex or national origin, in
any of the following:
(1) For an employer to fail or refuse to hire, to

discharge, or to otherwise discriminate against an
individual with respect to compensation or the terms,
conditions or privileges of employment..."
Federal case law under Title VII, 42 U.S.e. s 2000e-2(a),
is instructive as to the necessary quantum of proof and the
applicable standards for adjudication in sex discrimination
cases. Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 606 P.2d 458
(1979).
It is held that a plaintiff alleging unlawful discrimination
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she
applied for an available position, for which she was
qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which
give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Fumco
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct.
2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668
(1973). Here Hoppe presented a prima facie case creating
the inference of sex discrimination, thus shifting to the
Department the burden to "articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason" for Hoppe's rejection.
McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at
1824. Burdine, supra, clarified the nature of the burden
that thus shifts to the defendant:

"The burden that shifts to the defendant ... is to rebut

the presumption of discrimination by producing
evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that
it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.
(citation). It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence
raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this,
the defendant must clearly set forth, through the
introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the
plaintiffs rejection. The explanation must be legally
sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. If the
defendant carries this burden of production, the
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted,
and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity." 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094.
(footnotes omitted).
Here the evidence of the Department, if believed by the
trial court, rebutted the inference of discrimination raised
by Hoppe's prima facie case. The evidence of the
Department indicated that Hoppe was not rated among the
top three candidates for the job and that she was not even
the top-rated female applicant. It also indicated that
Hoppe was rejected because of her lack of qualifications
relative to the other applicants; i.e., that Hoppe had no
experience in the field of unemployment insurance, which
was a major program administered by the Department and
that she had no supervisory experience. On the other
hand, the individual selected for the position had
experience in all of the Department's programs, and had
exhibited superior performance in a supervisory position
*37 **359 within the Department for nearly three years.
Thus the Department's evidence could be viewed as
articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
Hoppe's rejection, and further, as tending to indicate that
the person hired for the position was better qualified than
was Hoppe. Such a showing exceeded that necessary to
merely rebut Hoppe's prima facie case. Burdine, supra.
The burden of production then returned to Hoppe,
merging with her ultimate burden of persuasion as set
forth in Burdine, supra.
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She
now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision. This burden now merges with
the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has
been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may
succeed in this either directly by persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."
Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. 256, 101 S.Ct. 1095.
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617 F.3d 1273
United States Court ofAppeals,
Tenth Circuit.

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
4(a)(1),

Judy F. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
OKLAHOMA CI1T PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Independent School District No. 89 of
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
Defendant-Appellee.
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Amicus Curiae.
No. 09-6108. I Aug. 24, 2010.
Synopsis
Background: Former curriculum director sued school for
age discrimination in demoting her to elementary school
principal. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma,
granted school summary judgment. Plaintiff
appealed.
Circuit Judge,
Holdings: The Court of Appeals,
held that:
McDonnell Douglas applies to Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) claims;
plaintiff suffered adverse employment action; and
district court engaged in improper "pretext plus"
analysis.
Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes (8)

To succeed on claim of age discrimination,
plaintiff must prove by preponderance of
evidence that her employer would not have taken
challenged action but for plaintiffs age; age need
not have been the only factor, rather, ifthere were
other factors, employer may be held liable if age
was the factor that made a difference. Age

McDonnell Douglas three-step analysis, in which
plaintiff must first demonstrate prima facie case
of unlawful discrimination, which shifts burden
of production to employer to identity legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
adverse
employment action, which shifts burden back to
plaintiff to prove employer's proffered reason
was pretextual, applies to age discrimination
cases under ADEA. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq.,

To prove prima facie case of age discrimination,
plaintiff must show: (1) she is member of class
protected by ADEA; (2) she suffered adverse
employment action; (3) she was qualified for
position at issue; and (4) she was treated less
favorably than others not in protected class. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
§
et seq.,

Adverse employment action, as element of prima
facie case of age discrimination, is not simply
limited to monetary losses in form of wages or
benefits, rather court takes "case-by-case
approach," examining unique factors relevant to
situation at hand; although mere inconvenience
or alteration of job responsibilities would not be

110 Fair EmpLPrac.Cas. (BNA) 4,93 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,967,260 Ed. Law Rep. 541

job
transfer,
had
strikingly
similar
responsibilities, and district court improperly
favored district's version ofthe facts in reasoning
that director generated only weak question of fact
regarding whether school district's proffered
reasons were pretextual. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq.,

adverse employment action, the prong is satisfied
by significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or
decision causing significant change in benefits.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq.,

Although former curriculum director's salary
was not immediately decreased when she was
reassigned to position as elementary school
principal, she suffered adverse employment
action, as required for her age discrimination
claim, where she suffered $17,000 decrease in
salary the following year, her vacation benefits
were reduced immediately upon reassignment,
her retirement benefits were reduced the
following year, and she lost professional prestige,
falling to lower position in school district's
organizational hierarchy. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq.,

Having established prima facie case of age
discrimination and demonstrated that school
district's proffered reasons for her reassignment
to elementary school principal, superintendent's
desire to undertake reorganization of school
district's executive team in revenue-neutral
fashion and his belief that director's former
position contained only narrow duties that could
be absorbed by other directors, were pretextual,
former curriculum director was not required to
produce additional evidence of discrimination in
order to avoid summary judgment; former
director produced evidence that her former
position stayed on books for the next fiscal year
and that staff in her department remained
employed in same positions after her transfer,
and that a new position, created shortly after her

Plaintiff in employment discrimination case
produces sufficient evidence of pretext when she
shows such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions
in employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its
action that reasonable factfinder could rationally
find them unworthy of credence and hence infer
that employer did not act for asserted
non-discriminatory reasons.

When evaluating sufficiency of evidence of
pretext, on motion for summary judgment in
employment discrimination case, court looks to
several factors, including strength of employee's
prima facie case, probative value of proof that
employer's explanation is false, and any other
evidence that supports employer's case and that
properly may be considered on motion for
summary judgment.

Attorneys and Law Firms
*1274

and
with him on the briefs), Ward & Glass, LLP,
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Norman, OK, for the Plaintiff-Appellant.
The Center for Education Law, Inc.,
Oklahoma City, OK, for the Defendant-Appellee.
James M. Tucker,
and
Vincent Blackwood filed a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
in support of Appellant.
Before
Judges.

and

Opinion
Circuit Judge.

Judy F. Jones appeals from the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of her employer, Oklahoma
City Public Schools ("OKC"), dismissing her claim of
discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"),
Although the district court found that Jones produced
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and submitted *1275 evidence to show that
OKC's proffered explanations for her demotion were
pretextual, the court granted summary judgment to OKC
on the ground that no reasonable juror could find that OKC
had committed age discrimination. Because we conclude
that the district court engaged in a "pretext plus" analysis
in rendering its decision, we reverse.

I

Jones began working for OKC as a teacher in 1969. She
then served as a principal of an elementary school for
approximately fifteen years. In 2002, Jones was promoted
to Executive Director of Curriculum and Instruction.
Colleagues evaluated Jones' performance in this position
as satisfactory or better. For the 2006-2007 fiscal year,
Jones' negotiated salary was $98,270, with a daily pay rate
of$396.25 per day.
In July 2006, Linda Brown became OKC's interim
superintendent. Brown altered OKC protocol such that
Jones reported first to Manny Soto and later to Linda
Toure, two ofOKC's five executive directors in charge of
schools and support services. Over the course of the next
year, both Soto and Toure asked Jones when she was going
to retire. On one occasion, Brown also questioned Jones
about her retirement plans.

OKC eventually hired John Porter as its permanent
superintendent in spring 2007. Porter was to start full-time
work in July 2007, but was employed as a consultant
during the months of May and June. According to Porter,
he and Brown "worked closely" during this period "to
ensure a smooth transition into the position of
Superintendent." After reviewing the
district's
organizational chart, Porter determined that OKC's
executive team should be reorganized. In particular, he
decided that Jones' position could be eliminated and its
duties absorbed by other directors. This elimination would
allow Porter to reorganize the district's administration in a
budget-neutral manner. Porter directed Michael Shanahan,
OKC's senior human resources officer, to notify Jones that
her position would be eliminated and she would be
reassigned as an elementary school principal. Brown was
present during this exchange, but averred that she did not
have any input into Porter's decision.
Jones met with Shanahan in early June 2007. Shanahan
communicated Porter's orders and informed Jones that her
salary would stay the same for the ensuing school year
only.l Jones asked Shanahan who made the decision to
demote her, and Shanahan responded that it was Brown
and Porter. Shanahan subsequently stated that four other
executive directors were involved in the reassignment
decision. Scott Randall, OKC's senior finance officer, later
told Jones that she was the only director the administration
had "gone after." Randall also stated that if Porter was
transferring Jones for financial or budgetary reasons,
Porter would have "run" it by him.
After her reassignment and during her first year of
employment as an elementary school principal, Jones
retained her previous salary level. Her vacation benefits,
however, were affected immediately. After Jones
completed her first year as principal, her salary was
decreased by approximately $17,000. This pay cut had the
effect of reducing her retirement benefits. Jones' daily pay
rate was also reduced by roughly five dollars per day.
One month after Jones' reassignment, Porter decided to
create a new OKC executive *1276 position, Executive
Director of Teaching and Learning. The job description
and responsibilities for this position were quite similar to
those of Jones' former position of Executive Director of
Curriculum and Instruction. Both positions required a
master's degree in curriculum and instruction, and the job
responsibilities for both positions included oversight of
programs designed to improve teacher instruction and
curricular development. OKC filled this new position with
an individual who was forty-seven years of age. At the
time of Jones' reassignment, she was nearly sixty years
old.
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In May 2008, Jones filed suit in the District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma alleging OKC violated the
ADEA when it demoted her to the position of elementary
school principaJ.2 OKC filed a motion for summary
judgment, denying that Jones was demoted and arguing, in
the alternative, that if Jones had suffered an adverse
employment action it was due exclusively to the
elimination of her former position.

comments, it faulted Jones for not providing any
"additional evidence" to show that age played a role in the
reassignment decision. As a result, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of OKC. This appeal
followed.

II

Analyzing Jones' claims under the traditional
framework, the district court concluded that
Jones had established a prima facie case of age
discrimination. The court determined that Jones suffered
an adverse employment action because her transfer
resulted in an immediate reduction in her vacation pay,
retirement benefits, and the prestige of her position.
Proceeding to the next step of the fYiLUCmn",
analysis, the district court concluded that OKC met its
burden of offering legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its actions: (I) Porter decided to create a new deputy
superintendent position in a revenue-neutral manner; and
(2) Jones' position was eliminated to fund the new
position. The court held that this evidence was sufficient to
shift the burden back to Jones to demonstrate that OKC's
reasons for her reassignment were pretextual.
In response, Jones noted that funding for her previous
position stayed on the books for the 2007-2008 fiscal year,
and staff in her former department continued working in
that department before and after the position of Executive
Director of Teaching and Learning was created. Moreover,
Jones stressed the similarities between her previous
position and the new position created just after her
demotion. She also stated under oath that fellow OKC
directors, including Brown, made age-related comments
regarding her retirement plans and that these comments
occurred outside of the context of a normal course of
conversation. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Jones, the district court determined that a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that OKC's proffered
reasons for Jones' reassignment were inconsistent or
unworthy of belief.

however, the court reasoned: "[T]here will be
instances where, although the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject
the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could
conclude that the action was discriminatory." According to
the district court, Jones' case fell within this exception. Her
evidence for pretext was not "particularly strong" and "a
reasonable juror could very * 1277 well find no
inconsistencies in [OKC's] position." Although the court
acknowledged that OKC leadership had made age-related

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same legal standard used by the lower
Summary judgment is proper only if"there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
"We examine the factual record and reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to [Jones],
who opposed summary judgment."

A

1

Before reaching the merits of parties' arguments, we must
first determine whether the Supreme Court's holding in
decided after the
district court issued its summary judgment order, affects
compels
our analysis on appeal. OKC argues that
dismissal of Jones' claim because it requires an ADEA
plaintiff to provide some evidence that her employer was
motivated solely by age when making an adverse
employment decisionA

III OKC's argument is flawed on several levels, but we
need address only one: It conflates two separate standards
for causation. The ADEA, like other anti-discrimination
statutes, includes a causation requirement. It prohibits
employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age."
) (emphasis added). The statute,
however, does not define the phrase "because of," and
before
it was unclear which causal standard applied.
clarified that the ADEA requires "but-for"
causation.
. Consequently, to succeed on
a claim of age discrimination, a plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that her employer would
not have taken the challenged action but for the plaintiffs
age.
OKC argues that in mandating but-for causation,
established that "age must have been the only
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factor" in the employer's decision-making process.
We disagree. The Tenth Circuit has long held that a
plaintiff must prove but-for causation to hold an employer
liable under the ADEA. See

another panel ofthis court barring en banc reconsideration,
a superseding contrary Supreme Court decision, or
authorization of all currently active judges on the court."
(quotation and citation omitted)).
But rather than barring our use of the
paradigm,
expressly left open the question of
"whether the evidentiary framework of
lJ"J~Fl1L'
utilized in Title VII cases[,] is appropriate in the
see also
ADEA context."
(applying
to an ADEA claim "[b]ecause the
parties do not dispute the issue").
accordingly does
not overturn circuit precedent applying
UIIJAVflA.' to ADEA cases.
],

*1278 (requiring an ADEA
plaintiff to show that age had a "determinative influence on
the outcome" of her employer's decision-making process).
does not hold otherwise. Accordingly,
does
not disturb longstanding Tenth Circuit precedent by
placing a heightened evidentiary requirement on ADEA
plaintiffs to prove that age was the sole cause of the
adverse employment action.

2
A more nuanced question is whether
rendered the
framework of proving discrimination
inapplicable to claims brought pursuant to the ADEA.
Under
a plaintiff may survive
summary judgment by providing circumstantial rather than
direct evidence of discrimination. See
To do so, the plaintiff must first demonstrate
a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.
If she succeeds at this first stage, the burden
of production then shifts to the employer to identifY a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
Once the employer advances such
employment action.
a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the
employer's proffered reason was pretextual. See

Moreover, the rule articulated
has no logical
to age
effect on the application of
discrimination claims.
held that "the burden of
persuasion [n]ever shifts to the party defending an alleged
mixed-motives discrimination claim brought under the
ADEA."
however,
does not shift the burden of persuasion from the plaintiff to
the defendant. Rather, it shifts only the burden of
7,
Throughout the three-step
process, "[t]he plaintiff ... carries the full burden of
persuasion to show that the defendant discriminated on
[an] illegal basis."
Although we recognize that
created some
uncertainty regarding burden-shifting in the ADEA
context, we conclude that it does not
continued application of
claims. See
(unpublished)
did not overrule circuit precedents in which we
*1279 have consistently employed the
] burden-shifting framework in ADEA cases.").
is not precedential, see 10th Cir. R. 32.1, we
agree with its reasoning and join all of our sibling circuits
that have addressed this issue. See

12] This circuit has long held that plaintiffs may use the
three-step analysis to prove age
discrimination under the ADEA. See

We will not overrule our prior decisions applying this
framework to ADEA claims unless those decisions are in
("Under the doctrine of
stare decisis, this panel cannot overturn the decision of

(unpublished) (same).
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B

facie case of age discrimination.

c

(4) "The Tenth Circuit liberally defines the phrase 'adverse
employment action.' Such actions are not simply limited to
monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits. Instead,
we take a 'case-by-case approach,' examining the unique
factors relevant to the situation at hand." ,VlnUlez
(citations omitted). Although we do not deem "a
mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities
to be an adverse employment action,"
(quotation
omitted), the prong is satisfied by a "significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change
in benefits,"
I

(61 We thus consider the ultimate question of whether
OKC was entitled to summary judgment. Despite holding
that Jones established a prima facie case of discrimination
and demonstrated that OKC's proffered reasons for her
reassignment were pretextual, the district court granted
OKC's motion for summary judgment. It concluded that
Jones' claim fell within the exception outlined in
because, "even when the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to [Jones], no reasonable juror could find
that [OKC's] decision to reassign her was based on her
age." Jones argues that this determination constitutes
reversible error because the rare conditions necessary to
establish the
exception are not present in this case.
We agree.
In
the Supreme Court rejected the so-called
"pretext plus" standard that required plaintiffs using the
framework to both show pretext and
produce "additional evidence of discrimination" in order to
avoid summary judgment.
expressly held that "a plaintiff's prima facie case
[of discrimination], combined with sufficient evidence to
find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may
permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated."
No
additional evidence is necessary to show discrimination
because "[p ]roof that the defendant's explanation is
unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination."

17J [81 Consistent with
"definitively rejected a

151 Under the facts of this case, the district court correctly
determined that Jones suffered an adverse employment
action. Jones' reassignment letter specifically stated that
her salary level would remain the same for the ensuing
school year only, and Jones suffered a $17,000 decrease in
salary the following year. Her vacation benefits were
reduced immediately upon reassignment, and her
retirement *1280 benefits were reduced the following year.
Although OKC argues that Jones did not experience a
demotion, she certainly lost professional prestige and fell
to a lower position in the district's organizational
hierarchy. Also, OKC's argument that a five-dollar
reduction in daily pay is not sufficient to constitute an
adverse employment action is simply incorrect. All told,
the record in this case conclusively shows that Jones
suffered an adverse employment action and proved a prima

the Tenth Circuit has
'pretext plus' standard."

Consequently,
presents evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual
dispute regarding the veracity of a defendant's
nondiscriminatory reason, we presume the jury could infer
that the employer acted for a discriminatory reason and
must deny summary judgment."
A plaintiff produces sufficient evidence of pretext when
"such
weaknesses,
implausibilities,
she
shows
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy
of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act
for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons." IfJr!JYnfL
When evaluating the sufficiency this evidence, we look to
several factors, "includ[ing] the strength of the
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[employee's] prima facie case, the probative value of the
proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any
other evidence that supports the employer's case and that
properly may be considered" on a motion for summary
judgment.
OKC proffered two legitimate reasons for Jones'
reassignment: Porter's desire to undertake a reorganization
ofOKC's executive team in a revenue-neutral fashion and
his belief that Jones' former position contained only
narrow duties that could be absorbed by other directors.
With respect *1281 to Porter's first goal, Jones produced
evidence that her former position stayed on the books for
the 2007-2008 fiscal year and that staff in her department
remained employed in the same positions after her transfer.
Further, Randall told Jones that ifher transfer was actually
motivated by budgetary reasons, Porter would have "run"
it by him. Similarly, Randall attested to the fact that OKC
could have easily taken Jones' former position off the
books if it so desired.
Second, Jones presented evidence that a new position,
Executive Director of Teaching and Learning, was created
shortly after her transfer. As noted supra, this position's
job responsibilities were strikingly similar to those of
Jones' former position as Executive Director of
Curriculum and Instruction. Although OKC argues that the
new position entailed more responsibility, it also admits
that the position reabsorbed many of the same duties of
Jones' former position and was filled by someone thirteen
years Jones' junior. Together, this evidence was sufficient
to satisfy McDonnell Douglas'S third step, and the district
court's grant of summary judgment was therefore
improper.
In reversing the district court, we recognize that
carved out a narrow exception to our general rule against a
"pretext plus" requirement. Under
"there will be
instances where, although the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject
the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could
conclude that the action was discriminatory."
For example, an employer would be
entitled to summary judgment "if the record conclusively
revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak
issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was
untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted
independent evidence that no discrimination had
occurred."
(emphasis added).
But the

that Jones generated only a weak question offact regarding
whether OKC's proffered reasons were pretextual, the
district court improperly favored OKC's version of the
facts. It stated, for instance, that "[o]f the persons who
[inquired into Jones' retirement plans], only one, Ms.
Brown, was even arguably involved in the reassignment
decision, but [OKC] strongly argues she had no role in the
decision process." After noting that "Brown's own
testimony clearly states that the decision regarding [Jones']
reassignment was made by ... Porter," the court concluded
that Jones' "lack of evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find discrimination
place[d][her] case squarely
within the contours of the
exception."
However, the district court was required to view the facts
in the light most favorable to Jones. See
Accordingly, it should have credited Shanahan's
statement that four other directors were involved in the
decision to reassign Jones. Properly considered at the
summary judgment stage, Jones' evidence of
discrimination therefore included age-related comments by
three executive directors, all involved in the reassignment
decision.6 Finally, even if we were to assume *1282 that
Jones "created only a weak issue of fact as to whether
[OKC's] reason was untrue," the corollary "abundant and
uncontroverted
independent
evidence
that
no
discrimination had occurred" did not exist in this record.
Rather than properly applying
the district court
erroneously held Jones to the discredited "pretext plus"
standard. The court faulted Jones for not presenting
"additional evidence" that age was a determining factor in
her reassignment. But after showing that OKC's reasons
for her transfer were pretextual, Jones was under no
obligation to provide additional evidence of age
discrimination. See
accord
Accordingly, because we agree with Jones that the rare
conditions necessary to satisfy the
exception are
not present, we REVERSE the district court's grant of
summary judgment and REMAND for further
proceedings.
Parallel Citations
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exception does not apply here. In reasoning

Footnotes
Shanahan also told Jones that she could apply for other open positions. Jones declined to apply for these positions because doing so
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would require her to apply to "the very people" who made the decision to eliminate her former position.
Jones also alleged wrongful discharge in violation of the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act,
conceded below that this claim should be dismissed.

but

As discussed
allows plaintiffs to prove age discrimination using a three-step, burden-shifting method of proof.
"Although this argument was not raised below, inasmuch as
] was decided after [Jones] filed her notice of appeal, we may
consider changes in governing law arising during the pendency ofthe appeal."

OKC does obliquely reference the "undisputed" fact that, during his tenure as superintendent, Porter promoted and employed several
persons over the age of forty. However, OKC makes this reference in an effort to counter Jones' assertions that she was demoted.
OKC does not debate Jones' ability to satisfy the fourth factor of the prima facie test and has therefore has waived any argument to
that effect. See
(,,[Parties] who fail to argue [an] issue in their brief are deemed
to have waived [that] contention on appeal.").
At the time of the decision to transfer Jones, OKC employed five executive directors (including Jones). Two of these directors had
made comments concerning Jones' retirement plans: Linda Toure and DeAnn Davis. As previously noted, Toure questioned Jones at
least once about when she was going to retire. Also, Davis asked Jones on two occasions when she was going to retire. A witness to
one of these occasions interpreted Davis' questions as "indicating that things would be better if Dr. Jones would go ahead and retire
and that she really ought to consider retiring."
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evidence to put timely claims in context. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,
§
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CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY; Albert
Atesalp; I.R. Schulman; Manual Carbajal,
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State employee, a Caucasian female, brought Title VII
action against employer alleging racial and sexual
harassment and retaliation. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California,
1.,
entered summary judgment
for employer. Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Circuit Judge, held that: (I) court would consider
evidence of supervisor's actions occurring prior to date
referenced in employee's complaint, deposition, and Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge as
being the onset date of allegedly harassing incidents; (2)
though supervisor's sexually-related comments about
women were offensive, conduct was not frequent, severe,
or abusive enough to interfere unreasonably with
plaintiff's employment, as required for Title VII sexual
harassment claim; and (3) employee failed to support Title
VII retaliation claim.
Affirmed.
Circuit Judge, filed opinion dissenting in part.

Title VII is violated if sexual harassment is so
severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work
environment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703(a)(l),
).

Employer is liable under Title VII for conduct
giving rise to a hostile environment where
employee proves (l) that he was subjected to
verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature,
(2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that
the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter conditions of victim's employment and
create abusive working environment, but conduct
must be extreme to amount to a change in the
terms and conditions of employment. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I),

West Headnotes (J ])

With respect to employee's hostile work
environment claim, court would consider
evidence of supervisor's actions occurring during
the four to five months prior to date referenced in
employee's complaint, deposition, and Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
charge as being the onset date of allegedly
harassing incidents, as relevant background

To be actionable under Title VII, sexually
objectionable environment must be both
objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,
and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be
so. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703( a)(1),
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plaintiff's telling supervisor that she would no
longer serve as "acting senior psychologist" in
his absence, and supervisor's comments were
about other people. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703(a)(I),
).

Harassing conduct need not be motivated by
sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex, in violation of
Title VII, and the motivation can be a general
hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1),

In considering sexual harassment claim, courts
are to determine whether an environment is
sufficiently hostile or abusive by looking at all
the circumstances, including frequency of
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably
interferes with employee's work performance.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703( a)(l),

Former employee could not support Title VII
retaliation claim based on allegations that
supervisor stood outside her door and laughed,
saying "she got me on sexual harassment
charges," that supervisor ridiculed her to other
employees, falsely accused her of not submitting
a work order, and was hypercritical, and that she
was forced to take medical leave because of the
stress ofretaliatory actions; laughing incident did
not permit inference that supervisor's conduct
would continue without sanction or that
employee had no choice but to quit, and there
was no evidence that other alleged conduct
actually occurred. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
704(a),

c

~

Though supervisor's sexually-related comments
about women were offensive, conduct was not
frequent, severe, or abusive enough to interfere
unreasonably with plaintiff's employment, as
required for Title VII sexual harassment claim,
where offensive conduct was concentrated on
one occasion, it occurred in the wake of a dispute
about a nurse's failure to follow instructions and

To make out prima facie case of retaliation under
Title VII, plaintiff must establish that she acted to
protect her Title VII rights, that an adverse
employment action was thereafter taken against
her, and that a causal link exists between those
two events. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a),

83 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 618,78 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,189 ...

Opinion
Former medical clinic employee could not
support Title VII retaliation claim based on
allegations that supervisor gave employee lower
performance evaluations after employee accused
supervisor of sexual harassment, where assistant
superintendent of clinic raised the three low
marks that supervisor had given, supervisor's
evaluation was not disseminated beyond assistant
superintendent, who corrected it, assistant
superintendent's evaluation was not sub-average,
nor did employee ascribe any retaliatory motive
to it, and employee was not demoted, stripped of
work responsibilities, fired or suspended, or
otherwise treated adversely. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 704(a),

Circuit Judge:

Aybike Kortan, a Clinical Staff Psychologist for the State
of California Department of Youth Authority (CY A),
appeals the summary judgment entered in CY A's favor on
her action under
alleging hostile work
environment, retaliation, and gender discrimination. In a
published opinion, the district court declined to consider
evidence of harassment not mentioned in the complaint or
in Kortan's charge with the California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing; and held that a negative
evaluation (after Kortan complained about her supervisor's
conduct), unaccompanied by any other adverse impact
such as a demotion or change of responsibilities, is
insufficient to allow a retaliation claim to go forward.
opinion published after the
district court's decision,
indicates that evidence outside the
limitations period should be considered at least as relevant
background, it does not affect the result here. As we
otherwise agree that no triable issues are raised, we affirm.

To establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination based on sex, employee was
required to show that she was a member of a
protected group (females), that she was
adequately performing her job, and that she
suffered an adverse employment action, or was
treated differently from others similarly situated.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1),
§

and Law Firms
*1106
the plaintiff-appellant.

Los Angeles, California, for

Deputy Attorney General, San Diego,
California, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California Edward Rafeedie, District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV -96-08518-ER
Before:
and
Circuit Judges, and
GEORGE, Senior District Judge."

Kortan, who is a Caucasion female, began working at the
Southern Youth Reception Center and Clinic (SYCC) in
June 1988 as a Clinical Staff Psychologist. On June 29,
1989, her supervisor, Dr. Albert Atesalp, appointed Kortan
as "acting senior psychologist" with the authority to act on
his behalfin his absence. This was a special designation for
which Kortan received no extra remuneration or benefits.
On January 26, 1994, she was honored as Outstanding
Employee of the Year. Kortan had no complaints about
Atesalp's behavior until February 1994.
On February 1, she left instructions with the nursing staff
that a ward who had been admitted to the hospital was not
to be discharged back into the general population without
her approval, but the next day discovered that her
instructions had been tom up and the ward had been
returned. Kortan believed that Nurse Chavez was
responsible and reported this to Atesalp. Atesalp did not
seem to Kortan to take her problem seriously. On February
3, Kortan wrote Atesalp that she no longer wanted to be
"acting senior" in his absence, stating that "for the past 5
years, I have been acting in your capacity when you are
absent. I have been trying to do my best. However,
regardless of how much I try, I am unable to improve in
any way how things are around here." Over coffee after
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Atesalp received the memo, Kortan says that he referred to
one female, who was *1107 formerly a superintendent of
the SRCC, as a "regina," and said that this person "laughs
like a hyena." He also referred to a former assistant
superintendent as a "madonna," "regina" and a "castrating
bitch." In the same conversation, Atesalp referred to
women generally as "bitches" and "histrionics."2
Sometime between February 3 and 10, Kortan complained
about Atesalp's conduct to Assistant Superintendent
Schulman. He seemed empathetic and encouraged Kortan
to "take him [Atesalp] on." Kortan then complained to
Superintendent Manual Carbajal and memorialized her
charges against Atesalp in a February 10, 1994
memorandum. The memorandum details a number of
difficulties, including the incident with Nurse Chavez;
complaints from other psychologists that Atesalp
pressured them to write reports; being called to Atesalp's
office to listen to a tape by Dr. Abrams (a male
psychologist on staff) whose language was shocking to
Kortan and later, to read a letter Atesalp had written to
Abrams that used the phrase "masturbate yourself'; and
Atesalp's referring to a former Superintendent as "regina,"
and making racial remarks about blacks. The Office of the
Superintendent forwarded Kortan's complaints together
with a request for investigation to the Headquarters of the
California Youth Authority in Sacramento. Brian Rivera of
Internal Affairs was assigned to investigate.
After Kortan complained about Atesalp, he started to give
her "the looks" and to stare at her instead of smiling, as he
had before. Atesalp told Kortan that "All this time, I
assumed you were 'Artemis' ... I made a mistake, and you
are not 'Artemis.' You are 'Medea.' " She also heard him
laughing outside her door, saying "Yeah, she got me on
sexual harassment charges. Ha. Ha."
Meanwhile, Kortan was concerned about having an
upcoming evaluation conducted by Atesalp. She asked that
her supervision be transferred from Atesalp to Dr.
Pastrana, the Senior Psychologist of the Marshall program.
However, that program was separate from the diagnostic
program in which Kortan was working and was fully
staffed with clinical psychologists at the time.
Consequently, Atesalp did the evaluation. He rated
Kortan's performance as "E" ("performance consistently
exceeds expected standards") in five of the eight areas of
evaluation and "I" ("improvement needed to meet
expected standards") in three areas: work habits,
relationships with people,
and meeting work
commitments. These were the lowest overall evaluations
Kortan had received, although she had received an "M"
("performance fully meets expected standards") in the
"work habits" section on her 1989 evaluation. To avoid
any perception of retaliation, Schulman independently

reviewed Atesalp's evaluation of Kortan; because he did
not believe that Atesalp's initial evaluation was completely
accurate, and felt there was retaliation, he changed the
three low ratings to "M." He explained that he could not
give Kortan higher ratings because she had been on
vacation or leave for a significant part of the evaluation
period (between May and August 1993), and the
maintenance staff had complained about how she treated
them. Both Kortan and Atesalp refused to sign the
evaluation. Only Schulman's evaluation (signed April 26)
ended up in Kortan's personnel file.
On March 11 Schulman instructed Atesalp to conduct
business with Kortan so there could be no perception of
retaliation or harassment. On March 22, after reviewing
Atesalp's initial performance evaluation, Schulman told
him to stop any type of behavior that might be perceived as
retaliatory or harassing. He also forwarded * 11 08
information about Atesalp's possibly retaliatory conduct to
Rivera.
Kortan asked Schulman for a temporary transfer to the
Ventura facilty, but Schulman had no discretion to effect
such a transfer. When Kortan inquired of Vivian Crawford,
the Superintendent of the Ventura facility, regarding a
position, she was told there was none available but that her
letter would be kept on file. Kortan also indicated to Rivera
that she would like to change offices, as hers was located
next to Atesalp's. Alternatives were discussed with her and
her office was eventually moved in September.
Rivera completed his report May 7, 1994; he found the
charges of harassment in Kortan's February 10
memorandum unsubstantiated. Kortan was advised of
CY A's conclusion that there was no evidence of sexual
harassment on October 5, 1994. Her last day of work was
October 24, and she was hospitalized the next day. Since
then, Kortan has been on leave of absence.
Kortan filed charges with the EEOC on October 31, 1994.
She claimed that starting February 2, 1994, Atesalp created
a hostile work environment by using racist and sexist
terminology, and that after complaining about his conduct
she was given a lowered performance rating, had a
temporary transfer request denied, and had been threatened
with disciplinary action if she spoke about the allegations.
She received a right to sue letter in September 1996, and
filed this action December 6, 1996.
CY A moved for summary judgment, which the district
court granted. Kortan timely appeals.

II
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Kortan makes two arguments with respect to her hostile
work environment claim. First, she argues that there is a
triable issue as to the existence of a hostile work
environment; and second, she asserts that the district
court's decision to grant summary judgment was based in
large part on its decision not to consider evidence of
Atesalp's actions occurring during the four to five months
prior to February 3, 1994.

A

I I I The pre-February 3, 1994 evidence Kortan proffered
consists of her declaration that beginning in late 1993 and
continuing into 1994, Atesalp used gender derogatory
language in her presence, including referring to various
staff members as a "castrating bitch," "Madonna," and
"regina. Kortan also states that Atesalp referred to her as
"Rapunzel" and "Medea" and wrote postcards to her at
home. Asked at her deposition about Atesalp's use ofterms
such as "Madonna" or "castrating bitch," Kortan indicated
that prior to February 3, 1994 he did so "[v]ery
infrequently," "[p]robably once or twice" in the case of the
term "castrating bitch." Also, once, in talking about his
license, he described a woman who interviewed him as
"histrionic."
The district court did not consider this evidence because
Kortan expressly limited the onset of the allegedly
harassing incidents to February 1994 in her complaint, her
Kortan
EEOC charges,4 and her deposition. * 11 09
submits that this was wrong under our opinion in
,
because
Atesalp's prior actions were "like and reasonably related"
to her allegations of harassment occurring after February 3,
1994, and would have been within the scope of a
reasonably thorough EEOC investigation.
In Farmer, the employer decided to reduce the number of
women employed in production jobs and to accomplish
this by a gender neutral lay-off followed by rehires that
would be mostly male. The plaintiff raised a
discriminatory layoff claim in her federal complaint, which
Farmer Bros. sought to have dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies on the ground that she had
not included the layoff claim (as compared with a failure to
rehire claim) in the charges filed with the EEOC. In that
context we stated that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the lay-off claim if that claim fell within
the scope of the EEOC's actual investigation or an "
'EEOC' investigation which can reasonably be expected to
grow out of the charge of discrimination.' " Id. at 899
(quoting
We went on to note that Farmer had included

her claim of discriminatory lay-off in her EEOC charge,
but even if she hadn't, it was "necessary for the EEOC to
investigate the circumstances of [plaintiffs] layoff' in
order to understand the failure to rehire. Id. Therefore, we
held that the district court correctly exercised jurisdiction
over the layoff claim. Unlike Farmer, here it was not
"necessary" for the EEOC to investigate pre-February
1994 events in order to evaluate the claim Kortan actually
made-that Atesalp's comments beginning in February
created a hostile work environment-nor had it done so,
would the investigation have revealed anything probative
except for the same comments "very infrequently" made.
However, after the district court rendered its decision in
this case, we addressed a somewhat similar situation in
Anderson
was a veteran of the FBI who brought a Title VII action
alleging sexual harassment occurring over many years. In
granting summary judgment on her claim of a hostile work
environment, the district court declined to consider any
incident that did not occur within the statutory limitations
period before the EEOC proceedings were brought. We
held that the excluded incidents were part of a pattern of
alleged discrimination that continued within the statutory
period, and that regardless of whether "actionable in and of
themselves, untimely claims serve as relevant background
evidence to put timely claims in context."
Therefore, we shall consider the evidence to which Kortan
points that occurred four to five months prior to February
3,1994.

B

131
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
§
Title VII is violated if sexual
harassment is so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile
work environment. See !VU\i!IT!no
"An employer is liable under Title VII
for conduct giving rise to a hostile * 111 0 environment
where the employee proves (1) that he was subjected to
verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature, (2) that
this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment."
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amount to a change in the terms and conditions of
employment.' To be actionable under Title VII, 'a sexually
objectionable environment must be both objectively and
subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would
find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did
perceive to be so.' "
(quoting
"[H]arassing
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support
an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex."
The motivation can be a "general
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace." Id.
161 Courts are to determine whether an environment is
sufficiently hostile or abusive by " 'looking at all the
circumstances,' including the 'frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.' "
(quoting

171 There is no question that Atesalp's comments were
offensive. The difficulty is that they were mainly made in a
flurry on February 3rd. Once or twice before he had
referred to a former female superintendent as a "castrating
bitch" or "madonna" or "regina," but Kortan did not regard
this as harassing and she thought Atesalp behaved like a
"perfect gentleman" prior to February 3. He used "regina"
again on February 9. As unpleasant as Atesalp's outburst
was, the comments were about other people. He never
directed a sexual insult at Kortan. He also told her, on or
after February 3, that she wasn't Artemis as he had
previously thought but Medea. Even so, Atesalp's
utterances were just offensive. See !I!!v·vn,"w ,/w;vun
(mere utterance of epithet which engenders
offensive feelings would not affect conditions of
employment to sufficiently significant degree necessary
for violation of Title VII).
Kortan argues that whether a reasonable woman would
have found Atesalp's action hostile or abusive was an issue
of fact for the jury to decide. She points to
where we
affirmed the district court's findings and conclusions
following a bench trial that repeated vulgarities, sexual
remarks, and requests for sexual favors by a hotel
employee subjected female maids to severe and pervasive
sexual harassment that seriously tainted the working
environment and altered the terms and conditions of their
employment. Among other things, the chief of engineering
(Nusbaum) told a pregnant maid "that's what you get for
sleeping without your underwear," asked her why she was
pregnant by another man, and made comments about her

"ass." Nusbaum regularly offered to give another maid
money and an apartment to live in if she would "give him
[her] body"; he assured her she would never be fired if she
would have sex with him; and he told another * 1111 "You
have such a fine ass. It's a nice ass to stick a nice dick into.
How many dicks have you eaten?" The evidence also
showed that the Executive Housekeeper merely laughed at
such remarks and herself called one of the maids a "dog,"
"whore" and "slut."
However offensive his language, Altesalp's conduct is not
so severe or pervasive as Nusbaum's in Hacienda Hotel.
Although Kortan urges that improper conduct does not
have to rise to the level of that present in Hacienda Hotel to
be actionable, other cases in which a hostile work
environment has been found to exist are also quite
different. Anderson is a good example. Anderson was an
FBI agent who "endured a host of sexually harassing
incidents between 1986 and 1994," including being
referred to by her supervisor as the "office sex goddess,"
"sexy," "gorgeous," and "the good little girl" instead of by
name; at a presentation she was to make about an arrest
plan, finding an easel with a drawing of a pair of breasts
and the words, "Operation Cupcake," and being told by the
supervisor in front of the assembled group "This is your
training bra session"; receiving various vulgar notes
including a cartoon depicting varieties of female breasts
with her initials next to an example labeled "cranberries";
and being patted on the buttocks by another agent, who
commented on her "putting on weight down there" and
informed Anderson of his observations from time to time.
a female employee of a mmmg company
alleged that over a two-year period her supervisor made
sexual remarks about her, in and out of her presence;
frequently called her "beautiful" and "gorgeous" rather
than her name; told her about his sexual fantasies,
including his desire to have sex with her as well as his wife;
joked that the answer to a riddle about what a Mexican
prostitute was called is "frijole"; several times remarked
about Draper's "ass" and commented to others that "it
would be fun to get into [Draper's] pants"; and on one
occasion used the loudspeaker to ask whether she needed
help changing clothes and said there were several guys
willing to help, and on another, after Draper had taken off a
sweatshirt, to ask whether that was all she was going to
take off.
Montero further illustrates the type of conduct that gives
rise to a hostile working environment. Montero was the
only female employee at a parts distribution center. Over a
two-year period, one supervisor called her a "butt-kiss,"
told Montero he was going to spank her, rested his chin on
her shoulder, grabbed her arms until she said "ouch," and
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made crude gestures. Another supervisor grabbed his
crotch while speaking with her, placed his face on her
bottom, told her he had sexual dreams about her, put his
hand on her chair as she sat down, tried to bite her neck,
and knelt in front of her and tried to put his head between
her knees. Another employee had pulled her pants up from
behind by the belt loop, commented about the small size of
his penis, and placed notes on her desk telling Montero to
dance naked on the desk or to take off her clothes.
The conduct in this case is simply not of this order of
magnitude. Considering all the circumstances, including
the fact that Atesalp's offensive conduct was concentrated
on one occasion, and that it occurred in the wake of a
dispute about a nurse's failure to follow instructions and
Kortan's telling Atesalp that she would no longer serve as
"acting senior psychologist" in his absence, we conclude
that no triable issue exists about whether the conduct was
frequent, severe or abusive enough to interfere
unreasonably with Kortan's employment.

III

181 191 Kortan next argues that the district court ignored
retaliatory actions that were taken after she complained
about Atesalp's conduct, and that it applied an incorrect
legal standard in determining *1112 whether she had been
the subject of an "adverse employment decision." To make
out a prima facie case ofretaliation, Kortan must establish
"that she acted to protect her Title VII rights, that an
adverse employment action was thereafter taken against
her, and that a causal link exists between those two

Kortan identifies the following as adverse employment
actions:
· Atesalp's laughing and stating that Kortan "got him
on sexual harassment charges";
· Atesalp's ridiculing Kortan to other employees;
Atesalp's hostile stares;
· Atesalp's calling Kortan "Medea";
· Atesalp's falsely accusing Kortan of not submitting
a work order to have her desk repaired;
· Atesalp's increased criticism of Kortan;
· Atesalp's low ratings of Kortan's performance in
three categories whereas before her complaints, she

had been Outstanding Employee ofthe Year;
· CY A's failure to respond to Kortan's requests for
transfer and a different office;
· CY A's failure to investigate complaints about
retaliation;
· Shulman telling her on October 24, 1994 to
communicate with him rather than with CYA
headquarters about complaints, and Atesalp yelling at
her during the meeting;
Constructively discharging her.
Of these, Kortan contends that being forced to take medical
leave because of the stress of retaliatory actions is the most
obviously "adverse" employment decision. She analogizes
to Draper, where a woman employee who had been
subjected to extreme harassment by a supervisor and had
complained to management, confronted him months later
about continuing harassment and was met with a response
that included telling his direct supervisor that Draper was
in his office "digging up old bones" and laughing. From
this she could reasonably conclude that nothing was going
to be done to stop the conduct. Kortan views evidence that
Atesalp stood outside her door and laughed, saying "she
got me on sexual harassment charges" as similar; however,
unlike Draper, Atesalp's response was his own
immediate-albeit inappropriate-reaction to her complaint.
From this, it is not possible to infer either that Atesalp's
conduct would continue without sanction or that Kortan
had no choice but to quit. Nor can we say that the
combination of incidents after Kortan lodged her
complaint February 10 were such that a "reasonable person
would feel that the conditions of employment have become
intolerable."
Although she
claims that Atesalp ridiculed her to other employees,
falsely accused her of not submitting a work order, and was
hypercritical, there is no evidence showing that these
things happened. Thus, at most he was less civil, stared at
her in a hostile fashion, and became more critical of her
performance.
This leaves Kortan's evaluation by Atesalp, which
appraised her work as "exceeds expected standards" in five
categories but was lower than average in three-and was
admittedly retaliatory. However, Schulman raised the three
low marks that Atesalp had given to "performance fully
meets expected standards." Thus, the evaluation in
Kortan's file shows that she exceeded expected standards
in most categories and fully met them in the others. Kortan
does not ascribe any retaliatory motive to Schulman's
evaluation, which is the one that counts.
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Kortan maintains that she should not be expected to show a
tangible injury, relying on
and V~.A~ •• ",
In Hashimoto, an Asian-American woman
alleged that *1113 the Department of Navy gave her a
negative job reference in retaliation for filing an EEO
complaint. We recognized that unlike most cases alleging
retaliation where the retaliatory conduct takes the form of
discharge, demotion, failure to promote, or the like, a
retaliatory negative job reference does not itself inflict
tangible employment harm because it requires a
prospective employer's subsequent, adverse action in
response to the reference to create the employment harm.
Accordingly, we held that disseminating a negative job
reference is a personnel action that violates Title VII even
if it does not affect a decision not to hire the victim. In
Yartzoff, an employee at an EPA research laboratory
alleged that the Agency made a number of adverse
employment decisions because of his pursuit of Title VII
grievances in May 1979. Among them were the transfer of
various job duties between August 1979 and February
1980, the issuance of a sub-average performance rating in
April 1980, and the transfer of additional job duties in
February 1981. We stated that "[t]ransfers of job duties and
undeserved performance ratings, if proven, would
constitute 'adverse employment decisions' cognizable
However,
under this section."
neither Hashimoto nor Yartzojf rescues Kortan's claim
based on Atesalp 's negative evaluation. The Atesalp
evaluation was not disseminated beyond Schulman, who
corrected it; and the Schulman evaluation was not
sub-average or undeserved to the extent it was less than
perfect in three of eight categories. Beyond this, Kortan
was not demoted, was not stripped of work responsibilities,
was not handed different or more burdensome work
responsibilities, was not fired or suspended, was not denied
any raises, and was not reduced in salary or in any other
benefit. Thus. Kortan has not shown that her evaluation
was discriminatory or retaliatory, or was such an
"intolerable" act that it would force an employee to quit.
See
(evaluation characterizing
plaintiff as "acceptable" is not "intolerable"). Compare
(unfounded negative evaluations that led to
denial of merit pay in evaluation constituted constructive
discharge).

IV

1111 Finally, Kortan argues that a triable issue offact exists
whether she was discriminated against because of her sex.
In order to establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination, Kortan must show that she was a member

of a protected group (females); that she was adequately
performing her job; and that she suffered an adverse
employment action, or was treated differently from others
similarly situated. See
1
The district court properly dismissed this claim because,
for reasons we have already explained, Kortan failed to
show an adverse employment action.
AFFIRMED.
Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

I respectfully dissent from the majority'S conclusion that
Aybike Kortan failed to raise genuine issues of material
fact regarding her retaliation and hostile working
environment claims. Admittedly, this is a close case, and
there is an attraction to the majority's resolution in not
setting the bar for Title VII claims so low as to encourage
litigation over commonplace, although objectionable,
behavior in the workplace. Nonetheless, I believe that,
given the particular circumstances here and that this is a
ruling on summary judgment where the close call should
go to the plaintiff, Kortan has met her burden for both
claims and should be allowed to proceed to trial on the
merits.
The significant aspect of this case that causes me to differ
with the majority is the overt retaliation against Kortan by
her supervisor, Atesalp-conduct that elevates *1114 this
case from a misogynist's rantings against his female
colleagues into a hostile work environment for this
individual subordinate. For this supervisor did more than
demean with words; he used his superior position to punish
Kortan with a dramatically lowered and undeserved
performance evaluation that even Atesalp's supervisor,
Schulman, recognized as retaliation for Kortan's
complaints against Atesalp. The majority, I fear,
diminishes the true nature of the hostile work environment
Kortan faced by isolating the retaliatory performance
review from its analysis of the work environment,
notwithstanding that retaliation was a critical aspect of the
totality of the circumstances we are bound to consider. See
7,

( "[W]hether an environment is
'hostile' or 'abusive' can only be determined by looking at
also
all the circumstances.");
("[R]etaliation can take the form of a hostile work
environment."). Although Schulman took some steps to
ameliorate Atesalp's retaliatory review, Atesalp-on the
undisputed record before us-remained recalcitrant and
unrepentant, suffered no reprimand other than a
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memorandum directing him to avoid the perception of
retaliation or harassment and retained his supervisory
authority over Kortan. I believe Atesalp's offensive and
demeaning outbursts, his humiliating treatment of Kortan
and-most significantly-the undeserved,
retaliatory
performance review comprise a totality of circumstances
sufficient to withstand summary judgment on Kortan's
hostile work environment claim.
Moreover, even Schulman's revised evaluation largely
relied upon Atesalp's tainted evaluation and left Kortan
with the lowest performance rating of her career with the
California Youth Authority ("C.Y.A.") notwithstanding
her having just been awarded "Outstanding Employee of
the Year" for the same time period. Thus, I believe Kortan
has also raised a triable issue that even Schulman's
evaluation was impermissibly tainted by retaliation.

I. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT: THE

TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES

The record, construed favorably to Kortan, reasonably
shows the following circumstances that turned Kortan's
work environment into one of gender-based hostility. Until
February 1994, Kortan and Atesalp-her immediate
supervisor-enjoyed a relatively congenial professional
relationship in a close-knit work environment. They
interacted frequently to coordinate responsibility given
Kortan's special designation as acting senior psychologist
in Atesalp's absence, and Atesalp occasionally turned to
her as a confidant. As Kortan testified in her deposition,
however, this relationship made her "a captive audience"
for Atesalp's sexist remarks-and ultimately captive to his
retaliation as welL Kortan on several occasions had to
listen as Atesalp unburdened himself of his offensive and
demeaning attitudes toward women, with particular
invective for certain women who were superintendents at
C.Y.A. These sexist, hostile statements about others are
relevant to show Kortan was subjected to a hostile work
environment. See
*1115 (concluding that
environment includes "general hostility to the presence of
women in the workplace");
(concluding that "conduct
tending to demonstrate hostility towards a certain group" is
relevant to show discrimination against an employee who
is a member of that group). Most offensive in Atesalp's
misogynistic vocabulary was his use of certain terms to
label women he held in highest contempt: "castrating
bitch" and "regina," a term he let Kortan know was a
double-entendre for vagina.2 The term "regina" is not the
gutter language other cases have condemned, but given its

intended meaning is just as offensive to women. See
(relying on supervisor's references to
women in a "derogatory fashion using sexually explicit
and offensive terms," such as "dumb fucking broads" and
"cunt" as evidence he created a hostile work environment);
(concluding that such "vulgar and
offensive" words " 'are widely recognized as not only
improper, but as intensely degrading' " and thus frequent
use of such words "clearly violates Title VII" (quoting

(holding that "pervasive use of derogatory and insulting
terms relating to women generally and addressed to female
employees personally may serve as evidence of a hostile
work environment"). Although Kortan for a time tolerated
AtesaJp's derogatory statements about other women, and
acknowledges that as to her personally Atesalp was "a
perfect gentleman," his offensive references bothered her
and she objected to his use of them. Nonetheless, during
the four to five month period before February 1994,
Atesalp's verbal attacks on women "got worse and worse"
and eventually contributed to her February 3 decision to
step down from her role as acting senior psychologist.}
At that point, Atesalp's attitude toward Kortan plainly
shifted and became hostile. In a particularly emotional
outburst, Atesalp directed invective at other female
colleagues and females in general that, in context, Kortan
could and did reasonably understand now included
her-including relegating her to the despised "regina"
category. Had that been the end of it-the emotional
outburst of a supervisor who felt his trusted subordinate
had unfairly abandoned him-there would not be cause for
invoking Title VII. But that was not the end of it. Atesalp
persisted in his retaliation, committing acts of increasing
severity which transform this case from mere offensive
conduct into a valid hostile work environment claim.
Atesalp publicly directed his scorn against Kortan and
made mockery of her sexual harassment charge outside the
door of her office. Such humiliating conduct is an
important factor in determining whether an employee was
subjected to a hostile or abusive work environment. See
Kortan also
presented evidence, which on summary judgment we must
construe in her favor, that Atesalp retaliated by purposely
scheduling Kortan's performance evaluation on the day
Kortan was to meet with the C.Y.A.'s internal investigator
and falsely accusing Kortan of not submitting a work
order. Atesalp also stared and glared at her and became
hypercritical of her work-prompting Schulman to
admonish Atesalp to behave himself in a March 11
memorandum suggesting Atesalp was harassing *1116
Kortan and retaliating against her through "excessive

83 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 618, 78 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,189 ...

corrections on Psychological evaluations, lack of
flexibility of work hours, and documentation for minor
behavior irritants."4
Atesalp did not back off, however. Instead he invoked his
supervisory authority to retaliate against Kortan-using her
annual performance review to send an unmistakable
message of retribution. Thus Kortan, who had a five-year
record of receiving the highest ("E") rating in all
performance categories (with the exception of one "M"-an
average rating-in one category in her first year), and who
was awarded "Outstanding Employee of the Year" for
1993 (the evaluation period in question), dropped two
levels in three categories to the substandard "I" rating in
Atesalp's evaluation. Those ratings were admittedly
retaliatory, as the majority recognizes.
Although Schulman partially revised Atesalp's evaluation,
those revisions neither negated the hostility of the work
environment nor defeat Kortan's retaliation claim. In sum,
C.Y.A. management effectively ratified Atesalp's
retaliation, and added to the hostility of the work
environment, by failing to take any disciplinary action
against him. Not surprisingly, Atesalp remained
recalcitrant and refused to sign the upgraded evaluation.
As the Supreme Court has observed, management's
knowledge of sexual harassment and failure to take any
disciplinary action "may be seen as ... the employer's
adoption of the offending conduct and its results, quite as if
they had been authorized affirmatively as the employer's
policy."
accord
529
("Title VII does not permit employers to stand
idly by once they learn that sexual harassment has
occurred. To do so amounts to a ratification of the prior
harassment."). Faced with management's failure to punish
Atesalp for his known acts of retaliation, Kortan
reasonably perceived her work environment as hostile.5
The majority effectively insulates Atesalp's retaliatory
conduct, however, first by excluding his retaliatory
evaluation from its analysis of the hostile work
environment and, second, by finding no actionable
retaliation because Schulman's evaluation superseded
Atesalp's-essentially, "no harm, no foul." I believe both
grounds are in error: the totality of the circumstances,
including Atesalp's retaliatory evaluation, add up to a
triable case of a hostile work environment; and-as I discuss
next-even Schulman's evaluation supports a separate claim
of retaliation.

II. RET ALIA TION BASED ON THE POOR
EVALUATION

The majority accepts that Atesalp's performance
evaluation was retaliatory, and recognizes that an
undeserved performance evaluation is actionable under
It
attempts to distinguish Yartzoff, however, because only
Schulman'S "corrected" evaluation went into Kortan's
personnel file, and it characterizes Schulman's evaluation
as not undeserved. See maj. op. at 11l3. I disagree with this
analysis in several respects. First, although Schulman did
modifY
Atesalp's
retaliatory-and
therefore
undeserved-evaluation, he did not go so far as to correct it
Rather, Schulman largely relied on the retaliatory
evaluation to give Kortan the lowest evaluation of her
five-year career at C.Y.A., and thereby ratified Atesalp's
retaliation.
As to the three undeserved ratings Atesalp gave Kortan, in
the categories "relationships *1117 with people," "work
habits" and "meeting work commitments," Schulman
merely struck a compromise between the highest ("E")
rating and Atesalp's unwarranted "I" ratings-moving
Kortan up one rating to "M". Schulman may have
independently investigated Kortan in the "relationships
with people" category, but he did not independently
investigate the other two. Schulman contends he lacked a
"sufficient record of her performance ... to give her
anything more than 'M' ratings" in those categories
because she was on evacation or leave for a significant part
of the yearly evaluation period, between May and August
1993. This "justification" rings hollow given that Kortan
was named "Outstanding Employee of the Year" for the
same year, absences and all. Moreover, rather than allow
Atesalp's punitive ratings to drag Kortan down, Schulman
could have declined to rate Kortan in those two categories
for want of personal knowledge, defaulted to Kortan's
prior history of "E's" over the years or otherwise
memorialized his uncertainty. Instead, he simply
compromised and left Kortan with her lowest performance
evaluation at C.Y.A. At the end of the day, Schulman's
evaluation was at least as harmful to Kortan because, by
failing to remove the retaliatory taint of Atesalp's
evaluation, Schulman made clear to Kortan that
management would not eliminate the adverse effect of
Atesalp's retaliation-only lessen it.6
Not only does the majority decline to recognize the effect
of Schulman's tainted evaluation on Kortan, it also
declines to address the "chilling effect which [a
supervisor's] retaliatory conduct might have on the
remaining employees under his supervision."
accord
doubt many C.Y.A. employees observed the conflict
between Atesalp and Kortan and learned that the
consequence of Kortan exercising her Title VII rights was
that she went from "Outstanding Employee" to a
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disfavored employee and became the focus of Atesalp's
wrath. These employees will likely be deterred from
reporting sexual harassment out of fear of retaliation by
Atesalp and ending up in the same predicament as Kortan.

summary judgment on her retaliation claim.

Because Schulman's evaluation did not cure, but
effectively ratified and perpetuated the" 'deleterious effect
on the exercise of [Title VII] rights,' " caused by Atesalp's
evaluation,
(quoting
I would hold
that Kortan has presented sufficient evidence to defeat
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Footnotes
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Senior United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

Also in February of 1994, Atesalp made derogatory comments about two blacks which were offensive to Kortan. She originally sued
on account of these remarks as well, but has not appealed dismissal of claims based on racial discrimination.
Apparently Atesalp told Kortan that a Georgia O'Keefe poster she had in her office was "suggestive." When Kortan asked what he
meant. he said "\ will not say it because I'll be in trouble." Then he said: 'Til say it this way, it reminds me of a 'regina.' " Kortan
replied: "Oh, you have a dirty mind."
The EEOC charge, filed October 31, 1994, alleges that "[ sltarting February 2, 1994, my supervisor, Doctor Atesalp, created a hostile
work environment by using racist and sexist terminology in my presence." In the attached Affidavit, Kortan avers that "[iln early
February of 1994 my immediate supervisor, Dr. Atesalp, began to make verbal comments in my presence that were both racist and
sexist. I have heard him refer ... to females as 'bitches', 'Madonnas' 'casterating bitches'. 'Regina' and 'histronic' these are just
examples, he has used many negative terms to describe both females and Blacks." [sic.l
Kortan's EEOC charge also refers to the CYA investigation, which covered the November 1993 incidents involving the Abrams
tape and Altesalp letter responding to it. But Kortan does not base her hostile work environment claim on these incidents.
Kortan testified that before she wrote her February 3, 1994 letter, Atesalp treated her well and that she was never harassed by him
until she wrote the February 3 memorandum.
Recent Supreme Court opinions (rendered after the district court's decision) have discussed an employer's vicarious liability for a
hostile work environment, and have recognized the availability of an affirmative defense in certain circumstances. See, e.g.,
Since we hold that Kortan has failed to establish a prima facie case of hostile work
environment, we do not address the effect, if any, of these recent opinions on this case.
Prior to February 1994, Atesalp, referred to Crawford, a superintendent at C.Y.A., as a "regina" as well as "a castrating bitch."
Atesalp had referred to Chavira, another superintendent, as a "castrating bitch" more than once and as a "madonna." The majority
overlooks Atesalp's pre-February 1994 statements about Crawford when it says Kortan testified that Atesalp had used the term
castrating bitch "[vlery infrequently" and madonna "once or twice." Maj. Op. at 1108. This testimony was only referring to Atesalp' s
statements about Chavira. Later in her deposition, Kortan testified that Atesalp had also used these terms to refer to Crawford.
Several months prior to February 1994, Atesalp made clear to Kortan that he intended regina to mean vagina when he told her the
Georgia O'Keeffe poster in her office was "suggestive" because it reminded him "of a regina."
Atesalp also subjected Kortan to his racist comments. He repeatedly referred to one African-American employee as a "black ape,"
referred to another as a "black goon" and referred generally to African-American wards as "thugs."
Schulman's memo contradicts the majority's statement that "there is no evidence showing" Atesalp retaliated by becoming
hypercritical of Kortan. See maj. op. at 1112.

5

Kortan had reason to be disheartened, because Schulman had initially encouraged her to "take him [Atesalp] on," suggesting Atesalp
was a known abuser who needed to be challenged. Yet when Kortan did "take him on," she was the one who sutTered adverse
consequences.
The majority also seems to distinguish YartzofJ because Shulman's evaluation was not "subaverage." Ratings need not be
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subaverage, however, to constitute retaliation. Rather, it is "undeserved performance ratings, if proven, [that] would constitute
'adverse employment decisions' "actionable under the retaliation provision of Title VII.
(quotation marks
see also
and citation omitted) (emphasis added); accord Brooks
(holding that performance evaluation with only three below average ratings out of seven categories was sufficient
adverse employment decision to create prima facie case of retaliation).
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for adverse employment decision is pretext for
another motive which is discriminatory. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 703 (a)(l ), as amended, 42
U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I).

4oF.3d1551
United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Maivan LAM, Plaintiff-Appellant,

14 Cases that cite this headnote

v.
UNIVERSITY OF HA WAI'I; Albert Simone,
in his capacity as President of the
University ofHawai'i; and Jeremy
Harrison, in his capacity as Dean of the
Richardson School ofLaw,
Defendants-Appellees.

[21

~.=Retaliation

claims

Retaliation claims under Title VII are included
within McDonnell Douglas shifting burdens
framework. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

No. 91-16587. I Argued and Submitted Nov. 5,
1992. I Submission Deferred Nov. 19, 1992 . I
Resubmitted April 12, 1993. I Submission
Deferred Feb. 17, 1994. I Resubmitted May
26, 1994. I Decided Oct. 11, 1994. I As
Amended Nov. 21 and Dec. 14,1994.
Female applicant of Vietnamese descent sued state
university's law school, alleging discrimination in
application process on basis of race, sex and national
origin. The United States District Court for the District of
Hawai'i, Harold M. Fong, Chief Judge, entered summary
judgment for university on claim relating to first search
and hiring process for director of legal studies program,
and, following bench trial, entered judgment for university
on claim relating to second search. Applicant appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, held that:
(I) as to first search, evidence of bias on part of members
of appointments committee precluded summary judgment,
but (2) trial court did not clearly err in finding that
discrimination or retaliation did not play motivating part in
decision not to appoint applicant following second search.

Civil Rights

16 Cases that cite this headnote

131

Federal Civil Procedure
'S~Employees

and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

To survive employer's summary judgment
motion, only genuine factual issue with regard to
discriminatory intent behind employment
decision need be shown, and this requirement is
almost always satisfied when plaintiff's
evidence, direct or circumstantial, consists of
more than McDonnell Douglaspresumption.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as
amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(l);
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.CA.

Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

47 Cases that cite this headnote
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Federal Courts
>·"Summary judgment

III

Civil Rights

Federal Courts

,"··Effect of prima facie case; shifting burden

::Y,,·Summary judgment

Once prima facie case of employment
discrimination is established, burden then shifts
to
defendant
to
articular
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision, and then, in order to prevail, plaintiff
must demonstrate that employer's alleged reason

On review of trial court's grant of summary
judgment for defendant, Court of Appeals would
make all factual inferences in favor of plaintiff
and not make any credibility determinations.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.

Lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551 (1994)
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151

intentional discrimination at every stage of
decision making process; impermissible bias at
any point may be sufficient to sustain liability.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as
amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I).

Federal Civil Procedure
","',Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

With respect to hiring process for director of
public university law school's Pacific Asian legal
studies program, summary judgment for
university on unsuccessful applicant's claims of
race, sex and national origin discrimination was
precluded by evidence of discriminatory bias at
two stages of hiring process, including evidence
that head of appointments committee had biased
attitude toward women and Asians and that he
had disparaged abilities of applicant, who was
female and of Vietnamese descent, and evidence
that another white male professor had stated that,
given Japanese cultural preferences, program
director should be male. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-2(a)(1 ).

8 Cases that cite this headnote

18)

Civil Rights
~:Hiring

Limitations on liability which are appropriate in
context of sexual harassment cases involving
employer liabil ity for creation of hostile work
environment under doctrine of respondeat
superior
are
wholly
inapplicable
to
discriminatory hiring context. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.CA. §
2000e-2(a)(I).
2 Cases that cite this headnote
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191
161

Civil Rights
;."'" Vicarious liabil ity; respondeat superior

University may be liable where university has
delegated employment decision to committee,
and members of that committee have allegedly
engaged in discriminatory treatment. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 703(a)(J), as amended, 42
U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I).

Civil Rights
i;~Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements

Existence of third-party preferences for
discrimination does not justify discriminatory
hiring practices. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.CA. §
2000e-2(a)( J).
J Cases that cite this headnote
PO)

17)

Civil Rights
.".""Hiring
Civil Rights
,~~Promotion,

demotion, and transfer

Discrimination at any stage of academic hiring or
promotion process may infect ultimate
employment decision, and thus plaintiff in
university discrimination case need not prove

Civil Rights
.. ~Hiring

For purposes of unsuccessful employment
applicant's Title VII claim, different national
origins of applicant and another candidate for
position was relevant, even though both
candidates were of Asian descent, since applicant
alleged not only race discrimination but also
national origin discrimination. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
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II I I

2000e-2(a)(l ).

deemed relevant to, though not determinative of,
claim of sex and race discrimination, or whether
such evidence was wholly irrelevant. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42
U.S.CA.
§
2000e-2(a)(I);
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.CA.

Civil Rights
>=Admissibility of evidence; statistical evidence

3 Cases that cite this headnote

Nondiscriminatory employer actions occurring
subsequent to filing of discrimination complaint
will rarely even be relevant as circumstantial
evidence in favor of employer, given incentive in
such circumstances for employer to take
corrective action in attempt to shield itself from
liability. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)( I), as
amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I).

114)

Civil Rights
.>",Motive or intent; pretext
Civil Rights
.F"Motive or intent; pretext
Civil Rights
.",+Other particular bases of discrimination or
classes protected

I Cases that cite this headnote

1121

Civil Rights
,,>cQuestions of law or fact
Federal Civil Procedure
~./'C Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
For purposes of sex, race, and national ongm
discrimination claim brought by unsuccessful
female applicant of Vietnamese descent,
evidence of employer's favorable treatment of
other Asian women creates, at most, a genuine
dispute as to material factual question, and such
evidence does not necessarily defeat claim at
trial, nor can it do so at summary judgment. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as amended, 42
U.S.CA.
§
2000e-2(a)(I);
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.CA.
18 Cases that cite this headnote

1131

When Title VII plaintiff is claiming both race and
sex bias, it is necessary to determine whether
employer discriminates on basis of that
combination of factors, not just whether it
discriminates against people of same race or of
same sex. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(l),
as amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I).

Federal Courts
".=Summary judgment
Because district court was barred from weighing
conflicting evidence in ruling on motion for
summary judgment, Court of Appeals would not
decide whether evidence of employer's favorable
treatment of other Asian women could be

19 Cases that cite this headnote

1151

Civil Rights
.p.Admissibility of evidence; statistical evidence
Professor's testimony as to biases held by
chairman of appointments committee was
admissible in race, sex, and national origin
discrimination suit brought by unsuccessful
applicant for university law school position,
since professor testified not to remote acts but to
consistent pattern of behavior on part of
chairman, with one manifestation of his alleged
discriminatory attitude having occurred only a
few months before position search. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 703(a)(l), as amended, 42
U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(a)(I); Fed.Rules Evid.Rule
403,28 U.S.C.A.
5 Cases that cite this headnote
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P43,341,95 Ed.LawRep. 875 ...
District court's findings of fact are reviewed
under "clearly erroneous" standard.

Civil Rights
';."".Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof

2 Cases that cite this headnote
In antidiscrimination cases, as in other areas of
law, plaintiff bears heavier evidentiary burden if
factual context renders his claim implausible.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
I Cases that cite this headnote

1201

Federal Courts
,>c·Trial de novo

District court's legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo.
1171

Fact that adverse economic consequences may
flow from alleged act of employment
discrimination
does not render alleaation
.
b
Implausible; antidiscrimination laws are not
predicated upon existence of economically
"rational" discrimination, but rather problem that
exists and which such laws target is, to large
extent, stubborn but irrational prejudice. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
I Cases that cite this headnote

IIS1

Civil Rights
~;c"'Education,

employment in

Sex
discrimination
claims
brought
by
unsuccessful applicant for university position
were not rendered implausible in context of
present academic climate, despite university's
contention that, in that climate, acts that would
have even appearance of bias would constitute
professional suicide. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703(a)(I), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-2(a)(I).
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Civil Rights
";,,,Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements

Federal Courts
,~.o~Clearly Erroneous Findings of Court or Jury in
General

1211

Civil Rights
.,;"Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof

Under Title VII, ultimate burden of persuading
trier of fact that employer intentionally
discriminated remains at all times with plaintiff.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
I Cases that cite this headnote

122)

Civil Rights
.",,"Defenses in general
Civil Rights
·~.; •. Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof

Under Price Waterhouse rule, employer who is
proven to have discriminated can still avoid
liability by showing by preponderance of
evidence that employment decision would have
been same even if discrimination had played no
role, and burden is on employer to make this
showing as affirmative defense. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, §§ 703(a)(I), (m), 706(g)(2)(B)(i), as
amended, 42 U .S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(a)(I), (m),
2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
4 Cases that cite this headnote
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Defense and Education Fund, Asian Law Caucus, Asian
Pacific American Legal Center, Center for Constitutional
Rights, Equal Rights Advocates, Nat. Conference of Black
Lawyers.

Civil Rights
<I",Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof
Once employer has met its initial burden of
production in employment discrimination case,
district court may rule in its favor on basis of any
facts in record supporting its position, even
though court may entirely disbelieve employer's
proffered rationale. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et
seq.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

124)

Civil Rights
'v"'~Effect of prima facie case; shifting burden
Civil Rights
<.·~Retaliation claims
Although there was strong circumstantial
evidence of discrimination and retaliation with
respect to hiring process for university position,
trial court's determination that discrimination or
retaliation did not play motivating part in
decision not to appoint female Asian applicant to
position was not clearly erroneous, and thus
burden never shifted to university to show that it
would not have appointed her even in absence of
discriminatory or retaliatory motives, where trial
court found that each member of appointments
committee independently found applicant
insufficiently qualified to merit inclusion as
finalist. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(I).
12 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

* 1554 Catherine
plaintiff-appellant.

Fisk,

Los

Angeles,

CA,

for

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Hawai'i.
Before: BROWNING,
Circuit Judges.

NORRIS

and

REINHARDT,

Opinion
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Professor Maivan Clech Lam, a woman of Vietnamese
descent, claims that the University of Hawai'i's
Richardson School of Law ("the Law School")
discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex and
national origin both times she applied for the position of
Director of the Law School's Pacific Asian Legal Studies
Program. Lam first applied for the directorship during the
Law School's 1987-1988 hiring search (the "first search")
and became a finalist in that search; however, the faculty
cancelled the search without hiring anyone. She again
applied during the Law School's 1989-1990 search (the
"second search"), but the Law School offered the position
to another candidate. When that candidate declined to
accept the position, the faculty again cancelled the search.
Lam also claims that the Law School's actions constituted
unlawful retaliation.
Lam filed suit under 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII")
and other anti-discrimination statutes. I The district court
granted partial summary judgment to defendants as to the
first search, then, after a bench trial, granted final judgment
to defendants as to the second search. Because we find a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the
defendants violated Title VII in considering Lam's
application during the first search, * J555 we reverse the
award of partial summary judgment and remand for trial as
to that search.2 However, finding no material legal errors
in the district court's decision as to the claimed
discrimination and retaliation during the second search, we
affirm the court's award of final judgment as to that search.

Steven S. Michaels and Warren Price II I, Atty. General's
Office, Honolulu, Hawai'i, for defendants-appellees.

I.

Carin Ann Clauss, Madison, WI, and Joan E. Bertin,
Isabelle Katz Pinzler, New York City, for amici curiae
American Civ. Liberties Union, Asian American Legal

Lam was born in Vietnam of French and Vietnamese
parentage, and is fluent in French, English, Vietnamese
and Thai. She graduated magna cum laude with a B.A. in
English and Economics from Marygrove College in
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Detroit, Michigan in 1965. After college she received a
masters degree in Southeast Asian studies at Yale
University in 1967, and was later awarded a Ford
Foundation Fellowship. After several years as a full-time
mother, Lam taught anthropology courses at Hawai'i Loa
College between 1974-1981. She then obtained a second
masters degree from Yale in Anthropology.
In 1982, she collaborated with her husband, a professor at
the University of Hawai'i, on two monographs on
administration and social movements in Vietnam. In 1984,
she graduated from the Richardson School of Law, after
having completed an externship with the Chief Justice of
the Federated States of Micronesia. While she was a law
student, she wrote two law review articles on Hawai'ian
land law that were published after her graduation: one in
the Journal of Legal Pluralism and the other in the
University of Washington Law Review. During and after
law school, Lam was assistant director of the Law of the
Sea Institute, an organization that was affiliated with the
University of Hawai'i and under the direction of Emeritus
Law Professor John Craven. After graduating from law
school, Lam taught courses at Hawai'i Loa College, served
as a lecturer in the University ofHawai'i's political science
department, and gave guest lectures before Professor
Craven's ocean law class at the Law School.3

A.
In the fall of 1987, the Law School began a hiring search
for a full-time director for its Pacific Asian Legal Studies
("PALS") program A Approximately 100 persons applied
for the position, including Lam. The Law School
established an appointments committee consisting of
Professor Mari Matsuda, who was the chair, Professors
Eric Yamamoto and Randall Roth, and two students to
screen applicants and to recommend a list of finalists for
review by the full faculty. By *1556 some time in January
1988, the appointments committee had prepared a list of
ten names, including Lam's, for submission to the faculty.
Five of the ten candidates were women, among whom were
two of the three ethnic Asians recommended. Matsuda
chose Lam as one of her top two candidates.
Because of a previously scheduled semester's leave,
Matsuda had to resign from the appointments committee.
Professor A., a senior faculty member, approached
Matsuda expressing his interest in becoming chair and
asking that she forward his request to the Dean of the law
school. Matsuda, who was a friend of Lam's, knew that
Professor A. and Lam had had a "run-in" the previous
year.s Matsuda nonetheless passed along Professor A.'s
request to the Dean while also recommending that a
woman faculty member be appointed to the committee.
Subsequently, Professor A. was appointed to the
Next

Ed. LawRep:S75 ...

committee along with a woman professor. At the same
time, Professor Williamson Chang, a member of the PALS
committee, began to attend appointments committee
meetings on an ex officio basis.6
After Professor A. became chair of the appointments
committee, the group discussed forwarding one name, that
of a white male, rather than ten names to the facuIty. When
Chang informed Lam of this development, she became
concerned and set up a meeting with the Dean to discuss
the situation. Lam told the Dean of her prior problems with
Professor A., but said that she was worried that if Professor
A. were forced to resign from the committee his colleagues
would blame her. She thus did not request Professor A.'s
removal from the committee, but instead asked that the
committee recommend five names to the faculty instead of
one.
The Dean, in turn, mentioned to her the idea of cancelling
the search and reopening it to accommodate an Asian male
candidate who had missed the application deadline. In his
view, this course of action had the dual benefit of mooting
any possibility of obstruction by Professor A., since there
would be a new chair for the new search, and of allowing
consideration of the late applicant. Lam disagreed with his
proposal, stating that it would be unfair to reopen the
search.
There was vigorous debate regarding Lam's application at
a March 2, 1988 joint meeting of the PALS and
appointments committees. Professor A., in particular,
asserted that Lam was not collegial, was a poor scholar,
and had poor administrative ability. He finally stated that
in his view Lam was unfit to teach anywhere on the
University of Hawai'i campus. He also labelled Lam's
in-print criticism of another (white male) facuIty member
inappropriate. Craven spoke up strongly for Lam at this
meeting.
Both Craven and Chang later went to the Dean to complain
of Professor A.'s behavior and to recommend his removal
as chair of the appointments committee. At approximately
the same time, Lam spoke to the campus EEO officer about
the Dean's idea of reopening the search in order to consider
the late applicant, leading the EEO officer to call the Dean
and advise him against that plan. In accordance with Lam's
request and the EEO officer's recommendation, the Dean
then announced that the faculty was not to consider the late
applicant. The Dean also announced that Professor A. had
resigned from the committee and that Roth had replaced
him as chair. Although most of the faculty believed that
Professor A. resigned because of a conflict with Lam, the
Dean never attempted to alleviate the resulting controversy
by publicly explaining the events.
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The candidate list was eventually narrowed down to four,
including Lam, whose applications *1557 were considered
by the full fifteen-member faculty of the law school at a
meeting on March 18. At that meeting both Craven and
Professor A, spoke strongly for their respective positions
regarding Lam. Their polarization apparently made the rest
of the faculty uncomfortable. Although a white male
candidate apparently received the highest number of votes,
a consensus did not form around any of the candidates and
there was no decision to extend any offer of employment.
Two weeks later a bare majority of the faculty voted to
cancel the search.

B.

In response to the first search's cancellation, Lam filed a
discrimination complaint with the office of the University
vice-president. Although the University rejected her
administrative grievance after an investigation, it issued a
report detailing confidential ity breaches and procedural
violations in the PALS director search process. The
University vice-president told Lam that he would issue
stern instructions to the Law School Dean requiring that
the next search for the PALS directorship be conducted
pursuant to strict guidelines, with the position's
qualifications explicitly drawn. He asserted that it would
be a "fishbowl operation" consistent with the highest
standards of procedure.
At a Law School faculty meeting in September 1988, two
University EEO officers discussed selection procedures
and recommended, among other things, the use of rating
sheets and a clear definition of the PALS program and its
director. At the Dean's request, Professor Matsuda
prepared a memo on search procedures for the law school
in which she proposed that desired characteristics be
ranked and that minority applicants be encouraged. Further
procedures outlined in University affirmative action
guidelines mandated that interview questions, rating
sheets, selection evaluation sheets, and copies of
recruitment/selection forms be kept on file for three years.
Lam and a support group that had formed around the issue
of her treatment by the University leveled charges of
discrimination and procedural irregularities in the first
search in many outside fora, including the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the American
Association of Law Schools (AALS), the ABA, the
Hawai'i legislature, and the press. As a result, Lam's
allegations received both newspaper and radio coverage,
and the Dean of the Law School and the President of the
University were "cross-examined" about them at an AALS
meeting relating to the Law School's request for

accreditation.
The faculty decided to reopen the search for a PALS
director in 1989. The announcement for the position was
essentially identical to the one employed during the first
search, and Lam again applied, along with 87 other
applicants. All of the members of the 1987-88
appointments committee were either unwilling or unable to
serve again. The Dean asked two faculty members who had
voted for Lam the first time to serve on the committee, but
they declined. The appointments committee ultimately
consisted of three white members of the faculty who did
not support Lam in 19887 (one was an untenured woman
professor), along with two students of Asian ancestry.
Early in the 1989-90 academic year, the new appointments
committee reviewed applications for a commercial law
position. At one meeting, a male committee member stated
that the Law School should not have two women teaching
commercial law. This comment was reported to the Dean,
who said that he recognized that the professor had
difficulty dealing with women but took no action to
remove him from the committee or otherwise to remedy
the problem,8
When the appointments committee concluded its
deliberations regarding the commercial *1558 law
position, the chair distributed copies of the announcement
for the PALS directorship and a brief description of the
program to aid the committee in reviewing the applicants
for the position, Besides these materials, guidance for the
selection process was minimal: members of the committee
independently selected the 15 to 20 candidates that they
considered most promising and the committee list was
compiled based on these separate lists, The chair, who had
been on leave the previous semester, had not been
informed by the Dean of the extensive discussions and
developments that had taken place regarding selection
procedures. None of the suggestions or recommendations
of Professor Matsuda or of the EEO officers was
employed. Despite all of the past debate over the
possibility of discrimination and the need for careful
selection procedures, no mechanism was put into place to
screen out potential bias or retaliatory sentiments resulting
from the prior search.
Lam did not appear on any of the committee member's
lists, and neither Lam nor her application was ever
discussed at any committee meetings. The final list of
candidates that the committee recommended to the faculty
consisted entirely or almost entirely of persons of United
States origin, both white and non-white,9 in contrast to the
substantial number of non-whites and foreign-born
candidates appearing on the list prepared by the previous
appointments committee. The faculty met with six of the
top candidates, three of whom had applied during the first
search and been awarded lower ratings than Lam.lO
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The faculty voted to offer the PALS position to Alison
Conner, a white Harvard Law graduate with a Ph.D in
Chinese History who had substantial law teaching
experience and several publications. Conner, however,
declined to accept the offer. Rather than make an offer to
any of the other applicants, the faculty again cancelled the
search.

c.
Lam filed suit in May 1989 against the University of
Hawai'i, the Dean of the Law School, and the President of
the University, alleging discrimination on the basis of race,
sex and national origin with regard to the 1987-88 search,
as well as retaliation. Defendants moved for summary
judgment in July 1990 and Lam amended her complaint to
allege discrimination and retaliation during the second
search. In response, defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment regarding that search. The district court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding the
first search, but determined that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the defendants intentionally
discriminated against Lam, or retaliated against her, in
connection with the 1989-90 search. After a bench trial, the
district court entered judgment for the defendants as to the
second search. Lam now appeals both rulings.

on the basis of protected characteristics may be established
through indirect evidence under the familiar McDonnell
Douglas four-part test. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407
(1993) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). In
McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff can make out a prima facie case by showing that
(I) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she applied for and
was qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking
applicants, (3) despite being qualified, she was rejected,
and (4) after her rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from people of
comparable qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at
1824.
II) 12) After a prim a facie case is established, "the burden
then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.
Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the employer's alleged reason for the adverse
employment decision is a pretext for another motive which
is discriminatory." Wallis v. JR. Simp/of Co., 26 F.3d 885,
889 (9th Cir.1994 ) (quoting Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775
F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir.1985), as amended, 784 F.2d 1407
(9th Cir.1986)).11

Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to
hire ... any individual ... because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 USc. §
2000e-2(a)(l). It also prohibits an employer from
retaliating against an applicant for employment because
the applicant has opposed any unlawful employment
practice, or has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in an employment discrimination *1559
investigation or proceeding. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a).

13) On summary judgment, the existence of a
discriminatory motive for the employment decision will
generally be the principal question. To survive an
employer's summary judgment motion, only a genuine
factual issue with regard to discriminatory intent need be
shown, a requirement that is almost always satisfied when
the plaintiffs evidence, "direct or circumstantial, consists
of more than the McDonnell Douglas presumption."
Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934
F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.1991); compare JR. Simp/Of Co.,
26 F.3d at 890 (summary judgment appropriate, after
showing of a "bare prima facie case," where evidence to
refute defendant's legitimate explanation is "totally
lacking"). Because we find that Lam satisfied this
requirement, we reverse the district court's grant of
summary judgment to defendants.

A.

2.

We turn first to Lam's appeal ofthe district court's grant of
summary judgment as to the first search.

The district court found that Lam had established a prima
facie case of discrimination under the four-part McDonnell
Douglas test.l2 It then found that defendants had *1560
met their burden of proffering legitimate reasons for not
hiring Lam-specifically, Lam's lack of scholarship, and
faculty disagreement regarding the desired characteristics
of the PALS director-shifting the burden back to Lam to
show the existence of a triable issue of fact.

II.

1.
A primafacie case of unlawful employment discrimination
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14115) 16) Lam submitted evidence of discriminatory bias
at two stages of the hiring process, with respect to at least
two senior white male professors. Most significantly,
Craven testified that Professor A., who headed the
appointments committee for a month and disparaged
Lam's abilities before the committee and the faculty as a
whole, had a biased attitude toward women and Asians.
Indeed, the district court specifically found that "the
evidence suggests that Professor A. harbored prejudicial
feelings towards Asians and women." There was also
evidence that another white male professor had stated that,
given Japanese cultural prejudices,I3 the PALS director
should be male. This evidence is, as a matter of law,
sufficient to preclude the award of summary judgment for
defendants.
The district court articulated two reasons in support of its
decision to grant summary judgment, the primary one
being that any faculty prejudice that existed could not, in
its view, be attributed to the named defendants in the
action. Although the court acknowledged that members of
the faculty "may very well have harbored prejudices
against Asians and women in general, and against plaintiff
in particular," it ruled that "without proof that the named
defendants either shared those prejudices or conformed
their conduct under influence of those prejudices, [the
facts] are insufficient to support a showing of intentional
discrimination by defendants." Consistent with its focus on
the individual defendants, the court found it crucial that the
Dean asked Professor A. to resign as chair of the
appointments committee. 14 As this undue emphasis on the
Dean and corresponding disregard of the faculty members
demonstrates, however, the court failed to give proper
consideration to the nature of the university's hiring
process.
The principal defendant in this case is the University,
which has delegated to the faculty near-total control over
hiring. The faculty, first in committee, then as a whole,
reviews applications, chooses the final candidates, and
votes on whether to extend any candidate an offer of
employment. The hiring process is therefore not insulated
from the illegitimate biases of faculty members. Indeed,
since the faculty is small-only fifteen members-and great
emphasis is placed on collegiality and consensus
decision making, even a single person's biases may be
relatively influential. That is particularly true where, as
here, that person plays a significant role in the selection
process and leads the fight pro or con with respect to a
particular candidate. See Gutzwiller v. Fenik. 860 F.2d
1317, 1327 (6th Cir.1988) (two biased faculty votes
sufficient to establish discriminatory employment decision
in tenure process that required decisions at four separate
levels).

17) As other courts have recognized, discrimination at any
stage of the academic hiring or promotion process may
infect the ultimate employment decision. Roebuck v.
Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 727 (3d Cir.1988).
Accordingly, a plaintiff in a university discrimination case
need not prove intentional discrimination at every stage of
the decisionmaking process; impermissible bias at any
*1561 point may be sufficient to sustain liability. ld.;
Fields v. Clark University, 817 F.2d 931, 933-35 (1 st
Cir.1987)
(where
departmental
recommendation
important, evidence of sexist bias within sociology
department sufficient to sustain liability under Title VII,
even absent evidence of improper bias on the part of the
ultimate deciding authority). Here, the purported bias
allegedly had its ultimate impact at the faculty meeting
stage.

181 19) Defendants argue, nonetheless, that they can only
be held liable if it is shown that they "knew or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known" of
Professor A.'s biased attitudes. They cite EEOC v.
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir.1989);
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir.1991), as
mandating this rule. However, Hacienda Hotel and Ellison
are both sexual harassment cases involving employer
liability for the creation of a hostile work environment
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Limitations on
liability appropriate in that context are wholly inapplicable
to the discriminatory hiring context. As numerous cases
involving discrimination in faculty hiring and promotion
demonstrate, where a university has delegated employment
decisions to a committee and members of that committee
have allegedly engaged in discriminatory treatment, the
university is liable.IS See, e.g., Ruggles, 797 F.2d at 784;
Fields, 817 F.2d at 932.
PO] rIII The district court's second justification for
granting summary judgment was based on the defendants'
favorable consideration of two other candidates for the
PALS position: one an Asian man, the other a white
woman. In assessing the significance of these candidates,
the court seemed to view racism and sexism as separate
and distinct elements amenable to almost mathematical
treatment, so that evaluating discrimination against an
Asian woman became a simple matter of performing two
separate tasks: looking for racism "alone" and looking for
sexism "alone," with Asian men and white women as the
corresponding model victims. The court questioned Lam's
claim of racism in light of the fact that the Dean had been
interested in the late application of an Asian male.I6
Similarly, it concluded that the faculty'S subsequent offer
of employment to a white woman indicated a lack of
gender bias.I7 We conclude that in relying on these facts as
a basis for its summary judgment decision, the district
court misconceived important legal principles.
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1]21 113) 1141 To begin with, even the Law School's
favorable treatment of other Asian women would not
necessarily defeat Lam's claim at trial. See Gutzwiller, 860
F.2d at 1320-21 (tenure position denied one white female
professor in favor of another). Certainly it could not do so
at summary judgment, for such evidence creates at most a
genuine dispute as to a material factual question. * 1562 18
At least equally significant is the error committed by the
court in its separate treatment of race and sex
discrimination. As other courts have recognized, where
two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly
reduced to distinct components. See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at
1032-34; Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F.Supp. 1036,
1047 (N.D.lnd.1984); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629
F.Supp. 925, 946 n. 34 (D.Neb.1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697
(8th Cir.1987).19 Rather than aiding the decisional process,
the attempt to bisect a person's identity at the intersection
of race and gender often distorts or ignores the particular
nature of their experiences.2o Cf Moore v. Hughes
Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th CiL1983) (black
female not necessarily representative of interests of black
males and white females). Like other subclasses under
Title VII, Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes
and assumptions shared neither by Asian men nor by white
women.21 In consequence, they may be targeted for
discrimination "even in the absence of discrimination
against [Asian] men or white women." Jefferies, 615 F.2d
at 1032 (discussing black women); Hicks v. Gates Rubber
Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir.1987) (same).
Accordingly, we agree with the Jefferies court that, when a
plaintiff is claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to
determine whether the employer discriminates on the basis
of that combination of factors, not just whether it
discriminates against people of the same race or of the
same sex. Cf Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455, 102
S.Ct. 2525, 2535, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (1982) ("Title VII does
not permit the victim of a facially discriminatory policy to
be told that he has not been wronged because other persons
of his or her race or sex were hired.").

3.

I] 5) The defendants assert several additional arguments in
support of the grant of summary judgment. First, citing
Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1423 (7th
Cir.1986), and Garvey v. Dickinson College, 763 F.Supp.
799, 801-02 (M.D.Pa.1991), they argue that Craven's
testimony as to Professor A.'s biases was inadmissible
because it concerned acts and comments on Professor A.'s
part that were too remote in time or too attenuated from
Lam's situation. Although the Allis-Chalmers court stated
that acts "remote in time or place" may be excluded under
Fed.R.Evid. 403, it affirmed the admission of evidence of

long-term harassment of black workers because such
evidence demonstrated a "persistent pattern" of racial
hostility. 797 F.2d at 1423-24. The Garvey court affirmed
the admissibility of evidence of discriminatory incidents
that occurred within the plaintiffs department, while
excluding such evidence from other departments. 763
F.Supp. at 802. Even *1563 read broadly, neither case is
helpful to defendants. Craven testified not to remote acts
but to a consistent pattern of behavior on the part of
Professor A.-a member of the relevant department-with
one manifestation of his alleged discriminatory attitude
having occurred only a few months before the directorship
search.
Next, defendants argue that Matsushita E/ec. Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348,
89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), establishes a rule, triggered here,
that if the factual context renders a plaintiffs claim
implausible, she must come forward with more persuasive
evidence to support her claim than would otherwise be
necessary. See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. They argue
that because Professor A. 's alleged ethnic and gender
biases would amount to professional suicide in today's
politically correct academic climate, Lam's charges
"simply make[ ] no economic sense," id., thus justifYing
this more demanding evidentiary burden. Specifically,
they cite to the lack of corroboration of Craven's testimony
as to Professor A., insisting on other evidence of his bias.
We find defendants' reliance on Matsushita to be
misplaced.
The rule established in Matsushita pertains only to the
plausibility of inferences drawn from circumstantial
evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9th
CiLI988). Matsushita does not, therefore, affect our
consideration of Craven's allegations-which we accept as
true for purposes of summary judgment-even if it would
require us to question implausible inferences therefrom.
116) [17) 118) Moreover, while in antidiscrimination cases
as in other areas of law, a plaintiff bears a heavier
evidentiary burden if the factual context renders his claim
implausible, see Morales v. Merit System Protection
Board, 932 F.2d 800, 802-03 (9th Cir.1991), Lam's
charges are by no means implausible. The fact that adverse
economic consequences may flow from an alleged act of
employment discrimination does not render the allegation
implausible. Antidiscrimination laws are not predicated
upon the existence of economically "rational"
discrimination; the problem that exists and which such
laws target is, to a large extent, stubborn but irrational
prejudice. Thus, we cannot say that Lam's charges are
"implausible" simply because the discriminatory actions
might have an adverse economic impact on Professor A. or
the University. Cf Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1110
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n.IO (finding no circumstances rendering Title VII claim
implausible).22 Nor are we persuaded by the University's
assertion that Lam's claims are implausible in the present
academic climate because acts that have even the
appearance of bias would constitute professional suicide.
To accept the University's argument would be to create a
presumption that acts of academic employment
discrimination are implausible and that the Matsushita
burden applies to all such cases. This presumption is
patently contrary to fact and we squarely reject it. There is
no question that acts of bias and discrimination occur in
university hirings today. The process of rooting out
discrimination against women and minorities on our
nation's facuIties is far from ended.
Finally, not only is the point of defendants' argument that
"charges of bias should not be made lightly," somewhat
elusive, but the cases they cite, which concern recusal of
administrative law judges and other impartial arbitrators in
judicial and administrative hearings, are inapposite.23
AUs and judges are presumed to be impartial in their
decisions. * 1564 A member of a faculty appointments
committee is, in contrast, likely to be personally interested
in the outcome of the process.

4.

As we have previously explained, "[w]e require very little
evidence to survive summary judgment" in a
discrimination case, "because the ultimate question is one
that can only be resolved through a 'searching inquiry'-one
that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder,
upon a full record." Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1111.
Besides an overall more particularized factual inquiry, a
trial provides insight into motive, a critical issue in
discrimination cases. The existence of an intent to
discriminate may be difficult to discern in depositions
compiled for purposes of summary judgment, yet it may
later be revealed in the face-to-face encounter of a full trial.
The university setting-in which, as in this case,
employment decisions are made by a group, and
collegiality and personal relationships are often significant
factors-presents an especially difficult one in which to
evaluate allegations of discrimination. As with all group
decisionmaking, a complex of motives may exist. Personal
animus, factional infighting and politics may influence and
even determine certain faculty employment decisions, and
are legally permissible if not praiseworthy bases for such
decisions. Without a full factual inquiry, however, it may
be extremely difficult to distinguish these types of
permissible, though relatively personal, motivations from
unlawful ones. Accordingly, although for purposes of this

appeal we have considered the evidence in the light most
favorable to Lam, because the district court granted
summary judgment for defendants, we express no view on
the reasons underlying the faculty's decision to cancel the
first search. Instead, we necessarily reserve the resolution
of all factual issues to the district court following a full
presentation of the evidence.

B.

We turn next to Lam's appeal of the final judgment
regarding discrimination and retaliation in the second
search.

1.
119) 120) We review the district court's findings of fact
under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Muntin v. State of
Cal. Parks & Recreation Dept., 738 F.2d 1054, 1055 (9th
Cir.1984). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Miller
v. Fairchild Industries, lnc., 885 F.2d 498, 503 (9th
Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 1524,
108 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990).
121) 122) Under Title Vll the ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally
discriminated" 'remains at all times with the plaintiff.' "
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, ----, I 13
S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (quoting Texas
Dep 't ojCommunity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253,
101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)); see a/so
United States Postal Service Ed. oj Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478,1482,75 L.Ed.2d 403
(1983). However, under the rule enunciated in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104
L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion), an employer who
is proven to have discriminated can still avoid liability by
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that "the
employment decision would have been the same even if
[discrimination] had played no role." Sischo-Nownejad,
934 F.2d at 1110 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
243-47, 109 S.Ct. at 1786-89).24 The burden is on the
employer to make this showing as *1565 an affirmative
defense. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. at
1788.25

2.

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district
court first determined that Lam had established a prima
facie case of discrimination and retaliation. It then found
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that "[s]ome members of the faculty and administration
resented Lam's actions and one committee member had
difficulty dealing with women." It did not, however,
conclude that discrimination or retaliation played a
motivating factor in the Law School's failure to hire Lam.
Instead, it held that the discriminatory and retaliatory
animus was not causally linked to either the selection of
appointments committee members or the decision of the
appointments committee not to submit Lam's name to the
faculty. The court also noted that there was no "concerted
action" among committee members to keep her name off
each of their lists.
In addition, the court found that subjective hiring criteria
were unevenly applied. Nonetheless, it concluded that this
was due to faculty uncertainty regarding the desired goals
and attributes of the PALS program and the unorganized
and inefficient search conducted by the Law School, rather
than to discrimination or retaliation. Likewise, the court
concluded that the Dean's inquiry regarding whether one
candidate's application was weaker than Lam's did not
evidence prohibited motivations but instead reflected
concern over the Law School's legal difficulties with
Lam.26
The court ultimately determined that Lam would not have
been hired by the Law School, "even given a
well-organized and thorough search procedure," because
the members of the appointments committee had each
determined that she was less qualified than the candidates
they recommended. Accordingly, the court ruled that Lam
failed to prove a violation of Title VII.

3.
Lam alleges four principal errors in the district court's
rUling. First, she claims that the court erred by "inventing a
non-discriminatory reason" for the defendants' failure to
hire Lam. Second, she claims that the proffered reason is
insufficient as a matter of law. Third, she claims that the
court improperly required that Lam show "concerted
action" to retaliate. Fourth, she claims that the court
misapplied the applicable legal standards.
[231 Lam's first and second arguments pertain to her
contention that the district court improperly supplied the
rationale that disorganization was the legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision not to hire Lam
in the second search. For two reasons, however, these
arguments must fail. First, although the district court found
that the search was disorganized, it attributed the ultimate
decision not to appoint Lam to the search committee's
lawful determination that her qualifications were weaker
than those of the candidates it recommended. The court's

discussion of disorganization was included simply to
explain the uneven application of *1566 hiring criteria,
which Lam had asserted was evidence of discrimination.
Second, St. Mary's Honor efr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,113
S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), precludes Lam's
argument. In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that, once the
employer has met its initial burden of production, the
district court may rule in its favor on the basis of any facts
in the record supporting its position, even though the court
may entirely disbelieve the employer's proffered rationale.
Id. at ---- - ----. 113 S.Ct. at 2755-56. In any event, here the
court did rely on the nondiscriminatory reason advanced
by the defendants, and that reason was clearly sufficient as
a matter of law.
Lam also argues that the district court improperly required
that concerted action among committee members be
shown. Lam is of course correct in asserting that there is no
requirement under Title VII of concerted action to
discriminate or retaliate. In the present case, however, the
court simply noted the absence of concerted action as
relevant to his conclusion that each committee member
independently found Lam insufficiently qualified to merit
inclusion as a finalist; there is no indication that the court
thought that concerted action was required.
[241 Lam's fourth argument for reversal is that the district
court misapplied the relevant legal standards. In her view,
there was sufficient evidence of discrimination and
retaliation to trigger the burden-shifting requirement of
Price Waterhouse. Therefore, Lam contends, the district
court erred by failing to require the defendants to show that
they would not have appointed her even in the absence of
the discriminatory and retaliatory motives.
It is true that the district court here recited the Price
Waterhouse burden-shifting rule in its opinion. It is also
true that the court failed to shift the burden to the
defendants. Because, however, the burden shifts only when
the court finds that unlawful discrimination played a part in
the employment decision, and because here the court
clearly found that impermissible motives were not a factor
in the decision, the court had no reason to apply the Price
Waterhouse rule. Even though Lam presented strong
circumstantial evidence of discrimination and retaliation,
she did not, in the court's view, show that it is more likely
than not that discrimination or retaliation " 'played a
motivating part in [the] employment decision.' "
Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at III 0 (quoting Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244, 109 S.Ct. at 1787). Upon a
review of the record, we cannot say that this finding is
clearlyerroneous.27

III.
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We therefore reverse the district court's award of summary
judgment for the defendants * 1567 as to the first search
and remand for further proceedings, but affirm the decision
granting final judgment for the defendants as to the second
search. The fact that we find no clear error in the district
court's findings of fact in connection with the second
search does not affect our decision to remand for trial as to
the first search. In its decision regarding the second search,
the court did not itself find Lam objectively less qualified
than the other candidates: it simply found that the search
committee members had come to that conclusion and that
it was lawful for them to do so. The court did not conclude,
moreover, that it would have been unreasonable for the
committee members to have chosen Lam, nor did it
conclude that the faculty would have failed to select her
had she been recommended. In the first search, of course,

the members of the search committee did find Lam
sufficiently qualified to merit consideration by the full
faculty.28 Her name was included in the final list of four
recommended candidates. On the basis of the record before
us, we cannot say that absent the alleged bias the faculty
would have failed to select Lam for the PALS directorship
following the first search.
REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part.

Parallel Citations
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Footnotes
Lam also alleged violations of42 U.s.C. § 1981,42 U.S.c. § 1983,42 U.S.c. § 2000d (Title VI) and 20 U.s.c. § 1681 et seq. (Title
IX). The Title VII claim was the focus of the litigation, however, and the district court's conclusions of law regarding the other
alleged statutory violations are extremely summary, simply restating the overall conclusion that Lam did not prove discrimination on
the basis of racc, sex or national origin. Insofar as our remand of Lam's Title VII claim causes the district court to amend its
conclusions regarding discrimination, a reconsideration of its other statutory rulings will, of course, be necessary.

2

Since it was ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, the district court made all factual inferences in favor of Lam and did not
make credibility determinations. We must do the same on review of the court's decision. In doing so, of course, we express no view
regarding the truth of such allegations of bias. Specifically, we do not intend by anything we say in this opinion to suggest or imply
that any individual engaged in any speech or conduct of a biased or prejudicial nature.

3

Lam also belongs to several professional associations and has served on the Board of the Commission on Folk Law and Legal
Pluralism of the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. In addition, she is a member of the Hawai'i
bar.
After the initiation of the present litigation, Lam was hired by the University of Wisconsin law school. She later accepted an
associate professorship at CUNY law schooL which began in the fall of 1992.

4

The advertisement for the position read:
Duties: To develop an internationally recognized comparative law program, with a focus on the Pacific Basin region. The
position may entail conference organizing, grant-writing, liaison with Pacific-Asian scholars, and working with students and
systems. Additionally, teaching of related courses, scholarship, professional activities, committee. Desirable Qualifications: An
outstanding academic record and proven or potential excellence in scholarship and teaching. Foreign language abilities;
familiarity with Asian, Pacific and international scholars, organizations, international law, or comparative law. Ability to teach
courses in the J.D. program. Should be able to teach courses in Public or Private International Law, International Business
Transactions or a comparative law course on specific legal systems. Administrative experience and creative talents are
important... .. Closing Date: January 15, 1988.

5

The incident involved funding sought by Professor A. for a workshop he attended in Goa, India. Lam allegedly exposed certain
misrepresentations made by Professor A. in connection with this funding. embarrassing him. As a result, Lam was dismayed when
she found out that Professor A. would be replacing Matsuda as chair of the appointments committee.

6

The PALS Committee was a separate committee charged with developing policy with respect to the PALS program; Craven was
another of its members.

7

Since faculty balloting during the first search was open and in the presence of the Dean, he would have been aware of faculty
members' previous votes.

8

The woman law professor who spoke to the Dean about the male professor's comment testified that she believed the comment was
seriously meant, and that the search was "seriously tainted" by the male professor's attitude toward women applicants. She suggested
that it was inappropriate to continue the application process with the committee as then constituted. The male professor did, however,
eventually vote for the woman applicant who had prompted his comments.
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9

The list was divided into tiers, with a first group offive candidates described as the most qualified, a second group of three candidates
as qualified, and then an "also ran" group. Of the thirteen people on the list. only one had a last name denoting non-European ancestry
(his ancestry was never confirmed at trial but his resume indicates that he was born in Kansas), and only two were women.

10

The other three were first-time applicants.

11

Retaliation claims are included within this framework. Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc .. 885 F.2d 498, 504 n. 4 (9th Cir.1989);
Yartzoflv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1987). As noted in Ruggles v. California Polytechnic State University. 797 F.2d
782 (9th Cir.1986), "[r]etaliation is simply one sort of discrimination." Id. at 788 n. I (Nelson, 1., concurring); see 42 U.S.c. §
2000e-3(a) (using term "discrimination" to describe retaliation). Most commonly, of course, we rely on the tem1 discrimination as
shorthand to describe discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics. while using the term retaliation to describe
discrimination on account of an employee's, or potential employee's. opposition to an unlawful employment practicc.

12

Since Lam, in her opposition to summary judgment in connection with the first search, focused on discrimination on the basis of
protected characteristics rather than retaliation, the district court never specifically addressed the retaliation issue.
Since we conclude that Lam presented sut1icient evidence of discriminatory bias to survive summary judgment, we need not rule
on the adequacy of her asserted evidence of retaliation. We note, nonetheless, that the district court determined that most members
of the faculty believed that Professor A. recused himself from the appointments committee because of Lam's opposition to him.
and it found that some faculty members "were outraged that Professor A. had been asked to resign due to possible bias:' It would
certainly bc possible to infer that those faculty members allowed their anger at Professor A. 's forced resignation to shade their
consideration of Lam's application.

13

The existence of such third party preferences for discrimination does not. of course, justify discriminatory hiring practices. See, e.g.,
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.1971) (holding that customer preference for female flight attendants does
not constitute a "bona fide occupational qualification" under Title VII); c/ C. Sunstein. Three Civil Rights Fallacies. 79 CaLL.Rev.
751, 760-61 (1991 ) (economically "rational" discrimination has powerful reinforcing effect on ordinary prejudice).

14

The court stated that summary judgment for defendants would have been inappropriate had Professor A. been allowed to remain as
chair.

15

In their argument on this point, the defendants make no distinction between the University's liability and that of the Dean and
President (who are both sued in their ot1icial capacities).

16

Aside from the difference in gender, it is significant that Lam and the Asian male candidate were of different national origins-Lam
being Vietnamese-French, the male candidate, Chinese. Lam alleged not only race discrimination but also national origin
discrimination, thereby raising this distinction as relevant under Title VII. Moreover. the particular geographical consciousness of the
PALS program means that the distinction might be more salient than it otherwise might be.

17

The district court should have noted, besides the difference in race. the chronological considerations that preclude reliance on this
fact to defeat Lam's discrimination claim. The offer of employment to the female applicant was made long after Lam had complained
of discrimination both publicly and by filing the present discrimination action. By that time, the Law School was on notice that its
employment actions would be subject to scrutiny. Given the obvious incentive in such circumstances for an employer to take
corrective action in an attempt to shield itself from liability, it is clear that nondiscriminatory employer actions occurring subsequent
to the filing of a discrimination complaint will rarely even be relevant as circumstantial evidence in favor of the employer. Gonzales
v. Police Dept. o/San Jose. 90 I F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir.1990).

18

Since the district court is barred from weighing conflicting evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we need not decide
if such evidence might be deemed relevant to, though not detern1inative of a claim of race and sex discrimination. We note,
nonetheless, that in Jefferies v. Harris County Commul1ity Action Ass '11.. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.1980). the Fifth Circuit held that
evidence of nondiscriminatory treatment of black males and white females is wholly irrelevant to the question of discrimination
against a black female plaintiff claiming bias on both racial and gender grounds. Id. at 1034. On the other hand. evidence of
discriminatory treatment of~ for example, a black male clearly is relevant to the discrimination claim of a black woman. See, e.g..
EEOC v. Beverage Cal1ners. Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir.1990). We express no view on whether such a one-way bar is
justified in either some or all cases.

19

In essence, the district court's approach reduces discrimination against Asian women to discrimination against Asian men plus
discrimination against white women. The inherent fallacy of this approach is obvious when one considers that discrimination against
white men could be similarly analyzed. using the same models: Asian men plus white women.
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of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551
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20

See K. Crenshaw. Demarginalbng the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscriminatory Doctrine,
Feminist TheO/~v alld Antiracist Politics. 1989 U.Chi.Legal F. 139; J. Winston, l'v/irror, Alirror on the Wall: Title UI. Section 1981
and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 Cal.L.Rev. 775 (1991).

21

See. e.g., 1. Hagedorn, Asian Women in Film: No Joy, No Luck, Ms., lan.!Feb. 1994, at 74 (listing stereotypes of Asian women such
as geisha, dragon lady, concubine, lotus blossom).

22

In /YfcLaughlin, we emphasized the Matsushita rule's particular relevance to antitrust conspiracy cases (see 849 F.2d at 1207), though
we note that courts have applied Matsushita's reasoning to other contexts in which economic rationality might safely be presumed.
See. e.g.. Knight v. Shanf 875 F.2d 516. 523 (5th Cir.1989) (breach of contract); In re Fortune S:vs. Sec. Litigation, 680 F.Supp.
1360, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (securities fraud). Title VII, by contrast, applies to a very ditTerent kind of motivation, so that such cases
arc inappositc.

23

See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 826-27, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 1588,89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986); AfcLaughlin v. Union Oil Co.
of California. 869 F.2d 1039. 1047 (7th Cir.1989): Glass v. Pfej/er, 849 F.2d 1261. 1268 (10th Cir.1988): iv/aiel' v. Orr, 758 F .2d
1578. 1583 (Fed.Cir.1985).

24

Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the rule of Price Waterhouse. In cases in which § 107 applies, the employer is
liable once the plaintiff shows that a protected characteristic played a motivating part in the employment decision (the employer's
proof that the same employment decision would have been made in the absence of the impermissible motive goes only to the issue of
relief). See 42 U.s.c. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). Lam argues that § 107 is applicable here, but we need not decide this
issue in light of our holding that Lam did not prove that discrimination or retaliation was a motivating factor in the Law School's
decision not to appoint her.

25

As the Court explained in Price Waterhouse. the rule that the burden shifts to the employer to prove this affirmative defense does not
affect the rule that the plaintitT retains the burden of persuasion regarding discrimination, since these burdens involve two separate
and not inconsistent propositions. 490 U.S. at 246 n. II, 109 S.Ct. at 1788 n. II.

26

In her brief: Lam states that "the Dean admitted, and [Professor K.] agreed. that Lam was more qualified than a white male finalist in
the second search." However, that professor testified only that she "agreed with [the Dean] that [the white male finalist's] file was
less strong than Alison Conner's," not Lam's. Although Professor K. was eritical of both finalists' qualifications. she never compared
their qualifications with Lam's. Similarly, although Professor K. stated that the Dean expressed concern that that finalist's file might
be weaker than Lam's, she did not say that the Dean in fact believed that the finalist's file was weaker.

27

Lam presented a variety of evidence in support of her allegations of bias. Most obviously, Lam's absence from everyone of the
selection lists of the appointments committee members was suspect in light of her strong showing in the first search. Moreover,
non-white and foreign-born candidates were conspicuously missing from the final list of candidates prepared in the second search, in
contrast to the more diverse origins of candidates considered during the first search.
Additionally, the defendants failed to institute any of the procedural reforms suggested in the aftermath of Lam's original
allegations. As wc have previously explained, although an employer's violation of its own hiring policies does not constitute a
prima facie violation of Title VII, it may be circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Gonzales, 90 I F.2d at 761; compare
Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464. 465 (1st Cir.) (affirming district court finding of no discrimination in light of "exacting
protocol" of tenure decision process, including "prescribed standards" by which to measure candidates), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
848.111 S.Ct.137.112L.Ed.2d 104(1990».
Lam also showed evidence that one search committee member was reluctant to hire a woman commercial law professor, although
that member did in fact vote in favor of otTering the position to a woman.
Finally. Lam presented substantial evidence that, given the Law School's "collegial" atmosphere and corresponding emphasis on
consensus, the notoriety of her protest against the school's alleged discrimination was likely to afTect her chances of being otTered
a position there. Certain professors testified that the Dean and the President were strongly opposed to hiring Lam, and that this
opposition was known to the Law School faculty. (In her brief. Lam asserts that "two search committee members considered her
[oppositional] activities in rejecting her application." implying that their view of her activities affected their consideration of her
application. However, of the two professors cited, one was not on the second search committee, and the other stated that his view
of Lam's activities would not have affected his judgment on the merits of her application.)
Accordingly, the court's assertion that "no evidence has been adduced to point even to an inference of discriminatory or retaliatory
motives on the part of the second search committee members in the selection of recommended candidates" (Finding of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, at 14) is clearly erroneous. The above-described circumstantial evidence certainly supports an inference of
discriminatory/retaliatory intent. It does not, however, necessitate the conclusion that the defendants' failure to appoint Lam was
based on impermissible motivations. As we have emphasized, it often requires a searching factual inquiry to ascertain the
motivations for a hiring decision, a difficult task that is exacerbated when mUltiple decisionmakers are involved. Here, over the
course ofa five-day bench trial, the district court heard testimony from a variety of sources, including Lam, each of the members of
the search committee, various Law School facultyn1embers,and the Dean. The search committee members unif()rll1lx~tate~ that
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their decisions wcre not motivated by impermissible bias: the court. assessing their credibility and exercising its judgment. chose
to believe them. We cannot say that the court clearly erred in doing so.

28

We note, in addition, that substantial evidence was adduced regarding faculty uncertainty as to the goals of the PALS program and
the desirable attributes of its director. In particular, there was a good deal of debate in the faculty regarding whether a "public law" or
"private law" emphasis was preferable. As a result, therefore, ofthe two years intervening between the first and second searches, Lam
may have appeared a less attractive candidate to the 1989-90 search committee members.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.
Before BOOCHEVER, HALL and RYMER, Circuit
Judges.

Opinion
RYMER, Circuit Judge:

Michelle Lindahl brought this suit against her employer,
Air France, for sex discrimination under Title Vil of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and age discrimination under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) based on
Air France giving a promotion to a young male instead of
to her, a 49-year-old female. The district court granted Air
France's motion for summary judgment. We reverse.

*1436 I
Lindahl worked as a Customer Promotion Agent in Air
France's Los Angeles office. The office had two groups of
employees to handle sales activities, Customer Promotion
Agents and Sales Representatives. Sales Representatives
worked mostly in the field promoting sales, while the
Customer Promotion Agents worked inside, providing
backup to the Sales Representatives.
In 1982, the District Manager, Karl Kershaw, told the
Customer Promotion Agents that Air France was planning
to create a new position of Senior Customer Promotion
Agent and invited all of them to apply for the position.
After considering their qualifications, Kershaw told
Lindahl that she was the most qualified and would be given
the promotion. Subsequently, however, Air France decided
not to create the position, and Lindahl did not get the
promotion.
In 1987, without any prior notification to the Customer
Promotion Agents, Kershaw announced that he had chosen
Edward Michels to fill a new Senior Customer Promotion
Agent position. At that time, there were four eligible
candidates: two women over age 40 (including Lindahl),
and two men under age 40 (including Michels).
Lindahl, upset about the decision, decided to pursue Air
France's grievance procedure. First, she asked Kershaw to
give an explanation. After about six weeks, he responded
that Michels had the "best overall qualifications."
Unsatisfied, she wrote to Regional Manager Robert
Watson. Watson responded by affirming Kershaw's
decision. Finally, Lindahl had her attorney take her

grievance to Personnel Services Manager Eugene Carrara.
At this time, she made clear that she felt that the decision
was the product of age and sex discrimination. Carrara held
a hearing and decided to reject her claim because he
believed the promotion decision was reasonable. In his
decision, he stated that Michels's computer expertise was
the principal reason for selecting him.
While the grievance proceeding was pending, Kershaw
apparently became dissatisfied with the new organization
of the group, and Watson suggested a reorganization to
General Manager USA, Jean-Claude Baumgarten, that
would have put Michels in a purely technical function and
would have created another Senior Customer Promotion
Agent position to deal with sales backup. The new position
would have gone to Lindahl, but Baumgarten rejected the
proposal.
Lindahl then filed claims with the California Department
of Fair Employment and Housing and with the federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
After exhausting her administrative remedies, she filed suit
in the district court, alleging age and sex discrimination
under 29 USc. §§ 623, 631 (ADEA) (prohibiting age
discrimination against individuals over age 40) and 42
U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII) (prohibiting sex
discrimination). Air France moved for summary judgment
on both causes of action.
The district court granted summary judgment on the
ground that Lindahl had not raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Air France's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
explanations
are
pretexts
for
discrimination. Lindahl filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter,
amend, and vacate the judgment, which the district court
denied. She now appeals.

II

111 We review the district court's decision to grant
summary judgment de novo. Kruso v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664
(1990).

A

Summary judgment is proper if no factual issues exist for
trial. The party opposing summary judgment must
demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a
fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the
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evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. *1437 Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
2510,91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts
placed before the court must be drawn in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at
2513. However, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the
opposing party "must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ....
Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
'genuine issue for trial.' " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp .. 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.C!. 1348,
1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 ( 1986) (citations omitted) (quoting
First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Servo Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88
S.Ct. 1575, 1592,20 LEd.2d 569 (1968».

12/ 131 Lindahl argues that Air France's decision to
promote Michels was disparate treatment on the basis of
sex and age in violation of Title VII and the ADEA.l The
Supreme Court established the allocation of proof in Title
VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The plaintiff
"must carry the initial burden under the statute of
establishing a prima facie case of ... discrimination." Id. at
802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case by showing, for example, that she belongs to a
protected group, that she applied and was qualified for a
job which was open for applications, that she was rejected,
and that the position remained open after her rejection and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
the plaintiff's qualifications. Id.; see also Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs V. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n. 6, 101
S.Ct. 1089, 1094 n. 6, 67 LEd.2d 207 (1981) (explaining
that the McDonnell Douglas formulation is flexible and
can be adapted to fit the facts of each case).
141 15/ 16/ "The burden then must shift to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. At that point, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiffto show that the employer's reason was
a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825.
The plaintiff may carry this burden "either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 10 1 S.Ct. at 1095.
Disparate treatment claims under the ADEA "are analyzed
by the same standard used to analyze disparate treatment
claims under Title VII." Merrick V. Farmers Ins. Group,
892 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir.1990).

Lindahl contends that once she has made out a prima facie
case of discrimination, summary judgment is necessarily
improper. She reasons that the prima facie case raises an
inference of discrimination, and because on summary
judgment all inferences must be resolved in her favor, she
need not produce any additional evidence of pretext to
defeat summary judgment.

17/ 181 We have made clear that a plaintiff cannot defeat
summary judgment simply by making out a prima facie
case. Steckl V. lv/otorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th
CiLI983). It is true that the prima facie case raises an
inference of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 10 I
S.Ct. at 1094. However, when the employer produces
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment
decision, the inference of discrimination is rebutted. Id. at
255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. "[T]he defendant's articulation of a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason serves ... to shift the
burden back to the plaintiff to raise a genuine factual
question as to whether the proffered reason is pretextual."
Lmve V. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th
CiLI985), amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986).
19/ The plaintiff cannot carry this burden simply by
restating the prima facie *1438 case and expressing an
intent to challenge the credibility of the employer's
witnesses on cross-examination. She must produce specific
facts either directly evidencing a discriminatory motive or
showing that the employer's explanation is not credible.
See Steckl, 703 F.2d at 393. Still, because of the inherently
factual nature of the inquiry, the plaintiff need produce
very little evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a
gen uine issue 0 f fact.
[A]ny indication of discriminatory motive ... may suffice
to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfindeL
Once a prima facie case is established ... , summary
judgment for the defendant will ordinarily not be
appropriate on any ground relating to the merits because
the crux of a Title VII dispute is the "elusive factual
question of intentional discrimination."
Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255
n. 8, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 8).

B

The district court concluded, and the parties do not dispute,
that Lindahl made out a prima facie case of discrimination.
She is a woman over age 40 who, in effect, applied for a
promotion, was qualified for it, but lost it to a man under
age 40. The parties also do not dispute that Air France met
its burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for promoting Michels and not Lindahl. Air France
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points to the deposition testimony of Watson and Kershaw,
indicating that their reasons for promoting Michels were
(I) his computer proficiency, and (2) his leadership
abilities as they related to Air France's need to establish
order, rules, and regulations in a chaotic office.
1101 The issue on appeal is therefore whether Lindahl
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. We
believe Lindahl has raised factual questions material to
demonstrating that Air France's explanations are not
credible and that discrimination was the more likely
explanation for Michels's promotion.2
As to Air France's explanation that Michels was chosen for
his computer proficiency, Lindahl argues that it is not
credible because neither Kershaw nor Watson (the ones
most closely associated with the decision) mentioned it as
the reason for choosing Michels. Kershaw had said only
that Michels had "the best overall qualifications to lead the
group," and Watson had simply affirmed Kershaw's
decision. The computer explanation did not come out until
Personnel Services Manager Carrara, who was not
involved with the decision, mentioned it four months later
in response to a letter from Lindahl's attorney.
Simply because an explanation comes after the beginning
of litigation does not make it inherently incredible.
Merrick, 892 F.2d at 1438. Nevertheless, in this case, the
computer explanation would have been such a
straightforward answer to Lindahl's inquiries that one
might expect that Kershaw and Watson would have
mentioned it if it really were the explanation. That they
instead gave vague explanations about "overall
qualifications" might suggest that the computer
explanation was a later fabrication.
Moreover, computer expertise was not clearly related to
the leadership position. Indeed, computer proficiency had
never been listed as a qualification for the position of
Senior Customer Promotion Agent. While Michels's
computer knowledge might have been helpful to Air
France generally, it is not clear that it made him a better
candidate to lead the Customer Promotion Group.
Lindahl also challenges the credibility of Air France's
explanation that Michels was chosen for his leadership
abilities. Kershaw testified in his deposition that "being
accepted" is an important part of being a leader, but he
admitted that Michels "was not well liked by the group."
By contrast, Kershaw described Lindahl as having "a good
relationship with the staff."
Lindahl also stated that Michels was preoccupied with the
computer and neglected his duties backing up the Sales
Representatives * 1439 and that these backup duties were
traditionally part of the Customer Promotion Group's

responsibilities. Finally, the record shows that Michels was
the most junior member of the Customer Promotion
Group.
All of these facts tend to show that Michels may not have
been the best person to lead the group, and they therefore
suggest that leadership ability may not have been the real
reason for choosing Michels over Lindahl. See Williams v.
Edward ApfJels Coffee Co., 792 F.2d 1482, 1487 (9th
Cir.1986) (choosing inexperienced candidates can raise
question about motives). But see Cotton v. City of
Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir.1987) (experience
is not sole criterion employer may use to determine
qualifications).
Moreover, even if Kershaw did make his decision based on
leadership abilities, other evidence could suggest that his
evaluation of leadership ability was itself sexist. Lindahl
points out that Kershaw made statements about the
candidates' relative qualifications that reflect male/female
stereotypes. Kershaw testified in his deposition that he
believed that both female candidates get "nervous" and
that the other female candidate "gets easily upset [and]
loses contro!''' By contrast, Kershaw described Michels's
leadership qualities as "not to back away from a situation,
to take hold immediately of the situation, to attack the
situation right away, to stay cool throughout the whole
process." He went on to comment that "sitting and griping
and getting emotional is not contributing to, No.1, getting
the job done, number two, to the morale and atmosphere of
the group."
The Supreme Court has made clear that sex stereotyping
can be evidence of sex discrimination, especially when
linked to the employment decision. Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-52, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1790-92,
104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). Kershaw apparently saw Michels
as aggressive and cool (in addition to being the one who
could impose order), while he saw the female candidates as
nervous and emotional. His comments could suggest that
Kershaw made his decision on the basis of stereotypical
images of men and women, specifically that women do not
make good leaders because they are too "emotional."
Finally, Lindahl points to evidence showing that Air
France handled the promotion decision differently when
only women were eligible than when young men were
eligible. In 1982, when the possibility of an opening for
Senior Customer Promotion Agent position first arose, the
only eligible candidates for the position were women.
Kershaw told all of them about the possible opening and
that they would have to take a test. Air France abandoned
the idea to add the position. In 1987, two men under age 40
and two women over age 40 were eligible. Kershaw did not
tell the candidates about the position, and Michels got the

Lindah! v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (1991)
55 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1033,56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,712, 59 USLW 2726

promotion without taking a test or having an interview.
This difference in treatment might further support an
inference that Air France was discriminating against older
women.
While not overwhelming, Lindahl's evidence of
discriminatory motive is sufficient to raise a genuine issue
offact. She has pointed to facts that could call into question
the credibility of Air France's nondiscriminatory
explanations and could suggest discriminatory motives.
Whether the facts do indicate discrimination is a question
that should ordinarily be resolved by a factfinder, and we
believe it is possible that a reasonable trier of fact could
find that Air France discriminated against Lindahl in

promoting Michels. We therefore conclude that summary
judgment should not have been granted.3
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Parallel Citations

55 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1033, 56 Empt Prac. Dec.
P 40,712,59 USLW 2726

Footnotes
Lindahl could also show illegal discrimination by demonstrating sut11cient disparate impact. Although she presented this theory to
the district court. she has not argued it in her brief and has therefore abandoned this claim on appeal.

2

Because we would reach the same conclusion whether the case would be tried by a judge or a jury, we do not reach the issue of
whether 28 U.s.c. § 1330 precludes a jury trial in this case.

3

Lindahl also argues that the district court erred in concluding that she was barred from raising a claim for retaliation for the first time
in her opposition to summary judgment. Her retaliation theory is that General Manager Baumgarten rejected the reorganization
proposal that would have given her a promotion in order to get back at her for bringing discrimination charges. The district court did
not consider the merits of the claim because it was not raised in the EEOC complaint or in the federal court complaint.
In light of our disposition, we need not reach this issue. We express no opinion as to whether leave to amend might be appropriate,
whether the issue may be preserved in the pre-trial order, or whether the facts have evidentiary significance.

End
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Kathryn LOWE, PlaintijJ-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF MONROVIA, Paul Stuart, Robert
Bartlett, Monrovia City Council, John
Nobrega, Mary Wilcox, Ed Zoolalian,
Robert Ovrom and Betty Logans,
Defendants-Appellees.

Federal Courts
·W'",Objections to Jurisdiction, Determination and
Waiver
Except where jurisdictional issue requires
determination of facts relevant to merits of the
dispute, district court is ordinarily free to hear
evidence regarding jurisdiction, and to rule on
that issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes
where necessary.

No. 84-5960. I Argued and Submitted March
4,1985· I Decided Oct. 30, 1985. I As
Amended Dec. 26, 1985 and Jan. 21, 1986.
Unsuccessful applicant for position of city police officer
brought civil rights action against city and city officials,
alleging that defendants' failure to hire her was result of
discrimination on basis of race and sex. The United States
District Court for the Central District of California,
Cynthia Holcomb Hall, J., granted city's motion for
summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, held that evidence
raised material issue of fact as to whether city's motivation
in failing to hire plaintiff was based on race, precluding
summary judgment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

13\

Federal Courts
,;.,Particular Issues and Questions
When case is dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, clearly erroneous standard in
reviewing district court's underlying factual
findings is applied.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

141

Schwarzer, District Judge, sitting by designation, filed
opinion dissenting in part.

Federal Courts
;>.cDefinite and Firm Conviction of Mistake
Under clearly erroneous standard, Court of
Appeals accepts district court's findings of fact
unless upon review it is left with definite and firm
conviction that mistake has been made.

West Headnotes (27)

4 Cases that cite this headnote

111

Civil Rights
·~~'Exhaustion

of Administrative Remedies
Before Resort to Courts

When plaintiff fails to raise Title VII claim
before the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to hear it. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§§ 701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17.
21 Cases that cite this headnote

IS)

Civil Rights
,,=Particular Cases

Applicant for city police officer position was
barred from bringing Title VII sex discrimination
claim in district court where she failed to first file
such claim with Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17.
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19 Cases that cite this headnote

U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
10 Cases that cite this headnote

[61

Civil Rights
\.:,Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof

[9[

In order to prevail in a Title VII case on disparate
impact theory, plaintiff must show that business
practice, neutral on its face, has a substantial
adverse impact on group protected by Title VII;
once plaintiff establishes prima facie case of
disparate impact, burden shifts to defendant to
show that practice is justified by business
necessity. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718,
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.

Civil Rights
.c.··Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
If plaintiff establishes prima facie case of
discrimination in Title VII disparate treatment
case, burden then shifts to defendant to articulate
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision; then, in order to prevail, plaintiff must
demonstrate that employer's alleged reason for
adverse employment decision is pretext for
another motive which is discriminatory. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.

32 Cases that cite this headnote

155 Cases that cite this headnote

[7[

Civil Rights
.~.·Presumptions,

Inferences, and Burden of

Proof

[101

Civil Rights
~=Presumptions,

Inferences, and Burden of

Proof

Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
"disparate impact" plaintiff, unlike plaintiff
proceeding on a "disparate treatment" theory,
may prevail without proving intentional
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-l7.

Availability of Title VII discriminatory treatment
claim is not dependent on plaintiff's ability to
prove discriminatory impact claim; as long as
plaintiff can establish individual case of
intentional discrimination, there is no need to
show that employer has also discriminated
against an entire class. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§§ 701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17.
97 Cases that cite this headnote

[8[

Civil Rights
·;JPrima Facie Case
Allegations of unsuccessful applicant for city
police officer position that city's use of eligibility
lists with delayed effective dates which expired
automatically, combined with practice of lateral
hiring resulted in disproportionately low number
of job offers to Blacks were insufficient to
establish prima facie case of disparate impact
under Title VII, absent affidavits or documentary
evidence sufficient to support her claim. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 42

[11[

Civil Rights
.~.Presumptions,

Inferences, and Burden of

Proof
To establish prima facie case of discrimination in
disparate treatment case, plaintiff must offer
evidence that gives rise to inference of unlawful
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to

Lowe v.

of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (1985)

39 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 350, 41 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 931 ...

2000e-17.
Evidence that applicant for city police officer
position was told that she should apply in Los
Angeles, and that no Blacks were employed by
city police department at the time was sufficient
to create inference of discrimination sufficient to
establish prima facie case of employment
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17.

51 Cases that cite this headnote
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Civil Rights
',rPresumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof

Common way to establish inference of
discrimination in Title VI I disparate treatment
case is to show that four requirements are met:
that plaintiff belongs to class protected by Title
VII; that plaintiff applied and was qualified for
job for which employer was seeking applicants;
that, despite being qualified, plaintiff was
rejected; and that, after plaintiff's rejection,
position remained open and employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of comparable
qualifications. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17.

2 Cases that cite this headnote
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Federal Civil Procedure
,.=Burden of Proof

On motion for summary judgment in Title VII
disparate treatment case, defendant's articulation
of legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment decision serves only to shift burden
back to plaintiff to raise genuine factual question
as to whether proffered reason is pretextual. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.

12 Cases that cite this headnote

40 Cases that cite this headnote
/13/

Civil Rights
.=Prima Facie Case

Evidence that unsuccessful applicant for city
police officer position was qualified, that
position was open when she filed her application,
and that city continued to accept applications
from similarly qualified candidates after
eligibility list upon which applicant's name
appeared expired was sufficient to establish
prima facie case of race discrimination under
Title VII, despite evidence that position was no
longer open when the eligibility list became
effective, and that no openings occurred during
period list was effective. Civil Rights Act of
1964, §§ 701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000e to 2000e- 17.

/16/

Federal Civil Procedure
./QEmployees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

In Title VII disparate treatment case, evidence
that applicant for city police officer position was
told that she should apply in Los Angeles because
the Los Angeles police force was "literally
begging for minorities and especially females"
raised genuine issue of material fact with respect
to whether city's reasons or motivations in failing
to hire her were in fact discriminatory, precluding
summary judgment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17.

6 Cases that cite this headnote
12 Cases that cite this headnote
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Civil Rights
·,/",Prima Facie Case
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Federal Civil Procedure
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.·."Proceedings in Which Judgment Is Authorized
When Title VII plaintiff has presented sufficient
facts to meet his burden with respect to prima
facie aspect of employment discrimination case,
summary judgment for defendant will ordinarily
not be appropriate on any ground relating to the
merits. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as
amended, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

120/

Civil Rights
v..Employment Practices
Civil Rights
,.>.Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof
q ••

6 Cases that cite this headnote

117/

Claims of disparate treatment arising under Title
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.CA.
§ 1981 are parallel because both require proof of
intentional discrimination; same standards are
used to prove both claims, and facts sufficient to
give rise to one are sufficient to give rise to the
other. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 70 I-718, as
amended, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.

Federal Civil Procedure
,.=Proceedings in Which Judgment Is Authorized
Once Title VII plaintiff has established prima
facie employment discrimination case, summary
judgment for defendant will ordinarily not be
appropriate on any ground relating to the merits.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, as
amended, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
5 Cases that cite this headnote
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13 Cases that cite this headnote

121/

Civil Rights
>.Presumptions, Inferences, and Burdens of
Proof
Plaintiff suing under 42 U.S.CA. § 198 I may
prevail only by establishing intentional
discrimination, i.e., disparate treatment; proof of
disparate impact is insufficient.

Civil Rights
.,,,,Public Employment
Unsuccessful applicant for city police officer
position could not bring sex discrimination claim
under 42 U.S.CA. § 1981, since that section
redresses only discrimination based on race.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

5 Cases that cite this headnote
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[19/

Civil Rights
v~Employment

Practices

Civil Rights
.~,=Existence

of Other Remedies; Exclusivity

Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42
U.S.CA. § 1981 are overlapping but independent
remedies
for
racial
discrimination
in
employment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
701-718, as amended, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17.

Federal Civil Procedure
w····Employees and Employment Discrimination.
Actions Involving
Evidence that unsuccessful applicant for city
police officer position was told to apply in Los
Angeles because the Los Angeles police force
was "literally begging for minorities and
especially females" raised material issue of fact
as to whether city's hiring procedures
discriminated on basis of race, precluding
summary judgment. 42 U.S.CA. § 1981.
4 Cases that cite this headnote
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Federal Civil Procedure
(,cEmployees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Evidence that unsuccessful applicant for city
police officer position was told that she should
apply for position in Los Angeles because the
Los Angeles police department was "literally
begging for minorities and especially females"
raised material issue of fact as to whether city
purposefully discriminated against her because
of her race and sex, precluding summary
judgment on her claim under42 U.S.c.A. § 1983.
6 Cases that cite this headnote
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Civil Rights
,cGood Faith and Reasonableness; Knowledge
and Clarity of Law; Motive and Intent, in
General

under 42 U .S.C.A. §§ 1981 and 1983 with
respect to alleged discriminatory hiring practice
in city police department, since reasonable
person would have been aware that practices
complained of were unlawful.

Attorneys and Law Firms
*1001 Charles B.
p lainti ff-appel lant.
Poturica,
Melanie
defendants-appel lees.

Johnson,

Los

Pasadena,

Angeles,

Cal.,

Cal.,

for

for

*1002 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.
Before PREGERSON and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges,
and SCHWARZER, * District Judge.
Opinion

Government officials are entitled to qualified
immunity only if reasonable person would not
have been aware that actions at issue violated
well-established statutory or constitutional
rights.
6 Cases that cite this headnote

1251

Civil Rights
<",Municipalities and Counties and Their
Officers
Whether city employees are immune turns on
objective reasonableness of their conduct in light
of clearly established law, not under subjective
good faith.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Kathryn Lowe, a Black woman, brought this action under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USc. §§
2000e to 2000e- I 7 (1982), alleging that the failure by the
City of Monrovia ("the City") and the individual
defendants to hire her for a position on the City's police
force resulted from discrimination on the basis of race and
sex. Lowe also sought reliefunder 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1982)
and 42 U.s.c. § 1983 (1982) for the City'S alleged
discriminatory employment acts. The district court granted
the City'S motion for summary judgment, ruling that Lowe
could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination
because she was not rejected during the effective dates of
the employment eligibility list on which her name was
placed. We reverse.

4 Cases that cite this headnote
I. BACKGROUND
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Civil Rights
,. =Employment Practices
City officials were not shielded from liability

The City of Monrovia hires both inexperienced recruits
and experienced officers ("lateral hires") to fill entry-level
police officer vacancies. The City accepts applications for
entry-level police officers at all times, even when no
openings exist. After receiving applications from recruits,
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the City requires these candidates to pass both a written
and an oral examination. Applicants who pass both tests
are placed on an eligibility list. They are ranked on the list
according to their scores. The eligibility list, however, does
not become effective until a designated later date. Once a
list does become effective, it remains in effect for six
months. According to the City, when openings occur,
positions are offered to the applicants on the then active
"Entry Level Police Officer" list in the order of their rank
on that list. The City also maintains a list of lateral entry
candidates, although it is not clear how that list is
compiled. Nor is it clear when the City hires laterally for an
available entry-level position instead of offering the
position to an eligible recruit applicant. It does appear,
however, that most entry-level positions are filled by
recruits rather than experienced officers.

After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Lowe
brought this suit. Her complaint alleged three independent
causes of action. The first cause of action, brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e- 17 (1982), alleged discrimination for
failure to hire Lowe as a police officer based on her race
and her sex.2 The second cause of action, brought under 42
USc. § 1981 (1982), alleged that Lowe's right to contract
for her personal services as a police officer on a basis equal
to other persons was denied to her because of her race and
sex. The third cause of action, brought under 42 U.S.c. §
1983 (1982), alleged that Lowe was denied employment
based on her race and sex in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Kathryn Lowe, an inexperienced graduate of a police
officer training program, applied for an entry-level police
officer position on the Monrovia police force in January
1982. At that time there were no women or Blacks on the
police force.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

There is no dispute that an opening actually existed for an
entry-level police officer when Lowe applied. The City
contends, however, that although an opening existed and
although she was qualified, Lowe never became eligible to
fill that opening. Lowe passed both the written and the oral
examinations by May 28, 1982 and was notified on June 3,
1982 that she had been accepted for the eligibil ity list.
Nevertheless, according to the City, the list that contained
her name did not become effective until August I, 1982
and the opening that existed when Lowe first applied was
filled prior to that date. According to the City, Lowe was
not eligible for employment after February 1, 1983
because the list on which her name appeared automatically
expired on that date. It is undisputed that there was no
opening for an entry-level police officer at any time
between August 1, 1982 and February I, 1983.
Lowe claims that during her oral examination, Betty
Logans, Personnel Division Manager for Monrovia, told
her that the City's police force had no women and no
Blacks and it "[had] no facilities." Logans suggested that
Lowe apply for a position in Los Angeles where the police
department is "literally begging for minorities and
especially *1003 females."] Citing that statement, Lowe
filed a complaint against the City with the EEOC on June
18, 1982. On June 7, 1982, prior to the effective date of
Lowe's eligibility list but after Lowe had been notified that
she had qualified for placement on the list, Louis Razo was
hired laterally for an entry-level police officer position.
Lowe amended her EEOC complaint on June 24, 1982 to
include that information.

II/ 121 13/ 14) The district court found that Lowe was
barred from bringing an action for sex discrimination
pursuant to Title VII because she failed to file a complaint
for sex discrimination with the EEOC. When a plaintiff
fails to raise a Title VII claim before the EEOC, the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear it. Shah v.
Mr. Zion Hospital and Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268,
27 I -72 (9th Cir.1981). Except where the jurisdictional
issue requires a determination of facts relevant to the
merits of the dispute, a district court "is ordinarily free to
hear evidence regarding jurisdiction, and to rule on that
issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where
necessary." Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074,
1077 (9th Cir. I 983). When a case is dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, we apply the clearly erroneous
standard in reviewing the district court's underlying factual
findings. Under that standard, we accept the district court's
findings of fact unless upon review we are left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541-42, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); Bohemia,
Inc. v. Home Insurance Co., 725 F.2d 506, 509 (9th
Cir.1984).
The district court disposed of the remainder of Lowe's
claims, including the Title VII race discrimination claim,
by granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, Lojek v.
Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. I 983), and like the
trial court, we are governed by the standard set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, 715 F.2d 1327,1328 (9th
Cir.1983). We must determine whether, viewing the facts
and the law in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, there is any genuine issue of material fact and
whether the substantive law was correctly applied. Amaro
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v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 749 (9th CiLI984);
Lojek, 716 F.2d at 677; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

III. THE TITLE VII CLAIMS
A. Sex Discrimillatioll

[51 When determining that Lowe's Title VII sex
discrimination claim was jurisdictionally barred, the
district court considered Lowe's amended EEOC
complaint. In contrast to the initial complaint she filed
*1004 with that agency, Lowe's amended EEOC
complaint explicitly states: "I feel the sole reason for my
denial of the job is because I am Black." The amended
complaint does not allege discrimination on the basis of
sex. Because the district court correctly found that Lowe
did not file a sex discrimination claim with the EEOC, we
affirm its dismissal of the Title VII sex discrimination
charge.

B. Disparate Impact 011 the Basis of Race

161 Lowe alleges that the City's policy of using eligibility
lists that have delayed effective dates and that expire
automatically, along with its reliance on lateral-hire
employees to fill entry-level positions, has a disparate
impact on Blacks. In order to prevail in a Title VII case on
a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must show that a
business practice, neutral on its face, has a substantial
adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 40 I U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28
L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show that the practice is justified by "business
necessity." Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen 's Union,
Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.1982); Contreras
v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th
Cir.1981). The district court concluded that Lowe failed to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. We agree.
[7J A "disparate impact" plaintiff, unlike a plaintiff
proceeding on a "disparate treatment" theory, may prevail
without proving intentional discrimination. American
Federation ()[ State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th
Cir.1985); Gay, 694 F.2d at 537. However, the
requirements a disparate impact plaintiff must meet "are in
some respects more exacting than those of a disparate
treatment case. A disparate impact plaintiff 'must not
merely prove circumstances raising an inference of
discriminatory impact; he must prove the discriminatory
impact at issue.' " Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708

F.2d 475, 482 (9th Cir.1983) (citing Johnson v. Uncle
Ben's, Inc., 657 F .2d 750, 753 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 293, 74 L.Ed.2d 277 (1982) ). This
is usually done by establishing "that an employment
practice selects members of a protected class in a
proportion smaller than their percentage in the pool of
actual applicants." ld.

181 Lowe does not question the validity of the tests that are
used to rank the applicants on the eligibility lists. Rather,
she claims that the use of eligibility lists that have delayed
effective dates and that expire automatically, combined
with the practice of lateral hiring, has a disparate impact on
Blacks. She contends that these practices, regardless of the
City's motivation, result in a disproportionately low
number of job offers to Blacks.
Assuming arguendo that Lowe asserted a cognizable
disparate impact claim, her claim did not survive the City's
motion for summary judgment. Lowe did not offer
affidavits or documentary evidence sufficient to support
her claim; her assertions are made primarily in memoranda
of law, not by way of proferred facts.3 Thus, the district
court correctly concluded that Lowe failed to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact.

C. Db.parate Treatment

011

tile Basis of Race

191 fl 0 I Lowe also contends that the City intentionally
discriminated against her and that she is therefore entitled
to proceed under Title VII on a disparate treatment theoryA
In a Title VII disparate * 1005 treatment case, a plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.
Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the employer's alleged reason for the adverse
employment decision is a pretext for another motive which
is discriminatory. McDonnell Doug/as Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26,36 L.Ed.2d 668
(1973); Dia::: v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 752
F.2d 1356, 1358-59 (9th Cir.1985).
I. The Prima Facie Case

1111 1121 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination
in a disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must offer
evidence that "give[ s] rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination." Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67
L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); accord United States Postal Service v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481,75 L.Ed.2d
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403 (1983). A common way to establish an inference of
discrimination is to show that the four requirements set
forth in McDonnell Douglas are met:
1. that the plaintiff belongs to a class protected by
Title VII;
2. that the plaintiff applied and was qualified for ajob
for which the employer was seeking applicants;
3. that, despite being qualified, the plaintiff was
rejected; and
4. that, after the plaintiff s rejection, the posItIOn
remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of comparable qualifications.

See McDonnell Douglas, 4 I I U.S. at 802,93 S.Ct. at 1824.
Satisfaction ofthe McDonnell Doug/as criteria is sufficient
to establish a primafacie case. Furnco Construction Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2948-49,57
L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1359; Spaulding v.
University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 700 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 511, 83 L.Ed.2d 401
(1984); O'Brien v. Sky Chef~, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 868 n. I
(9th Cir.1982); Lynn v. Regents of the University of
California, 656 F.2d 1337,1340-41 (9th Cir.1981); White
v. City of San Diego, 605 F.2d 455,458 (9th Cir.1979).

1131 As a Black, Lowe belongs to a class protected by Title
VII. Both parties agree that she was qualified for the
position because she passed the examination and that at
some point she was rejected. Thus there is no disagreement
that Lowe met the first and third parts of the McDonnell
Douglas requirements for establishing a prima facie case.
But in order to satisfy the remaining requirements it was
necessary for Lowe to establish that an opening existed at
the time she applied or afterwards, and that after she was
rejected the City continued to accept applications from
comparably qualified applicants. See Gay, 694 F.2d at 547;
Chavez v. Tempe Union High School District, 565 F.2d
1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1977).
The City contends that Lowe failed to establish a prima
facie case because no entry level job existed on the police
force during the time the eligibility list which contained
Lowe's name was active. According to the City, Lowe did
not "apply," for purposes of the McDonnell Doug/as test,
until the eligibility list which contained her name became
effective. The City also contends that the automatic
expiration of the eligibility list on February I, 1983 did not
constitute a rejection. We cannot accept either of the City's
arguments.

* 1006 McDonnell Douglas' s second prima facie case
r~911iE~rnent relat~?~I1IX to whether there was all~p~l1ing.

either when the plaintiff applied or at any time her
appl ication was pending. The City advertised job openings
on the police force prior to the time Lowe filed her
application and Logans acknowledged that there was an
opening after the time Lowe completed the application
process-the opening that Razo was subsequently hired to
fill. The City does not contend that there was "no opening"
at any relevant time prior to the date of Razo's
employment. It is not relevant for purposes of this
requirement whether the City had a legitimate reason for
delaying the effective date of the eligibility list on which
Lowe's name was placed. Any such reason might
undermine the inference of discrimination raised once a
prima facie case has been established, but the order of
proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas does not permit us to
consider rebuttal evidence at the prima facie case stage.
Rather, in a Title VII disparate treatment case such
evidence is considered during the next analytic steps when
we evaluate the City'S articulated nondiscriminatory
reason for not hiring the plaintiff. Thus, Lowe "applied"
when she filed her application; she clearly met the second
requirement.
Lowe also satisfied the fourth McDonnell Douglas
requirement. After February I, 1983, the City no longer
considered Lowe an active, eligible applicant. Yet, the City
does not contend that it ceased hiring entry-level police
officers at that time, or that it suddenly changed the
qualifications required of eligible candidates. Rather, it
explains that eligibility lists automatically expire after six
months. As with its practice of delaying the effective dates
of its eligibility lists, the City may have a legitimate reason
for maintaining the lists for only six months. However, any
such justification, like any justification the City asserts for
delaying the effective dates of the lists, may be considered
only when we evaluate the articulated nondiscriminatory
reason for not hiring the plaintiff. Whatever its reason, the
City rejected Lowe on February 1, 1983 and continued to
accept applications from similarly qualified candidates.
Lowe has thus satisfied the final part of the McDonnell
Douglas four-part test and established a primafacie case of
discrimination.5

Jl41 In addition, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case
of disparate treatment without satisfying the McDonnell
Douglas test. See Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1361; Gay. 694 F.2d at
550. Lowe has provided * I 007 evidence that suggests that
"the employment decision was based on a discriminatory
criterion illegal under the [Civil Rights] Act."
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396
(1977). Logans' statement to Lowe regarding the
composition of the Monrovia police force and her
suggestion that Lowe apply in Los Angeles instead of
Monrovia, when viewed in conjunction with the fact that
no Blacks were employed by the Monrovia Police
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Department at the time Lowe applied, create an inference
of discrimination sufficient to establish a prima facie
case.6 Because Lowe has met the four-part McDonnell
Douglas requirements and alternatively because she has
provided direct and circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent, she established a prima facie case of
disparate treatment on the basis of race. Thus the district
court erred when it based its award of summary judgment
on the ground on which it relied.

eligibility lists that have delayed effective dates and expire
automatically is to mask its discriminatory hiring practices.
She alleges that the City hires from eligibility lists if the
candidates who rank high on the list are not Black but hires
laterally when Blacks rank high on the lists. Lowe attempts
to support this contention with a claim that Blacks are
selected in a proportion smaller than their percentage in the
pool of actual applicants. She alleges that six Blacks
qualified on the eligibility lists between 1979 and 1982 but
none were hired.8

2. The City's Articulated Nondiscriminatory Reason for
Rejecting Lowe and the Evidence of Pretext

A disparate treatment plaintiff may rely on statistical
evidence to establish aprimafacie case, see Diaz, 752 F.2d
at 1362, or "to show that a defendant's articulated
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision in
question is pretextual," id. at 1363. As we explained in
Diaz,

Because we are reviewing a district court's order granting
summary judgment, we must examine the record to
determine if there is any other basis for affirmance. Diaz,
752 F.2d at 1362. If the result below were correct, we
would affirm even if the district court relied on an
erroneous ground. Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295,
1300 & n. 3 (9th Cir.1983) (citing He/vering v. Gowran,
302 U.S. 238, 58 S.Ct. 154,82 L.Ed. 224 (1937)). In order
to determine whether any other basis for affirmance exists,
we must examine the portions of the record that relate to
the second and third steps governing the order of proof in
disparate treatment cases.
After Lowe established a prima facie case of employment
discrimination, the burden shifted to the City to rebut the
presumption of discrimination by articulating a
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her. To accomplish
this, the City was only required to set forth a legally
sufficient explanation for rejecting Lowe's application.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95;
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 97 S.Ct. at 1866-67. The
City's articulated reason for not hiring Lowe was that it
followed a long-standing nondiscriminatory practice with
respect to the creation and maintenance of eligibility lists.
The City contends that under the procedures it follows no
entry-level job opening existed during the time the
eligibility list which contained Lowe's name was in effect.
There may very well be administrative constraints that
would justify the City's use of a delayed effective-date,
automatic-expiration system for eligibility lists. It may also
be that it is preferable for the City to hire experienced
officers in some instances. In any event, we assume,
arguendo, that the City succeeded in articulating a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for failing to hire
Lowe.7
*10081151 However, on a motion for summary judgment
in a disparate treatment case, the defendant's articulation
of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason serves only to
shift the burden back to the plaintiff to raise a genuine
factual question as to whether the proffered reason is
pretextual. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. at
1094-95. Lowe contends that the reason the City uses

Statistical data is relevant because it can
be used to establish a general
discriminatory pattern in an employer's
hiring or promotion practices. Such a
discriminatory pattern is probative of
motive and can therefore create an
inference of discriminatory intent with
respect to the individual employment
decision at issue.

Id. While statistical data may be extremely useful in
demonstrating that a defendant's articulated reason for an
employment decision is pretextual, in this case, however,
as we noted earlier, Lowe's assertions of racial disparities
in hiring are not suppol1ed by a proper statistical record.
See supra p. 1005 & note 3.
116) Nevertheless, we conclude that there is a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to whether the reasons or
motivations for the City's actions were in fact
discriminatory. A plaintiff"may succeed in persuading the
court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination ... either by directly persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine,
450 U.S. at 256,101 S.Ct. at 1095. In order to do so, the
plaintiff need not necessarily offer evidence beyond that
offered to establish a prima(acie case. Id. at 255 n. 10, 101
S.Ct. at 1095 n. 10. The trier of fact may consider the same
evidence that the plaintiff has introduced to establish a
prima facie case in determining whether the defendant's
explanation for the employment decision is pretextual. See
id. Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1363 n. 8.

In other civil rights contexts, we have made it clear that
"the decision as to an employer's true motivation plainly is
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one reserved to the trier of fact." Peacock v. Du Val, 694
F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir. I 982) (quoting Nicholson v. Board
of Education Torrance Unified School District. 682 F.2d
858, 864 (9th Cir.1981) ). This notion-that the question of
an employer's intent to discriminate is "a pure question of
fact," *1009 Pullman-Standard v. Swint. 456 U.S. 273,
287-88, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982), to
be left to the trier offact-is well-established, id. at 288, 102
S.Ct. at 1789-90 (citing Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman. 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61
L.Ed.2d 720 (1979); Commissioner v. Duberstein. 363
U.S. 278, 286, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 1197, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218
(1960); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338,
341, 70 S.Ct. 177, 179, 94 L.Ed. 150 (1949) ), and clearly
applies in Title VII cases.ld. Moreover, an employer's true
motive in an employment decision is rarely easy to discern.
As we have previously noted, "[w]ithout a searching
inquiry into these motives, those [acting for impermissible
motives] could easily mask their behavior behind a
complex web of post hoc rationalizations." Peacock, 694
F.2d at 646.

117J As explained above, a plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case of disparate treatment by satisfying the
McDonnell Douglas four-part test, thereby creating a
rebuttable presumption of discriminatory treatment, or by
presenting actual evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the
employer's discriminatory motive. When a plaintiff does
not rely exclusively on the presumption but seeks to
establish a prima facie case through the submission of
actual evidence, very little such evidence is necessary to
raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer's
motive; any indication of discriminatory motive-including
evidence as diverse as "the [defendant's] reaction, if any,
to [plaintiff's] legitimate civil rights activities; and
treatment of [plaintiff] during his prior term of
employment; [defendant's] general policy and practice
with respect to minority employment," McDonnell
Douglas, 4 I I U.S. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1825-26-may
suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a
factfinder. Once a prima facie case is established either by
the introduction of actual evidence or reliance on the
McDonnell Douglas presumption, summary judgment for
the defendant will ordinarily not be appropriate on any
ground relating to the merits because the crux of a Title VII
dispute is the "elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination," Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 8.See, e.g,
Foster v. A rcafa Associates, Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1459 (9th
Cir. 1985) (courts generally cautious about granting
summary judgment in Title VII cases where intent
involved); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co .. 708 F.2d 655, 657
(11th Cir. 1983) (" 'granting of summary judgment is
especially questionable' " in employment discrimination
cases (quoting Hayden v. First National Bank, 595 F.2d
994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979))); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d

62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (factual disputes in most Title VII
cases preclude summary judgment). Moreover, when a
plaintiff has established a prima facie inference of
disparate treatment through direct or circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory intent, he will necessarily have
raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the
legitimacy or bona fides of the employer's articulated
reason for its employment decision.
According to the plaintiff's sworn affidavit, Logans, the
Personnel Division Manager for the City, made a point of
telling Lowe that the Monrovia police force had no women
and no Blacks. Logans then encouraged Lowe to apply for
a position as a police officer in Los Angeles rather than
Monrovia. Logans explained that Lowe should do so
because the Los Angeles police force was "literally
begging for minorities and especially females." One clear
inference that could reasonably be drawn from this
statement is that the Monrovia police force was not
begging for-or even interested in-such applicants.
Viewing all the evidence, including Logans' statements, in
the light most favorable to Lowe and resolving all
inferences in her favor, as we must, we conclude that there
is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the City'S
motive in failing to hire Lowe.9 Accordingly, we cannot
affirm *1010 the district court's grant of summary
judgment as to the Title VII race discrimination claim.

IV. SECTION 1981 AND SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
A. Section 1981

1181 Lowe alleges that the City'S hiring procedures
violated 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1982). Her claim is based on
both alleged sex and race discrimination. However, section
1981 redresses only discrimination based on race. Shah v.
Mount Zion Hospital and Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268,
272 n. 4 (9th Cir.1981). Accordingly, the district court
Lowe's
section
1981
sex
properly dismissed
discrimination claim. See White v. Washington Public
Power Supply System, 692 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th Cir.1982).
Jl9] 1201 121J We cannot agree, however, with the district
court's rejection of Lowe's section 1981 race
discrimination claim. Title VII and section 1981 are
overlapping but independent remedies for racial
discrimination in employment. Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461, 95 S.Ct. 1716,
1720-21, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Claims of disparate
treatment arising under Title VII and section 1981 are
parallel because both require proof of intentional
discrimination. Gay, 694 F.2d at 537.10 The same
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standards are used to prove both claims, Gay, 694 Fold at
537, and facts sufficient to give rise to one are sufficient to
give rise to the other.
[22[ For the same reasons that we held the district court's
grant of summary judgment on Lowe's Title VIi claim to
be improper, we must reverse its grant of summary
judgment on Lowe's section 1981 claim. Lowe has
presented sufficient evidence of discriminatory motive to
entitle her to a trial on this claim as well.

B. Section 1983
[23[ Lowe also alleges that she is entitled to reliefunder42
U.S.c. § 1983 (1982). Because section 1983 incorporates
the equal protection standards that have developed in
fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, see Chavez v. Tempe
Union High School District, 565 F.2d 1087, 1095 (9th
Cir.1977), in order to prevail on her section 1983 claim
alleging race and sex discrimination Lowe must first prove
that the defendants purposefully discriminated against her
either because of her race or her sex. See Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256. 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292, 60
L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976).
The City could then successfully defend against the charge
only if it could demonstrate that the discriminatory
treatment was justified. Because a plaintiff does not have
to exhaust * 1011 administrative remedies before bringing
a section 1983 action, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S.
496, 102 S.Ct. 2557,2560,73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), Lowe's
failure to file an EEOC sex discrimination complaint does
not bar her section 1983 sex discrimination claim.

The City denies that it has intentionally discriminated
against Lowe. In the equal protection context, just as in a
Title VII disparate treatment case, discriminatory intent
need not be proved by direct evidence. "[D]etermining the
existence of a discriminatory purpose demands a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available." Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,
102 S.Ct. 3272, 3276,73 L.Edold 1012 (1982) (quoting
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d
450 (1977); citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242,
96 S.Ct. at 2049).
Lowe has established a triable issue regarding her claim
that the City purposefully discriminated against her
because of her race. See supra Section III.C. Because the
evidence that satisfied the McDonnell Douglas test and the
evidence ofLogans' statements is at least as probative with
regard to sex discrimination as it is with regard to race
discrimination, Lowe has also established a triable issue
regarding her claim that the City purposefully

discriminated against her on the basis of sex. The City does
not claim in this case that it has a constitutionally
permissible justification for intentional discrimination on
the basis of race or sex.
Accordingly, summary judgment on the section 1983
claims was inappropriate.

C. Qualified Immunity
[241 [25[ [26[ The district court concluded as a matter of
law that the individual defendants were shielded from
liability under section 1981 and section 1983. Government
officials are entitled to qualified immunity only if a
reasonable person would not have been aware that the
actions at issue violated well established statutory or
constitutional rights. Davis v. Scherer, --- U.S. ----, 104
S.Ct. 3012, 3018, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d
396 (1982). Whether the City employees are immune turns
on the objective reasonableness of their conduct in light of
clearly established law, not on their subjective good faith.
Tubbesing v. Arnold, 742 Fold 401,405 (9th Cir.1984).

When the conduct that Lowe challenges took place it was
well established that Lowe had a constitutional right not to
be refused employment as a police officer because of her
race or sex. See supra pp. 10 10-10 I I. A reasonable person
would have been aware that the practices that Lowe
complains of were unlawful if, as she alleges, they were
intended to deprive Blacks or women of employment
opportunities. Therefore, the district court erred in
concluding that the officials were immune from suit.

V. CONCLUSION
The district court correctly dismissed Lowe's Title VII and
section 1981 sex discrimination claims; the Title VII claim
was jurisdictionally barred and sex discrimination cannot
be redressed under section 1981. However, the district
court erred when it granted the City's summary judgment
motion with respect to Lowe's Title VII, section 1981, and
section 1983 race discrimination claims. Although Lowe
did not offer sufficient facts to support her assertions of
disparate impact, she did establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment on the basis of race and raised a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the City'S
motivation in failing to hire her. The district court also
erred with respect to Lowe's section 1983 sex
discrimination claim. Lowe alleged sufficient facts to
withstand the City's motion with respect to that claim.
Finally, the district court erred in concluding that the
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individual defendants enjoy a qualified immunity from the
section 198 I and section 1983 claims.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND
REMANDED.

*1012 SCHWARZER, District Judge, dissenting in part.

The maJonty opinion holds that Lowe has made out a
prima facie case of disparate treatment simply by showing
that she was not hired by the City to fill a vacancy. It treats
the City's rules and practices under which an applicant
must qualifY to be hired as mere evidence admissible at
trial to rebut an inference of discrimination.
In so doing, the majority stands the case on its head, I
ignores the settled law of this circuit, and creates a
precedent that threatens the integrity of commonly used
non-discriminatory civil service hiring systems.
In addressing the question whether Lowe made out a prima
facie case, it is useful to recall the Supreme Court's
observation that
[t]he method suggested in McDonnell
Douglas for pursuing this inquiry
[whether a prima facie case has been
established],
however,
was
never
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible,
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in
light of common experience as it bears on
the critical question of discrimination. A
prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas raises
an
inference of
discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors.

Furnco Construction Co/po v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577,
98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). This court
elaborated on the reasoning in Furnco in Gay v. Waiters'
and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 F.2d 531 (9th
Cir.1982), stating that the McDonnell Douglas test
"presents the legal question whether the plaintiff has met
his burden of production, coming forward with sufficient
probative evidence to permit a rational jury or court to find
the material facts in his favor, thus avoiding a directed
verdict or motion for judgment as a matter of law." Id. at
543, n. 10.
The material facts are undisputed. Lowe filed her
application with the City on January 19, 1982. She took

and passed the written and oral examinations in May,
1982. The results of the examinations and the ranking of
the applicants were announced in June, 1982, and an
eligibility list of successful applicants was certified to take
effect on August I, 1982. Lowe ranked eleventh on that
list, based on her grades on the examinations.
Meanwhile on June 7, 1982, the City hired a male hispanic
applicant from its lateral transfer list to fill a vacancy. No
additional persons were hired until after February I, 1983,
the date on which the list with Lowe's name expired.
It is not disputed that the procedure followed in this case
conformed to the City's established rules and practices.
Every six months the City certifies a new list of eligible
applicants for entry level positions ranked in order of
grades. The list remains in effect for six months when a
new list is certified. In addition the City maintains a lateral
entry level eligibility list from which it also fills vacancies
for lateral entry.
These facts demonstrate that Lowe failed to establish a
prima facie case for three reasons:
(I) At the time when Razo was hired in June, Lowe was not
yet eligible to be hired because her name did not appear on
a then effective eligibility list;
(2) During the period when she was eligible, there were no
job openings;
*]013 (3) Even if Lowe were treated as having been
eligible in June, her position as the eleventh on the
eligibility list precludes any inference that the failure to
hire her "more likely than not [was] based on the
consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco, supra.2
This case falls squarely within principles well-settled in
this circuit. A plaintifffails to establish the second element
of McDonnell Douglas if she does not show that she
completed the application process for the position, Tagupa
v. Board of Directors, 633 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir.1980), and
that she was a qualified applicant when the job opening
existed. Morita v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical
Group, supra; Chavez v. Tempe U High Sch. Dist. No.
213, 565 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.1977); Gay v. Waiter's and
Dairy Lunchmen's Union, supra. A plaintiff fails to
establish the third element by failing to show that she was
barred from consideration for the position or that she was
not considered when others of her qualifications were.
White v. City orSan Diego, 605 F.ld 455 (9th Cir. 1979).3
The majority sweeps all of this aside by holding that
"Lowe 'applied' when she filed her application" and that
"the City rejected Lowe on February I, 1983 [when the
eligibility list expired]." (At 1006) To reach those
conclusions, however, the majority has to disregard
entirely the City's established rules and practices in
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accordance with which it acted. Lowe challenged those
rules and practices as having a disparate impact on Blacks.
The court below granted summary judgment on that issue
and the majority affirms. Thus we must accept those rules
and practices as racially neutral.4
Under those rules and practices, the City hired only
persons whose names appeared on a then certified
eligibility list and a person did not become eligible for hire
until she had qualified and been placed according to her
rank on a certified list. There is no evidence to support the
majority's characterization of the City's practice as
"delaying the effective dates of its eligibility lists."
(Majority at 1006) What the evidence shows is that the
City regularly prepares a new list every six months and
maintains it in effect for six months. Before a new list is
prepared it advertises for applicants who may then take the
examinations to qualify for placement on the new list.
There is no evidence that the City in preparing and
certifying the August I, 1982, eligibility list acted other
than in the ordinary course.
Nor is there any evidence that in permitting the August I,
1982, list to expire on February I, 1983, to be replaced by a
new list, the City acted other than in accordance with its
established rules and practices.
"[I]t is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate that similarly
situated employees were not treated equally." Texas Dept.
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra 450 U.S. at 258,
101 S. Ct. at 1096. Who are similarly situated employees?
Presumably it would be others who had applied but whose
eligibility list had not yet gone into effect when a job was
filled, or whose eligibility list had expired when ajob was
filled. There is no evidence of any other person so situated,
*1014 let alone that anyone in that position was treated
differently. When the City made the decision to fill a
position in June, it did not hire anyone who under its
system was not eligible for consideration. During the
period when Lowe was eligible, it did not hire anyone.
When Lowe's list expired, it did not prevent her from
reapplying for future consideration.
The majority's concern, of course, is that the City'S system
enables it to fill a vacancy with some one else if a minority
applicant is coming up on the next eligibility list before
that eligibility list goes into effect. It may be assumed that
the City'S system, as the majority says, "permil[s} the
manipulation of hiring dates and job openings." (At 1010
n. 10, emphasis added). The trouble with that reasoning,
however, is that a defendant cannot be held liable for a
wrongful act without some evidence from which a trier of
fact could find by a preponderance ofthe evidence not that
he was capable of committing it but that he did commit it.
Here there is not an iota of such evidence.s

Inasmuch as there is no evidence of disparate treatment,
the City'S Personnel Division Manager's alleged statement
to Lowe that the City'S police force had no women and no
Blacks and her encouraging Lowe to apply to the Los
Angeles Police Department instead is irrelevant. Evidence
of motive is insufficient to establish a prima facie case in
the absence of evidence of disparate treatment. See Hagans
v. Andrus, 651 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Hagans v. Wall, 454 U.S. 859, 102 S.Ct. 313, 70
L.Ed.2d 157 (1981); cf. Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726
F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir.1983).6 Here there is none.
It is appropriate to take note that the system of hiring off
eligibility lists ranking applicants in order of their
examination scores and having a limited life is common
practice for public agencies. See, e.g. Cal.Gov't Code §§
18900 et seq., §§ 19050 el seq. Such a system promotes fair
and open hiring based on qualifications; it offers early
applicants a chance to qualify for job openings created
after they have first applied while giving later applicants a
chance to gain high ranking on a new list if their
qualifications entitle them to it. So long as such a system is
not shown to have a disparate impact, mere adherence to it
does not afford a basis for finding disparate treatment. The
majority's conclusion to the contrary raises the spectre ofa
rule under which minority employees must be considered
for employment whenever openings exist, regardless of
whether they are eligible under the public agency's hiring
procedures. Title VI I does not call for such preferential
treatment. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
supra, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096. See also Atonia
v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 768 F.2d 1120, 1132 (9th
Cir.1985) ("essential that employers remain free to set
employment qualifications as they honestly saw fit, so long
as those qualifications were not based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."); and EEOC Uniform
*1015 Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
CFR § 1607.1 B (no restriction on "selection procedures
where no adverse impact results") § 1607.11 (prohibition
against disparate treatment does not preclude selection
procedures in compliance with guidelines).
Because the undisputed facts would not permit a rational
jury or judge to find that Lowe was subjected to disparate
treatment or that, as the eleventh on the list, she would
have been hired but for the City'S discriminatory motive, I
dissent from parts JII.c. and IV and would affirm the
judgment below.7
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Footnotes
Hon. William W. Schwarzer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California. sitting by designation.

*

We accept Lowe's version of her conversation with Logans because when we review an order granting summary judgment to the
defendant we are required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356.
1358 n. I (9th Cir.1985).

2

In the section of her brief devoted to her disparate treatment claim, Lowe argues that the City is obligated to adhere to its affirmative
action plan. She does not raise the affirmative action contentions as a separate claim on appeal. See infra note 7.

3

Lowe's assertions of racial disparities in hiring are not supported by a proper statistical record. The only racial breakdown of
applicants is for the year 1982.

4

The dissent is based on the proposition that a plaintiff who claims intentional employment discrimination. and alleges that an
established procedure under which she was denied employment permits discriminatory treatment in particular cases, may not
challenge the discriminatory application of the procedure to her unless she can show that it has been applied with similar
discriminatory results to an entire class of job applicants. We disagree. The availability of a discriminatory treatment claim is not
dependent on the plaintiffs ability to prove a discriminatory impact claim. To the contrary. as long as a plaintiff can establish an
individual case of intentional discrimination. there is no need to show that the employer has also discriminated against an entire class.

5

We note that one of our recent cases, Hagans v. Clark. 752 F.2d 477 (9th Cir.1985), if read casually, could suggest that even a
plaintiff who has satisfied the four-part McDonnell Douglas test may have failed to establish a prima facie case for purposes of some
employment decisions. Of course, we did not intend in that case to establish a rule in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's
statement of the law, as a more careful reading of the case makes clear. When we used the term "prima facie case" in Hagans. we
were referring to the plaintitrs burden of putting on a case-in-chiefthat is sufficient to defeat a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and
thus to require the defendant to put on its case in opposition. We were not referring to the rebuttable presumption that a plaintiff must
establish, as the first step in a Title VII case, before the defendant must articulate a legitimate. nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. See Burdine. 450 U.S. at 254 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 7 (defining "prima facie case" for purposes of
McDonnell Douglas test). In Hagans, as in Correa v. Nampa School District No. J31, 645 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.1981), the plaintiff had
already presented her case-in-chief at trial and the defendant had introduced evidence by way of cross-examination and depositions.
See Hagans, 752 F.2d at 483. It was irrelevant at that stage of the proceedings whether the plaintiff had "met her initial fprimafacie
case] burden under McDonnell Douglas, [since the defendant! presented sufficient evidence in the form of affidavits, depositions and
cross-examination of [the plaintitrsj witnesses to establish a reasonable, non-discriminatory reason for her discharge .... " Correa,
645 F.2c1 at 816; see also Un ired States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711. 103 S.Ct. 1478. 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (When
evidence is presented to a fact-finder at trial, "the McDonnell-Burdine presumption 'drops from the case,' ... and 'the factual inquiry
proceeds to a new level of specificity.' "); Kimbrough v. Secretary ofU.S. Air Force, 764 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.1985) (same).

6

Lowe also contends that the City's failure to comply with its voluntarily adopted affirmative action plan raises an inference of
intentional discrimination. Both public and private employers may voluntarily adopt race-conscious affirmative action plans to
eliminate traditional patterns of segregation and imbalances in the work force, and Congress may require such plans. See Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482,100 S.Ct. 2758, 2776-77, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193,207-09, 99 S.Ct. 2721. 2729-30, 61 L.EcI.2d 480 (1979); johnson v. Transport. Agency, 748 F.2d 1308. 1314
(9th Cir.1984). We need not determine at this time whether a defendant's failure to follow an affirmative aetion plan, once voluntarily
adopted, could by itself demonstrate discriminatory intent. In any particular case the significance of such a failure may depend on the
circumstances, including the reasons why the defendants failed to comply with the plan. Any evidence that indicates that a defendant
intentionally circumvented an affirmative action plan would, of course, be probative regarding the defendant's motives in making a
given employment decision.

7

The City also contends that even if it had filled the June 7, 1982 opening by hiring from the eligibility list that contained Lowe's
name, Lowe would not have been offered the job. According to the City, Lowe was the eleventh candidate on the list. Lowe offered
evidence purporting to show that she should have been second on the list. Lowe's proper place on the list does not matter. Whether
Lowe was second or eleventh on the list, she would not have been the first person offered the position that was filled on June 7, 1982.
Nevertheless, the fact that Lowe was not the first person on the list does not justify the City's failure to hire her. Regardless where
Lowe ranked on the list, she eventually would have received ajob offer if the City did not treat lists as automatieally expiring after six
months and did not occasionally hire laterally, practices that Lowe alleges the City engages in so that it can avoid hiring from its
"Entry Level" list when Blacks and women qualify for inclusion.

8

Lowe also claims that the City "holds over" non-Blacks from old "Entry Level" eligibility lists and hires them later. This assertion is
without support in the record; it is made by way of a memorandum of law rather than by proferred facts .

.... Next
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9

Our dissenting colleague concludes that no discriminatory act could have occurred in this case because the original opening was
filled before the plaintitTbecame eligible for employment under the applicable civil service rules and no other openings were created
until after her eligibility expired. The point is, however, that the rules at issue permit the manipulation of hiring dates and job
openings. They are not as mechanical as the dissent suggests. When the City receives an application from a minority recruit applicant
it can fill existing vacancies from a separate lateral list and thus foreclose the existence of an opening at the time the minority member
completes the eligibility requirements and the new eligibility list becomes effective. Similarly, it can allow a list with high-ranking
minority members to expire before announcing the existence ofthe next set of openings. Whether the City acted with discriminatory
intent in any particular case is a matter for determination by a factfinder. It is not correct to say, as our dissenting colleague does, that
the mere existence ofa system of the nature of the City's precludes plaintiffs trom showing intentional discriminatory treatment. The
existence of such a system may provide a basis for the City's articulation ofa nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, but it does not
foreclose a plaintifffrom challenging the City's motivation for adopting or invoking the system, or applying it in a particular manner.
Here, as we have explained supra. the plaintiff has raised a genuine issue offact as to whether the true motive for the City's actions
was discriminatory.

l O A plaintiff suing under section 1981 may prevail only by establishing intentional discrimination, i.e., disparate treatment. Proof of
disparate impact is insufficient. Gay v. Waiters' and Daily Lunchmen 's Union, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.1982); Craig v. County oj
Los Angeles. 626 F.2d 659. 668 (9th Cir.1980).
The majority confuses the framework of rules and practices within which the City acted with non-discriminatory reasons for an
employment decision which may rebut a prima facie case. (pp. 1007-1008) See AlcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.
802,93 S.O. 1817. 1824.36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (after plaintiff has made a prima facie case, burden shifts to employer "to articulate
some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection") It does so by in effect shifting a part of plain tiffs burden
to make a prima facie case-her qualification to be hired-onto defendant by making it a part of its rebuttal casco See Texas Dept. oj
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. 254, 10 I S.O. 1089. 1094.67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); ,"flvforila V. Southern Cal. Permanente
AIedical Group. 541 F.2d 217, 219 (9th Cir.1976). The error in this approach is discussed in what follows.

2

At oral argument, moreover, counsel for the City represented that the City is obligated to hire from among the top three candidates on
any list.
Inasmuch as the only issue concerns the tilling of the vacancy in June 1982, it is not necessary to address the majority's point that
if the lists did not automatically expire, the City would have had to hire Lowe eventually, no matter how low she ranked. (Majority
at 1007 n. 7)

3

The City contends that Lowe failed to satisfy both the second and third elements. See App'ee Br. 10-16.

4

The majority rejects "Lowe's challenge to lateral hiring and the use of eligibility lists with delayed effective dates and automatic
expiration times" because she "did not offer affidavits or documentary evidence sufficient to support her claim [of disparate
impact]." (At 1005) It is difficult to follow the majority's logic under which these same practices. held to be neutral under the impact
analysis, are held to raise an inference of disparate treatment. (At 1006)

5

Thus the majority misconceives the basis of this dissent. Obviously, it is not that "[tJhe availability of a discriminatory treatment
claim is ... dependent on the plaintiffs ability to prove a discriminatory impact claim." (At 1005 n. 5) Nor is it "that the mere
existence of a system of the nature of the City'S precludes plaintiffs from showing intentional discriminatory treatment." (At 1010 n.
10) Rather it is that a showing of nothing more than hiring in accordance with rulcs and practices found by the majority not to have
been shown to have a discriminatory impact is insuflicient to prove a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment.

6

The majority opinion correctly states that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment without satisfying the
McDonnell Douglas test" (At 1007) but no case to this writer's knowledge has ever held that a plaintiff can do so without some proof
of disparate treatment. See the cases cited by the majority (At 1007), Diaz v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 752 F.2d 1356, 1361
(9th Cir.1985) (plaintiff not precluded trom suit merely because person of same protected class selected for challenged position); Gay
V. Waiters and Dairy Lunchmen 's Union, supra. 694 F.2d at 550 (reliable generalized statistical data relevant and admissible at prima
facie stage of disparate treatment case to determine whether employment decision was product of intentional discrimination.)

7

In the light of the conclusion I reach, it is not necessary to address the majority's discussion of the individual defendants' qualified
immunity. I do not understand, however, how "[a] reasonable person would have been aware that the practices Lowe complains of
were unlawful" when this court itself has failed to find them so (At 10 II); that awareness surely cannot be attributed ex post facto on
the strength of allegations of discriminatory intent subsequently made in litigation.
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The PEOPLE OF the STATE OF
CALIFORNIA ex rei, John VAN DEKAJl,fP,
Attorney General of the State of
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The TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING
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775 F.20 998 (1985)

Prior Report: 766 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. I 985).
Before ANDERSON AND CANBY, Circuit Judges and
NIELSEN,' District Judge.
Opinion

ORDER

The panel orders the following amendment to its opinion in
this case, filed July 22, 1985:
Replace the language at page 9, lines 16-18, which states:
The proposed TRPA Regional Plan will
require the installation of best management
practices on all shorezone property.
with the following:

Attorneys and Law Firms

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., N. Gregory Taylor,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard M. Skinner, Deputy Atty. Gen.,
Sacramento, Cal., E. Clement Shute, Shute, Mihaly &
Weinberger, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

TRPA's goals include ultimately putting
best management practices in place for all
land in the Lake Tahoe region.
The petition for rehearing is denied.

William T. Chidlaw, Law Offices of William T. Chidlaw,
Sacramento, Cal., for intervenor-appellant.
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116 Idaho 708
Court ofAppeals ofIdaho.

Sydney Mae LOWRY, Individually, and
Sydney Mae Lowry, as personal
representative of the Estate ofSteven
Douglas Lowry, Deceased, PlaintiffCounterdefendant -Appellant-Cross
Respondent,
v.
IRELAND BANK, an Idaho banking
corporation, and R. Brad Bowen,
Defendants-CounterplaintiffsRespondents-Cross Appellants.

In reviewing summary judgment, Court of
Appeals determines whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and, if not,
whether prevailing party below was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

[2J

In reviewing summary judgment, Court of
Appeals views the narrative facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c).

No. 17624. I Sept. 1, 1989.
Widow brought action against bank seeking payment of
credit life insurance proceeds and bank counterclaimed for
payment on promissory note. The District Court, Sixth
Judicial District, Bannock County, P. McDermott, 1.,
granted summary judgment in favor of the bank in the
action for insurance proceeds and entered judgment in
favor of the bank on its counterclaim for payment on the
promissory note. Widow and bank appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Burnett, J., held that: (I) fact issues existed
precluding summary judgment on widow's insurance
claim; (2) widow could not raise lack of acknowledgement
of her signature on deed of trust as defense to bank's
counterclaim to collect on note; (3) bank was entitled to
recover on promissory note without filing claim against
husband's estate; and (4) where deed of trust that had been
signed by widow and her husband authorized husband to
obtain a further loan secured by the encumbered property,
widow consented to additional loan made at her husband's
request and such loan commensurately increased the
encumbrance of the community property, despite the fact
that widow signed no document increasing the loan, and,
therefore, bank was entitled to collect the additional loan
by foreclosure of the deed of trust.

Appeal and Error

c"... Judgment

[31

Witnesses
..=Actions and Proceedings in Which Testimony
Is Excluded

Dead man's statute did not apply to evidence
used to defend against claim. Rules of Evid.,
Rule 601(b).
I Cases that cite this headnote

141

Judgment
J""Weight and Sufficiency

Determination of credibility should not be made
on summary judgment if credibility can be tested
in court before trier of fact.

Summary judgment vacated, judgment on counterclaim
vacated in part, and case remanded.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

West Headnotes (II)
[5J

111

Appeal and Error
.;"",Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of
Decision Appealed from

Judgment
~••• Banks, Cases Involving

In suit against bank alleging negligence in failing

Lowry v. !reland Bank, 116 Idaho 70S (1

779 P.2d 22
to obtain credit life policy, fact issues existed
precluding summary judgment as to whether
bank manager's conduct was negligent and as to
whether such negligence was superseded or
outweighed by negligence on borrower's part.

[91

Bank which took over bank that made loan,
assuming all of its assets, accounts, and
liabilities, was real party in interest entitled to
recover on promissory note. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 17(a).

1 Cases that cite this headnote

16)

Bills and Notes
•. =Parties Plaintiff

Husband and Wife
0~~Estoppel to Assert Invalidity
Wife could not raise lack of acknowledgement of
her signature on deed of trust as defense to suit by
bank to collect on note, where wife's conduct at
the time the loan was made was consistent with
the existence of a valid encumbrance, in that she
and her husband accepted the loan proceeds and
she admitted she signed the deed of trust. I.e. §

[10)

Husband and Wife
v=Mortgage by Husband and Wife
General rule that community real property can be
validly encumbered only if both spouses join in
executing the instrument of encumbrance is
subject to an exception if one spouse is
authorized to act as an agent for the management
and disposition of community real property. I.e.
§ 32-912.

32-912.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

I Cases that cite this headnote

171

Alteration of Instruments
<"ccAdmissibility of Instrument in Evidence

1111
Promissory note executed by husband and wife
was admissible in evidence despite fact that it
was altered to increase amount, where alteration
was made with husband's participation and
obvious consent.

IS)

Husband and Wife
.:;=Estoppel to Assert Invalidity

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Where deed of trust signed by husband and wife
authorized husband to obtain further loan secured
by encumbered property, wife consented to
additional loan made at her husband's request
and the loan commensurately increased the
encumbrance of community property, despite
fact that wife signed no document increasing the
loan; bank was entitled to collect the additional
loan by foreclosure ofthe deed oftrust. I.e. § 32-

Executors and Administrators
Which Must Be Presented

912.

'0c~Claims

Bank was entitled to recover on promissory note
executed by husband and wife, without filing
claim against husband's estate, where trust deed,
which is a form of lien, was involved. I.e. §§ 9-

601,15-3-803.
Attorneys and Law Firms
**23 *709 A. Bruce Larson, Soda Springs, for appellant.
Guy R. Price, argued, and Archie W. Service, Green,
Service, Gasser & Kerl, Pocatello, for respondent.
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Opinion

were found to contain new loan documents apparently
awaiting signatures.

BURNETT, Judge.

This appeal presents issues relating to a bank loan, credit
life insurance and an encumbrance of community real
property. Sydney Mae Lowry, a widow, brought this action
against Ireland Bank, seeking payment of credit life
insurance proceeds allegedly due upon her husband's
death. The Bank counterclaimed, demanding payment
**24 *710 on a promissory note she and her husband had
signed. The district court entered summary judgment
dismissing Mrs. Lowry's insurance claim, but the court
held a bench trial on the bank's claim to recover on the
note. Following that trial, the court entered a judgment for
the bank, but for less than the amount sought. Both parties
appealed. For reasons explained below we vacate the
judgments and remand the case for further proceedings.
The background facts are as follows. Mrs. Lowry and her
husband borrowed money to build an auto body repair
shop on a parcel of land which they owned as community
property. The loan was evidenced by a $20,000 revolving
credit note in favor of Downey State Bank, a predecessor
ofIreland Bank. The note was secured by a deed of trust on
the shop property. The documents were prepared by the
bank and signed by the Lowrys. The bank manager
notarized the documents even though Mrs. Lowry's
signature and acknowledgement did not occur in his
presence. Later, Mr. Lowry amended the note by
interlineation, increasing the loan to $25,600. The bank
disbursed the additional $5,600 to the Lowrys' joint
account. Mrs. Lowry did not initial the amendment of the
note.
Approximately six months after the original note was
signed, Mr. Lowry asked the bank to add credit life
insurance to the note. The bank manager agreed, and he put
a statement on the promissory note that Mr. Lowry had
requested life insurance. The note was then submitted to
the bank's insurance carrier. A few days later, the
insurance carrier informed the bank that credit life
insurance could not be added to an existing note.
What happened next is in dispute. The bank manager stated
in a deposition that he called Mr. Lowry and told him about
the insurance problem. The bank manager also stated that
he offered to execute new loan documents if Mr. Lowry
still wanted the insurance. If this conversation took place,
it occurred at least three weeks after the insurance carrier
had informed the bank it could not insure an existing note.
Shortly after the alleged conversation, Mr. Lowry was
killed in an airplane crash. The bank's files subsequently

In her suit against the bank, Mrs. Lowry cast the insurance
question as one of negligence. She alleged that the bank's
manager negligently had failed to obtain the credit life
insurance in a timely fashion. She demanded $25,600 in
damages. As mentioned above, the bank counterclaimed
on the amended note and sought foreclosure of the deed of
trust. The district court dismissed Mrs. Lowry's claim and
sustained the bank's claim, but limited the bank's recovery
to the original $20,000 obligation.
On appeal, Mrs. Lowry has argued that dismissal of her
claim by summary judgment was improper because there
was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the bank
manager's alleged negligence. She further contends that
the note cannot be collected by foreclosure on the deed of
trust, in any amount, because (a) the deed of trust is void
for lack of proper acknowledgement of her signature; (b)
the note has been materially altered and, therefore, should
not have been admitted into evidence; (c) the bank did not
timely file a claim in probate against her husband's estate;
and (d) Ireland Bank, as successor to Downey State Bank,
is not the real party in interest. In its cross appeal, Ireland
Bank argues that it should be entitled to collect the full
amount of the amended note, $25,600, from the
encumbered real property.

III 121 We first address Mrs. Lowry's contention that
summary judgment should not have been entered against
her insurance claim. In our review of a summary judgment,
we determine whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact and, if not, whether the prevailing party
below was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In reaching our decision, we view the
narrative facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Boise Car and Truck Rental Co. v. **25
*711 Waco, Inc., 108 Idaho 780,702 P.2d 818 (1985).
131 Here, the district court held there was no genuine issue
of material fact as to the bank's negligence because the
bank manager said he had telephoned Mr. Lowry and had
told him that new loan documents were required for the
credit life insurance.l The district court concluded that this
statement disproved any negligence by the bank because
the conversation put Mr. Lowry on notice of the need to
sign new documents. The court further concluded that Mr.
Lowry was contributorily negligent in failing to sign the
documents promptly.

lowry v.lre!and Bank, 116 Idaho 708 (1989)
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14] As noted, there is a dispute as to whether the bank
manager actually did so notity Mr. Lowry. Mrs. Lowry
suggests he did not. The only person who could confirm or
directly controvert the bank manager's story is dead. The
record contains a telephone bill showing the existence of a
call from the bank to the Lowrys' telephone number.
However, the bank concedes that the call occurred some
three weeks after the insurance carrier informed the bank
of its refusal to issue the credit life insurance. Moreover,
the bank manager admitted falsely notarizing Mrs.
Lowry's signature on the deed of trust. Taken together,
these facts frame an issue of the bank manager's
credibility. A determination of credibility should not be
made on summary judgment if credibility can be tested in
court before the trier of fact. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho
668, 691 P.2d 1283 (Ct.App.1984).
IS] Moreover, even if Mr. Lowry was told during the
telephone call of the need to sign new documents, this
would not necessarily establish that the bank manager had
acted in a timely fashion or that Mr. Lowry was
contributorily negligent. If the bank manager did notity
Mr. Lowry, he evidently waited several weeks before
doing so. Mr. Lowry died a few days after the alleged
notification. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to
Mrs. Lowry, a jury could find that the bank manager's
conduct was negligent. In addition, the jury could find that
such negligence was not superseded or comparatively
outweighed by any negligence on Mr. Lowry's part.
Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment against
Mrs. Lowry's insurance claim was improper.

II

We turn now to Mrs. Lowry's challenge to the judgment
allowing the bank to collect the original $20,000 note by
foreclosing against the shop property. She raises several
issues, which we will address in turn.

A

Mrs. Lowry's first contention is that the deed of trust is
void because her signature was not acknowledged as
required by I.e. § 32-912. This statute provides that in
order to conveyor to encumber community realty, both
spouses must sign and acknowledge the instrument of
conveyance or encumbrance. However, the statute does not
create an inexorable rule. In Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho
50,480 P.2d 896 (1971), our Supreme Court held that a
party can waive the protective requirements of I.e. § 32912. The Court stated that even if an instrument lacks an

acknowledgment of a spouse's signature, the spouse will
be deemed to have waived the defect ifhis or her conduct is
consistent with the existence and validity of the
instrument. Jd. at 54, 480 P.2d at 900.
16] Here, the Lowrys treated the deed of trust as valid, and
they accepted the loan proceeds from the bank. Mrs.
Lowry later admitted that she had signed the deed of trust.
Consequently, we hold that her conduct was consistent
with the existence ofa valid encumbrance. She cannot now
raise the lack of acknow ledgment as a defense.

**26 *712 B

We turn next to Mrs. Lowry's contention that the amended
promissory note is an altered document that should not
have been admitted into evidence. Idaho Code § 9-60 I
provides that an altered document may be admitted if the
alteration is not "material to the question in dispute." It
also provides that an altered document can be used as
evidence if the alteration was made with the consent of the
affected parties. The parties have not contended that the
statute is inconsistent with the Idaho Rules of Evidence;
accordingly, we will assume that it is effective and
pertinent to the issue here. See I.R.E. 1102.

17] It is undisputed that $20,000 was loaned to Mr. and
Mrs. Lowry. Mrs. Lowry admits signing the note for that
amount. Consequently, the document could be used to
prove the $20,000 obligation. Moreover, Mrs. Lowry
conceded in her complaint that her husband had borrowed
the additional $5,600. She later verified that the initials on
the note, appearing next to the amendment, were in Mr.
Lowry'S handwriting. As we will explain later, the bank
has not contended that Mrs. Lowry is individually liable
for the $5,600. Rather, it has contended that Mr. Lowry
incurred the obligation and that it may be collected from
the couple's community real property described in the deed
of trust. Because the alteration of the note was made with
Mr. Lowry's participation and obvious consent, we hold
that the amended note was admissible as to the particular
claim presented in this case.

c
181 Mrs. Lowry further contends that the bank cannot
recover on the note because it did not file a timely claim
against her husband's estate under I.e. § 15-3-803. The
bank filed no claim in probate against Mr. Lowry's estate;
rather, it made a demand through its counterclaim in Mrs.
Lowry's action, naming the estate as an additional
counterdefendant. Neverthel.~ss,.IY,1£~.:~0':VrX:~Eeliance
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upon I.c. § 15-3-803 is misguided. The statute itself
contains an exception regarding proceedings to enforce a
mortgage or other lien upon estate property. See I.c. § 153-803( c). Because this case involves a trust deed, which is
a form of lien, the bank was not required to comply with
the requirements elsewhere contained in the statute.
Therefore, the statute is inapplicable to this case.

o
19) Finally, Mrs. Lowry argues that Downey State Bank,
not Ireland Bank, is the real party in interest. She invites
attention to Rule 17(a), I.R.C.P., which requires every
action to be "prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest." In this case, Downey State Bank made the loans.
Mrs. Lowry filed her complaint against Downey State
Bank. However, as noted by the district court, Ireland Bank
subsequently took over Downey State Bank, assuming all
of the bank's assets, accounts and liabilities. We deem it
clear that Ireland Bank thereby became the real party in
interest for this action, within the meaning of I.R.C.P.
17(a). See Caughey v. George Jensen & Sons, 74 Idaho
132,258 P.2d 357 (1953) (real party in interest is one who
has substantial interest in the subject matter and whose
satisfaction ofajudgment will bar fUliher suit on the same
matter). We see no error in treating Ireland Bank as the
proper party in this case.

III
We now arrive at Ireland Bank's cross-appeal. The bank
contends that the district court erred in its determination
that the community real estate-i.e., the shop property
described in the deed of trust-was encumbered only for
the amount of the original note, $20,000. The bank argues
that the additional $5,600 loan also was secured by the
deed of trust. Mrs. Lowry counters that because she signed
no document increasing the loan, the property is not a
source of repayment beyond the original $20,000
obligation.
Of course, the bank does not assert that Mrs. LOWry is an
individual obligor on the **27 *713 $5,600 loan.2 The
mere fact that her husband borrowed the money would not
impose personal liability upon her as a spouse. Idaho's
community property laws do not displace fundamental
principles governing individual liability for a debt. Rather,
they simply affect the property to which creditors may look
for satisfaction of the debt. Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v.
Holley, III Idaho 349, 723 P.2d 893 (1986). Here, the
bank argues that the shop property is a source of payment

for the $5,600 debt because it was community property
when the debt was incurred and has been encumbered by
the deed of trust.
110) We have noted that community real property can be
validly encumbered only if both spouses join in executing
the instrument of encumbrance. I.c. § 32-912. The statute
evinces a legislative policy of protecting community real
property from creditors, unless both spouses agree in
writing to incur the debt. Thus, the statute usually requires
two signatures. However, an exception to this general rule
exists if one spouse is authorized to act as an agent for the
management and disposition of community real property.
Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 Idaho 364,367,421
P.2d 444, 447 (1966). Our Supreme Court has held that
such an agency may be created by an express power of
attorney, as authorized by I.c. § 32-912, or may be
inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties.
Noble, 91 Idaho at 368,421 P.2d at 448.
Ill) In this case, the deed of trust recited that it was
executed for the following purposes:

[S]ecuring payment of the indebtedness
evidenced by a promissory note, of even
date herewith, executed by Grantor in the
sum of Twenty Thousand and noll OOths
dollars ($20,000.00), final payment due
8/ I 0/89, and to secure payment of all
such further sums as may hereafter be
loaned or advanced by the beneficiary
herein to the Grantor herein, or any or
either of them, while record owner of
present interest, for any purpose, and of
any notes, drafts or other instruments
representing such further loans, advances
or expenditures together with interest on
all such sums at the rate therein provided.
(Emphasis added.)
Both spouses signed this instrument. It clearly authorized
Mr. Lowry to obtain a further loan secured by the
encumbered property. Nevertheless, the district court held
that the property was not encumbered by the additional
loan because Mrs. Lowry did not sign or initial the
amendment to the promissory note. In so holding, the court
focused too narrowly on whether Mrs. Lowry participated
directly in obtaining the additional loan. The dispositive
question is whether she consented to the additional loan,
and to the commensurately increased encumbrance of the
property, by agreeing that the bank could make such a loan
at her husband's request. We hold that she did. Therefore,
we must set aside the district court's determination that the
bank was not entitled to collect the additional loan by
foreclosure of the deed of trust.

V.

ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708 (1989)

779 P.2d 22
In conclusion, we vacate the summary judgment
dismissing Mrs. Lowry's insurance claim. We also vacate
that part of the subsequent judgment limiting the bank's
recovery to the original note obligation. We remand the
case for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Because the credit life insurance claim and the promissory
note obligation are interrelated and potentially offsetting,
and because this appeal has produced a mixed result, we
decline to specify a prevailing party on appeal.
Accordingly, we award no costs or attorney fees.

SWANSTROM, J., and HART, 1. Pro Tern., concur.

Parallel Citations
779 P.2d 22

Footnotes
We note. incidentally, that Mrs. Lowry contends the "dead man's" statute, see I.R.E. 601(b), bars evidence concerning a telephone
conversation between Mr. Lowry and the bank manager. We disagree. The statute does not apply to evidence used to defend against
a claim. Because the evidence at issue here was used to defeat Mrs. Lowry's claim, I.R.E. 601(b) is inapposite.

2

Presumably because Mrs. Lowry has no individual liability for the $5,600 loan, the bank has conceded in oral argument that it can
make no claim against any of her separate property. Neither does the bank appear to claim an encumbrance upon any real estate other
than the shop property.
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jurisdictional
prerequisites to federal action under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by filing timely
charges of employment discrimination with
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and by receiving and acting upon the
Commission's statutory notice of right to sue,
district judge erred in dismissing his claim of
racial discrimination under provision dealing
with whether for any reason a racially
discriminatory employment decision has been
made; the Act did not restrict a complainant's
right to sue to those charges as to which the
Commission has made findings of reasonable
cause. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(I), 42
U .S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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Suit claiming violation of provisions of Civil Rights Act of
1964. The District Court, 299 F.Supp. 1100 and 318
F.Supp. 846, entered judgment, and appeal was taken. The
Court of Appeals, 463 F.2d 337, ordered the case
remanded, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court,
Mr. Justice Powell, held that the Act did not restrict a
complainant's right to sue to those charges as to which the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has made
findings of reasonable cause, and further held that where
employer sought mechanics, complainant's trade and
continued to do so after complainant's rejection and
employer did not dispute complainant's qualifications,
complainant proved prima facie case under Title VII and
fUlihermore, employer, which assigned complainant's
paIiicipation in unlawful conduct against it as cause for his
rejection, discharged its burden of proof to articulate
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for complainant's
rejection, but on remand complainant had to be afforded a
fair opportunity to show that employer's stated reason for
complainant's rejection was in fact pretextual.
Cause remanded.
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findings as to complainant's contentions under
provision of Civil Rights Act of 1964 relating
solely to discrimination against an applicant or
employee on account of his participation in
legitimate civil rights activities or protests
involved identical issues raised by his claim
under other provision of the Act dealing with
whether for any reason a racially discriminatory
employment decision has been made, dismissal
of complainant's claim under the latter provision
was not harmless error and he should have been
accorded right to prepare his case and plan
strategy of trial with knowledge that cause of
action under that provision was properly before
the district court. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
703(a)(I), 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(a)(I),
2000e-3(a).
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employer,
which
assigned
complainant's
participation in unlawful conduct against it as
cause for his rejection, discharged its burden of
proof to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for complainant's rejection, but on
remand complainant had to be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that employer's stated
reason for complainant's rejection was in fact
mere pretext. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et
seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e et seq.
20406 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
<'·~Discrimination

by Reason of Race, Color,
Ethnicity, or National Origin, in General

In implementation of employment and personnel
decisions, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et
seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e et seq.
417 Cases that cite this headnote
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Civil Rights
, .,.Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of
Proof

Complainant in a trial under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 must carry initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie
case of racial discrimination and that may be
done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U .S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
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Civil Rights
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Civil Rights
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Where
employer
sought
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complainant's trade, and continued to do so after
complainant's rejection and employer did not
dispute
complainant's
qualifications,
complainant proved prima facie case under Title
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, and furthermore,
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Civil Rights
•.",Discharge or Layoff

Nothing in Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 compels an employer to absolve and rehire
one who has engaged in deliberate, unlawful
activity against it. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701
et seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e et seq.
284 Cases that cite this headnote

18)

Civil Rights
.•~Discharge or Layoff
Civil Rights
.,""Discharge or Layoff

Employer may justifiably refuse to rehire one
who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts
against it but only ifthat criterion is applied alike
to members of all races. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 701 et seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e et seq.
251 Cases that cite this headnote
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Civil Rights
,··Particular Cases

Rejection of prospective employee for unlawful
conduct against employer, in the absence of proof
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such a reason, is not the kind of artificial,
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which it was the intent of Congress to remove
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U .S.C.A. § 2000e
et seq.
504 Cases that cite this headnote

**1819 *792 Syllabus*
Respondent, a black civil rights actIvIst, engaged in
disruptive and illegal activity against petitioner as part of
his protest that his discharge as an employee of petitioner's
and the firm's general hiring practices were racially
motivated. When petitioner, who subsequently advertised
for
qualified
personnel,
rejected
respondent's
re-employment application on the ground of the illegal
conduct, respondent filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charging
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
EEOC found that there was reasonable cause to believe
that petitioner's rejection of respondent violated s 704(a)
of the Act, which forbids discrimination against applicants
or employees for attempting to protest or correct allegedly
discriminatory employment conditions, but made no
finding on respondent's allegation that petitioner had also
violated s 703(a) (I), which prohibits discrimination in any
employment decision. Following unsuccessful EEOC
conciliation efforts, respondent brought suit in the District
Court, which ruled that respondent's illegal activity was
not protected by s 704(a) and dismissed the s 703(a)(l)
claim because the EEOC had made no finding with respect
thereto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the s 704(a) ruling,
but reversed with respect to s 703(a)(I), holding that an
EEOC determination of reasonable cause was not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to claiming a violation of that
provision in federal court. Held:
I. A complainant's right to bring suit under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is not confined to charges as to which
the EEOC has made a reasonable-cause finding, and the
District Court's error in holding to the contrary was not
harmless since the issues raised with respect to s 703(a)(I)
were not identical to those with respect to s 704(a) and the
dismissal of the former charge may have prejudiced
respondent's efforts at trial. Pp. 1822-1823.
2. In a private, non-class-action complaint under Title VII
charging racial
employment discrimination,
the
complainant has the burden of establishing a prima facie
case, which he can satisfy by showing that (i) he belongs to
a racial **1820 minority; (ii) he *793 applied and was
qualified for a job the employer was trying to fill; (iii)
though qualified, he was rejected; and (iv) thereafter the

employer continued to seek applicants with complainant's
qualifications. P. 1824.
3. Here, the Court of Appeals, though correctly holding
that respondent proved a prima facie case, erred in holding
that petitioner had not discharged its burden of proof in
rebuttal by showing that its stated reason for the rehiring
refusal was based on respondent's illegal activity. But on
remand respondent must be afforded a fair opportunity of
proving that petitioner's stated reason was just a pretext for
a racially discriminatory decision, such as by showing that
whites engaging in similar illegal activity were retained or
hired by petitioner. Other evidence that may be relevant,
depending on the circumstances, could include facts that
petitioner had discriminated against respondent when he
was an employee or followed a discriminatory policy
toward Minority employees. Pp. 1824-1826.
8 Cir., 463 F.2d 337, vacated and remanded.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Veryl L. Riddle, St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner.
Louis Gilden, St. Louis, Mo., for respondent.
Opinion
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion for a
unanimous Court.

The case before us raises significant questions as to the
proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title
*794 VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42
U.S.c. s 2000e et seq.
Petitioner, McDonnell Douglas Corp., is an aerospace and
aircraft manufacturer headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri,
where it employs over 30,000 people. Respondent, a black
citizen of St. Louis, worked for petitioner as a mechanic
and laboratory technician from 1956 until August 28,
19641 when he was laid off in the course of a general
reduction in petitioner's work force.
Respondent, a long-time activist in the civil rights
movement, protested vigorously that his discharge and the
general hiring practices of petitioner were racially
motivated.2 As part of this protest, respondent and other
members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally
stalled their cars on the main roads leading to petitioner's
plant for the purpose of blocking access to it at the time of
the morning shift change. The District Judge described the
plan for, and respondent's participation in, the 'stall-in' as
follows:
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'(F)ive teams, each consisting of four cars would 'tie up'
five main access roads into McDonnell at the time of the
morning rush hour. The drivers of the cars were instructed
to line up next to each other completely blocking the
intersections or roads. The drivers were also instructed to
stop their cars, tum off the engines, pull the emergency
brake, raise all windows, lock the doors, and remain in
their cars until the police arrived. The plan was to have the
cars remain in position for one hour.
*795 'Acting under the 'stall in' plan, plaintiff (respondent
in the present action) drove his car onto Brown Road, a
McDonnell access road, at approximately 7:00 a.m., at the
start of the morning rush hour. Plaintiff was aware of the
traffic problems that would result. He stopped his car with
the intent to block traffic. The police **1821 arrived
shOlily and requested plaintiff to move his car. He refused
to move his car voluntarily. Plaintiff's car was towed away
by the police, and he was arrested for obstructing traffic.
Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the charge of obstructing traffic
and was fined.' 318 F.Supp. 846.
On July 2, 1965, a 'lock-in' took place wherein a chain and
padlock were placed on the front door of a building to
prevent the occupants, certain of petitioner's employees,
from leaving. Though respondent apparently knew
beforehand of the 'lock-in,' the full extent of his
involvement remains uncertain.3
*796 Some three weeks following the 'lock-in,' on July 25,
1965, petItIOner publicly advertised for qualified
mechanics, respondent's trade, and respondent promptly
applied for re-employment. Petitioner turned down
respondent, basing its rejection on respondent's
PaJilclpation in the 'stall-in' and 'lock-in.' Shortly
thereafter, respondent filed a formal complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming
that petitioner had refused to rehire him because of his race
and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement, in
violation ofss 703(a)(I) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.c. ss 2000e-2(a)(I) and 2000e-3(a).4 The
former section generally prohibits racial discrimination in
any employment decision while the latter forbids
discrimination against applicants or employees for
attempting to protest or correct allegedly discriminatory
conditions of employment.
*797 The Commission made no finding on respondent's
allegation of racial bias under s 703(a)(I), but it did find
reasonable cause to believe petitioner had violated s 704(a)
by refusing to rehire respondent because of his civil rights
activity. After the Commission unsuccess-fully attempted
to conciliate the dispute, it advised respondent in March
1968, of his right to institute a civil action in federal court
within 30 days.

On April 15, 1968, respondent brought the present action,
claiming initially a violation of s 704(a) and, in an
amended **1822 complaint, a violation of s 703(a)(I) as
wel!.s The District Court, 299 F.Supp. 1100, dismissed the
latter claim of racial discrimination in petitioner's hiring
procedures on the ground that the Commission had failed
to make a determination ofreasonable cause to believe that
a violation of that section had been committed. The District
Court also found that petitioner's refusal to rehire
respondent was based solely on his participation in the
illegal demonstrations and not on his legitimate civil rights
activities. The court concluded that nothing in Title VI I or
s 704 protected 'such activity as employed by the plaintiff
in the 'stall in' and 'lock in' demonstrations.' 318 F.Supp.,
at 850.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that unlawful
protests were not protected activities under s 704(a),6 but
reversed the dismissal of respondent's s 703(a)( I) claim
relating to racially discriminatory hiring practices, holding
that a prior Commission determination of reasonable cause
was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to raising a claim
under that section in federal court. The court *798 ordered
the case remanded for trial of respondent's claim under s
703(a)(I).
In remanding, the Court of Appeals attempted to set forth
standards to govern the consideration of respondent's
claim. The majority noted that respondent had established
a prima facie case of racial discrimination; that petitioner's
refusal to rehire respondent rested on 'subjective' criteria
which carried little weight in rebutting charges of
discrimination; that, though respondent's participation in
the unlawful demonstrations might indicate a lack of a
responsible attitude toward performing work for that
employer, respondent should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate that petitioner's reasons for refusing to rehire
him were mere pretexu In order to clarify the standards
governing the disposition of an action challenging
employment discrimination, we granted certiorari, 409
U.S. 1036,93 S.Ct. 522,34 L.Ed.2d 485 (1972).

11)12) We agree with the Court of Appeals that absence of
a Commission finding of reasonable cause cannot bar suit
under an appropriate section of Title VII and that the
District Judge erred in dismissing respondent's claim of
racial discrimination under s 703(a)( 1). Respondent
satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action
(i) by filing timely charges of employment discrimination
with the Commission and (ii) by receiving and acting upon
the Commission's statutory notice of the right to sue, 42
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U.S.c. ss 2000e-5(a) and 2000e-5(e). The Act does not
restrict a complainant's right to sue to those charges as to
which the Commission has made findings of reasonable
cause, and we will not engraft on the statute a requirement
which may inhibit the review of *799 claims of
employment discrimination in the federal courts. The
Commission itself does not consider the absence of a
'reasonable cause' determination as providing employer
immunity from similar charges in a federal court, 29 CFR s
1601.30, and the courts of appeal have held that, in view of
the large volume of complaints before the Commission and
the nonadversary character of many of its proceedings,
'court actions under Title VII are de novo proceedings
**1823 and . . . a Commission 'no reasonable cause'
finding does not bar a lawsuit in the case.' Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (CA4 1971); Beverly v.
Lone Star Lead Construction Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (CA,5
1971); Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers International Union of
North America, 431 F.2d 205 (CA 7 1970); Fekete v.
United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (CA 3 1970).

13] Petitioner argues, as it did below, that respondent
sustained no prejudice from the trial court's erroneous
ruling because in fact the issue of racial discrimination in
the refusal to re-employ 'was tried thoroughly' in a trial
lasting four days with 'at least 80%' of the questions
relating to the issue of 'race.'8 Petitioner, therefore,
requests that the judgment below be vacated and the cause
remanded with instructions that the judgment of the
District Court be affirmed.9 We cannot agree that the
dismissal of respondent's s 703(a)(I) claim was harmless
error. It is not clear that the District Court's findings as to
respondent's s 704(a) contentions involved the identical
issues raised by his claim under s 703(a)(I). The former
section relates solely to discrimination against an applicant
or employee on account of his participation in legitimate
civil rights activities or protests, while the latter section
deals with the broader and centrally *800 important
question under the Act of whether for any reason, a racially
discriminatory employment decision has been made.
Moreover, respondent should have been accorded the right
to prepare his case and plan the strategy of trial with the
knowledge that the s 703(a)(I) cause of action was
properly before the District Court. I 0 Accordingly, we
remand the case for trial of respondent's claim of racial
discrimination consistent with the views set forth below.

II
The critical issue before us concerns the order and
allocation of proof in a private, non-class action
challenging employment discrimination. The language of
Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure

equality of employment opportUl1ltles and to eliminate
those discriminatory practices and devices which have
fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 40 I U.S. 424,429,91 S.Ct. 849, 852,28 L.Ed.2d 158
(1971); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (CA 1 1972);
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (CA2
1972); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505 (ED
Va.1968). As noted in Griggs, supra:
'Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to
guarantee a job to every person regardless of
qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that any
person be hired simply because he was formerly the
subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a
minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress
has proscribed. *801 What is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.' Id., 40 I U.S., at 430-431,91 S.Ct., at 853.

141 There are societal as well as personal interests on both
sides of this equation. The broad, overriding interest,
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient
and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and
racially neutral employment and personnel decisions. In
the implementation of **1824 such decisions, it is
abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial
discrimination, subtle or otherwise.
In this case respondent, the complainant below, charges
that he was denied employment 'because of his
involvement in civil rights activities' and 'because of his
race and color.' II Petitioner denied discrimination of any
kind, asserting that its failure to re-employ respondent was
based upon and justified by his participation in the
unlawful conduct against it. Thus, the issue at the trial on
remand is framed by those opposing factual contentions.
The two opinions of the Court of Appeals and the several
opinions of the three judges of that court attempted, with a
notable lack of harmony, to state the applicable rules as to
burden of proof and how this shifts upon the making of a
prima facie case.12 We now address this problem.
*802151161 The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry
the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for ajob for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.13 In the instant case, we agree with the
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Court of Appeals that respondent proved a prima facie
case. 463 F.2d 337, 353. Petitioner sought mechanics,
respondent's trade, and continued to do so after
respondent's rejection. Petitioner, moreover, does not
dispute respondent's qualifications14 and acknowledges
that his past work perfonnance in petitioner's employ was
'satisfactory.' 15
The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection. We need not attempt in the instant
case to detail every matter which fairly could be *803
recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire. Here
petitioner has assigned respondent's participation in
unlawful conduct against it as the cause for his rejection.
We think that this suffices to discharge petitioner's burden
of proof at this stage and to meet respondent's prima facie
case of discrimination.

171 The Court of Appeals intimated, however, that
petitioner's stated reason for refusing to rehire respondent
was a 'subjective' rather than objective criterion which
'carr[ies] little weight in rebutting charges of
discrimination,' 463 F.2d, at 343. This was among the
statements which caused the dissenting judge **1825 to
read the opinion as taking 'the position that such unlawful
acts as Green committed against McDonnell would not
legally entitle McDonnell to refuse to hire him, even
though no racial motivation was involved ... .' Id., at 355.
Regardless of whether this was the intended import of the
opinion, we think the court below seriously underestimated
the rebuttal weight to which petitioner's reasons were
entitled. Respondent admittedly had taken part in a
carefully planned 'stall-in,' designed to tie up access to and
egress from petitioner's plant at a peak traffic hour.16
Nothing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and
rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful
activity against itJ 7 In upholding, under the National
Labor Relations Act, the discharge of employees who had
seized and forcibly retained *804 an employer's factory
buildings in an illegal sit-down strike, the Court noted
pertinently:
'We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to
compel employers to retain persons in their employ
regardless of their unlawful conduct,-to invest those who
go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of
trespass or violence against the employer's property ...
Apart from the question of the constitutional validity of an
enactment of that sort, it is enough to say that such a
legislative intention should be found in some definite and
unmistakable expression.' NLRB v. Fansteel Corp., 306
U.S. 240,255, 59 S.Ct. 490, 496, 83 L.Ed. 627 (1939).
[81 Petitioner's reason for rejection thus suffices to meet

the prima facie case, but the inquiry must not end here.
While Title VII does not, without more, compel rehiring of
respondent, neither does it penn it petitioner to use
respondent's conduct as a pretext for the sort of
discrimination prohibited by s 703(a)(I). On remand,
respondent must, as the Court of Appeals recognized, be
afforded a fair opportunity to show that petitioner'S stated
reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext.
Especially relevant to such a showing would be evidence
that white employees involved in acts against petitioner of
comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were nevertheless
retained or rehired. Petitioner may justifiably refuse to
rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts
against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to
members of all races.
Other evidence that may be relevant to any showing of
pretext includes facts as to the petitioner's treatment of
respondent during his prior tenn of employment;
petitioner's reaction, ifany, to respondent's legitimate civil
rights activities; and petitioner's general policy and *805
practice with respect to minority employmentl 8 On the
latter point, statistics as to petitioner's employment policy
and practice may be helpful to a detennination of whether
petitioner's refusal to rehire respondent in this case
confonned to a general pattern of discrimination against
blacks. **1826 Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431
F.2d 245 (CA 10 1970); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 Mich.L.Rev. 59, 91-94
(1972).19 In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a
full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his
rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision.
19] The court below appeared to rely upon Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., supra, in which the Court stated: 'If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot *806 be shown to be related to job perfonnance, the
practice is prohibited.' 40 I U.S., at 431, 91 S.Ct., at 853,
28 L.Ed.2d 158.20 But Griggs differs from the instant case
in important respects. It dealt with standardized testing
devices which, however neutral on their face, operated to
exclude many blacks who were capable of performing
effectively in the desired positions. Griggs was rightly
concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and
background of minority citizens, resulting from forces
beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative
and invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder of
their lives. Id., at 430, 91 S.Ct., at 853. Respondent,
however, appears in different clothing. He had engaged in
a seriously disruptive act against the very one from whom
he now seeks employment. And petitioner does not seek
his exclusion on the basis of a testing device which
overstates what is necessary for competent perfonnance, or
w

,

",",m

,

McDonnell

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1
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through some sweeping disqualification of all those with
any past record of unlawful behavior, however remote,
insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant's personal
qualifications as an employee. Petitioner assertedly
rejected respondent for unlawful conduct against it and, in
the absence of proof of pretext or discriminatory
application of such a reason, this cannot be thought the
kind of 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment' which the Court found to be the intention of
Congress to remove. Id., at431, 91 S.Ct., at 853.21

opportunity to demonstrate
**1827 that petitioner's
assigned reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or
discriminatory in its application. If the District Judge so
finds, he must order a prompt and appropriate remedy. In
the absence of such a finding, petitioner's refusal to rehire
must stand.
The cause is hereby remanded to the District Court for
reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.
So ordered.
Remanded.

*807 III
In sum, respondent should have been allowed to pursue his
claim under s 703(a) (I). I f the evidence on retrial is
substantially in accord with that before us in this case, we
think that respondent carried his burden of establishing a
prima facie case of racial discrimination and that petitioner
successfully rebutted that case. But this does not end the
matter. On retrial, respondent must be afforded a fair

Parallel Citations
93 S.Ct. 1817, 5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 965, 5 Empl.
Prac. Dec. P 8607,36 L.Ed.2d 668

Footnotes

*

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of
the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co .. 200 U.S. 321. 337,26 S.C!. 282. 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
His employment during these years was continuous except for 2 I months of servicc in the military.

2

The Court of Appeals noted that respondent then 'filcd formal complaints of discrimination with the President's Commission on
Civil Rights, the Justice Department, the Department of the Navy. the Defcnse Department, and the Missouri Commission on Human
Rights.' 463 F.2d 337 (8 Cir., 1972).

3

The 'lock-in' occurred during a picketing demonstration by ACTION, a civil rights organization. at the entrance to a downtown
office building which housed a part of petitioner's ot1ices and in which certain of petitioner's employees were working at the time. A
ehain and padlock werc placed on the front door of the building to prevent ingress and egress. Although respondent acknowledges
that he was chairman of ACTION at the time, that the demonstration was planncd and stagcd by his group. that he participated in and
indeed was in charge of the picket line in front of the building, that he was told in advance by a member of ACTION 'that he was
planning to chain the front door,' and that he 'approved of chaining the door. there is no evidence that respondent personally took
part in the actual' lock-in.' and he was not arrested. App. 132-133.
The Court of Appeals majority, however, found that the record did 'not support the trial court's conclusion that Green 'actively
cooperated' in chaining the doors of the downtown St. Louis building during the 'lock-in' demonstration.' 463 F.2d, at 341. See also
concurring opinion of Judge Lay. Id., at 344. Judge Johnsen, in dissent, agreed with the District Court that the 'chaining and
padlocking (were) carried out as planned, (and that) Green had in fact given it ... approval and authorization.' Id., at 348.
In view of respondent's admitted participation in the unlawful 'stall-in.' we find it unnecessary to resolve the contradictory
contentions surrounding this 'lock-in.'

4

Section 703(a)( I) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. s 2000e-2(a) (I). in pertinent part provides:
'It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fbil or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual. or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation. terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. because of
such individual's race. color, religion, sex, or national origin ... .'
Scction 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.s.c. s 2000e-3(a). in pcrtinent part provides:
'It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter .... '

5

Respondent also contested the legality of his 1964 discharge by petitioner, but both courts held this claim barred by the statute of
limitations. Respondent does not challenge those rulings here.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
93 S.Ct. 1817,5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 965, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8607 ...

6

Respondent has not sought review ofthis issue.

7

All references are to Part V of the revised opinion of the Court of Appeals, 463 F.2d. at 352. which superseded Part V of the eourt's
initial opinion with respect to the order and nature of proof. 463 F.2d 337.

8

Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.

9

Brief for Petitioner 40.

10

The trial court did not diseuss respondent's s 703(a)( 1) claim in its opinion and denied requests for diseovery of statistical materials
which may have been relevant to that elaim.

11

The respondent initially charged petitioner in his complaint filed April IS, 1968, with discrimination beeause of his 'involvement in
civil rights aetivities.' App. 7, 8. In his amended complaint, filed Mareh 20, 1969. plaintitlbroadened his eharge to inelude denial of
employment beeause ofraee in violation ofs 703(a)(l). App. 27.

12

See original opinion of the majority of the panel whieh heard the ease. 463 F.2d. at 338; the eoncurring opinion ofJudge Lay, id., at
344; the first opinion of Judge Johnsen, dissenting in part, id., at 346; the revised opinion of the majority, id .. at 352; and the
supplemental dissent of Judge Johnsen, id .. at 353. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied by an evenly divided Court of
Appeals.

13

The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the speeification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.

14

We note that the issue of what may properly be used to test qualifications for employment is not present in this case. Where
employers have instituted employment tests and qualifieations with an exclusionary effect on minority applieants, sueh requirements
must be 'shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to sueeessful performance of the jobs' for whieh they were used, Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424. 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (CAl 1972); Chance v.
Board of Examiners. 458 F.2d 1167 (CA2 1972).

15

Tr. of Oral Arg. 3; 463 F.2d, at 353.

16

The trial judge noted that no personal injury or property damage resulted from the 'stall-in' due 'solely to the fact that law
enforcement of1ieials had obtained notice in advance ofplaintitrs (here respondent's) demonstration and were at the seene to remove
plaintiff s ear from the highway.' 318 F.Supp. 846. 851.

17

The unlawful activity in this case was directed specifically against petitioner. We need not eon sider or decide here whether, or under
what eircumstanees. unlawful activity not direeted against the particular employer may be a legitimate justification for refusing to
hire.

18

We are aware that some of the above faetors were, indeed, considercd by the Distriet Judge in finding under s 704(a), that
'defendant's (here petitioner's) reasons for refusing to rehire the plaintitl were motivated solely and simply by the plaintiff's
participation in the 'stall in' and 'lock in' demonstrations.' 318 F.Supp .. at 850. We do not intimate that this finding must be
overturned after consideration on remand of respondent's s 703(a)(l) claim. We do, however, insist that respondent under s 703(a)( 1)
must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that whatever the stated reasons for his rejection. the
decision was in reality racially premised.

19

The District Court may, for example, determine, after reasonable discovery that 'the (raeial) composition of defendant's labor force is
itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices.' See Blumrosen, supra. at 92. We caution that such gcneral determinations,
while helpful. may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision. particularly in the presence of an
otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to rehire. See generally United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F.Supp. 977, 992
(WDNY 1970), order modified. 446 F.2d 652 (CA2 1971). B1umrosen, supra, n. 19, at 93.

20

See 463 F.2d, at 352.

21

It is, of course, a predictive evaluation, resistant to empirical proof~ whether 'an applicant's past participation in unlawful conduct
directed at his prospective employer might indicate the applicant's lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work for that
employer.' 463 F.2d. at 353. But in this casc, given the seriousness and harmful potential of respondent's participation in the 'stall-in'
and the accompanying inconvenience to other cmployees, it cannot be said that petitioner's refusal to employ lacked a rational and
neutral business justification. As the Court has noted elsewhere;
'Past conduct may well relate to PE~~ent fitness;p~stloyalt)l m~x~ave a reasonable relationship to present and future trust.' Gamer v.

McDollneH Douglas

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

93 S.Ct. 1817,5 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 965, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8607 ...
Board of Public Works of Los Angeles. 341 U.S. 716. 720. 71 S.Ct. 909, 912. 95 L.Ed. 1317 (1951).
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Treatment

The ultimate factual question that must be
addressed in a civil action for age discrimination
under Oregon law is whether the plaintiff has
proved that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff, that is,
whether the defendant treated the plaintiff
differently, and adversely, because of age.
West's Or.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659A.030(l)(a).

Michael MORROW, Plaintiffs,

v.
BARD ACCESS SYSTEMS, INC., a Utah
corporation, Defendant.
Civil No. 3:10-cv-00209-JO. I June 20,
2011.
Synopsis
Background: Former employee brought action in state
court against former employer, alleging age discrimination
and wrongful discharge in violation of Oregon law.
Following removal, employer filed motion for summary
judgment.
Holdings: The District Court, Jones, J., held that:
[I] genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
employee was terminated because of his age, and
[2] there was no evidence that employee's complaints
about safety of products were a factor in decision to
terminate him.
Motion granted in part and denied in part.

West Headnotes (3)

111

Federal Civil Procedure
,-Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether employee was terminated because of his
age, precluding summary judgment in his age
discrimination claim under Oregon law. West's
Or.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659A.030( I )(a).

[21

Civil Rights

[3)

Labor and Employment
.>,Causal Connection; Temporal Proximity
There was no evidence that employee's
complaints about safety of products were a factor
in decision to terminate him, as required for his
wrongful discharge claim under Oregon law.

Attorneys and Law Firms
Richard C. Busse, Busse & Hunt, Portland, OR, for
Plaintiffs.
Jeffrey S. Bosley, Man Overbeck, Winston & Strawn,
LLP, San Francisco, CA, Ryan S. Gibson, Victor 1. Kisch,
Stoel Rives, LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants.
Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER
JONES, District Judge:
*1 Plaintiff Michael Morrow brought this action against
defendant Bard Access Systems, Inc., in state court,
alleging claims for age discrimination under ORS Chapter
659A, and common law claims for wrongful discharge.
Defendant removed the action to this court based on
diversity jurisdiction.
The case is now before the court on defendant's motion (#

Morrow v. Bard Access
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Inc., ---

25) for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below,
defendant's motion is denied as to plaintiffs age
discrimination claim and granted as to the wrongful
discharge claims.

STANDARDS
Summary judgment should be granted if there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
If the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues
of material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the
pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23,106 S.Ct.
2548, 9 I L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A scintilla of evidence, or
evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly
probative, does not present a genuine issue of material fact.
United Steelworkers o[America v. Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d
1539, 1542 (9th Cir.1989).
The substantive law governing a claim determines whether
a fact is material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242,248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986): see also
T W Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d
626, 630 (9th Cir.1987). Reasonable doubts as to the
existence of a material factual issue are resolved against
the moving party. T W. Elec. Service, 809 F.2d at 631.
Inferences drawn from facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 630-31.

DISCUSSION
The parties are familiar with their extensive evidentiary
submissions, and 1 find it unnecessary to repeat the factual
background of this dispute here. Having thoroughly
reviewed the parties' arguments and submissions, I
conclude that summary judgment on plaintiffs age
discrimination claim must be denied, but that his wrongful
discharge claims are not viable and must be dismissed.

I. Age Discrimination
[I J The record establishes that during his employment with
defendant, plaintiff "was his own worst enemy," as
defendant points out and has thoroughly documented. But
the record also shows that plaintiff consistently was a top
performer in sales. Despite plaintiffs success in sales,
defendant contends that plaintiffs long history of
administrative failings, misconduct, and other behavior,
including the final unprofessional emaill that is central to
defendant's arguments, resulted in the decision to
terl'l1inate his empl(j)lIl1 ent. The evidence strol1~I)I~upp()l1:s

1)

defendant's position.
Plaintiff, in turn, contends that age, not misconduct, was
the reason for his tennination. In support of his argument,
plaintiff largely relies on his own affidavit, in which he
describes statements made by several of defendant's
managers that may be construed as demonstrating age bias.
Because this is a summary judgment proceeding, the
veracity of plaintiffs testimony is not before the court.
Accepting plaintiffs testimony as true for purposes of the
pending motion, a reasonable trier of fact could find that
plaintiffs termination was an unlawful employment
practice under ORS Chapter 659A.2
*2 The parties debate whether causation is measured by the
"but for" test the United States Supreme Court articulated
in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct.
2343, 2351, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009), for federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEN') cases, or
the "substantial factor" test ordinarily applied in Oregon
state law discrimination claims. See, e.g., Seitz v. State by
and Through Albina Resources Center, 100 Or.App. 665,
675,788 P.2d 1004 (1990)(sex and race discrimination).
Neither party has cited an Oregon appellate court decision
that addresses the specific issue of causation in a ORS
Chapter 659A age discrimination case, nor has this court
found one.
12) It is tempting to construe the language of the Oregon
law as the Supreme Court did in Gross, because the
pertinent language interpreted in Gross is identical in both
statutes, i.e., with respect to causation, both statutes
prohibit discrimination "because of age." Compare 29
U.S.c. § 623(a)(I) with ORS 659A.030(l)(a). The ADEA,
however, specifically applies only to age discrimination,
while ORS 659A.030(I)(a) prohibits discrimination
"because of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
national origin, marital status or age .... " As noted above,
although no Oregon appellate decision interprets the
"because of language in the context of an age
discrimination case, the courts have clarified that the
'substantial factor' " test applies to other fonns of
discrimination prohibited by the same statute. See, e.g.,
Ettner v. City of Medford, 178 Or.App. 303, 35 P.3d 1140
(200 I) (gender); Winnett v. City of Portland, 118 Or.App.
437,847 P.2d 902 (1993) (sex); Seitz, supra, 1000r.App.
at 675, 788 P.2d 1004 (sex and race); see also Ventura v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 2010 WL 3767882 at *[0 (D.Or.
Sept. [6, 20 I 0). And as the Oregon Court of Appeals
recently noted:

The ultimate factual question that must
be addressed in such a civil action is
whether the plaintiff has proved that the
defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff, that is, whether the
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defendant treated the plaintiff differently,
and adversely, because of ... age.

Christianson v, State of Oregon, 239 Or.App. 451, 455,
244 P.3d 904 (2010).
The record in this case strongly supports an inference that
plaintiff was, indeed, terminated for performance
deficiencies and misconduct. On the other hand, the record
also demonstrates that defendant initially planned to
respond to plaintiffs unprofessional email by disciplining
him and giving him a formal letter of reprimand, not
terminating him. The fact that defendant terminated
plaintiff just weeks before his second installment of
deferred stock awards was to vest, coupled with plaintiffs
testimony concerning age-based comments by defendant's
managers, permits an inference, albeit a weak one, that
plaintiffs age was a substantial factor in defendant's
decision to terminate him. Based on the above, I conclude
that plaintiffs evidence is sufficient to establish his prima
facie case of discrimination under the evidentiary
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp, v,
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668
(1973), which this court applies to both federal and Oregon
state law discrimination claims. Snead v. Metropolitan
Property & Casualty Insurance Company, 237 F.3d 1080,
1094 (9th Cir.200 I).

2. Wrollg/ul Discharge
*3 Plaintiff alleges two claims for wrongful discharge, one
tort claim and one contract claim. In the tort claim, plaintiff
alleges that he was wrongfully discharged for complaining
about allegedly unsafe products that defendant marketed.
In his so-called "wrongful termination-contract" claim,
plaintiff alleges that defendant terminated him to avoid
having to pay certain stock awards that had not yet vested.
See Amended Complaint, Claims 2 and 3.

"at-will employment rule," holding that" '[g]enerally an
employer may discharge an employe[e] at any time and for
any reason, absent a contractual, statutory or constitutional
requirement [to the contrary].' " Babick v. Oregon Arena
Corporation, 333 Or. 40 I, 407 and n. 2, 40 P.3d 1059
(2002) (quoting Patton v. J.C Penney Co., 301 Or. 117,
120, 719 P.2d 854 (1986)). Oregon courts also recognize,
however, that discharge of an at-will employee may be
deemed "wrongful" under certain circumstances, for
example, "when the discharge is for exercising a
job-related right that reflects an important public policy" or
"when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public
duty." Babick. 333 Or. at 407, 40 P.3d 1059 (citations
omitted).
13) Plaintiffs "wrongful discharge" tort claim fits neither
example. More importantly, plaintiff has presented no
plausible evidence that his complaints about products were
a factor, let alone a substantial factor, in defendant's
decision to discharge him. Similarly, even ifthe court were
to accept plaintiffs "wrongful termination-contract"
theory of recovery,3 there is no plausible evidence that the
future vesting of stock awards, standing alone, resulted in
defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff or even was a
substantial factor in that decision. The possible vesting of
future stock awards is relevant only as some circumstantial
evidence, albeit weak evidence, of age discrimination, as
plaintiff suggests and the court, with reservation, accepts.
See discussion supra.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, defendant's motion (# 25)is granted
in part and denied in part, as follows: GRANTED as to
plaintiffs wrongful discharge claims (Claims 2 and 3) and
DENIED as to plaintiffs age discrimination claim (Claim
I).

Oregon courts have repeatedly affirmed the validity of the
Footnotes

1

In response to an inquiry from a clinical nurse at OI-ISU, one of defendant's significant customers. concerning whether plaintiff
wanted to continue as the industry representative on the Oregon Vascular Access Network ("ORVAN'"), plaintiff responded:
You are kidding. right? I have heard the terrible and untrue things you. Jamie. and Leslie have said about me, I have heard it
from [defendant]. and I have heard it from several different reps as well. I hope I never have to be in the same room as any of
you, You have disparaged me and killed my career at [defendant], You should all be ashamed of yourselves, [ will pray for you
all. but I will not put myself in a position to be your scapegoat ever again, The lack of integrity and truthfulness you have all
demonstrated is deplorable, and I cannot pretend for political reasons that it is not. So, no. I do now want anything to do with
[ORVAN],
See, e,g, Declaration of Richard Busse, Attachment 21 , Plaintiff sent the email on January 11,2009; he was terminated on January
26, 2009. a mere two weeks later.

2

Defendant filed evidentiary objections to plaintiirs declaration (# 40), but I decline to rule on those objeetions at this juncture.
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I agree with defendant that plaintiffs "wrongful discharge-contract" claim fails as a matter of law for the reasons set forth in
Defendant's Reply, pp. 29-30. Further, whether ERISA is or is not implicated by plaintiWs contract claim is not an issue this court
must address to resolve defendant's motion; the court also rejects plaintiffs argument that he has a valid ERISA claim because his
Amended Complaint alleges no such claim.
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116 S.Ct. 1307
Supreme Court of the United States

Fact that ADEA plaintiff was replaced by
someone outside protected class is not a proper
element of McDonnell Douglas prima facie case;
given that discrimination prohibited by ADEA is
discrimination because of individual's age, fact
that one person in protected class has lost out to
another person in protected class is irrelevant, so
long as he has lost out because of his age. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
4(a)(I), as amended, 29 U.S.CA. § 623(a)(I).

James O'CONNOR, Petitioner,

v.
CONSOLIDATED COIN CATERERS
CORPORATION.
No. 95-354. I Argued Feb. 27, 1996. I Decided
April 1 , 1996.
Employee who was discharged after reorganization
brought Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
action against former employer. The United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Robert D.
Potter, Senior District Judge, 829 F.Supp. 155, granted
summary judgment in favor of former employer. Former
employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hamilton,
Circuit Judge, 56 F.3d 542, affirmed. Certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Scalia held that fact
that ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside
protected class is not a proper element of McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case.

1439 Cases that cite this headnote

131

Civil Rights
Age Discrimination
The ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis
of age and not class membership. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., as amended, 29 U.S.CA. § 62 I et seq.
197 Cases that cite this headnote

Reversed and remanded.
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II]

Civil Rights
.p~Practices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements
Civil Rights
'~'''''Age Discrimination
Assuming that Title VII's McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA
cases, there must be at least a logical connection
between each element of prima facie case and
illegal discrimination. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of I 967, §§ 2 et seq., 4(a)(I), as
amended, 29 U.S.CA. §§ 621 et seq., 623(a)(I).
939 Cases that cite this headnote

121

Civil Rights
".~Discharge

or Layoff

At age 56, petitioner was fired by respondent corporation
and replaced by a 40-year-old worker. He then filed this
suit, alleging that his discharge violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The
District Court granted respondent's summary judgment
motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
petitioner failed to make out a prima facie case of age
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
41 I U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668, because he
failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the
age group protected by the ADEA.

Held: Assuming that Title VII's McDonnell Douglas
framework is applicable to ADEA cases, there must be at
least a logical connection between each element of the
prima facie case and the illegal discrimination.
Replacement by someone under 40 fails this requirement.
Although the ADEA limits its protection to those who are
40 or older, it prohibits discrimination against those
protected employees on the basis of age, not class
membership. That one member of the protected class lost
out to another member is irrelevant, so long as he lost out
because a/his age. The latter is more reliably indicated by

O'Connor v. Consolidated COin Caterers

517 U.S. 308 (1996)
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the fact that his replacement was substantially younger
than by the fact that his replacement was not a member of
the protected class.
56 F.3d 542 (CA4 1995), reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, 1., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Attorneys and Law Firms
George Daly, Charlotte, NC, for petitioner.
Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Washington, DC, for U.S., as amicus
curiae by special leave of the Court.
*309 James B. Spears, Jr., Greenville, SC, for respondent.
Opinion

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a plaintiff alleging
that he was discharged in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 8 I
Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.c. § 621 et seq., must show
that he was replaced by someone outside the age group
protected by the ADEA to make out a prima facie case
under the framework established by McDonnell Douglas
Corp. V. Green, 41 I U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d
668 (1973).
Petitioner James O'Connor was employed by respondent
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation from 1978 until
August 10, 1990, when, at age 56, he was fired. Claiming
that he had been dismissed because of his age in violation
of the A DEA, petitioner brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.
After discovery, the District Court granted respondent's
motion for summary judgment, 829 F.Supp. 155 (1993),
and petitioner *310 appealed. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated that petitioner could establish a prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas only if he could
prove that (I) he was in the age group protected by the
ADEA; (2) he was discharged or demoted; (3) at the time
of his discharge or demotion, he was performing his job at
a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations; and
(4) following his discharge or demotion, he was replaced
by someone of comparable qualifications outside the
protected class. Since petitioner's replacement was 40
years old, the Court of Appeals concluded that the last

element ofthe prima facie case had not been made out. I 56
F.3d 542, 546 (1995). Finding that petitioner's claim could
not survive a motion for summary judgment without
benefit of the McDonnell Douglas presumption (i.e.,
"under the ordinary standards of proof used in civil cases,"
56 F.3d, at 548), the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of dismissal. We granted O'Connor's petition for
certiorari. 516 U.S. 973, 116 S.Ct. 472, 133 L.Ed.2d 401
(1995).
In McDonnell Douglas, we "established an allocation of
the burden of production and an order for the presentation
of proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases." St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113
S.Ct. 2742,2746,125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). We held that a
plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et
seq., could establish a prima facie case by showing "(i) that
he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
appl icants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of [the] complainant's
qualifications." *311 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S., at
802,93 S.Ct., at 1824. Once the plaintiff has met this initial
burden, the burden of production shifts to the employer "to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection." Ibid. If the trier of fact finds that
the elements of the prima facie case are supported by a
preponderance of the evidence and the employer remains
silent, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff. St.
Mary's Honor Center, supra, at 509-510, and n. 3, 113
S.Ct., at 2748-2749, and n. 3; Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089,
1094, 67 L. Ed.2d 207 (1981).
[11 In assessing claims of age discrimination brought under
the ADEA, the Fourth Circuit, like others,2 has applied
some variant **1310 of the basic evidentiary framework
set forth in McDonnell Douglas. We have never had
occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII
rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do
not contest that point, we shall assume it. Cf. St. Mary's
Honor Center, supra, at 506, n. I, 113 S.Ct., at 2747,~. 1
(assuming that "the McDonnell Douglas framework is
fully applicable to racial-discrimination-in-employment
claims under 42 U .S.c. § 1983"). On that assumption, the
question presented for our determination is what elements
must be shown in an ADEA case to establish the prima
facie case that triggers the employer's burden of
production.

121 As the very name "prima facie case" suggests, there
must be at least a logical connection between each element

O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers

517 U.S. 308 (1996)

116 S.Ct. 1307,70 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 486, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,927 ...

our view, however, the proper solution to the problem lies
not in making an utterly irrelevant factor an element of the
prima facie case, but rather in recognizing that the prima
facie case requires "evidence adequate to create an
inference that an employment decision was based on a[nJ
[illegal] discriminatory criterion . ... " Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358,97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866,52 L.Ed.2d
396 (1977)
(emphasis
*313 added).
In
the
age-discrimination context, such an inference cannot be
drawn from the replacement of one worker with another
worker insignificantly younger. Because the ADEA
prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class
membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially
younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of
age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was
replaced by someone outside the protected class.

of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination for
which it *312 establishes a "legally mandatory, rebuttable
presumption," Burdine, supra, at 254, n. 7, 101 S.Ct., at
1094, n. 7. The element of replacement by someone under
40 fails this requirement. The discrimination prohibited by
the ADEA is discrimination "because of [an] individual's
age," 29 U.S.c. § 623(a)(I), though the prohibition is
"limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age," §
631(a). This language does not ban discrimination against
employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans
discrimination against employees because of their age, but
limits the protected class to those who are 40 or older. The
fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to
another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so
long as he has lost out because of his age. Or to put the
point more concretely, there can be no greater inference of
age discrimination (as opposed to "40 or over"
discrimination) when a 40-year-old is replaced by a
39-year-old than when a 56-year-old is replaced by a
40-year-old. Because it lacks probative value, the fact that
an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the
protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case.

The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.

131 Perhaps some courts have been induced to adopt the
principle urged by respondent in order to avoid creating a
prima facie case on the basis of very thin evidence-for
example, the replacement of a 68-year-old by a
65-year-old. While the respondent's principle theoretically
permits such thin evidence (consider the example above of
a 40-year-old replaced by a 39-year-old), as a practical
matter it will rarely do so, since the vast majority of
age-discrimination claims come from older employees. In
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EG&G IDAHO, INC., and Constance C.
Blackwood, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 23611. I Sept.

7,2000.

Employee whose employment was terminated based upon
her alleged poor performance and no indication of her
willingness to improve brought action against employer
and her supervisor, alleging wrongful discharge,
defamation, self-defamation, and emotional distress. The
District Court, Bonneville County, Brent, J. Moss, J.,
granted summary judgment to employer on many of
employee's claims, and following jury trial on remaining
claims, granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV) on claims in which the jury found for employee.
Employee appealed. The Supreme Court, Kidwell, J., held
that: (I) supervisor's statements in employee's notice of
termination were not made with malice; (2) employer was
not liable to employee on employee's defamation claim;
and (3) substantial competent evidence supported jury's
determination that employee failed to prove severe
emotional distress.

Appeal and Error
,~Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of
Decision Appealed from
Appeal and Error
c.·",Appeal from Ruling on Motion to Direct
Verdict
In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV), or a directed verdict, the Supreme Court
applies the same standard as that applied by the
trial court when originally ruling on the motion.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

13/

Judgment
"/,,,Where Directed Verdict or Binding
Instructions Would Have Been Proper
When a trial court reviews a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the motion
is treated as a delayed motion for a directed
verdict and the same standard is applied for both.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b).

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (10)

/1/

Libel and Slander
."'~Falsity

Supervisor of employee's statements in
employee's notice of termination that employee
had failed to comply with requirements of the
Corrective Action Plan (CAP), and that
employee was not willing to improve, were
truthful, and thus were not made with malice, so
as to support employee's defamation claim
against supervisor, where employee testified that
she had not attended word processing training or
database training, as required by CAP, and she
admitted that she had not achieved mastery of the
database system.

14/

Judgment
>·.Where There Is Some Substantial Evidence to
Support Verdict
When ruling on a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the trial
court must determine whether there is substantial
evidence to support the jury's verdict. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b).
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Judgment
.,,,,,Evidence and Inferences That May Be
Considered or Drawn
Judgment
;~'Where There Is Some Substantial Evidence to
Supp0l1 Verdict

181

In determining whether a jury properly found that
there is clear and convincing evidence of actual
malice in a defamation suit, the Supreme Court
must determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to support the conclusion that the
defendant entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of her statements or that subjectively
defendant had a high degree of awareness of the
probable falsity of the statements; the Supreme
Court's focus will be on whether the evidence
indicates that defendant purposely avoided the
truth.

Upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV), the moving party admits the
truth of all the adverse evidence and all
inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it;
it is not a question of no evidence on the side of
the non-moving party, but rather, whether there is
substantial evidence upon which ajury could find
for the non-moving party. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
50(b ).

[61

Appeal and Error
,",·"Review of Evidence

Appeal and Error
of Review Dependent on Nature of
Decision Appealed from

".~Extent

191
Supreme Court will not make a finding of
substantial evidence in favor of the non-moving
party when reviewing a decision to grant or deny
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV) if it concludes that there can be
but one conclusion as to the verdict that
reasonable minds could have reached. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b).

Libel and Slander
"",.Malice

Employer was not liable to employee on
employee's defamation claim against employer,
based on supervisor's comments in employee's
notice of termination, which indicated that
employee had failed to comply with requirements
of the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) and was not
willing to improve, absent evidence that
supervisor acted with malice in making such
statements.

I Cases that cite this headnote

I Cases that cite this headnote

171

Judgment
<.c,·Evidence and Inferences That May Be
Considered or Drawn
Judgment
.. ·Credibility of Witnesses and Weight of
Evidence

In
deciding
a
motion
for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the trial
court may not reweigh the evidence or consider
the credibility of the witnesses; instead, it must
draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 50(b).
2 Cases that cite this headnote

1101

Damages
,.,.·Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress

Substantial competent evidence supported jury's
determination that employee failed to prove
severe emotional distress, based on employer's
termination of her employment, though
employee's psychiatrist testified that employee's
loss of her employment was a very serious
stressor; testimony of psychiatrist was rebutted
by testimony of witness who was employed in
employer's human resources office that six
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months after employee's termination, witness
saw employee and employee seemed cheerful
and pleased to see her, and witness agreed that
she did not notice any change in employee's
demeanor or behavior between their meeting or
when employee left her employment.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

**]245 *779 Stephen A. Meikle, Idaho Falls, for
appellant.
Pike & Shurtliff, Idaho Falls, for respondents. Edward W.
Pike argued.

Opinion
KIDWELL, Justice.

In this employment discrimination case, the appellant was
terminated for "poor performance" and "no indication of
willing[ness] to improve." The appellant claimed that the
allegations were false and that the employer was
discriminating against her. Prior to trial, the district court
granted summary judgment to the employer on many of the
appellant's claims. Following ajury trial on the remaining
claims, the district court granted judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (j.n.o.v.) on the claims in which the jury found
for the appellant. The decision of the district court is
affirmed.

J.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June of 1975, Sondra Olson began working for Aero Jet
Company at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL) (now INEEL). In 1976, when Aero Jet was
replaced by EG&G Idaho, Olsen was employed as a
project control representative. Thirteen years later, Olson
was promoted to EG&G's Academic Programs Office
CAPO). In this **1246 *780 position, Olson was
responsible for the fellowship research program of the
Associated Western Universities (A WU). The A WU, a
consortium of 50 universities, was under contract with the

U.S. Department of Energy. The A WU was responsible for
recrmtmg
university
students,
usually
at
the
under-graduate level, for summer jobs. When applications
were received, Olson would pair the students with
appropriate mentor engineers who requested assistance for
research projects. Olson also coordinated student security
clearances
and
assisted students
with
finding
accommodations during the summer. Between 1989 and
1993, the APO grew significantly, as did Olson's
responsibilities for the A WU program. During this time of
growth, Olson was rated good to excellent on the
performance of her responsibilities.
In March of 1993, the Department of Energy gave EG & G
Idaho a negative performance evaluation during a
semi-annual review. Also in March of 1993, respondent
Constance C. Blackwood was appointed manager of the
APO as well as Olson's supervisor. Soon after becoming
Olson's supervisor, Blackwood began to require Olson to
perform specific tasks in limited amounts of time. On
March 22, 1993, Blackwood directed Olson to input 700800
A WU
applications
and
to
develop
an
acknowledgement letter all in the same day. Olson testified
that Blackwood gave her similar directives that were not
possible to accomplish in the time allotted.
Blackwood testified that after being appointed manager of
the APO, she began receiving phone calls about Olson's
performance. Blackwood noted that Olson had not
submitted several weekly reports to the Department of
Energy. She further stated that although she had met with
Olson on several occasions to remedy Olson's poor
performance, Olson had not been responsive to her
suggestions.
On May 7, 1993, Blackwood met with the Women's
Program Manager, Arantza Zabala, to discuss Olson's
performance. Sherree Schell of EG&G Idaho's Human
Resource Office was also at the meeting. During the
meeting, it was determined that a corrective action plan
would be implemented to educate Olson on her
deficiencies and to determine whether Olson was capable
of adequately performing the job. Blackwood showed the
plan to Olson on July 9, 1993. Thereafter Olson and
Blackwood met every Friday to discuss Olson's
performance under the plan. Blackwood testified that
during these meetings Olson was unresponsive to
Blackwood's suggestions. Olson described the meetings as
extremely unpleasant and uncomfortable.
On August 12, 1993, Blackwood terminated Olson as an
EG&G Idaho employee because Olson had failed to
comply with the corrective action plan in a satisfactory
manner. After being informed of the termination, Olson
returned to her work station where she was met by armed
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security guards. The security guards escorted Olson to her
car with her belongings, consisting of a refrigerator and
several boxes of personal items.

amended complaint to add a claim under the False Claims
Act and to add EG&G, Inc., the parent corporation of
EG&G Idaho, as a party.

Olson testified that following her termination she suffered
from anxiety attacks and depression. Olson stated that she
constantly worried about what her fellow employees at
EG&G Idaho were thinking about her being escorted by
armed security guards. Olson's psychiatrist testified that
Olson required medication to control depression and that
without medication Olson had a 90% chance of relapsing
into depression.

On September 19, 1996, respondents moved to dismiss
EG&G, Inc. as a party and to dismiss Olson's False Claims
Act claim. The district court granted respondents' motions,
denied Olson leave to amend her seventh amended
complaint to add EG & G, Inc. and dismissed Olson's
False Claims Act claim.

On December 28, 1993, Olson filed a complaint against
EG&G Idaho, Blackwood, and John Does I-X, alleging
wrongful discharge, defamation, self-defamation and
emotional distress. Olson made her first motion to amend
her complaint on June 21, 1994, seeking to add claims for
violation of privacy and violation of civil rights. Following
the EEOC's notice of right to sue, Olson filed a second
amended complaint on December 15, 1994, adding age and
disability discrimination claims as well as a claim under
the False Claims Act (31 U.S.c. § 3729).

A jury trial began on December 3, 1996. At the close of
Olson's case, respondents moved for a directed verdict on
all claims. The district court granted the motion as to the
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Blackwood, but denied the motion as to the remainder of
Olson's claims. On December 18, 1996, the jury began
deliberations. During deliberations the jury sent out a note
concerning jury instruction number 15, intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Over Olson's objection,
the district court modified the instruction to include
examples from cases where courts had found intentional
infliction of extreme emotional distress.

On January 20, 1995, EG&G Idaho and Blackwood
(respondents) moved to dismiss portions of Olson's second
amended complaint. On August 10, 1995, the district court
dismissed John Does I-X and Olson's False Claims Act
claim. Olson filed her third amended complaint on August
30, 1995. On ** 1247 *781 February 13, 1996, she moved
to amend her complaint a fourth time, this time adding
another False Claims Act claim as well as breach of
contract and equal protection claims. Also on February 13,
1996, respondents filed for summary judgment on all
claims.

The jury entered special verdicts on December 19, 1996.
The jury found that Olson had established a case of
defamation against Blackwood, but not against EG&G
Idaho. The jury also found that Olson had not proven her
case of intentional infliction of emotional distress against
EG&G Idaho. Following the jury's special verdicts, the
parties made opposing motions for j.n.o.v. The district
court granted Blackwood's motion and denied Olson's. On
February 3, 1996, Olson filed a timely notice of appeal.

In an order dated April 9, 1996, the district court granted
respondents summary judgment on Olson's claims for
wrongful termination, self-defamation, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, violation ofprivacy, violation of due
process/civil rights (42 U.s.c. § 1983), and age and
disability discrimination under the Idaho Human Rights
Act. The court denied the motion as to defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also
denied the motion to dismiss Blackwood as a party
defendant. On April 18, 1996, Olson moved for
reconsideration, however the district court denied her
motion.

II.

Olson moved to amend her complaint for a sixth time on
August 8, 1996. The district court denied Olson's sixth
amended complaint but allowed her to file a seventh
amended complaint to provide more specific and definite
allegations than those contained in the sixth. On August
28, 1996, Olson filed a motion to amend her seventh

ANALYSIS
A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting
Blackwood's Motion For J.N.O.V. On Olson's
Defamation Claim.

III The district court granted Blackwood's motion because
it found there was not enough evidence that Blackwood
acted with malice. On appeal, Olson claims that the district
court erred because it ruled contrary to its ruling on
Blackwood's motion for a directed verdict following the
close of Olson's case. Alternatively, Olson argues that the
jury was presented with substantial evidence of
Blackwood's malice.
12113114) In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion
for j.n.o.v., or a directed verdict, this Court applies the
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same standard as that applied by the trial court when
originally ruling on the motion. Quick v. Crane, III Idaho
759, 764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). When a court
reviews a motion for j.n.o.v. under LR.C.P. 50(b), the
motion is treated as a delayed motion for a directed verdict
and the same standard is applied for both. Quick, I I I Idaho
at 763, 727 P.2d at I 191. When ruling on a motion for
j.n.o.v., the trial court must determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Lanham
v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495,943 P.2d 912, 921
(1997).
*782 151 161 171 **1248 "Upon a motion for JNOY, the
moving party ... adm its the truth of all the adverse evidence
and all inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it."
Id. at 496, 943 P.2d at 922. It is not a question of no
evidence on the side of the non-moving party, but rather,
whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury
could find for the non-moving party. Quick, I I I Idaho at
763, 727 P .2d at I 191. This Court will not make a finding
of substantial evidence in favor of the non-moving party if
it concludes "that there can be but one conclusion as to the
verdict that reasonable minds could have reached." Id. at
764, 727 P.2d at 1192. In deciding a motion for j.n.o.v. the
trial court may not reweigh the evidence or consider the
credibility of the witnesses. Instead, it must draw all
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Lanham, 130
Idaho at 496, 943 P.2d at 922.
At the close of Olson's case, respondents moved for a
directed verdict. Concerning Blackwood's motion, the
district court ruled that:
On the defamation matter, the issue I
believe there is malice. I believe there
was communication, it was privileged
and, of course, the question now is was it
made maliciously. And all I would
indicate (sic) there is I think if the jury
took all the inferences in favor of
Plaintiff's case, they could, perhaps, find
malice. And I will allow them to do so.
Following the jury's verdict that Olson had proved a cause
of action for defamation against Blackwood, Blackwood
made a motion for j.n.o.v. In ruling upon that motion, the
court held that:
Now, defamation has to be proven by
clear and convincing evidence. Now, as
to defamation, the jury has determined
that. However, the Court cannot agree
with it on the basis of the law, that there
was sufficient evidence presented to
show actual malice in this telmination. In

doing that, I'm not deciding who was
right in this matter, but I'm just simply
deciding what the law requires me to
decide. I cannot decide that the evidence,
perhaps a preponderance of the evidence
would support that claim, but I cannot
find clear and convincing, based on
everything I've heard, everything I've
reviewed, to show actual malice.
On Blackwood's motion for j.n.o.v., the district court was
required to determine whether there was substantial and
competent evidence to support the jury's conclusion that
there was clear and convincing evidence that Blackwood
acted with malice. The district court ruled that while there
might have been a preponderance of evidence upon which
the jury could have found that Blackwood acted with
malice, there was not clear and convincing evidence. Thus,
we must review the record to determine whether, taking all
inferences in favor of Olson, there was substantial and
competent evidence to support the jury's conclusion that
Olson proved by clear and convincing evidence that
Blackwood acted with malice.

181 In determining whether a jury properly found that there
is clear and convincing evidence of actual malice in a
defamation suit, this Court "must determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that
[Blackwood] in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of [her] statements or that subjectively [Blackwood]
had a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of
the statements. Our focus will be on whether the evidence
indicates that [Blackwood] purposely avoided the truth."
Wiemer v. Rankin, I 17 Idaho 566, 576, 790 P.2d 347, 357
( 1990).
The difficulty presented by this issue is that Olson has not
cited any singular, particular comment made by
Blackwood, but rather, ambiguously cites "statements by
Blackwood to the EEO office and the Human Resources
Office as documented in the record." The record contains
three documents which Olson has argued make up the
defamatory comments: (I) the notice of termination, (2)
the EEO memorandum, and (3) the Corrective Action Plan
(CAP). Olson argues that the "most damaging defamatory
statements made by Blackwood against Olson were in the
notice of termination which alleged poor performance and
failure to meet any of the requirements of the CAP as well
as unsatisfactory or inadequate skills and unwillingness to
improve."
**1249 *783 Olson responds to these allegations by
arguing that "she documented substantial completion or
scheduled for completion all of the items required in the
CAP." The CAP noted seven items that Olson was to
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complete in order to improve her performance. At trial,
Olson testified that she had completed, attempted to
complete, or had scheduled for completion each of the
seven items listed in the CAP. For example, she testified
that she was scheduled to begin WordPerfect training the
day after she was terminated. Olson testified that she
prepared a program plan and presented it to Blackwood but
that Blackwood did not consider it sufficient. Additionally,
Olson testified that for each of the requirements of the CAP
she communicated her progress to Blackwood.
From this testimony, Olson concludes the Blackwood
acted with malice because Blackwood knew that Olson
was attempting to complete the requirements of the CAP.
However, the evidence does not support her conclusion.
While Olson testified that she was in the process of
completing the CAP requirements, she also testified that
she had not completed all of the requirements prior to her
termination. She testified that she had not attended
WordPerfect training or database training. She also
admitted that she had not achieved mastery ofthe database
system.
Therefore, while there is some evidence that Blackwood
may have acted with malice, there is also evidence that
Blackwood was truthful when she indicated that Olson had
failed to comply with the requirements of the CAP and was
not willing to improve.
Additionally, we disagree with Olson's claim that the
district court was inconsistent when it granted
Blackwood's motion for j.n.o.v. after having denied her
motion for directed verdict on the defamation claim. At the
time of Blackwood's motion for directed verdict, the
district court had not heard the evidence presented by both
sides. After considering the entire evidence of both sides,
the district court was in a better position to determine the
merits of each litigant's case. Therefore, we affirm the
district court's decision granting Blackwood's motion for
j.n.o.v. on Olson's defamation claim.

B. The District Court Properly Denied Olson's Motion
For J.N.O.V. On Her Defamation Claim Against
EG&G Idaho.
[91 Olson claims that the district court erred in refusing to
grant her motion for j.n.o.v. in the face of inconsistent jury
verdicts. She claims that EG&G is liable because
Blackwood was acting within the scope of her employment
when she defamed Olson.

We have determined that the district court did not err in
granting Blackwood's motion for j.n.o.v. on Olson's
defamation claim. Therefore, the district court did not err

in refusing to grant Olson's motion for j.n.o.v. Absent a
ruling that Blackwood acted with malice, and thus
defamed Olson, there is no basis upon which EG&G could
be liable for defamation against Olson.

C. The District Court Properly Denied Olson's Motion
For J.N.O.V. On Her Claim Of Intentionallntliction
Of Emotional Distress.

110] Olson argues that she provided the jury with
substantial and competent evidence that her emotional
distress was severe. She contends that the district court
should have granted her motion for j.n.o.v. because
respondents did not rebut that evidence.

As stated above, this Court reviews the record to determine
whether there is substantial and competent evidence upon
which the jury could find that Olson's emotional distress
was not severe. Lanham v. idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho at
495,943 P.2d at 921.
At trial, Olson's psychiatrist testified that Olson was
suffering from post traumatic stress disorder and that the
stress had been aggravated by the armed guards. The
psychiatrist testified that Olson's depression "markedly
decreased her enjoyment of life," and that Olson suffered
from "psychiatry agoraphobia, which is a fear of going
outside." Additionally, the psychiatrist stated that "At the
time of my evaluation, Mrs. Olson would not have been
able to work because of the severe anxiety, the
uncontrolled pan ic attacks, her fears, her performance
**1250 *784 anxiety and just the tremendous panic that
she had about leaving the house." The psychiatrist
concluded that Olson's loss of her employment was, on the
severity scale, close to losing a spouse, and was a "very
serious stressor, it's in the top four or five."
This testimony, as Olson contends, could have provided
the jury with sufficient evidence to determine that Olson's
emotional distress was extreme. However, Olson IS
incorrect in her claim that the evidence was unrefuted.
As pointed out by respondents, this testimony was rebutted
by testimony from Olson and from Sherree Schell. Olson
testified that she began working for Mary Kay Cosmetics
while she was still employed by EG & G and that she
continued to sell them after her termination. Schell
testified that she talked with Olson at a craft fair about six
months after Olson's termination. During their
conversation Olson seemed cheerful and generally pleased
to see Schell. Finally, Schell agreed that she did not notice
any change in Olson's demeanor or behavior between their
meeting at the craft fair or when Olson had left EG & G.
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Thus, the jury was provided with evidence which it could
have relied upon to determine that Olson's emotional
distress was not as severe as indicated by Olson's
psychiatrist. The district court properly determined that
there was substantial and competent evidence to support
the jury's determination that Olson had failed to prove that
her emotional distress was severe.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in granting Blackwood's
motion for j.n.o.v. on the issue of defamation. Likewise,
the district court correctly granted EG&G's motion for
j.n.o.v. on the issue of EG&G's liability for Olson's
defamatory comments. The decision of the district court is
affirmed. No attorney fees are awarded on appeal. Costs to
respondents.

D. The Remainder OrOlson's Issues On Appeal Are
Without Merit.

After having carefully considered the rest of Olson's issues
on appeal, we find them to be without merit. The decision
of the district court is affirmed on all issues relevant to this
appeal.

Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SILAK, SCHROEDER
and WALTERS concur.
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Background: Former state employee brought action
against her former employer, the Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare (IDHW), alleging constructive
discharge in violation of the Human Rights Act and the
Protection of Public Employees Act. The District Court,
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Michael R.
McLaughlin, J., dismissed claims. Employee appealed.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, J. Jones, J., held that:
[I] IDHW did not waive statute oflimitations defense;
[2] claim arose when employee tendered her resignation;
[3] employee's complaints were not protected activity; and
[4] employee's belief that employer was engaged in
unlawful employment practices was not objectively
reasonable.

Judgment
<.",Existence or non-existence of fact issue

Summary judgment is appropriate where the
nonmoving pm1y bearing the burden of proof
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's
case. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c).
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Limitation of Actions
;~Waiver or estoppel by failure to plead

Employer did not waive statute of limitations
defense by failing to plead it as an affirmative
defense in its answer to employee's complaint in
action in which state employee alleged
constructive discharge in violation of Idaho
Human Rights Act (IHRA) and Idaho Protection
of Public Employees Act (lPPEA), where
employer raised the affirmative defense in its
memorandum in support of its motion for
summary judgment, and employee responded to
defense in her opposition memorandum. West's
LC.A. §§ 6-2101, 67-5901; Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule S(c).

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (22)

II J

Judgment
,;",,,Presumptions and burden of proof
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Supreme Court reviews the grant of a motion for
summary judgment on the same standard used by
the district court. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56( c).
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A party does not waive an affirmative defense for
failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it
is raised before trial and the opposing party has
time to respond in briefing and oral argument.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 8(c).
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,y,,·Appointment or employment and tenure of
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State employee's
discharge pursuant
Public Employees
employee provided
intent to resign,
resignation became
6-2104,6-2105(2).

171

State
employee's
complaints
regarding
intra-office affair between her supervisor and her
co-workers was not protected activity under the
Idaho Human Rights Act (lHRA), and therefore
employee failed to show the existence ofa hostile
work environment; although supervisor's
conduct certainly violated employer's policy
regarding intra-office relationships, and could
well have resulted in paramour favoritism, the
favoritism affected all concerned on a
gender-neutral basis. West's LC.A. § 67-5911.

claim for constructive
to the Idaho Protection of
Act (lPPEA) arose when
unequivocal notice of her
rather than on date her
effective. West's LC.A. §§

Officers and Public Employees
·J··Grounds for removal

[10)

Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act
(lPPEA) seeks to protect the integrity of the
government by providing a legal cause of action
for public employees who experience adverse
action from their employer as a result of reporting
waste and violations ofa law, rule, or regulation.
West's l.C.A. § 6-2101.

The opposition clause protects employees who
both subjectively and reasonably believe that
they are opposing activity that violates Title VII.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-3(a).
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Officers and Public Employees
>,,·Grounds for removal

For purposes of a claim pursuant to the Idaho
Protection of Public Employees Act (IPPEA),
where the alleged adverse action is a constructive
discharge, a plaintiff must prove that working
conditions became so intolerable that a
reasonable person in the employee's position
would have felt compelled to resign. West's
l.C.A. § 6--2104.

Civil Rights
/.·Activities protected

Civil Rights
.•./.,Hostile environment; severity, pervasiveness,
and frequency

Pursuant to the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA),
unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex
includes the creation of a hostile work
environment. West's LC.A. § 67-5909.
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Pursuant to the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA),
in order to show that a work environment is
sufficiently hostile, a plaintiff must show the
occurrence of numerous improper acts which
establish a pattern of conduct sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment. West's LCA, § 67-5909.

1131

1151

Civil Rights
,,~"~Activities

protected

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under the opposition clause of Title
VII if he shows that he had a good faith,
reasonable belief that the employer was engaged
in unlawful employment practices. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U,S.CA, § 2000e-3(a),

Civil Rights
···Hostile environment: severity, pervasiveness,
and frequency
The standard to prove a hostile environment
under the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) is
that the environment is both subjectively and
objectively perceived as hostile based on a
totality of the circumstances. West's LCA. § 675909.
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5909; Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42
U.S.CA. § 2000e-3(a).

Civil Rights
f·~Hostile environment; severity, pervasiveness,
and frequency

1161

Civil Rights
~c"Activities

protected

In order to establish a retaliation claim under
Title VII, a plaintiff must not only show that he
subjectively, that is, in good faith, believed that
his employer was engaged in unlawful
employment practices, but also that his beliefwas
objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
record presented. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
704(a), 42 U,S,CA. § 2000e-3(a).
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State employee's belief that employer was
engaging in unlawful employment practices due
to intra-office relationship between supervisor
and employee's co-worker was not objectively
reasonable, and therefore employee failed to
maintain claim for retaliation pursuant to the
Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA); existing
substantive law was to the contrary, employee
training materials that were more restrictive than
Title VII did not create a reasonable belief on the
part of employee that conduct violated Title VII,
and employee could base her good faith belief
that employer had engaged in unlawful
employment practices based on the good faith
belief of another employee. West's I.CA. § 67", ,Ne:d

117)

Civil Rights
>,Activities protected
It is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that his
belief that his employer was engaged in unlawful
employment practice was honest and bona fide;
the allegations and record must also indicate that
the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was
objectively reasonable in order to establish a
retaliation claim under Title VII. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-3(a).
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Civil Rights
>zActivities protected
For purposes of establishing a retaliation claim
under Title VII, a critical element of the inquiry
regarding objective reasonableness of an
employee's belief that she was participating in a
protected activity is the existing case law at the
time of the incident. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
704(a), 42 U.S.e.A. § 2000e-3(a).
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Appeal and Error
;".",Points and arguments
In order to be considered by the Supreme Court,
the appellant is required to identify legal issues
and provide authorities supporting the arguments
in the opening brief. Appellate Rule 35.

[191

Appeal and Error
\pReply briefs
Public employee failed to preserve for appellate
review her assertion that her activities in
complaining about intra-office relationship
between supervisor and co-worker were
protected activity pursuant to participation clause
of the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) and Title
VII, where, although employee argued in her
reply brief that she was entitled to relief under the
participation clause, she did not make the same
argument in her opening brief. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.e.A. § 2000e-3(a);
West's I.e.A. § 67-5909.
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Appeal and Error
(;.oRulings by Lower Court
In order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the
record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms
the basis for an assignment of error.

*313 Lynette Patterson appeals the dismissal of her claims
against her former employer for alleged violation of the
Idaho Human Rights Act and the Idaho Protection of
Public Employees Act. We affirm.

I.

Factual and Procedural History

1211

Appeal and Error
of presentation in general

,,~Necessity

Issues not raised below but raised for the first
time on appeal will not be considered or

This is a constructive discharge case arising under the
Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA), I.e. § 67-5901 et seq.,
and the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act
(IPPEA), I.e. § 6-2101 et seq. Appellant, Lynette
Patterson, argues that she was constructively discharged
from her position as the Program Supervisor of the Fraud
Unit at the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
.QI?11\\2ciue to her ~oll1pIaint~ E~~arding an intra-office
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romance between her supervisor, Mond Warren (Warren),
and a lateral employee, Lori Stiles (Stiles). Stiles was the
Program Supervisor of the Surveillance Utilization and
Review Unit (SUR Unit) and Warren was the direct
supervisor for both Stiles and Patterson. Patterson made
multiple complaints regarding the relationship and
favoritism, which she alleges resulted in her first negative
performance review with IDHW, culminating in a
constructive discharge.
IDHW had an internal policy discouraging intra-office
relationships. Its manual provided the following guidance
on such relationships:

Cohabitation and Romantic Relationships. Cohabitation
of and/or romantic relationships between employees and
their supervisors and others holding positions of
authority over them is not condoned. If such
relationships exist, the disciplinary action such as
involuntary transfer may be considered. The possibility
of intentional, unintentional or perceived abuse of power
should be strongly considered in such relationships.
Patterson's first complaint regarding the affair and
preferential treatment came in the fall of 2004. Patterson
went to Human Resource (HR) Specialist Bethany
Zimmerman (Zimmerman) and told her that Warren and
Stiles were having an affair and, as a result of the affair,
"Warren was not treating her fairly." As a result of this
complaint and others, Zimmerman and Warren's direct
supervisor, David Butler (Butler), confronted Stiles, but
Stiles denied the existence of the affair. Butler and
Zimmerman conducted an interview with Warren who
similarly denied the allegation. Two months later,
Zimmerman again went to Butler to alert him to ongoing
rumors regarding the inappropriate relationship and
preferential treatment. Thereafter, Butler and another HR
employee questioned Warren about the relationship for a
second time, but he again denied the affair. However,
several days after this second interview, Warren went to
Butler and admitted to having had an intimate relationship
with Stiles some five years previously (in approximately
1999 or 2000). The relationship was said to have lasted one
year, with sporadic intimate encounters thereafter.
After Warren admitted to the romantic relationship, IDHW
Civil Rights Department Manager Heidi Graham
(Graham) conducted *314 **722 an investigation
regarding the complaints of preferential treatment. Graham
interviewed Patterson on December 28, 2004. During the
interview, Patterson alleged that the SUR Unit received
preferential treatment, including better pay, better
equipment, access to evidence rooms, more recognition,
and preferential disciplining of subordinate employees.
Graham's investigation concluded that Warren and Stiles

had engaged in a romantic relationship but also concluded
that there was no evidence to support the allegations of
preferential treatment. "[A ]ny differences complained of
by Fraud Unit staff and Ms. Patterson regarding the SUR
Unit were either inconsequential, were based on perception
and lacked factual bases, were the result of legitimate
program needs or were merely territorial rivalries between
the two groups."
At the conclusion of the investigation, Employee Relations
Manager Monica Young (Young) met with Patterson to
discuss the investigation outcome. After explaining
Graham's conclusions, Young noted that Patterson was
upset that Graham "was lied to and fell for it" and
wanted to know where she could
complain and I told her she could file a
complaint with the Idaho Human Rights
Commission or consult with an attorney.
She told me she knew she would be
retaliated against. .... She cut me off
before I could finish and said she could
talk about [Ms. Stiles and Mr. Warren
having an affair] if it was impacting her
and other's work and she stormed out of
my office.
Because Warren had been dishonest about the relationship,
a "Notice of Employment Status" letter was placed in his
permanent employee file. This letter indicated that "the
work environment in the unit is disruptive, dysfunctional,
and laden with mistrust, resentment, and anger." However,
Warren retained his position as Bureau Chiet: and as the
supervisor of both Stiles and Patterson.
In February of2005, Butler attended a Fraud Unit meeting
at Patterson's request, wherein staff voiced concerns
regarding the alleged relationship and preferential
treatment. The Fraud Unit provided Butler with an "Issues
Memorandum" describing the concerns of the unit, and
Patterson personally provided Butler with an additional
document entitled "Summary of Issues Fraud and Sur
Units." After further discussions between Butler and
Graham, Butler decided not to re-open the investigation
because there were no new allegations raised in the
complaints.
Patterson had a performance review in May of 2005,
approximately three months after the meeting with Butler,
wherein she received "Achieves Performance Standards"
but it was noted that she had not completed one
performance objective. I Patterson strenuously objected to
the notation and attached a personal explanation to the
performance review.
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Patterson met with Graham again on May 25, 2005,
alleging "that there was retaliation and 'hostility' between
the Fraud and SUR Units." Patterson further stated that
"things had gotten worse since [Graham's December 2004]
investigation had concluded." However, no new
investigation resulted from these allegations.
On September 27, 2006, Patterson met with the new
Director of IDHW, Richard Armstrong (Armstrong), to
discuss her allegations of preferential treatment. Patterson
told Armstrong that she "felt discriminated against in that
she and the employees in her Fraud unit did not get an
equal amount of resources (as the SUR unit) and were not
getting the recognition of good work that she felt was being
done by the members in the Fraud unit." She also made
allegations of unequal pay. Following his meeting with
Patterson, Armstrong met separately with Butler and
Graham to discuss Patterson's complaints. He met with
Patterson again on November 22, 2006, indicating that her
concerns had been adequately investigated and, since no
new incidents had occurred, he did not intend to reopen the
previous investigation.

granted because: (I) Patterson did not file her IPPEA claim
within 180 days of her constructive discharge on March 16,
2007; and (2) Patterson failed to demonstrate that she
engaged in protected activity in order to sustain her IHRA
claim. Patterson moved for reconsideration on the IHRA
claim, but the district court denied her motion. She timely
appealed to this Court.

II.
Issues on Appeal
I. Is Patterson's IPPEA claim time-barred?

II. Did the district court err in determining that
Patterson failed to demonstrate that she was
engaging in protected activity under the IHRA?

III.

Approximately four months later, Warren gave Patterson a
draft performance evaluation *315 **723 which rated her
as "Does Not Achieve Performance Standards." This
document specifically identified staff involvement in
searches and continued use of deferred prosecution
agreements as the basis for the negative review. This
document was provided to Patterson on March 16,2007,
via an e-mail in which Warren requested a 2:00 p.m.
meeting to discuss the evaluation. Patterson typed a
resignation note before attending the afternoon meeting.
The note stated, in relevant part:
Please consider this as my resignation from the
Department of Health and Welfare Fraud Unit. After 25
Yz years with the state, I can no longer work under these
conditions. The work environment has become
increasingly hostile over the past few years. Retaliation
is becoming unbearable. For health concerns and my
own peace of mind, I am resigning effect[ive] March 30,
2007 and will be taking vacation from now until then.

Discussion
A. Standard of Review
)1) 12] 13) This Court reviews the grant of a motion for
summary judgment on the same standard used by the
district court. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145
Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008). Summary
judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts are liberally
construed in favor of the nonmoving party and "all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." Mackay,
145 Idaho at 410, 179 P.3d at 1066. "Summary judgment is
appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the burden
of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case." lei.

I have left keys, badges, ID etc. with Susan Slade GrossI.
Patterson did not return to work after March 16,2007.2
B. Patterson's IPPEA claim is time-barred.
On September 14,2007, Patterson filed a complaint with
the Idaho Human Rights Commission (IHRC), alleging
sexual discrimination and retaliation. On September 25,
2007, Patterson filed her initial complaint in district court
alleging violations of the IPPEA. Subsequently, Patterson
amended this complaint by adding an unlawful retaliation
claim in violation of the IHRA. IDHW moved for
summary judgment on both claims, which the court

Patterson contends the district court erred in dismissing her
IPPEA claim on statute of limitations grounds, both
because IDHW waived any statute of limitations defense
and because, even ifit did not, her complaint on this claim
was timely filed. Patterson first argues IDHW waived any
statute of limitations defense regarding her IPPEA claim
because it was not pleaded as an affirmative *316 **724
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defense in IDHW's initial answer to her complaint.
Patterson next argues that, even if the defense was not
waived, her complaint was timely filed and the district
court erred in using the notification date of her resignation,
on March 16, 2007, rather than the effective date of her
resignation, on March 30, 2007, as the appropriate accrual
date for her IPPEA claim. IDHW argues it properly raised
the statute of limitations defense at the time of the
summary judgment proceedings and, therefore, never
waived the issue. Additionally, IDHW argues that the
relevant accrual date for Patterson's IPPEA claim is the
date she provided her notice of resignation because she
communicated her intent to resign on that date, and it was
the last time IDHW could have engaged in unlawful
employment activity.
The district court ruled that IDHW did not waive its statute
of limitation defense, even though it was not pleaded in the
answer to the complaint, because Patterson had the
opportunity to fully argue the issue before trial. The court
then determined that Patterson's constructive discharge
claim was untimely filed on September 25,2007, because
it accrued on March 16, 2007, when the "atmosphere at
work was so intolerable she could stay no longer and had to
resign." The court rejected Patterson's allegation that the
adverse actions constituted a continuing incident,
culminating with the effective date of her resignation on
March 30, 2007, because the constructive discharge was a
discrete act.
[41 151 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides that
"[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively" a statute of limitations defense. This
Court has interpreted IRCP 8(c) as requiring affirmative
defenses to be plead, but without identifying the
consequences for failing to do so. Fuhriman v. State, Dep't
of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 803-04, 153 P.3d 480, 483-84
(2007). In Fuhriman, the Court held that the State's failure
to raise the affirmative defense of statutory employer
immunity, until filing its memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment, was not fatal to that
defense. fd. at 804, 153 P.3d at 484. The Court determined
that because the State's memorandum alerted the
appellants to the affirmative defense, and the appellants
responded to this argument in reply briefing, as well as in
oral argument before the district court, the defense had not
been waived for failing to plead it in the initial answer. fd.
See also Bluestone v. l'vfathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455, 649
P .2d 1209, 1211 (1982) (finding no waiver of a statute of
frauds defense where it was raised "for the first time in the
summary judgment motion even though the reply to the
counterclaim has been filed."). Therefore, pursuant to
Fuhriman, a party does not waive an affirmative defense
for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is
raised before trial and the opposing party has time to
respond
in briefing
and oral argument.
Like the State in
.
. .
... -. . .
--.
,,""-~

Fuhriman, IDHW raised its statute of limitations
affirmative defense in its memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment, and Patterson responded to
in
her opposition
memorandum.
this
defense
Consequently, IDHW did not waive its statute of
limitations defense regarding Patterson's IPPEA claim.3
/6) [7) We next consider whether Patterson's claim was
timely filed. The IPPEA seeks to protect the integrity of the
government "by providing a legal cause of action for
public employees who experience adverse action from
their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations
of a law, rule or regulation." Van v. Portneu( Med. Ctr.,
147 Idaho 552, 557, 212 P.3d 982, 987 (2009). To establish
an IPPEA claim, a plaintiff must establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, "that the employee has
suffered an adverse action because the employee, or a
person acting on his behalf engaged or intended to engage
in an activity protected *317 **725 under section 6-2104,
Idaho Code." I.e. § 6-21 05( 4). "An employee who alleges
a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action for
appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both,
within one hundred eighty (180) days after the occurrence
of the alleged violation of this chapter." I.e. § 6-2105(2).

181 Where the alleged adverse action is a constructive
discharge, a plaintiff must prove that "working conditions
bec[a]me so intolerable that a reasonable person in the
employee's position would have felt compelled to resign
[.]" Waterman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667,
672, 20 I P.3d 640, 645 (2009). Assuming that Patterson
met this evidentiary burden, this Court must determine
whether her claim for constructive discharge arose with her
resignation notice on March 16, or with the effective date
of her termination on March 30. We hold that Patterson's
IPPEA claim is untimely because her claim for
constructive discharge arose on March 16 when she
provided unequivocal notice of her intent to resign.
The Ninth Circuit has held that in constructive discharge
cases, it is the date of resignation that starts the relevant
statute of limitations period.
We hold ... that the date of discharge
triggers the limitations period in a
constructive discharge case, just as in all
other cases of wrongful discharge.
Constructive discharge is, indeed, just
one form of wrongful discharge. The fact
that the actual act of terminating
employment is initiated by the employee,
who concludes that she is compelled to
leave as a result of the employer's
actions, rather than by the employer
directly does not change the fact that the
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employee
has
been
discharged.
Therefore, if the date of [plaintiffs]
quitting falls within the relevant period
of limitations, as it unquestionably does
here, her claim is timely filed.

Draperv. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
Cir.1998).
Similarly, the Second Circuit has expanded on this holding
and determined that a constructive discharge claim accrues
on the date the employee gives "definite notice of her
intention to retire," rather than upon the effective date of
that resignation. Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d
133, 138 (2d Cir.2000). In Flaherty, the plaintiff submitted
a formal statement to her employer on June 12, 1997, that
she would be retiring from the corporation effective
November I, 1997. Id. at 139. The court held that the June
12 notification date was the date that the plaintiff
"effectively communicated her intention to resign" and
was, therefore, the relevant date for her constructive
discharge claim. Id.
Like the plaintiff in Flaherty, wherein the court treated the
resignation notice date as the appropriate accrual of the
plaintiffs cause of action, rather than the effective date of
her termination, Patterson gave IDHW definitive notice of
her intent to resign on March 16, 2007, even though that
resignation was not to become effective until March 30,
2007. Specifically, Patterson's resignation note stated that
she could no longer work for IDHW due to the unbearable
conditions to which she was subjected and that she would
take vacation time until the effective date of her
resignation. Indeed, Patterson turned in her keys and badge
and did not return to work after her March 16 notice.
IDHW was in no position to subject her to additional
discriminatory treatment after that date. While Patterson
points to documents created by IDHW, identifying her
termination date as March 30, 2007, to establish her
discharge date, the accrual of the constructive discharge
claim is based on when the work environment became
unbearable for the employee, not when the employer
believed she was no longer employed there. Therefore, we
affirm the decision of the district court that Patterson's
IPPEA claim was time-barred under I.e. § 6-2105(2).

C. The district court did not err in determining that
Patterson failed to demonstrate she was engaging in
protected activity under the IHRA.
[9) Patterson alleges that her supervisor's intra-office affair
and consequent favoritism toward his paramour's work
group created a hostile work environment, that she
opposed the actions creating that environment *318 **726
and that, as a consequence, she was retaliated against in

violation of the IHRA. She argues that, even if the affair
and favoritism were not legally sufficient to constitute a
hostile work environment, she engaged in protected
activity in opposing such actions because she had a
reasonable and good faith belief that they were violative of
the IHRA. IDHW contends that the district court did not
err in determining otherwise because overwhelming case
law holds that paramour favoritism is not violative of Title
VII and, therefore, opposition to such activity is not
protected activity under the IHRA. The district court
concluded, as a matter oflaw, that Patterson could not have
reasonably believed her complaints regarding the
intra-office romance and alleged favoritism amounted to
protected activity under the opposition clause of the IHRA
and Title VII because case law overwhelmingly holds that
paramour favoritism is not proscribed activity.
The IHRA not only prohibits discriminatory actions
against persons in protected groups, but also prohibits
retaliation against persons who oppose such actions. Idaho
Code § 67-5911 provides:
It shall be unlawful for a person or any
business entity subject to regulation by
this chapter to discriminate against any
individual because he or she has opposed
any practice made unlawful by this
chapter or because such individual has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or litigation
under this chapter.

(emphasis added). A claim under I.e. § 67-5911 is
commonly referred to as a retaliation cause of action.
There is no Idaho case law regarding a retaliation claim
based on allegations of paramour favoritism. However,
"[t]his Court has previously determined that the legislative
intent retlected in I.e. § 67-5901 allows our state courts to
look to federal law for guidance in the interpretation of the
state provisions." Mackay, 145 Idaho at 413, 179 P.3d at
1069.
In order to make a prima facie retaliation claim, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
that: (I) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered
an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal
link between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. See E.E.o.C v. Luce, Forward,
Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir.2002).
"Protected activities include: (I) opposing an unlawful
employment practice; and (2) participating in a statutorily
authorized proceeding." Id.

1101 The opposition clause protects employees who both
subjectively and reasonably believe that they are opposing
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activity that violates Title VII. Little v. United
Technologies Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956,960
(II th Cir.1997). In this case, it is undisputed that Patterson
subjectively believed that she engaged in protected
opposition activitYA Therefore, only the objective
reasonableness of her belief is at issue before this Court.
[111 [12) [13) In detennining whether it was objectively
reasonable for Patterson to believe that she was engaging
in protected opposition activity, we first consider whether
a paramour relationship resulting in favoritism toward the
paramour, in and of itself, constitutes unlawful conduct.
The IHRA prohibits employers from discharging or
otherwise discriminating against employees because of
their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. I.e. § 675909. The relevant portion of this provision provides:
It shall be a prohibited act to discriminate against a
person because of, or on a basis of, race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, in any of the following
subsections ....

(I) For an employer ... to discharge, or to otherwise
discriminate against an individual with respect to
compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of
employment or to reduce the wage of any employee in
order to comply with this chapter.. ..
ld. Unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex includes the
creation of a hostile work environment. "In order to show
that a work *319 **727 environment is sufficiently hostile,
a plaintiff must show the occurrence of numerous improper
acts which establish a pattern of conduct sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment."
Frazier v. JR. Simplot Co., 136 Idaho 100, 105,29 P.3d
936, 941 (2001). "[T]he standard to prove [a] hostile
environment is that the environment is both subjectively
and objectively perceived as hostile based on a totality of
the circumstances." Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop. Inc.,
131 Idaho 242, 248, 953 P.2d 992, 998 (1998) (internal
quotation omitted).

Patterson claims that the affair and favoritism created a
hostile work environment. However, based on our review
of the record, we conclude that the activity alleged by
Patterson is not sufficient to constitute a hostile work
environment. Her supervisor's conduct certainly violated
IDHW's policy regarding intra-office relationships, and
could well have resulted in favorable treatment being
received by Stiles and the SUR Unit, as Patterson alleges.
However, as IDHW points out, the favoritism affected all
concerned on a gender-neutral basis. That is, Patterson
provides no evidence that either the romantic relationship
or the alleged favoritism was directed against, or that the
results had an unfavorable effect upon, a person or group

protected by the IHRA.
Although none of this Court's decisions have dealt
specifically with a paramour favoritism case, previous
cases have dealt with the issue of hostile work
environment. In Fowler v. Kootenai County, 128 Idaho
740,918 P.2d 1185 (1996), while we rejected a contention
that "if an employer equally abuses men and women no
claim would arise [under the IHRA] because both sexes are
accorded equal treatment," we held that the effect of
abusive activity upon persons in a protected group is the
critical factor in determining whether a hostile work
environment has been shown. Jd. at 744-45, 918 P.2d at
1189-90. We stated, "Title VII is aimed at the
consequences or effects of an employment practice and not
at the ... motivation of co-workers or employers." Jd.
(quoting Ellison v. Brady. 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th
Cir.1991 )). In this case, Patterson has failed to present facts
to show that the effect of the affair and alleged favoritism
on her or other women in her unit was such that it created a
hostile work environment. While the affidavit she
submitted in opposition to IDHW's motion for summary
judgment refers to and incorporates a large volume of
meeting notes, emails, pay records, and other documents,
and asserts a number of instances of favoritism toward the
SUR Unit, it fails to provide narrative testimony as to how
Patterson or other women were adversely impacted by the
same. Patterson's affidavit provides little guidance
regarding the sequence of events that led to her
unfavorable performance review and resignation.

Strongman v. Idaho Potato Commission, 129 Idaho 766,
932 P.2d 889 (1997), also dealt with a hostile work
environment claim. There, the Court held that, "[ s]exual
conduct is not a necessary element of a hostile
environment
claim
based
on
gender-specific
discrimination." Jd. at 770, 932 P.2d at 893. In that case,
the Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the
plaintiff's hostile work environment claim on summary
judgment because the plaintiff had presented evidence
indicating "that not only was [she] treated differently than
her male counterparts in the amount of travelling she was
required to do, but that her job was relocated to a city to
which the director knew the employee would not move,
and that she was criticized for taking sick leave." fd. at 771,
932 P.2d at 894. Once again, Patterson has failed to present
specific facts showing that she or other members of a
protected group were subjected to abusive treatment that
would constitute a hostile work environment. What her
allegations boil down to, in essence, is that her supervisor
had a relationship with a lateral employee, resulting in
more favorable treatment for the paramour and her unit.
Where courts in other jurisdiction have dealt specifically
with the issue, the overwhelming weight of the decisions is
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that paramour favoritism does not violate Title VII. See
DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304,
308 (2d Cir.1986) (finding that paramour favoritism does
not constitute gender discrimination because it affects men
and women equally). While the federal Equal Employment
Opportunities *320 **728 Commission and some federal
courts recognize Iimited exceptions to this rule where (I)
paramour favoritism is a result of coerced sexual behavior
in which case, the quid pro quo analysis of sexuai
harassment would apply; or (2) the paramour activity is so
widespread that there is an expectation of sexual favors in
exchange for advancement or promotion in the workplace,
Patterson's allegations do not fall within either of these
limited exceptions and, therefore, a claim for hostile work
environment would not lie here. See EEOC, Policy
Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title V!lfor Sexual
Favoritism, No. 915.048,1990 WL 1104702 at *2-3 (Jan.
12,1990).
[141 [151 /161 1171 However, that is not the end of our
inquiry. Patterson's claim is not for a hostile work
environment but, rather, for retaliation as a result of her
complaints about the work environment resulting from the
affair and favoritism. Because a hostile work environment
claim is distinct from a retaliation claim, some courts have
found that, even where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate a
hostile work environment, the plaintiff's retaliation claim
may proceed to the jury based on her reasonable belief that
she engaged in protected activity. See Drinkwater v. Union
Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 865--66 (3rd Cir.1990)
(despite the fact that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a
hostile work environment claim, the court allowed her
retaliation claim to go to the jury because she believed the
activity was prohibited and because there was case law in
existence at the time of her opposition activity that
arguably supported the reasonableness of her belief that
paramour favoritism violated Title VII). As articulated in
United Technologies:
[a] plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case of retaliation under the opposition
clause of Title Vll ifhe shows that he had
a good faith, reasonable belief that the
employer was engaged in unlawful
employment practices .... It is critical to
emphasize that a plaintiff's burden under
this standard has both a subjective and an
objective component. A plaintiff must
not only show that he subjectively (that
is, in good faith) believed that his
employer was engaged in unlawful
employment practices, but also that his
belief was objectively reasonable in light
of the facts and record presented. It thus
is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that

his belief in this regard was honest and
bona fide; the allegations and record
must also indicate that the belief, though
perhaps mistaken, was objectively
reasonable.
103 F.3d at 960 (emphasis omitted)
Patterson argues her belief that she was engaging in
protected activity was objectively reasonable because: (I)
she filed a complaint with the IHRC and she personally
complained and participated in the internal investigation
regarding the affair and alleged preferential treatment and
(2) IDHW treated her complaints as potential violations of
Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
referring Patterson to the civil rights investigator and by
providing her training materials indicating that paramour
favoritism could be illegal. IDHW argues that Patterson's
factual allegations do not support the reasonableness of her
belief because: (I) Patterson's complaints to IDHW, as
well as her IHRC complaint, do not support a finding that
her belief was objectively reasonable; (2) the IDHW
training materials provide that discrimination must be
because of the victim's gender and these materials cannot
create a heightened standard for Title VII violations; (3)
Patterson's allegations of unequal pay affected both the
men and women in Patterson's fraud unit equally; and (4)
Patterson cannot form an objective belief that her activity
is protected based on discussions with third parties.
The district court agreed with the arguments advanced by
IDHW, finding that Patterson's belief was not objectively
reasonable because: (I) existing substantive law was to the
contrary; (2) employee training materials that are more
restrictive than Title Vll do not create a reasonable belief
on the part of an employee that conduct violates Title VII;
and (3) an employee cannot base her good faith belief that
an employer has engaged in unlawful employment
practices based on the good faith belief of another
employee. The district court also pointed out that Patterson
had failed to demonstrate that the alleged favoritism was
due to plaintiff's, or any other *321 **729 person's,
gender. As the court stated, "In sum, the Court is not aware
of any evidence in the record demonstrating that the
Plaintiff drew a connection between the affair and the
favoritism and a violation of the IHRA, be it gender or sex
discrimination or otherwise. In fact, common sense
dictates that any adverse actions stemming from the affair
and favoritism of the SUR Unit would have fallen upon
male and female fraud investigators alike."
/18] A critical element of the inquiry regarding objective
reasonableness of an employee's belief that she was
participating in a protected activity is the existing case law
at the time of the incident. In Drinlovater. the plaintiff'S
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claim was allowed to proceed because of an eXlstmg
decision favorable to her position. The Drinkwater court
noted, however, that that holding had been vacated after
Drinkwater's case arose. Id at 865---66. The only case
favorable to her position that Patterson cited was decided a
month and a half after her letter of resignation and could
not have been relied upon in making her determination as
to the reasonableness of her belief that she was engaging in
protected activity. See Alaniz v. Peppercorn. 2007 WL
1299804 (E.Dist.Cal. May 3, 2007). Because the great
weight of the case law did not support Patterson's position,
she had no grounds to believe that she was engaging in
protected activity. See Luce, 303 F.3d at 1006 (a plaintiffs
belief that she engaged in protected opposition activity
cannot be reasonable when faced with voluminous case
law to the contrary); Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176
FJd 1346, 1351 (II th Cir.1999) ("The objective
reasonableness of an employee's belief that her employer
has engaged in an unlawful employment practice must be
measured against existing substantive law."). The district
court did not err in dismissing Patterson's IHRA claim.
1191 Patterson also argues that her activities were protected
activity under the participation clause of the IHRA and
Title VII because she complained to human resources
personnel, as well as to the civil rights investigator at
IDHW, regarding the alleged favoritism and retaliatory
treatment. An employee can engage in protected activity
by participating in the statutory proceedings created by
Congress to assist in Title VII violations. "Title VII ...
make[ s] it unlawful for an employer to discriminate or
retaliate against an employee or an applicant for
employment because that person has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated, in any manner in a
proceeding." Luce, 303 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotation
omitted). A "proceeding includes instituting a civil action,"
and also extends to an employee "who informs his
employer of his intention to participate in a statutory
proceeding, even ifhe has not yet done so." fd at 1006-07
(internal quotation omitted).

is true that she made reference to having participated in the
investigations precipitated by her complaints, but her
argument was premised on the opposition clause. Her
arguments before the district court were premised on the
opposition clause and that is the basis upon which the
district court appears to have ruled. "It is well established
that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record
must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an
assignment of error." Krempasky v. Nez Perce County
Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,236,245 P.3d 983, 988
(2010). "Issues not raised below but raised for the first time
on appeal will not be considered or reviewed". Id Further,
"In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is
required to identify legal issues and provide authorities
supporting the arguments in the opening brief." Hogg v.
Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 557, 130 PJd 1087, 1095 (2006)
(citing I.A.R. 35). This requirement ensures that the
respondent has an opportunity to respond to the appellant's
arguments. See Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d
120, 122 (2005). Patterson failed to raise her participation
clause argument in her opening brief, which denied IDHW
the opportunity to respond.

IV.

Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the district courts Costs to
IDHW.

*322 **730 Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices
BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON concur.

Parallel Citations
256 P.3d 718

[20) 1211122) Although Patterson argues in her reply brief
that she was entitled to relief under the participation clause,
she did not make the same argument in her opening brief. It

Footnotes
Prior to giving Patterson her May 2005 performance review, Zimmerman reviewed the rating and concludcd it was appropriate and
supported by documentation.

1
2

By precipitously resigning. Patterson elected to forego pursuit of statutory remedial procedures available to state employees.
Employee problem solving and due process procedures are mandated by I.e. § 67-5315 and provided for in Rule 200 of the Rules of
the Division of Human Resources & Idaho Personnel Commission (IDAPA 15.04.01.200).

3

Patterson cites Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 443, 235 P.3d 387, 393 (2010) for the proposition that
unpleaded claims cannot be preserved for appeal. However, A40rtensen clearly addresses claims, rather than affirmative defenses,
and this Court has stated that the Fuhriman and Bluestone cases speak only to "when an aftirmative defense may be properly raised
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of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310 (2011)

256 P.3d 718
and thus provides no basis jor a different result" regarding a cause of action not raised in the initial pleadings. Edmondson v. Shearer
Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 178-79, 75 P.3d 733. 739-40 (2003). Thus, Mortensen is of no consequence to the situation at issue
in this case.

4

The district court noted that "[t]he Court fully credits the Plaintiffs assertion throughout this litigation that she believed in good faith
the conduct she opposed was unlawful."

5

The district court's judgment contained a Rule 54(b) certificate stating that the judgment was final with regard to the issues dealt with
therein. It is unclear why a Rule 54 (b) certification was required because the complaint only raised the IPPEA and IHRA claims, both
of which were dismissed upon summary judgment. It appears the Rule 54(b) certificate was superf1uous. as all issues were resolved
by the judgment and the case has been fully disposed of on appeal.
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;p~Discharge

3 2 9 F ·3d740
United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Evidence that employee was 60 years old, that
employee's last performance review was
satisfactory, and that employee was discharged
and replaced by a younger employee with equal
or inferior qualifications was sufficient to make
out prima facie case of age discrimination under
the ADEA. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 4(a)(I), 29 U.S.CA. § 623(a)(I).

Charles R. POITENGER,
PlaintUT-Appellant,

v.
POTLATCH CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 02-35235. I Argued and Submitted
March 4, 2003. I Filed May 19,2003·
Former employee brought action against his former
employer, alleging that he was forced to retire in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
and the Idaho Human Rights Act and setting forth state law
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation. The United States District Court for the
District of Idaho, Edward 1. Lodge, J., granted summary
judgment to employer, and employee appealed. The Court
of Appeals, William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judge, held that:
( I) employee sufficiently made out prima facie case of age
discrimination under the ADEA; (2) employer met burden
of articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating employee; (3) evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate that employer's proffered reason for firing
employee was pretext for age discrimination; (4) under
Idaho law, employer's statement was not defamatory; and
(5) under Idaho law, employee's allegations were
insufficient to support claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

5 Cases that cite this headnote

131

5 Cases that cite this headnote

141

Civil Rights
\>~Discharge

or Layoff

The Court of Appeals reviews a grant of
summary judgment de novo.

Employer met burden of articulating legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason
for terminating
60-year-old employee, as required to rebut prima
facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA,
where employee claimed that reason for
termination was a lack of confidence that
employee could make the hard decisions
necessary to turn around the ailing plant that
employee headed, which had lost large amounts
of money over the past four years. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
4(a)(l), 29 U.S.CA. § 623(a)(I).

I Cases that cite this headnote

10 Cases that cite this headnote

West Headnotes (21)

121

Civil Rights
\>,Disparate Treatment
To prove age discrimination in violation of the
ADEA under a disparate treatment theory, an
employee must show that his age actually played
a role in the employer's decisionmaking process
and had a determinative influence on the
outcome. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.

Affirmed.

11)

or Layoff

Federal Courts
I'~ Trial De Novo

Civil Rights

IS)

Civil Rights

v. Potlatch

329 F.3d 740

91 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1530,61 Fed.R. E~id.Serv. 388 ...

'.. ,"Motive or Intent; Pretext
Evidence that employee's last performance
review included positive comments, and that
meeting in which decision was made to terminate
employee was brief, was insufficient to
demonstrate that employer's proffered reason for
firing employee, that employee could not make
decisions necessary to turn around ailing plant
that employee headed, was pretext for age
discrimination in violation of ADEA; review
contained negative comments specifically
singling out concerns with employee's
management, process of evaluation and
deliberation prior to termination was much
longer than final meeting, and employer did not
have required procedure for discharging
management.
Age
Discrimination
in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 623(a)( I).

2 Cases that cite this headnote

181

Civil Rights
,S","Age Discrimination
Statistical analysis of employer's reduction in
force plan (RIF) was insufficient to support
inference of age discrimination in employee's
age discrimination action for alleged disparate
treatment under the ADEA in connection with his
termination; analysis took into account only two
variables, including the employee's age at the
time of the RIF and whether the employee was
terminated, and did not consider other relevant
variables, such as job performance, which were
available to employee. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(I), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 623(a)(l).

6 Cases that cite this headnote
8 Cases that cite this headnote

161

Federal Civil Procedure
,>,.Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

191

Fundamentally different justifications for an
employer's action give rise to a genuine issue of
fact with respect to pretext in an ADEA action,
precluding
summary
judgment.
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
4(a)(l), 29 U.S.c.A. § 623(a)(l).

Civil Rights
.•=Admissibility of Evidence; Statistical
Evidence
A plaintiff may use statistics to show an intent to
discriminate
under
the
ADEA.
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U .S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

1101
171

Civil Rights
b"Disparate Treatment
Supervisor's remarks, referring to an "old
management team," an "old business model,"
and "deadwood," in relation to 60-year-old
employee,
were
insufficient
to
show
discriminatory motive required for employee's
disparate treatment age discrimination claim
under the ADEA for his termination. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(l).

Civil Rights
.,,·Age Discrimination
Fact that 60-year-old employee's replacement
was only 43 years old and that shortly before
employee's discharge, employer moved a
younger employee, who held a higher position,
ahead of him on the successor list for promotion,
without more, was insufficient to create inference
of discriminatory motive required to support
claim of disparate treatment age discrimination
under the ADEA. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A.

v. Potlatch
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Ill)

§ 623(a)( J).

et seq., 29 U .S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
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Civil Rights
Discrimination

1141

.~~~.Age

Statistical analysis of employer's reduction in
force plan (RIF) was insufficient to support
inference of age discrimination in employee's
age discrimination action for alleged disparate
impact under the ADEA, although analysis did
tend to show at least some relationship between
age and termination, where employee was not
subject to, nor terminated as part of, the RIF,
which was not put into place until a month after
employee was terminated and applied only to
lower-level employees. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.c.A. § 621 et seq.

A disparate impact claim under the ADEA must
challenge a specific business practice. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
4 Cases that cite this headnote

1151

Federal Civil Procedure
,...Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Summary judgment is appropriate on a claim of
disparate impact age discrimination under the
ADEA when statistics do not support a disparate
impact analysis.
Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq .

3 Cases that cite this headnote

1121

Civil Rights
$'''' Disparate Impact

Civil Rights
.' " Disparate Impact

14 Cases that cite this headnote
A disparate impact claim challenges employment
practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity.

[161

Libel and Slander
,>c. Employees

5 Cases that cite this headnote
Under Idaho law, employer's statement that
employee "elected to take early retirement," even
if false, was not defamatory.
1131

Civil Rights
.~."cDisparate

Impact

To make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show:
(I) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral
employment practices, and (2) a significantly
adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of
a particular age produced by the employer's
facially neutral acts or practices. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2

1171

Libel and Slander
.",,,Actionable Words in General
Under Idaho law, defamatory statements are
actionable without allegation and proof of special
damages if they impute to the plaintiff: (I) a
criminal offense; (2) a loathsome disease; (3) a
matter incol11p~tiblewith his trade, b~sil1~~~:

Pottenger v. Potlatch

329 F.3d 740 (2003)
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profession, or office; or (4) serious sexual
misconduct.

I Cases that cite this headnote

121J

Damages
.,~~Elements

118J

Libel and Slander
'c0"Nature and Meaning in General
Under Idaho law, even if employee alleged
special harm stemming from statement by
employer in notice to remaining employees that
employee "elected to take early retirement,"
when in actuality employee was terminated, was
insufficient to support claim of defamation per
quod; although employee claimed that a reader
could infer that he had committed some misdeed
and was therefore terminated immediately, the
notice stated that the retirement became effective
a week from that time, and there was no evidence
that anyone misconstrued the notice or that
anyone would.

in General

In order to prove intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Idaho law, plaintiff
must show that defendant's conduct was extreme
and outrageous and either intentionally or
recklessly caused severe emotional distress.
I Cases that cite this headnote
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*743 Candy W. Dale and Tamsen L. Leachman, Hall
Farley Oberecht & Blanton, Boise, ID, for the appellant.
Michael E. McNichols, Clements Brown & McNichols,
Lewiston, ID, Jerrold C. Schaefer and Lisa M. Pooley,
Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, for Appellee.

/191

Libel and Slander
.,=Special Damages
Under Idaho law, in order to state a claim for
defamation per quod, the plaintiff must allege
and prove that some special harm resulted from
the statement.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho; Edward J. Lodge, District Judge,
Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-00612-EJL.
Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER and GOULD,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion

1 Cases that cite this headnote

OPINION
WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

120J

Damages
Particular Cases

\,~Other

Under Idaho law, employee's allegations that
employer's conduct in firing him was outrageous
because he worked for employer for 32 years,
was not given an opportunity to save face, and
because people might infer he was discharged for
misconduct or that he was "deadwood," were
insufficient to support claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress against employer.

Charles R. Pottenger worked for the Potlatch Corporation,
a diversified forest products company, for 32 years until he
was discharged in April 2000 at age 60. During his tenure
at Potlatch, Pottenger rose to Group Vice President of Pulp
and Paper, reporting directly to Potlatch's President,
Richard Paulson. After his dismissal, Pottenger sued
Potlatch alleging that he was forced to retire in violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEN'), 29
U.S.c. §§ 621 et seq., and the Idaho Human Rights Act,
Idaho Code §§ 67-590 I et seq. Pottenger also claims
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation
under Idaho law. The district court dismissed all

V.

Potlatch

329 F.3d 740 (2003)

91 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1530.61 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 388 ...

Pottenger's claims on summary judgment, and we affirm.

I

Pottenger joined Potlatch in 1968 after receiving his Ph.D.
in paper technology. He held a variety of positions in the
company, generally moving up through the ranks. In 1993,
he became a group vice president, and at the date of his
termination he was Group Vice President of Pulp and
Paper. As a group vice president, Pottenger reported
directly to the President and Chief Operating Officer of
Potlatch, Richard Paulson, who reported to the CEO,
Pendleton Siegel. Pottenger worked in Lewiston, Idaho,
and oversaw Potlatch's operations in Idaho and Arkansas,
including the Idaho Pulp and Paperboard Division
("IPPD") based in Lewiston. After the cost of capital,
IPPD lost $63.7 million in 1997, $67.4 million in 1998,
$85.0 million in 1999, and $14.5 million in the first quarter
of2000.
In January 1999, shortly before he became president of
Potlatch, Paulson attended an executive training course at
the University of Michigan. After attending the training
course, Paulson decided that Potlatch needed to make "real
and significant" changes in order to improve its
performance. On November 23, 1999, Pottenger and three
of his colleagues responsible for pulp and paperboard met
with Paulson in Spokane, Washington, to talk about
turning the pulp and paperboard business around. At the
meeting, Paulson characterized Pottenger and his team as
an "old management team" using an "old business modeL"
In February 2000, Paulson gave Pottenger his performance
review for 1999. Pottenger received an MR- rating. In the
Potlatch rating system, MR+ means that the individual has
more than met the requirements of the job. MR means that
the individual has fully met the requirements of the job.
MR- means that there is some reason for concern. MM
means that *744 the individual has met the minimum
requirements for the job. Out of twelve managers listed in
Potlatch's records that year, two received MR+ ratings, six
received MR ratings, three received MR- ratings, and one
received an MM rating. On the review form, Paulson
characterized Pottenger's strengths as "smart," "knows
business," "loyal to Potlatch," "technical knowledge,"
"enthusiastic leader," and "wants Potlatch to succeed." He
also wrote the following under areas for improvement:
"break victim mentality in IPPD," "be a strong leader in
stopping the 'mill town' mentality in Lewiston," "set
higher expectations for people," and "think in terms of
opportunities and develop change strategies to get there."
In March 2000, the Potlatch management committee,

which included Pottenger, met to discuss cost-cutting
strategies. Because the company was in financial trouble,
the committee members made a commitment to each other
to eliminate "deadwood," and to do so quickly. At the end
of March, the committee distributed a memo announcing
that the company was embarking on a course of significant
change in response to poor earnings. The changes included
a wide array of cost-cutting measures (including cuts in
travel, mail, cell phone, and trade association expenses).
The memo also announced that over the next two months
the committee would be "evaluating where to make
significant reductions in the number of salaried positions."
The management committee met again on April 12,2000,
to discuss the company's plan for a reduction in force.
During the day, Paulson and Siegel (Potlatch's CEO) met
separately from the committee for 10-15 minutes to discuss
Pottenger. Paulson described his concerns that Pottenger
was not capable of bringing about real and significant
change in the Lewiston operation. At their meeting,
Paulson and Siegel decided to fire Pottenger.
Paulson told Pottenger of his termination on April 18,
2000. When Pottenger asked Paulson why he was being
fired, Paulson stated that he lacked confidence that
Pottenger had the commitment to make the hard decisions
necessary to make Potlatch successfuL] Paulson offered
Pottenger an enhanced severance package as part of his
termination. Without the enhancement, Pottenger was
entitled to 52 weeks of severance pay (equaling his yearly
base pay of $324, 120) and one year of employee benefits
(medical, dental, and life insurance). After a year, Potlatch
would pay monthly retirement benefits of$15,134.74 and
75% of Pottenger's medical, dental, and life insurance
premiums. The enhanced severance package included an
additional 26 weeks of base pay (for a total of78 weeks or
$486,180) and an additional monthly payment thereafter of
$5,401.74 (for a total monthly payment of $20,536.48).
The enhanced package also offered fully-paid medical,
dental, and life insurance until age 65 (the mandatory
retirement age for executives at Potlatch), and 75%
payment thereafter. In return for the enhanced severance
package, Paulson asked Pottenger to sign a separation
agreement waJvmg any claim under the Age
Discrimination Employment Act.
The next day, the company distributed a memo to all
employees from Paulson stating that Pottenger had
"elected to take early retirement." Pottenger had declined
Paulson's offer the previous day to help *745 write the
notice. The memo stated that Craig Nelson, formerly the
Consumer Products Division Vice President, was
assuming Pottenger's position. At the time, Pottenger was
60 years old and Nelson was 43.
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Pottenger ultimately declined the enhanced severance
package and refused to waive his claims under the ADEA.
He then brought suit in federal district court claiming age
discrimination under the ADEA, 29 U.S.c. §§ 621 et seq.,
and the Idaho Human Rights Act,2 Idaho Code § 67-5909,
and claiming defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
The district court granted Potlatch's motion for summary
judgment. The court found that Pottenger had made out a
prima facie case of age discrimination, but that Potlatch
had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
discharging Pottenger-that he was not prepared to make the
tough decisions necessary to tum around the Idaho Pulp
and Paper Division. The court found that Pottenger had not
raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether
the reason articulated by Potlatch was pretext. Pottenger,
the court noted, did not contest that lPPD lost money
during his tenure as head of that division. Rather he
attacked the company's decision to address the losses by
replacing him. The court also rejected Pottenger's
disparate impact age discrimination claim because of the
unreliability of his statistical evidence.
The court also granted summary judgment against
Pottenger on his defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims. It found that the company's
statement that Pottenger had "elected" early retirement did
not constitute defamation per se. It concluded that
Pottenger had not supported his intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim because there was no evidence in
the record tending to show that Potlatch's conduct was
"extreme and outrageous."

fll We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.
Frank V. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 849 (9th
Cir.2000).

II
A. Disparate Treatment Age Discrimination Claim

12 J 131 The ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer ... to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual [who is
at least 40 years old] ... because of such individual's age."
29 U .S.C. § 623(a)(I). To prove age discrimination under a
disparate treatment theory, Pottenger must show that his
age" 'actually played a role in [Potlatch's decisionmaking]
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.'
" Reeves V. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133,141,120 S.Ct. 2097,147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)(quoting
Hazen Paper CO. V. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct.
1701 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (I?93)):II1.~'I~11I~til1~

discrimination claims, we employ the familiar framework
developed in McDonnell Douglas COlp. V. Green, 411
U.S. 792,93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Wallis
V. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994).

141 Pottenger has made out a prima facie case of age
discrimination. He was 60 years old; his most recent
performance review grade ofMR- was not outstanding, but
indicated that he was meeting the requirements of the job;
he was discharged; and he was replaced by Craig *746
Nelson, then 43 years old, a substantially younger
employee with equal or inferior qualifications. See
Coleman V. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th
Cir.2000). Potlatch, in tum, has articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Pottenger: a lack
of confidence that Pottenger could make the hard decisions
necessary to tum around the ailing Idaho Pulp and
Paperboard Division, which he headed. It is undisputed
that IPPD lost over $200 million during 1997, 1998, 1999,
and the first quarter of2000. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142,
120 S.Ct. 2097 (holding that the employer's burden is one
of production, not persuasion).
Pottenger may establish pretext through evidence showing
that Potlatch's explanation is unworthy of belief or through
evidence showing that discrimination more likely
motivated its decision. Pottenger need not rely on only one
type of evidence, and he has offered evidence both to cast
doubt on Potlatch's credibility and to show a
discriminatory motive. Id. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Chuang
V. Univ. orCal. Davis, Bd. or Trs., 225 F.3d 1115,1127
(9th Cir.2000). At the summary judgment stage,
Pottenger's burden is not high. He must only show that a
rational trier of fact could, on all the evidence, find that
Potlatch's explanation was pretextual and that therefore its
action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons.
If he does so, then summary judgment for Potlatch is
inappropriate. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889.

151161 Pottenger advances several reasons that, in his view,
undermine Potlatch's explanation of his discharge. They
include positive comments in his performance review,
shifting justifications for his dismissal, the brevity of the
meeting at which the president and CEO reached their
decision to discharge him, and the procedures followed in
his termination. Considering all of Pottenger's evidence
together, however, we conclude that he has not created a
genuine issue of material fact. Pottenger's performance
review did contain some positive comments, but it also
contained negative comments specifically singling out
concerns with his performance in managing IPPD.
Potlatch's proffered explanation does not state that
Pottenger was incompetent or a generally bad employee;
rather, it states that Potlatch lacked confidence that
Pottenger could help tum the company around. Instead of
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casting doubt on Potlatch's explanation, the statements in
the performance review are consistent with it. Moreover,
although" 'fundamentally different justifications for an
employer's action ... give rise to a genuine issue of fact
with respect to pretext: " Payne V. Norwest Corp., 113
FJd 1079, 1080 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Washington v.
Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.I993 », Pottenger has
pointed to no evidence suggesting that Potlatch has ever
offered a reason for his dismissal other than doubt about
his commitment to making hard decisions to help the
company.

don't necessarily like grey hair" constituted "at best weak
circumstantial evidence" of discriminatory animus, Nesbit
V. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1993), that the
use of the phrase "old-boy network" is generally
considered a colloquialism unrelated to age, Rose V. Wells
Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417,1423 (9th Cir.1990), and that
an employer's comment describing a younger employee
promoted over an older employee as a "bright, intelligent,
knowledgeable young man" did not create an inference of
age discrimination, Merrick V. Farmers Ins. Group, 892
F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir.1990).

Finally, the duration of the meeting between Paulson and
Siegel at which they made the termination decision and the
manner of Pottenger's discharge do not create a factual
issue regarding the company's credibility. The meeting
between Paulson and Siegel at which they ultimately made
the decision to terminate Pottenger was short, but it
obviously came at the end of a much longer process of
evaluation and deliberation. There is also little evidence of
an established formal or informal company procedure for
discharging high-level employees. In fact, when Pottenger
himself discharged the then-head of the Idaho Pulp and
Paper Division in 1997, he did so in a manner similar to his
own discharge. Potlatch's failure to follow some
unspecified procedure in its treatment *747 of Pottenger
does not cast any doubt on its proffered reason for his
termination.

Paulson's remarks in this case do not sufficiently support
an inference of age discrimination so as to create a triable
issue of material fact that would defeat summary
judgment. In the context of this case, the phrase "old
business model," does not support an inference of age
discrimination. Similar to the language in Rose, the phrase
is a colloquialism not generally associated with the target's
age. Nor does Paulson's use of the term "old management
team" during the same meeting create a triable issue of
fact. Similarly, the management committee's use of the
term "deadwood" does not suggest age discrimination. The
Oxford English Dictionary defines "deadwood" as "[a]
person or thing regarded as useless or unprofitable; a
hindrance or impediment." 4 Oxford English Dictionary
293 (2d ed.1989).

[71 To show discriminatory motive, Pottenger states that
Paulson made comments referring to an "old management
team," an "old business model," and "deadwood."
Remarks can constitute evidence of discrimination. The
Supreme Court has held that telling an employee he "was
so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower" and
"was too damn old to do [his] job" constituted evidence of
age discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 120 S.Ct.
2097 (alteration in original). We have found a triable issue
of material fact when an employee was told upon applying
for an executive position that the board "wanted somebody
younger for the job," Schnidrig V. Columbia Mach., lnc.,
80 F.3d 1406, 1410-11 (9th Cir.1996), and, in a Title VII
case, when an employee was told, during the period that he
was otherwise eligible for a university position, that "two
Chinks" in the department was "more than enough,"
Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1128. These remarks are clearly
sufficient to support an inference that the decisionmaker
acted in a discriminatory fashion. In other cases, we have
held that some remarks lead to no reasonable inference of
discrimination and thus no triable issue of material fact
exists. We have found that a supervisor's comment about
getting rid of "old timers" because they would not "kiss
[his] ass" did not sufficiently support an inference of age
discrimination, Nidds V. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113
F.3d 912,918-19 (9th Cir.1996), that a comment that "we

18] [91 Pottenger also contends that the company's June
2000 reduction in force ("RIF") disproportionately
affected older employees. However, the statistical analysis
of the RIF offered by Pottenger is insufficient to raise a
triable issue of discrimination. A plaintiff may use
statistics to show an intent to discriminate. See, e.g.,
Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1282-83; Rose, 902 F.2d at 1423.
Potlatch, however, objects to the use of statistics from the
RIF because Pottenger's dismissal was not formally part of
the RIF. Nevertheless, if Pottenger can show that age was a
motivating factor in determining who would be terminated
under the RIF, that would constitute circumstantial
evidence of discrimination in his dismissal.

*748 Pottenger's statistical analysis of the RIF takes into
account only two variables-the employee's age at the time
of the RIF and whether the employee was terminated. The
numbers show a statistically significant relationship
between these two variables, but this court and others have
treated skeptically statistics that fail to account for other
relevant variables. See Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1283 (holding
that to raise a triable issue of fact regarding pretext based
solely on statistics, the statistics "must show a stark pattern
of discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than
age" (internal quotation marks omitted»; see also Frank V.
United Airlines, Inc., 216 FJd 845, 856 (9th Cir.2000)
("An employer does not violate the ADEA by
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discriminating based on a factor that is merely empirically
correlated with age."); Sheehan V. Daily Racing Form, 104
FJd 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) (criticizing a statistical
analysis showing a correlation between age and discharge
for failing to take account of any other relevant variable
and finding the statistics without evidentiary significance);
Rea V. Martin Marietta Corp .. 29 FJd 1450, 1456 (lOth
Cir. I 994) ("[A] plaintiff's statistical evidence must focus
on eliminating nondiscriminatory explanations for the
disparate treatment by showing disparate treatment
between comparable individuals." (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Pottenger's expert had data about other relevant variables
besides age and termination status, yet his statistical
analysis makes no attempt to take these variables into
account. See Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1283; Rose, 902 F.2d at
1425. In addition, Pottenger declined the opportunity to
make use of the variable most likely to have offered a
legally appropriate explanation of why certain employees
were selected for lay-off: job performance. Although job
performance may have been an important factor in
determining who would be laid off, Pottenger specifically
acquiesced in the suggestion that obtaining data about
individual employees' performance reviews was
unnecessary. If Pottenger had had access to only two
variables, we would be presented with a different case. But
here, where Pottenger had or had access to additional
relevant data and chose not to use it, we conclude that
Pottenger's statistical analysis is insufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact regarding pretext.

/1 01 Pottenger also argues discriminatory motive may be
inferred from the fact that his replacement was only 43
years old and that shortly before his discharge the company
moved a younger employee ahead of him on the successor
list for CEO. Evidence that forms part of the prima facie
case may also be considered to show that a proffered
explanation is pre-textual. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120
S.Ct. 2097. Without more, however, the fact that Nelson
was younger than Pottenger does not create a triable issue
of pretext. Nor does the fact that the company moved a
younger employee ahead of Pottenger on the CEO
successor list suggest that Potlatch acted with any
discriminatory motive, for that employee had held a higher
position in the company than Pottenger.
We have considered all of Pottenger's evidence of pre-text
and conclude that it does not refute Potlatch's basic
rationale for Pottenger's termination-that IPPD was losing
money and the company lacked faith that Pottenger was
the one to turn IPPD around. Potlatch has leeway to make
subjective business decisions, even bad ones. See
Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1285; Cotton V. City ofAlameda, 812
F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir.1987). It may have been unfair

(and perhaps unwise) for Potlatch to blame Pottenger for
IPPD's losses, but it is not surprising that Pott;nger's
bosses would try to make a change in leadership *749 in a
division that was having such consistent trouble. We hold
that Pottenger has not created a genuine factual issue of
pretext and the district court properly dismissed his
disparate treatment claim on summary judgment.

B. Disparate Impact Age Discrimination Claim

111J 1121 The Supreme Court has not addressed whether
plaintiffs may bring disparate impact claims under the
ADEA, but this circuit permits such claims. See Katz v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 229 F.3d 831, 835 (9th
Cir.2000); Frank, 216 F.3d at 856; EEOC v. Local 350,
Plumbers and Pipejitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n. 2 (9th
Cir.1993). A disparate impact claim challenges
"employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified
by business necessity." Int'l Bd of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d
396 (1977).
1131 /141 To make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact, Pottenger must show "( I) the occurrence of certain
outwardly neutral employment practices, and (2) a
significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on
persons of a particular [age] produced by the employer's
facially neutral acts or practices." Katz, 229 F.3d at 835
(quoting Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 538 (9th
Cir.1986» (alteration in original). A disparate impact
claim must challenge a specific business practice. The RIF
would constitute such a practice. See Rose, 902 F.2d at
1424-25 (holding that Wells Fargo's policy of committing
employment decisions in a RIF to the subjective discretion
of its managers constituted a specific employment practice
subject to disparate impact analysis).
I] 51 The district court found that Potlatch had discredited
Pottenger's statistical evidence and therefore dismissed his
disparate impact claim. Summary judgment is appropriate
when statistics do not support a disparate impact analysis.
See Katz, 229 F.3d at 835 (affirming summary judgment
dismissal where the plaintiffs were "unable to set forth a
substantial statistical disparity that would raise an
inference of intentional discrimination"). To make out a
prima facie case of disparate impact, Pottenger must show
only that a facially neutral business practice had a
significant adverse effect on older workers. Arnett v. Cal.
Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 179 F.3d 690, 697 (9th
Cir.1999), vacated on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1111, 120
S.Ct. 930, 145 L.Ed.2d 807 (2000). Pottenger's statistical
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analysis of the RIF does tend to show at least some
relationship between age and termination. It does not tend
to show that age motivated RIF decisions, which is why it
does not help Pottenger establish a disparate treatment
claim. But such a showing of causation is not necessary for
a prima facie case of disparate impact.
In the context of this case, Pottenger's disparate impact
claim nonetheless fails because Pottenger was not
terminated as part of the RIF. When Potlatch discharged
Pottenger in April, the RIF was under consideration, but it
did not actually begin until June. Pottenger argues,
however, that his discharge was functionally part of the
RIF because the enhanced severance package offered to
him was similar in structure (though not in dollar amount)
to that suggested for use in the RIF, and because he was
given 45 days to consider the package, as had been
suggested for employees subject to the RIF. Pottenger
acknowledges, however, that when Potlatch terminated
him, the company did not use the objective, four-step
evaluation process used to identify employees to be
terminated *750 as part of the RIF. Moreover, Pottenger
was a high-level executive, while the RIF targeted
rank-and-file employees. To bring a disparate impact
claim, Pottenger must show that he was subject to the
particular employment practice with the alleged disparate
impact. Because Pottenger was not formally or
functionally subject to the RIF, his disparate impact claim
cannot survive summary judgment.

Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d
416, 425 (I996). The statement that Pottenger "elected to
take early retirement" does not impute to Pottenger any of
these things.3
120 J 1211 Pottenger's intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim also fails. In order to prove intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Idaho law, Pottenger
must show that Potlatch's conduct was "extreme and
outrageous" and either "intentionally or recklessly" caused
"severe emotional distress." Brown v. A1atthews Mortuary,
Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37, 41 (1990); Hatfield v.
Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d
944,953-54 (1980). Pottenger argues that the company's
conduct was outrageous because he was fired after 32
years at the company, because he was not given an
opportunity to save face, because people might infer he
was discharged for misconduct or because he was
"deadwood," and because the company incorrectly stated
that he "elected" early retirement. The Idaho Supreme
Court requires "very extreme conduct" before finding
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Brown, 80 I
P.2d at 41. None of these allegations approach the sort of
extreme conduct described by the Idaho court in cases
where plaintiffs recovered for emotional distress from
discharge. See Holmes v. Union Oil Co., 114 Idaho 773,
760 P.2d 1189, 1197 (1988) (describing cases where a
supervisor made abusive and racially motivated remarks
when terminating an employee and where a manager fired
waitresses in alphabetical order to coerce them into
disclosing *751 whether one of them was stealing from the
restaurant ).

C. State-Law Tort Claims
(16) [1711181 1191 Finally, we affirm the district court's
summary judgment dismissal of Pottenger's state-law tort
claims. Potlatch's statement that Pottenger "elected to take
early retirement," even if false, was not defamatory. Under
Idaho law, defamatory statements are actionable without
allegation and proof of special damages if they impute to
the plaintiff I) a criminal offense; 2) a loathsome disease;
3) a matter incompatible with his trade, business,
profession, or office; or 4) serious sexual misconduct.

AFFIRMED.
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Footnotes

1

Pottenger and Paulson characterize Paulson's words slightly differently, but the parties agree to the substance of the remarks.

2

The Idaho Human Rights Act incorporates the major protections of the ADEA into statc law. See Idaho Code §§ 67-5901,67-5909.
The parties have not separately briefed the state and federal discrimination claims, and we treat them together.

3

Pottenger also alleges defamation per quod-a broader category of defamation that allows a plaintiff to show injury from a statement
based on extrinsic evidence or innuendo. See Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173,249 P.2d 192. 195 (1952). In order to state
such a claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove that some special harm resulted from the statement. Yoakum. 923 P.2d at 425. The
district court concluded that Pottenger did not allege special hann. We need not decide whether this is so. because even assuming that
Pottenger did allege special harm, his defamation claim still fails. Pottenger claims that a reader could infer from Potlatch's statement
that he had committed some misdeed and was therefore terminated immediately. First. the announcement, dated April 19, stated that
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Pottenger's retirement was effective June I. Therefore. it is not reasonable that anyone could infer he had been immediately
dismissed. Second, Pottenger otTers no evidence that anyone misconstrued the announcement or that anyone would. See Bistline V.
Eberle, 88 Idaho 473, 40 I P.2d 555. 558 (1965) ("'The fact that the plaintiff himself places an actionable connotation on the
statements does not make such statements actionable."). There is simply no reason to believe that anyone would infer that when
Potlatch wrote that Pottenger had "elected to take early retirement," the phrase connoted anything disparaging about him.
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217 F.3d 1234
2 Cases that cite this headnote

United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.
William J. RAY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
William J. HENDERSON, Postmaster
General, Defendant-Appellee.

12]

No. 99-15289. I Argued and Submitted April
26, 2000. I Filed July 7, 2000.

United States Postal Service employee sued government
for retaliation in violation of Title VII. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California,
Garland E. Burrell, J., entered summary judgment for
government. Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Betty B. Fletcher, Circuit Judge, held that: (I) as set forth
in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines, "adverse employment action" required for
Title VII retaliation claim is adverse treatment that is
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in
protected activity; (2) employee suffered cognizable
adverse employment actions when employer, in alleged
retaliation for employee's complaints concerning
management's treatment of women employees, eliminated
employee meetings, eliminated flexible start-time policy,
instituted
workplace
"lockdown,"
and
reduced
employee's workload and salary; (3) as matter of first
impression, hostile work environment may be basis for
retaliation claim under Title VII; and (4) genuine fact
issue existed as to whether employee was subjected to
hostile work environment, thus precluding summary
judgment on hostile work environment-based retaliation
claim.

Civil Rights
'V'cpractices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements
To make out prima facie case of retaliation
under Title VII, employee must show that (1) he
engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer
subjected him to adverse employment action;
and (3) a causal link exists between protected
activity and adverse action. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 704(a), as amended, 42 U .S.C.A. §
2000e-3( a).
241 Cases that cite this headnote

13)

Civil Rights
·;'.=Retaliation Claims
If plaintiff has asserted prima facie retaliation
claim under Title VII, burden shifts to defendant
to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-3(a).
69 Cases that cite this headnote

Reversed and remanded.
14)
West Headnotes (18)

II)

Postal Service
Clerks, and Employees

·~··Officers,

Postal employee may bring suit under Title VII
anti-retaliation provision pursuant to statute
extending Title VII protection to federal
employees. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 704(a),
717, as amended, 42 U.S.c.A. §§ 2000e-3(a),

Civil Rights
v=Retaliation Claims
In Title VII retaliation action, if defendant
articulates legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for adverse employment decision, plaintiff bears
ultimate burden of demonstrating that the reason
was merely a pretext for a discriminatory
motive. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).
92 Cases that cite this headnote
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references, and changes in work schedules. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

Civil Rights
>c; Activities Protected

240 Cases that cite this headnote
Making an informal complaint to a supervisor is
a protected
activity
under Title
VII
anti-retaliation provision. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-3(a).

[91

Civil Rights
,;.,,,,Administrative Agencies and Proceedings

16 Cases that cite this headnote

161

Although Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) Guidelines are not binding
on the courts, they constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance.

Civil Rights
,"~Activities

Protected

Employee's complaints about the treatment of
others is considered a protected activity under
Title VII anti-retaliation provision, even if
employee is not a member of the class that he
claims suffered from discrimination, and even if
discrimination he complained about was not
legally cognizable. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

(10)

Definition of adverse employment action, as
required for Title VII retaliation claim, does not
cover every offensive utterance by co-workers,
because offensive statements by co-workers do
not reasonably deter employees from engaging
in protected activity. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

12 Cases that cite this headnote
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Civil Rights
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133 Cases that cite this headnote
While mere ostracism by co-workers does not
constitute an "adverse employment action" for
purposes of Title VII anti-retaliation provision, a
lateral transfer does. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

1111

Postal Service
.>Officers, Clerks, and Employees

35 Cases that cite this headnote

181

Civil Rights
.",Adverse Actions in General
"Adverse employment action," as required for
Title VII retaliation claim, is adverse treatment
that is reasonably likely to deter employees from
engaging in protected activity, and this includes
such actions as lateral transfers, unfavorable job

Postal employee suffered cognizable "adverse
employment actions," as required for Title VII
retaliation claim, when employer, in alleged
retaliation
for
employee's
complaints
concerning management's treatment of women
employees, eliminated employee meetings and
flexible start-time policy, instituted "Iockdown"
of workplace, and reduced employee's workload
and salary disproportionately to reductions faced
by other employees; actions decreased
employee's pay, decreased amount of time he
had to complete same amount of work, and
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decreased his ability to influence workplace
policy, and so were reasonably likely to deter
employees from complaining about workplace
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
704(a), 717, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000e-3(a),2000e-16.

Hostile work environment may be the basis for a
retaliation claim under Title VII. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 704(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-3(a).
II Cases that cite this headnote

34 Cases that cite this headnote
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Civil Rights
;~=Hostile Environment; Severity,
Pervasiveness, and Frequency

Postal employee established causal link between
his protected complaint activity under Title VII
and adverse employment actions, as required for
Title VII retaliation claim, by demonstrating that
each action was implemented close on the heels
of his complaints. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§
704(a), 717, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000e-3(a),2000e-16.

Harassment is actionable under Title VII only if
it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
conditions of victim's employment and create
abusive working environment, and it must be
both objectively and subjectively offensive.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
22 Cases that cite this headnote

24 Cases that cite this headnote
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Federal Civil Procedure
.}~Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

Fact questions existed as to whether
nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by United
States Postal Service (USPS) for adverse actions
taken against employee, including elimination of
flexible start-time policy, institution of
workplace lockdown in alleged response to
death threat, and reduction in employee's pay as
part of across-the-board cuts, were pretexts for
retaliation following employee's complaints
conceming management's treatment of women
employees, thus precluding summary judgment
on Title VII retaliation claim. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, §§ 704(a), 717, as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-3(a), 2000e-16.

1141

Civil Rights
,y··Hostile Environment; Severity,
Pervasiveness, and Frequency

To determine whether an environment is
sufficiently hostile to support harassment claim
under Title VII, courts look to totality of the
circumstances, including frequency of the
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably
interferes with employee's work performance.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
20 Cases that cite this headnote

(17)

8 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
.,,'Hostile Environment; Severity,
Pervasiveness, and Frequency

Civil Rights
. . =Harassment; Work Environment

Repeated derogatory or humiliating statements
can constitute a hostile work environment under
Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq .
9 Cases that cite this headnote
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118)

Federal Civil Procedure
and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

'~''''Employees

Evidence that postal service employee was, inter
alia, subjected to verbal abuse by supervisors,
subjected to pranks, and falsely accused of
misconduct raised genuine fact issue as to
whether employee was subjected to hostile work
environment after he complained about
treatment of women in his workplace, thus
precluding summary judgment on hostile work
environment-based retaliation claim under Title
VI L Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 704(a), 717, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-3(a), 2000e-16.
33 Cases that cite this headnote
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California; Garland E. Burrell, District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-0l776-GEB.
Before: B. FLETCHER, ALARCON, and HAWKINS,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion

Betty B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

In this case we are called upon to determine whether
William J. Ray suffered adverse employment actions after
complaining of harassment at his workplace. We hold that
in our circuit an adverse employment action is adverse
treatment that is reasonably likely to deter employees
from engaging in protected activity. Under this standard,
we conclude that Ray suffered cognizable adverse
employment actions when his employer, in retaliation for
Ray's complaints concerning management's treatment of

women employees, eliminated employee meetings,
eliminated its flexible starting time policy, instituted a
"lockdown" of the workplace, and cut Ray's salary. We
also hold that Ray has a cognizable claim for retaliation
based on his supervisors' creation of a hostile work
environment.

William Ray has been a rural postal carrier in Willits,
California for over 28 years. In addition to Ray, there are
four other rural carriers. Ray's immediate supervisor at
the Willits Post Office is Dale Briggs, and the Postmaster
is Dan Carey.
Prior to the events at issue in this case, the rural carriers
had a flexible start-time. Ray and the other carriers
generally arrived at work between 6:00 A.M. and 7:00
A.M, and they went out on their delivery routes at 9:45
A.M. Because their salaries were fixed, arriving early did
not affect their incomes, however it did give them time to
sort mail and do other administrative tasks before leaving
on their routes.
In 1994, Ray and his co-workers became concerned about
gender bias and harassment at the post office. Several
female employees had apparently sought medical advice
and transfers because of harassment by Briggs. The
subject of the harassment of women first came up at a
March 30, 1994 Employee Involvement meeting. I At that
meeting, a female janitorial employee raised her hand and
asked to be recognized to speak. Postmaster Carey
"immediately wheeled around, swinging his arm, yelled
and pointed. He ordered [the employee] out of the
meeting." After she had left, Ray spoke up. He stated his
objections to the treatment of women at the post office.
Postmaster Carey vehemently denied the charges, and
berated Ray as a "liar."
Ray next made a complaint about the treatment of women
at an April 7, 1994 Rural Carriers Employee Involvement
meeting. Carey again angrily denied the charges. After
these complaints failed to spur any change, Ray and two
of his co-workers wrote a letter complaining of the
harassment of women to Lito Sajones, Carey's supervisor.
The letter prompted a meeting, held in the nearby Ukiah
Post Office on June IS, 1994, regarding the alleged
harassment. At that meeting, Carey stated his displeasure
that Ray had written the complaint to his supervisor. He
said that, because of the letter, "I may have to change my
*1238 whole approach to management. I've been a
manager f()reil?,~teen'years. I have left Y()U alone. Its
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called self-management. I may have to change that."
Carey did not effectuate that threat until February 1995.
However, in the meantime Briggs and Carey publicly
berated Rayon a regular basis. For example, Briggs
yelled at Ray at a staff meeting on November 10, 1994,
after Ray had made a suggestion for improving efficiency
at the office. On December 24, 1994, Postmaster Carey
called Ray a "rabble rouser" and a "troublemaker," and
said he would cancel all future Employee Involvement
meetings at the post office, apparently to avoid further
complaints about gender bias and harassment. He also
stated that "if Bill Ray has so much time for talking,
maybe he is coming in [to the office] too early." This was
another veiled threat to end the "self management" policy
under which workers set their own starting and finishing
times.
One week later, Ray met with Briggs and Carey to discuss
employees' rights to communicate with other employees.
Ray fled the meeting after Carey yelled at him and made
physically threatening gestures toward him.
One month later, on January 31, 1995, Ray and the union
shop steward, Bob Daitoku, met with Carey to discuss
Carey's recent decision to cancel the Employee
Involvement meetings. Carey stated that "We're not
having any E./. program as long as you're writing letters
over my head."
Postmaster Carey made good on his threat to eliminate
both the Employee Involvement program and the
"self-management" policy soon after the January meeting.
In February 1995, Briggs announced that all rural carriers
were required to come to work at a fixed starting time:
7:00 A.M. When the fixed start time was instituted, the
postal carriers found themselves with less time to sort the
mail prior to going out on their routes. Ray states that he
had the longest route and the largest amount of mail to
sort; the 7:00 A.M. start time forced him to work at top
speed, sorting 60 letters per minute and 40 magazines per
minute, even though the Rural Carrier Handbook states
that the standard allowable rate for sorting mail is 16
letters per minute and 8 magazines per minute. The 7:00
A.M. start time also forced Ray to work later in the
afternoon so that he could finish some of the
administrative tasks that he had previously done in the
morning.

In May 1995, Ray's wife became extremely ill. Ray
wanted to leave work earlier in order to take care of her,
and he therefore requested to come to work half an hour
early-at 6:30 A.M. While Briggs granted the request, he
repeatedly threatened to retract the early start time.

Ray continued to be the target of Briggs and Carey's
hostility during the summer and fall of 1995. On one
occasion, after Ray made a suggestion at an office
meeting, Briggs yelled at him, telling him to "shut up"
and "that's a direct order."
Ray was twice falsely charged with misconduct. He was
accused, and then cleared, of opening a package. He was
later accused, and then cleared, of knocking down a
mailbox on his route. Also, a series of pranks were played
on Ray during this time. For example, someone left a dog
biscuit near Ray's work space. On another occasion, Ray
found a ball bearing in his work space.
On October 13, 1995, Ray filed a request for counseling
with the EEOC, complaining of a hostile work
environment. He alleged that the management at the
Willits Post office employed a "singling-out-and-punish
method of controlling and frightening and eventually
demoralizing the workers." In his EEOC request he also
stated that:
It is because of [management's]
conviction they are doing the right thing
that makes the situation so troubling and
actionable at law. The Joint Statement
on Violence and Behavior In the
Workplace
clearly
outlaws
their
practices and * 1239 a contin uati on of
their pattern will be dire. Four people
have said to me the SPO should be
killed. They were speaking out of
frustration and pain. But this should
show that the situation is not isolated to
my complaint.

On November 7, 1995, Ray took stress leave from work.
On November 22, while Ray was still out on stress leave,
Postmaster Carey received a copy of the EEO complaint.
He immediately instituted a procedure called "lockdown"
at the Willits Post Office.2 During lockdown, the doors to
the loading docks were kept locked at all times. Every
time Ray (or another postal carrier) needed to load his
vehicle with mail, he would have to unlock the doors,
push his mail cart out onto the loading dock, go back
inside and lock the doors, and then exit through a side
door to take the mail from the cart into his car. To get
back inside the post office, he would have to ring a bell
and wait for another postal employee to open the door.
The lockdown procedure turned a process that had taken
seconds into one taking several minutes.
Postmaster Carey states that he instituted the lockdown
because Ray's complaint to the EEO contained a death
threat. Briggs ordered Ray not to come back to the office,
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and called in a Postal Inspector to determine whether the
EEO letter constituted a threat. The Inspector, Robert
Dortch, conducted an investigation into the matter. He
determined that no death threat had been made, and Ray
was allowed to return to work. Nonetheless, even after the
inspector had cleared Ray of wrongdoing, a temporary
supervisor, Bill Wilber, announced to the staff that Ray
had made a death threat. The lockdown at the Willits Post
Office continued until February 1996, when it was
discontinued without explanation.
Also in response to the supposed death threat, on
December 1, 1995 Postmaster Carey canceled Ray's 6:30
start time, requiring him to arrive at work at 7:00 A.M.
Carey stated that he did not want Ray coming to work
early because he "had to be supervised at all times."
Ray wrote additional EEO complaint letters on December
13,1995, January 15 and 21, 1996, and April 1, 1996. In
March 1996, Ray's postal route was reduced by 90 boxes,
causing him to lose approximately $3,000 from his annual
salary. Although all the postal carriers suffered cuts In
their routes, Ray's route was cut the most.
Ray's EEO complaint was heard by an Administrative
Law Judge (All) on May 28, 1997. The All found that
the United States Postal Service (USPS) had retaliated
against Ray after he filed his written EEO counseling
request, but rejected Ray's remaining claims. The USPS
rejected the All's finding of retaliation and entered a
final agency decision rejecting all of Ray's claims on
August 13, 1997.
Ray then filed suit in federal district court. His First
Amended Complaint alleged retaliation for engaging in
protected activity, discrimination, and failure to make
accommodations for Ray to allow him to care for his ill
wife. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant on all claims. Ray appeals only the grant of
summary judgment on his retaliation claim.

II

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
U.s.c. § 1291. We review the district court's decision to
grant summary judgment de novo. See Robi v. Reed, 173
F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952, 120
S.Ct. 375, 145 L.Ed.2d 293 (1999). In reviewing an order
denying or granting summary judgment, we must
determine, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and whether the *1240
districtcourt correctlyappI}~d the substantive law. See id.

III

II) Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
against an employee because that employee "has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a). A postal employee
may bring suit under § 2000e-3(a) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16. See Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446, 450 (9th
Cir.1976).

12) 13/14/ To make out a prima facie case of retaliation,
an employee must show that (1) he engaged in a protected
activity; (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse
employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between
the protected activity and the adverse action. See Steiner
v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th
Cir. I 994). If a plaintiff has asserted a prima facie
retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision. Id. at 1464- I 465. If the defendant articulates
such a reason, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of
demonstrating that the reason was merely a pretext for a
discriminatory motive. Id.
15) 161 The parties do not contest that Ray engaged in
protected activities when he complained of the treatment
of women at the Willits Post Office both informally and
formally with the EEOC.3 The heart of this dispute is
whether Ray suffered cognizable adverse employment
actions. Ray asserts that he suffered from changes in
workplace policy and pay, as well as from a hostile work
environment. We first examine the definition of an
adverse employment action. We then discuss whether the
changes in workplace policy and pay constitute adverse
employment actions, and whether Ray has established a
causal link between his protected activities and those
adverse employment actions. Finally, we examine
whether Ray's allegation that he was subjected to a
hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in
protected activity is cognizable under the anti-retaliation
provisions of Title VII.

IV

The circuits are currently split as to what constitutes an
adverse employment action. Although we have yet to
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articulate a rule defining the contours of an adverse
employment action, our prior cases situate us with those
circuits that define adverse employment action broadly.
Other circuits that define adverse employment action
broadly are the First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C.
Circuits. An intermediate position is held by the Second
and Third Circuits. The most restrictive view of adverse
employment actions is held by the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits. Below, we set forth the Ninth Circuit's position
within this split, and explain the case law in the other
circuits. Then, we examine what guidelines we should
follow in analyzing whether an action constitutes an
adverse employment action.
I7J We have found that a wide array of disadvantageous
changes in the workplace constitute adverse employment
actions. *1241 While "mere ostracism" by co-workers
does not constitute an adverse employment action, see
Strother v. Southern Caliji'Jrnia Permanente AIedical
Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir.1996), a lateral transfer
does. In Yartzojf v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th
Cir.1987), we held that "[t]ransfers of job duties and
undeserved performance ratings, if proven, would
constitute 'adverse employment decisions.' " The YartzofJ
decision was in line with our earlier decision in Sf. John v.
Employment Development Dept., 642 F.2d 273, 274 (9th
Cir.1981), where we held that a transfer to another job of
the same pay and status may constitute an adverse
employment action.4

promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and
toleration of harassment by other employees"); Knox v.
Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.1996) (employer can
be liable for retaliation if it permits "actions like moving
the person from a spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy
closet, depriving the person of previously available
support services
or cutting off challenging
assignments"); Corneveaux v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Group,
76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir.1996) (employee
demonstrated adverse employment action under the
ADEA by showing that her employer "required her to go
through several hoops in order to obtain her severance
benefits"); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986
(10th Cir. I 996) (malicious prosecution by former
employer can be adverse employment action); *1242
Wideman v. Wal-lvfart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456
(11th Cir.1998) (adverse employment actions include an
employer requiring plaintiff to work without lunch break,
giving her a one-day suspension, soliciting other
employees for negative statements about her, changing
her schedule without notification, making negative
comments about her, and needlessly delaying
authorization for medical treatment); Passer v. American
Chemical Soc., 935 F.2d 322, 330-331 (D.C.Cir.1991)
(employer's cancellation of a public event honoring an
employee can constitute adverse employment action
under the ADEA, which has an anti-retaliation provision
parallel to that in Title VII).

Similarly, in Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 67 I. 676 (9th
Cir. 1997), we found that the dissemination of an
unfavorable job reference was an adverse employment
action "because it was a 'personnel action' motivated by
retaliatory animus." We so found even though the
defendant proved that the poor job reference did not affect
the prospective employer's decision not to hire the
plaintiff: "That this unlawful personnel action turned out
to be inconsequential goes to the issue of damages, not
liability." Jd

The Second and Third circuits hold an intermediate
position within the circuit split. They have held that an
adverse action is something that materially affects the
terms and conditions of employment. See Robinson v.
City ol Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir.1997)
("retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough
to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment ... to constitute [an] 'adverse
employment action' "); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625,
640 (2nd Cir. 1997) (to show an adverse employment
action employee must demonstrate "a materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of employment")
(quoting lvfcKenney v. New York City Orf-Track Betting
Corp., 903 F.Supp. 619, 623 (S.D.N.Y.1995)).

In Strother, we examined the case of an employee who,
after complaining of discrimination, was excluded from
meetings, seminars and positions that would have made
her eligible for salary increases, was denied secretarial
support, and was given a more burdensome work
schedule. 79 F.3d at 869. We determined that she had
suffered from adverse employment actions. Id.
These cases place the Ninth Circuit in accord with the
First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits. These
Circuits all take an expansive view of the type of actions
that can be considered adverse employment actions. See
Wyatt v. City olBoston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir.1994)
(adverse employment actions include "demotions,
disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to

The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, adopting the most
restrictive test, hold that only "ultimate employment
actions" such as hiring, firing, promoting and demoting
constitute actionable adverse employment actions. See
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th
Cir.1997) (only "ultimate employment decisions" can be
adverse employment decisions); Ledergerber v. Stangler,
122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (transfer involving
only minor changes in working conditions and no
reduction in payor benefits is not an adverse employment
action).

V.

Henderson, 211 F.3d i 234 (2000)

83 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 753,78 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,196 ...

The government urges us to turn from our precedent, and
to adopt the Fifth and Eighth Circuit rule that only
"ultimate employment actions" such as hiring, firing,
promoting and demoting constitute actionable adverse
employment actions.s But we cannot square such a rule
with our prior decisions. Actions that we consider adverse
employment actions, such as the lateral transfers in
Yartzoff and St. John, the unfavorable reference that had
no affect on a prospective employer's hiring decisions in
Hashimoto, and the imposition of a more burdensome
work schedule in Strother are not ultimate employment
actions. Nor, for that matter, does the test adopted by the
Second and Third Circuits comport with our precedent.
While some actions that we consider to be adverse (such
as disadvantageous transfers or changes in work schedule)
do "materially affect the terms and conditions of
employment," others (such as an unfavorable reference
not affecting an employee's job prospects) do not.
[81 [91 The EEOC has interpreted "adverse employment
action" to mean "any adverse treatment that is based on a
retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the
charging party or others from *1243 engaging in
protected activity." EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8,
"Retaliation," ~ 8008 (1998). Although EEOC Guidelines
are not binding on the courts, they "constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance." Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399,
91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140,65 S.Ct. 161,89 L.Ed. 124 (1944));
see also Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031,
1049 (9th Cir.1988). We find the EEOC test to be
consistent with our prior holdings, and with the holdings
in the First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits.

fl 0) The EEOC test covers lateral transfers, unfavorable
job references, and changes in work schedules. These
actions are all reasonably likely to deter employees from
engaging in protected activity. Nonetheless, it does not
cover every offensive utterance by co-workers, because
offensive statements by co-workers do not reasonably
deter employees from engaging in protected activity.
As we stated in Hashimoto, the severity of an action's
ultimate impact (such as loss of payor status) "goes to the
issue of damages, not liability." 118 F.3d at 676. Instead
of focusing on the ultimate effects of each employment
action, the EEOC test focuses on the deterrent effects. In
so doing, it effectuates the letter and the purpose of Title
VII. According to 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a), it is unlawful
"for an employer to discriminate" against an employee in
retaliation for engaging in protected activity. This
provision does not limit what type of discrimination is
covered, nor does it prescribe a minimum level of severity

for actionable discrimination. See Knox 93 F.3d at 1334
("There is nothing in the law of retaliation that restricts
the type of retaliatory act that might be visited upon an
employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a
complaint."). We agree with the D.C. Circuit, which
noted in Passer that:
The statute itself proscribes "discriminat[ion]" against
those who invoke the Act's protections; the statute does
not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take
the form of cognizable employment actions such as
discharge, transfer or demotion ..... "[T]o establish a
prima facie case under section 704(a) [42 U.S.c. §
2000e-3(a) ], a plaintiff must show: I) that he or she
engaged in activity protected by the statute; 2) that the
employer ... engaged in conduct having an adverse
impact on the plaintiff; and 3) that the adverse action
was causally related to the plaintiffs exercise of
protected rights."
935 F.2d at 331 (emphasis in original) (citing Berger v.
Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d
1395, 1423 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam), supplemented on
other grounds on reh 'g, 852 F.2d 619 (D.C.Cir.1988)).
Because the EEOC standard is consistent with our prior
case law and effectuates the language and purpose of Title
VII, we adopt it, and hold that an action is cognizable as
an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to
deter employees from engaging in protected activity.6
We now turn to the question of whether the actions
alleged by Ray constitute adverse employment actions
under this standard, whether Ray has provided sufficient
evidence of a causal link between his protected activities
and the adverse employment actions, and whether he can
overcome the USPS' proffered nondiscriminatory reasons
for the actions.

V
Ill) Ray claims that, in retaliation for his complaints, his
supervisors eliminated the Employee Involvement
program, eliminated the flexible start-time policy,
instituted lockdown procedures, and reduced *1244 his
workload-and his pay-disproportionately to the reductions
faced by other employees.7

We conclude that all four qualify as adverse employment
actions. The actions decreased Ray's pay, decreased the
amount of time that he had to complete the same amount
of work, and decreased his ability to influence workplace
policy, and thus were reasonably likely to deter Ray or
other employees from complaining about discrimination
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in the workplace.
1121 We also find that Ray has established a causal link
between his protected activity and the employment
actions by demonstrating that each action was
implemented close on the heels of his complaints. That an
employer's actions were caused by an employee's
engagement in protected activities may be inferred from
"proximity in time between the protected action and the
allegedly retaliatory employment decision." Yart::off, 809
F.2d at 1371.
113/ What remains, therefore, is an examination of
whether Ray has produced sufficient evidence supporting
his contention that the nondiscriminatory reasons
proffered by the Postal Service are pretexts for retaliation.
We find that he has. The USPS alleges that Carey and
Briggs eliminated flexible starting times because of an
increase in the amount of mail and because of later
delivery of the mail to the post office. However, it is
undisputed that Postmaster Carey announced publicly that
he was instituting the fixed start time in response to Ray's
complaints. Furthermore, the USPS' assertion is belied by
the fact that even after the policy change several of the
postal carriers continued to arrive at work early with
official sanction.

The Postal Service also asserts that Carey instituted the
lockdown procedures in response to a death threat, not for
retaliatory reasons. Ray contends that this is false, and
points to the fact that his supervisors continued the
lockdown even after the postal inspector had stated
definitively that there was no death threat. Also,
supervisory employees continued to say publicly that Ray
had made a threat when they knew that that was not the
case. We are sensitive to the Postal Service's desire to
protect its employees and customers from violence, and
nothing should prevent management from taking
precautionary steps. Certainly, locking the doors ensured
that unauthorized persons could not enter the building,
and thus enhanced security. Nonetheless, a lockdown
such as that implemented by the postal service seems
unlikely to prevent harm from a disgruntled employee
working inside the building, nor would the lockdown stop
a violent postal employee from entering the post office,
since an employee would probably open the door from
inside for any co-worker; indeed, if anything, the
lockdown ensured that employees would find it more
difficult to leave. Although the reasons for the lockdown
present a close question, we conclude that Ray has raised
a genuine issue of material fact, and that there is sufficient
evidence to survive summary judgment on this claim.
Finally, the USPS claims that the reduction in Ray's pay
was part of across-the-board cuts,
and
was

nondiscriminatory. However, Ray has sufficiently
rebutted this assertion by demonstrating that he suffered
the greatest loss in pay.
We therefore hold that, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Ray, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on the retaliation claim.

VI

/14J We now examine whether Ray's allegation that he
was subjected to a hostile work environment is cognizable
under the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII. We have
not previously decided whether a hostile work
environment may be the basis for a retaliation claim under
Title VII. See * 1245 Gregmy v. Widnall, 153 F.3d 1071,
1075 (9th CiLI998). However, the Second, Seventh and
Tenth Circuits have held that an employer may be liable
for a retaliation-based hostile work environment. See
Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2nd Cir.1999) ("co-worker
harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute adverse
employment action so as to satisty the second prong of
the retaliation prima facie case"); Drake v. Minnesota
Mining & M[g. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th CiL1998)
("retaliation can take the form of a hostile work
environment"); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152
F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.1998) ("co-worker hostility or
retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may
constitute 'adverse employment action' for purposes of a
retaliation claim").
We agree with our sister circuits. Harassment is obviously
actionable when based on race and gender. Harassment as
retaliation for engaging in protected activity should be no
different-it is the paradigm of "adverse treatment that is
based on retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to
deter the charging party or others from engaging in
protected activity." EEOC Compliance Manual ~ 8008.
115/ /16) Harassment is actionable only if it is
"sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the .victim's employment and create an abusive workin ba
envIronment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S.
17,21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 LEd.2d 295 (1993). It must be
both objectively and subjectively offensive. See Faragher
v. City 0.[ Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275,
141 LEd.2d 662 (1998). To determine whether an
environment is sufficiently hostile, we look to the totality
of the circumstances, including the "frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

v.
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employee's work performance." Jd. (quoting Harris, 510
U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367).
Not every insult or harassing comment will constitute a
hostile work environment. In Gregory v. Widnall, we
rejected a claim of a hostile work environment based on
"[a] single drawing of a monkey on a memo circulated by
senior NCO's, accompanied by the verbal explanation
that it was intended to remind officers not to 'get the
monkey off their back' by passing their responsibilities to
others." 153 F.3d at 1074-75; see also Strother, 79 F.3d at
869 ("mere ostracism in the workplace is not enough to
show an adverse employment decision").
[171 Repeated derogatory or humiliating statements,
however, can constitute a hostile work environment. In
Hacienda Hotel, for example, we found that the plaintiffs
had demonstrated sufficiently "severe or pervasive"
harassment by demonstrating that one supervisor
"repeatedly engaged in vulgarities, made sexual remarks,
and requested sexual favors" while another supervisor
"frequently witnessed, laughed at, or herself made these
types of comments." 881 F.2d at 1515. And in Draper v.
Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th
Cir.1998), we found that the appellant's allegations that
her supervisor had regularly made sexual remarks about
her throughout her employment, and that he laughed at
her complaints to him, raised a genuine factual issue
regarding a hostile work environment.
(181 Here, after Ray made his complaint about the
treatment of women at the Willits Post Office, he was
targeted for verbal abuse related to those complaints for a
period lasting over one and half years. His supervisors
regularly yelled at him during staff meetings; they called
him a "liar," a "troublemaker," and a "rabble rouser," and
told him to "shut up." Additionally, Ray was subjected to
a number of pranks, and was falsely accused of
misconduct.

Not only did his supervisors make it harder for Ray to
complete his own tasks, they made Ray an object lesson
about the perils of complaining about sexual harassment
in the workplace. Carey and Briggs made it clear to the
other staff members *1246 that disadvantageous changes
in management style were due to Ray's complaints. Carey
linked the change to a fixed starting time to Ray's letter to
Carey's supervisor. He canceled the Employee
Involvement meetings in response to Ray's complaints.
Carey and Briggs also fostered animus in other employees
whose working conditions were affected. Other
employees began to distance themselves from Ray, and
some stopped talking to him. In November of 1995, the
difficulties at work rose to such a level that Ray took
stress leave from his job.
We conclude that Ray has presented evidence that is, for
purposes of summary judgment, sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether he was subjected to a
hostile work environment. We therefore hold that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on the
hostile work environment-based retaliation claim.

VII

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district
court grant of summary judgment and REMAND for a
trial on the merits of Ray's retaliation claim.

Parallel Citations
83 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 753, 78 Empi. Prac. Dec.
P 40,196, 00 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 5520, 2000 Daily
Journal D.A.R. 7393

Footnotes
Employee Involvement meetings are a means for employees to communicate with the management regarding workplace issues.

2

It is unclear from the record whether lockdown is a standard post office procedure. Ray asserts that lockdown procedures had never
been instituted in the Willits Post Oftice before November 1995.

3

As the statutory language quoted above indicates. filing a complaint with the EEOC is a protected activity. See 42 U.S.c. ~
2000e-3(a). Making an informal complaint to a supervisor is also a protected activity. See Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504. 1514 (9th Cir.1989).
Furthermore. an employee's complaints about the treatment of others is considered a protected activity, evcn if the employee is
not a member of the class that he claims suffered from discrimination, and even if the discrimination he complained about was
not legally cognizable. See jHoyo V. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir.1994) (prison guard had a claim for retaliation if he was
discharged for complaining about the trcatment of black inmates and he was acting on a reasonable belief that a Title VII
violation had occurred, even though the complained-of discrimination was not actually a Title VII violation).

4

The governmcnt cites Steiner V. Showboat Operating Co .. 25 F.3d 1459 and Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., I I3 F.3d 912,912
(9th Cir.1996),for the proposition that a lateral transfer is not an adverse employment action.

V.

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (2000)
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In Steiner, this court stated in dicta and in a footnote that "the transfer is just barely-if at all-characterizable as an 'adverse'
employment action: Steiner was not demoted, or put in a worse job, or given any additional responsibilities. In fact, at first she
even claimed to enjoy the day shift." 25 F.3d at 1465 n. 6. The court did not reach the question of whether the transfer was an
adverse employment action because it found that the action was not retaliatory in nature. Jd. at 1465. In Nidds, this court, citing
Steiner, found that the plaintiffs transfer was not an adverse employment action. 113 F.3d at 919. However, it conducted no
analysis to reach this point, merely asserting that "Although we decline to view Nidds' transfer to the restoration department as
an adverse employment action, his ultimate termination on July 28, 1992 certainly was." Id.
Neither Steiner nor Nidds establish that a lateral transfer can never be an adverse employment action. Had they done so, they
would have had to abrogate this court's earlier decisions in YartzofJ and St. John, supra, neither of which were cited in the
Steiner and Nidds decisions. We therefore reject the government's assertion that a lateral transfer cannot be an adverse
employment action for the purposes of Title VII.

5

The govcrnment relies on Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 14 I L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) for the
proposition that only ultimate employment actions such as "hiring, tiring, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
diffcrent responsibilities [and] a decision causing a significant change in benefits" constitute adverse employment actions. But the
discussion in Burlington Industries cited by the government concerns the types of employment actions which, if taken by a
supervisor, would subject the employer to vicarious liability for harassment. See 524 U.S. at 760-761. 118 S.Ct. 2257. Although
the Supreme Court cited to circuit-level Title VII cases that defined "adverse employment actions," the Court specifically declined
to adopt the holdings of those cases: "Without endorsing the specific results of those decisions, we think it prudent to import the
concept ofa tangible employment action for resolution of the vicarious liability issue we consider here." Jd. at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257.
Therefore, we reject the contention that Burlington Industries set forth a standard for adverse employment actions in the
anti-retaliation eontext.

6

The iirst part of the EEOC's detinition of adverse employment aetion, which requires that the action be "based on a retaliatory
motive," collapses into the "eausallink" prong of the prima faeie test for retaliation.

7

He also alleges that his supervisors created a hostile work environment that constituted an adverse employment action. We discuss
the hostile work environment claim in the following section.
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Discrimination

58 F·3d 454

United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Allocation of burdens of proof and order of
analysis in ADEA in Title VII actions follow
three step pattern: plaintiff must first establish
prima facie of discrimination; then burden shifts
to
defendant
to
articulate
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision; then, in order to prevail, plaintiff must
demonstrate that employer's alleged reason for
adverse employment decision was pretext for
another motive which was discriminatory. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e
et seq.

Jack RI1TER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 93-56711. I Argued and Submitted April
3,1995. I Decided June 22,1995·
Former employee sued former employer for age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment ACT (ADEA), and for termination to prevent
his retirement benefits from vesting in violation of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The
United States District Court for the Central District
California, A. Andrew Hauk, J., granted summary
judgment for former employer. Former employee
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Leavy, Circuit Judge,
held that: (I) former employee failed to establish prima
facie case of age discrimination; (2) former employee
failed to establish prima facie claim of termination to
prevent vesting of retirement benefits in violation of
ERISA; (3) former employee failed to rebut legitimate
nondiscriminatory business reasons articulated by former
employer for termination of former employee; and (4)
district court properly took judicial notice of widespread
layoffs at former employer.

18 Cases that cite this headnote

131

Former employee failed to establish prima facie
case of age discrimination based on replacement
by younger and less qualified employee; former
employee's claim as to who allegedly replaced
him was different in complaint and opposition to
summary judgment and former employee
presented no specific evidence regarding
identity, age, or inferior qualifications of second
alleged replacement. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.

Affirmed.
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Civil Rights
fcAge Discrimination

6 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
Discrimination

,c~Age

Standards of proof in ADEA discrimination
actions parallel those in Title VII actions. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.CA § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e
et seq.
5 Cases that cite this headnote

121

Civil Rights

141

Civil Rights
,.•.,Age Discrimination

Former employee failed to establish prima facie
of age discrimination through circumstantial,
statistical or direct evidence that discharge
occurred under circumstances giving rise to
inference of discrimination; fact that he worked
in a number of projects and positions which were
eventually subject to cutbacks and layoffs did not
give rise to inference of subterfuge based on age
in
discrimination.
Age
Discrimination
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
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U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.

pretext, in action for discriminatory discharge to
prevent vesting of retirement benefits in violation
of ERISA, where it stated that it laid him off due
to reduction in work force after carrying him in
temporary positions for over a year after his
discharge for cause. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, § 510,29 U.S.CA.
§ 1140.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

15J

Civil Rights
,;,,=Retaliation Claims
Labor and Employment
",,,"Presumptions and Burden of Proof

McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting analysis
applicable to Title VII and ADEA claims also
applies to claims for discriminatory discharge to
prevent vesting of ERISA pension rights. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U .S.CA. § 2000e
et seq.; Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, § 510,29 U.S.CA. § 1140.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

18J

District court could take judicial notice of layoffs
at employer, in action brought by former
employee alleging that he was discharged
because of his age and to prevent his ERISA
retirement benefits from vesting, where fact of
layoffs was generally known in area and was
capable of sufficiently accurate and ready
in
determination.
Age
Discrimination
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, § 510,29 U.S.CA.
§ 1140; Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 20 I (b), 28
U.S.CA.

Labor and Employment
Cases in General
Labor and Employment
"~i'",Causal Connection; Temporal Proximity
~Particular

Former employee failed to establish prima facie
case of discriminatory discharge to prevent
vesting of retirement benefits in violation of
ERISA; he failed to show how layoff policy was
plan was covered by ERISA or that there was any
nexus between revised layoff policy and vesting
of his retirement rights. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, § 510,29 U.S.CA.
§ 1140.

and Associations and Members

Thereof

II Cases that cite this headnote

16J

Evidence
.,~""Corporations

30 Cases that cite this headnote

19J

Federal Courts
<",Reception of Evidence

Appellate court reviews district court's decision
to take judicial notice for abuse of discretion.
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 20 I (b), 28 U.S.CA.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

10 Cases that cite this headnote
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Labor and Employment
". =Presumptions and Burden of Proof

I]OJ
Former
employer
articulated
sufficient
nondiscriminatory reasons for layoff of former
employee to shift burden of going forward back
to former employee to present evidence that
reasons advanced by former employer were mere

Labor and Employment
,,,,Motive and Intent; Pretext

Former employer's presentation of two reasons
for discharge of former employee, namely, his
prior dismissal for cause and his final layoff due
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to reduction in force (RIF) did not establish
sufficient proof of pretext to avoid summary
judgment in ERISA action for termination to
prevent his retirement benefits from vesting,
where rationales were not inconsistent.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, § 510,29 U.S.C.A. § 1140.
8 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*455 Michael 1. Rodriquez and Douglas M. Marshall, Law
Offices of Douglas M. Marshall, Newport Beach, CA, for
plainti ff-appellant.
Wanda R. Dorgan, Hughes Aircraft Company, Los
Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.
Before: NOONAN,
Circuit Judges.

O'SCANNLAIN,

and

LEAVY,

Opinion
LEAVY, Circuit Judge:

Jack Ritter appeals from a grant of summary judgment in
favor of Hughes Aircraft Co. Ritter claims that Hughes
unlawfully discharged him: I) because of his age, in
violation of § 4 of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEN'), 29 U.S.c. § 623,1 and 2) in order to
prevent his retirement benefits from vesting, in violation of
§ 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.c. § 1140.2 We affirm.

replaced by a new supervisor. Ritter then began to receive
negative evaluations. In 1987 he was notified that unless he
could find employment elsewhere in the company he
would be laid off.
Ritter was able to find employment as a Senior Project
Engineer reporting to a former colleague of his. In order to
obtain this position, however, Ritter was forced to accept a
job declassification, but not a decrease in salary. In this
new position, Ritter was given responsibility for the
Automatic TOW 2 Field Test Set Program ("A T2FTS"), a
new product being developed by Hughes. Ritter was also
assigned to work on the Ground TOW Program ("TFTS"),
devoted to supplying spare parts and equipment updates
for older units in the field. George Hall ("Hall") became
Ritter's immediate supervisor, and, in 1989, Richard
Kagimoto ("Kagimoto") became his Operations Manager.
Kagimoto was responsible for making sure that the
AT2FTS and TFTS programs were on schedule and within
budget.
While Ritter worked in the AT2FTS and TFTS a variety of
problems developed. Ritter acknowledges that Kagimoto
viewed his (Ritter's) employment performance as deficient
and the source of many of the problems. Ritter also
acknowledges that Hall had notified him of specific areas
of upper management dissatisfaction with his work. In
May of 1990, Hall informed Ritter that upper management
had decided that unless he (Ritter) could find another
position at the company within six weeks he would be laid
off.
Ritter appealed the six week deadline to the Human
Resources Manager and was allowed to remain on payroll
for over one year while seeking a permanent reassignment.
During this time Ritter occasionally found temporary
assignments but most of his work was charged to an
overhead account. In June of 1991, having been unable to
find a permanent position, Ritter was laid off.

*456 FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Approximately ten weeks after Ritter was laid off, Hughes
revised its layoff policy. The new layoff policy provided
that employees with at least 15 years of service and who
were within 5 years of a retirement milestone would be
offered alternate employment, in a downgrade/demotion
position if necessary, prior to being laid off.

Jack Ritter ("Ritter") was employed by Hughes Aircraft
Co. ("Hughes") from July of 1962 until August of 1979,
when he voluntarily quit to pursue work as a real estate
agent. Ritter was rehired as a Senior Project Engineer in
the Fall of 1981, and he subsequently held a variety of
positions in the company. Sometime after 1984, Ritter was
appointed a Staff Manager. Six months after his last
transfer, his supervisor suffered a heart attack and was

In February of 1992, Ritter brought this action against
Hughes claiming that the company unlawfully terminated
him because of his age and in order to prevent the vesting
of his retirement benefits. In November of 1993, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Hughes. The court held that Ritter had failed to present a
prima facie claim under the ADEA, and that although
Ritter had established a prima facie case of a violation of
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ERISA, he did not present adequate evidence that the
reasons offered by Hughes to justifY his layoff were mere
pretexts. Ritter now appeals from the decision of the
district court.

ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgment on the ADEA Claim

III 12) Standards of proof in ADEA discrimination suits
parallel those in Title VII suits. "We combine the Title VII
and ADEA claims for analysis because the burdens of
proof and persuasion are the same." Wallis V. J.R. Simp/ot,
Co., 26 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. I 994). The allocation of the
burdens of proof and order of analysis follow a three step
pattern:
[A] plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. If the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the burden then shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision.
Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the employer's
alleged
reason
for
the
adverse
employment decision is a *457 pretext
for
another
motive
which
IS
discriminatory.

Jd. at 889 (quoting Rose V. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d
1417,1420 (9th Cir.1990)).
13) Ritter was 5 I years old at the time of his termination,
and he raised a material issue of fact as to whether he was
qualified for the position of Senior Project Engineer and
other positions he sought. In his Amended Complaint,
Ritter alleged that after his discharge, work originally
performed by him was taken by another Hughes'
employee, Ernie Lau ("Lau"), "who was substantially
younger ... and less qualified." But, in his opposition to
summary judgment, Ritter argued not that Lau took his
position, but that Lau had hired some other unnamed
person outside the protected age group. Yet, in support of
this claim, Ritter presented no specific evidence
establishing the identity, age, or inferior qualifications of
this employee. In view of the inconsistency of Ritter's
claims and the vagueness of the evidence offered in
support of them, we conclude, as did the district court, that
Ritter failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any
genuine material issue of fact as to whether he had been
replaced by a person outside the protected class. See

Anderson V. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
[4) Ritter, however, could also prove age discrimination
"through circumstantial, statistical or direct evidence that
the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to
an inference of age discrimination." Wallis, 26 F.3d at 891
(quoting Rose, 902 F.2d at 1421). Ritter contends that
because he worked in a number of projects and positions
which were eventually subject to cutbacks and layoffs,
there exists an inference of "subterfuge" based on age
discrimination.

We find Ritter's argument meritless. In Nesbit v. Pepsico,
Inc., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.1993), an employee claimed
that his employer had violated the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act by discriminating against
him because of his age. The plaintiff relied on the
following evidence:
(1) statistical evidence that some older workers were
terminated while some younger workers were retained
and that employees hired after the RIF were generally
younger than those terminated; (2) a comment by [the
employee's] direct superior to [the employee] that '[w]e
don't necessarily like grey hair'; and (3) an interview of
[the employer's] Senior Vice President of Personnel in
which he stated, "We don't want unpromotable
fifty-year olds around."

Id. at 705. Observing that California courts have adopted
the analysis applicable to ADEA claims, we concluded that
"[v]iewing the evidence cumulatively, and in a light most
favorable to the appellants, it falls short of creating an
inference of age discrimination." Id. at 704-05. Ritter
presented less evidence than that offered by the
unsuccessful plaintiff in Nesbit. His employment history
does not give rise to an inference of age discrimination.
We hold that the district did not err in concluding that
Ritter failed to present a prima facie case of age
discrimination and properly granted summary judgment.

II. Summary Judgment on the ERISA Claim
IS) We adopt the Second Circuit's view in Dister V.
Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108 (2nd Cir. 1988),
that the burden shifting analysis applicable to Title VII and
ADEA claims, described in section I above, applies also to
§ 510 ERISA claims:

Because the existence of a specific intent to interfere
with an employee's benefit rights is critical in § 510
cases-yet is seldom the subject of direct proof-the
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district court allocated the burdens of production and
order of proof in a manner similar to the approach used
in Title VII and ADEA cases, where direct evidence of
discriminatory intent is also scarce or nonexistent.
... We hold that the McDonnell Douglas presumptions
and shifting burdens of production are equally
appropriate in the context of discriminatory discharge
cases brought under § 510 of ERISA.

Dister, 859 F.2d at 1111-12.

16J Section 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.c. § 1140, prohibits an
employer from terminating *458 an employee in order to
prevent the vesting of pension rights. Hughes challenged
Ritter's assertion that the layoff policy was covered by
ERISA. It argued that Ritter failed to establish that the
layoff policy qualified as an "employee welfare benefit
plan" or an "employee pension plan" covered by § 510 of
ERISA. Hughes also points out that the layoff policy in
question was revoked one year after it was instituted.
In Dister, the Second Circuit found that the termination of
an employee four months prior to vesting of his pension
rights, and the savings to his employer brought about by
that termination, were sufficient to create an inference of
discrimination. 859 F.2d at 1115. Ritter's claim, however,
is much more attenuated. He argues that his ERISA rights
were violated because he was prevented from taking
advantage of the revised layoff policy adopted about ten
weeks after he was laid off. Ritter, however, has failed to
show how the layoff policy itself constitutes a plan covered
by ERISA, or that there is any nexus between the revised
layoff policy and the vesting of his retirement rights. If
Ritter could have taken advantage of the layoff policy,
which was terminated one year later, it is not evident that
he would have obtained vesting of his retirement benefits.
We disagree with the district court's finding that it was an
undisputed fact that the revised layoff policy was covered
by ERISA, and we conclude that Ritter has failed to raise a
material issue of fact as to this element of his prima facie
ERISA claim.

not familiar with the programs and believed that Ritter
could not perform his duties on time and within budget.
Hughes kept Ritter on the payroll for over a year while he
attempted to find other permanent work. Hughes contends
that Ritter was finally laid off due to a lack of work and a
company wide reduction in workforce. Hughes offered the
declaration of Marie Jaqua, Human Resources Manager,
who stated that she made repeated efforts to find Ritter a
permanent position after his discharge from A T2 FTS and
TFTS. Hughes relied on portions of Ritter's own
deposition testimony acknowledging work shortages.
Hughes also requested judicial notice of significant layoffs
occurring at Hughes. We conclude that Hughes succeeded
in articulating sufficient nondiscriminatory reasons for
Ritter's layoff, and the burden of going forward then
shifted back to Ritter to present evidence that the reasons
advanced by Hughes were mere pretexts. Washington v.
Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1432-33 (9th Cir.1993).
Ritter contends in part that he is in fact not required to
present evidence rebutting the reasons offered by Hughes.
He argues that Hughes never successfully articulated
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for his discharge and
layoff. We reject this contention.

18J 19J Ritter also argues that the district court improperly
took judicial notice of widespread layoffs at Hughes based
on a newspaper article and that general evidence of layoffs
was not sufficient to explain Ritter's individual layoff.
Fed.R.Evid. 20 I (b) provides that judicial notice must be
"one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (I)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." An appellate court reviews the
district court's decision to take judicial notice under Rule
201 for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Chapel, 41
FJd 1338, 1342 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1135,115 S.Ct. 2017. 131 L.Ed.2d 1015 (U.S.1995).

I7J Ritter also failed to rebut the legitimate
nondiscriminatory business reasons articulated by Hughes
for Ritter's layoff. Hughes said that it laid Ritter off due to
a reduction in workforce after carrying him in temporary
positions for over a year after his discharge for cause from
the AT2FTS and TFTS programs.

We conclude that judicial notice of layoffs at Hughes was
not an abuse of discretion. *459 This is a fact which would
be generally known in Southern California and which
would be capable of sufficiently accurate and ready
determination. Apart from the court's taking notice of the
layoffs at Hughes, Ritter in his own depositions had
indicated that the general shortage of jobs at Hughes had
affected his ability to find work.

Both Kagimoto and Hall state that Ritter was laid off
because of a variety of problems in their programs caused
by Ritter's deficient performance. Ritter himself testified
that he was aware at the time that upper management was
disappointed with his performance, and that Kagimoto was

11 0 J Finally, Ritter argues that Hughes' presentation of two
reasons, namely, his prior dismissal for cause from his
position under Kagimoto and his final layoff due to
reduction in workforce, establishes sufficient proof of
pretext to avoid summary judgment. Ritter relies on our

Ritter v.

Aircraft

58 F.3d 454 (1995)

68 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 418,42 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 676

holding in Washington, that in the "ordinary case, ...
fundamentally different justifications [given by the
employer] for an employer's action would give rise to a
genuine issue of fact with respect to pretext since they
suggest the possibility that neither of the official reasons
was the true reason." 10 F.3d at 1434.

Having considered Ritter's other contentions and finding
them meritless, we hold that Ritter failed to raise any issue
of material fact as to essential elements of his prima facie
ADEA and ERISA claims, and also failed to rebut the
nondiscriminatory reasons offered by Hughes for his
discharge and layoff.

Ritter's reliance on Washington is inappropriate. The
rationales offered by Hughes are not inconsistent. The
distinct timing and justifications offered by Hughes for its
separate decisions to dismiss Ritter from his position under
Kagimoto and his layoff one year later distinguish this
case from Washington, where an employer simultaneously
offered two distinct and arguably inconsistent reasons for
an employee's discharge.

AFFIRMED.

Parallel Citations
68 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 418, 42 Fed. R. Evid. Servo
676

Footnotes
Section 623 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer(I) to fail or refuse to hire to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions. or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate. or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age.

2

Section I 140 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge. fine. suspend, expel, diseipline. or discriminate against a participant ... for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this
subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
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80F.3d1406
United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.
[2J

Herman E. SCHNIDRlG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COLUMBIA MACHINE, INC., a
Washington corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.

Former employee established prima facie case of
age discrimination when employer denied him
promotion, shifting burden to employer to
articulate nondiscriminatory motives regardless
of employee's qualifications.

No. 93-35770. I Argued and Submitted Jan.
12,1995· I Submission Vacated Jan. 23,1995.
I Resubmitted April 4, 1996. I Decided April
11,1996.
Former employee brought action against former employer
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) for
allegedly denying him promotion because of his age and
constructively discharging him. The United States District
Court for the District of Oregon, Malcolm F. Marsh, J.,
granted summary judgment for employer, and employee
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Trott, Circuit Judge, held
that: (I) employee's allegations and evidence to show
employer's discriminatory intent in hiring company
president made summary judgment for employer
inappropriate on age discrimination claim; (2) employee
failed to establish that his working conditions were so
intolerable and discriminatory that reasonable person
would have felt forced to resign, as required for claim of
wrongful constructive discharge; and (3) employer's
discovery of after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing by
employee did not warrant summary judgment in favor of
employer.
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
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Federal Civil Procedure
c,"'Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Former employee's allegations and evidence to
show employer's discriminatory intent in not
hiring him as company president made summary
judgment for employer inappropriate on former
employee's age discrimination claim; former
employee alleged that on three separate
occasions, when asked to be considered for
president, he was told that company's board of
directors wanted somebody younger, and he
produced evidence of shorthand notes taken at
board meeting and affidavit of co-worker that age
was considered by board in making decision.
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Civil Rights
,>:Constructive Discharge
Former employee failed to establish that his
working conditions were so intolerable and
discriminatory that reasonable person would
have felt forced to resign, as required for claim of
wrongful constructive discharge, though he was
replaced as head of company by much younger
man, forced into smaller office, and excluded
from discussions with other executives, where he
was not demoted, subjected to pay cut,
encouraged to resign or retire, or disciplined.
28 Cases that cite this headnote

16)

Joseph Posner, Encino, California, for amicus curiae
National Employment Lawyers Association.
Robert K. Udziela, Pozzi, Wilson, Atchison, O'Leary &
Conboy, Portland, OR, for amicus curiae Oregon Trial
Lawyers Ass'n.
Robert J. Gregory, E.E.O.C., Washington, DC, amIcus
curiae.
Douglas S. McDowell, Ann Elizabeth Reesman,
McGuiness & Williams, Washington, *1408 DC, for
amicus curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon, Malcolm F, Marsh, District Judge,
Presiding.

Civil Rights
,,~,::Constructive

John R. Potter, Heurlin & Potter, P.S., Lee A. Knottnerus,
Horenstein & Duggan, Vancouver, Washington, for
defendant-appellee.

Discharge

To establish claim for "constructive discharge,"
former employee must show there are triable
issues of fact as to whether reasonable person in
his position would have felt that he was forced to
quit because of intolerable and discriminatory
working conditions,

Before: PREGERSON and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and
FITZG ERALD, *District Judge.
Opinion
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OPINION
TROTT, Circuit Judge:

17)

Civil Rights
,~;:@Defenses in General
Civil Rights
(!'~Relief

Employer's discovery of after-acquired evidence
of wrongdoing by former employee bringing age
discrimination claim did not WaiTant summary
judgment in favor of employer, though discovery
of that evidence may bear upon specific remedy
to be ordered.

Herman Schnidrig appeals the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Columbia Machine, Inc.
("Columbia") in Schnidrig's Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEN') action alleging Columbia
improperly denied him a promotion because of his age and
constructively discharged him. We review the district
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, Jesinger v,
Nevada Fed Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127. 1130 (9th
Cir.1994), and reverse.
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Solomon, ,Portland, ", Oregon,

for

Columbia is a closely held Washington Corporation owned
by the Neth family. Fred Neth, Sr., is the majority
shareholder, chairman of the Board of Directors, and chief
executive officer of Columbia. The Board consisted of six
directors: Fred Neth, Sr.; three of his children, Fred Neth

V.
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Jr., Dorothy Osadchuk, and one other daughter; Bill Wells,
a long time employee; and Joe Barclay, president of the
Cascade Corporation.
Schnidrig, who was born in 1930, began working for
Columbia as a production manager in 1980. In 1981, he
was promoted to vice-president of manufacturing. In
February of 1991, the president of the company, Tom
Neth, resigned under pressure. Schnidrig was asked to take
over the responsibilities of Tom Neth and run the company
as general manager/vice-president of operations while the
Board searched for a new president.
Schnidrig alleges, and we accept as true for purposes of
summary judgment, that as early as June of 1991, Bill
Wells told Schnidrig that during a Board of Directors
meeting, Joe Barclay voiced the opinion that Columbia
needed a president in the 45-50 year old range and that
other directors agreed. In addition, the affidavit of Robert
Showman, the manager of cost accounting, states that in
the Fall of 1991, Bill Wells told him the Board was not
considering Schnidrig because they wanted someone in his
or her mid to late forties. Schnidrig also presented the
shorthand notes of the minutes ofa Board meeting held on
February 25, 1992. The notes indicate during discussion
regarding the preparation of materials to be sent to the
executive search firm, Joe Barclay stated "they should
send a copy of job description, maximum compensation
level, only perk, company car, age 45-50 years, and past
experience with long-term potential." Bill Wells omitted
the reference to an age requirement from the final draft of
the minutes.
On February 12, 1992, Schnidrig sent a memo to Fred
Neth, Sf. indicating he was interested in the president's
position. Schnidrig alleges that on February 19, Fred Neth,
Sf. told him Joe Barclay wanted a younger man for the job
and that his daughters were leaning that way as well.
Schnidrig also alleges that on February 27, Fred Neth, Sf.
admitted the Board discussed wanting somebody younger
as the new president.
In March of 1992, the Board hired Ronald Goerss of the
recruiting firm Smith, Goerss, & Ferneborg, to conduct a
nationwide search for a new president and to present
candidates for the position to the Board. The Board agreed
the president would be selected from the candidates
submitted by Goerss. The Board gave Goerss a list of six
minimum qualification requirements for the position. The
list included four general requirements: I) strong work
ethic; 2) warm, friendly personality; 3) effective
communication skills; *1409 and 4) team leadership. In
addition, the list contained two specific requirements:
(I) a minimum of 5 years broad general management

experience and proven track record with a medium sized
company or a division of a larger firm engaged in the
design, manufacture and sale of industrial machinery
and equipment; and
(2) strong operations (manufacturing) background with
a thorough working knowledge of accounting and
financial reporting.
Goerss indicated he relied solely on the criteria given him
by the Board and that he was never instructed to, nor did he
consider age in making his decisions.
Schnidrig alleges that on May 8, he again asked Fred Neth,
Sf. why he could not be president of Columbia and was
again told the Board was looking for somebody younger.
In June of 1992, Goerss completed his search, including
interviews of all three Columbia vice-presidents, and
submitted a list of five candidates to the Board. All five
candidates were from outside the company. The Board
interviewed two of the five candidates and, in July, entered
into negotiations with Gerald O'Meara to be the president
of Columbia.
Also in July, Schnidrig again applied for the position of
president and alleges he was again told the Board was
looking for somebody younger in the 45-50 year old range.
Thereafter, Schnidrig filed his first complaint with the
EEOC. Schnidrig claims that from this point on his work
Particularly,
Schnidrig
environment
deteriorated.
complains
Robin
Popple,
another
Columbia
vice-president, was given a raise so that he earned more
than Schnidrig; he was excluded from a lunch meeting
with the officers of First Interstate Bank; company
executives and other personnel were instructed not to talk
to Schnidrig about various matters including corporate
finances; and he was moved out of his office and given a
much smaller office.
On October 8, 1992, O'Meara accepted Columbia's offer
and agreed to begin work on November 2, 1992. Schnidrig
resigned on October 27, 1992.
Schnidrig filed suit against Columbia claiming that he was
denied the promotion to president because of his age, and
that he was constructively discharged in retaliation for
filing a complaint with the EEOC. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia on all
claims.

II

Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406 (1996)
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AGE DISCRIMINATION
The allocation of burdens and order of presentation of
proof for claims of discrimination arising under the ADEA
follow three steps:
[A] plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. If the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the burden then shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision.
Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the employer's
aIleged reason
for the
adverse
employment decision is a pretext for
another motive which is discriminatory.
Wallis v. JR. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994)
(quoting Lowe v. City ol Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1005
(9th Cir.1986)).

III "The prima facie case may be based either on a
presumption arising from the factors such as those set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802,
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or by more
direct evidence of discriminatory intent." Wallis, 26 F.3d
at 889 (citing Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009). Furthermore,
"[ w]hen a plaintiff does not rely exclusively on the
presumption but seeks to establish a prima facie case
through the submission of actual evidence, very little such
evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact
regarding an employer's motive; any indication of
discriminatory motive ... may suffice to raise a question
that can only be resolved by a factfinder." Lowe, 775 F.2d
at 1009.
In this case, Schnidrig clearly established a prima facie
case of age discrimination. Schnidrig did not attempt to
establish the factors giving rise to a presumption of
discrimination. Rather, Schnidrig offered direct evidence
of discriminatory motives in the *1410 form of statements
made by directors and notes taken during Board meetings.

121 Columbia argues that whether Schnidrig chooses to
establish a prima facie case through a presumption or
through direct evidence of discrimination, he must stiIl
show that he is qualified for the job. This argument is
premature. Schnidrig established a prima facie case that he
was treated differently on the basis of his age. Therefore,
Schnidrig's qualifications are irrelevant to the existence of
the prima facie case of discrimination. The burden shifts to
Columbia to articulate nondiscriminatory motives
regardless of Schnidrig' s qualifications.

Columbia offered three nondiscriminatory reasons why it
chose not to promote Schnidrig: I) Schnidrig was
eliminated as a candidate for the position by Goerss who
did not include Schnidrig's name in the list of qualified
candidates which he presented to the Board, therefore, it
was not the Board's decision not to promote Schnidrig; 2)
Schnidrig was not qualified for the job; and, 3) O'Meara
was more qualified for the job than was Schnidrig.

13) 141 The district court found that Columbia produced
evidence to support its claim that O'Meara met the
qualifications of the job profile and that Schnidrig did not.
This was sufficient to shift the burden back to Schnidrig to
show that Columbia'S reasons for not promoting him were
pretextual. Thus, the issue before this Court is whether
Schnidrig produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine
issue of fact as to whether Columbia's proffered reasons
were pretextual. "If a rational trier of fact could, on all the
evidence, find that the employer's action was taken for
impermissibly discriminatory reasons, summary judgment
for the defense is inappropriate." Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889.
Schnidrig presented the following aIlegations and evidence
to show discriminatory intent by Columbia: I) Allegation
that BiII Wells told Schnidrig that during a Board meeting
in June of 1991, Joe Barclay expressed wanting a president
in the 45-50 year old range; 2) Affidavit of Robert
Showman, manager of cost accounting, stating that
following a Board meeting in the faIl of 1991, Bill Wells
told Showman the Board was not seriously considering
Schnidrig for president because they wanted someone in
his or her mid to late forties; 3) Allegation that on February
19, 1992, Fred Neth, Sr. told Schnidrig some of the
directors wanted a younger man as president; 4) Shorthand
notes of the minutes of the Board meeting on February 25,
1992, indicating Joe Barclay that the requirement of being
45-50 years old be included in the job profile for president;
5) AIIegation that on February 27, 1992, Fred Neth, Sr.
admitted the Board discussed wanting somebody younger
as the new president; 6) AIlegation that on May 8, 1992,
Fred Neth, Sr. again told Schnidrig the Board wanted
somebody younger; and 7) Allegation that in July of 1992,
Fred Neth, Sr. again told Schnidrig the Board was looking
for somebody younger to be president.
This Court has set a high standard for the granting of
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.
Most recently, we explained that" '[ w]e require very little
evidence to survive summary judgment' in a
discrimination case, 'because the ultimate question is one
that can only be resolved through a "searching
inquiry"-one that is most appropriately conducted by the
factfinder, upon a full record.' " Lam v. University of
Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting
Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934
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F.2d 1104.1111 (9thCir.1991)).
"[W]hen a plaintiff has established a prima facie
inference of disparate treatment through direct or
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, he will
necessarily have raised a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to the legitimacy or bona fides of the
employer's articulated reason for its employment
decision."
When [the] evidence, direct or
circumstantial, consists of more than the McDonnell
Douglas presumption, a factual question will almost
always exist with respect to any claim of a
nondiscriminatory reason. The existence of this question
of material fact will ordinarily preclude the granting of
summary judgment.

Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at IIII (quoting Lowe, 775
F.2d at 1009). Cf *1411 Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890 ("[W]hen
evidence to refute defendant's legitimate explanation is
totally lacking, summary judgment is appropriate even
though plaintiff may have established a minimal prima
facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas type
presumption."); FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 473 n.
16 (9th Cir.1991) ("However, Lowe was subsequently
amended to indicate that the Court did not mean to 'prevent
the summary disposition of meritless suits but simply
ensure that when a material fact exists a civil rights litigant
will not be denied a trial on the merits.' ").
The district court, in granting summary judgment,
emphasized that Schnidrig was eliminated as a candidate
for president by Ronald Goerss of the executive search
firm hired by Columbia and not by the Board. The district
court found there was no evidence Goerss was ever told to
consider age and that he never considered age in selecting
candidates for the Board's consideration. The district court
concluded the comments made by Fred Neth, Sr., were
attenuated from the decision-making process, and
therefore, were merely "stray remarks" with no connection
to the employment decision.
The Ninth Circuit authority relied on by the district court is
distinguishable. In Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892
F .2d 1434 (9th Cir.1990), an executive for Farmers made
one comment that he chose one candidate over another
because he was " 'a bright, intelligent, knowledgable
young man.' " ld. at 1438. Similarly, in Nesbit v. Pepsico,
{nco 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.1993), a supervisor commented
during a meeting that" '[w]e don't necessarily like grey
hair.' " Id. at 705. The court found this "comment was
uttered in an ambivalent manner and was not tied directly
to Nesbitt's termination." Id.
Contrasting, in the instant case, Schnidrig alleges that on
three separate occasions, when he asked to be considered

for president, he was told the Board wanted somebody
younger for the job. Significantly, at least one of these
instances occurred after Goerss had submitted his list of
candidates to the Board. Furthermore, Schnidrig did more
than offer mere allegations of discriminatory intent; he
produced evidence in the form of shorthand notes taken at
the February 25, 1992, Board meeting and the affidavit of a
coworker.
Although it is possible that Columbia sufficiently insulated
the decision-making process from the discriminatory
remarks of the directors, in light of the reluctance of this
Circuit to allow summary judgment where there is direct or
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, the
district court was premature in resolving this issue on
summary judgment. Whether Columbia relied on
impermissible factors in refusing to promote Schnidrig is a
question appropriately answered by a trier of fact.

III

CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
IS) Schnidrig also contends Columbia constructively
discharged him by making working conditions so
intolerable that he felt forced to resign. Specifically,
Schnidrig submitted six factors which, taken together,
were designed to humiliate him and force him to resign: I)
He was replaced as head of the company by a man fifteen
years younger than him; 2) Columbia did not give him a
new position; 3) Another vice-president was given a pay
raise so that he was earning more than Schnidrig; 4) He
was forced to move out of his office and into a much
smaller office; 5) He was excluded from a lunch meeting
with officers from First Interstate Bank; and 6) Other
executives were told not to speak to him about financial or
other matters.

16) To establish a claim for constructive discharge,
Schnidrig "must show there are triable issues of fact as to
whether 'a reasonable person in [his] position would have
felt that [he] was forced to quit because of intolerable and
discriminatory working conditions.' " Steiner v. Showboat
Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1465 (9th Cir.1994)(quoting
Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1989)).

Whether working conditions were so
intolerable and discriminatory as to
justify a reasonable employee's decision
to resign is normally a factual question
for the jury. In general, however, a single
isolated incident *1412 is insufficient as
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a matter of law to support a finding of
constructive discharge. Thus, a plaintiff
alleging a constructive discharge must
show some aggravating factors, such as a
continuous pattern of discriminatory
treatment.

Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424, 431 (9th
Cir.1990) (internal quotations and citations omitted), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 815, 112 S.Ct. 66, 116 L.Ed.2d 41 (1991).
Schnidrig was not demoted, did not receive a cut in pay,
was not encouraged to resign or retire, and was not
disciplined. Accepting all of Schnidrig's allegations as
true, his working conditions were not so intolerable and
discriminatory that a reasonable person would feel forced
to resign. Additionally, Columbia offered legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for each of the actions
complained of by Schnidrig.

The Supreme Court recently held that the use of
after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing by an employee
that would have resulted in their termination as a bar to all
relief for an employer's earlier act of discrimination is
inconsistent with the purpose of the ADEA. McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, ----, 115
S.Ct. 879, 884, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995); see also 0 'Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 759 (9th
Cir.1996) ("[I]f an employer discharges an employee for a
discriminatory reason, later-discovered evidence that the
employee could have been discharged for a legitimate
reason does not immunize the employer from liability.").
Therefore,
although
Columbia's
discovery
of
after-acquired evidence may bear upon the specific remedy
to be ordered, it does not warrant the granting of summary
judgment.

V

The district court correctly found no evidence to suggest
either that any of these actions were motivated to force
Schnidrig to resign or that they made Schnidrig's working
conditions intolerable. Therefore, the district court's grant
of summary judgment for Columbia on the claim of
wrongful constructive discharge is affirmed.

IV
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE

(7J Columbia argues that even if this Court should find a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Schnidrig was
denied the promotion for improper reasons, summary
judgment is still appropriate because after Schn idrig
resigned,
Columbia
discovered
a
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for which Schnidrig would have
been discharged. Columbia claims it later learned
Schnidrig copied and removed confidential and personnel
documents without authorization in violation of the terms
of Columbia's employee handbook.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Columbia on Schnidrig's
claim of constructive discharge is affirmed. We reverse the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Columbia on Schnidrig's claim of age discrimination and
remand that issue to the district court for a trial on the
merits.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in
part.
Each party shall bear its own costs ofthis appeal.
Parallel Citations
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favorable to nonmoving party.
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Patricia SHARP, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
W.H. MOORE, INC., an Idaho corporation;
Anthony "Mike" Barbero, d/b/a Security
Inveshnents; and Robert Goold, d/b/a
Security Police, Defendants-Respondents.

121

Genuine issue of material fact existed, precluding
summary judgment for building owner, security
contractor, and security service, on whether
building owner, contractor, or security service's
employees owed worker who was raped in
building duty of care to be sure that all building
doors were locked.

No. 16667. I July 31,1990.
Worker who was raped while in office building brought
negligence action against building owner, security
contractor, and security service for failure to check that all
doors in building were locked which allegedly resulted in
rapist's entrance into building. The Fourth Judicial District
Court, Ada County, Robert G. Newhouse, J., granted
motion for summary judgment against worker, and she
appealed. The Supreme Court, Bistline, J., held that: (I)
genuine issues of material fact existed, precluding
summary judgment for owners, contractor, and security
service, on whether breach of duty to worker occurred as
result of alleged failure to check that all doors were locked;
(2) owners and contractor had duty of care to prevent
unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to worker; and (3) if
security service employees were negligent, employees
were susceptible to liability which in turn could be imputed
to security contractor and building owner.

Judgment
~= Tort cases in general
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Landlord and Tenant
"",In general; defective or dangerous conditions
Landlord and Tenant
.>'"Questions for jury
Landlord owes duty to tenants to exercise
reasonable care in light of all the circumstances
and it is for jury to decide whether that duty was
breached.

Reversed and remanded.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
Bakes, C.J., filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
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Landlord who voluntarily provides security
system is potentially subject to liability if
security systems fails as result of landlord's
negligence.

Appeal and Error
.~.cExtent of Review Dependent on Nature of
Decision Appealed from
Appeal and Error
\.",Judgment
In reviewing order granting summary judgment,
appellate court determines whether any genuine
issue of material fact remains and whether
moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of
law by construing facts and any reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in light most
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.y.1n general; defective or dangerous conditions
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IS)

Detectives and Security Guards
v·Authority, duty, and liability of private
detectives and security providers

Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990)
796 P.2d 506

Negligence
.=Store and business proprietors

191

Once owner of building and security contractor
initiated locked door policy and employed
security service with intent of keeping doors
locked, owner and contractor undertook duty and
were subject to liability for failure to perform that
duty with reasonable standard of care.

Negligence
~.c·Store and business proprietors
Building owner can be held liable for negligence
in keeping building area secure even if no prior
similar incident of violence has occurred in
building.
5 Cases that cite this headnote

I Cases that cite this headnote

1101
161

Negligence
~.·"Protection

Negligence
.:"" Foreseeab i Iity
Negligence
'J~Reasonable care

against acts of third persons

Even if building owners intended to provide
security to protect only building and its contents
and not persons inside, whether it was reasonably
foreseeable that intruder might commit violent
act after gaining entry to building where security
was employed was question for jury.

Every person has duty of care to prevent
unreasonable, foreseeable risk of harm to others.
12 Cases that cite this headnote

(71

Negligence
>.Foreseeability

1111

In determining whether duty of care is owed, if
degree of result or harm is great and preventing it
is not difficult, relatively low degree of
foreseeability is required but, if threatened injury
is minor and burdens preventing injury are high,
higher degree of foreseeability may be required.

Hazard to be guarded against by security
contractor and security service was possibility of
criminal activity within building so that any
occurrence of criminal activity was not an
intervening superseding force breaking the chain
of causation potentially binding security
contractor and building owner to liability for
attack and rape of worker in building after door
was left unlocked.

22 Cases that cite this headnote

181

Negligence
v~Protection

Detectives and Security Guards
.>=Authority, duty, and liability of private
detectives and security providers
Negligence
."'~Intervening and superseding causes

Against Acts of Third Persons

I Cases that cite this headnote
Proof of prior similar incidents of criminal
activity occurring in building or in vicinity was
not required to show that criminal activity was
foreseeable absent sufficient security to keep
doors in building locked.

1121

Principal and Agent
<"",Nature of the relation in general

9 Cases that cite this headnote
Agency relationship is created if one who hires
another retains contractual right to control other's
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manner of perfonnance.
I Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
**507 *298 Wilson &
Carnahan, Boise,
plaintiff-appellant. Robert R. Chastain, argued.

1131

Detectives and Security Guards
duty, and liability of private
detectives and security providers
Principal and Agent
,,"'Contractor

'd~'Authority,

Agreement between contractor and security
service created agency so that if service was
negligent for not checking door through which
rapist may have gained entry to building, security
contractor was itself liable and its liability in turn
could be imputed to building owner.

for

Howard
&
Hull,
Quane,
Smith,
Boise,
for
defendants-respondents W.H. Moore, Inc. and Anthony
Barbero. Robert C. Moody, argued.
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Field, Boise, for
defendant-respondent Robert Goold. Mark S. Prusynski,
argued.

Opinion
BISTLINE, Justice.

ON REHEARING

1141

Principal and Agent
<"Liabilities of agent

A rehearing was granted; counsel reargued; the Court has
reconsidered, and has detennined to substitute this opinion
for the Court in place of 1989 Opinion No. 134, which is in
significant respects different, and is now withdrawn.

Agent is liable for its own negligence.

1151

Principal and Agent
•"Rights and liabilities of principal
Principal is liable for torts of agent committed
within scope of agency relationship.
I Cases that cite this headnote

(161

Principal and Agent
;>",Negligence or wrongful acts of agent's
employees
Both principals and agents are liable for torts of
subagent committed within agency relationship.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

On May 12, 1985, Patricia Sharp was an employee of the
Jess Swan Insurance Agency, whose offices were located
in a building leased by Swan Insurance from W.H. Moore,
Inc. W.H. Moore had contracted with Security Investment
to act as property manager for the building. Security
Investment, in turn, contracted with Security Police to
provide the protective patrols for the building .
On the Sunday morning in question, Sharp was working
alone in her office at 1199 Shoreline Drive, Boise, Idaho.
While there, she was assaulted and raped by an unknown
assailant who may have gained access to the building
through an unlocked third floor fire escape door.
Sharp filed her complaint and demand for a jury trial on
January 24, 1986. W.H. Moore, Inc. and Security
Investments filed a motion for summary judgment on May
28, 1986. Security Police filed its motion for summary
judgment on June 26, 1986. The district court granted both
motions on the basis that, under the circumstances of this
case, the defendants owed no duty of care to Sharp.
The sole issue is whether the district judge erred in this
determination. Judge Newhouse discussed the matter in the
following terms:

Sharp v, W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990)
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**508 *299 It is a matter of law to
determine whether a duty of care is owed
in the factual circumstances pled by the
plaintiff.... In this case the plaintiff has
alleged the breach of the duty of care
occurred when the defendants Moore and
Barbero allowed a third floor fire escape
door to have a faulty lock that could be
left unlocked. The plaintiff alleges that
Robert Goold and his security company
breached a duty of care in not inspecting
the lock to make sure the door was locked
on the night of May II, 1985, and the
morning of May 12, 1985. It is
speculated by the plaintiff and the police
that the intruder gained entry into the
building by going in through the third
floor fire escape door. The rape and
assault in this cause of action occurred in
the secured area of the plaintiffs
employer's offices on the second floor.
The plaintiff has admitted in her
deposition that she left unlocked the back
door of her employer's second floor
offices when she went to the bathroom.
Sometime thereafter, the assault and rape
occurred inside the offices. To further
complicate this issue is the deposition of
Lowell E. Michael, taken on May 28,
1986, in which Mr. Michael states he was
the security guard on duty that night and
had the job of checking the doors to make
sure they were secured. Mr. Michael, in
his deposition, swore under oath that he
checked the third floor fire escape door
and it was secured at the time of his
check around midnight and 1:00 a,m.
This court is of the belief that even if the
thirdfloor door had been negligently left
unlocked and had not been inspected by
the security guard on the night of May
II, 1985, this court can not as a matter of
law determine that the security company
breached its duty of care owed to the
plaintiff The plaintiff herself could have
prevented the injury if she had not
negligently left the door unlocked to her
offices on the secondfloor. This court in
of the
reviewing
the
totality
circumstances does not believe that the
alleged breach of the duty by the
defendants is of a high enough degree of
foreseeability to warrant a finding of a
breach of duty that can be imposed

against the defendants. Therefore this
court grants the motion for summary
judgment on behalf of all the defendants
in this case.
Memorandum Decision and Order, R. Vol. I at 29-32
(emphasis added).

III Review
of an order granting summary judament
.
b
reqUires an appellate court to make two determinations: (I)
Whether there remains a genuine issue as to any material
fact; and (2) Whether the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99
Idaho 396, 582 P.2d 1074 (1978). In making those
determinations, the Court will construe the facts and any
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case, Sharp.
Anderson v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171
(1986); Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho
792,683 P.2d 440 (Ct.App.1984).
121 With this standard of review in mind, a reading of the
trial judge's opinion, particularly the portions excerpted
above, clearly demonstrates reversible error. The district
court barely touched upon the only question of law before
it, whether the defendants owed Sharp a duty of care.
Instead the district court reached and decided factual issues
that are normally reserved for the jury-defendants'
breach of a duty, if any, and the plaintiff's comparative
negligence, if any. The court's view that "[t]he plaintiff
herself could have prevented the injury if she had not
negligently left the door unlocked to her offices on the
second floor," appears to have weighed particularly
heavily in the court's decision. In addition, the court
actually reversed the burden of persuasion, stating that " ...
this court cannot as a matter of law determine that the
security company breached its duty of care owed to the
plaintiff." Sharp did not pretend that she was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. It was both
defendants who made that contention. It was therefore the
defendants' burden to show that, even construing the facts
and inferences most favorably to Sharp, the defendants
were entitled to a **509 *300 judgment as a matter oflaw.
This they did not do. The summary judgment in
defendants' favor must therefore be reversed.
However, this reversal does not end our inquiry. "[I]n
giving a decision, if a new trial be granted, the court shall
pass upon and determine all the questions of law involved
in the case presented upon such appeal, and necessary to
the final determination of the case." Idaho Code § 1-205.
This is true even if the reversal is of a summary judgment
rather than a judgment rendered after a trial. Layrite Prods.
Co. v. Lux, 86 Idaho 477,388 P.2d 105 (1964). It therefore
remains for us to determine whether, as a matter of law,
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any of the defendants owed Sharp a duty of care under the
circumstances of this case.

I. THE LANDLORD
13] The question of whether a landlord owes a duty of
reasonable care to the tenants of the property was settled by
our recent decision in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,
678 P.2d 41 (1984). There, Justice Donaldson, with three
judges agreeing, wrote:

[W]e today decide to leave the common-law rule and its
exceptions behind, and we adopt the rule that a landlord
is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all
the circumstances.
We stress that adoption of this rule is not tantamount to
making the ~andlord an insurer for all injury occurring
on the premlses, but merely constitutes our removal of
the landlord's common-law cloak of immunity .... We
hold that defendant Stearns did owe a duty to plaintiff
Stephens to exercise reasonable care in light of all the
circumstances, and that it is for a jury to decide whether
that duty was breached.
106 Idaho at 258,678 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
14]15] In addition to the clear rule of Stephens, other legal
principles favor the recognition of a requirement of due
care in the circumstances present here. One is the familiar
proposition that one who voluntarily assumes a duty also
assumes the obligation of due care in performance of that
duty. A landlord, having voluntarily provided a security
system, is potentially subject to liability if the security
system fails as a result of the landlord's negligence. Jardel
Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987) (having provided
security, owner must anticipate conduct of third persons);
Feld v. iHerriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984);
accord Rowe v. State Bank ofLombard, 125 I11.2d 203, 126
I1I.Dec. 519,531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988); Lay v. Dworman,
732 P.2d 455 (Okla.1987) (landlord's control over security
creates potential liability where tenants rely on security).
While the landlord/tenant relationship does not in and of
itself establish a duty to keep doors locked, once Moore
and Security Investments had initiated a locked door policy
and had employed a security service with the intent of
keeping the doors locked, they undertook such a duty and
are subject to liability if they failed to perform that duty
with a reasonable standard of care.

16 J Another reason for finding a duty of care to exist in this
case is the general rule that each person has a duty of care
to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to
others. Alegria v.Pqyonk, 101 Idaho 61 619 P.2d 135
Next

(1980); Harper v. Hojjinann, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536
(1974).
Every person has a general duty to use
due or ordinary care not to injure others,
to avoid injury to others by any agency
set in operation by him, and to do his
work, render services or use his property
as to avoid such injury. [Citations
omitted.] The degree of care to be
exercised must be commensurate with
the danger or hazard connected with the
activity. [Citations omitted.]

Whitt v. Jarnagin, 9 I Idaho 181, 188, 418 P.2d 278, 285
(1966). Whether the duty attaches is largely a question for
the trier offact as to the foreseeability ofthe risk.

171 Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with
the circumstances of each case. Where the degree of result
or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a
relatively low degree of foreseeability **510 *301 is
required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor
but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher
degree of foreseeability may be required. See Us. v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.1947)
(Judge Learned Hand); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial
Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653,
658 (1985). Thus, foreseeability is not to be measured by
just what is more probable than not, but also includes
,,;hatever result is likely enough in the setting of modern
hfe that a reasonably prudent person would take such into
account in guiding reasonable conduct. Bigbee v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Ca1.3d 49,192 Cal.Rptr. 857,665 P.2d
947 (1983); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47,
449 N .E.2d 331 (1983).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of foreseeability because the
plaintiff failed to come forward with any evidence that
prior similar incidents of criminal activity had occurred in
the building or in its vicinity. However, the "prior similar
incidents" rule was rejected recently by a leading case
upon which the trial court purported to rely to the contrary.
In Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hasp., 38 Cal.3d 112,
211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 (1985), the California
high court rejected a strong line of cases from California's
intermediate appellate courts that held to the position
espoused here by the defendants. The California court
ruled that while prior similar incidents are relevant
evidence of foreseeability, they are not the sine qua non on
the issue offoreseeability. Id. at 362, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 659.
See also Sharpe v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, 401 Mass. 788,
519 N.E.2d 1341 (1988); Mullins v. Pine Manor College,
389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983);.
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The solid and growing national trend has been toward the
rejection of the "prior similar incidents" rule. See, e.g.,
Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 lll.2d 203, 126
Ill.Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (simply because no
violent crimes had been committed at the office parking
area does not render criminal actions unforeseeable as a
matter oflaw); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg. Inc.,
393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975); Aaron v. Havens,
758 S. W.2d 446 (Mo.1988) (no need for past similar
crimes); Small v. McKennan Hasp. (Small fl), 437 N.W.2d
194 (S.D.1989) (failure to prove any criminal activity in
the area is not fatal to the submission of the foreseeability
issue to the jury because criminal assaults occur in all
neighborhoods); Patersonv. Deeb, 472 So.2d 1210,121819 (Fla.App.1985) ( "[ w]e are not willing to give the
landlord one free ride, as it were, and sacrifice the first
victim's right to safety upon the altar of foreseeability by
slavishly adhering to the now-discredited notion that at
least one criminal assault must have occurred on the
premises before the landlord can be held liable").

181191 Reduced to its essence, the "prior similar incidents"
requirement translates into the familiar but fallacious
saying in negligence law that every dog gets one free bite
before its owner can be held to be negligent for failing to
control the dog. That license which is refused to a dog's
owner should be withheld from a building's owner and the
owner's agents as well. There is no "one free rape" rule in
Idaho.
The "prior similar incidents" requirement is not only too
demanding, it violates the cardinal negligence law
principle that only the general risk of harm need be
foreseen, not the specific mechanism of injury. Taco Bell v.
Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo.1987); Galloway v. Bankers
Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988); Duncavage v.
Allen, 147 Ill.App.3d 88, 100 IlI.Dec. 455, 497 N.E.2d 433
(1986); Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 43 at 299
(5th ed. 1984). See also Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel,
Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 742 P.2d 377 (1987); Small v.
McKennan Hasp. (Small I), 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D.1987).
Such a requirement would remove far too many issues
from the jury's consideration. Foreseeability is ordinarily a
question of fact. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38
Cal.3d I 12, 126,211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 362, 695 P.2d 653, 659
( 1985).

1101 Defendants argue that security was provided to protect
only the building and its contents, not the persons within.
**511 *302 Otherwise put, property is entitled to
protection, but not so with persons. In reality the question
is whether it is foreseeable that an intruder might commit a
violent act after gaining entry to the building where
security was employed to protect against "prowlers,
vandals or unauthorized intruders." Service Agreement

between Security Police and Security Investments, R. Vol.
1 at 26. The risk to be prevented was that of criminal
activity. Unfortunately criminals do not tidily confine their
crimes to property only. Even a shoplifting may turn
violent. Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 525
(De1.l987); Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d
437, 439 (Iowa 1988). Accord Aaron v. Havens, 758
S.W.2d 446, 448 (Mo.1988) ("[i]fa burglar may enter so
may a rapist"); Small v. McKennan Hospital (Small II),
437 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 1989). The question is one of
foreseeability. It is therefore an issue for the jury or other
trier of fact to decide. K.S.R. v. Novak & Sons, Inc., 225
Neb. 498, 406 N.W.2d 636 (1987); Isaacs, 211 Cal.Rptr. at
362,695 P.2d at 659.

111 J Defendants also argue that the occurrence of criminal
activity is an intervening, superseding force that breaks the
chain of causation potentially binding defendants to
liability. While this is a superficially pleasing statement of
a general rule, it has no applicability under the
circumstances of this case. Here the precise hazard to be
guarded against was criminal activity.
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a
particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal
does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm
caused thereby.
b. The happening of the very event the likelihood of
which makes the actor's conduct negligent and so
subjects the actor to liability cannot relieve him from
liability. The duty to refrain from the act committed or to
do the act omitted is imposed to protect the other from
this very danger. To deny recovery because the other's
exposure to the very risk from which it was the purpose
ofthe duty to protect him resulted in harm to him, would
be to deprive the other of all protection and to make the
duty a nUllity.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449 and comment b
(1965). Accord Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments,
Inc., 382 So.2d 98, 101 (Fla.App. I 980) (rejecting the
"superseding" argument as entirely fallacious). See also
Massie v. Godfather'S Pizza, Inc., 844 F.2d 1414 (lOth
Cir.1988); Meyers v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 833
F.2d 1521 (11th Cir.1987); Duncavage v. Allen, 147
lll.App.3d 88, 100 Ill. Dec. 455, 459-60, 497 N.E.2d 433,
437-38 (1986).
Thus, in addition to the rule of Stephens v. Stearns, 106
Idaho at 249,678 P.2d at 41, imposing a duty of reasonable
care, under the circumstances, running from landlords or
owners to their tenants as a matter oflaw, there are ample
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additional reasons for imposing such a duty on the landlord
in this case. It remains for ajury to detennine whether there
was any breach of that duty. Therefore the summary
judgment as to Moore is reversed and remanded.

II. THE LANDLORD'S AGENTS
Remaining for our consideration are the summary
judgment rulings in favor of defendants Security
Investments and Security Police. Two contracts in the
record demonstrate the establishment of a principal/agency
relationship between Moore and Security Investments and
a subagency relationship between Security Investments
and Security Police.

1121 Security Investments was hired by Moore to manage
the building housing Sharp's employer. The contract
between them provided in relevant part:
Contractor [Security Investments] shall
[make] appropriate arrangements for and
[supervise] the delivery of utility,
security, ... and other services incidental
to the operation of the Project, all in a
manner consistent with the efficient
operation of a first class office
development and in accordance with
such spec(jic **5] 2 *303 guidelines as

may from time to time be given by
Owner.
R. Vol. 2, at 12 (emphasis added). It is axiomatic that an
agency relationship is created where one who hires another
has retained a contractual right to control the other's
manner of performance. Bryant v. Sherm's Thunderbird
Markel, 268 Or. 591, 522 P.2d 1383 (1974); Smith v.
Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950).

1131 The contract between the building manager and
Security Police provided the following explicit
agency-creating language:
Security Police is hereby given authority
and made agent to act in behalf of and to
do all acts that Subscriber could do to
protect the above premises from
PROWLERS,
V ANDALS,
OR
UNAUTHORIZED INTRUDERS.
R. Vol. I at 26.

1141 (151 1161 As a result of the agency relationships
established, if Security Police was negligent for not

checking the door through which the rapist may have
gained entry, Security Police itself is susceptible to
liability, which in turn may be imputed to Security
Investments and to Moore. An agent is liable for its own
negligence. McAlvain v. General Ins. Corp. ofAmerica, 97
Idaho 777,781,554 P.2d 955, 959 (1976); Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 343 (1958). A principal is liable for
the torts of an agent committed within the scope of the
agency relationship. Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497,
708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985); Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 25 I (1958). Both principals and agents are liable
for the torts of a subagent committed within the agency
relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 255, 362
(1958). Thus the negligence, if any, of the subagent,
Security Police, renders it potentially liable to Sharp, and
its liability may be imputed to the agent, Security
Investments, and to the principal, Moore.
All three summary judgments are reversed and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings. Costs to appellant; no
attorney fees on appeal.

JOHNSON and BOYLE, JJ., and WALTERS, J. Pro Tem.,
concur.
BAKES, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:

I concur in the reversal of summary judgment for W.H.
Moore, Inc. However, I dissent from the reversal of
summary judgment for the defendants Security
Investments and Security Police. Under I.R.C.P. 56(c)
summary judgment should be affirmed when "the
pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
ajudgment as a matter oflaw." The plaintiff has not shown
any breach of duty owed to the plaintiff by either Security
Investments or Security Police and, accordingly, the
summary judgment in favor of these two defendants should
be affirmed.
Since the analysis ofthe right to summary judgment differs
among the various defendants, a separate analysis of the
claims against each of the defendants is necessary.

I. CLAIM AGAINST W.H. MOORE, INC.
As owner and landlord of Forest River Plaza # I building
(the plaza), W.H. Moore, Inc. (Moore), owed certain duties
to its tenants including the Jess Swan Insurance Agency
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(Swan) and to its tenants' employees, including plaintiff
Sharp. Ownerllandlord Moore owed a duty to tenant Swan
"to exercise reasonable care in light of all the
circumstances." Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258,
678 P.2d 41, 50 (1984). Under our decision in Keller v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 595, 691 P.2d 1208,
1210 (1984), an owner/landlord must also "exercise
reasonable care in light of all the circumstances" to a
tenants' employees (I) "for protection [from a dangerous
condition] even though the dangerous condition is known
and obvious to the employee," and under Marcher v.
Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 871, 749 P.2d 486,490 (I 988), (2)
"to provide safe conditions for employment upon the
premises."

**513 *304 Reviewing the entire record most favorably to
the party opposing the summary judgment motion, the
record reflects that there was a genuine issue of material
fact regarding (I) whether the defendant Moore breached a
duty to Sharp; (2) whether that breach was the actual cause
of Sharp'S injury; and (3) was that breach the proximate
cause of Sharp's injury. Accordingly, I agree that the
summary judgment for Moore should be reversed.

II. CLAIMS AGAINST SECURITY INVESTMENTS
AND SECURITY POLICE
Sharp also alleges that the defendants Security Investments
and Security Police breached duties owed to her.
Depending on the relationship of the parties, there can be
duties owed in tort and/or in contract. See Just's v.
Arrington Construction Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583
P .2d 997, 1003 (1978) ("[N]egligent conduct and breach of
contract are two distinct theories of recovery.").
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion today fails to
distinguish between those "two distinct theories of
recovery." The Court's opinion recognizes the contractual
relationship between Moore and Security Investments (the
property manager) and between Security Investments and
Security Police (who provided the periodic daily
inspections). However, the Court makes no analysis of
how Security Investments and Security Police breached
any tort duties owed to Sharp or, for that matter,
contractual duties to the plaintiff Sharp. While indeed
Security Investments may have breached its contractual
duties to Moore, and Security Police may have breached its
contractual duties to Security Investments, neither Security
Investments nor Security Police breached either a
contractual or a tort duty to the plaintiff Sharp, and
accordingly summary judgment was appropriate in favor
of those two defendants.

A. Tort Duties
"A tort requires the wrongful invasion of an interest
protected by the law .... " Just's v. Arrington Construction
Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462,468,583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978).
The elements of common law negligence
have been summarized as (I) a duty,
recognized by law, requiring a defendant
to conform to a certain standard of
conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a
causal
connection
between
the
defendant's conduct and the resulting
injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage.

Alegriav. Payonk, 101 Idah0617,619P.2d 135(1980).
The law recognizes that ownerllandlords owe duties to
their tenants and their tenants' employees to exercise
reasonable care (1) "in light of all the circumstances,"
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258, 678 P.2d 4 I, 50
(1984), (2) "for protection [from a dangerous condition]
even though the dangerous condition is known and obvious
to the employee," Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho
593,595,691 P.2d 1208, 1210 (1984), and (3) "to provide
safe conditions for employment upon the premises."
Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 871, 749 P.2d 486, 490
(1988). These duties of the owner/landlord are based on the
landlord/tenant relationship with the tenant and the
tenant's employees. Because an ownerllandlord exercises
control of his building, he also bears responsibility for
foreseeable injuries to the tenants and their employees
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care. Id.
However, Security Investments and Security Police were
not the owner/landlord, nor did they have any recognized
legal relationship with the tenants of the owner/landlord or
the tenants' employees such as plaintiff Sharp. They do not
become the owner/landlord merely by contracting to
perform services, even security services, for the landlord.
While their contracts may have imposed some contractual
duties upon them, there can be no recovery in tort by Sharp
from Security Investments or Security Police because they
owed no duty to Sharp. Strangely, the majority opinion
does not make a tort analysis with regard to Security
Investments and Security Police. The majority opinion
does not point out any duty owed by Security Investments
or Security Police to Sharp the breach of which could result
in a negligence claim by Sharp against them. The Court's
opinion merely **514 *305 states that, "If Security Police
was negligent for not checking the door through which the
rapist may have gained entry, Security Police itself is
susceptible to liability, which in turn may be imputed to
Security Investments and to Moore. An agent is liable for
its own negligence." Ante at 303, 796 P.2d at 512.
However, the Court does not go on and determine whether
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or not Security Police breached any duty to Sharp, which
could be the basis for its negligence. Rather, the Court
concludes that, "Thus the negligence, if any, of the
sub-agent, Security Police, renders it potentially liable to
Sharp, and its liability may be imputed to the agent,
Security Investments, and to the principal, Moore." Ante at
303,796 P.2d at 512 (emphasis added). All the Court has
said is that if there was any negligence on the part of
Security Police, it could be imputed to Security
Investments and Moore. The Court may be correct in
concluding that if there was negligence on the part of
Security Police it would be imputed to Security
Investments and to Moore. That would depend on whether
Security Police was an agent rather than an independent
contractor. However, the Court has not made any analysis
establishing that there was a triable issue of fact
concerning whether Security Police had breached a duty
toward Sharp which could result in a claim of negligence
by Sharp against Security Police. The Court has merely
said that ifthere was any negligence on the part of Security
Police it would be imputed to the others. The Court has not
demonstrated how this record establishes any negligence
on the part of either Security Investments or Security
Police, i.e., breach of a duty owed by either to Sharp. To
the contrary, the record demonstrates that no such tort duty
was owed, and accordingly the summary judgment granted
in favor of those two defendants should be affirmed.

B. Contract Duties
Because Sharp was not in privity of contract with either
Security Investments or Security Police, the only possible
contractual duty owed to her by these two defendants
would be under a third party beneficiary theory. Here,
Sharp alleges, and the majority opinion by reversing
apparently assumes, that the contracts between (I) Moore
and Security Investments, and (2) Security Investments
and Security Police were intended to benefit her as an
employee of Moore's tenant, Swan. However, a review of
our prior cases clearly demonstrates that plaintiff Sharp
was not a third party beneficiary of those contracts
between (I) Moore and Security Investments, and (2)
Security Investments and Security Police.
We have previously set forth requirements for recovery
under third party beneficiary theory:
[8]efore recovery can be had by a third party
beneficiary, it must be shown that the contract was made
for his direct benefit, or as sometimes stated primarily
for his benefit, and that it is not sufficient that he be a
mere incidental beneficiary.

... [T]he contract itself must express an intent to benefit the
third party. 'This intent must be gleaned from the contract
itself unless that document is ambiguous, whereupon the
circumstances surrounding its formation may be
considered.' [Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92
Idaho 526, 532, 446 P.2d 895, 90 I (1968) ].
Adkison COlP. v. American Building Co., 107 Idaho 406,
409, 690 P .2d 341, 344 (1984). A third party may only
enforce a contract "if he can show he is a member of a
limited class for whose benefit it was made." Stewart v.
Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho at 532, 446 P.2d at
90 I; Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho
462,464,583 P.2d 997,999 (1978).
Here, in order for Sharp to recover from Security
Investments under a third party beneficiary theory, the
contract between Security Investments and Moore must
express an intent to benefit her as a third party. However,
the contract does not express such an intent. In its
"Management Agreement" with Moore, Security
Investments agreed to manage the plaza and to "provide
for the smooth and efficient physical operation of the
[plaza] by making **515 *306 appropriate arrangements
for and supervising the delivery of utilities, security,
emergency response, inspection and other services
incidental to the operation of the [plaza ] .... " In the
contract, Security Investments undertook no duty with
reference to the safety of the tenants' employees. It only
agreed "to promote a harmonious relationship with
Tenants on behalf of Owner, and in furtherance thereof
shall visit all tenants at their premises on a regular basis to
express the owner's appreciation of their tenancy and to
solicit their suggestions and comments and shall provide
prompt and courteous response to tenant inquiries and
problems." Such a provision is insufficient to demonstrate
that the parties intended that employees of a tenant would
be able to exercise rights under the contract. At most the
tenants' employees were only incidental beneficiaries of
Security Investments' contractual duty to manage the
plaza. Under our prior cases such an incidental beneficiary
may not maintain a third party beneficiary action. Just's,
Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462,583 P.2d
997 (1978); Stevvart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92
Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 (1968).
It follows that if Security Investments' contract with W.H.
Moore did not undertake an express contractual duty to
intentionally benefit Sharp, then it could not further pass
on such a duty in its contract with Security Police. Even if
it could, Security Investments in fact did not contract
expressly with Security Police to provide safe conditions
for employees working in the plaza. Rather, in its "Service
Agreement" with Security Investments, Security Police

Sharp v. W.H. Moore, inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990)
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merely agreed to (I) "furnish night patrol services to [the
plaza] intermittently during the hours of 8:00 o'clock PM
and 7:00 o'clock AM seven nights per week ... doors to be
locked at 7-8:00 o'clock PM and unlocked at 7:00 o'clock
AM on weekdays only"; (2) "check the above named
premises for Forcible Entry, Unauthorized Persons,
Unlocked Doors, Broken Windows, Fire ... "; (3) "[c]heck
three front doors and fire escape on third floor, East end at
opening, regular rounds and closing"; and (4) "protect the
above premises from Prowlers, Vandals or Unauthorized
Intruders." The contract makes no mention of providing
personal security for either tenants or tenants' employees.
Again, while tenants' employees may have derived some
incidental benefits from the Security Investments-Security
Police contract, the contract itself was not expressly
intended to benefit them, and there is no indication that the
contracting parties intended that third parties, such as
Sharp, would be entitled to exercise rights under the
contract as third party beneficiaries. The only arguable
third party beneficiary from the Security InvestmentsSecurity Police contract was Moore, the plaza's owner.

provision would not have been a tort, but would merely
have provided Sharp with contract damages. Taylor v.
Herbold. 94 Idaho 133, 138,483 P.2d 664, 669 (1971) (
"Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a tort."). Sharp's
claim against Security Investments and Security Police
alleged a tort, not a breach of contract. Therefore, even if
those two contracts had clearly provided that the tenants
and their employees were intended to be direct third party
beneficiaries, not merely incidental beneficiaries, Stewart
v. Arrington Construction Co .. 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895
(1968), the mere breach of the contract would not
constitute a tort. "To found an action in tort, there must be a
breach of duty apart from the non-performance of a
contract." Taylor v. Herbolcl, 94 Idaho at 138,483 P.2d at
669.

Even if the contracts of the defendants Security
Investments and Security Police had been worded so as to
express an intention that tenants or their employees were to
be third party beneficiaries who could exercise rights under
those contracts, violation of such a third party beneficiary
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Accordingly, because Security Investments and Security
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summary judgment entered in favor of Security
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original recorded restrictive covenants did not violate
terms of sale agreement;
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Covenants
-(,,,Nature and Operation in General

Judicial rewriting of restrictive covenants is
prohibited.

Opinion

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This case involves a real estate purchase and sale
agreement between Scott and Mary Shawver ("Shawvers")
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and Huckleberry Estates, L.L.c. ("Huckleberry"). The
Shawvers allege Huckleberry breached the sale agreement
by making an invalid amendment to the restrictive
covenants applicable to the property, which rendered the
Shawvers' proposed house designs nonconforming. Both
parties moved for summary judgment and the district court
found Huckleberry in breach. Following a court trial on
issues relating to the interpretation of the original
covenants and appropriate damages, the district court
awarded specific performance of the sale agreement in
favor of the Shawvers, subject only to the original
covenants. Both parties appealed.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 9, 1999, Huckleberry and the Shawvers
executed an agreement to reserve for the Shawvers the
purchase of Lot II, Block 2, of the Huckleberry Estates
subdivision ("the Subdivision"). The sale was to close
within 30 days of the recording of the final plat of Phase I
of the Subdivision. Huckleberry's agent provided the
Shawvers with a copy of the preliminary plat and
restrictive covenants as then drafted ("Draft CC & Rs").
By signing the reservation agreement, the Shawvers
acknowledged that they had received a copy of the
restrictive covenants that applied to the lot, had
familiarized themselves with the covenants and agreed to
abide by them. The Draft CC & Rs provided in relevant
part:
c. MINIMUM BUILDING SIZE: All residential
buildings erected upon said property shall have a
finished floor area of not less then 2,200 square feet of
ground area, exclusive of garages, carports,
breezeways, storage rooms, porches or similar
structures; or 2,600 square feet of finished area in the
case of a two story house. All dwellings **689 *358
must have at least a three-car garage, attached or
detached. Lot 3 Block 4 shall be excepted from this
condition and shall have a minimum residential
finished floor area of 1,600 square feet on the ground
floor level and a two-car garage.

******
r. DESIGN REVIEW: Grantor or other persons
designated by Grantor shall review all structures and
site plans prior to commencement of construction.

After signing the reservation agreement, the Shawvers
designed a house for the Huckleberry property which met
the square-footage requirements of the Draft CC & Rs. The
plan was for a two-story structure with 1370 square feet on
the first floor and 1770 square feet on the second floor. The
Shawvers engaged a contractor to build the house.
On July 21, 2000, Huckleberry recorded the final plat and
original CC & Rs for the Subdivision. The original
recorded CC & Rs contained an amendment provision,
which allowed amendment of any provision of the CC &
Rs upon written approval of "at least seventy-five percent
of the lot owners." The Shawvers received a copy of the
original recorded CC & Rs on August I, 2000. Aside from
the addition of the amendment provision, the recorded CC
& Rs did not differ from the Draft CC & Rs in any respect
relevant to this case.
On July 28,2000, a real estate purchase and sale agreement
("Sale Agreement") was initialed by HuckleberryJ and
delivered to the Shawvers by Huckleberry's real estate
agent. The Shawvers signed the Sale Agreement and
delivered it to Huckleberry's real estate agent on August
17, 2000. Pursuant to the agreement, the Shawvers were
responsible for obtaining and reviewing a copy of the
applicable CC & Rs. The Shawvers checked the
corresponding "yes" box adjacent to this provision,
indicating that they had in fact reviewed the applicable CC
& Rs.
The Shawvers submitted site, floor and elevation plans for
their home to Huckleberry on August 8, 2000. On August
11, 2000, Huckleberry returned those plans to the
Shawvers and told the Shawvers that the plans had not
been approved. Huckleberry subsequently recorded
amendments to the original recorded CC & Rs ("First
Amended CC & Rs") on August 28, 2000, which included
an increase in the minimum square footage requirement for
all homes built in the Subdivision. A copy of the First
Amended CC & Rs was provided to the Shawvers on
August 30, 2000. As amended, the CC & Rs prevented the
Shawvers from constructing their home according to the
plans they had previously designed and submitted to
Huckleberry. The relevant amendments were as follows:
Article I, Paragraph c. is hereby amended to read as
follows:
c. MINIMUM RESIDENTIAL BUILDING FLOOR
AREA: Floor area shall be exclusive of eaves, steps,
porches, entrances patios and garages. The floor area
of a one-story house shall have not less than two
thousand two hundred (2,200) square feet on the
ground floor. Two story houses shall have not less
than a total of two thousand six hundred (2,600)
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square feet and shall have the following minimums on
each floor: one thousand six hundred (1,600) square
feet on the ground floor and not less than 800 hundred
(800) square feet on the second floor. All dwellings
must have at least a three-car garage, attached or
detached, which must be identical in architecture to
the residential dwelling if detached. Lot 3 Block 4
shall be excepted from this condition and may have a
total minimum floor area of one thousand (1,600)
square feet and a two-car garage. The Architectural
Committee shall have the discretion to reduce the
minimum floor areas if the proposed design warrants
such an adjustment. Provided, however, that the
minimum ground floor area of any dwelling shall
**690 *359 not be reduced below one thousand five
hundred (1,500) square feet.

subdivision and then such amendment may be only
made by approval of seventy-five percent of the
then lot owners.
On August 31, 2000, the Shawvers tendered to the closing
agent, First American Title, the balance of the purchase
price, but only if First American could assure them they
were purchasing under the original recorded CC & Rs and
not the First Amended CC & Rs. When First American
refused to close under these conditions the Shawvers filed
suit against Huckleberry.

II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
******
Article I, Paragraph w. is hereby amended to read as
follows:
w. DESIGN REVIEW: Grantor or other persons
designated by Grantor, shall act as the
Architectural Committee. The Architectural
Committee shall consider and act upon any and all
proposals or plans and specifications submitted for
its approval pursuant to this Declaration, including
the inspection of construction in conformance with
plans approved by the Architectural Committee.
The Architectural Committed shall have the power
to determine, by rule or other written designation
consistent with this Declaration, which types of
improvements shall be submitted for Architectural
Committee review and approval. The Architectural
Committee shall approve proposals or plans and
specifications submitted for its approval only if it
deems that the construction, alternation, or
additions contemplated thereby in the locations
indicated are in conformity with this Declaration,
and that the appearance of any structure affected
thereby will be in harmony with the surrounding
structures on other properties within the
Subdivision.
Article I, Paragraph z. is hereby amended to read as
follows:
z. AMENDMENTS: The Grantor reserves the right
to amend this Declaration until all lots are sold in
the subdivision. No amendments shall be made to
this Declaration by any of the owners until ten (10)
years after the date of the sale of the last lot in the

On September I, 2000, the Shawvers filed a complaint
against Huckleberry seeking specific performance of the
Sale Agreement. The Shawvers amended their complaint
on March 7, 200 I, to add damages as an alternative basis
for relief and to seek a declaration that the August 28,2000
amendments to the CC & Rs were void. Huckleberry
answered the Shawvers' amended complaint and
counterclaimed.
On June I, 2002, the parties submitted cross motions for
summary judgment. The Shawvers claimed that the First
Amended CC & Rs were invalid because Huckleberry
alone did not constitute seventy-five percent of the lot
owners, the percentage required for the adoption of a valid
amendment under the original recorded CC & Rs. They
also asserted that Huckleberry's invalid amendment to the
original CC & Rs constituted a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and that Huckleberry was
prevented from amending the original CC & Rs by the
doctrine of quasi estoppel. Huckleberry claimed that
summary judgment was inappropriate because a contested
issue of material fact existed regarding representations
made to the Shawvers by Huckleberry's agent concerning
the applicability of the Draft CC & Rs. Alternatively,
Huckleberry claimed that it was entitled to summary
judgment because the Shawvers were seeking to reform the
parties' agreements, which could not be accomplished
through application of specific performance or the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
On July 23, 200 I, Huckleberry recorded a second
amendment to the original recorded CC & Rs ("Second
Amended CC & Rs"). The Second Amended CC & Rs
included essentially the same provisions as the First
Amended CC & Rs with the exception of the provision for
amendments which was **691 *360 changed to remove
the grantor's reservation. Unlike the First Amended CC &
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Rs, the Second Amended CC & Rs were approved by over
seventy-five percent of the existing lot owners in
compliance with the amendment provision contained in the
original recorded CC & Rs. Neither party has challenged
the validity of the Second Amended CC & Rs.

attempting to amend the CC & Rs and that the Shawvers
were entitled to specific performance of the Sale
Agreement under the original recorded CC & Rs.

A. Standard of Review
On October 3, 2001, the district court issued its
memorandum decision, finding that any contested issue
regarding the applicability of the Draft CC & Rs was
immaterial because there was no significant difference
between the Draft CC & Rs and the original recorded CC
& Rs. The district court also found Huckleberry in breach
of the Sale Agreement.
The case proceeded to trial on issues relating to the
interpretation of the design review provision of the original
recorded CC & Rs, the appropriate remedy for the breach
and Huckleberry's counterclaim concerning a lis pendens
filed by the Shawvers in connection with the lawsuit. The
district court found that the only reasonable interpretation
of the design review provision was that it allowed the
grantor to enforce conformity with the specific provisions
of the original recorded CC & Rs and that the Shawver's
proposed house designs were compliant. The district court
concluded that the Shawvers are entitled to specific
performance of the Sale Agreement, subject only to the
original recorded CC & Rs. The district court determined
that, "[t]he subsequent amendments have no application to
[the Sale Agreement]." Huckleberry's counterclaim was
denied. Subsequently, the district court entered its
judgment and an order staying the judgment. The
Shawvers were awarded attorney fees and costs.
Both parties appealed. Huckleberry claims that the district
court erred in awarding specific performance of the Sale
Agreement subject only to the original recorded CC & Rs.
Huckleberry also challenges the award of attorney fees and
costs in favor of the Shawvers. The Shawvers contend that
the district court erred by not offsetting the award of
attorney fees and costs against the amount they owe
Huckleberry in order to close on the purchase of the lot.
Both parties seek attorney fees on appeal.

11) [2) On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary
judgment, this Court employs the same standard as used by
the district judge originally ruling on the motion. Wens man
v. Farmers Ins. Co. o[ldaho, 134 Idaho 148, 151,997 P.2d
609, 612 (2000) (citing McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,
152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997)). Summary judgment is
proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."
I.R.C.P. 56(c). The fact that both parties move for
summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Kromrei v. AID
Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549,551,716 P.2d 1321 (1986) (citing
Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 507, 600 P.2d
1387, 1389 (1979)). The fact that the parties have filed
cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the
applicable standard of review, and this Court must evaluate
each party's motion on its own merits. Stafford v.
Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119
(2000) (citing Bear Island Water Ass 'n, Inc., v. Brown, 125
Idaho 717,721,874 P.2d 528,532 (1994)).

131 [4) Neither party in this case made a demand for ajury
trial. When an action will be tried before the court without
a jury, the **692 *361 trial court as the trier of fact is
entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based
upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant
the summary judgment despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences. Id. (citing Brown v. Perkins, 129
Idaho 189, 191, 923 P.2d 434, 436 (1996); Loomis v.
Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991)).
The test for reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial
court is whether the record reasonably supports the
inferences.ld. (citing Walker v. Hollinger, 132 Idaho 172,
176, 968 P.2d 661, 665 (1998); Riverside Dev. Co. v.
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,518-19,650 P.2d 657, 660-61
(1982)).

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THA T HUCKLEBERRY BREACHED THE
AGREEMENT BY AMENDING THE CC & RS AND
ERRED IN GRANTING THE SHA WYERS
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Huckleberry argues that the district court erred in ruling, as
a matter of
that it breached the Sale Agreement

B. The district court erred by finding Huckleberry in

breach of the Sale Agreement.
IS) The district court concluded that Huckleberry breached
the Sale Agreement when it made an invalid amendment to
the original recorded CC & Rs. Huckleberry claims that
this decision constituted error because the First Amended
CC & Rs, though invalid, did not violate the terms of the
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Sale Agreement.
161 [7J [81 [91 [101 [111 1121 When the language of a
contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and
legal effect are questions of law. State v. Barnett, 133
Idaho 231, 234, 985 P.2d 111, 114 (1999). An
unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning. Id.
The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the
intent of the contracting parties at the time the contract was
entered. Opportunity, L.L.c. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602,
607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002) (citing Rutter v.
McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 P.2d 135 (1980». In
determining the intent of the parties, this Court must view
the contract as a whole. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway
Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 735,9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000). If a
contract is found ambiguous, its interpretation is a question
offact. Id. (citing Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v.
Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 823, 41 P.3d 242, 251 (2002».
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question oflaw. Boe!
v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 13,43 P.3d 768,
772 (2002) (citing Terteling v. Payne, 131 Idaho 389,39192,957 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1998». Whether the facts
establish a violation of the contract is a question of law
reviewed de novo. Barnett, 133 Idaho at 234, 985 P.2d at
114 (citing United States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799,803
(9th Cir.I99 I ».

The original recorded CC & Rs, which were incorporated
by reference into the Sale Agreement, provided in relevant
part:
GENERAL COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS:
That all lots of said Huckleberry Estates Subdivision
shall be subject to the following covenants, conditions,
and restrictions, that by acceptance of any such
conveyance, the grantee or grantees and their heirs,
executors, administrators, successors, and assigns agree
to the conditions described as follows:

******
z. AMENDMENTS: Any amendment to these
covenants, conditions, and restrictions shall be
approved in writing by at least seventy-five percent of
the lot owners.
The Shawvers received a copy of the original recorded CC
& Rs on August 1, 2000. On August 17, 2000, Scott and
Mary Shawver both signed the Sale Agreement with
Huckleberry. Paragraph five of the Sale Agreement
provided that "buyer hereby acknowledges copies of the
recorded plat & CCR's." Paragraph sixteen provided that
the Shawvers were responsible to obtain and review the

applicable CC & Rs. Pursuant to paragraph sixteen, the
Shawvers checked the corresponding "yes" box adjacent to
this provision, indicating that they had in fact reviewed the
applicable CC & Rs.
[13) /14) "A breach of contract occurs when there is a
failure to perform a contractual duty." Daniels v.
Anderson, 113 Idaho 838, 840, 748 P.2d 829, 831
(Ct.App.1987) (citation omitted). The Shawvers contend
that Huckleberry breached the Sale Agreement by
recording the First Amended CC & Rs because
Huckleberry had a contractual duty to convey the property
to the Shawvers subject only to the original recorded CC &
Rs. This argument is inconsistent with the language of the
Sale Agreement. Under the express terms of the Sale
Agreement, the **693 *362 Shawvers agreed to purchase
property governed by restrictive covenants, which could be
amended by written consent of seventy-five percent of the
existing lot owners. Such agreements are valid under the
law. See 20 AMJUR.2D Covenants § 236 (1995) ("[T]he
restrictive agreements in a tract of land may provide for a
method of abrogating or modifying such agreements, as,
for example, by vote of a certain proportion of the property
owners."). The Shawvers had no right under the Sale
Agreement to override the amendment provision or to
avoid compliance in the event amendments were properly
adopted. "Courts do not possess the roving power to
rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable."
Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho
680, 684, 760 P.2d 19, 23 (1988) (citation omitted). The
Shawvers' position that the Sale Agreement was subject
only to the original recorded CC & Rs is contrary to the
agreement they made.

r15) 11611171 The Shawvers also claim that Huckleberry's
conduct constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties'
contract. Idaho P(TWer Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134
Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000). No covenant
will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the
contract negotiated and executed by the parties. See First
Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Gaige. 115 Idaho 172, 176, 765 P.2d
683,687 (1988); Clement v. Farmers Ins. Etch., 115 Idaho
298, 300, 766 P.2d 768, 770 (1988) (an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing cannot override an express
provision in a contract). The covenant requires that the
parties perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by
their agreement, and a violation of the covenant occurs
only when either party violates, nullifies or significantly
impairs any benefit of the contract. See Idaho First Nat.
Bank v. Bliss Valley Food.~, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824
P.2d 841,863 (1991).
Under the express provisions of the Sale Agreement,
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amendments to the existing CC & Rs could be adopted
upon written consent of at least seventy-five percent of the
existing lot owners. To imply that Huckleberry was
obligated to perform the Sale Agreement subject only to
the original recorded CC & Rs would be contrary to the
terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the
parties.
Huckleberry's first recorded amendments to the CC & Rs
were unenforceable against the Shawvers because they
were not adopted in compliance with the applicable
amendment provision. This action did not breach the
implied covenant of good faith. As applied to the Sale
Agreement, the First Amended CC & Rs were simply void,
and therefore the Shawvers were not deprived of any
benefit under their contract with Huckleberry.
The district court's determination that Huckleberry was in
breach of the Sale Agreement was in error.

The Shawvers also claim that they are entitled to recoup
damages associated with complying with the Second
Amended CC & Rs in the event this Court holds that they
are applicable in this case. According to the Shawvers,
their damages amount to $16,000, the cost of increasing
the size of their home to make it meet the requirements of
the Second Amended CC & Rs. The Shawvers request that
the district court be directed to consider and enter
judgment for that additional cost should the Shawvers be
required to comply with the Second Amended CC & Rs.

A. Standard of Review
118) 119) 1201 121) 122) This Court exercises free review
over the district court's conclusions of law. Trimble v.
Engelking, 134 Idaho 195,196,998 P.2d 502, 503 (2000).
The standard of review of a non-jury district court's
findings offact is set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a). Williamson v. City oj lvfeCal!, 135 Idaho 452, 19
P.3d 766, 769 (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a)). I.R.C.P. 52(a)
provides in pertinent part:

IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THA T THE SECOND AMENDED CC & RS DID
NOT APPLY TO THE LOT THE SHA WVERS WISH
TO PURCHASE FROM HUCKLEBERRY
Huckleberry claims that the district court erred in holding
that the Second Amended CC & Rs did not apply to the
Shawvers' purchase of the lot in question. Specifically,
Huckleberry claims that under the express terms of the
parties' agreement, amendments to the original CC & Rs
could be adopted at any time upon the written consent of at
least seventy-five percent of the existing lot owners.
The Second Amended CC & Rs were adopted and
recorded on July 23, 200 I. A copy of these amendments,
along with the lot owners' notarized signatures, were made
part of the record before the district court. Huckleberry
argues that the district court's order in this case essentially
redrafted the parties' agreement by allowing the Shawvers
to avoid compliance with the Second Amended CC & Rs
or other future amendments despite their unchallenged
validity or application to the property in question.
The Shawvers do not challenge the validity of the
amendment provision contained in the **694 *363 original
recorded CC & Rs or the fact that the Second Amended CC
& Rs were properly adopted in compliance with that
provision. They contend that the adoption of the Second
Amended CC & Rs prevented Huckleberry from being
able to convey the property according to the terms of the
Sale Agreement.

In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury ... the court shall find the facts
specifically and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon and direct the
entry of the appropriate judgment.
Findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous. [n application
of this principle regard shall be given to
the special opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of those witnesses
that appear before it.

Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 52(a)). "In determining whether a
finding is clearly erroneous this Court does not weigh the
evidence as the district court did. The Court inquires
whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial
and competent evidence." Id. (citation omitted). "This
Court will not substitute its view of the facts for the view of
the district judge." Id. (citation omitted). "Evidence is
regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed
point offact had been proven." Id.

B. The district court erred by determining that
performance of the Sale Agreement was subject only to
the original recorded CC & Rs.

1231 The district court concluded that the Shawvers were
entitled to specific performance of the Sale Agreement and
that "[tlhis purchase and sale transaction is subject to the
Declaration of Protective Covenants, Conditions, and
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Restrictions for Huckleberry Estates Subdivision recorded
July 21, 2000 as Instrument No. 100057017, only, as and
for [sic] restrictive covenants." Huckleberry claims that the
district court's decision constitutes error because it
effectively prevents the adoption and enforcement of
future amendments to the existing CC & Rs with regard to
the Shawvers only and violates the express terms of the
parties' agreement.
124) 125) 126) Idaho recognizes the validity of covenants
that restrict the use of private property. Nordstrom v.
Guindon, 135 Idaho 343, 345, 17 P.3d 287, 290 (2000)
(citing Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d
434,437 (1996)). When interpreting such covenants, the
Court generally applies the same rules of construction as
are applied to any contract or covenant. fd. However,
because restrictive covenants are in derogation of the
common law right to use land for all lawful purposes, the
Court will not extend by implication any restriction not
clearly expressed. Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 473,475,873
P.2d 118, 120 (citing Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398,
404, 690 P.2d 333, 339 (1984)). Further, all doubts are to
be resolved in favor ofthe free use of land. fd.
1271 1281 129) 1301 Beginning with the plain language of
the covenant, the first step is to determine whether or not
there is an ambiguity. Brown, 129 Idaho at 193,923 P.2d at
437 (citing City of Chubbuck v. City oj Pocatello, 127
Idaho 198,201,899 P.2d 411,414 (1995)). "Words or
phrases that have established definitions in common use or
settled legal meanings are not rendered ambiguous **695
*364 merely because they are not defined in the document
where they are used." City of Chubbuck, 127 Idaho at 20 I,
899 P .2d at 414. Rather, a covenant is ambiguous when it is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation on a
given issue. Post, 125 Idaho at 475, 873 P.2d at 120 (citing
Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 P.2d 135
(1980)). To detennine whether or not a covenant is
ambiguous, the court must view the agreement as a whole.
Brown, 129 Idaho at 193,923 P.2d at 438.
131) 132) The second step in contract or covenant
construction depends on whether or not an ambiguity has
been found. If the covenants are unambiguous, then the
court must apply them as a matter of law. City oj
Chubbuck, 127 Idaho at 201, 899 P.2d at 414. "Where
there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction; the
plain meaning governs." Post, 125 Idaho at 475, 873 P.2d
at 120. Conversely, if there is an ambiguity in the
covenants, then interpretation is a question of fact, and the
Court must determine the intent of the parties at the time
the instrument was drafted. Brown, 129 Idaho at 193, 923
P.2d at 438.

Both parties agree that the original recorded CC & Rs were

applicable when the Sale Agreement was executed. The
original recorded CC & Rs provide in relevant part:
GENERAL COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS:
That all lots of said Huckleberry Estates Subdivision
shall be subject to the following covenants, conditions,
and restrictions, that by acceptance of any such
conveyance, the grantee or grantees and their heirs,
executors, administrators, successors, and assigns agree
to the conditions described as follows:

******
z. AMENDMENTS: Any amendment to these
covenants, conditions, and restrictions shall be
approved in writing by at least seventy-five percent of
the lot owners.
Paragraph z simply states that any amendment may be
adopted upon the written consent of at least seventy-five
percent of the existing lot owners. Because there is no
ambiguity in this language, "there is no room for
construction, and the plain meaning of the language
governs." Sun Valley Ctr. v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho
411,413,690 P.2d 346, 348 (1984). Huckleberry concedes
that the First Amended CC & Rs were invalid because they
were not adopted in compliance with the amendment
provision. However, Huckleberry contends that the Second
Amended CC & Rs, which were recorded on July 23,200 I,
were properly adopted by over seventy-five percent of the
existing lot owners. These amendments are currently in
effect throughout the Subdivision. The issue is whether the
district court erred in declaring that the Second Amended
CC & Rs had no application to the parties' agreement in
this case.
The district court concluded that "the Shawvers are entitled
to specific performance of the [Sale Agreement], which is
subject to the original CC & R's. The subsequent
amendments have no application to that agreement." The
Shawvers subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment to include a finding that a second set of house
plans submitted by the them in January 200 I as part of an
attempt to settle this matter, comply in all respects with the
First Amended and Second Amended CC & Rs. The
district court denied the motion, stating that, "[ w ]hile there
was some discussion of the Second Amended CC & R's at
trial in the context of whether specific perfonnance as
originally requested by Plaintiffs should be granted, the
issue of different plans and compliance with any of the
amended CC & R's was not litigated."
133J Under the terms of the Sale Agreement, the Shawvers
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acknowledged that they had received and reviewed a copy
of the applicable CC & Rs. When the Shawvers and
Huckleberry negotiated and executed the Sale Agreement,
presumably they expected that it would be fully valid and
enforceable. See Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners &
Taxpayers v. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 590, 595, 661
P.2d 756, 761 (1983) (courts presume that parties to a
contract intended a lawful construction of that contract).
Because the Shawvers had notice of the applicable CC &
Rs, they were bound to abide by them. See **696 *36520
Am.Jur.2d Covenants § 267 (1995) ("A purchaser with
notice of restrictive covenants upon land is bound by such
restrictions, although they are not such as in strict legal
contemplation run with the land."). The practical effect of
the district court's decision is to release the Shawvers from
their legal obligation to abide by future amendments
regardless of the validity or necessity of such amendments.
"Courts possess no roving commission to rewrite
contracts. Equity will not intervene to change the terms of
a contract unless it produces unconscionable harm, is
unlawful or violates public policy." Smith v. Idaho State
Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680, 684. 760 P.2d 19,
23 (1988) (quoting Quintana v. Anthony, 109 Idaho 977,
981, 712 P.2d 678, 682 (Ct. App. 1985). A parallel
measure of judicial restraint prohibits the judicial rewriting
of restrictive covenants.
The district court's order eliminates the terms of the
original recorded CC & Rs with respect to future
amendments. The trial court's order granting specific
performance of the Sale Agreement subject only to the
original recorded CC & Rs is in error. There is doubtless a
point when a party has changed his or her position in
reliance upon the covenants in effect to a degree that
enforcement of an amendment would be precluded, but
that point was not demonstrated in this case. The issue of
whether the Shawvers could have rescinded the Sale
Agreement is not before this Court.

allows this Court to award attorney fees only if permitted
by some other statutory or contractual authority; it is not
authority alone for awarding fees. Robbins v. County of
Blaine, 134 Idaho 113, 120, 996 P.2d 813, 820 (2000).
I.A.R. 41 requires that the request for attorney fees on
appeal be made in the first brief from the respective party.
IAR. 35(a)(5) and (6) also require that the requesting
party put the request for fees in a separate section after the
issues presented section and the request be discussed in the
argument section. These procedural requirements have
been met as Huckleberry made the request after the issues
on appeal section in their first brief and the request was
discussed in the argument section.
In this case the authority permitting the recovery of
attorney fees and costs is contractual. Paragraph fourteen
of the Sale Agreement provides that, "[i]f either party
initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or
proceedings, which are in any way connected with this
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover
from the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and
attorney's fees, including such costs and fees on appeal."
Huckleberry is the prevailing party on appeal and is
awarded attorney fees and costs associated with the
original trial as well as its appeal to this Court.

VI.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court is reversed. Attorney fees
and costs are awarded to Huckleberry.

ChiefJustice TROUT, Justices EISMANN and BURDICK
concur.
Justice KIDWELL, dissents without opinion.

V.
Parallel Citations
HUCKLEBERRY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS
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134) 135) Idaho Appellate Rule (JAR.) 41 provides the
procedure for requesting attorney fees on appeal. I.A.R. 41
Footnotes
Neither party disputes the fact that Huckleberry's initialing of the Sale Agreement constituted a valid execution of the Sale
Agreement by Huckleberry.
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Civil Rights
:..=Operation; accrual and computation
Forty-five day period in which to file
administrative complaint for employee's claims
of age discrimination in relation to non-selection
for promotion to a temporary position and
non-interview for permanent position accrued on
date he was denied opportunity to interview, as
required for employee to bring claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
against Secretary of the Army and the United
States Army Corps of Engineers; decisions were
part of a single, two-step hiring process, selection
to temporary position gave advantage in hiring
decision for permanent position, and, even if
each was a discrete employment action,
investigation of non-interview to permanent
position would have led to investigation of hiring
Age
process
for
temporary
position.
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,2 et
seq., 29 U.S.C § 621 et seq.

Synopsis
Background: Employee brought action against Secretary
of the Army and the Army Corps of Engineers, alleging
that failure to promote violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington, Robelt H.
Whaley, 1., granted Secretary's motion for summary
judgment. Employee appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Wilken, District Judge,
held that:
[J] claims accrued on date employee was denied
opportunity to interview;
[2] genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
supervisors considered age and projected retirement
relevant to the hiring decision; and
[3] genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
selecting candidate for position because it was a lateral
move was pretext for age discrimination.
Reversed and remanded.

131
Bybee, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part.

West Headnotes (7)

III

Civil Rights
",,·Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before Resort to Courts
Officers and Public Employees
Jc.Prohibited personnel practices; discrimination
Federal employees who believe they have been
discriminated against on the basis of age have the

Civil Rights
,>"Motive or intent; pretext
To prevail on a claim for age discrimination
under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), a plaintiff must prove at trial that
age was the but-for cause of the employer's
adverse action; unlike Title VII, the ADEA's text
does not provide that a plaintiff may establish
discrimination by showing that age was simply a
motivating factor. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(I), 29 U.S.CA.
§ 623(a)(I); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et
seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e et seq.
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§ 623(a)(I).
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I Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
(=Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements
In a failure-to-promote case under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of
discrimination in violation of the ADEA by
producing evidence that he or she was: (I) at least
forty years old; (2) qualified for the position for
which an application was submitted; (3) denied
the position; and (4) the promotion was given to a
substantially
younger
person.
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(l).

17J

Civil Rights
,,~Motive or intent; pretext
In an employment discrimination action,
evidence of a plaintiffs superior qualifications,
standing alone, may be sufficient to prove pretext
in a stated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for an adverse employment action.
I Cases that cite this headnote
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Federal Civil Procedure
.,i,=Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether supervisors considered age and
projected retirement relevant to the hiring
decision, precluding summary judgment in 54
year
old
employee's
action
alleging
non-promotion and non-interview were age
discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(I).

*600 David M. Rose, Minnick-Hayner, P.S., Walla Walla,
W A, for the plaintiff-appellant.
*601 James A. McDevitt, United States Attorney, Frank A.
Wilson, Assistant United States Attorney, Spokane,
Washington; William E. Edwards, United States Army
Corps of Engineers, Kansas City, MO, for the
defendant -appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington, Robert H. Whaley, District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. EDWA No. 08-cv-5045-RHW.
Before: BETTY B. FLETCHER and JAY S. BYBEE,
Circuit Judges, and CLAUDIA WILKEN, District Judge. *
Opinion

161

Federal Civil Procedure
.;~~"Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether selecting candidate for position because
it was a lateral move, rather than promoting 54
year old employee, was pretext for age
discrimination, as required for employee's action
under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act
(ADEA).
Age
Discrimination
in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a)(I), 29 U.S.C.A.

Opinion by Judge WI LKEN; Partial Concurrence and
Partial Dissent by Judge BYBEE .

OPINION
WILKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Devon Scott Shelley appeals the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendant-Appellee Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army

V.

Geren, 665 F.3d 599 (2012)
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and the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(collectively, the Corps). Shelley sued the Corps for
violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 USc. § 621 et seq., by failing to interview
him and rejecting his applications for two promotions. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1291 to consider
Shelley's appeal. We find that Shelley presented a prima
facie case of age discrimination and evidence of pretext
sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether
age-related bias was the "but-for" cause of the Corps'
failure to interview and promote him. The district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Corps is
reversed.

BACKGROUND
In 2005, the Corps sought to fill a GS-14 Supervisory
Procurement Analyst position in the Contracting Division
at its Kansas City District. The position was also known as
Chief of Contracting. The Corps pursued a two-step hiring
process, in which it advertised an opening for a l20-day
temporary position, and then announced a formal process
to hire a permanent Chief of Contracting.
An email announcement of the 120-day position was made
on October 3,2005, and courtesy copies were sent to Major
Kelly Butler and Regional Contracting Chief Joseph
Scanlan. The announcement explained that recruitment for
the permanent position would begin in the near future.
Applicants were instructed to email or fax their current
resume/application, copies of their two most recent
performance appraisals, proof that they had completed the
educational requirements, and proof of eligibility for a
Critical Acquisition Position.
Shelley applied for the 120-day position. At the time, he
had been serving as Assistant Chief of the Contracting
Division for the Walla Walla District, a GS-13 position,
for over a year. In that position, Shelley supervised,
coordinated, and managed the work of Team Leaders.
Shelley was supervised by Connie Oberle, the Chief of
Contracting at Walla Walla. He held a master's degree in
business administration, had twenty-nine years of
experience in contracting (twenty-six of which were with
the Corps), and had received numerous awards for his
work. In 2005, Shelley *602 had received a "Special Act
Award" for "major acquisition accomplishments and
acquisition research [and] policy." In 2003, he had
received a Bronze Star Medal for exceptionally
meritorious acquisition service as a Contracting Officer
with the Corps while deployed to the Afghanistan Area
Office. He was born in 1951 and was fifty-four years old at
the time of his application for the 120-day position.

Butler served as the selecting official for the l20-day
position. She received about nine resumes and rated them
according to the criteria from the position announcement,
which she summarized as "[b ]asically their experience."
No other officials reviewed the resumes for the 120-day
position. Butler also spoke with the applicants' references.
Butler testified that Oberle gave a negative reference for
Shelley. She stated, "I called Connie for a reference for
[Shelley]. And, really, Connie's reference is why we did
not choose [Shelley]." Butler explained, "When I get a big
No feeling from the supervisor, that sends a red flag."
Later, Butler changed her testimony, stating that Oberle's
reference was "one of the reasons we did not choose
[Shelley]." Oberle, however, denied ever having spoken
with Butler regarding Shelley's qualifications. Oberle
testified that she spoke with Scanlan and informed him that
Shelley was interested in the I 20-day position, and that the
job would be a "wonderful opportunity for him."
Butler consulted about the applicants with Colonel
Michael Rossi, Commander of the Kansas City District,
and Steve Iverson, Deputy District Engineer for Project
Management for the same district. They agreed that Vince
Marsh should be hired. Marsh was serving as a
Supervisory Procurement Analyst and Chief of the
Business Management Division in Huntsville, Alabama, a
GS-14 position, and had been serving in the position for
more than a year. He supervised approximately fifteen
employees and served as Director of Contracting for the
Business Management Division "as requested." In his prior
position, as Business Operations Manager at the United
States Army Contracting Command in Europe, Marsh had
also served as Director of Contracting "as requested,"
supervising seventy-five contract specialists on those
occasions. He was forty-two years old at that time, born in
1963. He had twenty years of experience in contracting
(fourteen in contracting positions and six in procurement
positions). He had been with the Corps for less than two
years. The most recent award listed on Marsh's resume
was a "Sustained Superior Performance Award" he had
received in 2002, before joining the Corps.
Butler interviewed Marsh for the position. There is no
evidence that she interviewed other candidates.
On November 2, 2005, Kevin Brice, Business
Management Division Chief, sent an email seeking
approval to hire Marsh for the 120-day position. Brice
stated that he and Rossi recommended Marsh for the
position, that Scanlan had participated in the selection
process, and that Butler believed Marsh was Scanlan's top
pick. Marsh's selection was approved.
Scanlan knew Shelley and was aware that Shelley was in
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his fifties. Scanlan had served as a superior to Shelley, and
had worked with him for about six years. He was familiar
with Shelley's credentials and experience working for the
Corps. He knew that, as Assistant Chief of Contracting for
the Walla Walla District, Shelley had, at various times,
served as Acting Chief of Contracting when Oberle was
absent. Scanlan expressed confidence in Shelley's
performance of his duties as Acting Chief of Contracting
and testified that *603 both technically and professionally
Shelley was a good contracting officer.
At the time Scanlan supported Marsh for the 120-day
position, he knew Marsh only by reputation. They had met
at a social event for the Army Contracting Command in
Germany. Scanlan's belief that Marsh was the best
candidate for the 120-day position was not based on any
personal experience working with him. Scanlan, however,
told Butler, Brice, Iverson, Rossi and Kevin Bond, District
Counsel Chief, who later joined the selection panel for the
permanent position, that he had worked with Marsh in
Germany, and that he believed Marsh would do very well
in the I 20-day position.
Shelley learned that he was not selected for the 120-day
position on or about November 4,2005.
Meanwhile, on October 24, 2005, the permanent position
and job description had been announced, and the Corps
began accepting applications. The selection plan called for
a panel of five members to review applications. The panel
members were Scanlan, Brice, Rossi, Bond, and Mary
Parks, Chief Contracting Specialist. Scanlan, Brice and
Rossi had all participated in the hiring decision for the
I 20-day position. Rossi was assigned to chair the panel.
The selection plan identified four criteria on which to
screen applicants for interviews: technical competency,
management skiIIs, leadership and teamwork. On each
criterion, the applicants were to be evaluated as
"outstanding," "fully successful," or "minimally
acceptable." Possession of a graduate level degree was a
factor in ranking a candidate as outstanding for technical
competency. A factor to be considered with regard to
management skills was supervision of over thirty
employees.
Oberle testified that, around the time the hiring process
was taking place, Scanlan and Brice requested from the
contracting chiefs information about projected retirement
dates for employees in their districts and divisions. Scanlan
did not recall asking his chiefs for information on
retirement eligibility. He admitted, though, that in 2004 or
2005 he had requested, from the districts, certain data
which, at that time, was provided in a spreadsheet entitled
Capable Workforce Matrix. Although the matrix did not

include the names of the employees, it included
information such as job titles, grade levels, number of
employees in a particular position in a division, as well as
their anticipated retirement dates. The example in the
record of this matrix for the Walla Walla Contracting
Division is dated March 2 I, 2006, but apparently the same
format was used in 2004 and 2005. It is clear from the 2006
version of the matrix for the Walla Walla Contracting
Division that it would be a simple matter to deduce the
names of the incumbents from the position titles within the
division.
Thirty-three individuals applied for the permanent
position, including Shelley, Marsh, and Oberle. The panel
members independently evaluated the applicants as
outstanding, fully successful, or minimally acceptable, on
each of the four selection criteria, based on their resumes.
On December 19, 2005, the panel members convened by
teleconference to select candidates for interviews. Scanlan
testified that he did not share any age-related information
about Shelley at the teleconference. Brice testified that age
was not a consideration in evaluating the applicants,
although information on the resumes could allow panelists
to estimate applicants' ages.
During the teleconference, each panelist placed the
candidates in either the top *604 third, middle third, or
bottom third of the applicant pool. The spreadsheet
summarizing these scores does not identify the panelists by
name, but it shows that two candidates received a top score
from each of the five panelists. Marsh and another
candidate received four top scores and a mid score. A fifth
candidate received four top scores and a bottom score. An
applicant named Robert received three top scores and two
mid scores. These were the six candidates selected for
interviews. Shelley was given a top score by three of the
five panelists. He was initially given a mid score by two
panelists. This ranking would have been equal to that
which had earned Robert an interview. But one
panelist-whose identity is not disclosed in the
record-changed Shelley's mid score to a bottom score.
Shelley was not given an interview.
Marsh was, at forty-two years old, the youngest
interviewee. The oldest interviewee was fifty-five years
old, one year older than Shelley. The other interviewees
were forty-six (two of them), fifty, and fifty-three years
old.
On January 20, 2006, the panel recommended Marsh for
the permanent position. On or about February 17, 2006,
Shelley learned that he had not been afforded an
opportunity to interview for the permanent position. On
April 16, 2006, Marsh was reassigned to the permanent
Chief of Contracting position.
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On March 6, 2006, seventeen days after Shelley learned
that he had been denied an interview for the permanent
position, he made initial contact with the Corps' Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) officer. On May 12,
2006, after receiving notice of his right to file a formal
complaint of discrimination, Shelley did so, alleging that
he had been discriminated against between November
2005 and January 2006 due to his age, in that he was "not
afforded the anticipated interview opportunity ... thereby
eliminating his promotion opportunity for the Kansas City
District GS-14, Chief, Contracting Division position."
After the EEO office denied his claim in its Final Agency
Action on June 27, 2008, Shelley filed suit in federal
district court on July 28, 2008.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Corps. The court assumed, without deciding, that
Shelley timely exhausted his administrative remedies as to
both the 120-day position and the permanent position. The
court declined to analyze the motion in accordance with
McDonnel! Douglas Corporation v. Green. 411 U.S. 792,
93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), finding it
inapplicable to ADEA cases after the Supreme Court's
decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S.
167,129 S.Ct. 2343,174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). Relying on
Gross, the district court held that Shelley put forth
insufficient facts that his age was the "but-for" cause of his
non-selection for the 120-day position and for an interview
for and promotion to the permanent position.
Shelley appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary
judgment. Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th
Cir.1996). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact, and whether
the district court applied the relevant substantive law. Id.
"Whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative
remedies as required before filing suit is a question of law,
which we review de novo." Bankston v. White, 345 F.3d
768,770 (9th Cir.2003).

*605 DISCUSSION
I. Administrative Remedies

Preliminarily, the Corps argues that we may not consider
Shelley's complaint of non-selection for the 120-day
position because he failed to seek administrative remedies

for that decision in a timely manner. The Corps argues that
Shelley failed to contact the EEO office within fOliy-five
days of learning that he was not selected for the 120-day
position and failed to complain about his non-selection for
the 120-day position in his formal complaint of
discrimination in the EEO administrative process.

III Federal employees who believe they have been
discriminated against on the basis of age have "the option
of pursuing administrative remedies, either through the
agency's EEO procedures, or through the Merit Systems
Protection Board." Bankston, 345 F.3d at 770 (internal
citations omitted). Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) regulations provide that an
aggrieved federal employee who pursues the EEO avenue
must consult an EEO counselor within forty-five days of
the effective date of the contested personnel action, prior to
filing a complaint alleging age discrimination. 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1614.103, 1614.105(a)(l).1 We have stated that
although
the
regulatory
pre-filing exhaustion
requirement at § 1614.105 "does not carry the full
weight of statutory authority" and is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite for suit in federal court, we have
consistently held that, absent waiver, estoppel, or
equitable tolling, "failure to comply with this regulation
[is] ... fatal to a federal employee's discrimination
claim" in federal court.
Kraus v. Presidio Trust Facilities Div.!Residential
Mgmt. Branch, 572 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir.2009)
(alterations in the original) (quoting Lyons v. England,
307 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir.2002)).

121 Shelley took the position that he timely initiated the
EEO process on March 6, 2006, after he learned on or
about February 17, 2006, that he had been denied an
opportunity to interview for the permanent Chief of
Contracting position. In his EEO complaint, Shelley
asserted that he was discriminated against, between
November 2005 and January 2006, based on his age.
Shelley asserted that because of h is age he was not given
an interview, thereby eliminating his promotion
opportunity. Shelley learned that he was not selected for
the 120-day position on or about November 4,2005. Thus,
the time period Shelley specified in his EEO complaint
encompasses the hiring process for both the 120-day and
the permanent Chief of Contracting positions. Reading the
EEO complaint liberally, as we must, see Greenlaw v.
Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir.1995), it is apparent that
Shelley complained about both hiring decisions.
Further, the decisions were not discrete employment
actions, but were part of a single, two-step, hiring process.
The Corps sought to fill the position first on a temporary
basis, followed by a permanent appointment after 120
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days. It is obvious that the person selected for the
temporary position would have a significant competitive
*606 for the
advantage over the other applicants
permanent position, and therefore that the temporary
appointment could be seen as a step towards the permanent
appointment. Also, the limited nature of the hiring process
for the temporary position, and the fact that the recruitment
for the permanent position started less than a month after
the temporary position was announced, could have led an
applicant to view the processes as a continuum.
The interrelatedness of the two positions and of the hiring
processes for them persuades us that the process for filling
the Chief of Contracting position was a single course of
conduct that began in 2005 with the selection of Marsh for
the 120-day position and ended on April 16, 2006, when
Marsh was confirmed as the new Chief of Contracting.
Because Shelley filed his EEO complaint on March 6,
seventeen days after he learned that he had not been
selected to interview for the permanent position, he met the
45-day requirement of29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a).
Even if we assume that the two promotions were discrete
employment actions, Shelley's complaint was stilI timely.
"Incidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC
charge may not be considered by a federal court unless the
new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations
contained in the EEOC charge." Green v. Los Angeles
County Superintendent of Schools. 883 F.2d 1472, 1476
(9th Cir. I 989) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
determining whether a new claim is like or reasonably
related to allegations contained in the previous charge, the
court inquires into "whether the original EEOC
investigation would have encompassed the additional
charges." ld. The same is true of a complaint of
discrimination submitted to a federal agency's EEO office.
See Greenlaw, 59 F.3d at 1000 (citing Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920
F.2d 1451, 1456-57 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1990».
Here, the crux of Shelley's complaint is that he was
bypassed for promotion to the permanent Chief of
Contracting position because of his age. Because of the
close relationship between the two positions and the
temporally-overlapping hiring processes for them, an EEO
investigation into the hiring process for the permanent
position would necessarily have led to the investigation of
the hiring process for the temporary position. The case is
therefore distinguishable from Williams v. Little Rock
Municipal Water Works, 21 F.3d 218 (8th Cir.1994), upon
which the Corps relies. There, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
partial summary judgment in favor ofthe defendant on the
plaintiff's racial discrimination claim, finding that the
plaintiff's EEOC complaint for retaliation included no
mention of racial discrimination, and her allegations of
racial discrimination submitted to the EEOC years earlier
were not deemed reasonably related to her current claim

for retaliation. Jd. at 222-23.
In sum, Shelley's initial contact with the Corps' EEO
officer seventeen days after he learned that he had been
denied the opportunity to interview for the permanent
Chief of Contracting position timely initiated his
administrative claim based on being denied interviews and
selection for the 120-day and the permanent positions, all
of which occurred as part of the same course of conduct by
the Corps. Shelley timely exhausted available
administrative remedies.

II. Summary Judgment Disposition of Age
Discrimination Claim
[31 Shelley's failure-to-promote claim is a claim of
disparate treatment under the ADEA. The ADEA makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate "because of[an]
individual's age." 29 U .S.c. § 623(a)( I). The prohibition is
"limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of *607
age." 29 U .S.c. § 631 (a). The ADEA applies to protect
federal employees and applicants for federal employment.
29 U.S.c. § 633a(a). To prevail on a claim for age
discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove at
trial that age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's
adverse action. Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2350. "Unlike Title VII,
the ADEA's text does not provide that a plaintiff may
establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a
motivating factor." ld. at 2349.
This case, however, was resolved on summary judgment,
and not on the merits. Prior to Gross, our circuit applied the
burden-shifting evidentiary framework of McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, to motions for
summary judgment on ADEA claims. See, e.g., Coleman v.
Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir.2000);
Wallis v. JR. Simp/at Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. I 994);
Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th
Cir. I 990); Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th
Cir. I 983). The district court declined to apply this
framework, believing that Gross rejected it. The Corps
argues to the same effect.
We disagree. In Gross, the Court grappled with whether a
mixed-motives instruction may be given to the jury in an
ADEA case.2 129 S.Ct. at 2348. Relying on the text of29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) and case law allocating the burden of
persuasion, the Court held that a plaintiff retains at all
times the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the
"but-for" cause of an employer's adverse action. Jd. at
2352. Because Gross involved a case that had already
progressed to trial, it did not address the evidentiary
framework applicable to a motion for summary judgment.
The Court, in fact, explicitly noted that it "has not
definitively decided whether the evidentiary framework of
McDonnell Douglas utilized in Title VII cases is
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appropriate in the ADEA context." Id. at 2349 n. 2.
Since the decision in Gross, several sister circuits have
continued to utilize the McDonnell Douglas framework to
decide motions for summary judgment in ADEA cases.
See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487,498 (2d
Cir.2009); Velez v. Thermo King de P.R., Inc., 585 F.3d
441, 446-47 (I st Cir.2009); Connolly v. Pepsi Bottling
Grp., LLC, 347 Fed.Appx. 757, 759-61 (3d Cir.2009)
(unpublished).3 We join them and hold that nothing in
Gross overruled our cases utilizing this framework to
decide summary judgment motions in ADEA cases. The
McDonnell Douglas test is used on summary judgment,
not at trial. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc .. 299 F.3d 838, 855
(9th Cir.2002) ("This legal proof structure is a tool to assist
plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage so that they may
reach trial ... [I]t is not normally appropriate to introduce
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to the
jury."). The McDonnell Douglas test shifts only the *608
burden of production, after the plaintiff makes a prima
facie case. See, e.g., Tusing v. Des Moines Only. Sch. Dist.,
639 F.3d 507,515 n. 3 (8th Cir.201 I) ("The lvfcDonnell
Douglas analysis is likely still an appropriate way to
analyze ADEA 'pretext' claims, however, because
McDonnell Douglas only shifts the burden of
production."); Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684,
691 (3d Cir.2009) ("Gross stands for the proposition that it
is improper to shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant in an age discrimination case. McDonnell
Douglas, however, imposes no shift in that particular
burden."). "If plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, '[t]he
burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged actions.' " Hawn v. Exec. Jet
Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting
Chuang v. Univ. ofCa!. Davis, Bd. of Trs. , 225 F.3d 1 I 15,
1123-24 (9th Cir.2000)). "If defendant meets this burden,
plaintiffs must then raise a triable issue of material fact as
to whether the defendant's proffered reasons for their
terminations are mere pretext for unlawful discrimination."
/d. Because the continued use of McDonnell Douglas in
summary judgment motions on ADEA claims is not
inconsistent with Gross. we cannot overrule our prior
precedent because of Gross.
Thus, to survive summary judgment on his claim for a
violation of the ADEA under the disparate treatment
theory ofliability, Shelley must first establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination. Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1280-8 I.
If he is successful, the burden of production shifts to the
Corps to miiculate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for its adverse employment action. Id. at 128 I. It is then
Shelley's task to demonstrate that there is a material
genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer's
purported reason is pretext for age discrimination. Id. At
trial, he.must carry the burden to prove that age was the

"but-for" cause of his non-selection.

A. Prima Facie Case
A "prima facie case requires evidence adequate to create
an inference that an employment decision was based on
a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion." O'Connor v.
Con.wl. Coin Caterers Corp., 5 I 7 U.S. 308, 3 I 2, 116 S.Ct.
1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alterations in original).
14) In a failure-to-promote case, a plaintiff may establish a
prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the
ADEA by producing evidence that he or she was (1) at
least forty years old, (2) qualified for the position for which
an application was submitted, (3) denied the position, and
(4) the promotion was given to a substantially younger
person. See Sleckl, 703 F.2d at 393 (holding that the
plaintiff established a prima facie case for age
discrimination under the lVlcDonnell Douglas framework
because he "was clearly within the protected class, had
applied for an available position for which he was
qualified, and was denied a promotion which was given to
a younger person"); see also O'Connor, 5 I 7 U.S. at 313,
I 16 S.Ct. 1307 ("Because the ADEA prohibits
discrimination on the basis of age and not class
membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially
younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of
age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was
replaced by someone outside the protected class."); Nidds
v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 917 (9th
Cir. I 996) (finding that the requirements for a prima facie
case of age discrimination were satisfied by evidence that
the fifty-four year old plaintiff was discharged, he was
performing *609 his job satisfactorily, and his duties
continued to be performed by a substantially younger
employee, and holding that the district court "erred in
concluding that to establish a prima facie case, [the
plaintiff] was required to show that he was at least as
qualified as his replacement").4
It is undisputed that Shelley was fifty-four at the relevant
time, he was qualified for both the temporary and the
permanent positions, he was denied both positions, and
both went to a substantially younger candidate.
Accordingly, Shelley has established a prima facie case of
age discrimination.

B. Facial Legitimacy of the Corps' Explanation
The burden now shifts to the Corps to provide a
non-discriminatory explanation for its hiring decisions.
Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1281. The Corps did so here. In its
brief on appeal, the Corps proffers as its
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non-discriminatory explanation that Marsh was already
employed as a GS-14 Supervisory Procurement Analyst,
and hiring him caused a lateral move, whereas the position
would have been a promotion for Shelley, who was serving
at the GS-13 level. This is a facially legitimate
explanation.

179 L.Ed.2d 144 (201 I) (under Uniformed Services
Employment
and
Reemployment
Rights
Act,
discriminatory motive imputed to employer where a
supervisor performs an act motivated by discriminatory
animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an
adverse employment action, and that act is a proximate
cause of the ultimate employment action).

C. Pretext

The Corps' articulation of a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason shifts the burden back to Shelley to raise a genuine
factual question as to whether the proffered reason is
pretextual. The plaintiff can prove pretext "(I) indirectly,
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
'unworthy of credence' because it is internally inconsistent
or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that
unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the
employer." Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1124. All of the
evidence-whether direct or indirect-is to be considered
cumulatively. Id. We conclude that Shelley offered both
direct and indirect evidence of pretext.

i. Direct Evidence
IS) Shelley presented direct evidence of age discrim ination
to rebut the Corps' purported non-discriminatory reason.
Oberle testified that Scanlan and Brice inquired about the
projected retirement dates for employees in the contracting
divisions during the hiring period for the 120-day and
permanent positions. A fact-finder could infer from this
that they considered age and projected retirement relevant
to the hiring decision. Despite the absence of names in the
Capable Workforce Matrix, the format of the matrix
permitted the identification of specific employees. The
matrix contradicts Scanlan's testimony that individual age
information was not provided in that formaLS

The Corps contends that the matrix, at best, establishes that
Scanlan and Brice knew Shelley'S prospective retirement
date, which, standing alone, would not support *610 an
inference of age discrimination. But the fact that Scanlan
and Brice sought out the retirement dates at the time of
their participation in the hiring process for the temporary
and permanent positions shows more than that the
decision-makers may have known of the candidates' ages.
It raises an inference that they considered this information
relevant to their decisions. Although Scanlan and Brice did
not make the hiring decisions alone, evidence of their
inquiry and of their influence over the process supports an
inference that the Corps' proffered explanation for hiring
Marsh was a pretext for age discrimination. See Staub v.
Proctor Hospital, -U.S. - - , 131 S.Ct. I 186, I 194,

ii. Indirect Evidence
16) 17) Evidence of a plaintiffs superior qualifications,
standing alone, may be sufficient to prove pretext. Raad v.
Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d
1185, 1194 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Odima v. Westin Tucson
Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir.1995». A comparison
of Shelley's and Marsh's resumes gives rise to a factual
dispute as to whether Shelley was better qualified for the
position than Marsh. Compared to Marsh, Shelley had
significantly more years of work experience related to
contracting, and more experience employed in the Corps.
As of October 2005, Shelley had twenty-nine years of
experience in contracting, whereas Marsh had twenty
years. Unlike Marsh, Shelley spent most of his career in the
Corps. Shelley had been an employee of the Corps for over
nineteen years, Marsh for five and a half years.

Furthermore, Shelley was already employed in a
Contracting Division, while Marsh was a Supervisory
Procurement Analyst in a Business Management Division.
Shelley had been employed as Assistant Chief in the
Contracting Division under Oberle in Walla Walla for over
a year, and before that for four years as a Team Leader in
Walla Walla under Oberle. Contrary to the Corps'
contention, Marsh served as Director of Contracting only
"as requested." Shelley, too, served as Acting Chief of
Contracting in his supervisor's absence. Although this fact
was not included in his resume, Scanlan was aware of it,
and testified that he had confidence in Shelley's
performance as Acting Chief of Contracting. Shelley's
resume identified more impressive and recent awards for
on-the-job accomplishments than Marsh's.
Shelley's educational qualifications were superior to
Marsh's. Shelley held an M.B.A., while Marsh had no
graduate level degree. The selection criteria for the
permanent position indicate that possession of a graduate
level degree is a factor in ranking a candidate as
outstanding for technical competency.
The selection criteria for the permanent POSItIon listed
supervision of at least thirty employees as a factor to be
considered in evaluating management skills. The Corps
incorrectly asserts that Shelley's resume failed to indicate
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that he acted as a supervisor. While Shelley's resume did
not specify the number of employees he supervised, it did
disclose that, as Assistant Chief of Contracting, he
supervised, coordinated and managed the work of
subordinate Team Leaders, who presumably led teams.
Marsh relayed that he supervised fifteen employees in the
position that he held at the time of his application.
Although *611 Marsh had supervised seventy-five
employees on occasion when he served temporarily as
Director of Contracting in Europe, it was not part of his
regular job duties. Neither candidate clearly demonstrated
that he met this criterion.
The Corps argues that, while Shelley's qualifications as
described after the fact were extensive, he did not include
all of his work experience and skills in his resume. On
appeal, however, Shelley relies exclusively on information
that was listed in his resume to argue that his qualifications
for the position were superior. Even absent the additional
information (e.g., the value of construction contracts he
successfully shepherded), Shelley's resume demonstrated
sufficient qualifications that a reasonable jury could find
that he was substantially better qualified than Marsh. In
addition, Scanlan testified that he had worked with Shelley
for six years, and was familiar with Shelley's experience
and credentials.
Further, that Shelley was a GS-13 employee, while Marsh
was a GS-14, was relevant only as to the 120-day position.
Had Shelley been given that position, he would have
become a GS-14 and his move to the permanent position
would have been lateral, like Marsh's.
None of the officials whose support for Marsh was cited in
the email seeking approval for his hire for the 120-day
position had reviewed the applicants' resumes. Only Butler
reviewed the resumes. Viewed in the light most favorable
to Shelley, Butler's testimony, read in conjunction with
Oberle's testimony, could be understood to indicate that
Butler initially favored Shelley for the position, but that
she used an alleged negative reference from Oberle (which
Oberle denies she ever gave) as a pretext for hiring Marsh
after learning that Scanlan favored Marsh for the position.
Scanlan, it bears repeating, represented to Butler, Rossi,
Brice, Iverson and Bond that he had worked with Marsh in
Germany. He testified, however, that he recommended
Marsh based only on his reputation. Scanlan had met him
at a social event, but had never worked with him. As noted,
Scanlan had sought out information about employees'
retirement eligibility at the time of the hiring process.
Accordingly, Shelley's rejection for the 120-day position
could be found to be based on age discrimination. Ifit was,
then the inference that the decision-makers were biased
would carry over to their decision-making for the

permanent position. Further, the denial of the temporary
position was clearly a causative factor in the denial of the
interview and selection for the permanent position. If the
first decision was caused by discrimination, a strong
inference is raised that the subsequent decisions were as
well.
The Corps argues that age bias cannot be inferred in the
selection for the permanent position, because other
applicants close in age to Shelley were interviewed for that
position and Shelley was not. Those applicants, however,
were not selected for the position, and instead Marsh, the
significantly younger applicant, was hired. Stacking the
interview pool with older candidates does not immunize
the decision to hire a younger one. Of the five panelists
who selected the interviewees, Scanlan, Brice, and Rossi
had all participated in the hiring decision for the 120-day
position. Shelley received a top score from three of the five
panelists. It was only the alteration of one unidentified
panelist's score for Shelley from mid to bottom that cost
Shelley an interview and disqualified him for the
permanent position. The evidence of Scanlan's
discriminatory animus discussed above supports an
inference that Scanlan was biased against Shelley and in
favor of Marsh based on *612 age. The evidence of the
workings of the hiring process supports an inference that
Scanlan was able to influence the interview and selection
decisions. Neither Shelley's non-selection for an interview
for the permanent position, nor the interviews of other
older applicants who were not selected for promotion,
disproves Shelley's evidence suppOliing a prima facie case
and pretext.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
Shelley, is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that
the Corps' reliance on Marsh's GS-14 level, as compared
to Shelley's GS-13 level, was pretextual in the light of
Shelley's otherwise superior experience, education and
recognition.
In sum, Shelley produced sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination, and has responded
to the Corps' alleged non-discriminatory reason for
refusing to promote him by identifying evidence, both
direct and indirect, showing that the Corps' explanation is
pretextual.

CONCLUSION

Because Shelley initiated a timely administrative
complaint and produced sufficient evidence in support of
his ADEA claim, the district court's grant of summary
judgment in the Corps' favor is reversed. The case is
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remanded to the district court for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:

This should be a straightforward case. Plaintiff Devon
Scott Shelley ("Shelley") claims he became a victim of age
discrimination when the Army Corps of Engineers ("the
Corps") denied him an opportunity to interview for a GS14 position as Chief of the Contracting Division that
ultimately went to a younger candidate. An unfiltered look
at the facts reveals that of the six finalists the Corps
interviewed, one candidate was older than Shelley, and
two others were close to Shelley in age. The candidate the
Corps ultimately hired, Vince Marsh, was already a GS-14
Supervisory Procurement Analyst, while Shelley was a
GS- 13 Assistant Chief.
On this record, there is no way Shelley can show that the
Corps passed him over for an equally or less qualified
candidate on account of his age. Rather, the record shows
that 32 individuals applied for the position. A five-member
selection committee, chaired by an army colonel and
advised by an EEO officer, independently ranked the
candidates on the basis of their resumes. Based on their
individual evaluations of the candidates, the committee
held a telephone conference and produced a list of the top
six candidates. Shelley was not ranked among the top six,
but was included in the second-tier group of nine
candidates. The six finalists included three men and three
women (one of whom was Shelley's own supervisor,
Connie Oberle), and were born in 1950, 1952, 1955,
1959(2), and 1963; Shelley was born in 195 I. The
committee then jointly interviewed the finalists and
unanimously recommended hiring Marsh. In its report, the
committee found that Marsh had the "strongest
interview .... [It] demonstrated [his] technical competency,
professionalism, leadership and strategic thinking." The
committee also found that Marsh had "the highest overall
positive references." In the Corps's own investigation of
Shelley's complaint, every member of the committee
denied that age played any role in the committee's
decision.
To this overwhelming evidence that age was not the reason
the committee decided to hire Marsh and not Shelley, the
majority simply points to two facts: (I) some *613
members of the committee likely knew how old Shelley
was, Maj. Op. at 61 0, and (2) Shelley believed he had more
experience and, therefore, was better qualified than Marsh,
Maj. Op. at 610-1 I. This doesn't come close to proving
that the Corps "refuse[ d) to hire [Shelley] ... because of

such individual's age." 29 USc. § 623(a)(l) (emphasis
added). And because the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") does not permit a
mixed-motive theory, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557
U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350,174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009),
Shelley has no case at all. I would affirm the district court's
award of summary judgment, and I respectfully dissent.]

In Gross, the Supreme Court held that "under the plain
language of the ADEA ... a plaintiff must prove that age
was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse
decision." Id. at 2350. This "but-for" test applies no matter
whether the case was resolved on summary judgment or
after a jury trial, and it does not permit the plaintiff to rely
on a mixed-motive theory. See id.
Because Shelley has no direct evidence of discrimination
based on age, he must rely on the burden-shifting approach
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4 I I
U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The
majority holds that Gross did not overrule our prior cases
holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to
a disparate-treatment ADEA claim. Maj. Op. at 607--08. I
concur in that part of the opinion. Although I think the
McDonnell Douglas framework is going to be difficult to
apply to an ADEA claim after Gross-and the Court was
coy about whether McDonnell Douglas is compatible with
Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2349 n. 2-1 agree that Gross does not
clearly overrule our prior precedents. See Smith v. City of
Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 69 I (3d Cir.2009) ("Gross does
not conflict with our continued application of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm in age discrimination
cases.").
Even if we continue to apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework to the ADEA, Shelley still shoulders the
ultimate burden of showing that the Corps's
explanation-that Shelley was not as qualified as
Marsh-was pretextual and that the necessaty reason
Shelley was not hired was because ofhis age. "To establish
a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language ofthe
ADEA ... a plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but-for'
cause of the employer's adverse decision," Gross, 129
S.Ct. at 2350, because "the burden of persuasion [n]ever
shifts to the party defending an alleged mix-motives
discrimination claim brought under the ADEA," id. at
2348.
That is a heavy burden for Shelley to carry. And he doesn't
come close on this record. The processes used by the Corps
rule out impermissible bias, and the evidence relied on by
the majority is insufficient to raise an issue of material fact.
';,;
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II
The majority finds that "Shelley's rejection for the 120day position could be found to be based on age
discrimination." Maj. Op. at 611. It claims that Major
Kelly Butler's and Connie Oberle's testimonies could
show that "Butler initially *614 favored Shelley for the
position, but that she used an alleged negative reference
from Oberle (which Oberle denies she ever gave) as a
pretext for hiring Marsh after learning that Scanlan favored
Marsh for the position." Id. at 611. I think the 120-day
position is not really an issue.2 In any event, this is simply
not a reasonable inference. Although there is some dispute
over whether or how Oberle conveyed a reference to
Butler, whether she did offer a negative reference is beside
the point (though she was going to be a candidate for the
permanent position herself). It is not reasonable to infer
that Butler would have chosen Shelley but for an alleged
reference from Oberle. See Maj. Op. at 611. Butler did
state in the Department of Defense Fact-Finding
Conference of March 14, 2007 that "really, Connie's
reference is why we did not choose Scott [Shelley)." Yet
the Fact-Finding Conference at which she testified was not
convened to consider Shelley'S complaint, and, in context,
her statement is not particularly probative. Moreover, in
her deposition for this case she clarified her testimony,
saying: "I didn't mean to indicate that I was ready to hire
him and Connie Oberle said no. That's not the case ....
Connie's reference is one of the reasons we did not choose
Scott .... I did not mean to infer that she was the only reason
that ... he wasn't chosen." She stated that she based her
hiring decision on Marsh's being "the most qualified out of
the nine" who applied.
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to infer that Butler changed
her mind after input from Scanlan. She testified that she
was the only one who reviewed the resumes for that
position, and she made the decision in consultation with
Colonel Michael Rossi, Commander for the Kansas City
District, and Steve Iverson, Deputy District Engineer for
Project Management for the Kansas City District.
Although Scanlan may have been "a part of the process"
and let Butler know that Marsh was his top pick, there is no
indication that he was involved in the substance of the
decision, and Shelley produced no evidence to contradict
Butler'S account of how the decision was made. A
reasonable jury could not reasonably conclude from the
evidence that discrimination was the but-for cause of
Shelley failing to receive the 120-day position.
With regard to the permanent position, Shelley's biggest
problem is that before he can make out a case that he did

not get the position because of his age, Shelley has to show
that he was passed over for an interview because of his age.
This he cannot do. Of the six candidates who were actually
selected for a final interview (from a list of 32), one was
older than Shelley, one was only a year younger, and
another was *615 four years younger. The fact that the
Corps considered qualified candidates older than (or about
the same age as) Shelley without offering Shelley an
interview is fatal to his claim. It is true that the fourth
traditional element for establishing a prima facie case in
failure to promote cases under the McDonnell-Douglas
framework-that the employee be replaced by someone
substantially younger, O'Connor v. Conwl. Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Edold 433
(I 996)-is not a strict requirement. A plaintiff can produce
more probative evidence of discrimination, or he can show
that the decision to hire another member of the protected
class (or in ADEA cases, a person of similar age) was a
pretext to hide the discriminatory decision. See Diaz v. Am.
Tel. & Tel., 752 Fold 1356, 1359-62 (9th Cir.1985) (Title
VII); see also Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d
1201,1207-08 & n. 2 (9th Cir.2008). While I deal with the
former type of evidence below, there is no evidence of the
latter grand conspiracy, that candidates of the same age as
Shelley were given interviews to hide the already-made
decision that Marsh would be given the position. Because
age must be the but-for cause, see Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2350,
the fact that the committee ranked other similarly-aged
applicants higher than Shelley suggests that even without
any alleged age bias, he still would have not received the
job because another similarly-aged applicant would have
taken it instead.
Since the Corps interviewed similarly situated candidates,
but not Shelley, the only plausible conclusion from this set
of facts is that some reason other than age caused the
selection committee to decide not to interview Shelley.
And if the committee had some reason other than
age-indeed, if it had any other reason-then Shelley
cannot satisfy Gross's "but-for" test.

III
The majority finds that "Shelley presented direct evidence
of age discrimination to rebut the Corps' purported
non-discriminatory reason." Maj. Op. at 609. The majority
is just wrong on all accounts.
First, the majority (as did Shelley) framed its theory of the
case in terms of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis. See Maj. Op. at 608. But that test is used when the
plaintiff has to rely on inferences that are not based on
direct evidence. As we have explained, "[ w ]hen a plaintiff
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alleges disparate treatment based on direct evidence in an
ADEA claim, we do not apply the burden-shifting analysis
set forth in [McDonnell Douglas ]." Enlow v. SalemKeizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 FJd 802, 812 (9th Cir.2004).
In Enlow, we were simply following the Supreme Court's
instruction that "the McDonnell Douglas test is
inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
469 U.S. Ill, 121, lOS S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985).
Second, even if we look at the majority's "direct
evidence," it is anything but direct. As we explained in
Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co.: "Direct evidence is
evidence 'which, if believed, proves the fact [of
discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption.'
" 4 I 3 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.2005) (alteration in
original) (quoting Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d
12 17, 122 I (9th Cir. I 998)). It "typically consists of clearly
sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or
actions by the employer." Id.; see also Enlow, 389 F.3d at
812 ("Direct evidence, in the context of an ADEA claim, is
defined as 'evidence of conduct or statements by persons
involved in the decision-making process that may be
viewed as directly reflecting *616 the alleged
discriminatory attitude ... sufficient to permit the fact
finder to infer that that attitude was more likely than not a
motivating factor in the employer's decision.' ") (quoting
Walton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 167 FJd 423, 426
(8th Cir. I 999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The majority's "direct evidence" is a single fact-that two
members of the permanent position selection committee
(Regional Contracting Chief Joseph Scanlan and Business
Management Division Chief Kevin Brice) obtained a
document called the "Capable Workforce Matrix" (the
"matrix"), which lists projected vacancies in what appears
to be the Walla Walla Contracting Division.3 Maj. Op. at
609. The matrix lists each of the positions in the division
and, among other information, when the positions were
expected to become vacant due to planned departures or
retirements. The matrix does not mention the name of any
member of the division, but one who is familiar with the
division could deduce names based on the titles listed. For
instance, the matrix indicates that the division currently
employs one Assistant Chief of Contracting, and that the
incumbent is scheduled to either leave or retire in fiscal
year 2006. One who is familiar with the division would
know that the Assistant Chief of Contracting is Shelley and
would know, based on the matrix, that he is scheduled to
either leave or retire from his position in the Walla Walla
division in 2006. From this fact, the majority deduces "an
inference that they considered this information relevant to
their decision." Maj. Op. at 610 (emphasis added). But an
inference, we have said quite clearly, is not direct
evidence. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095.

Moreover, even taking this evidence as circumstantial
evidence, it doesn't amount to a hill of beans. There is no
evidence in the record that Scanlan or Brice actually
looked at the list, that either of them tried to link up
Shelley's name to the list, or (even assuming that they did)
that either took into account Shelley's age. In fact, the only
evidence in the record is to the contrary. Scanlan testified
that although he probably received the matrix, he did not
recall seeing it; both testified that age was not a
consideration. Nothing indicates that this request was
anything out of the ordinary. Scanlan and Brice were
entitled to these documents by virtue of their positions.
Scanlan testified that "the matrix is a working document
used for regional workforce planning purposes[, a]nd it is
updated periodically for workforce planning purposes"; all
of the districts, not just Walla Walla, were periodically to
provide that information for use in projecting future
requirements for different types of positions. So even if
Scanlan or Brice had determined Shelley's retirement date
from the matrix, that fact, without more, is irrelevant. And
because Shelley's supervisor, Oberle, was on the same
sheet and as readily identifiable as Shelley, there is no
reason to think that they would not also deduce her age and
discriminate against her-which they did not, because she
received an interview.
Furthermore, as the majority concedes, all of the applicants
had submitted resumes from which their ages could have
been estimated, Maj. Op. at 603-04, and Scanlan had
worked with Shelley for a number of years, so it would not
be surprising if he knew Shelley's age. Indeed, the
majority holds that Shelley has proved a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas, *617 which in the context of
an ADEA claim means that Shelley has shown that "the
promotion was given to a substantially younger person."
Maj. Op. at 608. Thus, the majority began from the premise
that everyone knew that Marsh was younger than Shelley.
But aside from the bare fact of knowing Shelley's age,
there are no statements by Scanlan or Brice, no emails, and
no off-hand remarks to Shelley or others about Shelley's
age. Yet "[w]ithout more, ... the fact that [Marsh] was
younger than [Shelley] does not create a triable issue of
pretext." Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 748
(9th Cir.2003). If mere awareness of an applicant's age is
direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to show
pretext, no disappointed-applicant-turned-plaintiff need
ever worry about summary judgment again. Indeed, even
in cases in which employers have not only noticed but also
commented in potentially negative ways about a plaintiff's
age, we have found that this weak evidence is insufficient
to justify a trial. See id. at 747 (compiling cases).
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The majority works very hard to come up with indirect
evidence of pretext. Shelley may establish pretext
"indirectly, by showing that the [Corps]'s proffered
explanation is 'unworthy of credence' because it is
internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or [ ]
directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more
likely motivated the employer." Chuang v. Univ. of Cal.
Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d I I 15, 1127 (9th Cir.2000)
(quoting Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220-22). Because Shelley
has no direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence upon
which he relies to refute the Corps's proffered explanation
must be " 'specific' and 'substantial' to create a genuine
issue of material fact." Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit
Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting
Godwin, 150 FJd at 1222). What the majority comes up
with is strict scrutiny of Shelley's and Marsh's resumes
and a conclusion that "Shelley's resume demonstrated
sufficient qualifications that a reasonable jury could find
that he was substantially better qualified than Marsh." Maj.
Op.at6lI.
The majority did not articulate the correct legal standard.
While we have held that a "district court's finding that a
Title VII plaintiff s qualifications were clearly superior to
the qualifications of the applicant selected is a proper basis
for a finding of discrimination," Odima v. Westin Tucson
Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir. I 995), we have yet to
articulate a precise standard in the summary judgment
context. In Road v. Fairbanks N Star Borough School
Dist., 323 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir.2003), we declined to
establish the high hurdle that the Fifth Circuit adopted in
Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 847 (5th Cir.1993) (requiring
that the "disparities [be] so apparent as virtually to jump
off the page and slap us in the face"). 323 FJd at 1194. The
Supreme Court also thought the standard in Odom was
"unhelpful and imprecise," though it did not choose to give
its own articulation of the correct standard. Ash v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163
L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006). Thus, we are left with the notion in
Road that a "pronounced difference" in qualifications can
be enough, 323 F .3d at I 194, but without more guidance
on what lesser quantum would also be sufficient.
Yet, surely situations in which the qualifications are so
similar that they could easily be thought to be equal cannot
justify a trial. More importantly, it cannot be that the
standard is that a reasonable jury could find that one
applicant is more qualified-however slightly-than
another; we cannot ask the jurors which of two candidates
they prefer. Rather, it must be that *618 a reasonable jury
could think that there is such a disparity in their
qualifications that the choosing of Marsh over Shelley is
only explainable because of the differences in their age.
This is a higher threshold than the majority's new
formulation. See Ash, 546 U.S. at 457, 126 S.Ct. 1195
("Under this Court's decisions, qualifications evidence

may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show
pretext."); Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1033 ("[A] reasonable
jury might also view the disparity between Cornwell's
management experience and Hall's as proof that
Defendants' explanation for Cornwell's demotion was a
pretext for race discrimination."); Road, 323 F.3d at I 197
nT]he fact that an employer hired a far less qualified
person than the plaintiff naturally gives rise to an inference
that the non-discriminatory explanation offered by the
employer is pretextuaL"),4
Shelley cannot show that his qualifications were so clearly
superior to Marsh's that a jury could reasonably find that
Marsh was promoted over Shelley on account of age. In
fact, it is far from clear that Shelley was even marginally
better qualified than Marsh. Shelley relied on no evidence
other than his own declaration and his resume. He offered
no expert witnesses who could evaluate the very technical
language of contracting and procurement hierarchy, he
proffered no colleagues who thought that he was better
qualified, and he couldn't point to any irregularities in the
selection process. All we have is Shelley's own opinion of
his relative qualifications. And because he has no other
evidence to support his claim of age discrimination,
Shelley rests his entire case on the theory that his
qualifications are so vastly superior to Marsh's that there is
no other explanation for the selection committee's decision
other than the disparity in their ages. With all due respect,
we have no business substituting our judgment for the
selection committee. And our judgment does not improve
by inviting jurors to decide which of the two they would
have hired.
According to the selection criteria, the selection committee
was supposed to evaluate resumes according to four
criteria: (I) technical competency, (2) management, (3)
leadership, and (4) teamwork. With regard to technical
competency, the criteria required the committee to
consider four factors: demonstrated knowledge of federal
contracting regulations, experience in overseeing
multimillion dollar contracts, knowledge and experience in
applying federal regulations, and experience in developing
contract strategies to support large acquisition programs.
The selection criteria add that an outstanding candidate
should possess a graduate level degree.
Shelley had two things going for him relative to Marsh. He
had more experience-Shelley had 29 years of contracting
experience, while Marsh had 21 years of experience-and
Shelley possessed an MBA from Northwest Nazarene
University. The MBA degree was a plus for Shelley, but
the years of experience tell us nothing. Both candidates had
at least 20 years of experience. We have no basis for
deciding that Shelley's additional years made him a
superior candidate; if so, then every employer must
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promote on the basis of years of experience alone, But
every employer knows that mere years in service is not a
perfect proxy for competence, And indeed, if one were to
rely on "experience" *619 alone, Oberle would be an
obvious choice over Shelley because she already had the
very same position in Walla Walla as was being offered in
Kansas City,
More importantly, the technical competency criterion
called for the candidates to have "[ e ]xperience in
overseeing multi-million dollar contracts." While
"supervis[ing]"
and
Shelley's
resume
lists
"coordinat[ing]" contracts as among his responsibilities, he
failed to list any specifics or examples of the contracts that
he managed. In his declaration prepared for this lawsuit,
Shelley claimed that he had supervised "multi-million
dollar military construction contracts" in Afghanistan, a
$100,000,000 power house at Minidoka Dam for the
Bureau of Reclamation, multi-million dollar dam projects
in the Pacific Northwest, a $200,000,000 modernization
project at McNary Dam, and other contracts exceeding
$10,000,000 on the Columbia and Snake rivers. All of that
is very impressive. Unfortunately, none of it was on
Shelley's resume. For example, Shelley testified as to the
projects he worked on in Afghanistan, for which he was
awarded the Bronze Star.

Q. Are those-are those examples listed in your
resume?
A. They're referenced in my Bronze Star award. Not
the contracts specifically.

Q. But if I look at the passage on the Bronze Star
award will I see any reference to those specific
projects?
A. I don't think so.

Q. Should the panel have considered those projects
when they were looking at your resume?
A. Yes.

Q. And they have done that by finding it out from
something other than your resume?
A. Yes.
He didn't fare any better on the other projects he claimed in
his declaration. Here is the testimony on the Minidoka
Dam project:

Q. Is that example listed anywhere in your resume?

A. No.
He was asked about his experience with the dams in the
Pacific Northwest:

Q. Where in your resume does it mention ... the
complex earth dams throughout the
Northwest? Or the Grand Coulee Dam?

Pacific

A. I don't list them specifically.
His Walla Walla experience didn't show up either:
Q. Where is that in your resume?
A. It's not specifically stated, but it's implied with my
unlimited warrant in my resume.
By contrast, Marsh's resume specifies that he "[ s]erved as
the Contract Administrator for the $1.3 billion Health Care
Delivery and Administrative Support Services contract."
The majority's answer for Shelley's failings in this regard
is to explain that Scanlan, who served on the selection
committee, was already personally "familiar with
Shelley's experience and credentials." Maj. Op. at 611. But
we have no idea whether Scanlan knew all the details
Shelley omitted, and suggesting that one member of the
selection committee "knows your record" is not the same
thing as submitting a complete application to the
committee. The decision not to interview Shelley was not
up to Scanlan alone-it was up to a five-member selection
committee, of which Scanlan was just one member. As
Colonel Rossi, who chaired the selection committee,
explained, each member of the selection committee
independently reviewed resumes from dozens of
applicants before convening via teleconference *620 to
decide on who to interview. Given the structure of the
application process, Shelley should not have expected
Scanlan to fill in the blanks in his resume if he failed to
submit a complete resume in the first place; it is
unreasonable for him to expect the remaining members of
the committee to rank him based on information he didn't
supply. In sum, though Shelley claimed to have had
experience managing large contracts, there is no way to tell
based on his resume, which offers only general
descriptions of his past experience.
With respect to management and leadership, the selection
criteria emphasize experience serving as branch or section
supervisor with over 30 employees, managing "large,
multidisciplined" organizations and overseeing the
execution of multi-million dollar contracts. Here, the
differences between the candidates' resumes really show.
At the time he applied, Shelley was Assistant Chief in the
Contracting Division, a GS-13 position. He previously had
positions as a Team Leader,Sllper\,i~()r'y Contract
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Specialist, and Contract Specialist. Although the criteria
specifically mentioned that the candidates should be
"branch or section supervisor ... with over 30 employees,"
Shelley did not list the number of employees he supervised
in any of his positions. By contrast, Marsh was a
Supervisory Procurement Analyst, which was a GS-14
position, and he stated that he supervised 15 employees. In
his previous position as Supervisory Contract Specialist,
he had supervised 75 contract specialists, including 14
contracting officers. And prior to that he had supervised 13
German and American contract specialists and three
contracting officers in Germany.
The majority recognizes that Shelley didn't respond
directly to the criteria, but props him up anyway: "While
Shelley's resume did not specify the number of employees
he supervised, it did disclose that, as Assistant Chief of
Contracting, he supervised, coordinated and managed the
work of subordinate Team Leaders, who presumably led
teams." Maj. Op. at 619-20 (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, it is a big presumption. Shelley stated that,
around 1985, he was temporarily made the Chief of the
Walla Walla Division. Here is his testimony:
A. How long have you served as a Division Chief,
how many days?
Q. I can't even number them on my head .... I was
constantly made the Division Chief.

Q. Is that noted on your resume?

A. I don't see that I covered that in there .... They
wouldn't have seen it from my resume.

Q. So is there anywhere in your resume where it
reflects that you acted as a Division Chief for any
significant period of time?
A. I don't see it in there.
To counteract the failings in Shelley'S resume, the majority
then disparages Marsh's resume because his supervising
75 employees was not part of his regular job duties. See
Maj. Op. at 610. From all of this, the majority calls the
round a tie because "[n]either candidate clearly
demonstrated that he met this criterion." Id. at 610.
The majority is wrong, of course. The most notable
distinction between the two resumes was that Shelley was

not the head of his office and Marsh was. That
inconvenient fact is also reflected in one other critical fact:
Marsh's demonstrated competence had been rewarded
with a GS-14 position, while Shelley was still a GS-13.
The majority's answer to this is incomprehensible. It says
that this was "relevant *621 only as to the 120-day
position" because, if Shelley had been given the 120-day
position, he too would have been a GS-14. Jd. at 61 I. The
majority has missed the whole point: Marsh was already a
GS- 14 when the I20-day position opened; even though he
was younger than Shelley and had fewer years with the
Corps, he held a higher position, at least as measured by his
supervisory responsibilities and his pay grade. See
Pottenger, 329 F.3d at 748 ("Nor does the fact that the
company moved a younger employee ahead of Pottenger
on the CEO successor list suggest that [the company] acted
with any discriminatory motive, for that employee had
held a higher position in the company than Pottenger.").
With regard to the final criterion, teamwork, the criteria
emphasize the ability to work with customers and other
departments, offices, and teams in a multi-disciplinary
setting. Marsh's resume lists relevant experience such as
serving as his directorate's point of contact with Congress
and the Army Audit Agency, in addition to maintaining
working relationships with counterparts throughout the
U.S.
Small
Business
Department of Defense,
Administration, and other federal agencies. Shelley's
resume, on the other hand, fails to list any comparable
experience. The majority opinion is just silent on this
criterion.
From all of this, the majority deduces that "a reasonable
jury could find that [Shelley] was substantially better
qualified than Marsh." Maj. Op. at 611 (emphasis added).
The majority thus sides with Shelley, who bitterly claims
that "Marsh should have received a 'minimally acceptable'
evaluation." But repeating it does not make it so. At the
very least, Marsh had a resume equal to or better than
Shelley's. And these were not the only two candidates. The
selection committee was responsible for ranking 32
applicants, among whom were a number of qualified
individuals, including Shelley'S supervisor. Based on the
relevant resume screening criteria, along with the fact that
Marsh was already a Supervisory Procurement Analyst,
there is no evidence to show that Shelley was
"substantially better qualified" than Marsh. And without
that evidence, Shelley has nothing to show that the Corps's
explanation-that the selection committee thought there
were six candidates better qualified than Shelley-was
pretextual.5
Indeed, the maJonty overlooks a straightforward
conclusion based on evidence that it discusses. In the panel
members' initial rankings-which were done individually
and prior to any discussion with other panel
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members~Marsh received four top rankings and one mid
ranking; Shelley received three top rankings and two mid
rankings. Even assuming that Scanlan was the one who
gave Marsh a top ranking and Shelley a mid ranking, that
means that the other panel members independently came to
the conclusion that Marsh was at least as qualified as
Shelley. Furthermore, a different panel member changed
his score for Shelley (downgrading him from mid to
bottom). Even if this change came after the panel
members' discussion-in which the evidence only shows
that age was never discussed and neither was Shelley in
particular~that means that at least two panel members
concluded that Marsh was a better *622 applicant than
Shelley. Thus, even if Scanlan did have animosity toward
Shelley based on his age (for which there is no evidence
whatsoever), Marsh would still have been strongly
preferred over Shelley by the committee as a whole.

There is more than sufficient evidence to affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment, even without
considering the Gross "but-for" test. See Coleman v.
Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1285 (9th Cir.2000)
(holding that comments related to age, the plaintiffs own
evaluations of his qualifications, and the use of subjective
evaluations for promotion were still insufficient to raise an
issue of fact concerning discriminatory motive). Once we

factor Gross into the mix, it is apparent that Shelley cannot
show that the Corps's decision is unexplainable on any
basis other than age discrimination.

******
There is not only no evidence of age discrimination against
Shelley, there is no evidence of age discrimination infavor
of Marsh. On this record, Shelley has failed to satisfY even
his minimal burden of showing that his age "actually
played a role in [the Corps's decision-making] process and
had a determinative influence on the outcome," Reeves v.
SandersonPlllmbingProds., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120
S.Ct.2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 6 I 0, 113 S.Ct. 170 I, 123
L.Ed.2d 338 (I 993)), much less advance any evidence of
"but for" causation for his ADEA claim. Accordingly, I
would affirm the grant of summary judgment.
Parallel Citations
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Footnotes

*

The Honorable Claudia Wilken, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

1

As an alternative to filing an administrative complaint, a federal employee may tile a civil action in a United States district court
under the ADEA after giving the EEOC not less than thirty days' notice of intent to sue. 29 U.s.c. § 633a(d): 29 C.F.R. §
1614.201 (a); see Bankston, 345 F.3d at 770. There is no evidence that Shelley provided the EEOC with notice of his intent to sue the
Corps, and he does not appear to rely on this alternative avenue.

2

Mixed-motivesjury instructions are used in Title VII cases where an employee alleges that he or she suffered an adverse employment
action because of both permissible and impermissible considerations. i.e., a "mixed-motives" case. Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2347 (citing
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228. 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989». Under such instructions, if a Title VII plaintiff
shows that discrimination was a "motivating" or a "substantial" factor in the employer's action, the burden of persuasion would shift
to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action regardless of that impermissible consideration. Jd.

3

We have done the same in non-precedential, unpublished decisions. Russell v. !v/ollnlain Park Health Or. Props., LLC 403
Fed.Appx. 195. 196 (9th Cir.20 10): EEOC v. Banner Health, 402 Fed.Appx. 289. 290~92 (9th Cir.201 0).

4

It thus appears that, as part of the prima facie case, a plaintiff does not have to show that he was discriminated against in favor of a
substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications. If Shelley were required to show this, he has done so. as
discussed below in connection with his showing of pretext. See Lowe v. Ci(v o/Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,1005 (9th Cir.1985), as
amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that in order to show pretext. a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence that he
olfered to establish a prima facie case).

5

Although the Walla Walla Capable Workforce Matrix in the record is dated March 21, 2006. after Shelley was denied an opportunity
to interview. it displays the same information that Scanlan and Brice had requested earlier, and shows that one could deduce the
names of individual employees.

1

Because I agree that Shelley exhausted his administrative remedies. I concur in Part I of the majority opinion. I also agree that the
district court erred in holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to ADEA claims. Accordingly, I concur in Parts
I through II.A of the majority opinion.
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2

The majority mischaracterizes the Corps's explanation for its decisions as being that Marsh was already a GS-14 whereas Shelley
was only a GS-13. Maj. Op. at 609. As I discuss in Part IV, Marsh's prior permanent GS-14 position is of course relevant and
demonstrates his superior qualifications, though it is hardly the only way in which he was a better applicant than Shelley. The Corps
has contended throughout that the six candidates selected for an interview were each generally better qualified than Shelley and that
the selection process worked correctly; even Shelley acknowledged this as the explanation offered by the Corps. Because of this
mischaracterization, the majority can claim that the Corps's explanation was irrelevant for the permanent hiring decision because if
Shelley had received the temporary position, his receiving the permanent position would have been a lateral move, too. See Maj. Op.
at 611. It also paves the way for the majority's erroneous conclusion that a "reasonable jury [could] find that the Corps' reliance on
Marsh's GS-14 level. as compared to Shelley's GS-13 level. was pretextual." Maj. Op. at 611.

3

For the reasons set out above, this piece of evidenee is irrelevant to the 120-<lay position and only potentially probative for
discrimination in the selection for the permanent position.

4

I note that in these cases the standard of proof is not as demanding as in this ADEA ease. Beeause these eases were brought under
Title VII and similar eauses of action, demonstrating mixed motives would have been sufficient in each; the plaintiffs did not need to
prove but-for causation. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003).

5

It should also be noted that, for the same reasons that Marsh demonstrated better qualifications for the permanent position, he also
demonstrated better qualifications for the 120-day position. In any case, Marsh already held the same job title as the 12O-day
position. Thus, for neither position can Shelley rebut the Corps's legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification.

Thomson Reuters. No
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·j·,Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements

934 F.2d 1104
United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Employee may show violations of Title VII or
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by
proving disparate treatment or disparate impact,
or by proving existence of hostile work
environment.
Age
Discrimination
in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
58 Cases that cite this headnote

Edyna Marie SISCHO-NOWNEJAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

MERCED COMMUNITY COLLEGE
DISTRICT; Board of Trustees ofMerced
Community College District; Bruce
Pressly; ~largaret Randolph; Richard
Rodini; Robert Ohki; Richard Parker; Dr.
E. W. Bizzini; James Edmonson; Walter
Crawford; Anthony Rose; William C.
Martineson; Dean Ron Williams; Luc
Janssens; Alan Beymer, in their official
capacity as members of the Board of
Trustees and Administrators ofMerced
Community College District,
Defendants-Appellees.

121

In order to prove disparate treatment,
employment discrimination plaintiff may assert
either that employer's challenged decisions
stemmed from single illegitimate motive or that
decision was product of both legitimate and
illegitimate motives. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 62 I et seq.; Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
16 Cases that cite this headnote

No. 89-15874. I Argued and Submitted Dec.
10,1990. I Decided June 13, 1991.

Art instructor at community college brought action
against college and college officials alleging age and sex
discrimination. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California, Robert E. Coyle, Chief
Judge, entered summary judgment in favor of college and
college officials, and instructor appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, held that: (I) instructor
established prima facie case of age and sex
discrimination; (2) genuine issues of material fact existed
as to whether legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
offered for disparate treatment were pretext for
discrimination; (3) triable issues existed with respect to §
1983 claim; and (4) instructor did not have claim under
California Fair Employment and Housing Act for failure
reasonably to accommodate her handicap of high blood
pressure.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.

West Headnotes (14)

II I

Civil Rights
;.>"'Particular cases
Civil Rights

Civil Rights
.. " Disparate treatment

131

Civil Rights
i?"'-,Effect of prima facie case; shifting burden

Employment discrimination plaintiff may
establish prima facie case by introducing
evidence that gives rise to inference of unlawful
discrimination, in which case burden shifts to
employee
to
articulate
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for challenged actions;
if employer does so, then burden returns to
plaintiff to prove that articulated reason is
pretextual, with question ultimately being
whether it is more likely than not that
employer's conduct was motivated solely by
intentional discrimination. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U .S.C.A. § 62 I et seq.; Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
94 Cases that cite this headnote

v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (1991)
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141

Civil Rights
or intent; pretext

'~F'Motive

171
employment
In
mixed
motive
case,
discrimination plaintiff must show that it is more
likely than not that protected characteristic
played motivating part in employment decision;
once that is done, employer may escape liability
only by proving by way of affirmative defense
that employment decision would have been
same even if characteristic had played no role.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.;
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
25 Cases that cite this headnote

151

16J

Normally when evidence giving rise to inference
of unlawful discrimination has been introduced,
court should not grant summary judgment to
defendant in employment discrimination action
on any ground relating to merits, even if
defendant
articulates
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
challenged
employment decision; specifically, in evaluating
whether defendant's articulated reason IS
pretextual, trier of fact must, at minimum,
consider same evidence that plaintiff introduced
to establish her prima facie case. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U .S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e
et seq.
76 Cases that cite this headnote

Federal Civil Procedure
"""Burden of proof
Employment discrimination plaintiffs burden
on summary judgment was merely to establish
prima facie case and, once employer articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions, to raise genuine factual issue as to
whether articulated reason was pre textual. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U .S.C.A. § 2000e
et seq.
51 Cases that cite this headnote

181

Civil Rights
prohibited or required in general;
elements
Civil Rights
c;.>~0Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements
'·i>~Practices

Same standards exist under Title VII and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act for
proving discrimination in conditions of
employment as exist for proving discrimination
in hiring. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et
seq.; Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq .

Civil Rights
·O)~Presumptions,

Inferences, and Burden of
Proof
Civil Rights
..' ' ' Prima facie case

Evidence giving rise to inference of unlawful
discrimination may be either direct or
circumstantial, and amount that must be
produced in order to create prima facie case is
very little. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et
seq.; Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
56 Cases that cite this headnote

Federal Civil Procedure
,tj=Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

191

Civil Rights
v"Sex discrimination
Civil Rights
'v"Age discrimination
Art instructor at community college introduced

v. Merced Community

Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (1991)
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sufficient evidence to give rise to inference of
disparate treatment on basis of age and sex,
where instructor was only female and one of
oldest full-time faculty members in art
department, and she introduced evidence she
was subjected to treatment that differed from
that accorded remainder of faculty, and that her
superiors referred to her as "an old warhorse"
and to her students as "little old ladies," and
made other derogatory remarks indicating age
and gender bias. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
18 Cases that cite this headnote
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26 Cases that cite this headnote

Federal Civil Procedure
~"'Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
offered for disparate treatment of art instructor
at community college were pretext for
discrimination on basis of age and sex,
precluding summary judgment on instructor's
claims under Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, considering
extent of disparate treatment evidence presented
by instructor beyond that necessary to establish
prima facie case. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U .S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
53 Cases that cite this headnote

I] ] I

Civil Rights
·.:=Education, employment in
Civil Rights
,.=Education, employment in
Allegation that community college and
employees thereof violated art instructor's rights
to equal protection of the laws by discriminating
against her on basis of age and gender was claim
cognizable under § 1983.42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
I I Cases that cite this headnote

in General

Plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants acted
with
intent to
discriminate
to
prove
discrimination in violation of § 1983. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

1131
1101

Civil Rights
'~.=.Discrimination

Federal Civil Procedure
v=Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Evidence that was determined to be sufficient to
create genuine issue of material fact as to
intentional discrimination for purposes of Title
VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act also served to create genuine issue of
material fact for purposes of discrimination
claim under § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
19 Cases that cite this headnote

1141

Civil Rights
.;'04Requesting and choosing accommodations;
interactive process; cooperation
Community college and its employees did not
violate art instructor's rights under California
Fair Employment and Housing Act by failing
reasonably to accommodate her handicap of
high blood pressure by granting her leave of
absence, where instructor made no request for
medical leave and, in fact, informed employees
when she requested leave that she was under no
medical restrictions. West's Ann.CaI.Gov.Code
§ 12900 et seq.
I Cases that cite this headnote
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Katherine
plaintiff-appellant.

Hart,

Fresno,

Cal.,

for

Benjamin L. Ratliff, Eldridge, Anderson & Weakley,
Fresno, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California.
Before TANG, FLETCHER and REINHARDT, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Edyna Sischo-Nownejad, an art instructor at Merced
Community College on Merced campus, brought suit
against the college and college officials alleging age and
sex discrimination. Her complaint alleges that because of
her age and sex, the defendants harassed her and
subjected her to different treatment regarding class
assignments and other working conditions. During the
period in question, Sischo-Nownejad was 52-58 years of
age. At the time, she was the only female, and one of the
oldest, full-time faculty members in the art department.
The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court held that Sischo-Nownejad had
failed to *]] 07 prove a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination pursuant to Title VII, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and 42 USc. §
1983, and that no triable issue of material fact existed
regarding her second § 1983 claim and her related state
law claims. Sischo-Nownejad appeals from the grant of
summary judgment.! We affirm in part and reverse in
part.
I. FACTS2

Sischo-Nownejad has been employed as a faculty member
in the Merced College art department since 1968. The
college ordinarily bases the assignment and scheduling of
classes on the input of faculty members, and senior
faculty who have developed particular courses are
normally given the first choice of teaching them. Further,
division chairpersons customarily consult with faculty
members regarding their need for supplies. The college
followed these practices with regard to the other faculty
members throughout the period in question, but did not do
so with regard to Sischo-Nownejad. Instead, from 1981 to
1986, division chairpersons failed to consult with her

about which courses she wanted to teach, gave her
teaching assignments that she did not want, and
reassigned courses that she had developed and taught for
many years. From 1982 to 1988, they also failed to
consult with her regarding her need for supplies
and-although the other faculty members received all the
supplies necessary-she received none. Moreover, from
198 I to 1983, the division chairpersons monitored the
enrollment of her classes but not the enrollment of classes
taught by others.
In March 1981, Sischo-Nownejad protested to defendant
Williams, a college dean, regarding her class assignments.
She stated that defendant Janssens, her division
chairperson, had reassigned some of her high-enrollment
courses to himself, regardless of the fact that she had
developed the classes. Williams took no action.
Sischo-Nownejad then wrote to Williams and sent a copy
of the letter to the president of the college and the board
of trustees. Janssens responded by filing a complaint with
the
faculty
ethics
committee
that
accused
Sischo-Nownejad of charging him with unprofessional
conduct in a widely disseminated letter, violating
department procedure by the copying and sale of art
department works, and physically abusing another art
department teacher. He did not send Sischo-Nownejad a
copy of the complaint. The ethics committee then violated
its own policies by conducting an investigation that
involved the entire faculty senate, rather than merely the
ethics committee, with no advance notice to
Sischo-Nownejad. Janssens's complaint resulted in an
admonishment against Sischo-Nownejad, which was
included in her personnel file.
In 1982, Sischo-Nownejad took a leave of absence for
medical reasons. When she returned to work, she found
that large file cabinets had been moved into her office
during her absence. College officials criticized her for
allowing her daughter to use her faculty parking space
and said that if the use continued, the space would be
taken away. Sischo-Nownejad responded that she was on
crutches and that her daughter was providing
transportation; the defendants took no further action
regarding the parking space. The defendants also
criticized Sischo-Nownejad for not being on campus
enough hours to fulfill her contractual obligation, for
failing to attend division meetings, and for being absent
during her office hours. Sischo-Nownejad denied the
allegations.
In February 1983, Sischo-Nownejad submitted a written
request for a leave of absence. The defendants denied her
request, stating that the semester had already progressed
too far to grant the leave. Sischo-Nownejad sought
reconsideration *1108 and defendant Martineson,
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president of the college, asked for clarification on the type
of leave requested. After soliciting information on the
types of leave available, Sischo-Nownejad requested a
paid sabbatical leave or an unpaid professional
development leave. The letter that her attorney wrote to
Martineson
requesting
the
leave
stated
that
Sischo-Nownejad was under no medical restrictions and
that, unless advised to the contrary by her doctors, she
would continue to fulfill her contractual obligations.
Martineson did not rule on the request for reconsideration,
and Sischo-Nownejad withdrew the request seven months
later.
Throughout the period in question, the defendants made
numerous statements indicating age and gender bias.
These statements include a reference to Sischo-Nownejad
as "an old warhorse" and a characterization of her
students as "little old ladies [who] have their own art
studio." Janssens once stated, "There she is with her little
group of women." He also made sarcastic remarks
regarding "you women's libbers." Martineson twice urged
Sischo-Nownejad to retire, a suggestion repeated by the
dean of personnel.

had failed to demonstrate age or sex discrimination
pursuant to Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the district court also held that she had
failed to demonstrate age or sex discrimination pursuant
to Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution4 and the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The court
held that no triable issue of material fact existed pursuant
to the Fair Employment and Housing Act on the question
whether the defendants had failed reasonably to
accommodate Sischo-Nownejad's high blood pressure by
granting a leave of absence. Finally, the court held that
Sischo-Nownejad could not recover for breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because
California law limits the application of tort damages in
employment situations.s
The district court denied the defendants' request for
attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1988. The
defendants do not appeal this ruling. They do, however,
request that we exercise our discretion and *1109 award
them their costs and attorney's fees on appeal.

III. TITLE VII AND AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT CLAIMS
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sischo-Nownejad's complaint contains several claims for
relief. She alleges that the defendants discriminated
against her on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act; that they discriminated against her
on the basis of age, in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act; and that they deprived her of equal
protection and the right to privacy, in violation of 42
U.s.c. § 1983. She further alleges that the defendants
deprived her of equal protection in violation of Article I, §
7 of the California Constitution. She claims that their
alleged age and sex discrimination constitutes a violation
of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, as
does their alleged refusal reasonably to accommodate her
handicap of high blood pressure by granting her a leave of
absence. Finally, she alleges that the defendants breached
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in her
employment contract.
The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on all claims. The court held that
Sischo-Nownejad had failed to establish a prima facie
case of intentional age or sex discrimination pursuant to
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
and § 1983. It further held that no triable issue of material
fact existed pursuant to § 1983 on the question whether
the defendants had violated Sischo-Nownejad's right to
privacy.3 Because of its holding that Sischo-Nownejad

A.

111 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it illegal for an
employer "to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's ...
sex." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act forbids the identical conduct when
the discrimination is "because of such individual's age."
29 U.S.c. § 623(a)(I). A plaintiff may show violations of
these statutes by proving disparate treatment or disparate
impact, or by proving the existence of a hostile work
environment. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15,97 S.Ct. 1843,
1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Jordan v. Clark, 847
F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1006, 109 S.Ct. 786, 102 L.Ed.2d 778 (1989); Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Borden's, Inc.,
724 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir.1984). Disparate treatment
involves intentional discrimination. Borden's, 724 F.2d at
1392. Disparate impact involves a facially neutral
employment criterion that has an unequal effect on
members of a protected class; discriminatory intent need
not be proved. !d. at 1392-93. A hostile work environment
requires the existence of severe or pervasive and
harassment because of a
unwelcome verbal or
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plaintiffs membership in a protected class. See Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67, 106
S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Young v. Will
County Dep't of Public Aid, 882 F.2d 290, 294 (7th
Cir.1989);Jordan, 847 F.2dat 1373.

121 13) 14) Sischo-Nownejad's claims are based
exclusively on a theory of disparate treatment.6 In order to
prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff may assert either that
the employer's challenged decision stemmed from a
single illegitimate motive (i.e., sex discrimination) or that
the decision was the product of both legitimate and
illegitimate motives. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 244-48,109 S.Ct. 1775,1788-89,104 L.Ed.2d
268 (1989). In the former case, the plaintiff may establish
a prima facie case by introducing evidence that "give[s]
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Texas
Dep't ol Community Ailairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248.
253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).7 The
burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
action. ld. If the employer does so, then the burden
returns to the plaintiff to prove that the articulated reason
is pretextuaI. ld.; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825,36 L.Ed.2d 668
(1973). Ultimately, the question is whether it is more
likely than not that the employer's conduct was motivated
solely by intentional discrimination. United States Postal
Service Board olGovernors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716,
103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). In other
words, does the preponderance of the evidence tend to
support the conclusion that *] ] 10 the action resulted from
a discriminatory
motive? The analysis in a case involvinab
.
mixed motives is somewhat different. The Price
Waterhouse plurality found the Burdine formula
unsuitable for mixed motives cases. Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 244-48, 109 S.Ct. at 1788-89. Instead it
adopted a simpler approach. Under Price Waterhouse, 'the
plaintiff must show that it is more likely than not that a
protected characteristic "played a motivating pali in [the]
employment decision." ld. at 244, 247 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. at
1787, 1789 n. 12. Once that is done, the employer may
escape liability only by proving by way of an affirmative
defense that the employment decision would have been
the same even if the characteristic had played no role. Jd.
at 243-47,109 S.Ct. at 1787-88.
IS) In opposing the summary judgment motion,
Sischo-Nownejad relied on a single-motive theory.8
Because her complaint survives summary judgment on
that theory, we need not decide here whether a mixed
motives theory would be applicable as wel1.9
Sischo-Nownejad's burden on summary judgment was
merely to establish a prima facie case and, once the
e ployer articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

fl1

reason for its actions, to raise a genuine factual issue as to
whether the articulated reason was pretextual. See Lowe v.
City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir.1985), as
amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986).10 Because she met that
burden, we hold that the district court committed
reversible error in granting summary judgment to the
defendants on her claims under Title VII and the Age
~
Discrimination in Employment Act.

B.

16J 171 In order to show a prima facie case of
discrimination, "a plaintiff must offer evidence that
'give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.' "
ld. at 1005 (quoting Texas Dep't olCommunity Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67
L.Ed.2d 207 (1981». The evidence may be either direct or
circumstantial, *11]] and the amount that must be
produced in order to create a prima facie case is "very
little." ld. at 1009. Normally, when such evidence has
been introduced, a court should not grant summary
judgment to the defendant on any ground relating to the
merits. ld. Even if the defendant articulates a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment
decision, thus shifting the burden to the plaintiff to prove
that the articulated reason is pretextual, summary
judgment is normally inappropriate. "[W]hen a plaintiff
has established a prima facie inference of disparate
treatment through direct or circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent, he will necessarily have raised a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the
legitimacy or bona fides of the employer's articulated
reason for its employment decision." ld. (emphasis
added). Specifically, in evaluating whether the
defendant's articulated reason is pretextual, the trier of
fact must, at a minimum, consider the same evidence that
the plaintiff introduced to establish her prima facie case.
ld. at 1008. When that evidence, direct or circumstantial
consists of more than the McDonnell Dougla;
presumption, a factual question will almost always exist
with respect to any claim of a nondiscriminatory reason.
The existence of this question of material fact will
ordinarily preclude the granting of summary judgment. ld.
at 1009.
In Lowe v. City of Monrovia, we reversed a grant of
summary judgment on facts similar to those before us
today. In that case, a black female plaintiff applied for a
job with Monrovia's police force. The city's personnel
manager told her that the city had no women or black
police officers and "had no facilities." The personnel
manager suggested that the plaintiff apply in Los Angeles
instead of Monrovia. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1002. We held
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that these statements, when viewed in conjunction with
the fact that Monrovia had no black police officers at the
time the plaintiff applied, created an inference of
discrimination sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
Id. at 1007. We further held that although the city had
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
refusing to hire the plaintiff, the evidence that the plaintiff
had introduced to establish her prima facie case was
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether the articulated reason was pretextual.
Id. at 1008-09.
181 The defendants in the case before us distinguish Lowe
as involving a refusal to hire, not conditions of
employment. They suggest that discrimination which
manifests itself in different conditions of employment
presents a separate problem from discrimination which
manifests itself through a refusal to hire, and that more
evidence is required to prove a prima facie case of the
former than of the latter. We reject this premise. Title VII
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act do not
suggest that different standards exist for proving
discrimination in hiring versus proving discrimination on
the job. Moreover, our precedents indicate the importance
of allowing the factfinder to consider the existence of
discrimination. "[A]n employer's true motive in an
employment decision is rarely easy to discern." As we
have previously noted, "[ w ]ithout a searching inquiry into
these motives, those [acting for impermissible motives]
could easily mask their behavior behind a complex web of
post hoc rationalizations .... " Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009
(quoting Peacock v. Duval, 694 F.2d 644, 646 (9th
Cir.1982». Thus, "the question of an employer's intent to
discriminate is 'a pure question of fact.' " Id. at 1008
(quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,
287-88, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982».
We require very little evidence to survive summary
judgment precisely because the ultimate question is one
that can only be resolved through a "searching
inquiry"-one that is most appropriately conducted by the
factfinder, upon a full record. Were we to increase the
amount of proof required to survive summary judgment
when conditions of employment are involved, the result
would be to remove from factfinders the ability to
consider claims that merit full exploration.
19] *]]]2 Applying the standards set forth in Lowe, we
hold that Sischo-Nownejad introduced sufficient evidence
to give rise to an inference of disparate treatment. Facts
introduced through her deposition and the declaration of
Penny Lowry, a college records officer, reveal that during
the time period in question, Sischo-Nownejad was the
only female, and one of the oldest, full-time faculty
members in the art department. She has adduced evidence
that she was subjected to treatment that differed from that

accorded the remainder of the faculty. Division
chairpersons
reassigned
Sischo-Nownejad's
high-enrollment courses away from her and assigned her
to teach courses that she did not want. They did not
provide supplies that she needed, and they monitored the
enrollment of her courses but not that of courses taught by
other faculty members. "Proof of discriminatory motive ...
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment." International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. IS, 97
S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Moreover,
while singling Sischo-Nownejad out for different
treatment, the defendants-her superiors-referred to her as
"an old warhorse" and to her students as "little old
ladies," and made other derogatory remarks indicating age
and gender bias. The Supreme Court has stated that
"stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that [a
protected characteristic] played a part" in an employment
decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251, 109 S.Ct. at
1791 (emphasis in original). In this instance, the fact that
stereotyped remarks were made by Sischo-Nownejad's
superiors at the same time that they were subjecting her to
less favorable working conditions is sufficient to raise an
inference of discriminatory intent.

110] The defendants attempt to rebut Sischo-Nownejad's
prima facie case of intentional discrimination by asserting
that the challenged actions occurred for nondiscriminatory
reasons. They state that Janssens reassigned some of
Sischo-Nownejad's classes to himself, for instance,
simply because he enjoyed teaching them. As in Lowe,
however, the evidence that Sischo-Nownejad introduced
to establish a prima facie case is direct and consists of
more than the McDonnell Douglas presumption.
Accordingly, that evidence serves a dual purpose. It is
sufficient not only to establish her prima facie case, but
also to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the defendants' articulated reasons are pretextual.
See Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1008-10. Therefore, the district
court committed reversible error in granting the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on
Sischo-Nownejad's Title VII and Age Discrimination in
Employment Act claims. We reverse the grant of
summary judgment on these claims and remand for a trial
on the merits.

IV. 42 U.S.c. § ]983 CLAIM
111) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may
challenge action committed under color of state law that
amounts to a deprivation of federal constitutional or
statutory rights. Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1333
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(9th Cir.1990). Sischo-Nownejad alleges that the
defendants, a community college and employees thereof,
violated her rights to equal protection of the laws by
discriminating against her on the basis of age and gender.
Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 875, 101 S.Ct. 218, 66 L.Ed.2d 96
(1980). Therefore, Sischo-Nownejad states a cognizable
claim.

11211131 In order to prove discrimination in violation of §
1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants
acted with the intent to discriminate. Peters v. Liel/allen,
746 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir.1984); Irby v. Sullivan, 737
F.2d 1418, 1424 n. 7 (5th Cir.1984). A plaintiff who fails
to establish intentional discrimination for purposes of
Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
also fails to establish intentional discrimination for
purposes of § 1983. See Knight v. Nassau County Civil
Service Commission, 649 F.2d 157, 161-62 (9th CiL),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818, 102 S.Ct. 97, 70 L.Ed.2d 87
(1981 ); see
* 1113 also Stones v. Los Angeles
Community College District, 796 F.2d 270, 275 (9th
Cir.1986). The district court relied on this principle to
grant summary judgment on Sischo-Nownejad's § 1983
claim. However, as we explained supra, Part III, the
district court erred in concluding that Sischo-Nownejad
had failed to present sufficient evidence of intentional
discrimination to defeat summary judgment for purposes
of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. Evidence that is sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact for purposes of those statutes also serves
to create a genuine issue for purposes of § 1983. See T &
S Service Assocs., Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722, 724 & n.
2 (I st Cir.1981); Whiting v. .lachon State University, 616
F.2d 116, 121-22 (5th Cir.1980). Therefore, the district
court erred when it granted summary judgment on
Sischo-Nownejad's § 1983 claim. We reverse the district
court on this count and remand for a trial on the merits.

V. CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT &
HOUSING ACT CLAIMS

A.
The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants on Sischo-Nownejad's Fair Employment and
Housing Act claim of intentional sex and age
discrimination. I I The court held that the standard for
interpr~ting, the Fair Empl().YI11~nt andJ:I()usiIlg, Act is

identical to that used in federal Title VII cases, but it cited
a case which is not on point to support this proposition.
See Best v. California Apprenticeship Council, 161
CaLApp.3d 626, 207 Ca1.Rptr. 863 (1984). Because the
district court had granted summary judgment to the
defendants on Sischo-Nownejad's Title VII claim, it did
the same on her Fair Employment and Housing Act claim.
Sischo-Nownejad argues that liability is more readily
found under the Fair Employment and Housing Act than
under Title VII. See Ibarbia v. Regents of the University
of California, 191 Ca1.App.3d 1318, 1326-28, 237
Cal.Rptr. 92, 96-98 (1987). We need not resolve this
question. Even if the district court was correct in holding
that the standards of liability are identical, we have
already held that summary judgment was inappropriate on
Sischo-Nownejad's Title VII claim. See supra, Part III.
Therefore, summary judgment should not have been
granted on the Fair Employment and Housing Act claim
of intentional discrimination. We reverse on this count
and remand for a trial on the merits.

B.

1141 Sischo-Nownejad's second claim under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act is that the defendants
failed reasonably to accommodate her handicap of high
blood pressure by granting her a leave of absence.12 The
record does not give rise to * 1114 a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to this allegation. The facts
introduced below demonstrate that Sischo-Nownejad
sought a paid sabbatical leave or an unpaid professional
development leave. She made no request for a medical
leave and, in fact, informed the defendants that she was
"under no medical restrictions at the present time." The
district court correctly granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment regarding this Fair Employment and
Housing Act claim. We affirm on this count.

VI. COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
The defendants do not challenge the lower court's refusal
to grant them attorney's fees pursuant to 42 USc. §
1988, but request that we exercise our discretion to award
them their costs and attorney's fees on appeal. They cite
no authority for this request, but presumably rely upon
our authority to award costs and attorney's fees as a
sanction for bringing a frivolous appeal. See Fed.R.App.P.
38; 28 U .S.c. § 1912; Glan:::man v. Uniroyal, Inc., 892
F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir.1989). This appeal was not frivolous,
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as Sischo-Nownejad's claims obviously were not wholly
without merit. See McConnell v. Critchlmv, 661 F.2d 116,
118 (9th Cir.1981). Therefore, we deny the defendants'
request. Costs on appeal are awarded to appellant.

VII. CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment on Sischo-Nownejad's claims of intentional
discrimination. Specifically, we remand the following
claims for a trial on the merits: (I) Title VII claim of sex
discrimination; (2) Age Discrimination in Employment
Act claim of age discrimination; (3) 42 U.s.c. § 1983

claim of equal protection violation; and (4) Fair
Employment and Housing Act claim of age and sex
discrimination. We affirm the remainder of the grant of
summary judgment. We deny the defendants' request for
attorney's fees and costs, and grant costs to the appellant.
AFFIRMED IN
REMANDED.

PART;

REVERSED

IN

PART;

Parallel Citations
56 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 250, 56 Empl. Prac. Dec.
P 40,844, 67 Ed. Law Rep. 1109

Footnotes
She raises only some of her many claims on appeal. See inFa notes 3-5.

2

For purposes of summary judgment we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Sischo-Nownejad. See
Nilsson. Robbins, Da/garn. Berliner, Carson & Wlirst 1'. Louisiana Hydro/ec. 854 F.2d 1538, 1542 (9th CiLI988). That is what we
do in this section of our opinion. Whether the tacts will ultimatcly be found to be differcnt in one or more respects is a matter that
must bc determined after a trial on the merits.

3

Sischo-Nownejad does not appeal this rUling. In referring to her claim under § 1983, her briefs address only the issue of equal
protection, and not the issue of her right to privacy. Similarly, her counsel made no reference to the § 1983 right to privacy claim
during oral argument.

4

Sischo-Nownejad does not appeal this ruling. In her briefs and in oral argument the only state law claims she discusses are those
arising under the Fair Employment and !-lousing Act.

5

Sischo-Nownejad does not appeal this ruling. See supra note 4.

6

The district court, while acknowlcdging that Sischo-Nownejad's claims are based on disparate treatment, addressed much of its
analysis to theories of disparate impact and hostile working environment. We reiterate that these are distinct theories. Disparate
treatment, unlike disparate impact, requires proof of discriminatory intcnt. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
335 n. 15. 97 S.Ct. at 1854 n. 15. Moreover, disparate treatment. unlike a hostile working environment, need not involve physical
and/or vcrbal harassment. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405. 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986).

7

One way in which a plaintilT may establish an inference of discrimination is by satisfying the four-part test set forth in McDonnell
Doug/as Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.802.93 S.Ct. 1817.1824.36 LEd.2d 668 (1973):
I. She belongs to a protected class.
2. She applied for and was qualified for ajob for which the employer was sceking applicants.
3. Despite being qualified, she was rejected.
4. After her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from people of comparable
qualifications.

8

A plaintiff need not choose between a single motive and mixed motive theory at the beginning of the case. The Supreme Court has
explained:
[We do not] suggest that a case must be correctly labeled as either a "pretext" case or a "mixed motives" case from the
beginning in the District Court: indeed, we expect that plaintiffs often will allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both.
Discovery otten will be necessary before the plaintiff can know whether both legitimate and illegitimate considerations played
a part in the decision against her. At some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide whether a
particular case involves mixed motives. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy the factfinder that it is more likely than not that a
forbidden characteristic played a part in the employment decision, then she may prevail only if she proves, following Burdine.
that the employer's stated reason for its decision is pretextual.
]d, 490 U.S. at 247 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. at 1789 n. 12.
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9

The Supreme Court did not decide Price Waterhouse. in which it articulatcd the standards governing a mixed motives casc, until
after Sischo-Nownejad's complaint was filed. In her briefs on appeal. as well as in oral argument, she argues mixed motives.

10

Although it may be self-evident, we note here that nothing in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,106 S.C!. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d
265 (1986), affects our decision in Lowe. Celotex involved the question whether a party moving for summary judgment satisfies its
burden of production by simply pointing to the absence of any record evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Lowe, in contrast. involved the situation where the nonmoving party has produced record evidence-albeit "very
little"-giving rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
Lowe is also unaffected by the Supreme Court's decisions in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242. 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). and Matsushita Etec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.C!. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986). Anderson required that when a substantive claim may only be proved by "clear and convincing evidence," a district
court considering a motion for summary judgment must take that heightened evidentiary standard into account. The ultimate
burden of persuasion in Lowe, however, was that of proving intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
lvfatsushita is also not on point. There, the Supreme Court held that when the factual context rendered a claimed antitrust
violation implausible because the claim made no economic sense, the plaintiffs must produce more evidence than would
normally be necessary in order to defeat summary judgment. No such factual considerations existed in Lowe, nor do they exist in
the case before us today.

11

The Fair Employment and Housing Act states, in relevant part:
§ 129·10. Employers, labor organizations, employment agencies and other persons; unlawful employment practice;
exceptions.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or. except where based
upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the State of California:
(a) For an employer, because of the ... sex of any person. to ... discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms.
conditions or privileges of employment.
§ 12941. Age; unlawfid employment practice by employers; exceptions.
(a) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire or employ, or to discharge, dismiss, reduce.
suspend, or demote. any individual over the age of 40 on the ground of age, except in cases where the law compels or
provides for such action.
Cal.Gov.Code §§ 12940-12941 (Deering 1982 & Supp.1990).

12

The Fair Employment and Housing Act states, in relevant part:
§ 19240. Employers, labor organizations, employment agencies and other persons; unlawful employment practice;
exceptions.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, except where based
upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the State of California:
(a) For an employer, because of the ... physical handicap .. , of any person. to ... discriminate against the person in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
Cal.Gov.Code § 12940 (Deering 1982 & Supp.1990).
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'0"0 Weight and Sufficiency

Richard Jay SOHN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HowardR. FOLEY,
Defendant-Respondent.

When ruling on motion for summary judgment, it
is not within trial court's province to assess
credibility of affiant or deponent when credibility
can be tested in court before trier of fact.

No. 20550. I Jan. 3, 1994. I Petitionfor
Review Denied March 9, 1994.
Divorced husband brought legal malpractice action against
attorney who represented him in divorce case. The District
Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, D. Duff
McKee, J., entered summary judgment for attorney, and
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, Perry, 1., held
that: (I) triable issues existed regarding whether husband
and attorney were in pari delicto, and (2) triable issues
existed regarding proper award of damages.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[4[

Judgment
,>,.Presumptions and Burden of Proof

When assessing motion for summary judgment,
trial court must liberally construe all controverted
facts in favor of nonmoving party, and must
make all reasonable inferences in favor of
nonmoving party. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c).

Reversed and remanded.
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Summary judgment is proper only when there is
no genuine issue of material fact and moving
party is entitled to judgment as matter of law.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c).
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Judgment
,=Attorneys, Cases Involving

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether
husband and his attorney engaged in scheme to
defraud wife out of life insurance policy during
divorce proceedings, or whether husband
believed that final property settlement agreement
would require return of policy to husband and
would make transfer clear to wife, precluded
summary judgment for attorney on husband's
legal malpractice claim pursuant to in pari delicto
defense.

Appeal and Error
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whether genuine
whether moving
matter of law.

summary judgment, reviewing
free review in determining
issue of material fact exists and
party is entitled to judgment as
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Genuine issue of material fact as to whether
husband would actually have proceeded to trial in
divorce case if wife had refused to transfer life
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insurance policy to him as term of settlement
precluded summary judgment limiting husband's
damages in legal malpractice case against his
divorce attorney to those economic losses
directly attributable to or connected with policy.

[71

Attorney and Client
and Costs

,~.=Damages

In legal malpractice case based upon negligence
in handling litigation for client, measure of direct
damages is difference between client's actual
recovery and recovery which should have been
obtained but for attorney's malpractice.

Attorneys and Law Firms
**497 *169 Ellis, Brown & Sheils, Boise, for appellant.
Allen B. Ellis argued.
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Boise, for
respondent. Mark S. Geston argued.
Opinion
PERRY, Judge.

Richard J. Sohn (Richard) filed an action against his
former divorce attorney, Howard Foley (Foley), alleging
that Foley negligently advised him during property
settlement negotiations. The district court granted
summary judgment to Foley, finding that the parties were
in pari delicto and that the damages requested, which were
based on a hypothetical trial of Sohn v. Sohn, were too
speculative. The district court ruled, therefore, that if the
action against Foley were to go to trial, the damages were
limited to the economic losses directly attributable to the
loss of an insurance policy of which Richard contends he
would have obtained ownership, but for Foley'S
malpractice. Richard appeals the granting of the summary
judgment. We reverse the judgment entered by the district
court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Richard and Margaret (Margaret) Sohn were married in
1962. During their marriage, Richard and Margaret had
acquired various assets and liabilities, including a **498
*170 $300,000 indebtedness to the Internal Revenue
Service. During the marriage, United Airlines (UAL),
Richard's employer, began paying the premiums on a life
insurance policy for Richard. In 1984, Richard assigned
the policy to Margaret.
The Sohn's marriage had been deteriorating for years, and
the two had discussed divorce and settlement of their
property as early as 1989. The Sohns had preliminarily
decided how most of their property would be divided upon
their divorce. During the course of these settlement
discussions, Richard corresponded frequently with
Margaret, who had moved to Florida. A letter written on
June 18, 1990, sent by fax, indicates that Richard had
already made a comprehensive offer. It also indicated that
he wished to accomplish the divorce "as quickly and
cleanly as possible."
Richard again wrote Margaret on June 20, 1990. In this
letter he explained his plan for distribution of the assets and
liabilities and his belief it would be wiser for Margaret to
accept his proposal rather than endure a trial. Richard also
observed that a settlement would be better because "if we
go to court I will have to list all assets to get my fair share
and the IRS settlement is a liability and it will almost
certainly be verified directly with the IRS. This will have
an effect that neither of us will appreciate." The letter
proposed that Richard would take the $300,000 tax
liability plus a down payment on a house while Margaret
would get the remaining assets.
Richard first met with attorney Foley on July 5, 1990.
During this meeting, Richard provided Foley with a copy
of the 1984 assignment of the UAL life insurance policy,
informing Foley that Margaret owned the policy. Richard
claims that he also told Foley that he strongly desired to get
the policy back and that if he could not, he would not
accept a negotiated settlement and would go to trial.
According to Richard, Foley told him that it did not matter
what Margaret actually agreed to, as Richard would regain
ownership of the UAL policy after the divorce by
operation of the "insurable interest" doctrine. Richard and
Foley agreed that the policy would not be mentioned to
Margaret as a matter of strategy. Richard contends,
however, that the final language of the property settlement
agreement was to award him the policy.
Following the meeting with Foley, Richard wrote to
Margaret on a number of occasions, but did not mention
the policy. Finally, in response to a letter from Margaret
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stating that she believed she owned the insurance policy,
Richard stated in a letter on ] uly 22, 1990, "The insurance
policy is as you interpreted it. You own it and you control
it, no matter how obscene it is to hold a life insurance
policy on someone else's husband ... Don't bother to
respond on this issue, there is nothing you could say to
make you look righteous."
Richard and Margaret finally agreed on the wording of the
settlement agreement drafted by Foley, which did not
specifically mention the UAL policy. The agreement did,
however, state:
The following community assets and property are
hereby awarded to husband free of any and all claims by
wife as his sole, separate and absolute property:

5. All United Airline retirement benefits and programs
accruing to the Plaintiff prior to September 7, 1962 and
likewise all such benefits following the entry of the
Decree of Divorce herein.
Following the entry of the decree, Richard tried to recover
the policy. UAL, however, refused to recognize that the
settlement agreement set aside the 1984 assignment.
Richard, through Foley, filed a post-divorce motion under
I. R.C.P. 60(b), arguing that the provision set forth above
established that he owned the policy. This motion was
denied. Foley then filed, on behalf of Richard, an
independent action against Margaret and UAL to get the
policy returned to Richard. This suit, however, is not being
presently prosecuted.
Following Richard's unsuccessful attempts to get the
policy back, he filed this malpractice action against Foley.
Richard alleged that Foley's advice regarding the insurable
interest doctrine and his drafting of the provision in the
property settlement agreement **499 *171 were negligent.
The district court granted summary judgment to Foley on
the grounds that Richard and Foley were in pari delicto and
that no reasonable jury could render Richard relief on his
cause of action. The district court also found that if the
claim against Foley were to go to trial, the measure of
damages would be limited to economic losses directly
attributable to, or connected with, the life insurance policy.
Richard now appeals, claiming that the district court erred
when it granted Foley's motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons set forth below, we agree and therefore
reverse the ruling ofthe district court.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

IIJ 12J We first note that summary judgment under I.R.C.P.
56( c) is only proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we exercise free
review in determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc.,
III Idaho 851, 852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App.1986).
131141 When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it
is not within the trial court's province to assess the
credibility of an affiant or deponent when credibility can
be tested in court before a trier of fact. LOWlY v. Ireland
Bank, 116 Idaho 708,711,779 P.2d 22, 25 (Ct.App.1989).
When assessing the motion for summary judgment, all
controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of
the non-moving party. Furthermore, the trial court must
make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.,
119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851. 854 (1991).
B. 111 Pari Delicto

151 The district court granted Foley'S summary judgment
motion, finding that the parties were in pari delicto and
that, based on the undisputed facts before the district court,
no reasonable jury could grant Richard relief upon his
cause of action. The district court incorporated into the
written order the oral rulings made from the bench
following the hearing on the motion. In that oral ruling the
district court found that:
In my view, what is unmistakably clear is
Mr. Sohn was representing that his wife
was going to get and keep this insurance
policy. Or going to get to keep it. I guess
she already had it. And that that is
inconsistent with his contention now that
he and Mr. Foley, through Mr. Foley's
advice, were conspiring to deprive her of
that item. I think that I can find that as an
absolute matter of law, based upon the
uncontested documents that are in the file
and that have been submitted in terms of
the correspondence and communications
between Mr. Sohn and Mrs. Sohn.
The district court found the parties in pari delicto by virtue
of a "scheme" to defraud Margaret out of the policy.
Although the defense of in pari delicto has been accepted
in Idaho in various contexts, see Wilson v. Nielson, 75
Idaho 145,269 P.2d 762 (1954), and has been successfully
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used as a defense to an attorney malpractice claim in other
jurisdictions, see, e.g, Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris,
P.e, 180 Mich.App. 768,447 N.W.2d 864 (1989), we
hold that it was improperly applied in the context of a
summary judgment in this case.
In Richard's complaint against Foley, as well as
throughout his deposition, Richard maintains that he
believed the final property settlement agreement drafted by
Foley would conclusively require the return of the policy
to Richard, and that the document would make that transfer
clear to Margaret. He asserts that, to his knowledge, the
agreement adequately and properly provided for the return
of the policy. Therefore, his pre-agreement posturing did
not constitute fraud. In response, Foley contends that
Richard understood the document and that the two omitted
the policy from the settlement agreement because they felt
it would be returned to Richard as a matter of law. Foley
maintains that Richard intentionally misrepresented to
Margaret what Richard believed to be the law, hoping to
induce Margaret to sign **500 * 172 the agreement and
then regaining the policy in spite of the agreement.
The district court's determination, then, was essentially an
assessment of the parties' credibility. It is not the district
court's province to consider credibility when making a
summary judgment determination. Lowry, supra. There
remains a genuine question of material fact as to Richard's
intent during the process of negotiations. If the trier of fact
finds that it was Richard's intent to deprive his wife of the
policy by misrepresentations and fraud, then the doctrine
of in pari delicto may apply. If, on the other hand, the trier
of fact finds that Richard's intent was merely to wait until
the final draft of the agreement was presented to Margaret
to bring up reassignment of the policy, then the doctrine
would not apply.
It is not the place of the trial judge to assess the credibility
of the parties and then to rule based on that determination.
The trier of fact should ultimately make the credibility
determination taking into account all the evidence,
including the various letters sent by Richard to Margaret.
Therefore, it was error for the district court to grant the
summary judgment based on the doctrine of in pari delicto.

C. Summary Judgmellt Oil Damages

161 As part of the summary judgment order, the district
court also found that, "It is determined that Plaintiffs
damages, if any, shall be limited to those economic losses
directly attributable to or connected with the term life
insurance policy in controversy herein." In its oral ruling
on the motion, the district court stated:

On the partial summary judgment on the question of
damage I'm satisfied that a relitigation of Sohn versus
Sohn is not the measure of damage that should be
attributable in this case. I think it would be completely
speculative, as a matter oflaw, to attempt to try to figure
out what might have been the result had a settlement not
been reached and had the matter gone to trial. I agree
with the case cited by the defendant that this is just
beyond the realm of what the law would countenance as
proof of damage in a tort lawsuit.
I would further observe that in my view, the plaintiffs
contention in this area is fundamentally not credible as a
matter of law and that no jury would accept the
contention that ifhe did not get his way on this insurance
that he'd-that it was a deal breaker and that he'd go to
litigation wherever he might have to go to litigation,
whether in Idaho, or Florida, or Costa Rica, or wherever.
Again, as noted above, the credibility of the parties is not a
proper consideration when deciding a motion for summary
judgment. The district court found it unlikely, in its view,
that Richard would have actually proceeded to trial had he
thought he would not get the insurance policy. Although
this may seem unlikely, it is nonetheless a question for the
trier of fact at trial. What Richard might have done had
Foley correctly advised him about the insurable interest
doctrine or had Foley properly drafted the settlement
agreement are questions of fact. Thus, at trial, the question
of whether Richard would actually have proceeded to trial
in the divorce case if Margaret refused to transfer the
policy as a term of settlement is a question for the jury. If
the jury responds affirmatively, it will then be necessary to
determine the measure of damages, based on what Sohn
should have recovered upon a trial in the divorce
proceedings.

[71 In a legal malpractice case based upon negligence in
handling litigation for a claimant, the measure of direct
damages is the difference between the client's actual
recovery and the recovery which should have been
obtained but for the attorney's malpractice. See, I
RONALD E. MALLEN and JEFFREY M. SMITH,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 16.1 at 890 (3d ed. 1989);
Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977);
Pickett, Houlon & Berman v. Haislip, 73 Md.App. 89, 533
A.2d 287 (1987). Thus, the trier of fact in the malpractice
action must decide what the outcome would have been in
the previous case if the lawyer had performed properly, a
process that has been described as a "suit within a suit."
Chocktoot, 57 I P.2d at 1257. While presenting evidence of
such damages in the present **501 *173 case may be
difficult and complex, this measure of recovery is not
inherently speCUlative so as to render the claimed damages
unrecoverable as a matter oflaw. At trial, Richard will bear
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the burden of proving the existence and amount of such
damages with reasonable certainty. Fuller v. Wolters, 119
Idaho 415, 422, 807 P.2d 633, 640 (1991); Moeller v.
Harshbarger, 118 Idaho 92, 93, 794 P.2d 1148, 1149
(Ct.App.l990); Eliopulos v. Kondo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho
915,919,643 P.2d 1085, 1089, (Ct.App.1982). Ifhe fails
to meet this burden, recovery may be denied. It was
improper, however, for the district court to grant partial
summary judgment foreclosing any opportunity for such
proof. Therefore, the district court also erred when it
granted the motion for partial summary judgment limiting
the damages to economic losses directly attributable to the
life insurance policy.

The district court erred in granting the summary judgment
based on its detennination that Richard's statements were
not credible. The district court also erred when it granted
the motion for summary judgment based on the speculative
nature of the damages. We reverse the order granting
summary judgment and remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WALTERS, c.J., and LANSING, J., concur.
Parallel Citations
868 P.2d 496
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**267 *683 SILAK, Justice.

Appellant Ann Stansbury (Stansbury) sought relief under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U .S.c. §
1210 I, et seq., and the Idaho Human Rights Act (lHRA),

I.e. § 67-590 I, et seq. The district court entered summary
judgment for respondent Blue Cross of Idaho Health
Service, Inc. (Blue Cross), finding that Stansbury had
failed to prove that, with or without reasonable
accommodations for her disabilities, she was qualified for
the employment position she held. We vacate and remand.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prior to July 8, 1991, Stansbury worked for Blue Cross of
Oregon as a customer service representative. Stansbury
interviewed with Blue Cross for a similar position, but was
informed that no such positions were available. Instead
Blue Cross offered Stansbury a position as a claims
analyst. Stansbury accepted the position with an
understanding that she could later apply for a transfer to
customer service.
Blue Cross had in place performance goals which it
expected its employees to meet. Blue Cross used gradually
escalating goals over a nine month period to raise its new
employees' abilities to the level expected of fully trained
claims examiners. One performance goal required the
ability to process claims at a rate of at least 85% of the
performance standards, with no more than a 3% payment
error rate and no more than a 6% coding error rate. At the
completion of her three month probationary period,
Stansbury received a production rating of 50%, with a
1.6% payment error rate and a 6% coding error rate.
Stansbury'S supervisor informed her that she was
"performing above what is expected" and she was given an
overall performance rating of 96%.
Shortly thereafter, Stansbury began to experience back and
right arm and shoulder pains. In a discussion with her
supervisor, Stansbury noted a similar experience at Blue
Cross of Oregon. She stated that her previous employer
had successfully alleviated her pains by providing her with
an adjustable work-station designed by an ergonomist.
Blue Cross took no action.
After her probationary period, Stansbury became
increasingly unable to meet the escalating production
goals. At the conclusion of her nine month training period,
Stansbury was processing claims at a rate of 47% of the
performance standards, with a 4% payment error rate and a
5% coding error rate. Nonetheless, she received an overall
performance rating of 86%. Her supervisor noted that
Stansbury tended to be easily distracted and inattentive.
Her next evaluation noted a small improvement to a 55%
production rating, with a 2.6°i6pa)'l11ent error rate and a 1%
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coding error rate. She received an overall performance
rating of 88%,
After working at Blue Cross for over a year, Stansbury
requested a transfer to the customer service department.
Blue Cross denied her request on the basis that new
performance standards required an employee seeking a
transfer to have at least a 95% overall performance rating.
Since her production levels were still below expectations,
Blue Cross instituted weekly meetings between Stansbury
and her supervisor. Blue Cross hoped the weekly meetings
would provide suggestions and continued training to help
Stansbury raise her production ratings. Instead, Stansbury
felt that no help was being given to her at these meetings,
that they placed additional stress upon her, and that they
caused her to experience severe depression. When
Stansbury communicated the detrimental effect that she
believed these meetings were having on her, they were
moved from Fridays to Mondays. At these weekly
meetings Stansbury repeatedly informed her supervisors
that she was experiencing back and shoulder pains and
requested an adjustable desk set up by an ergonomist.
In late 1992, Stansbury experienced intestinal problems
which required surgery. She took medical leave and
returned to work a month later. After her return, Blue Cross
conducted another performance evaluation. Stansbury's
production rating was 56%, with a payment error rate of
3.4% and coding **268 *684 error rate of 1.2%, for an
overall performance rating of 87%. As a result, Blue Cross
placed Stansbury on a sixty day probation. She was
informed that the failure to achieve the established
production goals by the end of the probationary period
would result in termination of her employment.
After being placed on probation, Stansbury received the
adjustable desk she had requested. She informed her
supervisors that her arm and shoulder felt better and her
processing rate increased to 67%. Shortly thereafter
Stansbury developed problems with her thumb which
resulted in her production rate falling to 54%. Blue Cross
refused her request for an ergonomist to help her set up her
desk. Stansbury visited a hand specialist who diagnosed
her with carpal tunnel syndrome and tendinitis, later
determined to be radial tunnel syndrome. Stansbury
informed her supervisors and filed a worker's
compensation claim with the Idaho Industrial Commission.
When the probationary period expired and Stansbury still
had not met the established production goals, Blue Cross
terminated her employment.
Stansbury filed suit in district court alleging disability
discrimination under IHRA and ADA, as well as age
discrimination under IHRA and the federal Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U .S.c. § 62 I, et
seq. Blue Cross moved for summary judgment. I In
opposition, Stansbury submitted her own affidavit
asserting that "I could have done the work for Blue Cross,
if they had listened to me and provided the help I
requested." Stansbury also submitted affidavits from her
professional counselor and a consulting physician to the
Department of Health and Welfare. These affidavits
indicated that Stansbury was psychologically and
physically disabled and that Blue Cross' failure to
recognize and accommodate her impairments made it
"difficult ifnot impossible to perform at the level expected
at Blue Cross of Idaho."
The district court granted Blue Cross' motion for summary
judgment finding that all of Stansbury'S claims failed
because she did not prove that she was qualified to perform
the essential functions of the position. In light of her
consistent failure to meet the production goals set by Blue
Cross, the district court concluded that Stansbury had
failed to show that, with or without reasonable
accommodation for her disabilities, she would have been
able to process claims at a rate of 85%.
Stansbury appealed only as to her disability claims and did
not raise on appeal her age discrimination claims.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erred in considering,
analyzing, and deciding Stansbury's disability claim solely
as a claim for intentional disability discrimination.
2. Whether the court erred in determining, as a matter of
law, that Stansbury had not presented an adequate claim of
intentional disability discrimination.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

II] ]2] 13] Stansbury appeals the district court's entry of
summary judgment against her. In such a case, the Idaho
Supreme Court employs the same standard as that used by
the trial court when ruling on the motion. Avila v,
Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 747, 890 P.2d 331,333 (1995).
The Court construes the record in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences
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and conclusions in that party's favor. Id. If reasonable
people could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the record the motion must be
denied. Cates v. Albertson's Inc., 126 Idaho 1030, 1033,
895 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1995). Summary judgment is only
proper if, after reviewing the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the **269 *685 moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.e.P. 56(c).

IV.
ANALYSIS
A. A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Exists As To
Whether With Reasonable Accommodation For Her
Disabilities Stansbury Could Have Performed The
Essential Functions Of The Position.
14] ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified
individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C § 12 I 12(a).
Prohibited discrimination includes "not making reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability ... " 42 U.S.e. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Similarly,
IHRA prohibits disability discrimination but "shall not
apply if the particular disability, even with reasonable
accommodation by the employer, prevents the
performance of the work required by the employer in that
job." I.e. § 67-5909. When this Court has not had
occasion, as here, to determine the standards applicable to
the adjudication of state claims patterned on federal law,
this Court may look to that body of federal law for
guidance. See, Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 8 I 1-12,
606 P.2d 458, 46 I -62 (1979).
151 For purposes of the summary judgment motion below
and again on appeal, Blue Cross assumed Stansbury was
"disabled" as defined under ADA. As a result, we must
determine whether Stansbury has made a sufficient
showing that she was a qualified individual with a
disability to preclude summary judgment. A qualified
individual with a disability is a disabled person "who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position .... " 42
U.S.C § 121 I 1(8). Deference is given to the employer's
determination as to the essential functions of the position.
Jd; see also, 29 e.F.R.App. to Part 1630-lnterpretative
Guidance On Title I of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, pg. 406. Blue Cross insists that the key-punch tasks,
specifically the ability to process claims at 85% of the
performance standards, was an essential function of

Stansbury'S position at Blue Cross.
The district court found that all of Stansbury's claims
failed because she did not demonstrate that with reasonable
accommodation she could have performed the essential
functions of her job and processed claims at a rate of 85%.
We disagree and find that Stansbury has raised a sufficient
factual dispute to survive Blue Cross' motion for summary
judgment. While at Blue Cross, Stansbury requested
several possible accommodations which she believed
would have enabled her to meet the 85% production goal.
Her affidavit shows that Blue Cross ignored several of her
requests, including (I) the provision of an ergonomist to
analyze her work area and ensure that it was set up in a
manner which would alleviate her back and shoulder pains,
(2) a discontinuance of the weekly meetings, and (3) a
transfer to a customer service position.2
In her affidavit, Stansbury asserts that "I could have done
the work for Blue Cross, if they had listened to me and
provided the help that I requested." This assertion is
reinforced by the affidavit of Charles D. Steuart who found
that "without recognition of [her1 impairments and job
structuring taking the impairments into account, she would
not have been able to function adequately" at Blue Cross.
The affidavit of the counselor Joetta Fulgenzi also states
that without recognition of her chronic depression,
Stansbury "would have found it difficult ifnot impossible
to perform at the level expected by Blue Cross of Idaho."
Taking all of Stansbury's assertions to be true, we find that
she has raised sufficient facts from which reasonable
people could conclude that had Blue Cross provided the
requested accommodations she would have **270 *686
been able to meet the production quotas. In light of this
factual dispute, we vacate the district court's entry of
summary judgment against her.

B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary
Judgment on Stansbury's Intentional Discrimination
Claim.
]6]ln addition to her claim for failure to make reasonable
accommodation, Stansbury also alleged an intentional
discrimination based on disability claim. Blue Cross
insisted that it fired Stansbury for a purely
nondiscriminatory reason, i.e., her failure to meet the
production standards. Stansbury asserted this basis for
termination was pretextual. However, the district court did
not reach this issue as it found that Stansbury failed to
demonstrate that she was qualified to do her job, an
essential element of both disability claims.
]71 Both IHRA and ADA prohibit the discharge of a
qualified individual with a disability on the basis of that
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individual's disability. I.e. § 67-5909(1), 42 U.S.c. §
12112(a). In Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330 (9th
CiLI990), the Ninth Circuit noted that where a plaintiff
alleges intentional disability discrimination and the
defendant disavows any reliance on the disability in
making the employment decision, the analytical
framework of Title VII cases should be employed. ld. at
1339. To establish unlawful discrimination based on
disability Stansbury must prove that she (I) was disabled
within the meaning of the statute, (2) was qualified, that is,
was able to perform the essential functions of the job, with
or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) was
discharged because of her disability. See, e.g., Tyndall v.
National Educ. Centers, Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209,
212 (4th Cir.1994); White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d
357,360-61 (10th Cir. 1995).
For the purposes of summary judgment, Blue Cross
conceded that Stansbury was disabled within the meaning
of the relevant statutes. The fact that Stansbury was
discharged and replaced by a non-disabled person is also
not in controversy. Because we conclude that a factual
dispute exists as to whether Stansbury was qualified for the
position, we vacate the grant of summary judgment on the
intentional discrimination claim.

V.
CONCLUSION
IHRA and ADA seek to provide qualified disabled
individuals with the same employment opportunities that
are available to persons without disabilities. To that end, an
is
required
to
provide
reasonable
employer
accommodations to a disabled employee which would
enable that employee to perform the essential functions of
his or her position. Stansbury has raised a sufficient factual
issue concerning whether she could have met the 85%
production rating had Blue Cross provided her with the
accommodations she requested.
Because we find that Stansbury has raised a sufficient
factual dispute concerning whether she was qualified for
the position at Blue Cross, we vacate the district court's
entry of summary judgment, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs on appeal to Stansbury.

McDEVITT, c.1., and JOHNSON and TROUT, J1.,
concur.

SCHROEDER, Justice dissenting.

The district court found that Stansbury'S claims failed
because she did not demonstrate that with reasonable
accommodation she could have performed the essential
functions of her job and processed claims at a rate of 85
percent. This Court reverses the district court's decision,
citing several bases.
First, Stansbury asserts that Blue Cross ignored her request
to provide an ergonomist to analyze her work area and
ensure that it was set up in a manner which would alleviate
her back and shoulder pains. Under the circumstances of
this case that is a bare assertion that should be given no
weight. In fact, Blue Cross had provided an ergonomist for
Stansbury when she was employed in Oregon. Any
accommodation that might have been made was within her
knowledge, but she failed to set forth any facts establishing
what such an accommodation might be. If a reasonable
accommodation were possible, Stansbury knew what it
was and should have told the district court, rather than
simply **271 *687 making a conclusory assertion that an
ergonomist should have been provided.
The second ground upon which the Court relies is the
failure of Blue Cross to discontinue weekly meetings with
Stansbury. The record does establish that Blue Cross had
changed the date of the weekly meetings to accommodate
Stansbury'S concerns. In essence Stansbury says that she
should not have been supervised. This Court should not
impose such a burden upon an employer.
The third basis for the Court's decision is that Blue Cross
failed to transfer Stansbury to a customer service position.
That would not be an accommodation. That would be a
requirement that an employer hire a person for a job
different from what that person was initially hired to do.
The affidavits of the doctor and the counselor that are cited
provide no basis to determine what reasonable
accommodations could have been made. The assertions in
these affidavits are simply too vague to provide guidance
as to what Blue Cross failed to do that it could have done.
The district court correctly analyzed the issue as follows:
The ability to process claims at a rate of at least 85% of her
performance standard was an essential function of Ann
Stansbury'S job. See Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 836 F.Supp.
783, 788 n. 4 (W.D.Okla.1993) (ADA does not require an
employer to modify the actual duties of a job in order to
accommodate an individual who is not physically capable
of performing those duties). Unfortunately, the plaintiff
was not able to meet the performance standard required for
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her job.
The law also requires employers to make reasonable
accommodations so that an employee with a disability can
perform the essential functions of her position.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that, other than
requiring her employer to lower its performance
standards-which is not required, the plaintiff would have
been able to perform the essential functions of her position
even with reasonable accommodation by Blue Cross. The
plaintiff has failed to show that with a reasonable
accommodation she was qualified to do her job, an
essential element of her disability discrimination claim.
C./, Lutter v. Fowler, I A.D. Cases 861, 864, 1986 WL
13138 (D.D.C.J986) (granting summary judgment in favor
of employer in Rehabilitation Act case where, assuming
that employee in fact had a mental handicap, employee had
failed to present any evidence that he would have been able
to perform the essential functions of his job with a
reasonable accommodation).

The plaintiff has failed to establish that, with or without
reasonable accommodation, she was qualified to do her
job, an element essential to her disability discrimination
claim on which she would bear the burden of proof at trial.
Because this is a key element, the claim fails.
Conclusory and speculative assertions should not be
sufficient to deny a motion for summary judgment that has
been supported by specific allegations of fact. There is no
showing of facts by Stansbury of what a reasonable
accommodation would have been that would have allowed
her to perform the job she was hired to do. The district
court decision should be affirmed.
Parallel Citations
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Footnotes
For purposes of its summary judgment motion below and on appeal, Blue Cross assumed that as a rcsult of her physical disability, but
not her allegcd mental disability, Stansbury was '"disabled" as defined under ADA.

2

We note that all of these appear to bc potential accommodations according to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
guidelines, "reasonable accommodation may include but is not limited to ... job rcstructuring; part-time or modified work schedulcs:
reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modifications of equipment or deviccs .... " 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(0 )(2)(ii).
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United States Court ofAppeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Washington courts look to federal law when
analyzing retaliation claims. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a);
West's RCWA 49.60.210.

Lynda STEGALL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITADEL BROADCASTING COMPANY;
Citadel Communications Corporation;
Marathon Media LP,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-35399. I Argued and Submitted June
2,2003. I Decided Dec. 2,2003. I As
Amended Jan. 6, 2004.
Employee, a female on-air radio station personality who
was fired, allegedly because she complaining of gender
discrimination and wage disparities between male and
female employees, filed retaliation claim against former
employer under Title VII and Washington Law Against
Discrimination (WLAD). The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington, Edward F. Shea, J.,
granted summary judgment for employer. Employee
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Ferguson, Circuit Judge,
held that genuine issue of material fact, as to whether
employee's termination nine days after she complained to
new station manager and co-program director of gender
discrimination and pay inequity under past owner was
influenced by improper motives, precluded summary
judgment for employer.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

(31

To make out prima facie case of retaliation under
Title VII, employee must demonstrate that (1)
she engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered
adverse employment action, and (3) there was
causal link between her activity and employment
decision. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).
100 Cases that cite this headnote

141

Reversed and remanded.

Civil Rights
>cRetaliation Claims
Under McDonnell Douglas analysis, once
employee makes out prima facie case of
retaliation, burden shifts to employer to articulate
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for adverse
employment action; if employer does so,
employee
bears
ultimate
burden
of
demonstrating that articulated reason was merely
pretext for discriminatory motive. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

Gould, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion.

West Headnotes (9)

III

Civil Rights
~",Practices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements

Federal Courts
(:.w,Trial De Novo

107 Cases that cite this headnote

Court of Appeals reviews district court's decision
to grant summary judgment de novo. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

(21

Courts

15J

Civil Rights
;.·~Motive or Intent; Pretext
In retaliation action, employee can show pretext
either directly by persuading court that
discriminatory reason more likely motivated
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employer, or indirectly by showing that
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

the challenged action. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).
19 Cases that cite this headnote

26 Cases that cite this headnote

[9[
[6[

Civil Rights
';/~'Retaliation

Claims

In retaliation case, "direct evidence" is evidence
which, if believed, proves fact of discriminatory
animus without inference or presumption. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U .S.C.A. §
2000e-3(a).
48 Cases that cite this headnote

P[

Federal Civil Procedure
'h""Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
In retaliation case, when employee offers direct
evidence of discriminatory motive, triable issue
as to actual motivation of employer is created
even if evidence is not substantial; in contrast,
when direct evidence is unavailable and
employee proffers only circumstantial evidence
that employer's motives were different from its
stated motives, court requires specific and
substantial evidence of pretext to survive
summary judgment. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.; Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).
4 I Cases that cite this headnote

18[

Federal Civil Procedure
,,,,,,,Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

Civil Rights
,~=Motive or Intent; Pretext
In mixed motive cases, it does not make sense to
ask if employer's stated reason for terminating
employee is pretext for retaliation, when
employer has offered more than one reason for
action that it took; rather, relevant inquiry is
whether discrimination is a motivating factor in

Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether
improper motives influenced radio station
owner's termination of daily on-air personality
nine days after she complained to new station
manager and co-program director of gender
discrimination and pay inequity under past
owners, precluded summary judgment on
terminated employee's retaliation claim under
Title VII and Washington Law Against
Discrimination (WLAD), regardless of whether it
was analyzed as straightforward "pretext" case or
as
"mixed
motive"
case.
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.; Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a);
West's RCWA 49.60.210.
33 Cases that cite this headnote
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* 1062 Laura B. Allen, Seattle, Washington, for the
plaintiff-appellant.
Courtney W. Wiswall (argued) and Paul Buchanan
(briefed), Portland, Oregon, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington; Edward F. Shea, District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-05064-EFS.
Before: LA Y,*FERGUSON, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge.

The issue in this case is: what showing of pretext must a
plaintiff in a retaliation suit make in order to overcome a
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defendant's motion for summary judgment, where the
defendant has alleged legitimate reasons for the plaintiffs
termination. Appellant Lynda Stegall ("Stegall") appeals
the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
("District Court")' s grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant Marathon Media, L.P. ("Marathon"), which
foreclosed a jury trial on Stegall's retaliation claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Washington Law Against Discrimination ("WLAD"). The
District Court held that, although Stegall established a
prima facie claim of retaliatory discharge against
Marathon, she was unable to demonstrate that Marathon's
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her were a
pretext for retaliation. Stegall alleges that she was fired
from KORD, a country music radio station, in retaliation
for making complaints about gender discrimination and
wage disparities between male and female employees at
*1063 KORD. Because Stegall raises a triable claim with
respect to her retaliation claim, we reverse the District
Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Marathon.

I BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Lynda Stegall was employed by Citadel Broadcasting
Company ("Citadel") as an on-air personality at KORD, a
country music station that played recent country music
hits, I since 1993. Beginning in 1997 or 1998, Stegall began
to make complaints to her managers at Citadel that her
male
on-air personality
co-host was
sexually
propositioning her and using sexually suggestive language
on and off the air. She also complained that she was being
paid less than her male counterparts and requested a raise.
Allegedly, Citadel management did not adequately address
her complaints.
Stegall's problems with KORD escalated in October 1998
when Stegall took time off from work because she fell ill
from the stress and anxiety she was experiencing as a result
of KORD's gender discrimination, and because her
managers were being unresponsive to her grievances.
When she returned to work, Stegall averred that Curt
Cartier ("Cartier") who, at the time, was employed as the
program director for another one of Citadel's radio
stations, exhibited a great deal of hostility toward her.
Stegall stated in her deposition that prior to her two week
leave of absence, she and Cartier had been friends. Stegall
had previously spoken with Cartier, as well as other station
employees, on various occasions, about her complaints of
gender discrimination at KORD. However, Stegall noted
that upon her return, Cartier refused to speak with her.
Stegall believed that Cartier was upset because she had
walked out of KORD to protest the unequal treatment that

she was receiving, and because she was given a raise in
salary as a result.
In addition, Cartier allegedly told other station employees
that he was angry at Stegall for getting what she wanted
and had only been able to do so because she was a woman.
On two occasions after coming back to work, Stegall
alleges that Cartier yelled at her and denigrated her based
on her gender, calling her names such as "slut," "bitch,"
and "whore," in the course of arguments that were
seemingly about unrelated station matters.
On November 9, 1999, Marathon Broadcasting
("Marathon") purchased five Pasco, Washington radio
stations from Citadel, including KORD. After taking over
KORD, Marathon initially retained most KORD
employees, a decision that was necessary to ensure
continual, uninterrupted broadcasting.2 Upon Marathon's
purchase of Citadel's stations, Eric Van Winkle ("Van
Winkle") became the new general manager ("GM"),
responsible for supervising KORD and the four other
stations that Marathon acquired from Citadel. Prior to
assuming the GM position with Marathon, Van Winkle
worked in the central sales department for the five Pasco,
Washington radio stations when they were owned by
Citadel. Shortly after Van Winkle's promotion, he hired
Paul Drake and Curt Cartier to serve as co-program
directors of KORD under Marathon. Drake and Cartier
previously *1064 held positions as program directors for
other radio stations in the Pasco cluster. As program
directors, Drake and Catiier were responsible for the
content and presentation of KORD.
Due to the change in management and the impending
station changes that it was bound to bring, Stegall inquired
with Marathon about the security of her employment at
KORD on several occasions before she was terminated.
Shortly after Van Winkle became manager and Drake
became co-program director, Stegall stopped by their
individual offices to ask whether her job was secure. Both
responded affirmatively.
In early December 1999, Stegall and Drake, now her direct
supervisor at KORD, had a "get to know you" meeting
during which Stegall relayed to Drake the complaints of
gender discrimination that she had made to Citadel's
managers in the past, and the problems she had been
having with Citadel up until Marathon's purchase of
KORD. Stegall stated in her deposition that she brought
Drake up to speed about her prior concerns, and expressed
a desire to see Marathon conduct things differently and
remedy the gender inequities. Stegall noted that Drake did
not speak much during this meeting and, as a result, she felt
very uncomfortable.

..
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Nine days after Stegall complained to Drake, on December
15, 1999, Marathon fired Stegall and one other female
employee, Kristin Crume. Stegall was told during a
meeting with Van Winkle, Drake and Cartier that they
were planning changes for KORD which did not include
her and, as a result, she was being terminated. At this time,
Stegall inquired if anything she had done brought on the
decision to fire her, and she was explicitly told that it had
not. Rather, the decision, she was told, was solely about the
future of KORD.

retaliation, we reverse the District Court's decision.

II STANDARD OF REVIEW

II] We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.c. § 1291 (2000). The District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Marathon, finding that, although
Stegall made a prima facie showing of retaliation, she
could not rebut the legitimate reasons put forth by
Marathon for terminating her. "We review the district
court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo."
Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219-20 (9th
Cir.1998) (citations omitted). Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to Stegall, we must determine whether
any genuine issues of material fact exist, and whether the
district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.
Id. at 1220. In doing so, "[t]he evidence of the
[nonmoving] party is to be believed, and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before
the court must be drawn in the light most favorable
to[her]." Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th
Cir.1991).

Similarly, when Stegall later applied for unemployment
benefits, Marathon informed the state Employment
Security Department that a business decision based on
changing the programing and formatting was responsible
for Stegall's termination, and that nothing she had done
caused the discharge. However, after the commencement
of this litigation, Van Winkle and Drake stated in their
depositions that Stegall was fired in part because they were
not satisfied with her overall attitude during the brief
period oftime3 she was employed by Marathon.
After Stegall's termination, Marathon began making
changes to KORD. KORD was switched from
station-selected music to a computerized music service;
Marathon brought in Leah Knight, a syndicated host from
Seattle; changed each of the shows and did on-air
promotions about the format changes; stressed a different
"brand" of country music;4 removed all of the daily on-air
personalities; and replaced seven announcers on five shifts
including every morning show host. The only former daily
on-air personality who remained at KORD after the broad
station change was Ed Dailey, who was removed from
daily duties and given a four-hour Sunday morning
"oldies" show. However, Stegall and one other woman5
were the only employees *1065 who were fired from
KORD and not re-assigned to another station within the
Pasco cluster.6

]2] Stegall contends that she was illegally terminated in
retaliation for making wage discrimination complaints to
Marathon that she believed to be the result of gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the WLAD.
Because Washington courts look to federal law when
analyzing retaliation claims, we consider Stegall's
Washington state law claim and federal claim together. See
Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 30 I F.3d 958, 969
(9th Cir.2002); Graves v. Dep'l of Game, 76 Wash.App.
705,887 P.2d 424, 428 (1994).

B. Procedural history

A. Primajacie case of retaliation

On August 2, 2000, Stegall filed this litigation against
Citadel and Marathon, alleging gender discrimination,
sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of both Title
VII and WLAD. On Decem ber 19, 2001, Stegall stipulated
to the dismissal of all claims of sexual harassment and
retaliation against Citadel, and stipulated to the dismissal
of all claims of sexual harassment against Marathon. The
District Court granted summary judgment to Marathon on
Stegall's Title VII and WLAD claims of illegal retaliation,
finding that Stegall was unable to demonstrate that
Marathon's legitimate reasons for terminating her were
pretextual. Because Stegall has proffered a substantial
amount of specific circumstantial evidence that
Marathon's reasons for terminating her were motivated by

]3] Stegall alleges that Marathon terminated her
employment in retaliation for complaining to Marathon of
a disparity in pay and bonuses between herself and her
male counterparts. Under § 704 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it is unlawful "for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees ... because [the employee] has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
[Title VII]." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3 (2000). To make out a
primafacie case of retaliation under Title VII, Stegall must
demonstrate that "( 1) she engaged in a protected activity,
(2) she *1066 suffered an adverse employment action, and
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(3) there was a causal link between her activity and the
employment decision." Raad V. Fairbanks North Slar
Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1 185, 1196-97 (9th
Cir.2003). If Stegall is able to assert a prima facie
retaliation claim, the "burden shifting" scheme articulated
in McDonnell Douglas COJp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies. See Villiarimo
V. Aloha Island Air, [nc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th
Cir.2002).

141 Under McDonnell Douglas, once Stegall makes out a
prima facie case of retaliation, "the burden shifts to
[Marathon] to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action." Manatt V.
Bank of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.2003). If
Marathon articulates such a reason, Stegall "bears the
ultimate burden of demonstrating that the reason was
merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive." ld. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. Pretext

151 Stegall has two avenues available for showing that
Marathon's legitimate explanation for firing her is actually
a pretext for retaliation. The first is by "directly persuading
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer[,] or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs V. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)
(citation omitted).

probative than circumstantial evidence, we agree with the
Godwin court that Stegall must proffer "specific" and
"substantial" evidence of pretext to overcome Marathon's
summary judgment motion. See Manatt, 339 F.3d at 801
("Because Manatt failed to introduce any direct or specific
and substantial circumstantial evidence of pretext,
summary judgment forthe [employer] must be affinned.");
Brown V. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181,1188 (9th
Cir.2003); Bradley V. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d
267, 270(9th Cir.1996) ("To avoid summary judgment,
Bradley must do more than establish a primafacie case and
deny the credibility of the [defendant's] witnesses. She
must produce specific, substantial evidence of pretext.")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Desert Palace
affirmed the value and import of circumstantial evidence in
all cases. In the course of affirming a decision of our * 1067
circuit sitting en banc that, "[i]n order to obtain an
instruction under § 2000e-2(m) [of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act], a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice [,r "
123 S.Ct. at 2155, the Court stressed "the utility of
circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases." Id. at
2154. The Court stated that "[t]he reason for treating
circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and
deep-rooted: 'Circumstantial evidence is not only
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and
persuasive than direct evidence.' " I d. (quoting Rogers V.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n. 17, 77 S.Ct.
443, I L.Ed.2d 493 (1957)).

161171 As in all civil cases, Stegall can prosecute her case
using either direct or circumstantial evidence tending to
prove that Marathon terminated her employment in
retaliation for making complaints of gender discrimination.
" 'Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves
the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or
presumption.'" Godwin V. Hunt Wesson, [nc., 150 F.3d at
122 I(quoting Davis V. Chevron, USA., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082,
1085 (5th Cir.1994». "When the plaintiff offers direct
evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the
actual motivation of the employer is created even if the
evidence is not substantial." Id. In contrast, when direct
evidence is unavailable, the Godwin court noted, and the
plaintiff proffers only circumstantial evidence that the
employer's motives were different from its stated motives,
we require "specific" and "substantial" evidence of pretext
to survive summary judgment. Id. at 1222.

C. "Single motive" versus "mixed motive" cases

Although we note that the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Desert Palace, Inc. V. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct.
2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (U.S.2003), may undermine Godwin
to the extent that it implies that direct evidence is more

Further complicating the inquiry in a Title VII case is the
varying terminology that courts routinely utilize. As we
explained in Costa V. Desert Palace, [nc., 299 FJd 838
(9th Cir.2002) (en banc), courts often categorize cases as

Moreover, the Court also recognized the critical role that
circumstantial evidence plays even in criminal cases: "The
adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends beyond
civil cases; we have never questioned the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal
conviction, even though proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is required." Id. Finally, the Court noted that "juries are
routinely instructed that 'the law makes no distinction
between the weight or value to be given to either direct or
circumstantial evidence.' " I d. (quoting I A K. 0 'Malley, J.
Grenig, & W. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions,
Criminal § 12.04(5th ed.2000)). Accordingly, we refuse to
make such a distinction in Stegall's case.
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either "mixed motive" or "single motive" (sometimes also
termed "pretext" cases). The distinction between the two
types of cases is as follows:
"In [single-motive] cases, 'the issue is whether either
illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the 'true'
motives behind the decision.' In mixed-motive cases,
however, there is no one 'true' motive behind the
decision. Instead, the decision is a result of multiple
factors, at least one of which is legitimate."
ld. at 856(citing Price Waterhouse V. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228,260,109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989». The
significance of the distinction between "single motive" and
"mixed motive" is most often seen towards the end of a
trial when the district court must instruct the jury.

18) In mixed motive cases, of which Stegall's case is
arguably one, it does not make sense to ask if the
employer's stated reason for terminating an employee is a
pretext for retaliation, when the employer has offered more
than one reason for the action that it took. Rather, the
relevant inquiry in a "mixed motive" case is distinct from
that of a "single motive" or pretext case. We articulated the
proper framework in our en banc opinion Costa V. Desert
Palace:

that is done, the employer may escape liability only by
proving by way of an affirmative defense that the
employment decision would have been the same even if
the characteristic had played no role.
934 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.199l ) (citations omitted).
In the end, the inquiry is straightforward: "[p]ut simply, the
plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a violation
through a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or
circumstantial) that a protected characteristic played 'a
motivating factor.' " Costa, 299 F.3d at 853-54. Even at
summary judgment, it is important not to lose sight of the
ultimate question that will be before the court, should the
plaintiff survive summary judgment. See Costa, 299 F.3d
at 857("The employee's ultimate burden of proof in all
cases remains the same: to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the challenged employment decision was
'because or discrimination [or, in this case, retaliation].").
With these general principles of law in mind, we now turn
to the merits of Stegall's retaliation claim. We analyze
Stegall's case as both a pretext case and a mixed motives
case, and find that her case survives summary judgment
under either theory.

D. Stegall's retaliation claim
[I]n cases in which the evidence could
support a finding that discrimination is
one of two or more reasons for the
challenged decision, at least one of which
may be legitimate, the jury should be
instructed to determine first whether the
discriminatory reason was "a motivating
factor" in the challenged action. If the
jury's answer to this question is in the
affirmative, then the employer has
violated Title VII.
299 F.3d at 856-57.
Similarly, our opinion in Sischo-Nownejad V. Merced
Community College District summarizes the test as
follows:
*1068 The analysis in a case involving mixed motives is
somewhat different. The Price Waterhouse [v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228,109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989)]
plurality found the [Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v.] Burdine, [450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089,67 L.Ed.2d
207 (1981 ),] formula unsuitable for mixed motive
cases .... Instead, it adopted a simpler approach. Under
Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff must show that it is more
likely than not that a protected characteristic "played a
motivating part in [the] employment decision." Once

191 The District Court found, and Marathon concedes, that
Stegall established a prima facie case of retaliation.
Therefore, we embark upon our analysis of Stegall's
retaliation claim by examining Marathon's stated reasons
for terminating her employment. Marathon has offered two
reasons to justify its firing of Stegall. At the time it
terminated her, Marathon's management stated that it was
due to changes that were being made to KORD overall.
This was consistent with what Marathon told the state
Employment Security Department in response to its
inquiry about Stegall's application for benefits. However,
after Stegall commenced this lawsuit, Marathon's
managers also stated that she was terminated because she
had a negative attitude about her job. These are legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for Marathon'S termination of
Stegall. Therefore, under McDonnell Douglas, the burden
now shifts to Stegall to put forth evidence that Marathon's
reasons are pretextual. ,~/anatt, 339 FJd at 800.
Stegall offers myriad circumstantial evidence to show that
Marathon's explanations for her termination are pretextual.
Under Burdine, Stegall can show pretext in two ways:
either "directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs V. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089.

v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061 (2003)
92 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1769, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 10,332 ...

Stegall's circumstantial evidence is sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact because it demonstrates that
an illegitimate reason more likely motivated Marathon, or
was at least a motivating factor in her dismissal.
Furthermore, Stegall has raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Marathon's second reason *1069 for
firing her, her allegedly negative attitude, is unworthy of
credence.
While it is true that Stegall must "produce evidence in
addition to that which was sufficient for her prima facie
case in order to rebut [Marathon),s showing [,J" Godwin,
150 F.3d at 1220, it is improper to ignore the evidence in
support ofStegall'sprimafacie case. See Lowe, 775 F.2d
at 1008. Thus, the District Court erred by examining each
piece of Stegall's evidence in isolation, and failing to
consider the timing of Stegall's termination in its pretext
analysis.

1. The timing of Stegall's termination
Stegall argues that the timing of her termination, which
occurred nine days after her discrimination complaints,
supports her claim that Marathon's explanations were
pretextuaL We recently reaffirmed that the timing of
adverse employment action can provide strong evidence of
retaliation. "Temporal proximity between protected
activity and an adverse employment action can by itself
constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliation
in some cases." Be!! v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858,
865 (9th Cir.2003) (finding sufficient evidence to support
retaliation claim where low performance reviews
immediately followed plaintiffs complaints). Although
we have refused to infer causation from timing alone
where the gap between plaintiffs protected activity and the
adverse employment action extended to 18 months,
Villiarimo v. Aloha island Air, inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065
(9th Cir.2002), we have found timing highly probative
even when the period between the employee's complaints
and adverse action far exceeded the time interval in
Stegall's case. See, e.g., Yart?ojJ V. Thomas, 809 F.2d
1371,1376 (9th Cir.1987).
Here, a mere nine days lapsed between Stegall's
complaints of discrimination to her new manager, Paul
Drake, and 16933 her termination. Although Marathon
disputes that Stegall actually informed Drake of her
complaints, Stegall asserts that she did so, and we must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to her. See
Godwin, ISO F.3d at 1220. In addition, both Marathon and
Stegall admit that many station employees were aware of
Stegall's complaints, and gender discrimination was one of
them. Stegall had made it known throughout the station
over the course of her employment with KORD that she

resented her lower pay because she believed it was due to
her gender. It is clear that Stegall presented credible
evidence that she had a discussion with Drake, her new
manager, about discriminatory gender pay. Still, setting
aside the implausibility of Marathon's contentions that
Drake was unaware of Stegall's complaints of gender
discrimination, we must resolve issues of credibility in
favor of the non-moving party. See Su?uki Motor Corp. v.
Consumers Union of us., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110, 1132 (9th
Cir.2003) ("we 'must draw all justifiable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of
credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular
evidence.' ") (quoting Masson V. New Yorker Magazine,
inc., SOl U.S. 496, 520, III S.Ct. 2419, lIS L.Ed.2d 447
(1991)).
Marathon attempts to explain the timing of Stegall's
termination by noting that it coincided with the other
station wide changes. However, in almost the same breath,
Marathon asserts that KORD's change phase continued a
year and a half after Stegall's termination, when they
offered the termination of another employee, Gary
Mitchell, to counter Stegall's contention that she and
another female employee were the only people terminated
from KORD. Marathon cannot have it both ways.
*1070 The brief period of time that Marathon supervised
Stegall before terminating her, merely 24 days, also
undermines Marathon's assertion that it terminated her
because she had a negative attitude and was not a team
player. Although both sides vigorously dispute this issue, it
nevertheless casts doubt on Marathon's ability to fairly
assess Stegall's performance and attitude accurately, thus
strengthening Stegall's contention that illegitimate
considerations informed Marathon's decision.

2. Stegall's relationship with Cartier
Although timing, standing alone, may be insufficient to
raise a genuine issue with respect to pretext, we do not
need to rely solely on timing in this case because there
exists substantially more. Of significance is Stegall's
evidence of her tumultuous relationship with Cartier and
his subsequent role in Stegall's termination. Although
Marathon disputes that Cartier was aware of Stegall's prior
complaints of gender discrimination to Citadel, the record
is otherwise. Stegall alleged and offered deposition
testimony that not only did she personally tell Cartier of
her complaints of gender discrimination, but also that
Cartier markedly changed after Stegall took two weeks off
of work to protest the inequities at KORD.
Upon her return to work, Cartier's relations with Stegall
took a tum for the worse. Stegall asserts that, although they
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were friends before she took time off, he refused to speak
with her at all when she came back to work. Stegall
attempted to discuss her walk out with Cartier, but he
refused to hear her out. During an argument shortly after
her return to work, he denigrated her based on her gender
(calling her a "slut," "bitch," and "whore").
Furthermore, Marathon admits that during discussions
amongst its management, which included Cartier, about
the station's re-structuring, Cartier was "adamant" that
Stegall be terminated, despite her positive traits.7 Cartier's
insistence that Stegall and Kristin Crume, another
employee who also complained of gender discrimination,
be fired was attested to by Drake, Cartier's co-program
director. Moreover, both Van Winkle and Drake assured
Stegall shortly before she was terminated that her job was
secure, giving rise to the inference that Cartier's input may
have been determinative of Marathon's decision to fire
Stegall.
Stegall was not alone in her observations of Cartier's
animosity towards her. Tamara Peterson, a former KORD
employee, testified in her deposition that Cartier told her
that he was angered by Stegall's leave of absence and
subsequent return to work.8 According to Peterson, Cartier
called Stegall "a spoiled brat" and resented the fact that she
had walked out, yet was nonetheless allowed to return to
work. Furthermore, Kristin Crume testified in her
deposition that Cartier stated, shortly after learning of
Marathon's purchase of KORD, that he would not be
surprised *1071 "when the new company comes in that
Lynda [Stegall)'s ass would be blown out of the water."
Although not yet a manager at the time he made the
comment to Crume, the evidence thus far demonstrates
that it is probable Cartier decided to do just that once he
became Stegall's manager, because of ill will that he
harbored against Stegall due to her complaints. See
Winarto V. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d
1276, 1286 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that defendant's
"exasperation, lack of sympathy, and even animosity
towards [the plaintiff]" provided additional support for the
jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff).
Add to Cartier'S animosity circumstantial evidence that
Drake was also not supportive of Stegall's facts of gender
discrimination,9 and there can be no other outcome than to
allow this case to go to a jury.

3. The station overhaul and Stegall's "negative
attitude"
Marathon asserts that it fired Stegall due to its overhaul of
KORD. However, Marathon distorts and exaggerates the
extent of the overhaul. While Marathon asserts that all

employees were removed, this is simply not true. Most
employees either left of their own accord or were
re-assigned to another position at KORD, or at another one
of the Pasco cluster stations. Only Stegall and Crume were
expressly terminated. In short, the only employees
terminated by KORD were the two women who had
complained of gender discrimination.
Moreover, Marathon elaborated on the station overhaul by
adding Stegall's negative attitude as a further reason she
was terminated. Although Marathon did not offer this
reason until after the start of litigation, it has now gone to
great lengths to find evidentiary support that Stegall was a
problem employee. However, cutting against Marathon are
its assurances to Stegall that her job was secure, shortly
before her termination. Although Marathon attempts to
explain its assurances to Stegall, by arguing that it did so
out of necessity to ensure Stegall's radio broadcasts would
be free of bias, we reiterate that it is not within our
province to delve into these factual disputes; rather, we
leave them for the trier of fact. We note, however, that this
does not explain why Marathon continued to tell the
Employment Security Department that Stegall was not at
fault for the termination, even after she was no longer on
the airwaves.
Finally, although Stegall does not expressly designate her
case a "mixed motives" case, both her brief and the record
reveal that it can be construed as one. Indeed, a plaintiff
need not decide what kind of a case she is bringing at the
outset. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n. 12, 109
S.Ct. 1775 ("Nothing in this opinion should be taken to
suggest that a case must be correctly labeled as either a
"pretext" case or a "mixed-motives" case from the
beginning in the District Court; indeed, we expect that
plaintiffs will often allege, in the alternative, that their
cases are both .... At some point in the proceedings, of
course, the District Court must decide whether a particular
case involves mixed motives."). Accordingly, it is
common to have an employer's reasons for terminating an
employee fleshed out during the course of litigation. See,
e.g., Lindahl V. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir.1991)
(Noting that "[s]imply because an explanation comes after
the beginning of litigation does not make it inherently
*1072 incredible[,J" but finding on the facts of the case
before it that the employer's differing reasons suggested
the later reason was fabricated.).
Since it is uncontroverted that Marathon has offered two
reasons for firing Stegall, yet we hold that the record in this
case would support a finding that Marathon had
illegitimate motives, it is logical to examine the case as one
involving "mixed motives." See Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 244-45, 109 S.Ct. 1775. The timing of Stegall's
termination, the evidence of Stegall's problems with
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Cartier, and a probe of the station's proffered reasons for
terminating Stegall reveal that her protected activity was
most likely "a motivating factor" in her termination. See
Costa, 299 FJd at 853-54. At the very least, Stegall has
raised a triable issue about Marathon's motivations. Stegall
has also made the requisite showing that Marathon's
legitimate reasons for terminating her were pretextual,
because she has persuaded us that "a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated [Marathon)." Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Thus, Stegall is entitled to a trial on
this basis as well.
Analyzed as either a straightforward "pretext" case or a
mixed motives case, the record reveals that it is probable
that Stegall's protected activity motivated, at least in part,
Marathon's decision to terminate her. Whether or not one
accepts one or both of Marathon's explanations for
terminating Stegall, one cannot ignore the evidence, albeit
circumstantial, that Cartier, who resented Stegall for
complaining of gender discrimination, played a significant
role in her termination, thus raising a genuine issue of
material fact about whether Stegall's termination was in
fact retaliatory.
Lastly, our decision comes after careful scrutiny of the
record and in due regard of the history of discrimination
against women in the workplace. Throughout the record,
both Marathon and Citadel management repeatedly echoed
the all too familiar complaints about assertive, strong
women who speak up for themselves: "difficult,"
"negative attitude," "not a team player," "problematic."
The district courts must reject such sexual stereotypes and
learn to identify the oft employed rhetoric that could reveal
illegitimate motives.

IV CONCLUSION

The record in this case raises a triable issue as to whether
Stegall's termination was influenced by improper motives
on the part of Marathon. The standard is relatively low:
[I]n evaluating whether the defendant's
articulated reason is pretextual, the trier
of fact must, at a minimum, consider the
same evidence that the plaintiff
introduced to establish her prima facie
case. When that evidence, direct or
circumstantial, consists of more than the
McDonnell Douglas presumption, a
factual question will almost always exist
with respect to any claim of a
nondiscriminatory reason. The existence
of this question of material fact will
ordinarily preclude the granting of

summary judgment.

Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at IIII (citations omitted).
Moreover, "[w]e require very little evidence to survive
summary judgment precisely because the ultimate question
is one that can only be resolved through a 'searching
inquiry' -one that is most appropriately conducted by a
factfinder, upon a full record." Jd. We have often stated
that, because motivations are difficult to ascertain, such an
inquiry should be left to the trier offact: "[A]n employer's
true motive in an employment decision is rarely easy to
discern. As we have previously noted, '[w]ithout a
searching inquiry into *1073 these motives, those [acting
for impermissible motives] could easily mask their
behavior behind a complex web of post hoc
rationalizations .... ' " Jd. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Our opinion seeks only to allow Stegall the opportunity to
prove Marathon's motivations for terminating her.
Because Stegall has marshaled specific and substantial
evidence of improper motives on the part of Marathon, we
REVERSE the District Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Marathon, and REMAND for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GOULD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

A summary judgment rejected plaintiff's employment
retaliation claim, and we decide if trial is needed to
determine whether the termination of an employee who
was an on-air personality at a radio station, as part of a
format change and overhaul of the radio station, was in
reality a pretext for retaliation for her prior complaint
about asserted gender-based wage discrimination at the
radio station. I conclude that no genuine issue of fact is
presented on pretext in the context of the station's
undisputably broad changes of on-air personalities after a
new owner took control after an acquisition.
Marathon Media, L.P. ("Marathon"), defendant-appellee,
acquired a group of radio stations and promptly thereafter
changed the format of the flagship radio station that it
acquired, KORD, from modem country music to more
traditional
country
music.
Lynda
Stegall,
plaintiff-appellant, an on-air personality at KORD before
the Marathon acquisition and during a transition period of
about six weeks thereafter, was terminated when Marathon
changed KORD's format and did a station overhaul that
included replacement of every daily on-air personality.
Stegall brought suit contending that her employment was
terminated in retaliation for gender-based wage
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discrimination complaints that she made during a meeting
with Marathon's new management of KORD shortly
before the format change at KORD. Marathon, on the other
hand, contends that Stegall was fired because of a broad
station change of format and personalities and because of
Stegall's poor attitude during Marathon's management of
KORD. Because Marathon's articulated reasons for
terminating Stegall's employment with KORD are
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, we must determine
if genuine fact issues were presented whether Marathon's
articulated reasons were a pretext for an illegal
employment action.

On November 9, 1999, Marathon Media bought five
Pasco, Washington radio stations from Citadel
Broadcasting, including KORD, a country music station
that played recent country music hits. Marathon at first
kept most employees at KORD, in order to maintain radio
broadcasts at KORD. Lynda Stegall was one of the
employees at first retained. She had been employed as an
on-air personality at KORD since 1993. After Marathon
acquired KORD, Marathon hired a new general manager
("GM"), Eric Van Winkle, to supervise KORD and other
acquired stations. Van Winkle hired Paul Drake and Curt
Cartier as co-program directors of KORD under Marathon.
Drake and Cartier had been program directors at other of
the acquired radio stations. Drake and Cartier then
controlled KORD's content and presentation.
Neither Van Winkle, Drake, nor Cartier supervised Stegall
before Marathon's acquisition ofKORD. However, Stegall
testified that Cartier treated her "very badly" after Stegall
returned from a two week leave of absence that she took to
protest *1074 wage discrimination at KORD, when KORD
was under Citadel management. On December 6, 1999,
after Marathon's acquisition, Stegall told Drake, now her
supervisor, about prior complaints she had made to Citadel
complaining that she was paid less than on-air male
personalities because of her gender.
Nine days later, on December 15, 1999, KORD fired
Stegall and another woman announcer, Kristin Crume,
because Van Winkle, Drake and Cartier, according to
Stegall's testimony, were planning "big changes" for
KORD. When Stegall later applied for unemployment
benefits, KORD said that "a business decision based on
changing the programing and formatting," led to Stegall's
termination.
After Stegall's termination, Marathon management
switched KORD from station-selected music to a

computerized music service; brought in Leah Knight, a
syndicated host from Seattle; changed the morning show;
midday show; afternoon show; nighttime show and
overnight show; did on-air promotions about the format
changes; stressed a different and more traditional, less
contemporary, type of country music broadcast; removed
all the daily on-air personalities; and replaced seven
announcers on five shifts including every morning show
host. The only former daily on-air personality who
remained at the station after the broad station change was
Ed Dailey, removed from daily duties and given a
four-hour Sunday morning "oldies" show. Later, during
this litigation, Van Winkle and Drake testified that Stegall
was also fired because they did not like parts of Stegall's
performance during their brief supervision of KORD and
that this influenced their decision not to retain Stegall
during the station overhaul.
On December 19,2001, Stegall stipulated to dismissal of
her sexual harassment and retaliation claims against
Citadel, 16942 and to dismissal of her sexual harassment
claims against Marathon. The district court gave Marathon
summary judgment rejecting Stegall's Title VII and state
law claims of retaliation. The district court was correct and
we should affirm.

II

Stegall argues that she was illegally terminated in
retaliation for making wage discrimination complaints to
Marathon about lower pay she was receiving because of
her gender in violation of Title VII and the Washington
Law against Discrimination ("WLAD"). Because
Washington courts look to federal law when analyzing
retaliation claims, we analyze Stegall's Washington state
law claims and federal claims together. See Little v.
Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th
Cir.2002); Graves v. Dep't of Game, 76 Wash.App. 705,
887 P.2d 424, 428 (1994).
Under § 704 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it
is unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees ... because [the employee] has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title
VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]." 42
U.s.c. § 2000e-3. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden,
532 U.S. 268, 269, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509
(2001); see also Trent v. Valley Electric Association, Inc.,
41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir.1994) ("Courts have interpreted
'unlawful employment practices' to include a panoply of
actions involving discrimination and sexual harassment.").
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Because the district court granted summary judgment to
Marathon we review Stegall's claims de novo. Oliver V.
Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir.2002). In doing so, we
*1075 view all evidence in the light most favorable to
Stegall and determine whether there are any genuine issues
of material fact precluding summary judgment. Id.
To prevail on a retaliation claim brought under Title VII,
Stegall must first establish a prima facie case of illegal
retaliation by showing that (I) she was engaging in a
protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
decision; and; (3) a causal link exists between her activity
and the employment decision. Trent, 41 F.3d at 526; see
McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.s. 792, 802-03,
93 S.Ct. 1817,36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In an appropriate
case, "[t]he causal link may be established by an inference
derived from circumstantial evidence." jordan V. Clark,
847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir.1988). If Stegall establishes a
prima facie case of illegal retaliation, the burden of
production shifts to Marathon to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Stegall's
employment. Wrighten V. Metro. Hosps. Inc., 726 F.2d
1346, 1354(9th Cir.1984). If Marathon gives such a reason,
the burden of production shifts to Stegall to prove that
Marathon's articulated reason is a pretext for illegal
retaliation, with pretext shown "either directly persuading
the cOUli that a discrim inatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Texas Dep't of Cmty. AfTairs V. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1980)
(citation omitted). If Stegall satisfies her burden of
producing evidence that Marathon's reasons are pretextual,
summary judgment is inappropriate and ajury is entitled to
infer that the motive for Marathon's employment action
was retaliatory. Reeves V. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105
(2000).

A

Because Marathon does not question that Stegall has
established a prima facie case of retaliation, I begin
analysis by looking at Marathon's actions and testimony to
determine whether Marathon has satisfied its burden, of
production, to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating Stegall's employment. Despite
Stegall's argument that Marathon's reasons are not
legitimate, the reasons extended by Marathon, if asserted
in good faith and not as a pretext, are legitimate business
interests sufficient to support the termination of an
employee.

Marathon otTers two reasons for terminating Stegall's
employment. First, Marathon states that it terminated
Stegall's employment because of its decision to overhaul
the programming of KORD from a modem country station
that played the latest country hits to a more traditional
country music radio station that played older country
songs. Second, Marathon states that it terminated Stegall
because of a perception among Marathon management that
Stegall did not place a priority on maintaining strong
working relationships and thus displayed a poor attitude
toward her job and her co-workers. The reasons articulated
by Marathon satisfY Marathon's burden of production to
articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
terminating Stegall's employment. See Aragon V. Republic
Silver State Disposal, 292 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir.2002).

B

Because
Marathon
has
articulated
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Stegall, the
burden shifts back to Stegall to prove that Marathon's
articulated reasons are a pretext for illegal retaliation by
"either directly persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
*1076 by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1980).
First, Stegall argues that we should infer pretext because
the timing of Marathon's decision to terminate her
occurred shortly after she made a wage complaint to
Marathon management. Although Stegall previously made
gender-based wage discrimination complaints to Citadel
management at KORD, she renewed her gender-based
wage discrimination complaints to Drake, her immediate
supervisor under Marathon management of KORD, on
December 6, 1999, and was fired 9 days later on December
15, 1999. Stegall argues that the timing of Marathon's
decision to fire her after her wage discrimination complaint
to Marathon management shows pretext because her
performance at KORD was good and because one of the
persons responsible for deciding to fire her, Curt Cartier,
was upset that Stegall took a two week leave of absence to
protest wage discrimination while KORD was under
Citadel ownership.
As for her first point, tlmmg of a termination can be
significant, and with other evidence of pretext in an
appropriate case may be persuasive to show pretext. In
Little V. Windermere Relocation, Inc., we stated that
evidence of pretext was shown from the timing of the
employer's decision to fire the employee because the
employee was fired "within minutes" of her complaint,
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because the employee had a documented record of superior
performance, and because the employee's supervisor was
suspiciously uninvolved in the employer's decision to
terminate the plaintiff 30 I F.3d 958 (9th Cir.2002).
Stegall's case against Marathon as to significance of
timing to show pretext is nothing like the case presented by
the terminated employee in Little. Unlike the employee in
Little, Stegall has presented no substantial evidence that
the timing of her termination provides evidence of
Marathon's pretext. Marathon terminated StegaIl about six
weeks after it purchased KORD from Citadel, whereas in
Little the plaintiffs termination occurred minutes after the
employee's complaint about a rape by a customer. Further,
while the employee's termination in Little stood alone,
within weeks of Stegall's termination, Marathon replaced
every daily on-air personality at KORD with new talent in
an effort to increase KORD's ratings. As Drake testified:

which provide evidence of pretext. Stegall also argues that
Marathon's second articulated reason for laying her off,
her poor work attitude, supports a finding of pretext since
Marathon did not articulate this reason until the
commencement of litigation. It is correct that
"fundamentally different justifications for an employer's
action ... give rise to a genuine issue of fact with respect to
pretext since they suggest the possibility that neither of the
official reasons was the true reason." Washington V.
Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. I 994). But different
justifications for an adverse employment action will not
defeat summary judgment if those reasons are "not
incompatible." See Nidds V. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113
F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir.1996). See also Aragon, 292 F.3d at
661 ("We do not infer pretext from the simple fact that [an
employer] has two different, although consistent, reasons
for laying off[an employee.]").

I wanted to make changes. And I think
Eric [Van Winkle] described wholesale
changes. KORD was hurting financially.
It was not billing what it should. We
wanted to make a splash .... We changed
the morning show. We changed the
midday. We changed the afternoon. We
changed the nighttime show. We
changed the overnight show. We
changed the music. We made complete
changes around the clock.
Further, the supervisor of the employee in Little was not
consulted about the termination, whereas here Stegall's
direct supervisor, Drake, was involved in the decision to
terminate Stegall's employment. And Stegall has not
presented any evidence that Cartier knew of any of
Stegall's prior complaints to Citadel or that he knew that
Stegall was making complaints about gender-based wage
discrimination.l

I conclude that Marathon's reasons for terminating Stegall
are not inconsistent and do not support a showing of
pretext. That Stegall's work attitude was perceived by
Marathon to be poor is not inconsistent with Marathon's
articulated reason that it fired Stegall to effect a broader
station overhaul. The articulated reason of Stegall's poor
attitude supports Marathon's decision not to retain Stegall
during the overhaul that replaced every daily on-air
personality at KORD. Also, as we have previously held,
that an employer has given an explanation not previously
stated until after the commencement of litigation does not
by itself create sufficient evidence of pretext. See Lindahl
V. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1438(9th Cir.1991) (
"Simply because an explanation comes after the beginning
of litigation does not make it inherently incredible."). See
also Coleman V. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1286
(9th Cir.2000) (holding that employer's reasons for
termination which "mainly detaiI[ed] the earlier one [it
gave ]," was not sufficient evidence of pretext).

*1077 That Stegall's employment was terminated nine
days after making a gender-based wage discrimination
complaint, in the context of undisputed facts presented
including the wholesale changes at the station, does not
raise any genuine issue of fact on pretext by the employer.
Although Marathon's decision to fire Stegall was not
remote to her wage discrimination complaint to Marathon
management, there was insufficient evidence of pretext
based on the timing of Marathon's decision because the
timing of Marathon's decision to fire Stegall is
incontestably supported by its articulated reason of
instituting a broad overhaul of KORD.

Second, Stegall argues that Marathon's two reasons for
terminating her-the need to conduct a broad format change
and her poor attitude-are shifting and inconsistent reasons

Third, Stegall argues that one of the underlying reasons for
Marathon's termination of Stegall-the broad station
overhaul of KORD-is not worthy of credence. Stegall
argues in support of this position * 1078 that a change in
"the programming and format" of a radio station is
common in radio and that a change in format does not
usually require a change of on-air personalities. Stegall
also asserts that the "overhaul" claimed by Marathon
involved nothing more than routine changes. But even if
some format changes of radio stations are done without
personnel changes, that cannot be said to render
illegitimate a radio station's new management's business
objective if it prefers to have fresh faces and talent to
advance its chosen format.
Marathon's reason that it was overhauling KORD is
supported by its actions during and after Stegall's
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termination: Although some on-air personalities were
transferred to other stations, some resigned, and others
were terminated, Marathon did replace every daily on-air
personality, not merely Stegall, soon after Marathon
bought KORD. KORD under Marathon moved from
having
a
station-selected
music
format
to
a
computer-automated music selection, a system that
reduced KORD's reliance on its employee announcers to
select music. KORD changed its station format from
modern country to older country music. These changes of
personnel, operation, and program format at KORD
strongly support Marathon's articulated reason that it
conducted a broad station overhaul of KORD and on the
undisputed evidence foreclose Stegall's assertion of
pretext.

Stegall submitted insufficient evidence that Marathon's
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
terminating her were a pretext for illegal retaliation to
avoid a summary judgment based on Marathon's
legitimate reasons for termination. I would affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment to Marathon
Media on Stegall's illegal retaliation claims under Title VII
and Washington Law. Accordingly, I must respectfully
dissent.2

Parallel Citations
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Footnotes
Honorable Donald P. Lay. Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit. sitting by designation.

1

The five Pasco radio stations that Marathon acquired from Citadel were KORD (a country music station); KEYW (an adult
contemporary station); KXRX (a classic rock station); KTHK (a roek station); and KFLD (an AM radio station).

2

The only employees who were not initially retained by Marathon at KORD were management-level employees who chose to accept
positions with Citadel at other locations in the United States.

3

Stegall was employed by Marathon for only 24 days.

4

The format was changed from "contemporary" country to "classici today's" country. Van Winkle eharacterized the old format as
"way too contemporary." "a teenybopper thing." and "too hip for the audience." The new management broad east more classic
country music that included singers such as Gcorge Strait.

5

Kristin Crume was the other employee terminated on the same day as Stegall. She also previously eomplained of gender
discrimination at KORD.

6

Although Marathon eites the termination of another employee. Gary Mitchell, that employee was fired nearly a year and a half after
Stegall.

7

Marathon admitted that Stegall had name recognition and thus. visibility. and performed well at "remotes," olTsite station promotion
activities.

8

Although Marathon objects to Peterson's deposition testimony on the grounds that it is inadmissible hearsay. Such statements fall
squarely outside of the definition of hearsay. Federal Rule of Evidence 801 reads, in relevant part. as follows:
"(d) Statements which arc not hcarsay. A statement is not hearsay if(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party that is (A) the party's own statement, in either an
individual or a representative capacity .... "
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 801 (2002).

9

Stegall asserted that during her meeting with Drake in which she discussed her complaints of gender discrimination, he was virtually
non-responsive.

1

The majority also relies on Bell v. Clackamas COlln~v, 341 F.3d 858 (9th Cir.2003). holding in that case that temporal proximity
between protected activity and adverse employment action might be suffieient circumstantial evidence of retaliation. Bell adds
nothing to analysis based on Little. for in Bell. as in Little, an adverse employment action. in the case of Bell it was negative
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performance reviews, "immediately followed plaintiffs complaint" in the majority's words. The majority also cites YartzolT V.
Thomas, 809 F.2d 137l. 1376 (9th Cir.1987). which the majority contends found "highly probative" timing between employee
complaint and adverse action that "far exceeded" the 9 day interval between Stegall's complaint and her termination. Although
YartzoJTheld that the negative performance ratings in that case coming three weeks after protected activity ofYartzoffs complaints
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case on causation, each case turns on its facts and the majority here ignores the undisputed
evidence proving that Stegall's termination was part ofa broader set of terminations incidental to a new ownership's desire to change
programming and on-air personalities. That all on-air announcers were terminated from their full-time positions precludes the
negative inference that the majority draws under a rational interpretation of the evidence.

2

Apart from my disagreement with the majority's pretext assessment, I also regret to say that the majority's analysis distorts and
misunderstands our law. First, though circumstantial evidence was approved by the Supreme Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003), as a way to show mixed motive, rejecting the prior view of many circuits that
direct evidence was required for a mixed motive jury instruction, that has nothing to do with this case which deals with the traditional
and long-established assessment of the three-part test required by the Supreme Court's McDonnell Douglas precedent to assess
whether a summary judgment may be given in a Title VII case. It has always been the law, in our circuit and elsewhere, that
circumstantial evidence is admissible and can be considered on the issues of whether a prima facie case has been made, whether the
employer has shown legitimate reasons for a termination, and whether the reasons given are pretextual. Nothing is new in that regard.
I fully accept that Stegall can argue circumstantial evidence. It is simply not sufficient in the context of the station'S broad change of
program and personalities after an acquisition and the entry of new management.
Second, the majority appears to be "tutoring" Stegall's counsel to attempt to present this case as a mixed motive case, when the
majority asserts of mixed motive cases that "Stegall's case is arguably one." This case however was dismissed on summary
judgment. No issue was presented about any request for a mixed motive jury instruction. which was premature. The majority's
dicta about mixed motive cases properly has nothing to do with analysis of whether the record before the court when it granted
summary judgment showed a genuine issue of fact on pretext.
Third, the majority makes much of Stegall's problems with Cartier which occurred long before the change of management. No
genuine dispute on pretext of the termination as part of broad station change is shown by Cartier's dissatisfaction expressed when
Stegall previously walked off the job.
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II)

Appeal and Error
\,"""Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of
Decision Appealed from

In an appeal from an order granting summary
judgment, Supreme Court's standard of review is
the same as the standard used by district court in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment

12)

Judgment
'SP"Presumptions and Burden of Proof

All allegations of fact in the record and all
reasonable inferences from the record are
construed in the light most favorable to party
opposing a summary judgment motion. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c).
10 Cases that cite this headnote

27,2002.

Physician brought action against professional corporation
for wrongful discharge. The District Court, Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County, D. Duff McKee, J., granted summary
judgment for professional corporation, and physician
appealed. The Supreme Court, Schroeder, J., held that: (I)
physician waived objections to technical defects in
termination procedure; (2) professional corporation did not
tortiously interfere with contract; (3) professional
corporation
did
not
engage
in
intentional
misrepresentation; (4) genuine issue of material fact,
whether physician was eligible for public-policy exception
to employment at will doctrine, precluded summary
judgment on that issue; (S) physician'S failure to report
allegations of misconduct of another physician to state
Board of Medicine did not constitute an unclean hands
defense for professional corporation; and (6) physician was
entitled to amend complaint to add claims for emotional
distress.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and

131

Judgment
si,,,Existence or Non-Existence of Fact Issue

When a jury is to be the finder of fact, summary
judgment is not proper if conflicting inferences
could be drawn from the record and reasonable
people might reach different conclusions. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c).
II Cases that cite this headnote

14)

Judgment
>\CPresumptions and Burden of Proof

Burden of proving the absence of material facts is
upon the party moving for summary judgment

Thomas v. Medical Center

P.A., 138 Idaho 200 (2002)

61 P.3d 557

Rules Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c).

assigned as error, especially where there are no
authorities cited nor argument contained in the
briefs upon the question.

I Cases that cite this headnote

151

Judgment
,~·""Existence

or Non-Existence of Fact Issue

[91
Party moving for summary judgment is entitled
to judgment when nonmoving party fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party's case on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule S6(c).

An appellate court will not consider arguments
raised for the first time in an appellant's reply
brief.

PO)
16)

Appeal and Error
,,,,··Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
Pleading
<"'"Affected by Time of Application in General

[III

Appeal and Error
v""Form and Requisites in General
Appeal and Error
,t:-wPoints and Arguments

An appellate court will not review the actions of a
district court which have not been specifically

Health
v,,,Adverse Employment Action; Wrongful
Discharge

Physician waived objection to any technical
defects in termination procedure and ratified the
action of professional corporation in firing him,
where physician executed purchase agreements
for shareholder and partnership interests, and
accepted additional consideration.

Appeal and Error
:•• Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
An appellate court exercises free review over a
district court's conclusions of law.

[81

Contracts
.c.····Waiver

Under the law of waiver, a party to a contract
generally cannot accept a benefit from a
procedure or action and then claim that the
procedure or act is invalid.

The grant or denial of leave to amend after a
responsive pleading has been filed is a matter that
is within the discretion of the trial court, and is
subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of
that discretion. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule IS(a).

171

Appeal and Error
,;",Reply Briefs

[I2)

Labor and Employment
,·?Persons Liable

Professional corporation did not tortiously
interfere with its employment contract with
ph)'sician; corporation could not tortious I)'

Thomas v. Medical Center

138 Idaho 200 (2002)
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interfere with its own contract.

statement was true, (8) the hearer's right to rely
on the truthfulness, and (9) the hearer's
proximate injury.
I Cases that cite this headnote

1131

Labor and Employment
rDefinite or Indefinite Term; Employment
At-Will
Labor and Employment
",,"Termination; Cause or Reason in General

1171

Fraud
';;;=Existing Facts or Expectations or Promises
Physician failed to establish, for purposes of
misrepresentation claim against professional
corporation, that corporation did not have a
present intent to act on its promises to require
physicians to maintain appropriate standards of
care, to maintain quality-control measures, and to
enforce standards of care; promises were policy
statements and statements of future conduct.

Unless an employee is hired pursuant to a
contract which specifies the duration of the
employment, or limits the reasons why the
employee may be discharged, the employee is
at-will.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

2 Cases that cite this headnote

1141

Labor and Employment
·...•,·Termination; Cause or Reason in General
118)
Fraud
An at-wiII employee can be terminated for a n Y w = E x i s t i n g Facts or Expectations or Promises
reason or no reason at all.
An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not
I Cases that cite this headnote
lie for statements of future events; the law
requires the plaintiff to form his or her own
conclusions regarding the occurrence of future
events.

115)

Torts
w'"T0I1feasor as Stranger to Contract or
Relationship, in General
A party cannot tortiously interfere with his own
contract.

6 Cases that cite this headnote

1191

Fraud
~>"Relations

)16)

Fraud
<·,Elements of Actual Fraud
Actionable misrepresentation requires: (I) a
representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality,
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity, (5) the
speaker's intent that the representation be acted
upon by the hearer, (6) the hearer's ignorance of
the falsitY': (7) the hearer's reliance that the

and Means of Knowledge of Parties

Physician failed to establish, for purposes of
misrepresentation claim against professional
corporation, that he relied on corporation's
promises to require physicians to maintain
appropriate standards of care, to maintain
quality-control measures, and to enforce
standards of care; physician worked for a year
before signing employment agreement, and was
aware that corporation was taking no action on
his complaints about these issues.

Thomas v. Medical Center

PA, 138 Idaho 200
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reporting the falsification of medical records and
the performance of unnecessary operations to
bolster a physician's income.
[20[

4 Cases that cite this headnote

Labor and Employment
·/··Questions of Law or Fact

The determination of what constitutes public
policy sufficient to protect an at-will employee
from termination for whistle blowing should be
considered a question of law.

[24[

Labor and Employment
"·,,Protected Activities

An employee who reports wrongful conduct that
is protected under the public policy exception to
employment at will is protected by reporting the
conduct to superiors within the company.
[21[

Judgment
.•>~Employees, Cases Involving

Genuine issue of material fact, whether
physician's actions in reporting alleged
misconduct by another physician were in
furtherance of public policy, and thus subject to
an exception to the doctrine of employment at
will, precluded summary judgment in physician's
wrongful-discharge action against professional
corporation.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[2S[

Health
".·Records and Duty to Report; Confidentiality
in General

Statute governing reporting of violations by
physicians requires licensed physicians to report,
to state Board of Medicine, the conduct of other
licensed physicians that violates the provisions of
statute setting forth grounds for medical
discipline. I.e. §§ 54-1814, 54-1818.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[22[

Labor and Employment
~"~Exercise of Rights or Duties; Retaliation
Labor and Employment
.;·~Refusal to Engage in Wrongdoing
[26[

In order for the public policy exception to
employment at wilI to apply, a discharged
employee must: (I) refuse to commit an unlawful
act, (2) perform an important public obligation,
or (3) exercise certain rights or privileges.
6 Cases that cite this headnote

[23J

Labor and Employment
Activities

·~:=Protected

Physician employees are protected under the
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine for

Health
,,·,Adverse Employment Action; Wrongful
Discharge

Licensed physician's failure to report allegations
of misconduct of another doctor in medical
center to state Board of Medicine, as required by
statute, did not constitute an unclean hands
defense for medical center to physician's claim
of wrongful termination in violation of public
policy; while physician had a duty to report to
Board, it was prerogative of Board itself to
censure such a failure, even if failure was
evidence of an intent on part of physician to
coerce medical center to acquiesce to his
demands. I.e. §§ 54-1814,54-1818.

Thomas v. Medica! Center Physicians, PA, 138 idaho 200 (2002)
61 P.3d 557

Cause of Action or Defense

2 Cases that cite this headnote

1271

Statutes
i/"cEffect and Consequences
Statutes
'v,.Meaning of Language
Statutes
;·Existence of Ambiguity
Statutes
\,c··Construction with Reference to Other Statutes

The denial of a plaintiffs motion to amend a
complaint to add another cause of action is
governed by an abuse-of-discretion standard of
review. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule IS(a).
3 Cases that cite this headnote

i0

1311

Supreme Court interprets statutes according to
the plain, express meaning of the provision in
question and will resort to judicial construction
only if the provision is ambiguous, incomplete,
absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws.

1281

Appeal and Error
••~Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
The test for determining whether a district court
abused its discretion in denying a motion to
amend a pleading is: (I) whether the court
correctly perceived that the issue was one of
discretion, (2) whether the court acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it, and (3) whether it reached
its decision by an exercise of reason. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule IS(a).

Statutes
_Implied Amendment

I Cases that cite this headnote

Supreme Court disfavors statutory amendment
by implication absent clear, unequivocal
legislative intent.

1321

1291

Pleading
,,,,,,Statutory Provisions
The dual purposes of rule governing amendment
of pleadings are to allow claims to be determined
on the merits rather than technicalities, and to
make pleadings serve the limited role of
providing notice of the nature of the claim and
the facts that are at issue. Rules Civ.Proc .. Rule
IS(a).

Equity
Who Comes Into Equity Must Come with
Clean Hands

'~'AHe

Under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands,
the Supreme Court has the discretion to evaluate
the relative conduct of both parties and to
determine whether the party seeking equitable
relief should in the light of all the circumstances
be precluded from such relief.

1331

1301

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Pleading
.F"Sufficiency of Amendment

Appeal and Error
,.'·Amendment Increasing Demand, or Adding

A court may consider whether the allegations
sought to be added to a complaint state a valid
claim in determining whether to grant leave to
amend the complaint; a court, however, may not
consider the sufficiency of evidence supporting

Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 idaho 200 (2002)
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the claim sought to be added in determining leave
to amend because that is more properly
determined at the summary judgment stage.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(a).

[34[

[37[

Damages
.i>~Termination

in General

4 Cases that cite this headnote

In wrongful discharge cases, claims of infliction
of emotional distress are allowed if the facts of
the case support such a claim in addition to the
contractual claim.

Pleading
or Different Cause of Action or Defense
Pleading
.,,~Sufficiency of Amendment

2 Cases that cite this headnote

(~"'·New

Trial court abused its discretion in denying
physician's motion to amend his complaint for
wrongful
discharge
against
professional
corporation to include claims of intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, where
court considered the merits of the added claims.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(a).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[35)

Damages
'.""Breach of Contract or Warranty
Damages
.. ·~(Breach of Contract

Plaintiffs may not recover for emotional distress
in breach of contract cases, but punitive damages
might be appropriate if the defendant's conduct is
sufficiently egregious.

Attorneys and Law Firms

**560 *203 Cosho, Humphrey, Greener & Welsh, Boise,
for appellant. Thomas G. Walker, Jr. argued.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, Boise, for respondents. Phillip J.
Collaer argued.
Opinion

SUBSTITUTE OPINION
THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION DATED JUNE 12,
2002 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

ON REHEARING

136)

Damages
·.,;""Breach of Contract or Warranty

Claim for infliction of emotional distress is not
prohibited any time a breach of contract claim is
involved; for plaintiff to state a claim for
infliction of emotional distress, the conduct
complained of must arise independently of the
breach of contract claim.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

This is an appeal from an award of summary judgment in
favor of Medical Center Physicians et al. (Medical Center)
against Richard V. Thomas, M.D.'s (Thomas) claim for
wrongful termination.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 30, 1993, Thomas entered into a probationary
agreement with Medical Center to be employed as a
physician. Subsequently, Thomas and Medical Center
entered into an agreement in which Thomas became a

Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, PA, 138 idaho 200 (2002)
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shareholder in Medical Center and a partner in Nampa
Medical Dental Properties, a partnership created by
Medical Center. Prior to signing the 1994 agreement,
Thomas believed that he had observed certain instances of
misconduct by another doctor in this department (the
Doctor) and reported to administrators within Medical
Center what he considered to be breaches of the standard of
care. He reported that the Doctor had bartered with patients
for personal gifts in exchange for medical services,
performed unnecessary treatment and testing for the
purpose of boosting his income, falsified medical records,
and acted unprofessionally by driving his vehicle across
Medical Center's lawn.
A Medical Center executive committee considered the
complaints and concluded that the allegations of breach of
the standard of care by the Doctor were simply differences
in medical opinions. The committee concluded, however,
that the allegations of bartering had occurred, constituting
dishonesty, and the continuation of such would result in the
Doctor being dismissed from employment with Medical
Center.
Thomas treated one of the Doctor's patients in his absence,
telling the patient that he did not agree with the treatment
the Doctor had prescribed, and he referred the patient to a
local urologist. Thomas did not notify the Doctor upon his
return of the treatment he had rendered. After learning of
the treatment, the Doctor presented the information to
Medical Center's quality assurance committee, which
admonished Thomas **561 *204 for his actions in a memo
dated January 28, 1998, written by Dr. Aguilar (Aguilar).
The memo criticized Thomas' conduct, specifically for the
entry of information in the patient's chart that was
"inflammatory." Thomas responded by telling Aguilar that
he was going to report the events concerning the Doctor to
individuals or entities outside the Medical Center. Aguilar
asked Thomas to let Medical Center handle the situation
internally.
On February 17, 1998, Thomas distributed a memo
addressed to Medical Center's quality assurance
committee, Medical Center's chief administrator, and the
chief executive officer and president of Mercy Medical
Center. In the memo Thomas defended his conduct, stating
that his entries were objective, he was not "in the business
of trying to protect 'one of our own' from blatant, illegal
actions," and he was morally obligated to report the facts
accurately. He also alleged that the Doctor had erred in the
treatment of a patient without first administering a
pregnancy test, resulting in miscarriage of a viable
fifteen-week-old fetus. Thomas concluded the memo,
stating that "[i]f these issues are left unaddressed, I
guarantee a copy of this letter will also be sent to the Idaho
Medical Board."

Following the February 17, 1999 memo, Aguilar informed
Thomas that he and many others were very angry with
Thomas for writing the memo. On February 23, 1998, less
than a week after Thomas' memo was distributed, the
Doctor resigned his position at Medical Center. About the
same time, Thomas was interviewed by Kenneth Mallea
(Mallea), legal counsel for Medical Center. Mallea
reported that in his opinion, Thomas would not be satisfied
until Drs. Birkland and Lynn, two other physicians at
Medical center were no longer employed there.
On February 26, 1998, Birkland signed and dated a
document entitled "Consent of Directors," which was a
vote in favor of terminating Thomas' employment at
Medical Center. On March 3, 1998, written notice of a
meeting scheduled for March 5, 1998 to consider Thomas'
termination was distributed to some of Medical Center's
board of directors. Thomas did not receive written notice
of the meeting and, although he was actually aware of the
meeting, he decided not to attend upon advice of his
counsel. At the meeting all directors who were present, and
all of Medical Center's directors except Thomas and Dr.
McKinnon, signed the "Consent of Directors" in favor of
Thomas' termination. The document stated that every
director of Medical Center had consented to adopt
Thomas' termination without a formal meeting, in
accordance with the provisions of the Idaho Professional
Service Corporation Act. Thomas disputes that all
members of the board consented, because he, a director at
the time, did not sign the document. Medical Center's
of
incorporation
contained
procedural
articles
requirements for termination, requiring an affirmative vote
of at least 90% of the board of directors to terminate a
director's employment.
On March 7, 1998, Thomas was notified that his
employment had been terminated. Thereafter, Medical
Center and Thomas entered into agreements in which
Medical Center bought out Thomas' stock in the
corporation and his partnership interest.
Following his termination, Thomas ran advertisements in
local newspapers discussing particular aspects of the
dispute. On April 21, 1998, he filed a complaint against
Medical Center alleging wrongful termination/retaliatory
discharge, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, a wage
claim, intentional interference with an employment
relationship, and interference with a prospective economic
advantage. Medical Center answered and counterclaimed
against Thomas for breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
defamation, libel and slander per se. On October 6, 1999,
Thomas filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to
include claims for intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress and for punitive damages.

Thomas v. Medica! Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200 (2002)
61 P.3d 557

Medical Center filed a motion for partial summary
judgment to which Thomas responded by filing a motion
for summary judgment with respect to Medical Center's
counterclaims. Both motions were heard by the district
judge on December 21, 1999, and at the conclusion of the
hearing the judge granted Medical Center's motion for
summary **562 *205 judgment with respect to most of
Thomas' claims. The judge denied Thomas' motion for
Center's
summary
judgment
against
Medical
counterclaims and granted Thomas's motion to amend his
complaint for punitive damages, but denied the motion
with respect to the addition of the emotional distress
claims.
Medical Center filed a second motion for summary
jUdgment regarding Thomas' remaining claims. Following
oral argument, the district judge entered a memorandum
decision granting Medical Center's motion and dismissing
the remainder of Thomas' claims. Judgment was entered
on March 20, 2000, and Thomas filed a timely notice of
appeal.

Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868,452 P.2d 362, 365 (I 969).
The adverse party, however, may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must respond,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. I.R.C.P. 56( e). Therefore, the moving party is entitled
to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial. Badell, 115 Idaho at 102, 765
P.2d at 127 (citing Celotex V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (I 986)).

16] "The grant or denial of leave to amend after a
responsive pleading has been filed is a matter that is within
the discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal on
appeal only for an abuse of that discretion." Black Canyon
Racquetball Club, lnc., v. Idaho First Nat 'I Bank, N.A.,
119 Idaho 17 I, 175,804 P.2d 900, 904 (199 I).
17] "[T]his Court exercises free review over the district
judge's conclusions ofIaw." Williamson V. City oflvlcCall,
135 Idaho 452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (200 I).

II.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

111121 131 In an appeal from an order granting summary
judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as
the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion
for summary judgment. McDonald v. Paine, 119 Idaho
725, 727, 810 P.2d 259, 261 (1991); Meridian Bowling
Lanes v. Meridian Athletic Ass 'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 512,
670 P.2d 1294, 1297 (1983). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents on file with the court, read in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material
issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a
jUdgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Badel! v.
Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102,765 P.2d 126,127 (1988). In
making this determination all allegations of fact in the
record and all reasonable inferences from the record are
construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion. City of Kellogg v. A1ission Mountain Interests
Ltd, Co., 135 Idaho 239, 243, 16 PJd 915, 919 (2000).
When a jury is to be the finder of fact, summary judgment
is not proper if conflicting inferences could be drawn from
the record and reasonable people might reach different
conclusions. State Dept. of Fin. v. Res. Servo Co., lnc., 130
Idaho 877, 880, 950 P.2d 249, 252 (1997).
14J [51 The burden of proving the absence of material facts
is upon the moving party. Petricevich

V.

Salmon River

THE DISTRICT JUDGE PROPERLY GRANTED
MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON SOME ISSUES BUT ERRED IN
GRANTING THE MOTION ON THE VIOLATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM

A. Thomas Failed To Preserve Certain Material Issues
On Appeal

181 J91ln order to be considered by this Court, the appellant
is required to identify legal issues and provide authorities
supporting the arguments in the opening brief. I.A.R. 35.
"[T]his Court will not review the actions of the district
court which have not been specifically assigned as error[,]
[e ]specially where there are no authorities cited **563
*206 nor argument contained in the briefs upon the
question." Taylor V. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 490, 927
P.2d 873, 880 (1996) (internal quotation omitted).
Moreover, this Court will not consider arguments raised
for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. State V.
Killinger, 126 Idaho 737, 740, 890 P.2d 323, 326 (1995).

I. Waiver
1101 III J Thomas argues that the procedural defects of his

Thomas v. Medical Center
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termination by Medical Center and the individual directors
constituted breach of contract, breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, violation of Idaho Code § 30-1-821,
interference with an existing contract and intentional
interference with a prospective economic advantage. The
district judge concluded that Thomas' action in executing
the March 10, 1998, purchase agreements and accepting
the additional consideration paid waived any technical
defects in the termination procedure and ratified the action
of the corporation. Under the law of waiver, a party
generally cannot accept a benefit from a procedure or
action and then claim that the procedure or act is invalid.
Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 40 I, 700 P.2d 19, 23
(1985). The first agreement provided for Thomas'
resignation as a shareholder. The second effectuated his
withdrawal from the partnership and the sale of his
partnership interest. Both agreements stated that Thomas'
employment had been terminated, and Thomas received
over $23,000 in consideration pursuant to the agreements.
The district judge also found that Thomas waived any
procedural irregularities of his termination as a corporate
director under Idaho Code §§ 30-1-823 and 30-1-824(4).
Regardless of whether this ruling is correct, Thomas has
not argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding
that he waived his rights and ratified the termination
procedure. Thomas simply argues that the termination
procedure was flawed.l Even if flawed, if waived and
ratified, it is effective. Because not raised on appeal, the
district judge's ruling that Thomas waived and ratified the
termination procedure that Medical Center used to
terminate him is affirmed. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
758,763,864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993).

employee can be terminated for any reason or no reason at
all. Id. On appeal, however, Thomas did not raise the issue
of whether the district judge was correct in determining
that he was an at-will employee, and this Court will not
consider the issue on appeal. Thomas only uses the term
"at-will" in passing in his opening brief, stating that "[i]f
this court finds that Thomas is an employee 'at-will,' the
tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic
advantage is applicable to individual defendants." Thomas
does not argue or present authority showing that the district
court erred in finding that Thomas was an at-will
employee. Thomas does state that he "could only be
terminated for reasons that were deemed to be in the 'best
interests' of Medical Center ... upon an affirmative vote of
ninety percent (90%) of the corporate directors." This
argument, however, only goes to the procedural
irregularities **564 *207 of the termination, not to
whether there were substantive limitations imposed by the
"best interests" clause, which would make Thomas an
employee other than at-will.

1151 As to the tortious interference claim, it is clearly
established that a party cannot tortiously interfere with his
own contract. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of
Idaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993)
(citations omitted). Because Medical Center's actions with
respect to Thomas concerned Thomas' employment and
arose out of his employment contract, Thomas has not
stated a claim for tortious interference with contract.
B. The District Judge Properly Granted Summary
Judgment On The Misrepresentation Claim

2. Employment At-Will

116) The waiver and ratification ruling does not bar
Thomas' claim for misrepresentation because it relates to
prior statements by Medical Center, not the procedural
irregularities of his termination. However, the district
judge properly granted summary judgment on the merits of
the misrepresentation claim. Actionable misrepresentation
requires: (I) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5)
the speaker's intent that the representation be acted upon
by the hearer; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity; (7)
the hearer's reliance that the statement was true; (8) the
hearer's right to rely on the truthfulness; and (9) the
hearer's proximate injury. Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho
387,389,613 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1980).

1121113) 1141 The district judge ruled that Thomas was an
at-will employee. "Unless an employee is hired pursuant to
a contract which specifies the duration of the employment,
or limits the reasons why the employee may be discharged,
the employee is 'at-will.' " Nilsson v. Mapco, 115 Idaho
18, 22, 764 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct.App.1988). An at-will

117] Thomas asserts that Medical Center made
representations to him that: (I) Medical Center would
require its physicians to perform services for its patients at
the applicable standard of care; (2) Medical Center would
maintain appropriate quality control measures; and (3)
Medical Center would enforce the requirements that its

The district judge ruled that Thomas' breach of contract
claim was barred by waiver, and the remainder of Thomas'
claims were dismissed on the merits. However, Thomas
argues that the procedural irregularities (the same conduct
the district judge found he waived) impacted his claims for
breach of good faith and fair dealing, interference with an
existing contract, and interference with an economic
advantage, and Idaho Code § 30-1-821. Because these
claims are barred by waiver, there was no error in
dismissing them as well.
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physicians meet the applicable standard of care. The
district court ruled that the representations made were not
actionable because they were: (I) policy statements; and
(2) statements of future conduct.
[18J An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie
for statements of future events. Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120
Idaho 837,843,820 P.2d 707, 713 (Ct.App.1991) (citing
Sharp v. Idaho Investment Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 122, 504
P.2d 386, 395 (1972». The law requires the plaintiff to
form his or her own conclusions regarding the occurrence
offuture events. Id. Thomas was required to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Medical Center had no
present intention of following through on the
representations he complains of at the time the statements
were made in order for the statements to be actionable.
Thomas presented no such evidence; therefore, the district
judge's dismissal of his misrepresentation claim is
affirmed.
119] Moreover, Thomas had been working for Medical
Center and making complaints about the Doctor's conduct
for over a year prior to entering into the 1994 employment
agreement in which the alleged misrepresentations
occurred. The record demonstrates that Thomas was aware
that Medical Center was taking no action as a result of his
complaints, thus, Thomas has failed to demonstrate
reliance on any representations made in the written
contracts he signed.

C. The District Judge Erred In Granting Summary
Judgment On The Wrongful Termination/Retaliatory
Discharge In Violation Of Public Policy Claim

[20] The determination of what constitutes public policy
sufficient to protect an at-will employee from termination
for whistle blowing should be considered a question of
law. See generally Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944
P.2d 695 (1997) (determination of what constitutes a
violation of public policy in invalidating the terms of a
contract is a question oflaw). The district judge in this case
noted that once defined, the issue of whether the conduct in
question violates public policy becomes an issue for the
jury. The district judge found that Thomas' memo dated
February 17, 1998, constituted a conditional threat, as
Thomas implied that he would remain silent if Medical
Center acceded to his demands. The district judge
concluded **565 *208 that such conduct "as a matter of
law ... does not constitute conduct protected by the public
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in
Idaho"; thus, Thomas' conduct precluded his ability to
claim public policy exception.
On appeal this Court conducts a two-part inquiry. First, the

Court asks whether there is a public policy regarding
reporting medical irregularities sufficient to create an
exception to the employer's right to terminate an at-will
employee. Second, the Court decides whether the behavior
complained of by Thomas is protected under the public
policy exception, and whether ajury could reasonably find
that Thomas acted in a manner sufficiently in furtherance
of that policy.

I. The Conduct Thomas Complained of Falls Under the
Public Policy Exception
[21 J [22] In order for the public policy exception to apply,
the discharged employee must: (I) refuse to commit an
unlawful act; (2) perform an important public obligation;
or (3) exercise certain rights or privileges. Sorensen v.
Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70, 74
(1990). The public policy exception has been protected in
Idaho on several occasions. E.g., Watson v. Idaho Falls
Conso!. Hosps .. Inc., III Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632 (1986)
(protecting participation in union activities); Ray v. Nampa
Sch. Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117,814 P.2d 17 (1991)
(protecting reports of electrical building code violations);
Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 923 P.2d 981 (1996)
(protecting compliance with a court issued subpoena). This
Court has also indicated that the public policy exception
would be applicable if an employee were discharged, for
example for refusing to date her supervisor, for filing a
worker's compensation claim, or for serving on jury duty.
Sorensen, 118 Idaho at 668, 799 P.2d at 74 (citations
omitted). In Sorensen, the Court stated that if the reported
conduct constituted a statutory violation, it would be more
likely fall under the protection of the public policy
exception to the at-will doctrine. Jd.
[23] Thomas asserts that a fellow doctor falsified medical
records and performed unnecessary operations on patients
to bolster his income. Thomas asserts that his conduct in
reporting the Doctor's actions falls under the exception
listed in Sorensen for performing an important public
obligation. Granting all reasonable inferences to the
nonmoving party, this Court must accept that the Doctor's
conduct occurred as alleged by Thomas. Reporting such
misconduct falls under the public policy exception because
the conduct alleged by Thomas is unlawful and it involves
the health and welfare of the public. Crea v. FMC Corp.,
135 Idaho 175, 178,16 P.3d 272, 275 (2000). Employees
are protected under the public policy exception to the
at-will doctrine for reporting the falsification of medical
records and the performance of unnecessary operations to
bolster a physician's income.
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2. Thomas' Conduct of Reporting tile Violation Falls
Within tlte Exception
(24) Medical Center argues that Thomas was required to
report the conduct to an outside entity in order to be
protected under the public policy exception. In Crea, the
plaintiff sought protection under the public policy
exception following termination of his employment by
FMC. Crea argued that he was fired because he disclosed
to his supervisors documents indicating that activities of
FMC had caused serious contamination, including arsenic
that threatened ground water. This Court concluded that
"Crea's claim for wrongful discharge would fall under the
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine if facts
supporting the claim were established." Id. at 178, 16 P.3d
at 275. Thus, an employee who reports wrongful conduct
that is protected under the public policy exception is
protected by reporting the conduct to superiors within the
company.

Even if the Court were to require reporting to an outside
entity, the February 17, 1998 memo was addressed to the
chief executive officer and president of Mercy Medical
Center. Sending the memo to the CEO of a hospital with
whom Medical Center worked would satisfy any outside
reporting requirement.
**566 *209 Once the court defines the public policy,
whether the public policy was violated is a question for the
jury. Questions of fact remain as to whether Thomas'
conduct in reporting what he considered the Doctor's
misconduct, and whether his writing and distribution ofthe
February 17, 1998, memo were in furtherance of the above
defined public policy. There are also questions of fact
regarding whether Thomas was terminated for acting in the
furtherance of the public policy.

3. Unclean HaJ1(l5
(251 1261 Finally, Medical Center presents an "unclean
hands" argument with regard to Thomas's claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy,
contending that Thomas was required to report the
allegations of misconduct to the Idaho Board of Medicine
under Idaho Code § 54-1818, and his failure to do so
precludes his claim of discharge in violation of public
policy.

I daho Code § 54-1818 does require physicians to report
violations by other physicians, but there is an ambiguity in
the statute as to what violations are to be reported. The
statute requires physicians to report violations of Idaho
Code § 54-1810, but next to where the statute indicates that

Idaho Code § 54-1810 is the appropriate provision, there
are brackets containing Idaho Code § 54-1814, suggesting
that it is the violation of this statute that must be reported.
Compiler's notes to I.c. § 54-1818 state that the
"bracketed section number' § 54-1814' was inserted by
the compiler since § 54-1810 as it related to grounds for
revocation or suspension of licenses was repealed and §
54-1814 now deals with such subject matter."
1271 128) This Court interprets statutes according to the
plain, express meaning of the provision in question and
will resort to judicial construction only if the provision is
ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict
with other laws. Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith,
132 Idaho 732, 742, 979 P.2d 605,615 (1999). This Court
disfavors statutory amendment by implication absent clear,
unequivocal legislative intent. Wilkins v. Fireman's Fund
American Life Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 1006, 695 P.2d 391
(1985). However, the evidence indicates that the
legislature intended Idaho Code § 54-1818 to refer to Idaho
Code § 54-1814. Idaho Code § 54-1818 was passed in
1976 as the reporting statute for malpractice as then
defined by Idaho Code § 54-1810. Idaho Code § 54-1818
has not been amended since 1976. However, in 1977, the
legislature undertook an extensive rewriting of the Idaho
Medical Malpractice Act, repealing, along with many other
sections, Idaho Code § 54-18 10. In its place, the legislature
passed Idaho Code § 54-1814, which is clearly the
successor statute of Idaho Code § 54-1810 given their
substantially, almost exactly, identical provisions. Also,
current Idaho Code § 54-1810 merely demands that all
licensed physicians take a written exam to be certified, and
does not address what constitutes malpractice.
Determining that Idaho Code § 54- I 8 18 still refers to
Idaho Code § 54-1810 would frustrate and almost
completely nUllify the effectiveness of Idaho Code §
54-1818 and the responsibility of the medical field to
police itself. The compiler's notes state an accurate
correction of the statute. Idaho Code § 54-1818 requires
licensed physicians to report the conduct of other licensed
physicians that violates the provisions of Idaho Code §
54-1814.
129) As for Thomas's failure to report the allegations of
misconduct to the Idaho Board of Medicine, the failure of
Thomson to report the allegation of misconduct does not
constitute a defense for the Medical Center. Under the
equitable doctrine of "unclean hands," the Court has the
discretion to evaluate the relative conduct of both parties
and to determine whether the party seeking equitable relief
should in the light of all the circumstances be precluded
from such relief. Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 941 P.2d
350 (1997). While Thomas had a duty to report to the
Medial Board, it is the prerogative of the Medial Board
itself to censure such a failure. Thomas's failure to report
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the alleged misconduct to the Medical Center Board may
be evidence of an intent to coerce the Medical Center to
acquiesce to his demands, but the failure to meet his
responsibilities to the Medical Board is not enough to
preclude him from asserting his claim of **567 *210
discharge against public policy against the Medical Center.
Issues of material fact exist regarding whether Thomas is
entitled to relieffor discharge in violation of public policy.
He has provided sufficient evidence on the disputed issues
to survive
summary judgment, and the district J'udae's
•
b
order IS therefore reversed and remanded on this claim.

IV.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING
THOMAS' MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT
TO ADD CLAIMS FOR INTENTIONAL AND
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS
Amendments to complaints in civil cases are governed by
I.R.C.P. 15(a). After a responsive pleading has been filed,
leave of the court or written consent of the adverse party is
required. The Rule provides that "leave shaIl be freely
given when justice so requires."
[30) 131) The denial of a plaintiffs motion to amend a
comp laint to add another cause of action is governed by an
abuse of discretion standard of review. Raedlein v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 129 Idaho 627, 631, 931 P.2d 621,625
(1996). The test for determining whether the district court
abused its discretion is: (I) whether the court correctly
perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether
the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached
its decision by an exercise of reason. Highland Enter., Inc.,
v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009 (1999)
(citations omitted).
In Idaho Schools for Equal Education Opportunity v.
Idaho State Board olEducation, 128 Idaho 276, 284, 912
P.2d 644, 652 (1996), this Court found that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion to
amend the complaint without articulating a reason for the
denial. In that case, this Court wrote that under Rule 15(a):
[i]fthe underlying facts or circumstances
relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, [the plaintiff] ought to
be afforded an opportunity to test his

claim on the merits. In the absence of any
apparent or declared reason-such as
undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive
on the part of the movant, repeated
failure
to cure
deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue
of the allowance of the amendment,
futility of the amendment, etc.-the leave
sought should, as the rules require, "be
freely given." Of course, the grant or
denial of an opportunity to amend is
within the discretion of the [d]istrict
[c ]ourt, but outright refusal to grant the
leave without any justifying reason
appearing for the denial is not an exercise
of discretion; it is merely abuse of that
discretion ....

Id. (quoting Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d
993,996 (1986).
1321 133) The dual purposes of Rule 15(a) are to allow
claims to be determined on the merits rather than
technicalities and to make pleadings serve the limited role
of providing notice of the nature ofthe claim and the facts
that are at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen,
133 Idaho 866, 871,993 P.2d 1197,1202 (1999) (citation
omitted). A court may consider whether the allegations
sought to be added to the complaint state a valid claim in
determining whether to grant leave to amend the
complaint. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho
First Nat 'I Bank N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900,
904 (1991). A court, however, may not consider the
sufficiency of evidence supporting the claim sought to be
added in determining leave to amend because that is more
properly determined at the summary judgment stage.
Christensen Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 872, 993 P.2d at
1203.
1341 Thomas sought to amend his complaint to add claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. In denying
Thomas leave to amend his complaint, the district judge,
regarding Medical Center's conduct that Thomas aIleged,
wrote: "It doesn't seem to me that any of that reaches
anywhere **568 *211 near the level of outrage that would
be necessary to give rise to a separate cause of action for
emotional distress." This language indicates that the
district judge considered the merits of the emotional
distress claims in denying leave to add such claims.
The district judge also wrote, however: "And I can't see
that the separate claims of emotional distress and tortious
infliction of emotional distress go anyplace. If they're
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within the reach of contract damages so be it. But there is
not a basis to convert what is a contract action into a tort
action for emotional distress."

VI.

1351

Medical Center contends that the district judge
properly denied leave to amend because Thomas was
improperly attempting to litigate a contract claim in tort
because wrongful discharge sounds in contract, not in tort.
Hummer, 129 Idaho at 280-81, 923 P.2d at 987-88. In
Idaho, plaintiffs may not recover for emotional distress in
breach of contract cases, but punitive damages might be
appropriate if the defendant's conduct is sufficiently
egregious. Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 362, 699 P.2d
1371,1376 (1985).

1361 1371 However, a claim for infliction of emotional
distress is not prohibited any time a breach of contract
claim is involved. In order for the plaintiff to state a claim
for infliction of emotional distress, the conduct complained
of must arise independently of the breach of contract claim.
Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138,483 P.2d 664, 669
(197 I). In wrongful discharge cases, claims of infliction of
emotional distress are allowed if the facts of the case
support such a claim in addition to the contractual claims.
See, e.g., Olson v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 134 Idaho 778,
783-84,9 P.3d 1244, 1249-50 (2000). In Olson, this Court
upheld ajury verdict in favor of the defendant employer on
an emotional distress claim arising from an employee's
termination. Id.
Bearing in mind the policy behind Rule l5(a), this Court
finds that the district judge acted outside the bounds of
discretion in denying Thomas' motion to amend.

NEITHER PARTY IS ENTITLED TO AN A WARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

Idaho Code § 12- I 20(3) provides for mandatory attorney
fees on appeal and at trial to the prevailing party in disputes
involving contracts for services. The present case involves
a dispute relating to an employment relationship, which is
inherently contractual in nature. In addition, most of
Thomas' claims sounded in contract. However, because we
remand for further proceedings, neither party is the
prevailing party and the issue of fees is remanded for
consideration at the conclusion of the case.

VII.
CONCLUSION

The district judge's order of summary judgment on the
claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The case
is also remanded to allow Thomas to amend his complaint
to add claims for intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The award of costs and attorney fees is
vacated and remanded for consideration at the conclusion
of the case. No attorney fees are awarded on appeal. The
appellant is awarded costs.

V.
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices W ALTERS and
KIDWELL, and Justice Pro Tern MELANSON concur.
THE A WARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
IS VACATED

Parallel Citations
Because this Court reverses and remands for further
proceedings on the termination in violation of public
policy and denial of leave to amend the complaint, we
vacate the award of costs and fees below, reserving the
issue for later determination by the trial court.

61 P.3d 557

Footnotes

1

Thomas argues in his reply brief that the agreements only affected Thomas' status as shareholder and as a partner, not as a former
employee. This Court. however, will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. Raudebaugh, 124
Idaho at 763.864 P.2d at 601.
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105 S.Ct. 613
Supreme Court of the United States

Prevailing party may advance any ground in
Supreme Court in support of a judgment in his
favor, but an argument that would modity
judgment cannot be presented unless cross
petition has been filed.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
Harold H. THURSTON et al.
AIR LINE PILOT'S ASSOCIATION,
INTERNATIONAL, Petitioner,
v.
Harold H. THURSTON et al.
Nos. 83-997,83-1325. I Argued Oct. 9,1984.
I Decided Jan. 8,1985.

16 Cases that cite this headnote

121

Age Discrimination in Employment Act broadly
prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the
workplace based on age. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2 et seq., 4(a),
(a)(l),(c), (f)(1, 2), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§
62 I et seq., 623(a), (a)(l), (c), (f)(1, 2).

In suit brought against airline by labor union and in suit
brought by certain employees, appeal was taken from
District Court judgments, and the Court of Appeals, 7 I 3
F.2d 940,affirming in part and reversing in part, 547
F.Supp. 1221, held that the airline was liable for
"liquidated" or double damages for "willful" violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Airline
sought writ of certiorari and labor union filed cross petition
raising only the liability issue. The Supreme Court, Justice
Powell, held that: (1) the airline's transfer policy
discriminated against disqualified captains on basis of age;
(2) age was not a "bona fide occupational qualification";
and (3) the discriminatory transfer policy was not part of a
"bona fide seniority system"; and (4) to say that violation
of Age Discrimination in Employment Act is "willful" if
employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for
matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA
was acceptable way to articulate definition of "willful," but
where employer certainly did not know that its conduct
violated the Act nor could it be said that employer adopted
transfer policy in "reckless disregard" of requirements of
the Act, but, rather, record made clear that employer's
officers acted reasonably and in good faith in attempting to
determine whether their plan would violate Act, conduct
was not "willful" and respondents were not entitled to
liquidated damages.

Civil Rights
<:.=Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements

22 Cases that cite this headnote

131

Civil Rights
... Pilots; airlines and other carriers

Where many airline captains who obtained
positions as flight engineers to avoid compulsory
retirement at age 60 were forced to assume that
position prior to reaching 60, they were adversely
affected by discriminatory transfer policy, which
did not apply to captains disqualified for reasons
other than age; despite fact they obtained
positions as flight engineers and employer's
discriminatory transfer policy could violate Age
Discrimination in Employment Act even though
83% of the 60-year-old captains were able to
obtain positions as fl ight engineers through
bidding procedures. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
39 Cases that cite this headnote

Affirmed as to violation of the ADEA, and reversed as to
claim for double damages.

West Headnotes (17)

(1/

Federal Courts
'J"Certiorari in general

[4/

Civil Rights
.>"Pilots; airlines and other carriers

Trans World

Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985)
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Where employer, an airline, granted some
disqualified captains the "privilege" of
"bumping" less senior flight engineers, it could
not deny such opportunity to others because of
their age, and where captains who became
disqualified for any reason other than age were
allowed to "bump" less senior flight engineers,
airline's transfer policy was discriminatory on its
face. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, §§ 2 et seq., 4(a)(1), (c), (f)(I, 2), as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq., 623(a)(I),
(c), (f)(1, 2).

et seq., 4(a)(I), (c), (f)(I, 2), as amended, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq., 623(a)(I), (c), (f)(I, 2);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
564 Cases that cite this headnote

171

To be permissible under "bona fide occupational
of
the
Age
qualification"
provlSlon
Discrimination in Employment Act, age-based
discrimination must relate to "particular
business." Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 4(f)(I, 2), as amended, 29
U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1, 2).

56 Cases that cite this headnote

151

Statutes
:'AConstruction with Reference to Other Statutes
Because substantive prOVlSlons of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act were derived
in haec verba from equal employment
opportunity sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, interpretation of Title VII as providing that
benefit which is part and parcel of employment
relationship may not be doled out in
discriminatory fashion even if employer would
be free not to provide the benefit at all applies
with equal force in context of age discrimination.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§§ 2 et seq., 4(a)(1), (c), (f)( 1,2), as amended, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq., 623(a)(I), (c), (f)(I, 2);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
I 18 Cases that cite this headnote
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181

Civil Rights
airlines and other carriers

''''~•. Pilots;

Where under airline's policy age-disqualified
captains were not given transfer privileges
afforded captains disqualified for other reasons,
and where such policy did not operate to exclude
protected individuals from position of captain but
rather prevented qualified 60-year-olds from
working as flight engineers, and where it was
"particular" job of flight engineer from which
respondents were excluded by discriminatory
transfer policy, age under 60 was not a bona fide
occupational qualification for position of flight
engineer and the age-based discrimination at
issue could not be justified. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(f)(1, 2), as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1, 2).

Civil Rights
discrimination

.~cmAge

Shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell
Douglas were designed to assure that plaintiff
have his day in court despite unavailability of
direct evidence of employment discrimination,
and where, in suit under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, there was direct evidence that
method of transfer available to disqualified
captain depended upon his age, in suit under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, McDonnell
Douglas test was not applicable. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2

Civil Rights
"c"Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements
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Civil Rights
.;)=Pilots; airlines and other carriers
Although Age Discrimination in Employment
Act did not prohibit airline from retiring all

Trans World
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disqualified
captains,
including
those
incapacitated because of age, airline was not
thereby authorized to make dependent upon age
of individuals the availability of transfer to
position for which age was not bona fide
occupational qualification. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(f)(1, 2), as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1, 2); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
I Cases that cite this headnote

As to imposItIOn of penalty under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, manner in
which correlative provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act has been interpreted is relevant.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 7(b), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b); Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(a, b), 29
U.S.CA. § 216(a, b).
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[I3)
(10)

Civil Rights
in general

Civil Rights
·v·",Age discrimination

·.~=Defenses

Where although Federal Aviation Administration
"age 60 rule" might have caused respondents'
retirement the airline's seniority plan certainly
"permitted" it within meaning of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and where
captains disqualified for reasons other than age
were allowed to "bump" less senior flight
engineers, mandatory retirement was age based,
and the "bona fide seniority system" defense was
unavailable to airline. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 4( f)(l, 2), as
amended, 29 U.S.CA. § 623(f)(1, 2).

Want of intention on the part of employer to
violate Age Discrimination in Employment Act
does not necessarily make double damages
inappropriate. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
§ 16(b), 29 U.S.c.A. § 216(a).
36 Cases that cite this headnote

[I4J

In view of legislative history of liquidated
damages provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, "reckless disregard" standard
for imposition is reasonable. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), as amended,
29 U.S.CA. § 626(b); Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, § 16(a, b), 29 U.S.CA. § 216(a, b).

10 Cases that cite this headnote

[ 111

Civil Rights
>,=Age discrimination

Legislative history of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act indicates that Congress
intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in
nature. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, § 7(b), as amended, 29 U.S.CA. §
626(b); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §
16(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).
76 Cases that cite this headnote
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Statutes
-.=Construction with Reference to Other Statutes

Civil Rights
,,,,Age discrimination
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[15J

Civil Rights
...••. Age discrimination

damages
provIsIon
of Age
Liquidated
Discrimination in Employment Act would not be
interpreted in manner frustrating congressional
intention for two-tiered liability scheme, and
violation of the Act was not to be held "willful"
merely because employer simply knew of
potential applicability of the Act. Portal-to-Portal
Act of 1947, §§ 6(a), 11,29 U.S.C.A. §§ 255(a),
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penalties provision of the ADEA; disagreeing
with Hays v, Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d
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U.S.CA. § 260; Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), as amended, 29
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To say that violation of Age Discrimination in
Employment Act is "willful" if employer either
knew or showed reckless disregard for matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA
was acceptable way to articulate definition of
"willful," but where employer certainly did not
know that its conduct violated the Act nor could
it be said that employer adopted transfer policy in
"reckless disregard" of requirements of the Act,
but, rather, record made clear that employer's
officers acted reasonably and in good faith in
attempting to determine whether their plan would
violate Act, conduct was not "willful" and
respondents were not entitled to liquidated
damages. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 11,29
U.S.CA. § 260; Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1947, § 7(b), as amended, 29
U.S.CA. § 626(b); Railway Labor Act, § 6, 45
U.S.CA. § 156.
674 Cases that cite this headnote

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was
amended in 1978 to prohibit the mandatory retirement of a
protected employee because of his age. Concerned that its
retirement policy, at least as it applied to flight engineers,
violated the ADEA, petitioner Trans World Airlines
(TWA) adopted a plan permitting any employee in "flight
engineer status" at age 60 to continue working in that
capacity. The plan, however, does not give 60-year-old
captains (pilots) the right automatically to begin training as
flight engineers. Instead, a captain may remain with the
airline only if he has been able to obtain "flight engineer
status" through the bidding procedures outlined in the
collective-bargaining agreement between TWA and
petitioner Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). These
procedures require a captain, prior to his 60th birthday, to
submit a "standing bid" for the position of flight engineer.
When a vacancy occurs, it is assigned to the most senior
captain with a standing bid. If no vacancy occurs prior to
his 60th birthday, or if he lacks sufficient seniority to bid
successfully for those vacancies that do occur, the captain
is retired. Under the collective-bargaining agreement, a
captain displaced for any reason besides age need not
resort to the bidding procedure. For example, a captain
who is medically disabled or whose position is eliminated
due to reduced manpower may displace automatically, or
"bump," a less senior flight engineer. Respondent former
TWA captains (hereafter respondents) were retired upon
reaching age 60. Each was denied an opportunity to
"bump" a less senior flight engineer. Two of them were
forced to retire before TWA adopted its new plan and thus
were denied an opportunity to become flight engineers
through the bidding procedures. The third filed a standing
bid for the position of flight engineer but no vacancies
occurred prior to his 60th birthday, and he too was forced
to retire. Respondents filed an action against TWA and
ALPA in Federal District Court, claiming that TWA's
transfer policy violated § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA-which
proscribes differential treatment of older **617 workers
"with
respect
to
[a]
privileg[e]
of
employment"-because, while it allowed captains
displaced for reasons *112 other than age to "bump" less
senior flight engineers, it did not allow the same "privilege
of employment" to captains compelled to vacate their
positions upon reaching age 60. The District Court entered
summary judgment in favor of TWA and ALP A, holding
that respondents had failed to establish a prima facie case
of age discrimination under the test set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668, and that the affirmative defenses provided by
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§ 4(f)(I}-an employer may take "any action otherwise
prohibited" where age is a "bona fide occupational
qualification [BFOQ]"-and § 4(f)(2}-it is not unlawful
for an employer to adopt a "bona fide seniority
system"-of the ADEA justified TWA's transfer policy.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
McDonnell Douglas test was inapposite because
respondents had adduced direct proof of age
discrimination; that TWA was required by § 4(a)(I) to
afford 60-year-old captains the same "privilege of
employment," i.e., "bumping" less senior flight engineers,
allowed captains disqualified for reasons other than age;
that the affirmative defenses of the ADEA did not justify
TWA's discriminatory transfer policy; and that TWA was
liable for "liquidated" or double damages under § 7(b) of
the ADEA, because its violation of the ADEA was
"willful" within the meaning of that section.

Held:
I. TWA's transfer policy denies 60-year-old captains a
"privilege of employment" on the basis of age in violation
of § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA. Captains disqualified because of
age are not afforded the same "bumping" privilege as
captains disqualified for reasons other than age, but instead
must resort to the bidding procedures. While the ADEA
does not require TWA to grant transfer privileges to
disqualified captains, nevertheless, if it does grant some
disqualified captains the "privilege" of "bumping" less
senior flight engineers, it may not deny the opportunity to
others because of their age. The McDonnell Douglas test is
inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination. Here, there is direct evidence that the
transfer method available to a captain depends on his age.
Since it allows captains disqualified for any reason other
than age to "bump" less senior flight engineers, TWA's
transfer policy is discriminatory on its face. Pp. 621-622.
2. The affirmative defenses provided by §§ 4(f)(1) and (2)
do not support the argument that TWA's discriminatory
transfer policy is justified. The BFOQ defense is meritless
because age is not a BFOQ for the position of flight
engineer. Nor can TWA's policy be viewed as part of a
bona fide seniority system. A system that includes this
discriminatory transfer policy permits the forced
retirement of captains on the basis of age. Pp. 622-623.
* 113 3. TWA's violation of the ADEA was not willful
within the meaning of § 7(b), and therefore respondents are
not entitled to "liquidated" or double damages. A violation
is "willful" within the meaning of § 7(b) if the employer
knew its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA or showed a
"reckless disregard" for whether it was prohibited, but not
if the employer simply knew of the potential applicability
of the ADEA or that ADEA was "in the picture." The latter

broad standard would result in an award of double
damages in almost every case. TWA certainly did not
"know" that its conduct violated the ADEA. Nor can it
fairly be said that the TWA adopted its transfer policy in
"reckless disregard" of the ADEA's requirements. The
record makes clear that TWA officials acted reasonably
and in good faith in attempting to determine whether their
policy would violate the ADEA. Pp. 623-626.
713 F.2d 940 (CA2), affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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Opinion
*114 Justice POWELL delivered the opinion ofthe Court.

Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), a commercial airline,
permits captains disqualified from serving in that capacity
for reasons other than age to transfer automatically to the
position of flight engineer. In this case, we must decide
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U .S.c. § 621
et seq., requires the airline to afford this same "privilege of
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employment" to those captains disqualified by their age.
We also must decide what constitutes a "willful" violation
of the ADEA, entitling a plaintiff to "liquidated" or double
damages.

A

TWA has approximately 3,000 employees who fill the
three cockpit positions on most of its flights.] The
"captain" is the pilot and controls the aircraft. He is
responsible for all phases of its operation. The "first
officer" is the copilot and assists the captain. The "flight
engineer" usually monitors a side-facing instrument panel.
He does not operate the flight controls unless the captain
and the first officer become incapacitated.
In 1977, TWA and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
entered into a collective-bargaining agreement, under
which every employee in a cockpit position was required
to retire when he reached the age of 60. This provision for
mandatory retirement was lawful under the ADEA, as part
of a "bona fide seniority system." See United Air Lines,
Inc. v. McMann. 434 U.S. 192,98 S.Ct. 444,54 L.Ed.2d
402 (1977). On April 6, 1978, however, the Act was
amended to prohibit the mandatory retirement of a
protected individual because of his age.2 TWA officials
*115 became concerned that the company's retirement
policy, at least as it applied to flight engineers, violated the
amended ADEA.3
On July 19, 1978, TWA announced that the amended
ADEA prohibited the forced retirement of flight engineers
at age 60. The company thus proposed a new policy, under
which employees in all three cockpit positions, upon
reaching age 60, would be allowed to continue working as
flight engineers. TWA stated that it would not implement
its new policy until it "had the benefit of [ALPA's]
views."4 ALPA's views were not long in coming. The
Union contended that the collective-bargaining agreement
prohibited the employment of a flight engineer after his
60th birthday and that the proposed change was not
required by the recently amended ADEA.
Despite opposition from the Union, TWA adopted a
modified version of its proposal.5 **619 Under this plan,
any employee in "flight engineer status" at age 60 is
entitled to continue *116 working in that capacity. The
new plan, unlike the initial proposal, does not give
60-year-old captains6 the right automatically to begin
training as flight engineers. Instead, a captain may remain
with the airline only if he has been able to obtain "flight
engineer status" through the bidding procedures outlined in

the collective-bargaining agreement. These procedures
require a captain, prior to his 60th birthday, to submit a
"standing bid" for the position of flight engineer. When a
vacancy occurs, it is assigned to the most senior captain
with a standing bid. If no vacancy occurs prior to his 60th
birthday, or if he lacks sufficient seniority to bid
successfully for those vacancies that do occur, the captain
is retired.7
Under the collective-bargaining agreement, a captain
displaced for any reason besides age need not resort to the
bidding procedures. For example, a captain unable to
maintain the requisite first-class medical certificate, see 14
CFR § 67.13 (1984), may displace automatically, or
"bump," a less senior flight engineer.8 The medically
disabled captain's ability to bump does not depend upon
the availability of a vacancy.9 Similarly, a captain whose
position is eliminated due to reduced manpower needs can
"bump" a less senior * 117 flight engineer.] 0 Even if a
captain is found to be incompetent to serve in that capacity,
he is not discharged,] I but is allowed to transfer to a
position as flight engineer without resort to the bidding
procedures. 12
Respondents Harold Thurston, Christopher J. Clark, and
Clifton A. Parkhill, former captains for TWA, were retired
upon reaching the age of 60. Each was denied an
opportunity to "bump" a less senior flight engineer.
Thurston was forced to retire on May 26, 1978, before the
company adopted its new policy. Clark did not attempt to
bid because TWA had advised him that bidding would not
affect his chances of obtaining a transfer. These two
captains thus effectively were denied an opportunity to
become flight engineers through the bidding procedures.
The third captain, Parkhill, did file a standing bid for the
position of flight engineer. No vacancies occurred prior to
Parkhill's 60th birthday, however, and he too was forced to
retire.

**620 B
Thurston, Clark, and Parkhill filed this action against TWA
and ALP A in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. They argued that the
company's transfer policy violated ADEA § 4(a)(1), 81
Stat. 603, *11829 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The airline allowed
captains displaced for reasons other than age to "bump"
less senior flight engineers. Captains compelled to vacate
their positions upon reaching age 60, they claimed, should
be afforded this same "privilege of employment." The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission intervened
on behalf of 10 other age-disqualified captains who had
been discharged as a result of their inability to displace less
senior flight engineers. I3
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III The District Court entered a summary judgment in
favor of defendants TWA and ALP A. Air Line Pilots Assn.
v. Trans World Air Lines, 547 F.Supp. 1221 (1982). The
court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination under the test set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 LEd.2d 668 (1973). None could show that
at the time of his transfer request a vacancy existed for the
position of flight engineer. See id., at 802, 93 S.Ct., at
1824. Furthermore, the court found that two affirmative
defenses justified the company's transfer policy. 29 U .S.c.
§§ 623(f)(1) and (f)(2). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's
judgment. 713 F.2d 940 (1983). It found the McDonnell
Douglas formula inapposite because the plaintiffs had
adduced direct proof of age discrimination. Captains * 119
disqualified for reasons other than age were allowed to
"bump" less senior flight engineers. Therefore, the
company was required by ADEA § 4(a)(I), 29 U.s.c. §
623(a)( I), to afford 60-year-old captains this same
"privilege of employment." The Court of Appeals also
held that the affirmative defenses of the ADEA did not
justify the company's discriminatory transfer policY.14 713
F.2d, at 949-951. TWA was held **621 liable for
"liquidated" or double damages because its violation ofthe
ADEA was found to be "wiIlful." According to the court,
an employer's conduct is "willful" if it "knows or shows
reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct is
prohibited by the ADEA." Id., at 956. Because "TWA was
clearly aware of the 1978 ADEA amendments," the Court
of Appeals found the respondents entitled to double
damages. Id., at 956-957.
* 120 TWA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in which
it challenged the Court of Appeals' holding that the
transfer policy violated the ADEA and that TWA's
violation was "willfuL" The Union filed a cross-petition
raising only the liability issue. We granted certiorari in
both cases, and consolidated them for argument. 466 U.S.
926, 104 S.D. 1706, 80 LEd.2d 179 (1984). We now
affirm as to the violation of the ADEA, and reverse as to
the claim for double damages.

II
A

121 131 The ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary
discrimination in the workplace based on age." Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577, 98 S.Ct. 866, 868, 55 LEd.2d 40
(1978). Section 4(a)(l) of the Act proscribes differential
treatment of older workers "with respect to ... [a]

privileg[e] of employment." 29 U.S.c. § 623(a). Under
TW A's transfer policy, 60-year-old captains are denied a
"privilege of employment" on the basis of age. Captains
who become disqualified from serving in that position for
reasons other than age automatically are able to displace
less senior flight engineers. Captains disqualified because
of age are not afforded this same "bumping" privilege.
Instead, they are forced to resort to the bidding procedures
set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement. If there is
no vacancy prior to a bidding captain's 60th birthday, he
must retire.IS
14J ISJ The Act does not require TWA to grant transfer
privileges to disqualified captains. Nevertheless, if TWA
does grant *121 some disqualified captains the "privilege"
of "bumping" less senior flight engineers, it may not deny
this opportunity to others because of their age. In Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d
59 (1984), we held that "[aJ benefit that is part and parcel
of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a
discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free
... not to provide the benefit at all." /d, at 75, 104 S.Ct., at
2233-2234. This interpretation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq., applies with
equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the
substantive provisions of the ADEA "were derived in haec
verba from Title VI!." Lorillard v. Pons, supra, 434 U.S.,
at 584, 98 S.Ct., at 872.16

161 TWA contends that the respondents failed to make out
a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,36 LEd.2d
668 (1973), because at the time they were retired, no flight
engineer vacancies existed. This argument fails, for the
McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff
presents direct evidence **622 of discrimination. See
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, n. 44, 97
S.Ct. 1843, 1866, n. 44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). The
shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas
are designed to assure that the "plaintiff [has] his day in
court despite the unavailability of direct evidence." Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (CAl 1979). In this
case there is direct evidence that the method of transfer
available to a disqualified captain depends upon his age.
Since it allows captains who become disqualified for any
reason other than age to "bump" less senior flight
engineers, TWA's transfer policy is discriminatory on its
face. Cf. Los Angeles Dept. o(Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 98 s.n 1370, 55 LEd.2d 657 (1978)
(employer's policy requiring *122 female employees to
make larger contribution to pension fund than male
employees is discriminatory on its face).

B
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Although we find that TWA's transfer policy discriminates
against disqualified captains on the basis of age, our
inquiry cannot end here. Petitioners contend that the
age-based transfer policy is justified by two of the ADEA's
five affinnative defenses. Petitioners first argue that the
discharge of respondents was lawful because age is a
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) for the
position of captain. 29 USc. § 623(f)(l). Furthermore,
TWA claims that its retirement policy is part of a "bona
fide seniority system," and thus exempt from the Act's
coverage. 29 USc. § 623(f)(2).

171 Section 4(f)(I) of the ADEA provides that an employer
may take "any action otherwise prohibited" where age is a
"bona fide occupational qualification." 29 U.S.c. §
623(f)(l). In order to be permissible under § 4(f)(1),
however, the age-based discrimination must relate to a
"particular business." Ibid. Every court to consider the
issue has assumed that the "particular business" to which
the statute refers is the job from which the protected
individual is excluded. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (CA5 1969), for example, the court
considered the Title VII claim of a female employee who,
because of her sex, had not been allowed to transfer to the
position of switchman. In deciding that the BFOQ defense
was not available to the defendant, the court considered
only the job of switchman.
181 TWA's discriminatory transfer policy is not
permissible under § 4(f)(1) because age is not a BFOQ for
the "particular" position of flight engineer. It is necessary
to recognize that the airline has two age-based policies: (i)
captains are not allowed to serve in that capacity after
reaching the age of 60; and (ii) age-disqualified captains
are not given the transfer privileges afforded captains
disqualified for other reasons. * 123 The first policy, which
precludes individuals from serving as captains, is not
challenged by respondents. 17 The second practice does not
operate to exclude protected individuals from the position
of captain; rather it prevents qualified 60-year-olds from
working as flight engineers. Thus, it is the "particular" job
of flight engineer from which the respondents were
excluded by the discriminatory transfer policy. Because
age under 60 is not a BFOQ for the position of flight
engineer,I8 the age-based discrimination at issue in this
case cannot be justified by § 4( f)( I).
TW A nevertheless contends that its BFOQ argument is
supported by the legislative history of the amendments to
the ADEA. In 1978, Congress amended ADEA § 4(f)(2),
29 USC. § 623(f)(2), to **623 prohibit the involuntary
retirement of protected individuals on the basis of age.
Some Members of Congress were concerned that this
amendment might be construed as limiting the employer's
ability to terminate workers subject to a valid BFOQ. The

Senate proposed an amendment to § 4(f)(1) providing that
an employer could establish a mandatory retirement age
where age is a BFOQ. S.Rep. No. 95-493, pp. II, 24
(1977), U .S.Code Congo & Admin.News 1978, p. 504. In
the Conference Committee, however, the proposed
amendment was withdrawn because "the [Senate]
conferees agreed that ... [it] neither added to nor worked
any change upon present law." H.R.ConfRep. No. 95950, p. 7 (1978), U.S.Code Congo & Admin.News 1978, p.
529. The House Committee Report also indicated that an
individual could be compelled to retire from a position for
which age was a BFOQ. H.R.Rep. No. 95-527, pt. I, p. 12
(1977).

19/ *124 The legislative history of the 1978 Amendments
does not support petitioners' position. The history shows
only that the ADEA does not prohibit TWA from retiring
all disqualified captains, including those who are
incapacitated because of age. This does not mean,
however, that TWA can make dependent upon the age of
the individual the availability of a transfer to a position for
which age is not a BFOQ. Nothing in the legislative history
cited by petitioners indicates a congressional intention to
allow an employer to discriminate against an older worker
seeking to transfer to another position, on the ground that
age was a BFOQ for his former job.
1101 TWA also contends that its discriminatory transfer
policy is lawful under the Act because it is part of a "bona
fide seniority system." 29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(2). The Court of
Appeals held that the airline's retirement policy is not
mandated by the negotiated seniority plan. We need not
address this finding; any seniority system that includes the
challenged practice is not "bona fide" under the statute.
The Act provides that a seniority system may not "require
or penn it" the involuntary retirement of a protected
individual because of his age. Ibid. Although the FAA "age
60 rule" may have caused respondents' retirement, TWA's
seniority plan certainly "permitted" it within the meaning
of the ADEA. Ibid. Moreover, because captains
disqualified for reasons other than age are allowed to
"bump" less senior flight engineers, the mandatory
retirement was age-based. Therefore, the "bona fide
seniority system" defense is unavailable to the petitioners.
In summary, TWA's transfer policy discriminates against
protected individuals on the basis of age, and thereby
violates the Act. The two statutory defenses raised by
petitioners do not support the argument that this
discrimination is justified. The BFOQ defense is meritless
because age is not a bona fide occupational qualification
for the position of flight engineer, the job from which the
respondents were excluded. Nor can TWA's policy be
viewed as part of a bona *125 fide seniority system. A
system that includes this discriminatory transfer policy

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. iii (1985)
105 S.Ct. 613, 36 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas.(BNA) 977,35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P34,851 .. :

permits the forced retirement of captains on the basis of
age.

III

A

Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 8 I Stat. 604, 29 U .S.c. §
626(b), provides that the rights created by the Act are to be
"enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and
procedures" of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S., at 579, 98 S.Ct., at 869. But the remedial
provisions of the two statutes are not identical. Congress
declined to incorporate into the ADEA several FLSA
sections. Moreover, § 16(b) of the FLSA, which makes the
award of liquidated damages mandatory, is significantly
qualified in ADEA § 7(b) by a proviso that a prevailing
plaintiff is entitled to double damages "only in cases of
willful violations." 29 USc. § 626(b). In this case, the
Court of Appeals held that TWA's violation of the ADEA
was "willful," and **624 that the respondents therefore
were entitled to double damages. 713 F.2d, at 957. We
granted certiorari to review this holding.
Ill) The legislative history of the ADEA indicates that
Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in
nature. The original bill proposed by the administration
incorporated § 16(a) of the FLSA, which imposes criminal
liability for a willful violation. See 113 Cong.Rec. 2 I 99
(1967). Senator Javits found "certain serious defects" in
the administration bill. He stated that "difficult problems
of proof ... would arise under a criminal provision," and
that the employer's invocation of the Fifth Amendment
might impede investigation, conciliation, and enforcement.
Id., at 7076. Therefore, he proposed that "the [FLSA's]
criminal penalty in cases of willful violation .. . [be]
eliminated and a double damage liability substituted." Ibid.
Senator Javits argued that his proposed amendment would
"furnish an effective deterrent to willful violations [of the
ADEA]," ibid., *126 and it was incorporated into the
ADEA with only minor modification, S. 788, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967).

fI2) fl31 )141 This Court has recognized that in enacting
the ADEA, "Congress exhibited ... a detailed knowledge of
the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation .... "
Lorillard v. Pons, supra, 58 I, 98 S.Ct., at 870. The manner
in which FLSA § 16(a) has been interpreted therefore is
relevant. In general, courts have found that an employer is
subject to criminal penalties under the FLSA when he
"wholly disregards the law... without making any
reasonable effort to determine whether the plan he is

following would constitute a violation of the law." Nabob
Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 479 (CAlO), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 876, 72 S.Ct. 167,96 L.Ed. 659 (1951);
see also Darby v. United States, 132 F.2d 928 (CA5
1943).19 This standard is substantially in accord with the
interpretation of "willful" adopted by the Court of Appeals
in interpreting the liquidated damages provision of the
ADEA. The court below stated that a violation of the Act
was "willful" if"the employer ... knew or showed reckless
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by the ADEA." 713 F.2d, at 956. Given the
legislative history of the liquidated damages provision, we
think the "reckless disregard" standard is reasonable.
The definition of "willful" adopted by the above cited
courts is consistent with the manner in which this Court has
interpreted the term in other criminal and civil statutes. In
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 S.Ct. 223, 78
L.Ed. 381 (1933), the defendant was prosecuted under the
Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1928, which made it a
misdemeanor for a person "willfully" to *127 fail to pay
the required tax. The Murdock Court stated that conduct
was "willful" within the meaning of this criminal statute if
it was "marked by careless disregard [for] whether or not
one has the right so to act." Id., at 395, 54 S.Ct., at 225. In
United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 58
S.Ct. 533, 82 L.Ed. 773 (1938), the Court applied the
Murdock definition of "willful" in a civil case. There, the
defendant's failure to unload a cattle car was "willful,"
because it showed a disregard for the governing statute and
an indifference to its requirements. 303 U.S., at 242-243,
58 S.Ct., at 534-535.20
115) 1]6) The respondents argue that an employer's
conduct is willful if he is "cognizant **625 of an
appreciable possibility that the employees involved were
covered by the [ADEA]." In support of their position, the
respondents cite § 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947
(PPA), 29 U.S.c. § 255(a), which is incorporated in both
the ADEA and the FLSA. Section 6 of the PPA provides
for a 2-year statute of limitations period unless the
violation is willful, in which case the limitations period is
extended to three years. 29 USc. § 255(a). Several courts
have held that a violation is willful within the meaning of §
6 if the employer knew that the ADEA was "in the
picture." See, e.g., Coleman v. JiffY June Farms, Inc., 458
F.2d 1139, 1142 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948,
93 S.Ct. 292, 34 L.Ed.2d 219 (1972); EEOC v. Central
Kansas Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270, 1274 (CAlO
1983). Respondents contend that the term "willful" should
be interpreted in a similar manner in applying the
liquidated damages provision of the ADEA.
We are unpersuaded by respondents' argument that a
violation of the Act is "willful" if the employer simply
knew of the potential applicability of the ADEA. Even if
the "in *]28 the ,,_.h.C
picture"
standard were appropriate for the
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statute of limitations, the same standard should not govern
a provision dealing with liquidated damages.21 More
importantly, the broad standard proposed by the
respondents would result in an award of double damages in
almost every case. As employers are required to post
ADEA notices, it would be virtually impossible for an
employer to show that he was unaware of the Act and its
potential applicability. Both the legislative history and the
structure of the statute show that Congress intended a
two-tiered liability scheme. We decline to interpret the
liquidated damages provision of ADEA § 7(b) in a manner
that frustrates this intent.22

B
117) As noted above, the Court of Appeals stated that a
violation is "willful" if "the employer either knew or
showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its
conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 713 F.2d, at 956.
Although we *129 hold that this is an acceptable way to
articulate a definition of "willful," the court below
misapplied this standard. TWA certainly did not "know"
that its conduct violated the Act. Nor can it fairly be said
that TWA adopted its transfer policy in "reckless
disregard" of the Act's requirements. The record makes
clear that TWA officials acted reasonably and in good faith
in attempting to determine whether their plan would
violate the ADEA. See Nabob Oil Co. v. United States,

supra.
Shortly after the ADEA was amended, TWA officials met
with their lawyers to determine whether the mandatory
retirement policy violated the Act. Concluding that the
company's existing plan was inconsistent **626 with the
ADEA, David Crombie, the airline's Senior Vice President
for Administration, proposed a new policy. Despite
opposition from the Union, the company adopted a
modified version of this initial proposal. Under the plan
adopted on August 10, 1978, any pilot in "flight engineer
status" on his 60th birthday could continue to work for the
airline. On the day the plan was adopted, the Union filed
suit against the airline claiming that the new retirement
policy
constituted
a
"major"
change
in
the
collective-bargaining agreement, and thus was barred by §
6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U .s.c. § 156. Nevertheless,
TWA adhered to its new policy.
As evidence of "willfulness," respondents point to
comments made by J.E. Frankum, the Vice President of
Flight Operations. After Crombie was hospitalized in
August 1978, Frankum assumed responsibility for bringing
Footnotes

TWA's retirement policy into conformance with the
ADEA. Despite legal advice to the contrary, Frankum
initially believed that the company was not required to
allow any pilot over 60 to work. Frankum later abandoned
this position in favor of the plan approved on August 10,
1978. Frankum apparently had been concerned only about
whether flight engineers could work after reaching the age
of60. There is no indication that TWA was ever advised by
counsel that its new transfer policy discriminated against
captains on the basis of age.
*130 There simply is no evidence that TWA acted in
"reckless disregard" of the requirements ofthe ADEA. The
airline had obligations under the collective-bargaining
agreement with the Air Line Pilots Association. In an
attempt to bring its retirement policy into compliance with
the ADEA, while at the same time observing the terms of
the collective-bargaining agreement, TWA sought legal
advice and consulted with the Union. Despite opposition
from the Union, a plan was adopted that permitted cockpit
employees to work as "flight engineers" after reaching age
60. Apparently TWA officials and the airline's attorneys
failed to focus specifically on the effect of each aspect of
the new retirement policy for cockpit personnel. It is
reasonable to believe that the parties involved, in focusing
on the larger overall problem, simply overlooked the
challenged aspect of the new plan.23 We conclude that
TWA's violation of the Act was not willful within the
meaning of § 7(b), and that respondents therefore are not
entitled to liquidated damages.

IV
The ADEA requires TWA to afford 60-year-old captains
the same transfer privileges that it gives to captains
disqualified for reasons other than age. Therefore, we
affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue. We do not agree
with its holding that TWA's violation of the Act was
willful. We accordingly reverse its judgment that
respondents are entitled to liquidated or double damages.

It is so ordered.

Parallel Citations
105 S.Ct. 613, 36 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 977, 35
EmpJ. Prac. Dec. P 34,851, 83 L.Ed.2d 523, 53 BNA
USLW 4024

Trans World

Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1

105 S.Ct. 613,36 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 977,35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,851 ...

*

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of
the reader. See United Slates v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,337,26 S.O. 282, 287. 50 L.Ed. 499.
On certain long-distance flights, a fourth crew member, the "international relief officer," is in the cockpit. On some types of aircraft,
there arc only two cockpit positions.

2

Section 2(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978. Pub.L. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189, 29 U.S.c. §
623(f)(2).

3

A regulation promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration prohibits anyone from serving after age 60 as a pilot on a
commercial carrier. 14 CFR § 121.383( c) ( 1984). Captains and first officers are considered "pilots" subject to this regulation; flight
engineers are not. Therefore, TWA officials were concerned primarily with the effect that the 1978 amendments had on the
company's policy of mandatory retirement oftlight engineers.

4

The proposal was announced in a letter to ALPA from David Crombie. TWA's Senior Vice President for Administration.

5

On the same date that TWA implemented its new policy, ALPA tiled suit against the company. ALPA contended that TWA's action
constituted a "unilateral change in working conditions," and hence was violative of the Railway Labor Act, 45 USc. §§ 156-188.
This action, ALPA v. ll'ans World Airlines, was consolidated with the present action in thc United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. That court granted summary judgment in favor of TWA, and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed. It held that the new retirement policy did not constitute a "major" change in the existing terms and conditions of
employment. and that the Union therefore was without a remedy in the federal courts. See 45 USc. § 156.

6

The term "captain" will hereinafter bc used to reter to both the positions of captain and tirst officer.

7

In 1980. TWA imposed an additional restriction on captains bidding for tlight engineer positions. Successful bidders were required to
"fultill their bids in a timely manner." Under this amended practice, captains who bid successfully for positions as tlight engineers
were required to "activate" their bids immediately. As a result, many captains under age 60 were trained for and assumed flight
engineer positions, with resulting lower pay and responsibility.

8

The pilot must be able to obtain the second-class medical certificate that is required for the position offlight engineer. See 14 CFR §
67.15 (1984).

9

If the disabled captain lacks sufficient seniority to displace, he is not discharged. Rather. he is entitled to go on unpaid mediealleave
for up to tive years, during which time he retains and continues to accrue seniority.

10

Only those t1ight engineers in the current and last former domiciles of thc displaced captain may be "bumped." If a captain has
insufficient seniority to displace a flight engineer at either of these domiciles. he is not discharged. Instead. he is placed in furlough
status for a period of up to 10 years, during which time he continues to accrue seniority for purposes of a recall.

11

Although the collective-bargaining agreement does not address disciplinary downgrades, TWA's Vice President of Flight
Operations, J.E. Frankum, stated that such downgrades had occurred "many times over many years."

12

Captains disqualified for other reasons also are allowed to "bump" less senior tlight engineers. For example, the
collective-bargaining agreement provides that a captain who fails to "requalify" in that position will not be discharged.

13

Three of the EEOC claimants have settled with TWA. The remaining seven claimants are Lusk, Bobzin, Gowling, Widmayer,
Humbles. Roquemore. and Lewis. Lusk and Bobzin were retired prior to August 10, 1978. Thus, like Harold Thurston, they had no
way of knowing that the bidding procedures of the collective-bargaining agreement would represent a possible means of transferring
to the position oftlight engineer.
Gowling, Widmayer, Humbles, and Roquemore submitted standing bids lor the position of 11ight engineer. Because no vacancies
occurred prior to the time that they reached the age of 60. each was discharged.
Lewis submitted a bid and was awarded a position as J1 ight engineer on October 31. 1979. On January 15. 1980, he was told that he
would have to "fultill his bid in a timely manner." See n. 7, supra. Because this would have required Lewis to assume his new
position almost a year prior to his 60th birthday, he refused to appear for training. Theretore, his bid was canceled by TWA.

14

The Court of Appeals also tound that ALPA had violated ADEA § 4(c), 29 U.S.c. § 623(c), which prohibits unions from causing or
attempting to cause an employer to engage in unlawful discrimination. The court tound, however. that ALPA was not liable for
damages. It held that the ADEA does not permit the recovery of monetary damages. including backpay, against a labor organization.
It noted that the ADEA incorporates the remedial scheme ofthe Fair Labor Standard Act, which does not allow actions against unions
to recover damages. 713 F.2d, at 957.

Trans World

Inc. v.

469 U.S. 111 (1

105 S.Ct. 613, 36 Fair EmpLPrac.Cas. (BNA) 977,35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,851 ...
In its petition for a writ of eertiorari. TWA raised the issue of a union's liability for damages under the ADEA. Although we
granted the petition in full, we now conclude that the Court is without jurisdietion to consider this question. TWA was not the
proper party to present this question. The airline cannot assert the right of others to recover damages against the Union.
Both the individual respondents and the EEOC argue that the issue of union liability is properly before the Court. But the
respondents failed to file a cross-petition raising this question. A prevailing party may advance any ground in support of a
judgment in his favor. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n. 6, 90 S.O. 1153, 1156 n. 6, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). An
argument that would modify the judgment, however, cannot be presented unless a cross-petition has been filed. FEA v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 560. n. 11,96 S.O. 2295, 2302, n. II. 49 L.Ed.2d 49 (1976). In this case, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals would be modified by the arguments advanced by the EEOC and the individual plaintiffs, as they are contending that the
Union should be liable to them for monetary damages.

15

The discriminatory transfer policy may violate the Act even though 83% of the 60-year-old captains were able to obtain positions as
flight engineers through the bidding procedures. See Phillips v. lv!artin }vfarietta Corp.. 400 U.S. 542, 91 S.O. 496, 27 L.Ed.2d 613
(1971) (per curiam ).
It also should be noted that many of the captains who obtained positions as flight engineers were forced to assume that position
prior to reaching age 60. See n. 7, supra. They were adversely affected by the discriminatory transfer policy despite the fact that
they obtained positions as flight engineers.

16

Several Courts of Appeals have recognized the similarity between the two statutes. In Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Assn., 455 F.2d 818, 820 (1972), for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that with "a few minor
exceptions the prohibitions of [the ADEA] are in terms identical to those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."

17

In this litigation, the respondents have not challenged TWA's claim that the FAA regulation establishes a BFOQ for the position of
captain. The EEOC guidelines, however, do not list the FAA's age-60 rule as an example ofa BFOQ because the EEOC wishes to
avoid any appearance that it endorses the rule. 29 CFR § 1625 (1984).

18

The petitioners do not contend that age is a BFOQ for the position of flight engineer. Indeed, the airline has employed at least 148
flight engineers who are over 60 years old.

19

Courts below have held that an employer's action may be "willful," within the meaning of § 16(a) of the FLSA, even though he did
not have an evil motive or bad purpose. See Nabob Oil Co. v. United States. We do not agree with TWA's argument that unless it
intended to violate the Act, double damages are inappropriate under § 7(b) of the ADEA. Only one Court of Appeals has expressed
approval of this position. See Loeb v. Tex/ron, Inc .. 600 F.2d 1003. 1020, n. 27 (CA I 1979).

20

The definition of"willful" set forth in Murdock and lllinois Central has been applied by courts interpreting numerous other criminal
and civil statutes. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 584 F.2d 750 (CA5 1978); F./'( AIessina Construction Corp. v.
Occupational Safety & flealth Review Comm 'n, 505 F.2d 701 (CAl 1974).

21

The Courts of Appeals are divided over whether Congress intended the "willfulness" standard to be identical for determining
liquidated damages and for purposes of the limitations period. Compare Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d I 109, 1113 (CA4)
(standards are identical), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860, 102 S.O. 316, 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981), with Kelly v. American Standard, Inc.,
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The Court interpreted the FLSA, as originally enacted, as allowing the recovery of liquidated damages any time that there was a
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PPA, contra, flays v. Republic Steel Corp .. 531 F.2d 1307 (CA5 1976). Nevertheless, we think that the same concerns are reflected
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In his dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland also focused on the larger problem, rather than on the discriminatory transfer policy. Judge Van
Graafeiland stated: "TWA is the only trunk airline that voluntarily has permitted [persons] ... over 60 to continue working as flight
engineers. Instead of receiving commendation for what it has done, TWA is held liable as a matter oflaw for age discrimination." 713
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Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework for an employment discrimination
claim: (I) the plaintiff must make a prima facie
case of discrimination; (2) the burden of
production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the
defendant
to
offer
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken
against the plaintiff; and then (3) the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.

Vernon TROY, a married man,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, an
Oregon corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 00-35459. I D.C. No. CV-99- 0 5314-FDB.
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I

Former employee brought action against his former
employer, alleging employer violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The United
States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Franklin D. Burgess, 1., 2000 WL 502829,
granted summary judgment in favor of employer, and
employee appealed. The Court of Appeals held that
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating employee was pretext for discrimination,
precluding summary judgment.
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Civil Rights
/",Prima Facie Case
Federal Civil Procedure
./',Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
The burden of making a prima facie case of
employment discrimination under McDonnell
Doug/as is not onerous, and only minimal proof
is required to survive summary judgment.

Reversed and remanded.
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Employees need offer very little evidence of
employment discrimination in order to defeat an
employer's motion for summary judgment,
because the ultimate question of determining the
reason for the employer's actions requires a
searching inquiry, one that is most appropriately
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membership in a protected class, namely that he
is at least 40 years old; (2) he was qualified for
the position; (3) he was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (4) he was treated less
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favorably than similarly situated individuals
of the
protected
class.
Age
outside
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.

employer's motion for summary judgment, Chuang v.
Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir.2000),
because the ultimate question of determining the reason for
the employer's actions requires a "searching inquiry-one
that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a
full record." Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d
1406, 1410 (9th CiL1996) (quoting Lam v. Univ. of Haw.,
40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th CiLI994)).

Federal Civil Procedure
,.»,.,Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

*803 121 Under the McDonnell Doug/as burden-shifting
framework (I) the plaintiffmust make a prima facie case of
discrimination; (2) the burden of production, but not
persuasion, then shifts to the defendant to offer a
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the action taken
against the plaintiff; and then (3) the plaintiff must "prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons,
but were a pretext for discrimination." Reeves, 530 U.S. at
142-43 (citations omitted).

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether
former
employer's
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
employee was pretext for discrimination,
precluding summary judgment for employer in
employee's action alleging violation of the
ADEA. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 USCA § 621 et seq.

*802 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Franklin D. Burgess,
District Judge, Presiding.
Before B. FLETCHER, McKEOWN, and TALLMAN,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM*
Vernon Troy, a former sales representative for Standard
Insurance Company, appeals the summary judgment in
favor of the employer in a claim brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C
§ 623(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 USC § 129 L We
review the award of summary judgment de novo,
Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th CiL2001),
and we reverse. Because the parties are familiar with the
factual background, we do not recite the details here.

III The district court did not have the benefit of the
Supreme Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prod. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), at the time of its decision. Reeves
requires that we reverse the summary judgment in favor of
Standard and remand for trial. Employees need offer "very
little evidence" of discrimination in order to defeat an

131 141 The burden of making a prima facie case is "not
onerous," Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d
1337, 1342 (9th CiLI981), so that only "minimal proof' is
required to survive summary judgment Chuang, 225 F.3d
at 1124. The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADEA by showing he (1) belongs
to a protected class (he is at least 40 years old); (2) was
qualified for the position; (3) was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (4) was treated less favorably than
similarly situated individuals outside of the protected class.
See Wallis v. JR. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890-91 (9th
CiLI994). Troy established a prima facie case of age
discrimination.
In Troy's case, the parties only dispute the second
factor-whether Troy was qualified for his position as a
sales representative, or, as Standard puts it, whether he
satisfactorily performed his duties. Troy offered evidence
that he had worked for Standard for 23 years by the time he
was given the choice to resign or be fired. He received two
commendations, one from Standard's President and the
other from its Vice President, upon completing 20 years of
service, only three years earlier. Although Standard argues
that Troy's past performance is not relevant to concerns
about his performance during the last few years of his
service with the company, its own Vice President
acknowledged that "[t]rue success is measured by long
term results." Moreover, even during the last few years,
Troy consistently ranked in the top half of Standard's sales
representatives nationally, fared well when compared to
his regional peers, and, more often than not, beat his
Seattle peers, except for his former manager, Dennis
Dawson.l
151 Neither party contests that Standard met its burden in
providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
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terminating Troy's performance: Troy received two
successive poor evaluations and failed to meet the action
plan targets. Troy, however, met his burden of offering
evidence that Standard's reason was a pretext for age
discrimination. As Reeves states, in a motion for summary
judgment, courts must (I) review the record as a whole but
(2) do so in favor of the nonmovant so that (3) all
reasonable inferences are made on behalf of the
nonmovant. 530 U.S. at 149-50.
Without the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in
Reeves, the district court discounted as "innocuous"
comments referring to Troy's energy level, his manner of
sitting in his chair, his need to "rejuvenate" his sales
approach, and the "very seasoned/tenured reps" in the
Seattle office. Such comments could be innocuous, but
they could also be a sign of a bias favoring younger sales
representatives. Determining whether the comments were,
in fact, innocuous or, in fact, a sign of bias belongs to the
jury.
*804 Likewise, Standard may very well have had a
nondiscrimatory reason for its method of allocating and
reallocating territories as well as determining production
targets. Nonetheless, a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that an employer who requires its senior workers
(here, workers protected by the ADEA) to meet higher
production targets because of their experience/age, who
simultaneously takes away the territories that the senior
workers have developed over the years (and that may allow
them to meet their higher production targets), and who
gives those territories to less experienced/younger
employees, is engaging in a practice that is inherently
discriminatory. To simply say it is a business model is to
avoid the question of whether that business model is
discriminatory.2
Troy produced other evidence from which a jury could
infer pretext: Troy's production targets were set much
higher than his replacement's targets, even though his
replacement had 17 years of experience selling insurance;
Standard allowed its managers to arbitrarily assign

production targets; Standard's method of evaluating sales
representatives involved subjectivity that could have
allowed a manager's age-related bias to affect his or her
rating of an employee; Standard's failure to fire all
employees who missed production targets indicates that
they were not "quotas;" Garry Montag, the younger
manager who put Troy on the action plan that led to his
termination, engaged in questionable conduct that hurt
Troy's chance of meeting his production target but was not
disciplined himself; Troy's original action plan would have
been virtually impossible to achieve, while his revised plan
was simply one that no employee had achieved in the
previous four years; and Troy's problems began in 1994
when Dawson, Troy's contemporary, accepted a demotion
from manager to sales representative rather than face an
action plan Dawson considered impossible to achieve.
Troy did not have to prove his case at summary judgment
but rather just raise a material issue of disputed fact. See
Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir.1993)
("If a plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue
regarding the authenticity of the employer's stated motive,
summary judgment is inappropriate, because it is for the
trier of fact to decide which story is to be believed.").
Looking at all the evidence presented, with the benefit of
every reasonable inference, Troy has met his burden.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "no rational
factfinder could conclude that the [employer's] action was
discriminatory." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. This is not such a
case. Because there exist material issues of fact, the district
court should not have awarded summary judgment to the
defendant on Troy's age discrimination claim.
REVERSED.

Parallel Citations
2001 WL 1646866 (C.A.9 (Wash.»

Footnotes

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by
9th Cif. R. 36-3.

1

Standard's attacks on Troy's performance, especially when based on subjective factors, should not be considered during step one of
the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See Lynn. 656 F.2d at 1344.

2

While Standard is correet to say that not all practices that "discriminate" among workers, even those that are patently unfair, are
actionable, at the summary judgment stage, eourts must draw inferenees in favor of the non movant. Here, those inferences suggest
that Standard's motivation might have represented age-related bias.
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Requisite degree of proof necessary to establish
prima facie case for Title VII and Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
claims on summary judgment is minimal and
does not even need to rise to level of
preponderance of evidence; plaintiff need only
offer evidence which gives rise to inference of
unlawful discrimination. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e et seq.;
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.CA.

Gary E. WALLIS, husband; Carol Wallis,
wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, DefendantAppellee.
No. 92-36759. I Argued and Submitted Jan.
6,1994. I Decided May 26, 1994. I As
Amended on Denial ofRehearing July 14,
1994·
Discharged employee brought action claiming retaliatory
discharge and age discrimination. The United States
District Court for the District of Idaho, Marion 1. Callister,
Chief Judge, granted summary judgment for employer and
employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, T.G. Nelson,
Circuit Judge, held that summary judgment could be
granted even though employee established prima facie case
of discrimination where employee failed to present any
evidence
to
refute
employer's
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.
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West Headnotes (5)

Federal Courts
"",Time for Filing in General
Application of amended version of rule providing
that when notice of appeal is prematurely filed, it
shall be in abeyance, and shaII become effective
upon date of entry of order that disposes of last of
all such motions, to appeal that was pending on
effective date of rule, was "just and practicable";
appellee could not claim prejudice because it did
not discover defect in notice until court ordered
supplemental briefing on issue of jurisdiction
after case had been set for oral argument
F.R.A.P.Rule 4(a)( 4),28 U.S.CApp.(I988 Ed.).
28 Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
~>.,.Prima Facie Case
Civil Rights
,."",.Age Discrimination
Prima facie case for Title VII and Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
claims may be based either on presumption or on
direct evidence of discriminatory intent Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.CA. §
2000e et seq.; Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.CA. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
56,28 U.S.CA.

Affirmed.
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Federal Civil Procedure
;,,,Burden of Proof
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Civil Rights
,.,.Effect of Prima Facie Case; Shifting Burden
Civil Rights
_".Age Discrimination
Once prima facie case has been made under Title
VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), burden of production shifts to
defendant, who must offer evidence that adverse
action was taken for other than impermissibly
discriminatory reasons; once defendant fulfiIIs
this burden of production by offering legitimate,

Wallis v. J.R.

26 F.3d 885 (1994)

64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1507, 65 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1216 ...

nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision, presumption of unlawful discrimination
drops out of picture. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56,28 U.S.C.A.

Opinion by Judge T.G. NELSON.

OPINION
T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
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Federal Civil Procedure
and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

'~;~Employees

Even though employee established prima facie
case to support his retaliatory discharge and age
discrimination claims, when employee then
failed to present any evidence to refute
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for discharge, employee failed to establish triable
issue of fact on ultimate question of whether
employer
intentionally
discriminated
or
retaliated against him, and summary judgment
for employer was proper. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 70 I et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.;
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq., 29 U .S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.
447 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*886 Robert C. Huntley, Givens Pursley & Huntley, Boise,
ID, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Rory R. Jones, Richard H. Greener, Cosho, Humphrey,
Greener & Welsh, Boise, ID, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District ofIdaho.
Before: CANBY, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and
SHUBB,' District Judge.

Opinion

OVERVIEW
Gary and Carol Wallis appeal the district court's grant of
summary judgment dismissing Wallis' claims for
retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.c. § 2000e, et seq., age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), *88729 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.,
and various state law claims. I We affirm.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Gary Wallis (Wallis) was hired in 1982 by J.R. Simplot
Company (Simplot) as Director of Human Resources.
Early in his tenure, a female employee of Simp lot made a
charge of sexual harassment against a vice-president of
Simplot. Wallis supported her in her claim by transferring
her to another division. Later, a second employee was
discharged by the vice-president for his support of the
woman in the harassment claim. Wallis rehired this
discharged employee for his own staff and made
supportive public statements on behalf of the employee.
These events occurred sometime during 1983, 1984 and
1985.
In late 1989 and early 1990, Gordon Smith (Smith),
president of Simplot, decided to decentralize the human
resources department so that it would function at the
company's division level. Smith informed Wallis of the
decision in June 1990. At that time, and on occasions
thereafter, Smith told Wallis that Simplot would find a
"new role" for him and that he would not be "hurt by the
decentralization process."
On September 12, 1990, Smith sent Wallis a letter
terminating his employment. Wallis contends his
termination closely followed hispresentation to Smith of a
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copy of a speech which he intended to give at an annual
meeting of Simplot's management personnel. He contends
that this speech was critical of Simplot's employment
practices, and that his discharge was in retaliation for this
proposed speech. On the basis of these allegations, Wallis
filed suit in state court alleging violations of Title VII, the
ADEA, and various state law claims. Simplot removed the
case to federal district court.
The district court granted summary judgment for Simplot
on all claims as it saw them on February 12, 1992. Wallis
moved for reconsideration of the judgment, claiming he
had pleaded a claim of retaliatory discharge which had not
been addressed by the district court. Although the
complaint did not clearly allege this claim, the district
court considered the retaliatory discharge claim, and on
July 7, 1992, it entered a second summary judgment
adverse to Wallis on that claim also.
On July 15, 1992, Wallis moved the district court to alter or
amend the second summary judgment pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Then, on August 4, 1992, Wallis filed a
notice of appeal, appealing both summary judgments.
Finally, on January 6, 1993, the district court entered an
order denying the motion to alter or amend the second
summary judgment.

III.

JURISDICTION

111 At the time Wallis filed his notice of appeal, Rule
4(a)(4)2 plainly stated that a notice of appeal filed during
the pendency of a motion to alter or amend the judgment
"shall have no effect." The Supreme Court, in Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 6 I, 103
S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982), held that a notice of
appeal filed during the pendency of a Rule 59 motion is a
nullity, as ifno notice of appeal were filed at all. However,
Rule 4(a)( 4) was amended effective December I, 1993,3 to
provide *888 that when a notice is prematurely filed, it
"shall be in abeyance, and shall become effective upon the
date of entry of an order that disposes of the last of all such
motions." Under the old version of Rule 4(a)(4), applicable
at the time Wallis filed the notice of appeal, the notice was
a nullity. Thus, the issue becomes whether the notice may
be resurrected by a retroactive application of the amended
version of Rule 4(a)(4). See Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Indemnity Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 444, 445 (9th
Cir.1994) (applying amended Rule retroactively); Burt v.
Ware. 14 F.3d 256, 258 (5th Cir.1994) (holding amended
rule applies retroactively unless it would work injustice).

The Supreme Court's order adopting the 1993 amendments
to the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
That the foregoing amendments to the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
shall take effect on December I, 1993,
and shall govern all proceedings in
appellate cases thereafter commenced
and, insofar as just and practicable, all
proceedings in appellate cases then
pending.
61 U.S.L.W. 5365 (U.S. Apr. 27,1993) (emphasis added).
Wallis' appeal was pending on December I, 1993; thus, if
the application of the 1993 amendment to this case is "just
and practicable," we have jurisdiction.
The parties briefed this case and were prepared to argue it
as though the notice of appeal were valid. Simplot cannot
claim prejudice because it did not discover the defect in the
filing of the notice of appeal until this court ordered
supplemental briefing on the issue of jurisdiction after the
case had already been set for oral argument. To allow the
parties to proceed to present the appeal they have been
working on since August 1992 is just. Further, practicality
is no problem. No adjustments in briefing schedules or in
calendaring of oral argument were required in order to
address the issues raised by the parties.
Under the circumstances ofthis case, we hold that it is "just
and practicable" to apply the amended version of Rule
4(a)(4) to this case. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to
consider the appeal.

IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review the district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo to determine whether there are any genuine issues
of material fact and whether the district court correctly
applied the relevant substantive law." Sengupta v.
Morrison~Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1074 (9th
Cir.1986). We do not weigh the evidence or determine the
truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510~1 1,91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986). The record below is examined to determine
whether there is any basis for affirmance. Lowe v. City of
Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 1985), as amended,
784 F.2d 1407 (1986). If the result reached by the district
court is correct, we will affirm even if the district court
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relied on an erroneous ground. Id.

V.
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE AND AGE
DISCRIMINA TION
We combine the Title VII and ADEA claims for analysis
because the burdens of proof and persuasion are the same.4
See *889 Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417,
1420 (9th Cir.1990) ("The shifting burden of proof applied
to a Title VII discrimination claim also applies to claims
arising under ADEA."). The basic allocation of burdens
and order of presentation of proof for such claims follows
three steps:
[AJ plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment decision. Then, in order to prevail, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's alleged
reason for the adverse employment decision is a pretext
for another motive which is discriminatory.
Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1005.
12) The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a
prima facie case for Title VII and ADEA claims on
summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to
rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence. See
YartzofJv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1987),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939, III S.Ct. 345, 112 L.Ed.2d 309
(1990). The plaintiff need only offer evidence which
"gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."
Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1005 (quotation omitted). "The amount
[of evidence J that must be produced in order to create a
prima facie case is 'very little.' " Sischo. . .Nownejad v.
Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, IIII
(9th Cir.1991); see also, Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009.
"Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against the employee." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67
L.Ed.2d 207 (198 I).

(3) The prima facie case may be based either on a
presumption arising from the factors such as those set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802,
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or by more
direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Lowe, 775 F.2d at
1009. In offering a prima facie case, of course, a plaintiff
may present evidence going far beyond the minimum
]"~quirements.

141 Once a prima facie case has been made, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant, who must offer
evidence that the adverse action was taken for other than
impermissibly discriminatory reasons. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. Once the defendant fulfills this
burden of production by offering a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, the
McDonnell
Douglas
presumption
of
unlawful
discrimination "simply drops out of the picture." St.
Mmy's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, ,113 S.Ct.
2742,2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
IS) The question before us is whether, after these steps
have been taken, a summary judgment for the defendant
employer can be sustained. We are convinced that as in
any other summary judgment situation, the questi~n can
only be answered in each case by a review of the actual
evidence offered by each party, to see whether a genuine
issue of material fact has been presented for trial. If a
rational trier offact could, on all the evidence, find that the
employer's action was taken for impermissibly
discriminatory reasons, summary judgment for the defense
is inappropriate. Before we analyze the record in this case,
however, we deal with some of the more categorical
arguments offered by the parties.

Wallis relies on our decision in Sischo--Nownejad, 934
F.2d at I 104, for the proposition that summary judgment
for the employer is never appropriate after the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case. In that case, we noted:
Even if the defendant articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the challenged employment decision,
thus shifting the burden to the plaintiff to
prove that the articulated reason is
pretextual, summary judgment is
normally inappropriate. When a plaintiff
has established aprimafacie inference of
disparate treatment through direct or
circumstantial
evidence
of
discriminatory intent, he will necessarily
have raised a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to the legitimacy or
bona fides of the employer's articulated
reason for its employment decision.
*890 Id. at I I II (internal quotations and citations
omitted). However, we went on to state:

[I]n evaluating whether the defendant's
articulated reason is pretextual, the trier
of fact must, at a minimum, consider the
same evidence that the plaintiff
introduced to establish her prima facie
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case. When that evidence, direct or
circumstantial, consists of more than the
[prima facie ] presumption, a factual
question will almost always exist with
of
respect
to
any
claim
nondiscriminatory reason.

Jd. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Sischo-Nownejad, thus, read as a whole, stands for the proposition
that in deciding whether an issue of fact has been created
about the credibility of the employer's nondiscriminatory
reasons, the district court must look at the evidence
supporting the prima facie case, as well as the other
evidence offered by the plaintiff to rebut the employer's
offered reasons. And, in those cases where the prima facie
case consists of no more than the minimum necessary to
create a presumption of discrimination under McDonnell
Douglas, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact
Thus, the mere existence of a prima facie case, based on
the minimum evidence necessary to raise a McDonnell
Douglas presumption, does not preclude summary
judgment Indeed, in Lindahlv. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434,
1437 (9th Cir. 1991), we specifically held "a plaintiff
cannot defeat summary judgment simply by making out a
prima facie case." "[The plaintiff] must do more than
establish a prima facie case and deny the credibility of the
witnesses."
Schuler
v.
Chronicle
[defendant's]
Broadcasting Co., 793 F.2d 1010, 10 II (9th Cir. 1986). In
response to the defendant's offer of nondiscriminatory
reasons, the plaintiff must produce "specific, substantial
evidence of pretext" Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d
392,393 (9th Cir.1983). In other words, the plaintiff"must
tender a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext in order
to avoid summary judgment" Id.

have required plaintiffs to come forth with evidence
sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the
employer's explanation to be pretextual; the mere fact that
a bare prima facie case had been made out was not in itself
sufficient. See Davis v. Chevron US.A., 14 F.3d 1082,
1087 (5th Cir.1994) (failing to present more than mere
refutation of employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for not hiring); Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d
836, 340 (I Otl1 Cir. 1994) (failing to offer sufficient
evidence to support finding that reason was pretext);
Anderson v. BCLr;ter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124
(7th Cir.1994) (requiring plaintiff to produce evidence
from which rational fact finder could infer employer lied);
Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th
Cir.1993) (requiring evidence creating factual dispute
about nondiscriminatory reason); Geary v. Visitation ofthe
Blessed Virgin Mary, 7 F.3d 324, 332 (3rd Cir. 1993)
(failing to offer facts showing genuine issue of fact as to
reason); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 843
(I st Cir.1993) (requiring evidence sufficient for fact finder
to reasonably conclude discriminatory motive), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72
(1994). We hold that, when evidence to refute the
defendant's legitimate explanation is totally lacking,
summary judgment is appropriate even though plaintiff
may have established a minimal prima facie *891 case
based on a McDonnell Douglas type presumption.
We now tum to the specific facts of this case to determine
whether Wallis met his requisite burden to overcome
summary judgment Generally, to establish a prima facie
case of an ADEA violation, the plaintiff must show he was:
(I) a member of a protected class [age 40-70];
(2) performing his job in a satisfactory manner;

Wallis' assertion, that once a plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case summary judgment is impermissible, is
untenable. His position would require a trial in every
discrimination case, even where no genuine issue of
material fact exists concerning the legitimacy of the
employer's nondiscriminatory reasons. Such a result is not
compelled by Sischo--Nownejad and would be contrary to
other cases affirming summary judgment where the
plaintiff failed to produce evidence of intentional
discrimination. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 473 n. 16 (9th Cir.1991)
(distinguishing Lowe and Sischo--Nownejad ); Lindahl.
930 F.2d at 1437 (requiring more than mere primafacie
case); Schuler, 793 F .2d at 101 I; (requiring more than
prima facie case and denial of credibility of employer's
witnesses); Steck!, 703 F.2d at 393 (failing to produce any
facts, which if believed, would have shown pretext).
There are a number of recent cases in other circuits that

(3) discharged; and
(4) replaced by a substantially younger employee with
equal or inferior qualifications.

Rose, 902 F.2d at 1421. Proof of the replacement element
is not always required, however. Where the discharge
results from a reduction in work force, the plaintiff may
show "through circumstantial, statistical or direct evidence
that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise
to an inference of age discrimination." Id. Such an
inference can be established by showing the employer had
a "continuing need for his skills and services in that his
various duties were still being performed." Id. (quoting
Leichihman v. Pickwick lnt'l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855,108 S.Ct. 161,98 L.Ed.2d
I 16 (1987)); see also Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421,
1434 (9th Cir.1993) (prima facie case established by
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proving others not in employee's protected class were
treated more favorably).
The first three elements of the prima facie case are not
contested by Simplot. Regarding the fourth element,
Wallis claimed that twelve of the thirteen functions he
performed were retained at the corporate level, and that all
his duties were assigned to persons younger and less
qualified than he. Wallis was not replaced because his
position was eliminated; instead, current employees of
Simplot assumed Wallis' duties. In this respect, Wallis'
claim is more analogous to a reduction in force situation
which does not require proof of replacement, but allows
alternative proof of an inference of age discrimination.
Because very little evidence is required to establish a
primafacie case, we conclude he has met this burden.
We also find Wallis met his minimal burden of
establishing a prima facie case for a Title VII claim. Proof
of a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge requires a
showing that:
(I) he was engaged in a protected activity;
(2) he was thereafter subjected by his employer to an
adverse employment action; and
(3) a causal link exists between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.

Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1375.
Wallis contends his proposed speech, which he intended to
give at an annual meeting of Simplot's management
personnel and which he shared with Smith, constituted a
protected activity.s Further, he contends he was discharged
in retaliation for the proposed speech. The district court
held the speech was not a protected activity because it was
not critical of Simplot's actions. It read Wallis' proposed
speech as merely setting forth perceptions of the company
gained directly from employees during a recent facilities
tour and providing suggestions to management on how to
counter or ameliorate the adverse employee views
expressed during the tour.
The district court's view of the speech is supportable.
When viewed in the context of the tour and Wallis'
responsibilities, it can be fairly interpreted as not critical of
Simplot, but simply descriptive of problems which
employees relayed to Wallis. However, there are some
isolated passages which can be read as critical of Simp lot,
and Smith may have possibly interpreted the speech as
critical. Therefore, we disagree with the district court and
hold that Wallis established a prima facie case of
retaliatory discharge.

*892 Accordingly, because Wallis established prima facie
cases to support his Title VII and ADEA claims, the
burden shifts to Simplot to offer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Wallis' termination. Simplot
offers such a reason. In response to Wallis' claims, Simplot
asserts Wallis was not terminated because of his age or in
retaliation for the proposed speech. Instead, Simplot claims
Wallis' termination was a result of its decision to
decentralize the human resources function, and as a result
of this decentralization, Wallis' supervisory duties were
assumed by others at the corporate level, and the human
resources function was moved to the division level.
Because Simp lot offers this legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for Wallis' termination, it has carried its burden of
production, and the presumptions created by the prima
facie cases disappear. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at - - , 113
S.Ct. at 2749. This is true even though there has been no
assessment of the credibility of Simplot at this stage. fd.;
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 10 I S.Ct. at 1094.
The presumptions having dropped out of the picture, we
are left with the ultimate question of whether Wallis has
offered evidence sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact
to find that Simplot intentionally discriminated against him
because of his age or retaliated against him for his
proposed speech. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at· --,113 S.Ct. at
2749. In determining whether there is a triable issue of fact,
we must consider all the evidence, including that offered to
establish the prima facie cases and to rebut Simplot's
reason as pretextual together with any other evidence.
Wallis' response to Simplot's nondiscriminatory reason is
merely that the functions he performed continue to be
performed by other Simp lot employees and that
supervisory duties remained at the corporate level which is
the same proof he offered to establish his prima facie case.
Wallis offers no additional proof of age discrimination
either direct, circumstantial or statistical.6 Further, he
offers no additional proof of a retaliatory motive. Wallis'
response that other employees assumed his duties merely
serves to reinforce the Simplot's explanation for his
termination: the company was decentralizing Wallis'
function and downsizing by requiring other employees to
assume his duties. In essence, Wallis has simply showed
that an adverse employment decision was made under
conditions that permitted him to invoke a McDonnell
Douglas type of presumption of unlawful discrimination.
That evidence, although it sufficed to establish a minimal
prima facie case, is not enough now that Simp lot has
offered a nondiscriminatory explanation, and nothing in
Wallis' evidence controverts it. Because Wallis failed to
present any evidence to refute Simplot's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge, we hold Wallis
failed to carry his burden of establishing a triable issue of
fact on the ultimate question of whether Simp lot
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intentionally discriminated or retaliated against him.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Simplot.

64 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1507, 65 Fair
EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1216, 65 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas.
(BNA) 1881, 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,074, 28
Fed.R.Serv.3d 1464
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Footnotes

*

Honorable William B. Shubb, United States District Judge for Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.
This court affirms the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to Wallis' state law claims in a separate, unpublished
decision.

2

The version of Rule 4(a)(4) in effect at the time of Wallis' appeal stated:
If a timely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party ... under Rule 59 ... , the
time for appeal of all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying ... such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of{sllch motion} shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be tiled within the prescribed time measured from
the entry of the order disposing of the motion as provided above.
Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) (emphasis added).

3

A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of the judgment but bcJore disposition of any of the above motions is ineffective
to appeal from the judgment or order, or part thereof, specified in the notice of appeal until the date of the entry of the order disposing
of the last such motion outstanding. Appellate review of an order disposing of any of the above motions requires the party, in
compliance with Appellate Rule 3(c), to amend a previously filed notice of appeal. A party intending to challenge an alteration or
amendment of the judgment shall file an amended notice of appeal within the time prescribed by this Rule 4 measured from the entry
of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding. No additional fees will be required for filing an amended notice.

4

Wallis also makes a claim under the Idaho Human Rights Act (lHH.A), I.C § 67~590 1, et seq. The Idaho Supreme Court has held the
analysis under Title VII applies to claims under IHRA. See Hoppe v. A/cDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 644 P.2d 355. 358 (1982). See also
Sengupta v. Alorrison- Knudsen Co., Inc .. 804 F.2d 1072. 1077 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly. our decision resolving Wallis' Title VII
claim also resolves his IlIRA claim.

5

Wallis also contends his support of a female employee who brought a sexual harassment claim against a Simplot executive and of
another employee who supported her in this claim was a protected activity. We need not resolve this issue. however, because Wallis
concedes these events occurred sometime during 1983, 1984 and 1985, and were not in close proximity to his termination.

6

After summary judgment on Wallis' ADEA claim, Wallis moved for reconsideration of the judgment under Rule 59. In support of the
motion, Wallis' lawyer submitted an affidavit showing the ages of various people terminated by Simplot prior to Wallis' termination.
No attempt was made to show why this information was not presented at the summary judgment hearing; Wallis did not claim the
evidence was unavailable to him at the time of summary judgment. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration without
comment. Implicit in its denial was the rejection of the tardy affidavit. This r"jection was well within the district court's discretion.
The district court is required only to consider the tardy affidavit ifit constituted "newly discovercd evidence" within the meaning of
Rule 59. See Coastal Tramfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales. US.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir.1987). Evidence is not newly discovered
if it was in the party's possession at the time of summary judgment or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. See id.
at 212. We similarly decline to accept the tardy afJidavit.

End of Document
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Supreme Court ofIdaho,
Boise, December 2008 Term.
Joe C. WATERll1AN, Plaintfff-Appellant,
v.
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and Allied Insurance Company,
Defendants-Respondents.
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No. 33883. I Jan. 22, 2009.

When reviewing a decision to grant or deny a
motion for directed verdict or a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), Supreme
Court conducts an independent review of the
evidence and does not defer to the trial court's
findings.

Synopsis
Background: Former employee brought action against
employer alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967. After jury returned a verdict in
favor of employee, awarding him $700,000.00 in damages,
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, D. Duff
McKee, J., granted employer's motion for directed verdict
and entered judgment for employer. Employee appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, W. Jones, J., held that:
[I] two stray comments that employer was a "young
company" were insufficient to establish a discriminatory
intent on the part of employer;
[2] there was no evidence of a nexus between alleged
adverse employment actions and a discriminatory intent, as
required to support claim; and
[3] employer was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

Appeal and Error
\.""Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of
Decision Appealed from
Appeal and Error
s,=Appeal from Ruling on Motion to Direct
Verdict

2 Cases that cite this headnote

13)

Trial
".'-'BSubstantial Evidence
Trial
"" .• ,Hearing and Determination

When ruling on a motion for directed verdict,
court must determine whether, admitting the
truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every
legitimate inference most favorably to the
opposing party, there exists substantial evidence
to justify submitting the case to the jury.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (14)

III

Appeal and Error
,F",Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of
Decision Appealed from
Appeal and Error
,;,=Appeal from Ruling on Motion to Direct
Verdict
In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion
for
directed
verdict
or
a
judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), Supreme
Court applies the same standard as that applied
by the trial court when originally ruling on the
motion.

14]

Trial
,=Substantial Evidence

The substantial evidence test for a directed
verdict, i.e., whether substantial evidence exists
to justify submitting the case to the jury, requires
only that the evidence be of sufficient quantity
and probative value that reasonable minds could
conclude that a verdict in favor of the party
against whom the motion is made is proper.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
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claim; employer attempted to work with
employee so he could gradually return to his job,
employer offered to help employee find another
position within company after he complained
about his new position, and employer made a
good faith offer for employee to participate in
company's rehiring process after his benefits
were set to expire. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Courts
,,,"",Construction of Federal Constitution, Statutes,
and Treaties
Federal law guides state Supreme Court in its
interpretation of federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 claims. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

181
161

Labor and Employment
<.;,,"Constructive Discharge

Civil Rights
.. ~Practices Prohibited or Required in General;
Elements
Civil Rights
, .•• Discharge or Layotf

Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an
employee's reasonable decision to resign
because of unendurable working conditions is
assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial
purposes.

To establish an age discrimination claim under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, employee had to demonstrate that he was a
member of a protected class, meaning an
employee at least 40 years of age, that he was
performing his job in a satisfactory manner, that
he was discharged or his employer took adverse
employment action against him, and that his
position was filled by a younger person of equal
or lesser qualifications. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

191

Labor and Employment
;;;;··Constructive Discharge
The inquiry under the constructive discharge
doctrine is objective:
whether working
conditions became so intolerable that a
reasonable person in the employee's position
would have felt compelled to resign.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

171

Civil Rights
,;>=Motive or Intent; Pretext
1101
There was no evidence of a nexus between the
alleged adverse employment actions of which
employee complained, including that he did not
receive adequate training, had insufficient
knowledge of company merger, was assigned an
overwhelming number of claims, performed the
work ofa two adjustor job, was forced to use two
computers, and had to work in intolerable
conditions, and age discrimination as a
motivating factor, as required to support an Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

Civil Rights
..··<Motive or Intent; Pretext
Two stray comments that employer was a "young
company" were insufficient to establish a
discriminatory intent on the part of employer, in
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
case, where employee failed to put these
comments into context and did not produce
evidence of the intent behind the comments. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U .S.c.A. § 621 et seq.
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§ 12-121.

III J

Civil Rights
iCf·,Disparate Treatment
When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment by an
employer in an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 case, liability depends
on whether the protected trait, age, actually
motivated the employer's decision. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 u.s.eA. § 621 et seq.

Attorneys and Law Firms
**642 Kirkendall Law Office and Law Offices of Peter
Desler, PC, Boise, for appellant. Peter Desler argued.
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered,
Boise, for respondent. Patricia M. Olsson argued.
Opinion
W. JONES, Justice.

/l2J

Civil Rights
,.",Disparate Treatment
*669 NATURE OF CASE
Whatever the employer's decisionmaking
process, a disparate treatment claim cannot
succeed unless the employee's protected trait
actually played a role in that process and had a
determinative influence on the outcome.

I13J

Civil Rights
<.=Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Stray remarks are
discrimination.

Joe Watennan (Appellant) brought an action against his
fonner employer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
and Allied Insurance Company (collectively Respondent).
Although Appellant initially filed several causes of action,
the case proceeded to trial only on Respondent's alleged
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA). After the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Appellant, awarding him $700,000.00 in damages, the
district court granted Respondent's motion for directed
verdict. Appellant brings this appeal requesting this Court
to reverse the district court's directed verdict ruling and to
reinstate the jury verdict in his favor.

insufficient to establish
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jl4J

Costs
,,·=Nature and Form of Judgment, Action, or
Proceedings for Review
Employee's appeal from district court's grant of
employer's motion for directed verdict after jury
awarded employee $700,000 in damages was not
brought frivolously, and thus employer was not
entitled to attorney fees on appeal. West's LeA.

Nationwide hired Appellant in 1979 as an insurance claims
adjustor and gave him "pretty intense" training during his
first six months on the job. Appellant was the sole
Nationwide adjustor in the Boise area until approximately
1993, at which time the number of claims in the Boise area
increased and Nationwide hired a second adjustor. Until
that time, Appellant handled multiline claims, including
homeowner, auto, property damage, and bodily injury and
liability investigations. After the second adjustor was
hired, Appellant's responsibility was limited to property
damage claims. In 2000, the second adjustor left the Boise
office, but Appellant continued to handle property damage
claims exclusively until 200 I, which is when the alleged
adverse employment actions commenced.
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Nationwide purchased Allied Group Inc. in October 1998.
The two companies began integrating in 2000. Prior to the
merger, Nationwide used the Class software system to
handle claims and Allied used the Passport software
system. Mike Lex (Mr. Lex), Allied's Regional VicePresident, testified that he was in charge of transitioning
the companies to one common claims handling software
system. He testified that the company chose to convert all
claims handling processes to the Allied Passport model to
achieve the goal of a lower loss expense ratio.

Respondent claims it was not until February 2001. Either
way, Appellant testified that the increased number of
claims overwhelmed him and his requests for help went
unanswered. However, Respondent put on evidence that
Appellant was not meeting the company's expectations for
workload or timeliness. On February 4, 2001, Appellant
was given a verbal warning for failure to comply with
claims handling criteria. In March 200 I, Respondent
attempted to help Appellant by creating an action plan to
improve his performance.

Mr. Lex also testified he was part of the team that
determined which adjustors would be retained after the
merger. To accomplish this task, all employees were
required to fill out a Technical Background Update
explaining their technical competency and prior
performance. In July of 2000, Appellant filled out a
Technical Background Update wherein he listed 2 1.5 years
experience in auto and property damage claims and 15
years experience in med pay, bodily injury, litigation,
general liability and personal injury protection.

Appellant argues that he did not receive proper training on
the Allied Passport system. He testified that he attended
two meetings in Denver, his boss visited him once in
Boise, and he spent a few days job shadowing an adjustor
in Colorado. Appellant stated that Respondent failed in
each situation to provide him even the most basic training
that would be required for him to perform the job
adequately. However, on May 2, 200 I, during a conference
call between Appellant and his supervisors that was set up
to discuss Appellant's performance issues, Appellant
indicated to Nita Dunn, Respondent's human resources
consultant, that a lack oftraining was not the reason for his
poor performance:

**643 *670 From June through October 2000, Appellant
received a weekly company publication entitled "Up to
Date: An Integration Update for Nationwide's Western
States Claims Associates," which answered in-depth
questions about the merger. Appellant first learned in early
October of 2000 that he would have a position with the
company after the merger as a multiline adjustor.
Appellant testified that his supervisor never physically
handed him a job description, but he also admitted that
such materials were available online for review.
Prior to the merger, Appellant worked out of an office, but
in December 2000, he was required to move his office into
his house. Appellant was expected to settle the Nationwide
claims that existed prior to the merger on the Nationwide
software system while simultaneously transitioning to the
new Allied software system. This required Appellant to set
up two separate computers in his home office because the
Allied and Nationwide software systems could not run on
the same computer. DSLI was not available at Appellant's
home office at that time, so he had to use a dial-up line and
completely shut down one computer and boot up the other
computer any time that he needed to change between the
two software systems. Appellant mentioned that the
company gave another adjustor a switch that allowed her to
go quickly and easily from one program to another.
Appellant requested such a switch but was denied.
Appellant testified that the company indicated "it's only a
matter of time before you are done with the pending claims
on Class and it's not within our affordability to do that."
The parties dispute when Appellant began processing
Allied claims. Appellant argues it was on January I, 200 I;

Dunn: And it is not because, if I understand you
correctly it is not because you feel that uh you haven't
received enough training or that you don't have the
proper tools to do your job. But simply that the workload
is too heavy.
Waterman: Correct.
On May 22, 200 I, Appellant agreed to a work
improvement plan that called for Appellant to become
compliant with Respondent's claims handling standards by
50% within one month and 75% within three months.
Around this time Appellant requested a severance package
from Respondent, which Respondent denied, stating "your
request for consideration of a severance option was
unusual, as your position with Allied has not been
eliminated."
From June 4, 200 I through June 14, 200 I, Appellant went
on a preplanned vacation. Immediately following his
vacation, Appellant took leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) due to depression and his
doctor's advice not to work for four to six months.
Appellant received a letter dated September 5, 2001 stating
that his FMLA leave was exhausted and "based on
business *671 **644 needs, a decision has been made to
restaff your position. This decision does not reflect on your
ability to do your job, but rather the company's need to
ensure the job gets done despite your absence." On
September 6, 2001, Respondent posted a position for a
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Boise area claims adjustor. On September 17, 2001,
Appellant was specifically told that his position had not yet
been restaffed and that he should try a gradual return to
work, but he refused, stating he did not believe he could
ever return to a normal workload. On September 24,200 I,
Respondent filled the position with Tamyra Gent, age 4 I.
As of the date Appellant's FMLA leave expired,
Respondent placed him on long-term disability and he
received approximately 60% of his salary. Appellant was
subsequently found not to be disabled after an independent
medical examination was conducted. On April 27, 2002,
Respondent reinstated Appellant's full salary for two
months and advised Appellant to search for a new job
within the company, but there were no positions available
in Boise and Appellant was not willing to relocate.
Appellant was 51 years old as of his last day of
employment with Respondent.
On July 24, 2004, Appellant filed a Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial against Respondent asserting
various causes of action that primarily focused on age
discrimination. Respondent filed an Answer, essentially
denying the allegations made by Appellant and raising the
following affirmative defenses, among others: defendant's
actions were taken for legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons and without regard to plaintiffs age, plaintiff
failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective
opportunities provided by defendant or to otherwise avoid
harm, and defendant acted in good faith in applying
policies of which plaintiff was aware when he was hired
and during his employment. The jury trial commenced on
December 13,2006, and lasted four days.
During trial, Appellant presented testimony by a claims
director that he was aware of "some statements made in
group meetings where Allied was referred to as a young
company." However, the claims director did not know
what the statements meant. Appellant also presented
testimony of a district claims manager that, in reference to
a conversation with his supervisor about a job applicant
who was in his sixties, his supervisor stated to him, "Well,
you know, Allied is a young company." The inference was
that the job applicant was too old for the position, but he
was ultimately hired.
After Appellant rested his case, Respondent moved for
directed verdict, alleging Appellant failed to establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination because a
reasonable person could not find the second, third, or
fourth elements of an ADEA claim. The district court
denied Respondent's motion for directed verdict, but noted
that Respondent could renew its motion at the end of trial.
Respondent then presented its defense case.

On December 20,2006, both sides rested and Respondent
renewed its motion for directed verdict. The court took it
under advisement. The jury returned a 9-3 verdict in favor
of Appellant and awarded $700,000.00 in damages. After
the district court dismissed the jury, Respondent again
renewed its motion for directed verdict. The court granted
the motion, stating, "I've considered this carefully. I fully
expected the jury to take me off the hook on this, but they
have not. I'm satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to
establish the requisite elements and that a properly
deliberative jury could not have reached the verdict that
they did." On December 21, 2006, the court issued its
written Ruling on Motion for Directed Verdict. On
December 27, 2006, the court entered judgment against
Appellant and in favor of Respondent. There is no
evidence in the record that either party requested or
received attorney fees below. Appellant brought this
appeal seeking reinstatement of the jury verdict in the
amount of $700,000.00, plus interest. Respondent requests
attorney fees on appeal.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the district court err in granting Respondent's
motion for directed verdict?2
**645 *672 2. Is Respondent entitled to attorney fees on
appeal?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

IlJ 12113114J In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a
motion for directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, this Court applies the same standard as that
applied by the trial court when originally ruling on the
motion. Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 14 I Idaho 16,
27, 105 P.3d 676,687 (2005) (citation omitted). This Court
conducts an independent review of the evidence and does
not defer to the trial court's findings. fd. This Court must
determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse
evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most
favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial
evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury. fd. The
substantial evidence test does not require the evidence be
uncontradicted. fd. It requires only that the evidence be of
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable
minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the party
against whom the motion is made is proper. Jd.
15J 16J Federal law guides this Court in its interpretation of
ADEA claims. See 0 'Del! v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 81 I,
810 P.2d 1082, 1097(199 I) (citations omitted). Different
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jurisdictions, both within and outside the state of Idaho,
recite the elements of an ADEA claim differently. To
establish an age discrimination claim for the purposes of
this case, Appellant must first demonstrate that he was a
member of a protected class, which here is an employee at
least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.c. § 63I(a); Wallis v. JR.
Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 89 I (9th Cir.1994). Second, he
must demonstrate that he was performing his job in a
satisfactory manner. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir.2004); Wallis, 26 F.3d at 891.
Third, he must demonstrate that he was discharged or his
employer took adverse employment action against him. id.
Fourth, he must demonstrate that his position was filled by
a younger person of equal or lesser qualifications. Wallis,
26 F.3d at 891. In this case, the third element of
Appellant's ADEA claim is dispositive, so we need not
address elements one, two, or four.

ANALYSIS
The district court did not err in granting Respondent's
motion for directed verdict.

I7J 18J [9J To establish the third element of Appellant's
ADEA claim, he must prove he was discharged or
Respondent took adverse employment action against him.
In this case, Appellant contends he was constructively
discharged. "Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an
employee's reasonable decision to resign because of
unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal
discharge for remedial purposes. The inquiry is objective:
Did working conditions become so intolerable that a
reasonable person in the employee's position would have
felt compelled to resign?" Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d
1174, 1184 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Penn. State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2351, 159
L.Ed.2d 204, 216 (2004». Under the adverse employment
action doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has
stated, "A tangible employment action constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits." Burlington industries, inc.
v. Ellerth. 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2268, 141
L.Ed.2d 633, 652-53 (1998) (comparing Crady v. Liberty
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th
Cir.1993) ("A materially adverse change might be
indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion
evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly
diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that
might be unique to a particular situation"), with Flaherty v.
Gas Research institute, 31 F .3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1994) (a

"bruised ego" is not enough), Kocsis v. Multi-Care
Management, inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir.1996)
(demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or
prestige *673 **646 insufficient), and Harlston v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th
Cir.1994) (reassignment to more inconvenient job
insufficient».

11 OJ 111 J ]12 J II 3J When a plaintiff alleges disparate
treatment by an employer in an ADEA case, "liability
depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA,
age) actually motivated the employer's decision." Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, inc., 530 U.S. 133,141,
120 S.Ct. 2097, 2105, 147 L.Ed.2d 105, 116 (2000)
(quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610,
113 S.Ct. 1701, 1706, 123 L.Ed.2d 338, 346 (1993»).
Whatever the employer's decision making process, a
disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the
employee's protected trait actually played a role in that
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.
Jd. Stray remarks are insufficient to establish
discrimination. Nesbit v. Pepsico, inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705
(9th Cir.1993) (citing Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892
F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990». To establish the nexus
between Respondent's allegedly discriminatory motive
and the third element of Appellant's ADEA claim,
Appellant cites to two stray comments that NationwideAllied was a "young company." Appellant failed to put
these comments into context and did not produce evidence
of the intent behind the comments, thus the stray comments
are insufficient to establish a discriminatory intent.
Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence in the record
that Appellant was constructively discharged or that
Respondent took adverse employment action against him.
Appellant presented evidence at trial that he was not happy
with his new position after the merger and his
responsibilities changed in a way he found unpleasant.
However, he failed to establish a nexus between the
alleged adverse employment actions of which he
complains and any iota of evidence that age discrimination
was a motivating factor. Appellant claims he satisfied this
element of his ADEA claim by producing evidence at trial
that he did not receive adequate training, he had
insufficient knowledge of the merger, he was assigned an
overwhelming number of claims, he performed the work of
a two adjustor job, he was forced to use two computers,
and he had to work in intolerable conditions. However,
Respondent presented evidence that Appellant specifically
denied training was an issue, he was not trained differently
than other employees, his claim load was within normal
limits, there is no evidence that Appellant did the work of
two adjustors, the computer set-up in Appellant's home
was nothing more than a temporary annoyance, and
Appellant was on notice of the merger as early as February
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2000 and kept advised of the merger by weekly updates.
Moreover, Respondent attempted to work with Appellant
so he could gradually return to his job, offered to help him
find another position within the company after he
complained about his new position, and made a good faith
offer for him to participate in the company's rehiring
process after his benefits were set to expire.

the district court thereafter entered directed verdict against
Appellant. Thus, we deny Respondent's request for
attorney fees on appeal.

Appellant essentially requests this Court to overturn the
district court's entry of directed verdict based on
conjecture and speculation that two stray comments
provide sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus on
the part of Respondent. We decline to do so. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court's entry of directed verdict
against Appellant.

After drawing every legitimate inference in favor of
Appellant, we find Appellant did not produce substantial
evidence to establish the third element of this ADEA
claim. *674 **647 Therefore, we affirm the district court's
decision to grant Respondent's motion for directed verdict.
We deny Respondent's request for attorney fees on appeal.
Costs to Respondent.

Respondent is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
[141 Respondent requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant
to IC § 12-121. Attorney fees can be awarded on appeal
under IC § 12-121 only if the appeal was brought or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Teton Peaks fnv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 399,
195 P.3d 1207, 1212 (2008). We cannot say Appellant
frivolously brought this appeal where the jury found in
favor of Appellant, awarded $700,000.00 in damages, and

CONCLUSION

Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, HORTON and Justice pro
tern WALTERS, concur.

Parallel Citations
201 P.3d 640,105 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 556

Footnotes

1

"DSL" is shorthand for "digital subscriber line," which is a speedy medium for transferring data over regular phone lines and can be
used to connect to the Internet. See The Tech Terms Computer Dictionary, http://www.techterms.com/definition/dsl (last visited
Dec. 5, 2008).

2

Aftcr the jury returned the verdict, Respondent should have movcd for judgment notwithstanding the verdict rather than renew its
motion for directed verdict. See I.R.C.P. § 50. However, the two motions are reviewed under the same standard and for the purposes
ofthis case any distinction between the motions is without a difference.
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record in the light most favorable to nonmovant.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.

94 F .3d353
United States Court ofAppeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Martin T. WOHL, PlaintijJ-Appellant,
v.
SPECTRUM MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.

I Cases that cite this headnote
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No. 95-3610. I Argued Apri118, 1996. I
DecidedAug. 28, 1996. I Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Bane Denied
Nov. 21, 1996.
Employee brought Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) action against his former employer. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, James B. Zagel, .I., entered summary judgment for
employer, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals,
Eschbach, Circuit Judge, held that: (I) employee
established that he met employer's legitimate expectations
so as to establish prima facie case of discrimination, and
(2) material issue of fact as to whether employer's
proffered reasons for firing employee were pretext for age
discrimination precluded summary judgment for
employer.

Federal Civil Procedure
=Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Court applies summary judgment standard
rigorously in employment discrimination cases
because intent and credibility are crucial issues.
49 Cases that cite this headnote

14J

Federal Civil Procedure
,~Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
plaintiff may defeat employer's summary
judgment motion if plaintiff produces evidence
that employer proffered phoney reasons for firing
plaintiff. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U .S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Reversed and remanded.
Bauer, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion.

7 Cases that cite this headnote
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Federal Courts
<= Trial De Novo

151

Court of Appeals reviews de novo district court's
grant of summary judgment. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.

Federal Civil Procedure
J~,Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
To defeat employer's summary judgment
motion, ADEA plaintiff had to raise genuine
issue of material fact regarding sincerity of
employer's proffered reasons for plaintiffs
discharge. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
5 Cases that cite this headnote
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Federal Courts
0~"Summary Judgment
When reviewing district court's grant of
summary judgment, Court of Appeals views
~
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"
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Federal Civil Procedure

Woh! v.

Mfg., !nc., 94 F.3d 353 (1996)
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\=Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Material issue of fact as to whether employer's
proffered reasons for firing employee were
pretext for age discrimination precluded
summary judgment for employer on employee's
in
ADEA
claims.
Age
Discrimination
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
56, 18 U.S.C.A.
4 Cases that cite this headnote

171

Civil Rights
<,,;=Discharge or Layoff
General elements of prima facie case of age
discrimination are that plaintiff was in a
protected class, plaintiff performed well enough
to meet employer's legitimate expectations,
plaintiff was discharged, and employer sought
replacement for plaintiff. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
I Cases that cite this headnote

181

Civil Rights
. :,-=Discharge or Layoff
Employee established that he met employer's
legitimate expectations so as to establish prima
facie case of age discrimination; employer gave
employee substantial raise just before he was
fired and employer provided no documentary
evidence that employee did not meet its
legitimate expectations. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
3 Cases that cite this headnote

/91

Civil Rights
Facie Case

.~~"'Prima

Prima facie case of employment discrimination is
a flexible standard that is not intended to be
rigidly applied.
7 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*354 Aron D. Robinson, Bruce J. Goodhart, Matthew H.
Berns (argued), Holstein, Mack & Klein, Chicago, IL, for
p lainti ff-appe Ilant.
Terry J. Smith, Barry C. Kessler (argued), Kessler, Smith
& Powen, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellee.
Before BAUER, ESCHBACH, and FLAUM, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion
ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Martin Wohl was hired as Controller of
Defendant-Appellee Spectrum Manufacturing, Inc., in
1988. In 1992, at the age of 54, Wohl was fired and
replaced by Joe Holloway, who is approximately 20 years
younger than Wohl. Wohl then filed suit against Spectrum,
alleging that Spectrum fired him because of his age, in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as
amended, 29 U.S.c. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA") .
Spectrum filed a motion for summary judgment. The court
analyzed Wohl's claim under the indirect, burdenshifting
method of proof first established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d
668 (1973), and later applied to ADEA claims. See McCoy
v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371
(7th Cir.1992); see also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122-24 (7th Cir.1994) (discussing
the particulars of the burden-shifting approach). The court
found (or, more appropriately, presumed) that Wohl had
made a prima facie case for age discrimination. The court
also found that Spectrum had met its burden of rebutting
the presumption of age discrimination by articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The
court, therefore, required Wohl to prove that Spectrum's
"reasons" for firing Wohl were a pretext for age
discrimination. The court held that Wohl failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact and the court granted
Spectrum's motion for summary judgment. Wohl appeals
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from that decision, arguing that he raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Spectrum's proffered reason for
his firing was a *355 lie. We agree with Wohl and we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

IlJ 121131 We review de novo the district court's grant ofa
motion for summary judgment, Schultz v. General Electric
Capital Corp., 37 FJd 329, 333 (7th Cir.1994), cert.
denied sub nom. Alley v. General Electric Capital Corp.,
515 U.S. II45, 115 S.Ct. 2584, 132 L.Ed.2d 833 (1995),
and we view the record in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. McCoy, 957 F.2d at 369. We apply the
summary judgment standard rigorously in employment
discrimination cases such as this because intent and
credibility are crucial issues. Courtney v. Biosound, 42
FJd 414, 419 (7th Cir.1994).1
14J 151 A plaintiff in an age discrimination case may defeat
a summary judgment motion brought by the employer if
the plaintiff produces evidence that the employer proffered
a phony reason for firing the employee. Anderson, 13 F.3d
at 1123. The Supreme Court's opinion in Saint Mmy's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125
L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), specifically permits, but does not
require, the fact-finder "to infer the ultimate act of
intentional discrimination" based upon such evidence. Id.
at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. Therefore, to avoid summary
judgment, Wohl must raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the sincerity of the proffered reasons for his
discharge. With this framework in mind, we discuss the
relevant facts in the instant case.

II.
Spectrum is a small manufacturing company that makes
specialized machine parts. Wohl had a variety of
responsibilities as Spectrum's Controller. These
responsibilities included financial and cost accounting,
payroll, coordination of liability insurance and
administration of the company's 40 I K plan.
Shortly after Wohl was hired, he investigated and
purchased a new computer accounting program at the
company's behest for approximately $3,000. Spectrum
eventually outgrew this system and Wohl was directed to
assess the purchase of a more sophisticated system that
would permit management to track profitability by
department and job lot. Wohl and Spectrum's president,
James Ceriale, opted for a software accounting system
called "OCO." The compan)' purchased the OCO software

and the hardware necessary to implement the program at a
cost of slightly more than $100,000.
The company opted for this system because it was capable
of sophisticated cost accounting. Cost accounting requires
the company and its employees to input the variable costs
associated with a single job (i. e., materials, labor, and
machine overhead) along with proportionate fixed costs
(general overhead and administration). These figures are
then matched against billing for each job. The resultant
analyses provide the company with detailed information
regarding the company's efficiency, productivity, and
sources of profit and loss. This system, like all computer
systems and all accounting systems, is dependent on the
input of accurate information. For example, the system
requires production floor employees to log on to a
computer terminal and input their personal identification
number and a job account number before working on a
particular job with a particular machine. The employee
signs off after completing that period of work. If the
information that the employee enters is inaccurate, the
output data will be inaccurate. Garbage in, garbage out.

16J In its motion for summary judgment, Spectrum
suggested that it had fired Wohl for two reasons: (I) his
failure to "get along with" general manager Greg Reuhs
and (2) his inability to produce certain computer
accounting reports-specifically, computer-generated job
costing reports from the OCO system. The district court
found that these were legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for Wohl's termination. The court also found that
Wohl had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether *356 Spectrum's second reason2 was
false-a pretext for age discrimination. Wohl admits that he
did not produce accurate and reliable job costing reports
for Spectrum. This is, however, only half of the story.
Wohl alleges that general manager Greg Reuhs was
responsible for the system's failure. Wohl also claims that
he complained to Spectrum's management about Reuhs's
actions and that Spectrum's management instructed him to
get along with, and defer to, Reuhs. This allegation is
significant because, if true (and we must assume for
purposes of summary judgment that it is true), it creates a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Spectrum's proffered reason for firing Wohl was a pretext
for age discrimination.
The evidence indicates that Wohl and Reuhs had clashed
early on in Wohl's tenure at Spectrum. Reuhs was
primarily responsible for manufacturing, but he had
assumed responsibility in a number of other areas and was
given great deference by Spectrum's management. For
example, Reuhs insisted on taking responsibility for
billing, an area that ordinarily belongs under the
supervision of the Controller. When Spectrum first hired
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Wohl, Wohl had questioned some of the billing practices
maintained by Reuhs. Reuhs had an unorthodox policy of
keeping particular jobs open and refusing to abide by a
standard month-end cutoff. By employing this unorthodox
policy, Reuhs was able to manipulate department
profitability and "steal" billing from, and allocate labor to,
subsequent months. Reuhs's sleight of hand prevented
management from obtaining an accurate picture of
department profit and loss.
Reuhs's tinkering with billing so concerned Wohl that he
brought the matter to Spectrum's management's attention.
Wohl informed Jim Ceriale, Tom Brandseth, and William
Fricke about his concerns at a luncheon meeting. Ceriale,
Brandseth, and Fricke were the founders and managers of
the company and Ceriale was its president. At this
luncheon meeting, Wohl was specifically directed to "get
along with" Reuhs and to work out their differences. Wohl
stated that it was clear to him "that the company considered
Reuhs, who was the younger man, to be a key player in the
organization, and that he was to be appeased." Following
the meeting, Wohl learned to get along with Reuhs and
performed his duties to the fullest extent without clashing
with Reuhs.
As part of his duties in implementing the DCD system,
Wohl was responsible for setting up the computer with
certain fixed information, including overhead, employee
identification numbers and employees' rates of pay. Wohl
entered this information but was unable to produce the
desired reports because production floor employees were
supposed to supply much of the variable cost data, but did
not do so accurately. Wohl did not have authority to
manage these production floor employees; the employees
were supervised by Greg Reuhs. The reports were
unreliable because these employees failed to enter the
correct data. Reuhs further compromised the integrity of
the reports by failing to close out completed jobs and
deliberately manipUlating the billing cut-off dates.
The facts create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to both of Spectrum's proffered reasons for firing
Wohl. First, Wohl claims that he learned to "get along
with" Reuhs. Wohl's claim that he learned to "get along
with" Reuhs is corroborated by Spectrum's own outside
accountant, Charles Gries. Gries testified at his deposition
that "Greg [Reuhs] never felt that he had a problem with
Mr. W ohl" and that Reuhs "was always very
complimentary of him." The evidence is more than
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Especially when looked at in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Wohl and Reuhs
got along fine and that Spectrum did not fire Wohl for
failing to get along with Reuhs.

Second, Wohl has raised a genuine issue of material fact
regarding Spectrum's second reason, failing to produce
accurate and reliable computer reports. A reasonable jury
could find that Spectrum's second reason was false
because Spectrum knew that Reuhs's actions prevented
Wohl from implementing *357 the DCD system,3 yet
Spectrum failed to take any action to monitor or alter
Reuhs's management of the production floor employees
and failed to take action to prevent Reuhs from
manipUlating data to produce artificially good results. In
fact, Wohl had summoned sufficient courage to bring his
specific concerns regarding Reuhs' s behavior to the
highest level of management, but Spectrum's only
response was to tell Wohl to get along with Reuhs. That
Spectrum claimed that it fired W ohl for failing to "get
along with" Reuhs further lends credence to Wohl's claim
that Spectrum preferred him to defer to Reuhs rather than
rocking the boat in order to obtain accurate data from the
production floor employees.
Wohl's claim is distinct from a simple attempt to pass the
buck on responsibility for producing DCD rep0l1s to
Reuhs. See Schultz v. General Electric Capital Corp., 37
F.3d 329, 334 (7th Cir. I 994) (simply shifting the blame for
a problem does not establish pretext). Wohl claims that
Spectrum knew it was firing the wrong employee all along
and pointed to the DCD system as an after-the-fact excuse.
Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir.1995)
(pretext established for summary judgment by evidence
that employer did not honestly believe its proffered
reason); Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414,423 (7th
Cir.1994) ("Given the conflicting evidence, a reasonable
juror could conclude that [defendant] did not honestly
believe that [plaintiff] was responsible for the mishap, but
only claimed that the mishap was plaintiffs fault as an
excuse not to hire him.").4 Wohl's claim "create [s] an
issue as to whether [Spectrum] honestly believes in the
reasons it offers, not whether [Spectrum] made a bad
decision." Sample v. Aldi, Inc., 61 F.3d 544, 549 (7th
Cir.1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
see also *358 Schultz, 37 F.3d at 334 (noting that evidence
that employer knew that its reason for firing employee was
based on erroneous or irrelevant information is distinct
from evidence that merely shows that the employer made a
mistake and would permit a fact-finder to find that the
employer lied).
W ohl points to a number of additional factors that support
his claim that Spectrum's proffered reasons were a pretext
for age discrimination: Spectrum's files contain no
indication of any disciplinary action or informal concern
with Wohl's performance and Wohl received a 25 percent
pay raise less than 6 months before he was fired; Wohl
provided substitute reports using less-sophisticated
software that Spectrum's outside accountant, Gries,
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admitted "were very good" and were more than sufficient
to generate the company's year-end financial statements;
and Wohl's "replacement," Holloway, experienced the
same problems as Wohl in implementing the DCD system
because Reuhs refused to adopt a standard billing cut-off
and was unwilling to get cooperation from the production
employees. These facts all support Wohl's contention that
his failure to produce accurate and reliable reports was not
the true reason that he was fired. We recognize that a
reasonable fact-finder may infer contrary conclusions, but
we reemphasize that all reasonable inferences must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
on summary judgment.

171 [8) The facts also support the conclusion that Wohl had
established a prima facie case, the first step in the
burden shifting method of proof. The general elements of a
primafacie case of age discrimination are that: (I) plaintiff
was in the protected class, (2) plaintiff performed well
enough to meet the employer's "legitimate expectations,"
(3) plaintiff was discharged, and (4) the employer sought a
replacement for plaintiff. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122.
Spectrum concedes that plaintiff established three of the
four elements. Spectrum suggests, however, that summary
judgment was appropriate in this case even if it lied about
its reasons for firing Wohl because Wohl did not meet
Spectrum's legitimate expectations. We disagree.
Spectrum gave Wohl a substantial raise just before he was
fired, Wohl produced financial reports as best he was able,
and Spectrum provides no documentary evidence that
Wohl did not meet their legitimate expectations. Plaintiff
also stated in his affidavit that "[ u]nti I I was fired, I had
every reason to believe that the company was happy with
my performance. I was never given any indication that
Spectrum considered my efforts at implementing DCD to
be deficient." See Courtney, 42 F.3d at 418 ("The
nonmoving party's own affidavit or deposition can
constitute affirmative evidence to defeat a summary
judgment motion."); Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
864 F.2d 1359,1365 n. 7 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Williams
v. Williams Electronics, 856 F.2d 920, 923 n. 6 (7th
Cir.1988), for the proposition that plaintiff may establish
that he performed the job well enough to meet the
employer's legitimate expectations based solely upon
plaintiffs own testimony regarding the quality of his
work). This is essentially a swearing contest. Summary
judgment is not the appropriate place to resolve this
genuine dispute over a material fact.

191 Finally, Spectrum's claim that it fired Wohl for failure
to get along with Reuhs also cuts against Spectrum's
suggestion that Wohl did not perform well enough to meet
Spectrum's "legitimate expectations."5 Spectrum argues
that Wohl cannot establish that he met Spectrum's

legitimate expectations because "Plaintiff admitted he
failed to perform key elements of his job, i.e., the
production of job costing reports through *359
implementation of DCD." Yet, there was an inherent
tension between "getting along" with Greg Reuhs and
compiling accurate and reliable information relating to job
costing reports. Wohl pointed out this tension to
Spectrum's management. Management indicated to Wohl
that appeasing Reuhs should be his priority. Thus,
Spectrum's expectations regarding the DCD system and
the production of accurate and reliable reports are not
"legitimate" unless they are viewed in isolation. "The
prima facie case ... is a flexible standard that is not intended
to be rigidly applied." Collier, 66 F.3d at 890 (internal
quotation and citation omitted). Spectrum's "legitimate"
expectations must include a balancing of priorities: The
expectation that Wohl produce the DCD reports must be
balanced against Spectrum's stated expectation that Wohl
get along with Reuhs. Summary judgment is inappropriate
because Wohl has produced sufficient evidence that he met
all of Spectrum's "legitimate expectations."

III.

Wohl has established a prima facie case for age
discrimination and a trier of fact could reasonably
conclude that Spectrum's proffered reasons for firing Wohl
were false. Thus, Wohl has established a genuine issue of
material fact. The district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Spectrum is therefore REVERSED
and REMANDED.
BAUER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The opinion states: "Wohl admits
that he did not produce accurate and reliable job costing
reports for Spectrum. This is, however, only half of the
story. Wohl alleges that general manager Greg Reuhs was
responsible for the system's failure. Wohl also claims that
he complained to Spectrum's management about Reuhs'
actions and that Spectrum's management instructed him to
get along with, and defer to, Reuhs. This allegation is
significant because, if true (and we must assume for
purposes of summary judgment that it is true), it creates a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Spectrum's proffered reason for firing Wohl was a pretext
for age discrimination."
I simply cannot accept this. The brief of appellant Wohl
accurately reflects the complaint he made about Reuhs.
Wohls' affidavit says that he questioned Reuhs' practices

Wonl v.

Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d 353 (1996)

71 Fair EmpI.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1081

as
"manipulating
department
profitability"
and
"preventing management from seeing a true picture of
department profit and loss." The affidavit recites that Wohl
brought this matter to the attention of Spectrum
management early on in his tenure, within 6 to 9 months
after he was hired, "even before DCD was implemented."
This was at the luncheon when Wohl was "specifically told
to get along with and defer to Reuhs." There is nothing in
the record to support the statement that "Spectrum knew
that Reuhs' actions prevented Wohl from implementing
the DCD system .... " The complaint about Reuhs from
Wohl came many months before the DCD system was
purchased.
The fact is, the DCD system was put to
work-satisfactorily-by Reuhs' successor. Wohl, who
acknowledged in his deposition that it was his
responsibility to implement the DCD equipment, also
acknowledged that he was never capable of utilizing the
$100,000 DCD to provide accurate and reliable costing
reports for Spectrum. There is nothing to suggest that
Spectrum was told by Wohl that the DCD problem was
caused by some hanky-panky or shortcomings of
Reuhs'-Wohl's beef about Reuhs was long before the
company even acquired the DCD and that complaint could
not possibly be considered as creating a fact question as to
whether Spectrum's proffered reason was a pretext for age
discrimination.
There is simply no way of stretching a statement, "I didn't
do what the company expected but it wasn't my fault," into
an age discrimination claim. I do not know, nor is it
significant in terms of this law suit, whether Reuhs was a
terrible supervisor or Wohl a malcontent. Wohl admits that

he didn't produce "accurate and reliable job costing reports
for Spectrum." That provides the basis for the firing and
not any implication of age discrimination.
And, in passing, I hesitate to join an opinion that would
force a company to pause *360 before giving a pay raise to
an employee lest it be used to create an element of job
tenure that cannot be overcome in the event the employee
bogs down and the company wishes to fire him or her.
Giving an incentive pay raise to stimulate work is not
unknown nor is it even suspicious. (Both Reuhs and W ohl
received 25 percent pay raises.) The stimulus was a failure;
three months later the job costing reports were still not
produced. All of this is uncontroverted. Whether Wohl
couldn't produce the work because he was inept or
couldn't produce the work because it was Reuhs' fault is
immaterial; the company believed-and Wohl admitted-that
he couldn't do what the job required and so he got fired.
And when Reuhs couldn't do it, he got fired.
The record in this case, in the best light for the plaintiff,
should not survive a motion for a directed verdict for the
defendant if the case is tried. Whether Wohl agreed with
the decision of the company to give him the gate and keep
Reuhs and whether we agree with that business decision, is
not relevant to the proceeding. I would affirm.
Parallel Citations
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Footnotes

1

This is not to say that there is a hierarchy of the rigor with which we review cases on summary judgment. There is one summary
judgment standard and we apply it rigorously in all cases. It is, however, of particular import in cases that tum on intent and
credibility.

2

The district court nevcr reached the issue whether Wohl had raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding Wohl's relationship
with Reuhs.

3

The dissent hangs its hat on its belief that Wohl's complaints about Reuhs's billing practices cannot create a question of material fact
as to whether Spectrum's proffered reason was a lie. The dissent claims that "[t]here is nothing in the record to support the statement
that 'Spectrum knew that Reuhs' actions prevented Wohl from implementing the OeD system ... ,' " noting that Wohl complained
about Reuhs's phony billing practices before oeD was purchased. The dissent's position is untenable for two reasons. First. there is
nothing unusual about inferring knowledge of a later fact (Reuhs' refusal to input accurate OeD data) from awareness of an earlier
lact (Reuhs' refusal to input accurate data prior to purchase ofthe OeD). Furthermore. Wohl specifically raised this issue of fact. See,
e.g, Plaintiff's Local Rule 12(n) Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts in Support of Summary Judgment, at para. 7
("Answering further. Plaintiff alleges that Spectrum management was at all times aware ofthe true reasons for the problems with the
reports and simply elected to back Reuhs. the younger man they viewed to be the future of the company .... " (emphasis added». As
evidentiary support. Wohl cites to a Spectrum memo contained in the record:
The new computer system will be used for Accounts payable, check preparation. and general Ledger starting July I st. Sometime
during July Greg [ReuhsJ will start recording all work performed on jobs on the new system and go ofT the old system for that
purpose. We should be able to start generating invoices off of the new system shortly thereafter.
Nowhere does Spectrum claim that it was unaware ofReuhs's actions. On summary judgment we review the record in the light
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most favorable to Wohl and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. There is clearly enough evidence to create a factual issue
whether Spectrum knew that Greg Reuhs was responsible for the inability to produce accurate DCD reports.
Second, the dissent ignores thc fact that Wohl complained to Spectrum management that Reuhs was rigging the billing system to
create a pleasing, but inaccurate, picture of department of profit and loss and Spectrum 's only response was to instruct Wahl to
get along with Reuhs. Spectrum's response supports an inference that they knew that Reuhs was responsible for the DCD reports
because Spectrum's failure to stop the practice indicated that Spectrum actually condoned Reuhs's billing data high jinks.
Spectrum not only had knowledge of Reuhs's actions, they also authorized his actions. If Wohl had eontinued to conflict with
Reuhs, Spectrum would have had a legitimate reason to fire him. The record reflects that Wohl chose to get along with Reuhs.
Under the dissent's view ofthe matter, there would be no such thing as a pretext, because the company could always instruct an
employee to satisfy two mutually exclusive mandates. Heads I win, tails you lose. We do not support such a position.

4

The dissent states that "[t]here is simply no way of stretching a statement, 'I didn't do what the company expected but it wasn't my
fault,' into an age discrimination claim." The dissent ignores the facts and tells only half the story. Wohl's claim is that "1 didn't do
what the company expected but it wasn't my fault and the company knew it wasn't my fault but fired me anyway!"

5

The dissent states that "[t]he fact is. the DCD system was put to work-satisfactorily-by Reuhs' successor" in apparent support of its
position that the company's reason for firing Wohl were legitimate. The full facts of the case, however. support Wohl's position. Joe
Holloway, Wohl's replacement, did not have immediate success in implementing the DCD system. Initially. he experienced the same
problems as Wohl, that is, Reuhs's refusal to adopt standard billing practices and his failure to get appropriate input from production
floor employees. Holloway did eventually produce accurate DCD reports, but only after Reuhs was fired in August 1993, nine
months after Wohl was terminated. Wohl maintains that management simply elected to back Holloway, who is even younger than
Reuhs.

End
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Statutes

Idaho Statutes
TITLE 12
COSTS AND MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS IN CIVIL ACTIONS
CHAPTER 1
COSTS
12-121.
ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any civil action, the judge may award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided
that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which
otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or
"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation,
association, private organization,
the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
History:

[12-121, added 1976, ch. 349, sec. 1, p. 1158; am. 1987, ch. 263, sec.
2, p. 555.]

The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public
service. Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in
violation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho's
copyright.
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 67
STATE GOVERNMENT AND STATE AFFAIRS
CHAPTER 59
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
67-5911. REPRISALS FOR OPPOSING UNLAWFUL PRACTICES. It shall be unlawful
for a person or any business entity subject to regulation by this chapter
to discriminate against any individual because he or she has opposed any
practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.
History:
[67-5911,
6, p. 877.]

added 1982, ch. 83,

sec. 5, p.

156; am.

2005, ch. 278,

sec.

The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public
service, Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in
violation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho's
copyright.
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Rule 41. Attorney fees on appeal.
(a) Application for Attorney Fees - Waiver. Any party seeking attorney
fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in
the first appellate brief filed by such party as provided by Rules 35(a) (5)
and 35(b) (5); provided, however, the Supreme Court may permit a later claim
for attorney fees under such conditions as it deems appropriate.
(b)
Oral Argument on Attorney Fees. At the time of oral argument of an
appeal, the parties may present argument as to whether or not the party
claiming attorney fees has a legal right thereto.
(c)
Adjudication of Right to Attorney Fees. The Supreme Court in its
decision on appeal shall include its determination of a claimed right to
attorney fees, but such ruling will not contain the amount of attorney fees
allowed.
(d)
Amount of Attorney Fees. If the Court determines that a party is
entitled to attorney fees on appeal, the party claiming attorney fees shall
file a claim concurrently with, or as part of, the memorandum of costs
provided for by Rule 40. The claim for attorney fees, which at the
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees shall be accompanied
by an affidavit setting forth the method of computation of the attorney
fees claimed. Attorney fees may also include the reasonable cost of automated
legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it
was reasonably necessary in preparing the party's case. The opposing party
may object to the amount of attorney fees claimed in the same manner as
provided for objections to a memorandum of costs in Rule 40. The Court
shall determine the amount of attorney fees or remand this question to the
district court or agency to hear additional evidence and determine the
amount of attorney fees to be allowed. Upon the determination of the amount
of attorney fees, the Clerk shall insert the amount thereof in the
remittitur in the same manner as the Clerk inserts costs pursuant to Rule
40 (f) .
(e)
Number of Copies. An original and six copies of the claim or
memorandum for attorney fees, objections to attorney fees, and briefs in
support of or in opposition thereto shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977; amended March 30, 1984,
effective July 1, 1984; amended March 23, 1990, effective July 1, 1990.)
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Rule 56(a). Summary judgment - For claimant.
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after
the expiration of twenty (20) days from the service of process upon
the adverse party or that party's appearance in the action or after
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
that party's favor upon all or any part thereof. Provided, a motion
for summary judgment must be filed at least 60 days before the
trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order
setting the case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise
ordered by the court.
(Amended March 28, 1986, effective July I, 1986; amended June 15,
1987, effective November 1, 1987.)
Rule 56(b). Summary judgment - For defending party.
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
that party's favor as to all or any part thereof. Provided, a
motion for summary judgment must be filed at least 60 days before
the trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order
setting the case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise
ordered by the court.
(Amended March 28, 1986, effective July 1, 1986; amended June 15,
1987, effective November I, 1987.)
Rule 56(c). Motion for summary judgment and proceedings thereon.
The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at
least twenty eight (28) days before the time fixed for the hearing.
If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the party
must do so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The
adverse party shall also serve an answering brief at least 14 days
prior to the date of the hearing. The moving party may thereafter
serve a reply brief not less than 7 days before the date of the
hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. Such judgment, when
appropriate, may be rendered for or against any party to the
action. The court may alter or shorten the time periods and
requirements of this rule for good cause shown, may continue the
hearing, and may impose costs, attorney fees and sanctions against
a party or the party's attorney, or both.
(Amended March 28, 1986, effective July 1, 1986; amended June 14,
1987, effective November 1, 1987.)
Rule 56(d). Case not fully adjudicated on motion for summary
judgment.
If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the
whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary,
the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
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§

United States Code Annotated
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare
Chapter 21. Civil Rights (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter VI. Equal Employment Opportunities (Refs & Annos)
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2
§ 2oooe-2. Unlawful employment practices

Currentness
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) Employment agency practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise

to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for
employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-(l) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for
employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities,
or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
(d) Training programs
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established
to provide apprenticeship or other training.
(e) Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex, or national origin; educational institutions
with personnel of particular religion
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (I) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor
organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor

organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to
admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college,
university, or other educational institution or institution ofleaming to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such
school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned,
supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if
the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward
the propagation of a particular religion.
(f) Members of Communist Party or Communist-action or Communist-front organizations
As used in this subchapter, the phrase "unlawful employment practice" shall not be deemed to include any action or measure
taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management committee, or employment agency with respect to an
individual who is a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other organization required to register as a
Communist-action or Communist-front organization by final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board pursuant to the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 [50 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq.].

(g) National security
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an employer to discharge any individual from any position, or
for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, or for a labor organization
to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if-(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is
performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United
States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered under any statute ofthe United States or any Executive
order of the President; and

(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement

(h) Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production; ability tests; compensation based on sex and authorized
by minimum wage provisions
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work
in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount
of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the
provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
(i) Businesses or enterprises extending preferential treatment to Indians
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to
any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to
any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.
(j) Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of existing number or percentage imbalance
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group

because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any
employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or
classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases
(l)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if--

(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.

(B) (i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as described in
subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes
a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one
employment practice.
(ii) Ifthe respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall
not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.

(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989,
with respect to the concept of "alternative employment practice".
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim
of intentional discrimination under this subchapter.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a rule barring the employment of an individual who currently
and knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I and II of section 102(6) of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.c. 802(6», other than the use or possession of a drug taken under the supervision of a licensed health
care professional, or any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq.] or
any other provision of Federal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter only if such
rule is adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(I) Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the selection or referral of applicants or

candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results
of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment practices
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.
(n) Resolution of challenges to employment practices implementing litigated or consent judgments or orders

USCA § 2000e-2

(I)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that
implements and is within the scope ofa litigated or consent judgment or order that resolves a claim of employment discrimination
under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B).
(8) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a claim under the Constitution or Federal civil rights

laws-(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order described in subparagraph (A), had-(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that such judgment or order might

adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such person and that an opportunity was available to present objections
to such judgment or order by a future date certain; and
(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; or
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had previously challenged the judgment
or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law
or fact.

(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to-(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of parties
who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in the proceeding in which the parties intervened;
(8) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of members
of a class represented or sought to be represented in such action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was sought
in such action by the Federal Government;
(e) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order was obtained

through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or
(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due process of law required by the Constitution.
(3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that challenges an employment consent judgment or order described in
paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible before the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in
this subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action pursuant to section 1404 of Title 28.

Credits
(Pub.L 88-352, Title VII, § 703, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 255; Pub.L. 92-261, § 8(a), (b), Mar. 24, 1972,86 Stat. 109; Pub.L.
102-166, Title I, §§ 105(a), 106, 107(a), 108, Nov. 21,1991,105 Stat. 1074-1076.)
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